The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 22 April 2025
Tomorrow (23 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will discuss the imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Following opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that presentations will be delivered by Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), Emmanuel Budu Addo, Director of Administration, Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) and the Representative of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to deliver statements.
The development of the Maritime Task Force by the PSC has evolved progressively. The first mention of the initiative was in the PSC’s 1012th session on 23 July 2021, where the Council called on the AU Commission, in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), to promote cooperation and establish a Maritime Task Force among African littoral states. Building on this, the PSC’s 1128th session on 19 December 2022 acknowledged efforts by the Chiefs of Naval Staff, who met in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, in May 2022, to advance the establishment of the Regional Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea. This marked a transition from political commitment to concrete regional action, with a call for broader support from Member States and stakeholders. By the 1174th session on 18 September 2023, further institutional advancements were made, particularly through a follow-up Technical Committee Meeting in Dakar in August 2022, where a technical expert committee was established to guide the Task Force’s development. The PSC urged continued support from Member States and stakeholders to sustain these efforts. Finally, the 1209th session on 18 April 2024 marked a significant milestone as the PSC welcomed the formal establishment of the CMTF in May 2022 and the adoption of its Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by ten Gulf of Guinea countries, solidifying the Task Force as a regional mechanism for collective rapid response to maritime security threats. This trajectory demonstrates a structured approach to addressing maritime security challenges, moving from initial policy discussions to concrete operationalisation. However, ensuring the sustainability of the Task Force and enhancing inter-agency coordination remain critical considerations for the future. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s discussion will mainly focus on those two aspects.
The imperative to sustain and institutionalise maritime security mechanisms in the Gulf of Guinea stems from its strategic significance as the largest contiguous maritime space in Africa. Unlike the relatively narrower maritime spaces of North Africa’s Mediterranean coast or East Africa’s corridor near the Middle East, the Gulf of Guinea opens into the vast Atlantic Ocean, linking Africa to North and South America. This strategic positioning makes it one of the most navigable and economically significant maritime regions on the continent. Its importance is further amplified by continent-wide initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which depend on secure and efficient maritime trade routes.
Regarding the scope of discussions during tomorrow’s session, it is important to note that while the agenda indicates the PSC will focus on the role of ‘the CMTF in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea’, the region’s security challenges extend well beyond piracy. The Gulf of Guinea faces a complex and evolving array of maritime threats, including hijackings and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Fishing vessels are often linked to broader illicit activities, worsening economic losses, depleting marine resources, and driving coastal communities into poverty—conditions that increase vulnerability to piracy and transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking, illicit trade, and arms smuggling. Adding to the instability is the growing threat of terrorism closer to coastal states. Moreover, as maritime domains become contested spaces for geopolitical rivalry and competing claims, the risk of undermining unified security efforts deepens.
In this context, tomorrow’s session presents a critical opportunity to reassess how the CMTF can be effectively leveraged not only to combat piracy but also as a broader platform to address the interlinked maritime and coastal security threats facing the Gulf of Guinea.
While the decline in incidents of piracy by 22% in 2024 from the 2023 levels, representing only 22% of all the incidents reported in 2020, highlights the contribution of regional collective action, experts caution that piracy networks remain active and capable of resurgence if current security efforts are not sustained. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus not only on maintaining the downward trend but also on ensuring the long-term institutionalisation of maritime security mechanisms and ensuring the implementation of the Lome Charter and the AU’s blue economy plans.
As outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) adopted in April 2023 by the Chiefs of Naval Staff and Coastguards of 10 countries in the GoG region, the CMTF is envisioned as a multinational, rapid-response force led by the AU and operating in coordination with regional bodies such as ECOWAS and ECCAS. Designed to provide real-time operational capacity, the CMTF aims to address a range of maritime threats, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, transnational organised crime, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and maritime terrorism. Recognising the vast and complex maritime landscape of the GoG, the CONOPS divides the area into three operational sectors to enhance coordination and responsiveness: Sector North, headquartered in Senegal; Sector Central, based in Lagos, Nigeria; and Sector South, located in Pointe-Noire, Congo. This tri-sector approach treats the GoG as a single operational theatre, enabling integrated and collaborative maritime security efforts across national boundaries. In line with this structure, President Bola Tinubu, during the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, called on the PSC to formally establish the CMTF and reaffirmed Nigeria’s readiness to host its headquarters in Lagos.
The establishment of the CMTF raises an important question: how does it align with the Yaoundé Architecture? According to the CMTF Coordinating Commander, Mohammad Saghir Shettima, the establishment of the CMTF aims to address a key limitation of the Yaoundé Architecture—its reliance on voluntary state responses, which often delays operational action due to resource and priority constraints. While the Yaoundé Architecture has proven to be effective in coordination and intelligence-sharing, the CMTF could enhance it by providing a standing, ready-to-deploy force capable of rapid, coordinated maritime responses. He also indicated that this bridges the gap between early warning and action, strengthening regional maritime security. However, despite its strategic relevance, progress toward the full establishment and operationalisation of the CMTF has been limited since its establishment in 2022. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus on outlining the financial and logistical commitments required from the side of the AU to ensure the effective deployment and functionality of the Task Force.
In addition to the foregoing, tomorrow’s session is also expected to follow up on other initiatives for coordination and enhanced collective action in the maritime domain, including those envisaged in the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS). This provided for a coordinated approach to maritime security, the establishment of a Naval Component within the African Standby Force (ASF), and the formation of a Committee of Heads of African Navies and Coastguards. The Council may also follow up on the first ASF maritime exercise. Noting the financial, logistical, and institutional challenges, the AU Commission is expected to provide updates on the planning of the upcoming maritime command post exercise, based on the concept note developed during the AU Continental Maritime Exercise Concept Development Workshop held in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2024. Members of the PSC will be particularly interested in receiving detailed information on budgetary requirements, logistical arrangements, and organisational planning. It is also anticipated that any developments regarding the establishment of the CHANs working group will be shared. More broadly, it would be of interest for PSC members to receive update on the establishment of a Group of Experts or a Task Force to provide technical support to Member States and other stakeholders in delivering on the AU 2050 AIM Strategy and the implementation of the Lomé Charter and the establishment of a coordination mechanism or Unit on Maritime Security within the AU Commission.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a communique. The PSC may reiterate the importance of strengthening collaboration with regional partners to improve intelligence sharing, coordinate joint patrols, and bolster counter-terrorism efforts for maritime security and regional stability in the Gulf of Guinea. Along those lines, the PSC may urge Gulf of Guinea Commission Member States to strengthen political backing for the effective launch of the CMTF to boost regional maritime security efforts. The PSC may in this respect take note with commendation the interest that Nigeria expressed for hosting the headquarters of the CMTF. It may also reiterate its request for the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of a dedicated Maritime Security Coordination Unit to provide institutional leadership, coordination, and oversight of the CMTF and broader continental maritime security initiatives. In this regard, the PSC may also request the Commission, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and Member States, to develop a costed implementation plan and resource mobilisation strategy for the CMTF. To enhance operational coherence, the PSC may recommend strengthened coordination between the CMTF and existing Yaoundé Architecture structures—particularly the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, and CRESMAO—supported by the development of standard operating procedures to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing and response. Furthermore, the PSC may reiterate the call for the immediate activation and formal institutionalisation of CHANs as a continental advisory and coordination mechanism, and request the AU Commission to report on its operationalisation. Lastly, the PSC may also retreat its previous decisions calling for the establishment of a Group of Experts or Task Force to provide technical assistance to Member States in implementing the AU’s maritime security agenda, including the 2050 AIMS, Lomé Charter, and CONOPS of the CMTF.
Update on the AU elections for membership in the PSC for the Northern Region and the two remaining AU Commission Portfolios
Update on the AU elections for membership in the PSC for the Northern Region and the two remaining AU Commission Portfolios
Date | 17 April 2025
INTRODUCTION
This policy brief provides an update on what transpired during the 24th Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council. During the 38th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly held last February, the issue that attracted the most attention was the elections of the AU Commission and the members of the PSC. As discussed in our various analyses on the elections, the AU Commission elections for two portfolios could not proceed. As such, a decision was taken for the election process to open promptly and for the Executive Council to hold an extraordinary session to hold the elections on 15 April 2025. As part of this extraordinary session, it was also decided that the Executive Council would hold an election for membership in the PSC for the seat of the North Africa region.
Africa Mourns the Loss of an Illustrious Son and Great Pan-Africanist
Africa Mourns the Loss of an Illustrious Son and Great Pan-Africanist
Date | 11 April 2025
Said Djinnit* and El-Ghassim Wane*
And so it is that, on 8 April 2025, Amara Essy left us, joining the long lineage of servants of the Pan-African ideal who are no longer of this world. He was 80 years old.
An accomplished diplomat and man of vision, he marked a historic turning point in the life of the continental body.
We truly came to appreciate Essy’s exceptional qualities after his July 2001 election in Lusaka as the last Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), assuming a year later the role of interim Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission. He succeeded Salim Ahmed Salim, who had steered the OAU’s evolution through the post-Cold War era and was assigned the delicate mission of ensuring the transition to the AU.
This task, he carried out with rigor, determination, and humility. In Durban, in July 2002, the texts governing the functioning of the main organs of the AU were adopted and the new Union officially launched during a grandiose ceremony.
Before taking over the leadership of the OAU General Secretariat, Essy had notably served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire and as his country’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where he held the presidency of the General Assembly, playing a leading role in defending African positions. His experience, network, strategic insight, and benevolent leadership made him uniquely qualified to ensure this successful transition between the two institutional incarnations of Pan-Africanism: the OAU and the AU.
Numerous other accomplishments can be credited to Essy’s leadership during his productive twenty-four-month tenure—from his election as head of the continental organisation’s executive to his departure following the July 2003 Maputo summit. Indeed, this transformative period saw the adoption of several landmark documents, including the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)—an initiative that articulated a bold vision of governance and development in Africa; the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council; the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption; and the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women. All these instruments remain highly relevant to this day.
While guiding the successful transition from OAU to AU and advancing these normative frameworks, Essy remained fully engaged with other pressing issues of the time. He was actively involved in finding solutions to the crises affecting various regions of the continent, particularly in Madagascar, the Central African Republic, and Burundi, skillfully wielding the tools of African diplomacy, even when facing the most assertive leaders.
Well-versed in the intricacies of the international system, Essy had an acute awareness of the asymmetrical distribution of power within it and the inequalities and injustices that characterized it. He was fond of quoting this West African proverb: ‘The hand that gives is above the one that receives,’ as he advocated for a financially autonomous and politically sovereign African Union. Throughout his tenure, he championed this vision with remarkable persistence.
Essy’s management style was one of quiet authority, delegating with confidence and mobilizing energies in a spirit of genuine collaboration.
But what struck people most about him was the man behind the diplomat. He was remarkably humble, generous, discreet, and loyal in friendship. Everywhere he went, he left a profound imprint and earned universal esteem and respect. Those who knew and worked with him cherish memories of his exceptional kindness and attentiveness, qualities that extended well beyond his professional obligations. To the very end, he maintained meaningful bonds with his former collaborators, offering comfort and recognition with the dignified silence of the truly great.
His mandate concluded in July 2003 with the election of former President Alpha Oumar Konaré, yet his role as a bridge-builder between the OAU and AU remains indelible in the continent’s history. In today’s uncertain times, his example continues to inspire: ethics, commitment, discretion, and effectiveness stand as the enduring pillars of his legacy.
Essy often invoked another African adage: ‘In the village, everyone knows who the best dancers are.’ With his passing, Africa has lost one of its most graceful performers on the multilateral stage.
Our grief is profound. Yet we find solace in the wisdom of Birago Diop, who reminds us that:
« Those who die are never gone,
They are in the shadow that grows brighter,
And in the shadow that grows darker …,
They are in the trembling trees,
They are in the whispering wood,
They are in the water that runs,
They are in the water that sleeps … ».
Indeed, Essy’s spirit lives on in the memories, actions, and pathways of countless individuals he inspired across Africa and throughout the world.
Farewell, Mr. Amara Essy! May your noble soul rest in eternal peace.
* Said Djinnit, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in West Africa and Former Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region. He served as Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the Organisation of African Unity and Commissioner for Peace and Security at the African Union during Amara Essy’s tenure.
* El-Ghassim Wane, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali and Head of MINUSMA and Former Peace and Security Director at the African Union Commission. He served as Senior Political Officer/Acting Deputy Head of the OAU/AU Conflict Management Centre during Amara Essy’s tenure.
L’Afrique perd l’un de ses illustres fils et un grand panafricain
Said Djinnit* et El-Ghassim Wane*
Ainsi donc Amara Essy nous a quittés le 8 avril 2025, rejoignant la longue lignée des serviteurs de l’idéal panafricain qui ne sont plus de ce monde. Il avait 80 ans.
Diplomate accompli et homme de vision, il aura marqué un tournant historique de la vie de l’institution continentale.
Nous avons véritablement découvert Essy après son élection, en juillet 2001, à Lusaka, comme dernier Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine (OUA), devenant un an plus tard Président intérimaire de la Commission de l’Union africaine (UA). Il succédait alors à Salim Ahmed Salim, artisan de l’adaptation de l’OUA à la période d’après-Guerre froide, et s’était vu assigner la mission délicate d’assurer la transition vers l’UA.
Cette tâche, il la mena avec rigueur, détermination et humilité. À Durban, en juillet 2002, les textes régissant le fonctionnement des principales instances de l’UA furent adoptés et la nouvelle Union officiellement lancée lors d’une grandiose cérémonie.
Avant de prendre la direction du secrétariat général de l’OUA, Essy avait notamment exercé les fonctions de ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Côte d’Ivoire et de représentant permanent de son pays auprès des Nations unies, où il assuma la présidence de l’Assemblée générale, jouant un rôle de premier plan dans la défense des positions africaines. Son expérience, son réseau, sa lucidité stratégique et son leadership bienveillant ont fait de lui l’homme idéal pour assurer ce passage réussi entre les deux incarnations institutionnelles du panafricanisme que sont l’OUA et l’UA.
Bien d’autres résultats peuvent être mis à l’actif du leadership d’Essy, pendant les vingt-quatre mois de travail intense qui ont séparé son élection à la tête de l’exécutif de l’institution continentale de son départ après le sommet de Maputo en juillet 2003. Cette période a en effet vu l’adoption de textes majeurs, comme le Mémorandum d’entente de la Conférence sur la sécurité, la stabilité, le développement et la coopération en Afrique (CSSDCA) – une initiative fondée sur une vision audacieuse de la gouvernance et du développement en Afrique; le Protocole portant création du Conseil de paix et de sécurité; la Convention de l’UA sur la prévention et la lutte contre la corruption et le Protocole de Maputo sur les droits des femmes. Autant d’instruments qui restent, aujourd’hui encore, d’une brûlante actualité.
Tout en œuvrant à la réussite de la transition entre l’OUA et l’UA et à ces avancées normatives, Essy ne négligea point la gestion des autres dossiers prioritaires de l’époque. C’est ainsi qu’il s’impliqua activement dans la recherche de solutions aux crises qui affectaient diverses régions du continent, en particulier à Madagascar, en Centrafrique et au Burundi, maniant avec finesse les outils de la diplomatie africaine, y compris face aux dirigeants les plus affirmés.
Rompu aux arcanes du système international, Essy avait une conscience aiguë de la distribution asymétrique du pouvoir en son sein et des inégalités et injustices le caractérisant. Il aimait à répéter ce proverbe ouest-africain : « La main qui donne est au-dessus de celle qui reçoit », plaidant pour une Union africaine financièrement autonome et politiquement souveraine. C’était là l’un de ses combats constants.
Essy gérait les dossiers avec une autorité tranquille, déléguant en toute confiance et mobilisant les énergies dans un esprit de collaboration sincère.
Mais ce qui frappait le plus chez lui, c’était l’homme derrière le diplomate. Il était d’une rare humilité, généreux, discret, et fidèle en amitié. Partout où il est passé, il a laissé une empreinte profonde et a toujours joui de l’estime ainsi que du respect de tous. Nombreux sont ceux qui, l’ayant côtoyé et pratiqué, gardent le souvenir de sa sollicitude et de sa bonté, bien au-delà des exigences du devoir. Jusqu’à la fin, il aura maintenu un lien cordial avec ses anciens collaborateurs, leur offrant réconfort et reconnaissance, dans le silence digne des grands.
Son mandat prit fin en juillet 2003 avec l’élection de l’ancien président Alpha Oumar Konaré, mais son rôle de bâtisseur de ponts entre l’OUA et l’UA restera inoubliable. En ces temps d’incertitudes, son exemple demeure une source d’inspiration : éthique, engagement, discrétion et efficacité sont les piliers de son héritage.
Essy se plaisait à rappeler cet autre adage africain: « Dans le village, on connaît les meilleurs danseurs ». Avec sa disparition, l’Afrique vient de perdre l’un de ses plus fins danseurs sur la scène multilatérale.
Notre peine est immense. Mais, nous nous consolons avec la certitude, comme le rappelle Birago Diop, que:
« Ceux qui sont morts ne sont jamais partis,
Ils sont dans l’ombre qui s’éclaire,
Et dans l’ombre qui s’épaissit …,
Ils sont dans l’arbre qui frémit,
Ils sont dans le bois qui gémit,
Ils sont dans l’eau qui coule,
Ils sont dans l’eau qui dort … ».
Bref, Essy continuera à vivre dans la mémoire, les gestes et pas de ceux, nombreux, que son exemple a inspirés – tant en Afrique qu’en dehors du continent.
Adieu Monsieur Amara Essy ! Que ton âme repose éternellement en paix.
* Said Djinnit, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies en Afrique de l’Ouest et ancien Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies pour la région des Grands Lacs. Il a servi comme Secrétaire général adjoint aux Affaires politiques à l’Organisation de l’unité africaine et Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité à l’Union africaine pendant le mandat d’Amara Essy.
* El-Ghassim Wane, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies au Mali et chef de la MINUSMA et ancien Directeur Paix et Sécurité à la Commission de l’Union africaine. Il a servi comme fonctionnaire politique principal/chef adjoint par intérim du Centre de gestion des conflits de l’OUA/UA pendant le mandat d’Amara Essy.
Update Briefing on The Status and Operations of The AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia
Update Briefing on The Status and Operations of The AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia
Date | 10 April 2025
Tomorrow (11 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene for its 1273rd meeting for an ‘Update on the Status of the Operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).’
The meeting will begin with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Thereafter the PSC will receive introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).
Tomorrow’s session came at short notice following a quick shift on the programme, as the session was initially scheduled to happen on 17 April. This session also comes as an Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of the Troop Contributing Countries to AUSSOM is being organised to take place on 23 to 25 April 2025 in Entebbe, Uganda. A summit which was initially planned to take place on 15 April 2025, but following a note verbale addressed to the AU Commission on 31 March from Uganda, it had to be rescheduled.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to discuss AUSSOM’s financial status for military, police, civilian and operational components for the period January to June 2025 as well as ATMIS’s outstanding liabilities for TCCs. AUSSOM faces a critical funding challenge for the period January to June 2025, with a total cash requirement of $90.4 million to support military, police, civilian and operational components. Military costs dominate at $78.5 million, driven by troop allowances and compensation, while police and civilian components add $8.1 million and $3.3 million, respectively, and operational costs total $0.4 million. Against this backdrop, committed funding stands at $16.7 million from China, the AU Peace Fund, Japan and Korea, covering just 18.5% of the need, leaving a $73.7 million shortfall. Additionally, the liquidation ATMIS incurs of $1.7 million in liabilities, of which $1 million remains unfunded, bringing the total urgent cash requirement to $92.1 million. An unspecified pledge from the United Kingdom offers hope, but immediate action is needed to bridge this gap and ensure operational continuity. Compounding the issue, outstanding liabilities from ATMIS owed to TCCs for 2022–2024 total $93.9 million, including Uganda ($34.5 million), Kenya ($15.7 million), Ethiopia ($17.2 million), Djibouti ($8.3 million) and Burundi ($18.1 million).
Since the beginning of 2025, this will be the first meeting on AUSSOM since the official transition of the AU mission from ATMIS to AUSSOM on 1 January 2025. During its last convening, the 1253rd meeting was held on 19 December 2024 on ‘Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and Post-ATMIS Security Arrangements.’ As observed in the Monthly Digest on the PSC for December, ‘funding uncertainties remain a significant barrier to the full operationalisation of AUSSOM.’ The PSC thus stressed ‘the importance of ensuring predictable, sustainable and adequate funding for the AUSSOM, including through a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023), as the most suitable mechanism for providing adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, in order to avoid the perennial financial challenges faced by previous Missions.’ Equally important was its appeal to the UN Security Council ‘to consider the financing option, on the hybrid application of the framework established under resolution 2719(2023), as the only practicable solution for AUSSOM, for the mission to fulfil its mandate and support the implementation of the Somalia Security Sector Development Plan (SSDP).’ When endorsing AUSSOM CONOPs and authorising the mission’s deployment under Resolution 2767, the UNSC went some distance towards positively responding to this request of the PSC. It thus requested the UN Secretary-General to implement “the hybrid implementation” of the framework established by Resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025, including access to United Nations assessed contributions not exceeding 75 percent of AUSSOM’s annual budget. But this is made contingent on report to be submitted to the UNSC by 1 May 2025 detailing ‘the progress made in preparations for the implementation of the framework established by Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM under the “hybrid implementation” and confirmation by the Council of ‘the request to the Secretary-General in this paragraph through a Security Council decision, taking into account the report requested in paragraph 43 to this resolution, by 15 May 2025.’
It is to be recalled that the US abstained from Resolution 2767. With the Trump administration’s firm stand on cutting down costs and withdrawing from UN entities, the door that Resolution 2767 opened for applying 2719 to AUSSOM under the hybrid implementation no longer seems open. Unless conditions change and the Trump administration shows willingness to support the application of 2719 to AUSSOM on the basis of Resolution 2767, AUSSOM would face an even bleaker financial future beyond June 2025. As such and ahead of the summit of AUSSOM troop contributing countries one of the issues expected to feature during tomorrow’s session is whether there is a plan b regarding the financing of AUSSOM outside of the application of 2719 and what the implications of the absence of any such viable alternative plan for the sustainability of the mission post June 2025.
Tomorrow’s session would provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess the preparations for putting in place the report requested under Resolution 2767. It is expected that the AU Commission will provide an update in this respect. The PSC may also receive update on its request to the Commission to ‘draw up a roadmap, in collaboration with the UN for resource mobilisation to fill the funding gap of 25% for AUSSOM as directed by resolution 2719, including the possibility of convening a pledging conference…’ and ‘to present the AUSSOM Budget to the PSC for consideration and onward transmission following due process through the PRC Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters (GSCBFM) and F-15 Technical Experts in order to use part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment and the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to contribute to the financing of the AUSSOM in line with paragraph 11, of Communique [PSC/PR/COMM. 1236 (2024)] adopted at the 1236th PSC meeting held on 22 October 2024.’
What also makes this consideration of the financial uncertainties of AUSSOM pressing is the recent escalation of the threat that Al-Shabaab poses ’s persistent threat, with the group adapting through asymmetric warfare and maintaining control over parts of southern Somalia. The mission’s success and effectiveness hinge on the SSF’s ability to hold territory, which faced setbacks in recent months. Geopolitical rivalries and Somalia’s lack of political consensus continue to complicate AUSSOM’s operations. There has been skepticism as the mission has been criticised as inheriting ATMIS’s unresolved issues, including limited mobility and logistical constraints.
The expected outcome of the session is a summary record. The PSC is likely to express grave concern over the continued threat posed by Al Shabaab to peace and security in Somalia and the region and condemn all the attacks against Somali security forces and ATMIS forces. It is expected to encourage all Somali political stakeholders to prioritise the country’s national interests and immediately resume inclusive dialogue on all outstanding national issues through the framework of the National Consultative Council (NCC). The council may also reiterate its request for the AU Commission to continue extensive engagements with strategic partners and potential new donors to ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable funding and other forms of support for the AUSSOM. It may encourage the AU Commission working in consultation with Somalia and TCCs as well as interested stakeholders such as EU to work on a plan B in the highly likelihood of the UNSC declining to adopt a decision authorising the use of UN-assessed contributions under Resolution 2719. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission to present options regarding the various scenarios on the funding of AUSSOM in order to enable the PSC to make informed decisions.
Can AU’s anti-coup norm survive a scenario in which the military leaders of all suspended countries run for elections following the precedent in Chad and Gabon?
Can AU’s anti-coup norm survive a scenario in which the military leaders of all suspended countries run for elections following the precedent in Chad and Gabon?
Date | 10 April 2025
Almost a year ago, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) faced a test to its anti-coup norms during Chad’s presidential elections, where interim leader Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno ran for office despite the Council’s affirmation of his non-eligibility . This position was rooted in the AU’s established norm prohibiting coup leaders from contesting post-coup elections. In the 9 April 2024 edition of Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba, published ahead of Chad’s elections, it was presciently warned: ‘If the PSC is unable to enforce the rule on non-eligibility concerning Chad, it would be the end of any future application of this rule as well.’ In an edition of Amani Africa Dispatch of 2 May 2024, it was also observed that the election of Debi, despite PSC’s decision on non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that he was a member of, may set a precedent that juntas in other suspended AU member states may follow.
Election of Debi, despite PSC’s decision on non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that he was a member of, may set a precedent that juntas in other suspended AU member states may follow. This prediction is now imminent to materialise in Gabon.
This prediction is now imminent to materialise in Gabon. On 12 April, as Gabonese voters make their way to the ballot booth for casting their votes to elect their president, marking the end of 18-month political transition following the August 2023 military coup that deposed President Ali Bongo, General Brice Oligui Nguema, the interim president and leader of the coup, will be on the ballot. Nguema’s candidacy raises normative challenges for the AU, particularly in relation to Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits individuals who perpetrate unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections aimed at restoring democratic order or from holding positions of political responsibility.
Following the 30 August 2023 coup, the PSC, during its 1172nd session, suspended Gabon from all AU activities until constitutional order is restored. The PSC called for the swift restoration of civilian authority, including through free, fair, credible, and transparent elections under AU observation. The timely conclusion of the transition and the convening of the elections are positive developments towards meeting PSC’s demand under its 1172nd session. Yet, as clearly anticipated in Amani Africa Dispatch on the election in Chad, Nguema’s candidacy, contrary to established AU norm, will carry significant implications for the continuing credibility of the norm and for AU’s broader engagement with other countries under political transition in respect to the application of this norm.
While Nguema’s bid for the presidency was widely anticipated, the PSC did not indicate that the candidacy of members of the transitional government in Gabon would be contrary to established AU norms. At least when it came to Chad, the PSC made that clear, despite not being able to enforce it. The fact that the PSC did not make this clear during its visit to Gabon drew criticism for ‘going easy’ on the transitional authorities. During the field mission, civil society representatives raised concerns that the upcoming election would entrench Nguema’s rule and derail the prospect of a genuine democratic transition. Yet, the mission report contains no indication that the PSC used the visit to press Gabon’s military leaders to uphold AU principles, including the prohibition against coup leaders contesting elections, nor was there any such indication in the communique the PSC adopted on its field mission to Gabon.
While Nguema’s bid for the presidency was widely anticipated, the PSC did not indicate that the candidacy of members of the transitional government in Gabon would be contrary to established AU norms.
In respect to the election in Chad, while the AU Commission Chairperson refrained from issuing the customary congratulatory statement and later clarified that doing so would have violated PSC decisions, the PSC itself moved past Chad’s disregard of its decision and established AU norm. On top of not designating as coup the seizure of power by the TMC following suspension of the constitution of Chad, following the election, the PSC listed Chad among countries that had ‘successfully’ held elections in the first half of 2024. And in a communiqué adopted at its 1224th session, it congratulated Chad —effectively disregarding its standing decision and the clear terms of Article 25(4) of ACDEG. The PSC went further by inviting Chad to address that session, which considered the AU Commission’s half-year report on elections in Africa.
The immediate question that these developments raise for the AU and the PSC is whether the holding of the election in which Nguma becomes victorious would mark the restoration of constitutional order that would warrant the lifting of Gabon’s suspension. Indeed, all indications are that AU member states are disposed not only to accept such an outcome but also to welcome the conclusion of the transitional process within the agreed timeline despite the fact that aspects of the process fly in the face of a clear provision in Article 25 (4) of ACDEG.
Questions are also being asked on why we are witnessing this departure from ACDEG’s Article 25 (4) norm, hence this regressive trend. The first factor that is put forward to explain this could be the weakening of the consensus of member states around the AU’s anti-coup norm. Indeed, this may have a role but has only limited explanatory power. The other explanation relates to the inconsistencies in the application of AU’s anti-coup norm and the legitimacy crisis that arose to the application of the norm due to the failure of AU and regional bodies to act against conditions of unconstitutionality such as manipulation of presidential term limits. Beyond these, the current disposition of member states to tolerate disregarding of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm arose from the increasing challenge that the prolonged suspension of a significant number of AU member states poses to regional cooperation and mobilising collective responses to other challenges.
The current disposition of member states to tolerate the disregarding of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm arose from the increasing challenge that the prolonged suspension of a significant number of AU member states poses to regional cooperation and mobilising collective responses to other challenges.
Notwithstanding the force of such justification, the result of the aforementioned trends with respect to Chad and Gabon is actually the emergence of a tendency of laxity in enforcing ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm on the part of AU member states and the AU itself. One way of looking at this could be to consider this tendency as indicative of a possible evolution towards the emergence through practice of a customary norm of international law in Africa accepting the eligibility of coup makers for elections that are held for restoring constitutional order. However, such a reading would be implying that the practice is of such a nature that it firmly implies the emergence of the element of lawmaking through custom in international law, namely opinio juris, meaning that states believe that they intend to depart from the existing norm and be legally bound by the new practice.
One way of looking at this could be to consider this tendency as indicative of a possible evolution towards the emergence through practice of a customary norm of international law in Africa accepting the eligibility of coup makers for elections that are held for restoring constitutional order.
That would mean that representatives of AU member states are actually engaging in the formation of a norm through practice that is detrimental to the stability of governments, hence contrary to their interest. Because, despite their practice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest that member states accept the full consequences of the demise of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm, which includes the unravelling of the AU’s entire anti-coup norm.
Indeed, the implications of the cost arising from disregarding this norm in Chad and Gabon are not confined to the question of how to deal with the remaining five suspended countries if military leaders in these countries opt to run for elections. It would have far wider consequences for AU’s electoral and constitutional norms writ large.
The demise of this norm will have a heavy price on account of the fundamental reason for the adoption of this particular norm. Notably, it would signal to members of the militaries of all other AU member states that the cost of perpetrating a coup is now lifted. It may thus unintentionally suggest to the militaries across the continent that a coup has once again become a viable avenue for ascending to power with the possibility of it being recognised by the AU following the coup’s legitimisation through elections. Because in a scenario in which most of the coup makers, in the countries that experienced military seizure of power, legitimise themselves through elections, it would be difficult to imagine that members of the militaries of other AU member states would not take note. Accordingly, to suggest that AU member states are engaging deliberately in the process of removing ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm and replacing it by one that allows coup makers to legitimise themselves through elections would mean to accept that member states are removing a key disincentive that discourages their militaries from considering coup as an option for ascending to power. Although their practice may unintentionally signal such an outcome, they cannot be considered as engaging in such a self-harming enterprise by design.
Yet, this would still leave us with another question: How else should we then understand this current trend in which ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm is being put aside?
Perhaps, the most accurate way to understand this trend is as an aberration specific to this particular season as opposed to one that is generalisable as setting a standard for all occasions. This, of course, does not exonerate nor reduce the seriousness of the blow that the laxity of the AU in enforcing the norm on non-eligibility of coup makers for elections organised for restoring constitutional deals to the AU’s anti-coup norm and AU’s credibility itself. As such, there is a need for a well-considered, deliberate and candid reflection on the impact of non-enforcement of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm in order to ensure that AU’s anti-coup norm survive a scenario in which the military leaders of all suspended AU member states run for elections following the precedent in Chad and Gabon.
Perhaps, the most accurate way to understand this trend is as an aberration specific to this particular season as opposed to one that is generalisable as setting standard for all occasions.
Annual Activity Report of Amani Africa 2024
Annual Activity Report of Amani Africa 2024
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE YEAR
In 2024, Amani Africa has continued to consolidate its policy work and impact, strengthening its role in knowledge production, policy analysis, the timely dissemination of critical information on AU affairs, including on the Peace and Security Council, convening of policy forum and training, provision of technical support and strategic communications and outreach.
During the year, we broadened both the range of issues covered and the diversity of our outputs, enhancing their reach, relevance and influence. Additionally, we introduced new initiatives such as Amani Africa’s new podcast, The Pan-Africanist, and production of factsheets on key AU policy events, with a particular focus on developments from the AU Summit.
