Update on Operationalisation of ASF
Update on Operationalisation of ASF
Date | 01 December 2022
Tomorrow (01 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1124th session to receive updates on the status of operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and Regional Standby Forces.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. The various Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to provide updates to the PSC regarding on-going efforts to enhance Regional Standby Brigades.
The last time PSC met to follow up on the operationalisation of the ASF was at its 1069th session held on 10 March 2022. The session served to discuss capacity gaps that continue to constrain the deployment and employment of the ASF which has been declared fully operational by the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) in 2015. Tomorrow’s session serves to reflect on the status of some of the steps necessitated for the full deployment of ASF, particularly finalisation and adoption of key documents including the Five-Year Successor Strategic Work Plan (2021 – 2025) on the ASF and the AU-RECs/RMs Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Employment of the ASF.
Following the 1069th PSC session, the STCDSS convened its 14th Ordinary Session on 12 May 2022 where it considered both the 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan and the AU-RECs/RMs MoU. The 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan was developed by the AU Commission, following completion of the implementation period of the 2016 – 2020 Maputo Strategic Five-Year Work Plan. The new work plan which has been developed through a review process of the previous one including achievements and challenges observed in its implementation, aims to align all ASF policies with the AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) which was adopted by the 3rd Extraordinary Meeting of the STCDSS held on 30 January 2021. Following the STCDSS’s review at its 14th Ordinary Session, the draft 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan was shared with the RECs/RMs for final inputs and validation. One area the PSC could be updated on at tomorrow’s session is therefore the status of validation of the new strategic work plan by RECs/RMs.
Regarding the AU-RECs/RMs MoU on the employment of ASF, a key development has been the finalisation of the draft MoU – which defined the roles and responsibilities of the AU and RECs/RMs in the employment, deployment and post-employment of the ASF composed of regional standby forces – and its clearance by the AU Office of Legal Counsel. Having considered the draft, the STCDSS at its 14th Ordinary Session requested the AU to form a Working Group comprising representatives of AU, RECs/RMs and member States, to undertake further consultations and provide inputs on the MoU. Accordingly, a Working Group meeting was facilitated by the AU Commission from 24 to 26 October 2022 and a consensus document representing additional inputs from member States and RECs/RMs was produced. The STCDSS Bureau has tabled the AU-RECs/RMs MoU as an agenda item of its 15th Ordinary meeting scheduled to take place in May or June 2023. Tomorrow’s session also serves for the PSC to be updated of these developments regarding the MoU.
With regards to ASF capacity generation, it is to be recalled that the AU Commission Chairperson’s “Status Report/Roadmap on the Full Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Logistics Base (CLB)” that was submitted to the 1007th PSC session highlighted ‘hesitancy and reluctance by the RECs/RMs to confirm capabilities pledged and how they are to be made readily available’. Demonstrating the continuation of the challenge, it was noted by the PSC at its 1069th session that only the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) Secretariat provided a verification report upon the request of the AU Commission in July 2021, for RECs/RMs to verify their pledged capabilities using the 2019 ASF Pledged Capabilities Verification Guidelines. In addition to seeking update on the submission of verification reports by any of the other RECs/RMs, PSC may be interested in examining the specific challenges faced by respective RECs/RMs in completing the reports.
The other aspect in the operationalization of the ASF expected to be discussed tomorrow concerns the development of the Continental Movement Coordination Centre (CMCC) and Strategic Lift capability. The PSC may take note of initiatives of the AU Commission in assessing the strategic lift assets of AU member states that have pledged air capabilities (Chad, Gabon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote D’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea) and the submission of draft MoUs in this regard, to the AU Office of Legal Counsel for clearance. This is expected to pave the way for the utilisation of the pledged assets whenever the need arises.
Another important aspect of ASF operationalisation that may draw PSC’s attention is the status of utilisation of the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) which was launched in January 2018 and is based in Doula, Cameroon. The CLB, which serves the main purpose facilitating procurement and delivery of equipment as well as accounting for necessary support to the civilian, police and military components of AU PSOs, has been put to use for storing and managing equipment for PSOs including some donated to the South African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and to the Multinational Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram (MNJTF). Despite its important utility, the CLB faces challenges which could seriously hinder its operations. For example, since its inauguration in 2018, the CLB has been functioning through officers seconded by AU member States as there is shortage of funding for recruitment of substantive staff and to cover operating costs. In addition, there is still challenge in ensuring appropriate storage and maintenance facilities as well as comprehensive security to the equipment. On the other hand, the approval of the CLB structure through the AU Executive Council Decision adopted at its 41st Ordinary Session held on 14 July 2022 [EX.CL/Dec.1168(XLI)] has been an important progress.
Coming in the wake of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and ASF which took place from 01 to 03 November 2022, in Abuja, Nigeria, tomorrow’s session may also serve the PSC to take stock of and reflect on some of the main outcomes of the forum. One important point that formed part of the discussions at the Abuja lessons learned forum was the importance of reconceptualising the ASF as to align its visions of being continentally coordinated, with current practices and realities on the ground, particularly the more proactive role played by RECs/RMs in the deployment and management of PSOs. Despite some encouraging development being obtained in utilising the ASF framework, particularly through the deployment of SAMIM and SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL), the practice of deploying PSOs by RECs/RMs and some ad-hoc security arrangements has largely remained outside of, and mostly without any references to, the ASF framework.
The decision of the 14th Extraordinary Assembly on Silencing the Guns to declare the full operationalisation of ASF and direct its utilisation in mandating and authorising AU PSOs has been significant to address this gap. However, if the recent deployment of East African Community (EAC) Regional Force to Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – which makes no reference to the ASF framework – is to be any indication, the challenge still persists. Further to reconceptualising the ASF in a manner that grasps practices on the ground in the deployment of PSOs, it is thus important to also have clarity on some key strategic and political issues such as mandating deployment, political decision-making, and command and control, issues which will require the conclusion and signing of the AU-RECs/RMs MoU to be fully clarified.
An important point emphasised at the Abuja lessons learned forum was also the critical role that can be played by a well-funded ASF to tackle the growing challenge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, and the importance of unpacking previous and on-going counterterrorism operations such as AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and MNJTF to draw lessons for the deployment of continental responses to terrorism, through the ASF. Although the decision for the establishment of a Specialised Unit of the ASF on Counterterrorism has been made pursuant to the Communiqués of PSC’s 455th and 960th sessions and decision of the AU Assembly [Assembly/AU/Dec.815(XXXV)], its envisaged establishment and utilisation – upon request by the affected member State and RECs/RMs and approval by the PSC – is yet to be realised. Funding being one of the main constraints delaying establishment of the unit, it remains critical to explore all options including utilisation of the AU Peace Fund, which envisages under Window 3, dedication of funds for full operationalisation of ASF.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is unknown at the time of developing this insight. The PSC may welcome the inauguration of a lessons learned forum on AU PSOs and the ASF in Abuja and encourage its periodic and regular convening in the future. It may also welcome developments made since its last session, in the process of fully operationalising the ASF. It may particularly take note of advances made in finalising key documents including the 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan of the ASF and the AU-RECs/RMs MoU and urge the AU Commission to closely follow up on the status of their adoption. It may particularly encourage member States to adopt the draft AU-RECs/RMs MoU taking into account that it represents consensus of the members of the Working Group assigned by the STCDSS. Having regard to the importance of reconceptualising the ASF, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop a revised ASF Concept that takes full account of RECs/RMs ownership of their respective standby forces, and submit to the 15th Ordinary Meeting of the STCDSS in May/June 2023. It may further request the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly to endorse the CLB structure which has already been approved by the 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council. It may urge RECs/RMs that have not yet done so, to submit reports verifying their pledged capabilities. It may further commend RECs/RMs that have attained their full operational capability (FOC) and encourage those RECs/RMs that are yet to achieve FOC, to scale up the capabilities of their Regional Standby Brigades and work towards operationalising their respective Regional Logistic Depots. In this regard, considering also the experience of SADC in terms of non-readiness of the depot for supporting the SADC Mission in Mozambique,the PSC may further request the AU Commission to provide the necessary support to RECs/RMs in their efforts to enhance their capacities. While commending member States that have pledged strategic lift capabilities for rapid deployment, the PSC may call on the AU Office of Legal Counsel to finalise clearance for ensuring readiness of the legal parameters for utilizing the capabilities. The PSC may also take note of capacity challenges that confront the CLB as well as establishment of the ASF Specialised Unit on Counterterrorism and call on all relevant stakeholders to redouble efforts to obtain the necessary funding as well as other support to address these challenges.
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of December 2022
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of December 2022
Date | December 2022
In December, Nigeria will assume the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). PSC’s Provisional programme of work for the month envisages four substantive sessions addressing country/region specific situations and thematic issues. All meetings are expected to be held virtually except the 16 December session.
On 1 December, PSC will convene its first session of the month to consider two agenda items. The first is update on the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) and regional forces, which can be considered as a signature event of Nigeria’s PSC chairship. The session is also in line with PSC’s decision, during its 1007th meeting held on 8 July 2021, for the AU Commission and regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) to report on the implementation of the ASF on a quarterly basis. The last time that PSC received an update on the operationalization of the ASF was at its 1069th meeting held on 10 March 2022, which adopted a Summary Record as the outcome document of the meeting. PSC is therefore expected to take stock of progresses made in the operationalization of ASF since its 1069th session in March.
The second agenda item is the consideration of the outcome of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations and the African Standby Force. The forum was organized by the AU Commission Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) from 1 to 3 November 2022 in Abuja, Nigeria to assess how implementation of AU PSOs have been facilitated, ascertain the various ways in which the ASF have been utilized since its establishment, and identify key lessons that can contribute towards the full operationalization and utilization of the ASF. In this session, PSC is expected to consider and adopt the outcome report of the forum.
On the same day, PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) will meet to prepare for the Annual High-Level Seminar on the Peace and Security in Africa (ORAN Process), which is going to take place from 7 to 9 December 2022.
On 5 December, PSC’s Military Staff Committee (MSC) will meet to follow-up on the implementation of the outcome of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations and the African Standby Force.
From 7 to 9 December, PSC will hold the 9th Annual High-Level Seminar on the Peace and Security in Africa (ORAN Process) at the ministerial level in Oran, Algeria. The ORAN Process is a yearly forum which has been convened since 2013, with the main purpose of enhancing cooperation between the PSC and the African members of the UN Security Council (A3 States) in advancing Africa’s voice within the UN Security Council. It is to be recalled that the previous Seminar took place in Oran, Algeria, from 02 to 04 December 2021.
On 9 December, PSC will consider and adopt the monthly provisional programme of work for January 2023 via email exchange.
The second substantive session of the month is scheduled to take place on 12 December with two agenda items. The first agenda item is an update briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau. The last time that PSC received a briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau was during its 905th meeting held on 27 January 2020. One of the focuses of the briefing is likely to be on the Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea Bissau (MASGB) – an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mandated PSOs which the regional bloc decided to deploy at its 3 February 2022 extraordinary summit following the 1 February 2022 attempted coup d’Etat in Guinea Bissau. The mission was deployed in June for one year (renewable) comprising troops and police from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal with the view to ensuring the stability of the country. The financial situation of the mission and AU’s support in that regard could be the focus of the discussion.
The second agenda item will be consideration of the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against the Boko Haram. The session is in accordance with the PSC request of the Commission, in coordination with the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Secretariat, to report to Council regularly on the activities of the MNJTF, in line with the relevant provisions contained in the Communique PSC/AHG/ COMM.2(CDLXXXIV) of 29 January 2015, as well as in light of the upcoming mandate expiry of the Task Force early February. The PSC last renewed the mandate of the MNJTF at its 1057th session convened on 14 January 2022 for additional one year effective from 1 February 2022.
On 16 December, PSC will convene the third substantive session of the month, which is expected to happen in-person. Two items are placed on the agenda of the PSC in this session. The first item is a briefing on the activities of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). It is to be recalled that the PSC received AFCONE’s briefing on the implementation of the African Nuclear-Weapon Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and on its activities during its 1071st session on 31 March 2022. In that meeting, PSC expressed its ‘deep concern’ over the possible use of nuclear weapons in the world and appealed to ‘those concerned to find amicable means of resolving their differences and protecting the populations from the impact of nuclear weapons’. PSC’s increasing attention to the issue is not only an indication of PSC’s concern over the rising risk of use of nuclear weapons and backsliding in commitments towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in current geopolitical rivalry but also could show Africa’s agency in the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
The second item is an update on the deployment of 3000 troops to the Sahel region. Discussion on this item was postponed two times in August and November this year. The decision to deploy 3000 troops to Sahel was made by the AU Assembly at its 33rd Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)] in February 2020. While PSC discussed the situation in Sahel several times this year including during its 1087th session in June and 1116th session in October, the last time that PSC dedicated a stand-alone session on the deployment of the 3000 troops was its 950th meeting that took place on 30 September 2020. In that meeting, PSC endorsed the Revised Strategic Concept Note on Planning Guidance for the Deployment of 3000 Troops to the Sahel and requested the AU Commission together with the G5 Sahel and the ECOWAS to develop and submit the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the deployment of the troops. More recently, at its 1087th session of 1 June 2022, PSC also requested the Chairperson of the Commission to ‘intensify consultations with the concerned stakeholders, inclusive of ECOWAS, ECCAS, and G5 Sahel Joint Force’ on the deployment and ‘promptly brief the PSC on the outcomes of the consultations for due consideration’. While the upcoming session presents members of the PSC to follow-up on progress made in that regard, deteriorating security situation in the Sahel as well as the unfolding challenges that bilateral and multilateral security arrangements are facing have added further impetus to the need for the deployment of the troops.
The last substantive session of the PSC will take place on 19 December. It is expected that PSC will receive a briefing on the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. PSC’s last dedicated session on the theme was at its 1090th session in June 2022 where PSC requested the Commission, in close collaboration with RECs/RMs and other relevant regional bodies, for a regular briefing. It is also to be recalled that PSC discussed the state of maritime security in Africa during its 1112th session in July last year under the chairship of Nigeria. While the convening of the upcoming session on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea could be seen within the framework of PSC’s request for a regular briefing on the same, it also shows the weight that Nigeria attaches to the issues of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
On the same day, PSC is also expected to consider the Conclusions of the 14th PSC Retreat on its working methods and Conclusions of the 9th High-Level seminar. The 14th PSC Retreat happened in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, from 17 to 19 November while the 9th High-Level seminar is expected to take place from 7 to 9 December.
On 20 December, PSC will meet at the level of Committee of Experts to consider the Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa; and the Report on the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps on Silencing the Guns in Africa.
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Date | 30 November 2022
Tomorrow (30 November) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1123rd session to receive updates on the situation in South Sudan.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Emilia Ndinealo Mkusa, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of AU Liaison Office in Juba, Joram Mukama Biswaro is also expected to brief the PSC. Representative of South Sudan, as the concerned country will also be making a statement. Ismail Wais, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for South Sudan; Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), Major General (Rtd) Charles Gituai; and Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) are also expected deliver statements.
The last time the PSC met to discuss the situation in South Sudan was at its 1092nd session held on 11 July 2022. In its communique adopted following the meeting, the PSC encouraged the South Sudanese parties to urgently complete all outstanding transitional tasks, including the graduation and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF), the ratification of the Permanent Constitution-Making Bill and electoral laws, the reconstitution of the National Constitutional Review Commission and the National Elections Commission. In this regard, the PSC encouraged the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) to expedite the development of the long-awaited roadmap, which was expected to outline the outstanding transitional tasks in the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and chart out the way forward.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to focus on developments since the last session including the finalization of the roadmap, the implementation of outstanding transitional tasks and the state of preparations and commitment for the implementation of the roadmap. September 12 marked four years since the signing of the R-ARCSS. Although some progress has been made in the implementation of the agreement, much more remains to be done in implementing the agreement in full, including the outstanding transitional tasks mentioned in the communiqué of the PSC.
Considering that major transitional tasks remain outstanding and will not be completed before the end of the current transition in February 2023, there was a need for achieving political consensus on how to ensure implementation of these outstanding tasks and what happens at the end of the current transitional period. This is what the roadmap, whose finalization the PSC called for, is expected to deliver. On 4 August 2022, all signatories to the R-ARCSS agreed on and adopted ‘Agreement on the Roadmap to a Peaceful and Democratic end to the Transitional Period of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.’ The roadmap extended the transitional period by 24 months up until 22 February 2025.
In a statement issued on 9 August, the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat took note of the decision to extend the current transitional period. Underscoring that ‘the people of South Sudan have endured enough conflict and deserve a safe, secure and peaceful country’, he reiterated ‘his call for the urgent need for the leaders of the Transitional Government to fulfil their pledge to fully implement the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in order to deliver on the legitimate expectations of its citizens for peace and stability’.
On 1 September 2022, RJMEC voted on the roadmap that the RTGoNU presented during the extraordinary meeting of the RJMEC. RJMEC adopted the roadmap and the extension of the transition period with 37 of the 43 members of the RJMEC voting in favour of the adoption of the roadmap. However, the Troika (Norway, UK, and US) did not support the extension of the transition period expressing dissatisfaction that the South Sudanese leaders extended their time in power without delivering on their commitment to the agreement. They also expressed regret that the consultation on the roadmap did not involve civil society and other relevant stakeholders. But they supported the roadmap calling on South Sudanese leaders to dedicate the necessary resources for its implementation and deliver their commitments within the set timeframe.
The unification of forces remains the most critical task, according to RJMEC, to address inter-communal violence and lay the foundation for lasting peace. In an important milestone towards achieving this objective, the first batch of the NUF, more than 21 thousand officers who received training in the Equatoria region, were graduated on 30 August 2022. RJMEC welcomed the first phase graduation of the NUF and called for the graduation and deployment of all the forces as quickly as possible. Another 7500 officers were also graduated on 22 November 2022 in Malakal, Upper Nile State, as part of the NUF. It is reported that as of the middle of this month, around 80% of phase 1 of the NUF have graduated.
While welcoming the above progress, RJMEC and the UNMISS highlighted the need for finalizing and implementing deployment plans and for ‘phase two’ of the graduation to be provided with adequate logistical and political support. The other issue critical to reduction of subnational conflicts that have become dominant and stabilization of South Sudan is the implementation of the call on the government to start the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program. During the ceremony of the graduation of forces in Malakal, RJMEC Chairperson, Charles Tai Gituai, while expressing the expectation of RJMEC to see the roadmap fully followed to the letter and spirit, stated his wish ‘to see a program of DDR be taken seriously so those not able to be eligible to join the forces are able to leave the military in a manner that is respectable’.
RJMEC underscored the need for the revitalized transitional government to avoid lagging behind in terms of the implementation of other outstanding tasks outlined in the roadmap. In this regard, it emphasized the urgency of expediting the passage of the relevant bills particularly the Permanent Constitution-Making Process Bill, which is considered critical not only for constitution-making but also paving the way for the holding of elections at the end of the transition period. Recently, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) reportedly passed important bills, including the Constitution-Making Process Bill, ‘the Roadmap Bill’, National Police Bill and National Wild Services Act. The adoption of the National Elections Act necessary for the reconstitution of the National Elections Commission is still pending. It is also important to point out that the full implementation of the transitional justice chapter of the R-ARCSS is still pending.
Additionally, underscoring the need for vigilance in ensuring compliance with the benchmarks and timelines of the roadmap, various stakeholders are pointing out the slippage of early timelines specified in the roadmap. In this respect, the areas that require urgent attention for timely efforts include the reconstitution of the Political Parties Council, the National Constitutional Review Commission, the Constitutional Drafting Committee and the National Elections Commission. During the 24th plenary meeting of RJMEC, its Chairperson called for action on prioritizing the implementation of the roadmap tasks within timeline, provision of funds for all roadmap tasks, funding and implementation of the program of DDR and fast tracking the establishment of the Commission on Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH).
Tomorrow’s session will also consider the security situation in South Sudan, where intercommunal violence continues to ravage parts of South Sudan. This month, fighting between Shiluk armed youth and Nuer elements resulted in the displacement of thousands of people, according to UNMISS. There have also been deadly clashes in Upper Nile, Greater Equatoria and Bahr el-Ghazal regions which exasperated the dire humanitarian situation in the country. The country is suffering from the impact of climate change and flooding which has affected many South Sudanese living along rivers banks and marshlands. The continued intercommunal violence and the challenges posed by the massive flooding has made it very difficult for humanitarian workers to reach out to those in need. According to OCHA, close to 10 million South Sudanese will require urgent humanitarian assistance in 2023.
On the mediation front, it is to be recalled that the PSC in its earlier sessions commended the efforts that have been exerted by Sant’Egidio, the Rome based Catholic association with links to the Vatican, to mediate between the government and non-signatory parties since 2019. Although two factions of the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) had taken part in an induction workshop in June within the framework of the Sant’Egidio process to be integrated into the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) structure, they apparently failed to meet the deadline of 15 August 2022 to join the Mechanism, according to the latest report of the UN Secretary-General released on 13 September 2022. The non-signatory opposition groups also rejected the extension of the transitional period. In November, South Sudanese presidential Affairs Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin reportedly informed Sant’Egidio of the government’s decision to suspend its participation in the mediation process accusing the South Sudanese opposition groups of preparing for war.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may take note of the adoption of the roadmap outlining the outstanding transitional tasks and extending the transitional period and call on the RTGoNU to ensure the full implementation of the roadmap as necessary step for peaceful conclusion of the transitional period with a convening of national elections. The may also welcomed the graduation of the first batch of the NUF and call for the graduation and deployment of all forces as expeditiously as possible and implement phase 2 of the process. PSC may also call on the RTGoNU to proceed expeditiously with the DDR program and provide the required funding for its implementation. The PSC may also echo the call of RJMEC and UNMISS for the RTGoNU to take steps towards the reconstitution of the Political Parties Council, the National Constitutional Review Commission, the Constitutional Drafting Committee and the National Elections Commission and fast track the establishment of the CTRH. On intercommunal violence affecting various parts of the country and forcing civilians into displacement, the PSC may express its concern about the impact of these conflicts. It may welcome the activation of the investigation committees charged with investigating inter-communal conflicts by RTGoNU and urge the committees to conclude their investigations and submit their reports to facilitate measures for enhancing intercommunal harmony. The PSC may express concern over the dire humanitarian situation and appeal for enhanced support from the international community. On mediation efforts to bring non-signatory groups into the R-ARCSS, the PSC may express its concern over the failure of the groups to integrate into CTSAMVM and the declaration by the government of its withdrawal from the process and may express its support to the Sant’Egidio process and urge the parties to cooperate with and implement agreements reached under the process.
Update on AU Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)
Update on AU Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)
Date | 28 November 2022
Tomorrow (28 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1122nd session to receive update on AU Post-Conflict, Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The update will be one of the two agenda items that the PSC is set to consider during this session.
Emilia Ndinelao Mkusa, Permanent Representative of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November is expected to make opening remarks. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is scheduled to introduce the progress report and present an update on the activities implemented during the year.
This session comes within the context of the commemoration of the second edition of PCRD awareness week (24 to 30 November 2022), which is being marked under the theme of ‘towards repositioning Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa: greater awareness and sustained peacebuilding’. PCRD awareness week was first launched last year in November with the aim to raise awareness on and promote collective action of AU Member States and partners, on the recovery and development needs of post-conflict societies. It is to be recalled that the Assembly (Assembly/AU/Dec. 815(XXXV)) as well as the PSC during its 1047th session of November 2021 endorsed the institutionalization and regularization of the awareness week as an annual event.
In tomorrow’s session, members of the PSC are expected to discuss on progress and challenges in the implementation of AU PCRD policy since its last dedicated session on PCRD in November last year. PSC’s 670th session of March 2017 recognized that the ‘PCRD dimension remains the weakest link’ within the implementation processes of both the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). However, in recent years the Commission has stepped-up efforts in mainstreaming PCRD in its activities, as well as its support to Member States that are in political transition and post-conflict situations.
Examples that highlight the increasing implementation of PCRD support in member states include: Implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) in Somalia; the development of Regional Stabilization Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin and the Stabilization Strategy for the Sahel; support in the areas of reconciliation and healing in South Sudan, support in the establishment of Human Rights Commission and in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as well as security sector reform (SSR) in Central African Republic; and support in the areas of SSR, rule of law, and transitional justice in the Gambia, where the AU deployed a PCRD mission.
In past, liaison offices were AU’s main tool of channelling its PCRD support to Member States. This is expanded as the example of the AU Technical Support Team to the Gambia (AUTSTG) shows the deployment of technical mission involving experts tasked to support peacebuilding activities ranging from SSR, transitional justice to establishment of bodies like national human rights commission. In 2021, similar types of missions were initiated for the Comoros and Chad. For example, small team of experts (two international experts on constitutionalism & Rule of Law, and election, and one national expert) are being deployed ahead of the 2024 election in the Comoros.
In terms of progress in the operationalization and strengthening AU’s PCRD policy and its architecture since PSC’s 1047th session, two important developments are likely to be highlighted. The first is the initiation of the revision of AU PCRD Policy Framework, which has been in place since its adoption in 2006. It is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 1047th session, requested for the ‘urgent review of the AU PCRD Policy Framework in order to ensure that it is re-aligned and adaptable to the emerging challenges in the continental peace and security landscape’. The Assembly (AU/Dec.815XXXV of 6 February 2022) made a similar call, further requesting the Commission to submit the revised Policy in the upcoming ordinary session which is expected to happen in February 2023. AU Commission accordingly convened a high-level expert engagement to review the Policy from 9 to 14 September 2022 in Accra, Ghana. In his presentation, Bankole is likely to highlight the major areas of revision, including the addition of two pillars (youth and environmental security) and one principle (humanitarian principles); the definition of human security; and the expansion in scope.
The second major development is the formal launch of the AU PCRD Centre in Cairo, Egypt in December 2021 with the mandate to serve as a hub of operational excellence on peacebuilding efforts on the continent. However, as the AU Champion on PCRD, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, highlighted in his statement issued on 22 November, the full operationalization of the PCRD Centre need to be fast tracked for the Centre to deliver on the critical role that it is envisaged to play. According to the Commission’s progress report on the AU PCRD policy implementation, the shortlisting of candidates for 11 positions has been undertaken as of November. The Centre is expected to have 30 staff members when it becomes fully operational. Bankole may also highlight ongoing efforts to the formulation of an AU policy on psychosocial support to survivors in post-conflict contexts in line with PSC request at its 593rd session in April 2016.
While AU has made notable strides in creating the necessary normative and institutional frameworks and providing supports to Member States in the areas of PCRD, there are number of challenges and outstanding issues which PSC should consider for the effective implementation of AU’s PCRD policy. In terms of challenge, the most prominent one remains the resource constraint as PSC noted with concern during its 593rd, 670th, and 958th sessions, among others. For example, lack of funding was the main reason why the AU PCRD mission in the Gambia was brought to an end. In various of its sessions on PCRD, PSC considered at least three options to address the resource constraints. The first is revitalization of the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). The PSC, during its 1047th session, underlined the ‘urgent need’ for the revitalization of this initiative as ‘an important framework for mobilization of in-kind support from within the Continent’. The second is engaging the African Development Bank, African private sector, African stakeholder-organizations, as well as international partners such as World Bank, UN Development Programme, and UN Peace building Commission. The third is the use of AU’s peace fund. Among the priority activities proposed for the utilization of the peace fund under window 2 (institutional capacity) include operationalization and capacity building of the AU PCRD Centre and enhancing Member States’ capacity in the areas of DDR and SSR. Additionally, the PSC sub-committee on PCRD, which was supposed to provide the necessary political leadership and oversight on the implementation of PCRD activities, is also yet to be operationalized despite PSC’s repeated request for its re-activation.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. PSC is expected to welcome the commemoration of the second PCRD awareness week. Echoing the 21 November statement of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, PSC may note the significant achievements made towards the operationalization and implementation of the AU PCRD Policy, including the revision of the PCRD policy framework and formal launch of the Cairo PCRD Centre. PSC may also commend the Commission for the different initiatives and supports to Member States that are aimed at consolidating peace and preventing conflict relapse. On the Cairo PCRD Centre, PSC may reiterate the call of the AU Champion on PCRD, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, for the AU Commission to ‘fast track the operationalization of the work of the Center and to endorse its functional structure’. In relation to the challenges, PSC may call upon the Commission to expedite the pilot utilization of the peace fund in line with the identified priority activities. It may further request the Commission to step-up mobilization of resources, particularly through the revitalization of the ASI and engagement of African private sector and financial institutions, as well as international partners including UN PBC. It may also call upon the UN Security Council to ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable financing for peacebuilding efforts in Africa. PSC may urge the Commission to strengthen mainstreaming PCRD and peacebuilding aspects in all its activities including in the relevant country situations and thematic issues, as well as field visits. It may also request the Commission to expedite the preparation of AU Policy on psychosocial support to survivors in post-conflict contexts.
5th Annual Consultative meeting between the PSC and the UN PBC
5th Annual Consultative meeting between the PSC and the UN PBC
Date | 28 November 2022
Tomorrow (28 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1122nd session in which one of the agenda items will focus on the 5th annual consultative meeting with the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on climate change and peacebuilding in Africa.
The Consultative meeting is expected to start with opening remarks from Emilia Ndinelao Mkusa, Permanent Representative of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, and, Muhammad Abdul Muhith, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN and Chair of the UN PBC. The PSC will also receive interventions from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support Office and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU).
PSC and UN PBC have been able to regularize their engagement in recent years within the context of the joint AU-UN framework for enhanced partnership in peace and security signed in 2017 and the AU-UN framework for the implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2018), which lay the foundation for continued cooperation between AU and UN on peace and security on the continent. PSC and UN PBC have convened four annual consultative meetings since 2018. The last consultative meeting was held on 11 November 2021 during the inaugural AU PCRD week on the accompaniment of African countries undergoing political transitions with peacebuilding tools. The fifth annual consultative meeting will focus on climate and peacebuilding in Africa. This timely thematic focus comes at the backdrop of the conclusion of the two-week-long United Nations Climate Conference (COP27) in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. Moreover, the issue of climate change and security is high on the agenda of the PSC; the latter has convened around 12 sessions dedicated to climate change and security in Africa since 2016.
According to the concept note prepared for tomorrow’s session, the consultative meeting aims to exchange views on the ‘impact of climate change on peacebuilding, particularly in support of Agenda 2063 and the “Silencing the Guns” initiative’ and presents the two sides the opportunity to explore options that would synergize and coordinate ‘strategic and operational responses to the climate crisis in the pursuit of building and sustaining peace in the continent’. The consultative meeting is expected to specifically tackle the following questions:
- How is climate change impacting peacebuilding on the continent?
- What are the differential effects of climate change and conflicts on women, girls, youth,and other vulnerable groups?
- What are the existing local-specific mechanisms, good practices, and opportunities forclimate sensitive programming for peacebuilding?
Africa remains the most vulnerable continent to climate change despite its low contribution to greenhouse gas emissions (less than 4 percent). The PSC has recognized the link between climate change and security in Africa in various of its sessions. Its 1051st session of November 2021, for instance, acknowledged the ‘wide-ranging risks of climate change, as a threat multiplier, to the peace and security landscape in the continent including on food and water insecurity, loss of livelihoods, failure of management of natural resources, the scarcity of water resources, climate-induced displacements, and possibly aggravating existing vulnerabilities, tensions and conflicts’.
Amani Africa’s statement on climate and security nexus that was released ahead of COP27 also noted ‘mounting consensus and evidence that the climate crisis carries adverse consequences for political stability and peace and security’ despite the uncertainty over the causal links between climate and conflict. The statement identified four points in which climate change and security intersects in Africa. The first is where climate induced scarcity of natural resources leads to violent competition over control and access to such ever depleting resources. The second is where climate change induced extreme weather events operate as multipliers of conflict factors, through their interaction with existing national and local political, social, and environmental stresses. The third is where climate related disaster interferes with and undermines peace processes and transitions, while the fourth is when climate change in causing disasters and humanitarian emergencies leads to not only displacements that could undermine social cohesion but also impedes development efforts and resilience of societies for averting and managing political tensions and conflicts.
Negative effects of climate change particularly manifests in fragile contexts where ‘governance systems and institutions are not strong’, ‘coping mechanisms are weak’, ‘the natural resources are a key source of livelihoods’, and ‘there are stark gender inequalities.’ As such, given that climate change, developmental, and peace and security challenges of the continent are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, it is imperative to adopt a comprehensive strategy that are climate-sensitive and addresses underlying causes of insecurity in a holistic manner. Indeed, during its 1051st session, PSC underlined ‘the importance of adopting a climate-sensitive planning dimension in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts to prevent any relapse to armed conflicts in fragile communities’. In this respect, AU-Lake Chad Basin Commission regional strategy for the stabilization, recovery & resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin and UN integrated strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) and its Support Plan (2018-2030) offer important lessons in terms of developing such a comprehensive strategy that integrates peacebuilding as a major component in addressing multidimensional challenges including climate change. On the part of UN PBC, they are also likely to mention the UN Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund and its various climate informed peacebuilding projects with an active portfolio of over USD 251 million across Africa.
Of particular interest to the participants of the consultative meeting is the recent launch of the Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace (CRSP)- an initiative of COP27 Presidency in partnership with the AU as well as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Anchored on four pillars (strengthening the climate adaptation and peacebuilding nexus; sustaining peace through climate resilient food systems; advancing durable solutions to the climate-displacement nexus; and accelerating climate finance for sustaining peace), the initiative aims to ensure that integrated climate responses contribute to sustainable peace and development.
In terms of specific conflict contexts, tomorrow’s session may also put the limelight on how extreme whether events induced by climate change (floods and drought from repeated failure of rains) is undermining peacebuilding in South Sudan and in Somalia. The experiences in these countries clearly illustrate that unless accompanied by and integrates measures that address the impacts of climate change peacebuilding could not be pursued successfully.
The expected outcome from the consultative meeting is a press statement. It is expected that the two bodies welcome the progress made in strengthening their relations while reiterating the call made at the previous consultative meeting for an impact-driven collaboration with greater emphasis on coherent planning, operational complementarity, and leveraging on comparative advantages in specific contexts. The two bodies may also recognize some of the positive efforts made by AU in strengthening its PCRD and peacebuilding responses, notably the revision of the AU PCRD Policy and the launch of Cairo PCRD Centre. However, they may also recognize the resource constraint and in this regard, the two sides may emphasize the need for adequate, predictable, and sustainable funding for AU peacebuilding efforts. In relation to the theme of the meeting, while acknowledging the negative impact of climate change on the peace, security, and stability of the continent, they may further underscore the imperative of strengthening the climate adaptation and peacebuilding nexus. They may also welcome the launch of the CRSP initiative and call upon international partners to support the same, in addition to other continental, regional, and national initiatives in pursuit of addressing underlying causes of multidimensional challenges that many African countries are facing. They may also emphasize the need for climate sensitive planning and implementation of peacebuilding interventions and may in this respect call for enhanced climate action in implementing peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan and Somalia. Cognizant of the disproportionate impact of climate change on most vulnerable groups, the two bodies may also stress the importance of paying a particular attention in integrating the needs and priorities of women and youth.
