Peace Support Operations in Africa
Peace Support Operations in Africa
Date | 26 April 2026
Tomorrow (27 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an open session on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa.
The session is expected to commence with an opening statement by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements will also be delivered by El-Ghassim Wane, former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali, Head of MINUSMA, and UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, as well as former AU Director for Peace and Security; Dagmawit Moges, Director of the AU Peace Fund; and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU).
Tomorrow’s session is one of the signature events of Ethiopia’s chairship, given its history and contributions to peacekeeping. It comes against the background of major challenges afflicting AU-led PSOs from the breakdown of the political consensus on which they are predicated to the resultant weakening of diplomatic, financial and logistical support and political coherence necessary for deployment and successful conduct of PSOs.
Since its operationalisation in 2004, the PSC has remained consistently engaged on PSOs, which continue to constitute a critical tool in the AU’s peace and security architecture. The first PSO to be deployed under the mandating authority of the PSC was the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. Since then, PSOs in Africa have featured on the agenda of the PSC both through mission-specific sessions and thematic sessions dedicated to peacekeeping in Africa. Over time, its thematic focus has focused on key strategic issues, including the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) (with over 15 dedicated sessions since 2007), financing of AU PSOs, and broader systemic challenges affecting peace operations on the continent.
Two recent sessions are particularly noteworthy. At its 851st session (May 2019), the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted a report assessing the evolving context of AU PSOs, identifying key operational and strategic challenges, drawing lessons from past and ongoing missions, and proposing measures to enhance effectiveness. More recently, the 986th session, held at ministerial level on 18 March 2021 under Kenya’s chairship, reaffirmed these concerns under the theme ‘Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: Emerging Challenges and Critical Lessons for Sustainable Peacekeeping Operations.’
Africa remains the main theatre for peacekeeping operations, hosting a wide range of deployments, including those of the UN, AU, RECs/RMs, as well as bilateral arrangements. Over the past two decades, the AU has also authorised, mandated, or endorsed around two dozen peace support operations, according to Amani Africa data (see map below). In addition, regional mechanisms and ad hoc coalitions have in recent years come to step in to fill the gap that emerged in situations where neither the AU nor the UN were able to deploy in a timely manner, particularly in response to insurgencies with regional implications. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example, deployed missions in Mozambique and eastern DRC, while ECOWAS has undertaken interventions in contexts such as the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Alongside these, ad hoc coalitions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force have been deployed. These arrangements have often emerged as gap-filling responses by affected states, reflecting both the evolving nature of security threats and the limited capacity of continental and regional mechanisms to act promptly and adapt rapidly. In parallel, bilateral deployments have also increased, including Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique and the Central African Republic and various bilateral deployments in Somalia alongside the AU mission.
The various deployments have contributed meaningfully to stabilising conflict-affected contexts. However, recently, there has been a trend of steady decline in the deployment of PSOs in Africa, not only in the context of the AU but also the UN. The UN has not deployed a new mission on the continent since 2015, while the AU has not initiated any major PSO deployment under its command since its missions to Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. This is not due to a lack of situations requiring PSOs, but rather reflects the fact that the AU has become significantly behind the curve in mobilising timely engagement in situations directly implicating its peace and security mandate and the timely consensus and support required for deploying under its command, as well as in adapting to the evolving security threats on the continent.
In this context, several emerging trends and challenges over the past decade are shaping the effectiveness of PSOs in Africa, and are expected to feature in tomorrow’s deliberation.
One of the key issues likely to receive attention in tomorrow’s deliberation is the changing peace and security landscape, which calls for some adaptation of PSOs. Since around the mid of 2010s, Africa’s security environment has shifted significantly, with contemporary threats increasingly driven by fragmented non-state actors and asymmetric warfare by terrorist groups, rather than conventional civil wars. While the emergence of ad hoc deployments to fill in the ensuing gap contributes to managing the urgent security needs, they tend to be security-heavy, bereft of the tools necessary for addressing the underlying governance and socio-economic challenges. Often, they also operate outside the multilateral normative framework, with limited institutional anchoring within the AU framework.
Despite efforts to explore how to adapt the ASF, engagement on AU PSOs remains largely episodic, with limited efforts to develop new operational models aligned to current security dynamics and institutional and financial constraints. Systemic lessons and insights are not consistently carried forward to inform the AU’s approach to current and future PSOs.
Conflicts on the continent have become increasingly complex, often rooted in political contestation, governance crises, and deep-seated socio-economic challenges that do not lend themselves to purely military solutions. There is therefore a need to reconsider the growing tendency among policymakers to frame responses to Africa’s peace and security challenges—particularly those involving terrorism and insurgency—primarily in military terms. While military operations may be necessary in some contexts, they cannot substitute for a coherent political strategy. In this regard, the 2025 Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and the ASF reaffirmed that military action must be directly aligned with, and supportive of, clearly defined political end states. In the absence of such a strategy, PSOs risk becoming protracted and ineffective, as illustrated by the ongoing challenges facing the AU deployment in Somalia. The principle of the ‘primacy of politics’ should therefore remain central in all conflict resolution efforts, with political processes at the forefront of design, implementation, and exit strategies for PSOs.
Financing remains a major challenge, particularly for large, multidimensional missions. This is most evident in the current AUSSOM deployment, which has been operating under significant financial strain, with mounting debt and without predictable, adequate, and sustainable funding—conditions that have directly affected its effectiveness. The issue of financing the AU, including its PSOs, has gained increasing political attention, including at the most recent AU Summit held in February, where the Assembly, in light of these challenges, decided to convene an extraordinary session of the Executive Council dedicated to financing no later than November 2026.
At the AU, there is growing interest in expanding the use of the Peace Fund. But given the limited scope of the Fund’s endowment, only smaller and limited-scope PSOs may be financed through AU resources, including the Peace Fund. Large and resource-intensive multidimensional missions authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter require the shouldering of the financial burden by the UN and other international partners, given that the maintenance of international peace and security remains a primary responsibility of the UN Security Council. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 in December 2023 was premised on this consideration and marked an important milestone in AU–UN cooperation on peacekeeping. Yet, its implementation has been affected by shifting geopolitical dynamics. Changing policy towards PKOs and security priorities among partners, notably the US and EU, as well as the UN’s liquidity crisis affecting peacekeeping operations, has stifled implementation of resolution 2719 and further intensified financial pressures on AUSSOM.
Beyond financing, effective PSOs require adequate logistics, intelligence, and equipment, particularly in asymmetric environments where capabilities such as counter-IED measures are essential.
Coordination challenges also persist among the AU, RECs/RMs, the UN, and host states. The growing number of regional and ad hoc deployments risks fragmenting APSA. While AU–UN complementarity remains essential, both institutions retain distinct comparative advantages and should operate in a coordinated rather than substitutive manner. As noted by El-Ghassim Wane, the UN remains indispensable for multidimensional peacekeeping and supporting transitions to sustainable peace, while the AU is often better positioned to undertake early engagement using robust peace enforcement and counter-terrorism operations, with UN support, as well as smaller-scale stabilisation missions. Some of the models identified in the study on the future of peacekeeping that Wane led create opportunities for the AU in this respect.
Tomorrow’s deliberation is expected to explore concrete pathways for addressing them, building on some of the existing efforts, such as the lessons learned forum. This requires adopting a more systematic and sustained engagement by the PSC rather than an episodic one. Consideration may also be given to a comprehensive review of AU PSOs and the ASF framework—without reopening foundational instruments such as the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol—to ensure they remain responsive to evolving realities. Such a review should focus on developing adaptable PSO models aligned with current security and financial constraints, institute processes for systematically integrating lessons learned into policy, planning and practice, strengthening coordination with RECs/RMs, the UN, and international partners, and, while firmly anchoring operations in coherent political strategies. Given the need for strategic and high-level political support for PSOs, consideration may also be given to designating a dedicated AU-led PSOs Champion to sustain high-level attention.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reaffirm the indispensable role that PSOs play in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. It may further express concern over the multifaceted challenges facing PSOs in Africa, including political, operational, and financial constraints, and may consider the above measures, as well as modalities for follow-up, as part of efforts to address these challenges and enhance the effectiveness of PSOs on the continent. It may commission an independent, time-bound study on the future of PSOs in Africa, drawing inspiration from the recent UN initiative. It may also underscore the need for PSOs to be designed and implemented as part of a broader, integrated approach encompassing diplomacy, mediation, peace-making, and peacebuilding. The PSC may also consider developing an annual ministerial forum on AU PSOs, similar to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Ministerial, as a strategic platform for mobilising strategic, financial, logistical, and technical support for AU-led PSOs.
Peace Support Operations in Africa
Peace Support Operations in Africa
Date | 26 April 2026
Tomorrow (27 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an open session on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa.
The session is expected to commence with an opening statement by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements will also be delivered by El-Ghassim Wane, former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali, Head of MINUSMA, and UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, as well as former AU Director for Peace and Security; Dagmawit Moges, Director of the AU Peace Fund; and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU).
Tomorrow’s session is one of the signature events of Ethiopia’s chairship, given its history and contributions to peacekeeping. It comes against the background of major challenges afflicting AU-led PSOs from the breakdown of the political consensus on which they are predicated to the resultant weakening of diplomatic, financial and logistical support and political coherence necessary for deployment and successful conduct of PSOs.
Since its operationalisation in 2004, the PSC has remained consistently engaged on PSOs, which continue to constitute a critical tool in the AU’s peace and security architecture. The first PSO to be deployed under the mandating authority of the PSC was the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. Since then, PSOs in Africa have featured on the agenda of the PSC both through mission-specific sessions and thematic sessions dedicated to peacekeeping in Africa. Over time, its thematic focus has focused on key strategic issues, including the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) (with over 15 dedicated sessions since 2007), financing of AU PSOs, and broader systemic challenges affecting peace operations on the continent.
Two recent sessions are particularly noteworthy. At its 851st session (May 2019), the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted a report assessing the evolving context of AU PSOs, identifying key operational and strategic challenges, drawing lessons from past and ongoing missions, and proposing measures to enhance effectiveness. More recently, the 986th session, held at ministerial level on 18 March 2021 under Kenya’s chairship, reaffirmed these concerns under the theme ‘Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: Emerging Challenges and Critical Lessons for Sustainable Peacekeeping Operations.’
Africa remains the main theatre for peacekeeping operations, hosting a wide range of deployments, including those of the UN, AU, RECs/RMs, as well as bilateral arrangements. Over the past two decades, the AU has also authorised, mandated, or endorsed around two dozen peace support operations, according to Amani Africa data (see map below). In addition, regional mechanisms and ad hoc coalitions have in recent years come to step in to fill the gap that emerged in situations where neither the AU nor the UN were able to deploy in a timely manner, particularly in response to insurgencies with regional implications. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example, deployed missions in Mozambique and eastern DRC, while ECOWAS has undertaken interventions in contexts such as the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Alongside these, ad hoc coalitions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force have been deployed. These arrangements have often emerged as gap-filling responses by affected states, reflecting both the evolving nature of security threats and the limited capacity of continental and regional mechanisms to act promptly and adapt rapidly. In parallel, bilateral deployments have also increased, including Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique and the Central African Republic and various bilateral deployments in Somalia alongside the AU mission.
The various deployments have contributed meaningfully to stabilising conflict-affected contexts. However, recently, there has been a trend of steady decline in the deployment of PSOs in Africa, not only in the context of the AU but also the UN. The UN has not deployed a new mission on the continent since 2015, while the AU has not initiated any major PSO deployment under its command since its missions to Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. This is not due to a lack of situations requiring PSOs, but rather reflects the fact that the AU has become significantly behind the curve in mobilising timely engagement in situations directly implicating its peace and security mandate and the timely consensus and support required for deploying under its command, as well as in adapting to the evolving security threats on the continent.
In this context, several emerging trends and challenges over the past decade are shaping the effectiveness of PSOs in Africa, and are expected to feature in tomorrow’s deliberation.
One of the key issues likely to receive attention in tomorrow’s deliberation is the changing peace and security landscape, which calls for some adaptation of PSOs. Since around the mid of 2010s, Africa’s security environment has shifted significantly, with contemporary threats increasingly driven by fragmented non-state actors and asymmetric warfare by terrorist groups, rather than conventional civil wars. While the emergence of ad hoc deployments to fill in the ensuing gap contributes to managing the urgent security needs, they tend to be security-heavy, bereft of the tools necessary for addressing the underlying governance and socio-economic challenges. Often, they also operate outside the multilateral normative framework, with limited institutional anchoring within the AU framework.
Despite efforts to explore how to adapt the ASF, engagement on AU PSOs remains largely episodic, with limited efforts to develop new operational models aligned to current security dynamics and institutional and financial constraints. Systemic lessons and insights are not consistently carried forward to inform the AU’s approach to current and future PSOs.
Conflicts on the continent have become increasingly complex, often rooted in political contestation, governance crises, and deep-seated socio-economic challenges that do not lend themselves to purely military solutions. There is therefore a need to reconsider the growing tendency among policymakers to frame responses to Africa’s peace and security challenges—particularly those involving terrorism and insurgency—primarily in military terms. While military operations may be necessary in some contexts, they cannot substitute for a coherent political strategy. In this regard, the 2025 Lessons Learned Forum on AU PSOs and the ASF reaffirmed that military action must be directly aligned with, and supportive of, clearly defined political end states. In the absence of such a strategy, PSOs risk becoming protracted and ineffective, as illustrated by the ongoing challenges facing the AU deployment in Somalia. The principle of the ‘primacy of politics’ should therefore remain central in all conflict resolution efforts, with political processes at the forefront of design, implementation, and exit strategies for PSOs.
Financing remains a major challenge, particularly for large, multidimensional missions. This is most evident in the current AUSSOM deployment, which has been operating under significant financial strain, with mounting debt and without predictable, adequate, and sustainable funding—conditions that have directly affected its effectiveness. The issue of financing the AU, including its PSOs, has gained increasing political attention, including at the most recent AU Summit held in February, where the Assembly, in light of these challenges, decided to convene an extraordinary session of the Executive Council dedicated to financing no later than November 2026.
At the AU, there is growing interest in expanding the use of the Peace Fund. But given the limited scope of the Fund’s endowment, only smaller and limited-scope PSOs may be financed through AU resources, including the Peace Fund. Large and resource-intensive multidimensional missions authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter require the shouldering of the financial burden by the UN and other international partners, given that the maintenance of international peace and security remains a primary responsibility of the UN Security Council. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 in December 2023 was premised on this consideration and marked an important milestone in AU–UN cooperation on peacekeeping. Yet, its implementation has been affected by shifting geopolitical dynamics. Changing policy towards PKOs and security priorities among partners, notably the US and EU, as well as the UN’s liquidity crisis affecting peacekeeping operations, has stifled implementation of resolution 2719 and further intensified financial pressures on AUSSOM.
Beyond financing, effective PSOs require adequate logistics, intelligence, and equipment, particularly in asymmetric environments where capabilities such as counter-IED measures are essential.
Coordination challenges also persist among the AU, RECs/RMs, the UN, and host states. The growing number of regional and ad hoc deployments risks fragmenting APSA. While AU–UN complementarity remains essential, both institutions retain distinct comparative advantages and should operate in a coordinated rather than substitutive manner. As noted by El-Ghassim Wane, the UN remains indispensable for multidimensional peacekeeping and supporting transitions to sustainable peace, while the AU is often better positioned to undertake early engagement using robust peace enforcement and counter-terrorism operations, with UN support, as well as smaller-scale stabilisation missions. Some of the models identified in the study on the future of peacekeeping that Wane led create opportunities for the AU in this respect.
Tomorrow’s deliberation is expected to explore concrete pathways for addressing them, building on some of the existing efforts, such as the lessons learned forum. This requires adopting a more systematic and sustained engagement by the PSC rather than an episodic one. Consideration may also be given to a comprehensive review of AU PSOs and the ASF framework—without reopening foundational instruments such as the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol—to ensure they remain responsive to evolving realities. Such a review should focus on developing adaptable PSO models aligned with current security and financial constraints, institute processes for systematically integrating lessons learned into policy, planning and practice, strengthening coordination with RECs/RMs, the UN, and international partners, and, while firmly anchoring operations in coherent political strategies. Given the need for strategic and high-level political support for PSOs, consideration may also be given to designating a dedicated AU-led PSOs Champion to sustain high-level attention.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reaffirm the indispensable role that PSOs play in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. It may further express concern over the multifaceted challenges facing PSOs in Africa, including political, operational, and financial constraints, and may consider the above measures, as well as modalities for follow-up, as part of efforts to address these challenges and enhance the effectiveness of PSOs on the continent. It may commission an independent, time-bound study on the future of PSOs in Africa, drawing inspiration from the recent UN initiative. It may also underscore the need for PSOs to be designed and implemented as part of a broader, integrated approach encompassing diplomacy, mediation, peace-making, and peacebuilding. The PSC may also consider developing an annual ministerial forum on AU PSOs, similar to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Ministerial, as a strategic platform for mobilising strategic, financial, logistical, and technical support for AU-led PSOs.
The third international Conference on Sudan opens a new opportunity for a civilian-centred peace process
The third international Conference on Sudan opens a new opportunity for a civilian-centred peace process
Date | 24 April 2026
Zekarias Beshah, Senior Researcher, Amani Africa
The major breakthrough of the international conference on Sudan held in Berlin was the adoption of a joint declaration by the civilian forces convened during the conference. On 15 April, marking the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Sudan conflict, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States convened the third international Sudan conference in Berlin.
This meeting, which brought together ministers and representatives from 55 countries, alongside donors, regional organisations, United Nations entities, and other partners, as well as 38 international and Sudanese NGOs, follows earlier conferences in Paris (2024) and London (2025).
As with its predecessors, the convening was not without controversy—particularly regarding participation and representation. The exclusion of the warring parties (the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)) drew criticism from both sides. Sudan’s foreign ministry denounced the conference for proceeding without consultation with Khartoum, characterising it as a ‘colonial tutelage approach.’ Meanwhile, the Sudan Founding Alliance (TASIS), a coalition aligned with the RSF, raised concerns over the perceived inclusion of actors linked to the SAF and the Islamic movement, warning that such participation could dilute the civilian voice and hinder peace efforts.
Additionally, the countries that participated in the conference were unable to agree on a joint communique. Despite the joint statement that the members of the Quad negotiated and adopted in September 2025, divisions that resurfaced during the technical negotiations, reportedly over language relating to the preservation of ‘state institutions’, forced the convening to end without a joint communique of the participating states, as in London. Consequently, the conference closed with a co-hosts’ communiqué.
Despite these drawbacks, Berlin registered some positive outcomes for a situation that needs some flicker of progress. In this respect, the outcomes of the conference should be assessed against its stated objectives, rather than against expectations it was not designed to fulfil. Some commentary has downplayed the conference’s significance, criticising its format for failing to deliver a ceasefire or immediate relief for civilians. The conference instead focused on three core objectives: mobilising humanitarian support, elevating global attention to the Sudan crisis, and creating space for civilian and political dialogue. Its success should be evaluated accordingly.
A major outcome of Berlin was the creation, for the first time in three years, of a platform for Sudanese civilian and political actors to convene and agree on a joint statement calling for an end to the war. This process was facilitated by the Quintet. Building on consultations initiated in Addis Ababa and concluded in Berlin, some 46 representatives endorsed a joint call structured around seven key priorities: an immediate ceasefire; protection of civilians and infrastructure; humanitarian access; civilian democratic governance; a Sudanese-owned political process; international support; and justice.
This development is particularly significant given the persistent fragmentation of civilian actors and the limitation, to date, to collectively influence the trajectory of the conflict. Previous efforts by the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, established in January 2024, facilitated preparatory consultations in July and August 2024 and February 2025 but did not achieve comparable convergence. In this context, the progress made under the Quintet framework in Berlin should be seen as a meaningful step toward a unified civilian platform and lays the groundwork for a Sudanese-led political dialogue.
On the humanitarian front, the Sudan conflict has generated the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA’s February report, an estimated 33.7 million people need assistance, with 28.9 million requiring food security and livelihood support in 2026. Famine conditions have been confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli, with similar patterns observed in Dilling. As the conflict persists, humanitarian needs continue to rise, yet responses have not kept pace. Instead, significant funding shortfalls have led to reductions in life-saving assistance. The 2026 humanitarian response plan stands at USD 2.6 billion—a decrease of nearly one-third from the previous year—reflecting a constrained funding environment. Only 35 per cent of the 2025 plan was funded, and in 2026, just 16 per cent of the required funding has been secured to date.
Against this backdrop, one of the conference’s tangible outcomes is the mobilisation of financial commitments. International donors pledged €1.5 billion, with more than half (€811 million) contributed by the European Union and its member states, reflecting a significant increase compared to the London conference, where pledges totalled around €950 million. While insufficient to meet overall needs, this represents a substantial and concrete contribution that should not be understated, despite the lack of clarity about how much of the pledged money is additional to the amount pledged during the humanitarian convening held in Washington, D.C.
Third, the conference succeeded in bringing Sudan’s crisis to the forefront of international attention. Despite constituting the world’s most severe humanitarian emergency, Sudan has increasingly been overshadowed by other geopolitical crises, including those in Ukraine, Gaza, and, more recently, Iran. The Berlin conference, at least temporarily, served to re-centre global focus on Sudan.
Overall, the Berlin conference has helped generate momentum for Sudanese civilian and political actors to engage more cohesively and to shape the country’s transition toward civilian-led governance. This is a major development given the persisting deadlock in the SAF-RSF-focused processes. Sustaining this momentum now falls to the Quintet. A key next step will be to engage those actors not represented in Berlin and ensure broader inclusivity. Encouragingly, plans are reportedly underway to convene follow-up meetings in May to incorporate additional stakeholders. The success registered in Berlin with the adoption of a joint statement of civilians presents a unique opportunity to take forward the question of how to pursue proposals towards the constitution of a civilian transitional authority.
Constructing a Networked Multilateralism between Addis Ababa and Geneva: Seizing Policy Opportunities
Constructing a Networked Multilateralism between Addis Ababa and Geneva: Seizing Policy Opportunities
Date | 22 April 2026
SUMMARY
This Special report explores the potential for networked multilateralism to facilitate a more inclusive system of global governance through building networked policy exchanges and policy making between Addis Ababa and Geneva, two major global policy hubs. In response to shifting global power dynamics and complex challenges, it argues for a more connected, flexible, and inclusive multilateral system that leverages and draws on the role of multilateral diplomatic hubs and centres of decision-making in different parts of the world. Addis Ababa, as Africa’s diplomatic capital, excels in diplomatic negotiation for consensus-building and advancing regional priorities and global solidarity for a fairer global system, while Geneva offers a dense ecosystem of international organizations and technical expertise. Closer collaboration between the two diplomatic hubs could enable both to leverage their strengths, thereby becoming the example in practicing and organising networked multilateralism. Addis Ababa could access Geneva’s science diplomacy, data governance, and urban planning expertise, while Geneva could benefit from Addis’s experience in political negotiation, youth and gender inclusion, and Africa’s role as a major centre where current policy issues around energy transition and critical minerals and understanding African interests. Structured exchanges, joint research, and dedicated liaison platforms are recommended to operationalize this partnership. By moving beyond fragmented interactions, a structured and dynamic Addis-Geneva nexus can enhance collective action, better reflect African priorities in global forums, and model innovative approaches to global governance challenges.
Briefing by the A3 on its activities
Briefing by the A3 on its activities
Date | 19 April 2026
Tomorrow (20 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1340th session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Hirut Zemene, Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU and Chair of the PSC for April 2026, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representatives of the A3 members, Somalia as the coordinator of the group for the first quarter, are expected to brief the PSC on the activities of the A3.
Since January 2026, the three elected African members (A3) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) comprise the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia for the 2026–2027 term. Somalia joined the Council in January 2025 after more than five decades, while 2026 marks the return of Liberia after a 65-year absence and the return of the DRC after 35 years. Notably, the DRC concurrently serves on the PSC, creating an opportunity to strengthen coordination and coherence between the two councils.
With Guyana concluding its term at the end of 2025, there is currently no Caribbean representation on the Council. Consequently, unlike during the 2020–2021 and 2024–2025 terms, there is no prospect of expanding the A3 into an ‘A3+1’ configuration.
Tomorrow’s briefing takes place within the framework of longstanding efforts to strengthen coordination between the AU and the UNSC. This engagement traces back to the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa, held in Algiers in December 2013, which established the practice of the A3 providing quarterly briefings to the PSC on African issues on the UNSC agenda, although, in practice, these briefings have not been delivered consistently.
This commitment has since been consistently reinforced. It was reaffirmed during the 11th Oran Process in 2024 and further institutionalised through the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 at the PSC’s 1289th session on 24 July 2025, formalising requirements for regular reporting and structured engagement.
During the most recent A3+ briefing to the PSC in August 2025, the PSC not only decided to institutionalise consultative meetings between the PSC and the A3+ at ambassadorial level as a statutory activity within its annual indicative programme, but also reiterated its request for the A3+ to brief and consult the PSC on a quarterly basis and whenever necessary, on African issues under consideration by the UNSC.
In this context, the A3 are expected to brief the PSC on their activities within the UNSC since the beginning of 2026, highlighting their continued efforts to advance coordinated African positions and to ensure that the continent’s perspectives are effectively reflected in Council deliberations and outcomes. In this regard, the A3 have sustained an active and consistent engagement across a wide range of agenda items through the delivery of joint statements, covering both African country-specific situations and broader thematic and global issues. On African files, the A3 are likely to highlight their sustained engagement on situations such as the Central African Republic, DRC, Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan. Beyond African situations, the A3 have also demonstrated engagement on broader international peace and security issues, including developments in the Middle East. These interventions have generally underscored key principles, such as the primacy of political solutions, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of civilians, and adherence to international law, while also reaffirming the central role of the AU and regional mechanisms in addressing conflicts on the continent. These positions underscore the A3’s efforts to situate Africa as an active stakeholder in global peace and security discussions, beyond continent-specific concerns.
In addition to statements, the A3 are also expected to reflect on their growing role in influencing Security Council outcome documents through engagement in negotiations on draft resolutions and other Council outcome documents. Recent examples include their involvement in ongoing negotiations on the resolution of situations relating to Libya and a resolution and a press statement on South Sudan. Another instance is A3’s initiative in shaping Council engagement on Sudan, by initiating, together with the United Kingdom as penholder, a Security Council meeting in March, following a strike on a hospital in East Darfur state. These efforts point to the increasing role of the A3 in engaging with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African perspectives are reflected in the formulation of Security Council decisions.
The session is also expected to feature discussions as a follow-up to previous decisions of the PSC aimed at strengthening communication and coordination with the A3. In this regard, PSC members may draw on past precedents, such as, the communiqué adopted at its 1221st Session in July 2024 on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), which reiterated the call for the total lifting of the arms embargo on the CAR and encouraged the A3 to promote a unified position on this matter within the UN Security Council. Building on such precedents, the session may also reflect on recommendations emerging from the 11th and 12th High-Level Seminars on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process), which underscored the need for more systematic information sharing and the synchronisation of meetings between the PSC and the UN Security Council on issues under their joint mandate.
The meeting is also expected to provide an opportunity to reflect on the outcomes of the 5th Annual A3 Retreat held on 4 February, which brought together incoming, current, and former A3+ members for strategic reflection and planning. The Retreat underscored the importance of strengthening coordination, unity, and synergy with the PSC, while enhancing Africa’s strategic positioning within the Security Council. In this context, discussions may reflect on the need to address the continued challenges faced by the A3 in influencing Council outcomes, particularly their role in pen-holding and drafting processes while navigating through the current complex geopolitical competition.
Building on these reflections, the PSC session may recall the discussion that took place during the 6th A3 High-Level Meeting held on 13 February on the margins of the 39th AU Assembly, which focused on advancing African agency and leadership in peace and security within a changing global order. Discussions at that meeting emphasised the need to strengthen the A3 as a strategic mechanism guided by African priorities, enhance its proactive role within the Security Council, and advance predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations. In this regard, particular attention may be given to the importance of enhancing AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719. The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 2719 in December 2023 stands as a notable illustration of what coordinated A3 engagement can achieve in advancing a common African position. As such, the effective implementation and operationalisation of this resolution will be critical for further strengthening the AU–UN strategic partnership and ensuring sustained support for AU-led peace operations.
Tomorrow’s briefing outcome is expected to be a communiqué, and in this regard, the PSC is expected to welcome the briefing by the A3 and express appreciation for their continued efforts to articulate and advance coordinated African positions within the UNSC, while also commending the sustained cohesion, coordination, and unity demonstrated by the A3 since the beginning of their 2026–2027 term. Building on this, the PSC may acknowledge the growing role of the A3 in influencing UNSC outcomes, as well as their interaction with penholders and other Council members to ensure that African priorities and perspectives are adequately reflected, and in doing so, the Council may underscore the importance of strengthening coordination and coherence between the PSC and the UNSC. In the same vein, the PSC may further reiterate the need for the A3 to uphold, promote, and defend the decisions and positions of the PSC in their engagement within the UNSC, in line with relevant AU Assembly decisions and the conclusions of the High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa (Oran Process). In this regard, the PSC may also emphasise the importance of the effective implementation of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, particularly with regard to ensuring regular reporting, structured engagement, and timely exchange of information between the two bodies. In this context, it may call for enhanced regularity and predictability in the provision of briefings by the A3, in line with the agreed quarterly framework, and encourage more systematic consultations to facilitate timely guidance from the PSC on African issues under consideration by the UNSC, while at the same time encouraging further strengthening of practical cooperation between the PSC and the A3, including through the synchronisation of their respective programmes of work, enhanced interaction between the experts of the PSC and the UNSC, and the establishment of effective information-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the PSC may highlight the importance of enhancing the role of the A3 in pen-holding and drafting processes within the UNSC, while encouraging continued efforts to navigate geopolitical dynamics and safeguard African priorities. Finally, the PSC may stress the importance of strengthening AU–UN cooperation frameworks, including through the effective implementation and operationalisation of UNSC Resolution 2719 as a key instrument for ensuring predictable and sustainable financing of AU-led peace support operations.
Sierra Leone's 2024 - 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa's Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order
Sierra Leone's 2024 - 2025 UN Security Council Tenure and Africa's Recalibration in a Retreating International Law-Based Order
Date | 16 April 2026
SUMMARY
Sierra Leone’s 2024–2025 tenure on the United Nations Security Council unfolded during a period of visible retreat from an international law-based order, marked by rising unilateralism, intensifying geopolitical rivalry, selective application of norms, and growing strain on the UN Charter’s collective security scheme. Drawing on Sierra Leone’s Council experience and the framing of Amani Africa’s 2026 Pre-AU Summit High-level Dialogue on ‘Africa at a Crossroads: Pan-Africanism, the breakdown of global order, and the Future of Collective Security,’ this paper argues that the present moment, while destabilizing, also creates strategic space for African recalibration. Four interrelated pathways emerge: consolidation of African solidarity through the A3 and A3 Plus; principled African engagement on global crises beyond the continent; strategic navigation of multipolarity through coalition-building and stronger resource-governance safeguards; and a dual reform agenda centered on Security Council reform and operational subsidiarity under Chapter VIII. The paper concludes that Africa’s policy task is neither inward retreat nor rhetorical resistance, but the practical advancement of African agency: investing in African solutions while sustaining global relevance through principled, coalition-based diplomacy.
