Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow at Amani Africa and Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan

 

We are living through a rupture in the global order.

This is not a passing crisis, a cyclical downturn, or a temporary disruption. It is a rupture—moral, political, institutional, and ideological. The assumptions that governed global life for decades are not merely eroding; they are being openly repudiated. Power is no longer cloaked in the language of universal values. It is asserted through identity, exclusion, hierarchy, and fear.

This rupture is not abstract. It is already reshaping how the world organizes power, mobility, security, and value. Within this context, Africa now confronts a new scramble—quieter than the colonial past, but no less consequential.

The United States’ 2025 National Security Strategy’ illustrates this shift. It reads less like a traditional security document and more like a civilizational manifesto. Its central anxiety is not war, climate collapse, or nuclear escalation—but migration. Immigration is framed not as a policy challenge, but as a civilizational threat. A racialized fear is projected outward onto the world.

Stopping migration has become doctrine—exported through alliances, embedded in diplomacy, and enforced far beyond American borders. This is not simply border control; it is population control by proxy. Collective security is mocked. International cooperation is belittled. Global public goods are treated as illusions. Multilateralism itself is recast as a shackle—an obstacle to the exercise of raw power.

From certain capitals, this may appear to be a return to classical geostrategy, in which the world is divided into spheres of influence. Across the global South, however, it evokes something more familiar. Colonialism was geo-kleptocracy.

Those who witnessed Apartheid and its ‘homelands‘—low-wage reservoirs designed for extraction—will recognize the pattern. Stealing countries was the ultimate form of global kleptocracy.

For Africa, this shift is existential.

A century and a half ago, the continent was carved up by imperial powers who treated sovereignty as a commodity to be sliced, ranked, and traded. Aborting the organic process of the forming of indigenous political entities, this process produced the most arbitrarily contrived fragments in the service of colonial powers. This bequeathed Africa administrative shells designed for extraction, not autonomy.

The leaders of independence believed they had won the political kingdom. Yet when they took control of their new capitals, they discovered that the structures they inherited were little more than fortified trading posts—designed to serve the interest of the metropole and for stifling strategic autonomy and self-determination.

Africa’s agency has therefore never rested in the nation-state alone. It has rested in collective action. In Pan-Africanism.

Thus viewed, Pan-Africanism is not nostalgia. It is political technology for survival in a hostile world system and for unshackling Africa from the chains that locked it into the global system.

As Africa sought and seeks an international system in which it gets its due, it does not consider multilateralism anchored on the UN to be optional. It is existential.

Multilateralism is existential particularly where historical, political, socio-economic and geo-strategic conditions get in the way of Pan-African collective action.

Africa has often been failed by multilateral institutions. History is equally clear: Africa (as shackled as it has been and let down by its leaders) without multilateralism is Africa without leverage.

This is why attempts to bypass African multilateral institutions—whether in peace processes, economic negotiations, or security arrangements—are not neutral acts. They replace collective leverage with bilateral dependency.

THE NEW SCRAMBLE

Today’s scramble does not arrive with gunboats. It arrives through contracts, currency, legal instruments, digital infrastructure agreements, and critical minerals partnerships. Sometimes there are spectacular displays of force meant to send a message. More often, the mechanisms are quiet.

The danger is not engagement. Africa must engage the world. The danger lies in how Africa is engaging—fragmented, reactive, and uncoordinated—precisely at the moment when external actors are acting strategically when they engage Africa.

Fragmentation has become Africa’s primary strategic vulnerability.

Here is the paradox of our time. Africa has never mattered more. By 2030, nearly 1.7 billion people will live on the continent, including 40 percent of the world’s youth. Africa holds minerals essential to the green and digital transitions. Its geography anchors vital maritime routes.

In objective terms, Africa has leverage.

But leverage unused is leverage lost. And the reason is simple: disunity.

Fifty-five states negotiating separately. Trade deals concluded country by country. Mineral agreements signed in isolation. Data governance frameworks outsourced without shared standards.

External actors arrive with scale and long-term strategy. Africa responds with improvisation and short-term calculation. Even when individual deals appear attractive, their cumulative effect is erosion.

Fragmentation enables powerful actors to play states against one another—to extract concessions incrementally and shape rules Africa did not help write.

The pattern is not new. When preferential trade regimes were replaced by reciprocal arrangements, African economies suffered deeply. Industries collapsed and jobs disappeared. Yet the response was not collective; it was bilateral petitioning.

The same pattern now appears in critical minerals. Some states restrict exports. Others prioritize rapid extraction. Others advocate local processing. Each approach is rational on its own. Together, they form no strategy.

Without shared principles on value addition and safeguards, Africa remains a price-taker in industries it should help shape.

This fragmentation extends beyond economics—to migration policy, energy transition, and digital sovereignty. Africa is not setting the agenda. It is reacting to agendas set elsewhere.

Once again, sovereignty risks becoming a commodity—sliced, ranked, and traded. Not only by traditional great powers, but by rising middle powers as well.

Africa’s future is debated in rooms where Africans are either absent—or present without influence.

The emergence of private or semi-private diplomatic mechanisms raises further questions about the future of collective security. If mediation becomes transactional—if peace becomes an investment opportunity—what becomes of the principles embedded in the charters of continental and global institutions?

Will African institutions defend their mandates? Or will they defer to ad hoc structures shaped by private interest driven external power?

This dilemma is particularly acute because Africa’s own peace and security architecture has weakened. Norms exist. Institutions exist. But political will, commitment to Pan-Africanism and the drive for engaging in the difficult task of crafting imaginative collective solutions have withered.

Institutional limitation cannot become an alibi for capitulation. Moments of global upheaval demand coordination, moral courage, political imagination and leadership.

Africa does not require uniformity. It requires agreed minimums—baseline negotiating principles, solidarity mechanisms to prevent isolation, and the discipline to refuse piecemeal bargaining.

Africa must no longer negotiate its future piece by piece.

LEADERSHIP, SILENCE, AND RESPONSIBILITY

The most dangerous element of this moment is not external pressure. It is Africa’s silence.

That silence reflects a deeper leadership deficit. Too many leaders are products of fragile systems—elevated through survival skills, external sponsorship, or transactional compromise rather than vision and legitimacy.

At a moment demanding courage, Africa is governed by managerial survivalism. Bureaucratic Pan-Africanism administers decline instead of confronting history.

This vacuum invites manipulation. It emboldens insult. It fragments Africa state by state.

Africa has known another tradition—leaders who understood Africa not as geography, but as a political project.

That caliber of leadership is rare today. Yet Africa’s promise remains intact.

Africans must not accept defensive politics. A renewed Pan-Africanism—rooted in dignity, justice, and agency—is not optional. It is necessary.

Africa must engage the world as it is—but never at the cost of dignity.

IN CLOSING

The question is no longer whether Africa matters. It does.

The question is whether Africa will matter on its own terms and for its own interest.

History does not reward potential. It rewards organization and resolve.

The emerging global order is visible. The rank being assigned to Africa is visible. If that rank is accepted today, it may define the continent’s position for generations.

This is not a call for confrontation. It is a call for coordination.

If Africa acts together, this rupture can mark the beginning of strategic autonomy. If it does not, the new scramble will end quietly—without conquest, but with consequences just as enduring and damaging.

The responsibility rests in thought, political and organizational leadership.

History is watching.

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

In a report he presented to the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly on 14 February 2026 underway at the AU Headquarters in his capacity as the African Union (AU) Champion for the Institutional Reform of the AU, President Ruto proposed the development of ‘African foreign policy’ by five ‘foreign policy experts’ for submission and adoption by the AU Assembly during its 40th ordinary session.

This is one of many proposals put forward by the Champion in the quest to overhaul the AU institutions and make the AU fit for the challenges and changes taking place in the world. As the report pointed out, ‘[i]n an era shifting global power dynamics, Africa must reposition itself as a coherent and influential actor in shaping international norms, security and governance.’

There are at least two factors that make such repositioning imperative for Africa and the AU. The first relate to the expanding profile of the AU in global governance and the increasing demand and need for Africa to adopt position on matters of global governance. These expectations arise, among others, in the context of AU’s membership in the G20 and the role of the African three plus (A3) members of the UN Security Council. The second factor is the emergence of what Abdul Mohamed called ‘assertive external actors pursuing bilateral advantage at the expense of collective order.’

As the report that Amani Africa released on the eve of the AU Assembly observed, ‘[d]espite growing demand for the continent’s resources, diplomatic support, and political alignment, Africa continues to approach international partnerships largely through fragmented bilateral channels.’ This continues to cost Africa enormously as it limits collective leverage and reinforces asymmetrical relationships.

As natural resources, particularly critical minerals, increasingly become sites of geopolitical contestation, in a time when multilateral frameworks are unravelling and transactional and extractivist approaches take primacy, African states are exposed to another scramble for Africa, with major and middle powers targeting them individually & hence at their weakest. As Amani Africa’s report pointed out, Africa risks remaining exposed to competitive external pressures and transactional and extractive arrangements that avail Africa, and prioritise fleeting benefits that are no more than crumbs over substantive and strategic immediate and long-term interests.’

It would indeed be irresponsible for Africa to continue in a business-as-usual manner as far as international relations are concerned in the face of the unravelling of the multilateral system. Doing so would be condemning Africa to the vagaries of global disorder. It is against this background that Amani Africa’s report situated the development of common African foreign policy both as strategic imperative and a timely act. It thus held, Institutionalising a common pan-African foreign policy would provide the political and strategic framework on how Africa can advance its collective interests and project its voice effectively. Apart from serving as a necessary tool for shielding African states from the predatory tendencies of a time in which ‘anarchy is loosed upon the world’, such a common pan-African foreign policy would provide the framework for more effectively negotiating and coordinating common positions.’

The Champion’s proposal for African Common Foreign Policy avails Africa additional advantages. Such a common foreign policy also becomes ‘the basis for undertaking periodic continental strategic assessment that could avail unified analysis of global trends, external actors’ strategies, and emerging risks, thereby enabling Africa to plan and engage proactively rather than reactively.

For the AU as well, such a common African foreign policy would also provide the much-needed point of reference for reorganising and reimagining the role of the AU’s representational offices.’

Surely, adopting such a common foreign policy is necessary but not sufficient. Without commitment to such a policy and willingness to act collectively, Africa is unlikely to harness the opportunities such a foreign policy avails. It thus needs to be backed by an institutional framework that catalyses political will and commitment for the implementation of the policy.

Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow at Amani Africa and Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

A Moment of Convergence — and Risk

After nearly three years of devastating war, Sudan stands at a dangerous but decisive moment. Millions are displaced. Famine advances. Civilians are targeted deliberately. The state has been hollowed out. What began as a power struggle within the security establishment has evolved into a regionalised conflict system sustained by external actors, war economies, and geopolitical competition.

Yet, amid this devastation, something important is happening. Mediation efforts that once moved in parallel — African, trans-regional, and international — are slowly, painfully, and hesitantly moving toward some form of convergence. This convergence, however incomplete and thin, opens a window of opportunity.

That window must not be wasted.

The immediate imperative is clear: the war must stop. An immediate humanitarian truce is indispensable. It is not a concession. Sparing Sudanese from further death, mayhem and displacement is a moral and political necessity. But a truce cannot become an end in itself. It must be explicitly and credibly linked to a parallel political process aimed at restoring civilian authority and democratic self-determination.

This is very difficult — but it is doable.

War dynamics and deal-making among powerful external actors, particularly within the Quad, may shift the sequencing of negotiations. Adjustments may be necessary. The order in which security, humanitarian, and political tracks unfold may need recalibration. But if the overarching objective remains Sudan’s unity and sustainable peace, then maintaining convergence around a common political end-state of a comprehensive political settlement is indispensable.

Sudan’s predicament cannot be remedied by reverting to failed ideologies or procedural fixes. The crisis reflects long cycles of militarisation, exclusion, and broken democratic promises. Yet across decades and in the current difficult context— from uprisings to neighbourhood resistance committees — the Sudanese people have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a persistent demand for dignity and self-rule.

The challenge now is to craft a political order that finally matches the integrity and democratic aspirations of the Sudanese populace. That will require honesty, new thinking, and a break from formalistic responses that confuse activity with progress.

Sudan’s war has outgrown the mediation models currently applied to it. Unless that mismatch is addressed directly, even well-intentioned initiatives risk stabilising violence rather than resolving it.

A War Beyond Traditional Mediation

Sudan’s war is no longer primarily sustained by internal political disagreement. It has evolved into a regionalised conflict system driven by three forces: a struggle over sovereignty and coercive authority inside Sudan; a transnational war economy benefiting domestic and external actors; and sustained political, military, and financial intervention by regional and extra-regional powers.

Most mediation efforts have focused on elite bargaining between belligerents while treating war economies and external sponsors as secondary factors. The result has been repeated cycles of talks that unravel as battlefield realities or external incentives shift.

Mediation has been procedural when it needed to be structural.

Against this backdrop, five possible trajectories now confront Sudan.

Scenario One: Procedural Mediation and Strategic Drift

Under this scenario, mediation continues largely as it has. Ceasefires are negotiated. Conferences are convened. Civilian actors are consulted but not empowered. External actors are acknowledged but not structurally engaged.

The assumption is that persistence and incremental sequencing will eventually yield progress.

The likely outcome is a prolonged stalemate. Armed actors participate tactically. Civilian forces grow disillusioned. Institutional credibility erodes slowly. Mediation becomes a permanent process without transformation — a technical ritual bereft of strategic significance and outcome.

Scenario Two: Humanitarian De-escalation Without Political Settlement

Here, the immediate priority becomes stopping violence through negotiated truces and humanitarian access arrangements, even if political questions are deferred.

This approach may save lives in the short term. Such an outcome is of itself significant for civilians. It should not be dismissed. Indeed, a humanitarian truce is urgently needed.

But if such de-escalation is not explicitly linked to a political process, it risks entrenching militarised governance. Ceasefires become instruments of consolidation rather than transition. Relief becomes conditional on compliance by armed actors.

The danger is a frozen conflict — quieter, but structurally unchanged.

Scenario Three: Civilian Convergence Without Leverage

In this trajectory, Sudanese civilian forces and segments of the international community align around a shared vision for civilian rule. Declarations multiply. Political clarity increases. Fragmentation is reduced.

This convergence is necessary and welcome, although the pathway to that is yet to be found.

But without leverage over war economies and external sponsors, alignment alone cannot shift power on the ground. Expectations rise without mechanisms to meet them. Civilian unity risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

Convergence without leverage produces frustration.

Scenario Four: Deal-Driven Stabilisation — The Board of Peace Model

A more consequential trajectory is emerging. With the establishment of a Board of Peace under U.S. chairmanship and the growing centrality of the Quad, Sudan may become a candidate for essentially a deal-driven stabilisation.

Under this model, similar to scenario two, the priority is immediate cessation of fighting. Negotiations focus on belligerents and their sponsors. Political settlement is deferred. Unlike scenario two, material incentives and strategic bargains replace structural transformation.

Multilateral institutions may provide retrospective endorsement, converting power arrangements into formally legitimate ones.

Such a model may produce rapid de-escalation. It may mobilise leverage unavailable to traditional mediation.

But such an arrangement could entail:  Sovereignty may be functionally outsourced. Civilian politics may be indefinitely postponed. Sudan could enter a trusteeship-like condition governed through external deal-making.

For Africa, the precedent could be consequential: the deferring of multilateralism in favour of ad hoc power arrangements and the total loss of any agency on the governance of the affairs of the continent.

Scenario Five: Re-Engineered Mediation — Convergence with Leverage

The final scenario does not reject the others. It learns from them.

From Scenario One, it retains procedural discipline and institutional continuity. From Scenario Two, it affirms the urgent necessity of a humanitarian truce. From Scenario Three, it preserves and deepens civilian convergence. From Scenario Four, it recognises that real leverage — including that held by powerful external actors — cannot be ignored.

But it integrates these elements into a redesigned, power-aware mediation architecture.

This approach would secure an immediate humanitarian truce; explicitly link that truce to a parallel, time-bound political process; structure engagement with external sponsors; introduce mechanisms to disrupt war economies; reframe neutrality as principled engagement with power; and preserve African multilateral relevance while utilising available leverage responsibly.

Sequencing may shift. Tactical adjustments may be necessary. But the end-state — a united Sudan governed through a constitutional trajectory — must remain explicit and non-negotiable.

Durable stability for citizens, neighbours, and investors alike depends on democratic self-determination. Anything less will produce only temporary calm.

Choosing Intention Over Drift

Sudan is at a crossroads — not only between war and peace, but between competing doctrines of mediation.

Stopping the war is imperative. A humanitarian truce is urgent. But peace cannot be reduced to containment, nor politics postponed indefinitely.

Sudan’s people have repeatedly demonstrated courage, dignity, and resistance. What is required now is a mediation strategy worthy of that resilience — one that matches moral clarity with structural realism.

The choice before Sudan and its partners is not between realism and principle. It is between managed disorder and intentional transformation.

Peace remains possible — but only if convergence is secured and preserved, leverage is structured, and Sudanese political agency, buttressed by pan-African multilateral support, is placed at the centre.