Updated briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau
Updated briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau
Date | 12 December 2022
Tomorrow (12 December) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1126th session to receive an updated briefing on Guinea Bissau as one of the two agenda items that PSC is set to consider during this session.
Following the opening remark of the PSC Chairperson for December, Nigeria’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Victor Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Ovidio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Guinea Bissau and Head of AU Liaison Office in Guinea Bissau is scheduled to make a statement. The representative of the Economic Community for West Africa States (ECOWAS) is also expected to brief the PSC. The representatives of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU) and of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries are expected to make a statement. The representative of Guinea Bissau as the country concerned is also expected to make an intervention.
The last time the PSC held a session on Guinea Bissau was in January 2020 at its 905th meeting. The session was held during the time where the country was experiencing an electoral dispute following the presidential runoff vote between two candidates, Domingos Simões Pereira (Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde – PAIGC) and Umaro Sissoco Embaló (Movimento para Alternância Democrática (MADEM) G- 15). Despite the National Election Commission’s confirmation of Umaro Cissoko Embalo as winner of the December 2019 presidential run-off vote, Domingos Simoes Pereira contested the result at the Supreme Court with allegations of fraud. After contention between several institutions including the National Election Commission, the Supreme court and the Assembly, Umaro Sissoco Embaló was sworn in on 27 February 2020 while his victory remained highly contested.
The political tensions that arose during the electoral process in 2019 continued to affect the political environment of the country and disagreements have persisted. The dispute particularly between the President and the Assembly which is dominated by the opposition party PAIGC has resulted in the President dissolving the legislative body and calling for a snap election to take place in December 2022, although this will not take place as planned. The dissolution of the parliament came after corruption allegations of members of the Assembly by the President. Moreover, Embaló justified his decision by making reference to ‘persistent and unresolvable differences’ with the parliament.
Beyond electoral disputes, the political upheaval in Guinea Bissau is a result of long standing governance challenges. Guinea-Bissau has experienced successive military interventions including the last military coup in 2012 and the most recent attempted coup in February 2022. The AU, United Nations and the ECOWAS reacted quickly to the concerning development. The AU Commission Chair called upon the military to return to their barracks and to ensure the physical integrity of the President. UN Secretary General called for restraints after the attempted coup.
Apart from the political crisis, tomorrow’s session would also serve for discussing the support that the region has mobilized for stabilising the country. ECOWAS has been involved in mediating in the various political crises in the country including the 2012 military coup and the presidential dispute of 2019. Most recently in February 2022, ECOWAS convened an extraordinary summit two days after the attempted coup in which it expressed solidarity with the President and decided to deploy a force towards ‘supporting the stabilization of the country’. Following this decision, the stabilization force was deployed last June comprising troops and police from countries including Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana for a one-year period. Hence, the main focus of tomorrow’s session would be the update the PSC would receive on the deployment of the force and the mission’s operational, logistical and financial conditions since its deployment in June and the kind of support that the AU is expected to mobilize for the effective operation of the ECOWAS mission.
This is in not the first time for ECOWAS to deploy such a mission. Following the military coup that ousted prime minister Carlos Gomes Junior in April 2012, the bloc had deployed a force for stability and security in Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB). The force left in 2020 after staying in the country for eight years. It would be of interest for PSC members to enquire of the lesson learned from the 2012 ECOWAS’s experience and how it can be applied in making this new force even more effective in preventing military coups and supporting the country’s endeavor in advancing democratic value. Certainly, the efforts of promoting good governance and constitutionalism would require interventions that are broader than military response.
An important factor in Guinea Bissau’s political crisis is the complex relationship between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches of government. The ambiguity around the division of power continues to fuel dispute and the semi-presidential system has been characterized by power struggle between the various centers of power. After the election of Embaló, ECOWAS has called for the revision of the constitution to properly address these structural challenges that continue to trigger political crisis. Embaló in May 2020 had established an independent commission to draft a revised constitution with also the objective of reforming the semi-presidential system. Although the constitutional reform is a much-needed step the approach pursued by the President created displeasure in the parliament. Through the establishment of the commission not only was the President’s move in violation of the provisions of the constitution itself with regards to amendment but it also duplicated the mandate of the already existing parliamentary constitutional review committee.
The interference of drug trafficking and related crime in the political process of the country is also another major complicating factor affecting security issues and political stability. In the recent attempted coup President Embaló has also indicated of the possibility of drug traffickers being behind the plot to overthrow the government, although there is still no evidence to support these claims.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may condemn the February 2022 attempted coup in Guinea Bissau and may express the need for addressing the conditions that have made the country to coups. It may welcome the deployment of a stabilization mission by ECOWAS and applaud the regional bloc’s leadership in promptly responding to the crisis. The PSC may endorse the activities of the ECOWAS mission in Guinea Bissau and express its support for the mission. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission to mobilize the requisite financial and logistical support for the ECOWAS mission and request it and ECOWAS to report to the PSC on the activities of the mission. The PSC may also call on international actors including the UN Security Council and the European Union to support to the mission. The PSC may reiterate its previous decision on the need for institutional reform and constitutional review in the country to provide a more sustainable solution to the continuing political crisis in the country. The PSC may underline that such reforms need to take place in full compliance with the procedures laid down in the Constitution of the country and the participation of all political and social forces in the country. The PSC may express concern over the continued dispute between the President and the Assembly and it may call on the parties to resolve their disagreement through peaceful means to prevent any further disruption to the country’s efforts towards political and constitutional stability. The PSC may also express its concern over the challenges related to drug trafficking and the deep impact it has on the political stability of Guinea Bissau. In this respect the PSC may call on the AU Commission working with AFRIPOL and ECOWAS to put in place a regional framework for addressing the threat that drug trafficking poses to Guinea Bissau and the region. It may further reiterate the importance of strengthening institutional mechanisms including security sector reform in Guinea Bissau to effectively fight against drug trafficking.
Consideration of the mandate of the MNJTF
Consideration of the mandate of the MNJTF
Date | 12 December 2022
Tomorrow (12 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1126th session to consider the renewal of the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram as one of the two agenda items that PSC is set to consider during this session.
The permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of December, Victor Adekunle Adeleke will make opening remarks. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to present the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on MNJTF against Boko Haram terrorist group and the European Union (EU)-AU support to the force. The Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Head of Mission MNJTF, Mamman Nuhu and the Commander of the MNJTF Major General Abdul Khalifah Ibrahim will also deliver statements.
The session is convened in the context of the upcoming mandate expiry of the MNJTF on 1 February 2023. It was during its 1057th session held on 14 January 2022 that the PSC renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for additional one year effective from 1 February 2022. It is also in accordance with the PSC request of the AU Commission, in coordination with the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) Secretariat, to report to PSC regularly on the activities of the MNJTF, in line with the relevant provisions contained in the Communique PSC/AHG/ COMM.2(CDLXXXIV) of 29 January 2015.
The last time that PSC considered the situation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) was on 31 May 2022, at its 1086th session, where it assessed the security and humanitarian conditions of the region, as well as the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy (RSS) for Boko Haram affected countries.
Tomorrow’s session comes on the heels of the 16th Summit of the LCBC, which took place on 29 November in Abuja, Nigeria. In his opening remarks, the outgoing chairman of the Summit, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari noted the success recorded by MNJTF that brought about relative stability to the region, but also raised the alarm over the influx of weapons posing fresh challenges. He was quoted saying that ‘…the situation in the Sahel and raging war in Ukraine serve as major sources of weapons and fighters that bolster ranks of the terrorists in the Lake Chad Region’. He further stated that ‘a substantial proportion of the arms and ammunition procured to execute the war in Libya continues to find its way to the Lake Chad Region and other parts of the Sahel’. Not completely surprisingly, ‘weapons being used for the war in Ukraine and Russia are equally beginning to filter to the region’, according to the President. On account of the looming risks of heightened proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their implication to the peace and stability of the region, Buhari called upon his counterparts for more vigilance and tightening of security around the borders of the six member countries. In tomorrow’s discussion, members of the PSC could be interested to hear more about the reported influx of weapons to the region from near and far and could use the opportunity to reiterate their request for a continental strategy for the fight against illicit small arms and light weapons.
MNJTF has undertaken around six major operations since its authorization by the PSC in 2015, which significantly degraded the operational capacity of the terrorist groups (Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP)). Three of these operations were conducted following the decision of the extraordinary summit of the LCBC in December 2018 consequent on the deteriorating security situation in the region. The latest of such operations, Operation LAKE SANITY, saw MNJTF troops making unprecedented incursions deep inside the Lake Chad Islands and settlements known as ‘Tumbuns’. Plan to undertake the second phase of Operation LAKE SANITY is also currently underway. Major General Abdul Khalifa Ibrahim, the Force Commander of MNJTF, in his recent article, noted that the military pressures have led to the shrinking of operational space for the terrorist groups and their activities have been successfully confined to opportunity and limited attacks. The military intervention has also improved the security conditions of the conflict affected areas, paving the way to increasing humanitarian assistance, returning of displaced people to their homes, and surrendering of terrorists in large number. Despite these achievements, both Boko Haram and ISWAP have continued to pose security risks as they are adopting new technics, including the increasing use of Vehicle Borne Explosive Devices attacks.
In terms of support to MNJTF, AU and EU have continued providing critical supports that enhance the operational capability of the Force for the effective discharge of its mandate. For instance, EU has been providing USD 20.8 million financial support for this year, which is in addition to the various supports that are instrumental in filling the operational capability gaps of the Force. AU, on its part, has deployed around 14 staff at the AU and MNJTF Headquarters to facilitate the delivery of support in the areas of utilization of funds, delivery of fuel, and human rights and humanitarian law compliance, among others.
While MNJTF’s military success is an encouraging development, members of the PSC are expected to stress that the scourge of terrorism in the region or other parts of the continent cannot be sustainably tackled without addressing the underlying conditions that create conducive environment for terrorists. This certainly requires anchoring military operations on political strategies and accompanying non-military measures such as creating opportunities for the youth, increasing the provision of development projects, and (re)establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of local state administration infrastructure and the delivery of basic services. It is within this context that the region, in partnership with the AU, developed a Regional Strategy for Stabilization (RSS) based on the recognition of the need for a comprehensive approach that goes beyond military action and encompass development efforts for addressing the root causes of terrorism in the region. As such, it is important for members of the PSC to pay equal attention to the implementation of the Strategy while discussing the activities of MNJTF.
In this regard, the finalization and launching of the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) during the third LCB Governors Forum in October last year is a major step forward in the implementation of the RSS. This was further complimented by the development of priorities for regional intervention in the Regional Action Plan for 2022-2024 and its subsequent endorsement by the Steering Committee of the RSS – a key platform for review, decision-making, and strategic direction for the RSS – during its 3rd meeting held on 10 June 2022 in Douala, Cameroon. Cross-border interventions are accordingly prioritized to improve cross-border human mobility and trade in the region. Mobilizing the required resources for the execution of the Plans remain critical towards the full implementation of the Strategy.
It is to be recalled that the PSC, during its 1086th session, requested the AU Commission to take the lead in mobilization of the needed resources for the implementation of the Strategy. In relation to resource mobilization, it is worthy to note that the 3rd meeting of the Steering Committee endorsed the request by the LCB to apply for the allocation of UN Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), but there is also interest to explore the possibility of using AU’s Peace Fund.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. PSC is expected to commend the MNJTF and troop contributing countries for the progress made in the fight against terrorist groups and the restoration of relative stability in the region. Despite the progress, PSC may note the continued security threat posed by the terrorist groups and highlight the need to sustain the role of the MNJTF to consolidate the gains and address remaining security concerns. In that context, PSC is expected to renew MNJTF’s mandate for another one year. Echoing the statements of the outgoing chairman of the LCBC, Nigeria’s President Buhari, PSC may express concern over illicit flow of arms leaking from the conflicts in Libya, the Sahel, and the war in Ukraine. As part of the effort to strategically address the problem not only in the LCB but also in the rest of the continent, PSC may reiterate the request made at the 1086th session for the AU Commission to initiate a draft Continental Strategy for the fight against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons as well as other emerging weapons used by terrorists. PSC is also expected to stress the importance of anchoring MNJTF’s military engagement on solid political strategy geared towards resolution of the main factors behind the terrorist threat facing the region and complement the security measures with non-military measures that would address the governance, development and humanitarian deficits that make the emergence and growth of terrorist groups. In that regard, PSC may highlight the need for the full implementation of the RSS and intensifying developmental interventions in line with LCBC’s territorial and regional action plans. The PSC may also highlight the need for elevating support for affected populations including in terms of protection of IDPs and refugees including from sexual and other violence and acts of abuse, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the delivery of livelihood support interventions. The PSC may also emphasize the imperative of compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law as critical element of the protection of civilians and call on the MNJTF to work closely with the AU Commission to strengthen its human rights, IHL and conduct and discipline compliance monitoring and reporting system. The PSC may also call on members of the MNJTF to ensure that reports of violations of IHL, human rights and breaches of other standards of conduct are independently investigated and publicly dealt with.
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - DECEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - DECEMBER 2022
Date | December 2022
Nigeria assumed chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in December. Four sessions were convened during the month and three of these had two agenda items (the 1126th, 1128th and 1129th sessions), making the total agenda items discussed during the month seven. Of these agenda items, three were committed to country/region specific situations whereas one addressed a thematic issue and the remaining three were committed to consideration of conclusions of some retreats and convening of the PSC which took place during the year.
Update on Operationalisation of ASF
Update on Operationalisation of ASF
Date | 01 December 2022
Tomorrow (01 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1124th session to receive updates on the status of operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and Regional Standby Forces.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. The various Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to provide updates to the PSC regarding on-going efforts to enhance Regional Standby Brigades.
The last time PSC met to follow up on the operationalisation of the ASF was at its 1069th session held on 10 March 2022. The session served to discuss capacity gaps that continue to constrain the deployment and employment of the ASF which has been declared fully operational by the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) in 2015. Tomorrow’s session serves to reflect on the status of some of the steps necessitated for the full deployment of ASF, particularly finalisation and adoption of key documents including the Five-Year Successor Strategic Work Plan (2021 – 2025) on the ASF and the AU-RECs/RMs Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Employment of the ASF.
Following the 1069th PSC session, the STCDSS convened its 14th Ordinary Session on 12 May 2022 where it considered both the 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan and the AU-RECs/RMs MoU. The 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan was developed by the AU Commission, following completion of the implementation period of the 2016 – 2020 Maputo Strategic Five-Year Work Plan. The new work plan which has been developed through a review process of the previous one including achievements and challenges observed in its implementation, aims to align all ASF policies with the AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) which was adopted by the 3rd Extraordinary Meeting of the STCDSS held on 30 January 2021. Following the STCDSS’s review at its 14th Ordinary Session, the draft 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan was shared with the RECs/RMs for final inputs and validation. One area the PSC could be updated on at tomorrow’s session is therefore the status of validation of the new strategic work plan by RECs/RMs.
Regarding the AU-RECs/RMs MoU on the employment of ASF, a key development has been the finalisation of the draft MoU – which defined the roles and responsibilities of the AU and RECs/RMs in the employment, deployment and post-employment of the ASF composed of regional standby forces – and its clearance by the AU Office of Legal Counsel. Having considered the draft, the STCDSS at its 14th Ordinary Session requested the AU to form a Working Group comprising representatives of AU, RECs/RMs and member States, to undertake further consultations and provide inputs on the MoU. Accordingly, a Working Group meeting was facilitated by the AU Commission from 24 to 26 October 2022 and a consensus document representing additional inputs from member States and RECs/RMs was produced. The STCDSS Bureau has tabled the AU-RECs/RMs MoU as an agenda item of its 15th Ordinary meeting scheduled to take place in May or June 2023. Tomorrow’s session also serves for the PSC to be updated of these developments regarding the MoU.
With regards to ASF capacity generation, it is to be recalled that the AU Commission Chairperson’s “Status Report/Roadmap on the Full Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Logistics Base (CLB)” that was submitted to the 1007th PSC session highlighted ‘hesitancy and reluctance by the RECs/RMs to confirm capabilities pledged and how they are to be made readily available’. Demonstrating the continuation of the challenge, it was noted by the PSC at its 1069th session that only the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) Secretariat provided a verification report upon the request of the AU Commission in July 2021, for RECs/RMs to verify their pledged capabilities using the 2019 ASF Pledged Capabilities Verification Guidelines. In addition to seeking update on the submission of verification reports by any of the other RECs/RMs, PSC may be interested in examining the specific challenges faced by respective RECs/RMs in completing the reports.
The other aspect in the operationalization of the ASF expected to be discussed tomorrow concerns the development of the Continental Movement Coordination Centre (CMCC) and Strategic Lift capability. The PSC may take note of initiatives of the AU Commission in assessing the strategic lift assets of AU member states that have pledged air capabilities (Chad, Gabon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote D’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea) and the submission of draft MoUs in this regard, to the AU Office of Legal Counsel for clearance. This is expected to pave the way for the utilisation of the pledged assets whenever the need arises.
Another important aspect of ASF operationalisation that may draw PSC’s attention is the status of utilisation of the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) which was launched in January 2018 and is based in Doula, Cameroon. The CLB, which serves the main purpose facilitating procurement and delivery of equipment as well as accounting for necessary support to the civilian, police and military components of AU PSOs, has been put to use for storing and managing equipment for PSOs including some donated to the South African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and to the Multinational Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram (MNJTF). Despite its important utility, the CLB faces challenges which could seriously hinder its operations. For example, since its inauguration in 2018, the CLB has been functioning through officers seconded by AU member States as there is shortage of funding for recruitment of substantive staff and to cover operating costs. In addition, there is still challenge in ensuring appropriate storage and maintenance facilities as well as comprehensive security to the equipment. On the other hand, the approval of the CLB structure through the AU Executive Council Decision adopted at its 41st Ordinary Session held on 14 July 2022 [EX.CL/Dec.1168(XLI)] has been an important progress.
Coming in the wake of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and ASF which took place from 01 to 03 November 2022, in Abuja, Nigeria, tomorrow’s session may also serve the PSC to take stock of and reflect on some of the main outcomes of the forum. One important point that formed part of the discussions at the Abuja lessons learned forum was the importance of reconceptualising the ASF as to align its visions of being continentally coordinated, with current practices and realities on the ground, particularly the more proactive role played by RECs/RMs in the deployment and management of PSOs. Despite some encouraging development being obtained in utilising the ASF framework, particularly through the deployment of SAMIM and SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho (SAPMIL), the practice of deploying PSOs by RECs/RMs and some ad-hoc security arrangements has largely remained outside of, and mostly without any references to, the ASF framework.
The decision of the 14th Extraordinary Assembly on Silencing the Guns to declare the full operationalisation of ASF and direct its utilisation in mandating and authorising AU PSOs has been significant to address this gap. However, if the recent deployment of East African Community (EAC) Regional Force to Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – which makes no reference to the ASF framework – is to be any indication, the challenge still persists. Further to reconceptualising the ASF in a manner that grasps practices on the ground in the deployment of PSOs, it is thus important to also have clarity on some key strategic and political issues such as mandating deployment, political decision-making, and command and control, issues which will require the conclusion and signing of the AU-RECs/RMs MoU to be fully clarified.
An important point emphasised at the Abuja lessons learned forum was also the critical role that can be played by a well-funded ASF to tackle the growing challenge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, and the importance of unpacking previous and on-going counterterrorism operations such as AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and MNJTF to draw lessons for the deployment of continental responses to terrorism, through the ASF. Although the decision for the establishment of a Specialised Unit of the ASF on Counterterrorism has been made pursuant to the Communiqués of PSC’s 455th and 960th sessions and decision of the AU Assembly [Assembly/AU/Dec.815(XXXV)], its envisaged establishment and utilisation – upon request by the affected member State and RECs/RMs and approval by the PSC – is yet to be realised. Funding being one of the main constraints delaying establishment of the unit, it remains critical to explore all options including utilisation of the AU Peace Fund, which envisages under Window 3, dedication of funds for full operationalisation of ASF.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is unknown at the time of developing this insight. The PSC may welcome the inauguration of a lessons learned forum on AU PSOs and the ASF in Abuja and encourage its periodic and regular convening in the future. It may also welcome developments made since its last session, in the process of fully operationalising the ASF. It may particularly take note of advances made in finalising key documents including the 2021 – 2025 Strategic Work Plan of the ASF and the AU-RECs/RMs MoU and urge the AU Commission to closely follow up on the status of their adoption. It may particularly encourage member States to adopt the draft AU-RECs/RMs MoU taking into account that it represents consensus of the members of the Working Group assigned by the STCDSS. Having regard to the importance of reconceptualising the ASF, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop a revised ASF Concept that takes full account of RECs/RMs ownership of their respective standby forces, and submit to the 15th Ordinary Meeting of the STCDSS in May/June 2023. It may further request the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly to endorse the CLB structure which has already been approved by the 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council. It may urge RECs/RMs that have not yet done so, to submit reports verifying their pledged capabilities. It may further commend RECs/RMs that have attained their full operational capability (FOC) and encourage those RECs/RMs that are yet to achieve FOC, to scale up the capabilities of their Regional Standby Brigades and work towards operationalising their respective Regional Logistic Depots. In this regard, considering also the experience of SADC in terms of non-readiness of the depot for supporting the SADC Mission in Mozambique,the PSC may further request the AU Commission to provide the necessary support to RECs/RMs in their efforts to enhance their capacities. While commending member States that have pledged strategic lift capabilities for rapid deployment, the PSC may call on the AU Office of Legal Counsel to finalise clearance for ensuring readiness of the legal parameters for utilizing the capabilities. The PSC may also take note of capacity challenges that confront the CLB as well as establishment of the ASF Specialised Unit on Counterterrorism and call on all relevant stakeholders to redouble efforts to obtain the necessary funding as well as other support to address these challenges.
