Africa’s Multilateral Reckoning: Mediation, Leadership, and Survival in 2026
Africa’s Multilateral Reckoning: Mediation, Leadership, and Survival in 2026
Date | 30 January 2026
Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow at Amani Africa and Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan
Multilateralism has never been an inspiring word. It is procedural, abstract, and emotionally thin. No one rallies under its banner, and no leader wins popularity by defending it. Yet for Africa, multilateralism has never been a luxury of orderly times or a matter of institutional aesthetics. It has been, repeatedly and painfully, a strategy of survival. When collective systems fracture or lose authority, Africa is not a marginal casualty of global disorder; it is among the first and hardest hit.
As the continent enters 2026, this reality confronts Africa’s institutions with unusual force. Across the continent—from Sudan and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to the Sahel—war is no longer episodic or exceptional. It is increasingly systemic, durable, and profitable. Violence has become a bargaining instrument, fragmentation a political asset, and mediation itself a competitive marketplace. In such conditions, the question confronting Africa’s leaders is no longer abstract: can the continent’s multilateral institutions still exercise authority, or have they become spectators to conflicts they were created to prevent?
This question bears directly on the current leadership of the African Union. There will be no new leadership arriving in 2026. The current leadership, elected in 2025, now confronts its first true test. The coming year will not be a grace period; it will be a reckoning. Africa’s conflicts are deepening, external pressures are intensifying, and the margin for procedural caution is narrowing. The credibility of the present leadership will be judged not by intentions or rhetoric, but by political judgment and action.
Africa enters 2026 institutionally fatigued, politically fragmented, and increasingly exposed to assertive external actors pursuing bilateral advantage at the expense of collective order. The global environment has become harsher: geopolitical rivalry has replaced cooperation, transactional diplomacy has displaced norms, and multilateral restraint is no longer assumed. In this context, the African Union cannot afford leadership that confuses restraint with responsibility or equates neutrality with wisdom.
The challenge before the current leadership is therefore stark. It is not a question of managing institutions, refining processes, or preserving consensus for its own sake. It is a question of whether those at the helm are prepared to exercise authority, take political risks, and defend continental principles when doing so is uncomfortable. Multilateralism, in dark times, is not about convening meetings; it is about drawing lines.
The year 2026 will thus be decisive. If the African Union continues to drift—speaking in careful language while conflicts harden and authority leaks outward—it will confirm a dangerous perception: that Africa’s premier multilateral institution is no longer capable of shaping outcomes. If, however, the current leadership rises to the moment, reasserts political purpose, and treats mediation as an exercise in consequence rather than ceremony, the African Union may yet recover its relevance. The test is immediate, and it cannot be deferred.
On paper, the African Union should be a formidable mediation actor. It possesses peace and security institutions, mediation capacities, and panels of eminent persons. Yet in practice, it has struggled to shape outcomes in the continent’s most consequential conflicts. The problem is not absence of tools, but erosion of authority. Mediation succeeds when norms are backed by leverage and when institutions are willing to impose political costs.
The Union’s recent record in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Sahel underscores this pattern. In Sudan, early warning and legal authority existed, yet hesitation prevailed as war escalated. In eastern Congo, fragmented initiatives and militarized responses crowded out political solutions. In the Sahel, inconsistent enforcement of norms and reactive diplomacy allowed coups and counter-coups to consolidate. In each case, the vacuum created by African caution was filled by external actors pursuing their own interests.
Looking ahead, Africa’s conflicts increasingly resemble political marketplaces. Loyalty is purchased, fragmentation rewarded, and violence normalized as a negotiating tool. In such environments, moral persuasion alone is insufficient. Norms without leverage are priced out, and multilateralism that avoids imposing costs becomes performative.
The African Union’s comparative advantage is not financial or military. It lies in legitimacy: the ability to confer recognition, set benchmarks, and insist that peace, rights, and governance are inseparable. Reclaiming this role requires a renewal of Pan-Africanism as an intellectual and moral tradition—one that insists on sovereignty as responsibility, not exemption.
If the African Union is to remain relevant in 2026, it must reassert convening authority, enforce coordination, benchmark mediation participation, and place civic legitimacy at the center of peace processes. Above all, leadership must rediscover courage. Unity without principle is not unity; it is abdication.
Africa’s multilateral institutions were never designed to deliver perfection. They were designed to prevent catastrophe. Whether the African Union can rise to this challenge in 2026 will determine not only its own credibility, but Africa’s capacity to navigate an unforgiving world.
This article was first published on Diplomacy Now and can be accessed on https://dialogueinitiatives.org/the-african-unions-biggest-test/
Commemoration of Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation
Commemoration of Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation
Date | 29 January 2026
Tomorrow (30 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1328th session where it will discuss the fourth commemoration of the ‘Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation and Lessons learnt for the countries in conflict: Experiences of South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Angola, South Sudan, and the Great Lakes region’ as an open session.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jean-Léon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will make a statement. The meeting might feature Domingos Miguel Bembe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Angola to the AU, who may provide a briefing on Angola’s efforts for peace and reconciliation on the continent, as the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation. Other members expected to participate in the session include representatives from South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Angola, South Sudan, and the Great Lakes region. A representative from the UN may also be present at the meeting.
The 4th Commemoration of the Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation is set to build on the previous commemorations, and this year’s observance will focus on the practical application of peacebuilding strategies. Given the consideration of ‘Lessons Learnt for Countries in Conflict,’ the open session will specifically analyse the transformative experiences of South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Angola, South Sudan, and the Great Lakes region. By examining these diverse national trajectories, the PSC will aim to identify proven blueprints for national healing. These experience-sharing is intended to serve as a blueprint for the AU to more effectively intervene in current crises, particularly the devastating war in Sudan and the volatile security situation in the Eastern DRC, reinforcing the continent’s commitment to Silencing the Guns and fostering enduring social cohesion.
Since its inaugural meeting in 2023, the session has been traditionally held on 31 January of each year, following the declaration of the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly on terrorism and unconstitutional changes of government in Africa held in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in which it decided to institutionalise the commemoration annually. During the last commemoration, the 3rd, held on 31 January 2025, the PSC called for the ‘domestication of the commemoration of the Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation at Regional and national level…’ and highlighted the need for ‘the ‘Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation’ to be aligned with efforts to advance the implementation of the AU Transitional Justice Policy, which provides a roadmap, ensuring that reconciliation is built on accountability, truth-telling, and social cohesion.’
Given this, with lessons learnt, South Africa’s experience, anchored by its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), offers a profound lesson in choosing restorative justice over retribution. By prioritising the public acknowledgement of truth in exchange for conditional amnesty, the model allowed a fractured nation to transition from apartheid to democracy without collapsing into a cycle of revenge. The Côte d’Ivoire experience, on the other hand, highlights the necessity of moving reconciliation beyond the capital city and into the heart of rural and urban neighbourhoods through local peace initiatives like the UPF-Côte d’Ivoire’s journey over the past two decades in conflict prevention, youth engagement, and community reconciliation. This provides a vital lesson for current conflict zones: for a peace agreement to hold, it must empower community leaders and local peace initiatives to act as mediators, effectively mending the social fabric by fostering face-to-face reconciliation between neighbours who were once divided by conflict.
Sierra Leone’s post-civil war recovery is anchored in the ‘Fambul Tok’ (Family Talk) model, which emphasises that reconciliation must happen at the village level, not just in high courts. Following its 11-year civil war (1991–2002), Sierra Leone adopted a multifaceted approach to recovery by combining judicial accountability with social healing. This strategy centred on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to address wartime atrocities. Simultaneously, grassroots programmes like Fambul Tok were established to mend the social fabric and promote forgiveness at the community level. In Angola, following the end of its 27-year civil war in 2002, the country has evolved into a prominent regional peacemaker under the leadership of President João Lourenço – the AU’s Champion for Peace and Reconciliation. The nation has prioritised diplomatic mediation, especially regarding the conflict in the DRC. In South Sudan, the peace and reconciliation landscape in 2026 is characterised by a fragile adherence to the R-ARCSS framework. The promise of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement is still alive, yet it is shadowed by relentless local violence. Significant legislative steps have been taken, but the cycle of deadly conflict remains a formidable barrier to lasting reconciliation.
Regional peace and stability in the Great Lakes region hinge on strong cooperation frameworks and inclusive, long-term strategies that address both immediate security threats and deeper structural challenges. Central to these efforts is the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the DRC and the region, alongside the work of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which brings together more than eleven member states to curb conflict and promote development. Yet durable peace cannot be achieved without tackling root causes such as disputes over natural resources, weak governance, and the lingering legacy of violence, particularly in the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. National reconciliation initiatives, including Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and Burundi’s power-sharing arrangements, have sought to rebuild social cohesion and political stability.
In addition, as previously mentioned in the previous commemoration on the importance of further strengthening the Continental Early Warning System and preventive diplomacy on the Continent, it will be imperative that the council addresses this, aligning its deliberations with the ongoing APSA review and reform process. By linking these reforms to the peace, security, and development nexus, the PSC must encourage Member States to look beyond immediate security interventions and instead redouble efforts to address the deep-seated structural root causes of violence. This involves a holistic commitment to fixing governance-related factors – such as political exclusion and socio-economic inequality – ensuring that the AU’s reformed peace architecture is equipped not just to silence guns, but to prevent them from being fired in the first place.
The meeting is expected to result in a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the 4th Commemoration of Africa Day for Peace and Reconciliation and call for the need to continue promoting the culture of peace, tolerance, justice, forgiveness, and reconciliation as an important step for conflict prevention, especially in post-conflict communities. Council is also likely to acknowledge the role of President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, of Angola, as the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation, applauding his efforts to promote peace and reconciliation and his efforts to galvanise support for peace initiatives across the region. Council may also highlight the important role of national reconciliation towards achieving the AU’s noble goal of Silencing the Guns by 2030, considering the critical role that reconciliation plays in preventing conflict relapse and laying a strong foundation for sustainable peace in countries emerging from violent conflicts. It will also be important for the PSC to underscore the importance of inclusive and transparent political transitions, and emphasise the need for comprehensive peace, reconciliation, and development initiatives across the continent.
Consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa
Consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa
Date | 25 January 2026
Tomorrow (26 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1327th Session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period between July and December 2025.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jean-Léon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organised elections during the reporting period.
As per the PSC’s decision from its 424th session in March 2014, which mandates periodic updates on African electoral developments, the Chairperson presents a mid-year elections report. The previous update was delivered during the 1288th PSC session on 4 July, 2025 and covered electoral activities from January to June 2025. Tomorrow’s briefing will similarly provide accounts of elections conducted from July to December 2025, covering elections held in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Malawi, the Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania, while also outlining the electoral calendar for the first half of 2026.
Across the second half of 2025, governance trends across Africa reflected a complex and often uneven interplay between electoral continuity, democratic backsliding, and institutional resilience. A recurring pattern was the consolidation of executive power through elections held in constrained political environments, frequently following constitutional changes that weakened term limits or enabled incumbents or transitional authorities to entrench themselves. Many of these polls were marked by low or moderate voter turnout, opposition boycotts or exclusions, and contested credibility, even where regional and continental observation missions officially endorsed peaceful conduct, highlighting a growing gap between formal electoral procedures and substantive democratic competition. At the same time, episodes of acute instability, most notably the military interruption of elections in Guinea-Bissau, underscored the continued fragility of civilian rule in some contexts, prompting robust but reactive responses from regional bodies. In contrast, a smaller number of cases demonstrated democratic resilience through competitive elections, peaceful concessions, and credible alternation of power.
In the aftermath of Cameroon’s contested 12 October 2025 presidential election, President Paul Biya was re-elected to an eighth term amid heightened political tensions. Post-election protests were reported in parts of the country, with security forces intervening to restore order, resulting in casualties. The Constitutional Council confirmed Biya’s victory with 53.7% of the vote, a result rejected by opposition candidate Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who claimed victory and accused authorities of systematic manipulation. The AU deployed an election observer mission led by Bernard Makuza, former Prime Minister and former President of the Senate of the Republic of Rwanda, composed of 40 short-term observers (STOs). Later, a joint statement from the AU and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)indicated that ‘the election was conducted peacefully, with respect for democratic values and citizen participation.’ They also noted low turnout and urged stakeholders to channel grievances through legal mechanisms.
In the Central African Republic’s 28 December 2025 presidential election, the incumbent President Faustin-Archange Touadéra secured a third term, garnering approximately 76.15 % of the vote according to provisional results from the National Elections Authority, which will be officially validated by the Constitutional Court. Touadéra’s victory follows a controversial 2023 constitutional referendum that abolished presidential term limits and extended term lengths, enabling him to run again and entrench his decade-long rule. The major opposition coalition boycotted the vote, decrying an unequal political environment and unfair conditions, and some challengers have alleged electoral malpractice and fraud. Voter turnout was at around 52%, reflecting mixed public engagement amid ongoing instability, even as the election technically proceeded peacefully and without widespread unrest reported.
The 2025 electoral cycle in Côte d’Ivoire opened with the presidential election on 25 October, followed by legislative polls on 27 December. According to the electoral commission, President Alassane Ouattara won decisively with 89.8% of the vote, while businessman Jean-Louis Billon trailed at 3.09%. Voter turnout stood at 50.1%, underscoring limited public participation. At the invitation of Ivorian authorities, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a joint Election Observation Mission (EOM) of more than 250 observers across the country, reflecting strong regional engagement. Their preliminary report highlighted candidate exclusions, weak opposition presence, accessibility challenges, and logistical shortcomings. For the December legislative elections, the AU dispatched a separate mission of 31 observers to assess preparations, voting operations, and the post-election environment.
In Egypt, following the August senate elections, parliamentary elections were conducted in multiple phases starting in November, producing a legislature overwhelmingly aligned with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. His political bloc secured the super-majority required to advance constitutional amendments, consolidating executive dominance. Overall turnout and participation levels fluctuated.
The 23 November 2025 general elections in Guinea-Bissau, intended to produce a legitimate presidential and legislative outcome in a country long beset by political fragility, were abruptly upended when military forces seized power on 26 November, a day before provisional results were to be announced. Both incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and opposition candidate Fernando Dias da Costa had claimed victory prior to the official tally, but the military takeover involved storming the National Electoral Commission’s offices, the seizure and destruction of ballots, tally sheets and servers, and suspension of the entire electoral process, making completion of the vote effectively impossible. Major-General Horta Inta-A Na Man was installed as transitional president and appointed a new cabinet, drawing accusations from opposition figures and observers that the coup was either staged or exploited to forestall the constitutional transfer of power and preserve entrenched elite interests. In response, ECOWAS convened an extraordinary summit on 27 November, condemned the coup, suspended Guinea-Bissau, rejected any arrangements undermining the electoral process, and demanded the immediate declaration of the 23 November election results, while mandating a high-level mediation mission led by Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio. The PSC followed on 28 November by also suspending Guinea-Bissau, strongly condemning the coup, and calling for the completion of the electoral process and inauguration of the winner during its 1315th session. The Council also tasked the AU Commission Chairperson to create an inclusive AU Monitoring Mechanism, in collaboration with ECOWAS and stakeholders, to monitor the situation, especially the implementation of ECOWAS and PSC decisions.
In the 28 December 2025 presidential election in Guinea, held under a new constitution that followed the 2021 military coup, junta leader Mamady Doumbouya secured a landslide victory with 86.72 % of the vote and was later sworn in as president, marking the end of the formal transitional period since he seized power. AU observers were deployed to monitor the campaign and voting phases, with a mission arriving in mid-December and issuing preliminary statements that attested that the election took place in a peaceful, orderly, and credible environment. However, the electoral trajectory, notably a constitutional referendum earlier in 2025 that amended the legal framework to allow members of the ruling military authorities to stand as candidates, has deepened concerns about compliance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) Article 25(4), which seeks to restrict participation of those who have seized power through unconstitutional means.
In Malawi’s 16 September 2025 general elections, former President Peter Mutharika won a clear victory over incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera, securing 56.8 % of the vote to Chakwera’s 33%, with turnout around 76% of registered voters, prompting a peaceful concession by Chakwera and a commitment to a smooth transfer of power. The elections were observed by a joint African Union–COMESA Election Observation Mission and a SADC Electoral Observation Mission, both deployed at the invitation of Malawi’s government to assess compliance with national, regional, and international democratic standards, and to engage with key electoral stakeholders, including the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), political parties, civil society and media. Preliminary observation reports highlighted a generally peaceful and orderly process, with long queues and broad voter participation, though technical issues such as late polling station openings and structural challenges (e.g., biometric machine failures and the need for improved dispute resolution timelines) were noted, pointing to areas for future reform. This election reinforced Malawi’s democratic resilience and provided lessons for Africa on peaceful leadership alternation and the significance of robust electoral frameworks.
In the 2025 Seychelles general and presidential elections, the multi-stage process began with presidential and National Assembly polls on 25–27 September 2025, observed by a Joint AU and COMESA Election Observation Mission following an invitation from the Government and Electoral Commission; the mission engaged with key stakeholders across political, media, civic and institutional spheres to assess compliance with continental democratic standards enshrined in ACDEG and related instruments. According to the Joint Preliminary Report of the Joint mission, the candidate secured an outright majority in the first round, triggering a run-off held from 9 -11 October 2025 between opposition leader Patrick Herminie of the United Seychelles party and incumbent President Wavel Ramkalawan of Linyon Demokratik Seselwa. Herminie won the run-off with 52.7% of the vote to Ramkalawan’s 47.3%, returning his party to executive leadership and reversing the 2020 result that had first brought Ramkalawan to office. Observers and regional bodies, including SADC, noted the generally peaceful, orderly and professionally managed electoral environment.
In Gabon, the 27 September (first round) and 11 October (second round) parliamentary elections consolidated President Brice Oligui Nguema’s political dominance following his April presidential win, with his newly formed Democratic Union of Builders (UDB) securing a decisive majority in the National Assembly, winning around 101–102 out of 145 seats and relegating the long-dominant Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) to a distant second, alongside a handful of smaller parties and independents. According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Tracker, while the elections were largely peaceful and marked a significant shift in Gabon’s post-coup political landscape, they were also marred by irregularities, including missing ballots and annulments in several constituencies.
In Tanzania, the general elections held on 29 October 2025 produced an overwhelmingly one-sided result with President Samia Suluhu Hassan declared the winner on over 98% of the vote, but they were marred by deep controversy, violent unrest, and allegations of severe democratic deficits. The African Union Election Observation Mission’s preliminary report indicated that the elections “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections”, noting a restricted political environment, opposition boycotts and exclusions, internet shutdowns, outbreaks of deadly protests, and significant procedural irregularities that compromised electoral integrity and peaceful acceptance of results. On the other hand, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, issued a public statement congratulating President Suluhu on her victory while expressing regret at the loss of life in post-election protests and emphasising respect for human rights and the rule of law.
The period also marked a pivotal shift in Somalia’s electoral framework with the introduction of direct municipal elections. Somalia’s municipal elections held on 25 December 2025 in Mogadishu’s Banadir region introduced direct, one-person-one-vote polling for the first time in nearly six decades, a major departure from the indirect, clan-based model used since 1991 and direct voting last seen in 1969. The polls, involving some 1,604 candidates competing for 390 council seats and more than 500,000 registered voters, were widely framed by authorities and local observers as a critical first step toward restoring universal suffrage and laying the groundwork for nationwide direct elections scheduled for 2026, and showcased significant logistical and security efforts amid ongoing instability and insurgent threats. While the exercise proceeded under heightened security and with heavy public interest, it was also shadowed by political tensions, including opposition boycotts and concerns about inclusivity and turnout.
Furthermore, the report will highlight elections scheduled between January and June 2026. The majority of elections planned for 2026 will take place in the first half of the year, with Benin, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda holding polls during this period.
Uganda opened Africa’s 2026 election cycle with a presidential poll on 15 January. The presidential election saw long-time incumbent President Yoweri Museveni extend his rule into a seventh term, securing approximately 71.6 % of the vote against opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi (Bobi Wine), who received about 24.7 %, in a contest marked by significant controversy and political tension. Official results indicated a 52.5 % voter turnout, the lowest since the return to multiparty politics. The joint preliminary statement of The African Union – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Election Observation Mission indicated that Uganda’s elections proved more peaceful than the 2021 election, earning praise for voter patience, professional staff, and transparent counting, though concerns persisted over military involvement, internet shutdowns, opposition arrests, media bias, high fees excluding marginalized groups, Electoral Commission independence issues, and Election Day delays.
The Republic of Congo is scheduled to hold its presidential election on 22 March 2026, with incumbent President Denis Sassou Nguesso officially nominated by the ruling Congolese Labour Party (PCT) to run for another term alongside candidates from opposition parties.
The 2026 presidential election in Djibouti is scheduled to take place by April 2026, with incumbent President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who has governed the country since 1999, formally nominated by the ruling Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP) to seek a sixth term following a constitutional amendment in late 2025 that removed the presidential age limit, allowing the 77-year-old leader to run again.
The 7th general election in Ethiopia is scheduled to be held on 1 June 2026, with the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) confirming the official election timetable, including candidate registration and campaigning periods ahead of polling day. A wide range of political parties are expected to contest seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, including the ruling Prosperity Party and several opposition and regional parties participating with their candidates across constituencies.
The national election process in Somalia is expected to take place in June 2026 under a newly adopted electoral framework aimed at moving toward universal suffrage and direct elections after decades of indirect, clan-based vote systems. Preparatory local polls and voter registration efforts were conducted in late 2025 as part of this transition, although there remains significant political disagreement over the roadmap and mechanisms for the upcoming national vote. Several political figures, including incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and other declared or prospective contenders such as Abdi Farah Shirdon, are positioning themselves for the upcoming presidential race amid a fractured political landscape.
In Benin, President Patrice Talon steps down in line with constitutional term limits, breaking with the regional trend of incumbents extending their rule. The 2026 presidential election in Benin is set for 12 April 2026, with former finance minister Romuald Wadagni, endorsed by outgoing President Talon, emerging as a leading candidate after the ruling coalition cleared the required sponsorship thresholds. On 11 January 2026, parliamentary and local elections were held, in which the ruling Progressive Union for Renewal and the Republican Bloc together won all 109 seats in the National Assembly under a new 20 % threshold that left the main opposition without representation. These votes followed a failed coup attempt on 7 December 2025, when a small group of soldiers briefly announced the overthrow of the government but were quickly contained by loyal forces with regional support.
The Republic of Cabo Verde will hold its legislative elections on 17 May 2026 and its presidential election on 15 November 2026, with a possible second round for the presidency on 29 November if no candidate wins an outright majority. President José Maria Neves announced the dates after consultations with political parties and the National Elections Commission, and key parties preparing to contest include the ruling Movement for Democracy (MpD) and opposition parties such as the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) and the Independent and Democratic Cape-Verdean Union (UCID).
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may take note of the Chairperson’s elections report, covering electoral developments from July to December 2025 and the electoral calendar for the first half of 2026. The PSC may commend Member States where elections were conducted peacefully and led to credible outcomes, while encouraging those facing post-electoral tensions or transitions to resolve disputes through constitutional and legal mechanisms. The Council may reiterate its condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government, and call for the restoration and completion of disrupted electoral processes in line with AU norms. It may further underscore the importance of aligning national electoral frameworks with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, particularly concerning term limits, inclusivity, and the participation of transitional authorities. The PSC may encourage Member States to invite AU election observation missions in a timely manner, undertake necessary electoral and institutional reforms, ensure the neutrality of security forces, and uphold restraint and responsibility among all stakeholders to promote peaceful, credible, and inclusive elections across the continent.
Sudan’s Crisis is Africa’s Crisis - And Its Responsibility
Sudan’s Crisis is Africa’s Crisis - And Its Responsibility
Date | 22 January 2026
INTRODUCTION
Sudan is now the epicenter of one of the world’s deadliest conflicts and most desperate humanitarian crises. The numbers speak for themselves: since 2023, more than 150,000 people are estimated to have died as a result of violence and other related causes, 7.3 million have been newly internally displaced—on top of 2.3 million already displaced, bringing the total 9.6 million, 4.3 million have fled as refugees to neighboring countries, and more than 30 million people—two-thirds of the population—require humanitarian assistance (here). The atrocities committed defy words, and the battle for El-Fasher—its fall to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the unbearable reports that followed—has revived the darkest echoes of an earlier tragedy: the scorched-earth campaign waged in Darfur following the 2003 armed rebellion in that region. The fear now is stark: what happened there could happen again, elsewhere.
