African Union’s financing envoy calls for financing sovereignty as AU plans an extraordinary ministerial session
African Union’s financing envoy calls for financing sovereignty as AU plans an extraordinary ministerial session
Date | 26 May 2026
The question of financing is taking centre stage in the policy discussions on the African Union’s (AU) role in peace and security. It is in this context that the Eminent Panel of Experts on the review of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the AU Champion on Institutional Reform proposed to increase the capitalisation of the Peace Fund from its current $400 million to $1billion, although this did not receive the enthusiastic support of AU member states.
In addition to the near existential financial crisis afflicting the AU Stabilisation Support Mission to Somalia (AUSSOM), the financing challenge facing the AU can also be drawn from the fact that the lion’s share of the peace and security fund of the AU in 2025 was not from member states contributions. When it comes to member states’ contribution to peace operations, the lack of progress in meeting the Johannesburg target of 25% becomes even more glaring. The July 2024 Executive Council decision (EX.CL/Dec.1265(XLV) carrying the 2025 budget indicated that ‘peace support operations with a budget of US$52,929,131’ was ‘funded by International Partners.’
In the context of the major shifts in the nature of international relations involving, among others, the drying up of traditional sources of financing, enhanced self-reliance has become a strategic imperative. This was highlighted in the context of Donald Kaberuka’s recent engagement with the AU. Last March, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) held consultations with Donald Kaberuka, the AU Special Envoy on Sustainable Financing for the Union and Financing for Peace in Africa. Kaberuka informed member states that times have changed and Africa needs to adapt accordingly. On the preceding day, the High Representative also met with the Chairperson of the AU Commission.
During his engagement with the PSC, Kaberuka underscored the imperative for the AU to rely more decisively on its own financing mechanisms, including the Peace Fund, while expanding partnerships with the private sector and African financial institutions.
He also emphasised the importance of equitable access to UN-assessed contributions through fair burden-sharing arrangements to support African-led peace operations. While this proposition is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2719, it is worth recalling that as far as AU-led PSOs authorized under Chapter VII by the UN Security Council is concerned emphasis should be put on the legal and institutional responsibility of the UN for bearing the cost of such mission with AU and its member states bearing the burden that is paid with the lives and limbs of troops and the financial costs associated with the mobilization of such troops.
While its sustainability remains to be seen, the Peace Fund Secretariat has initiated efforts to source funds from such sources as the private sector and African financial institutions, as well as high-net-worth individuals. Thus, high-level pledging events convened in 2024 and 2025 mobilised some commitments. For instance, in 2024, Afreximbank pledged $210 million over three years, while Standard Bank Group and Ethiopian Airlines committed $1 million each. In 2025, additional contributions were secured from institutions such as Africa Reinsurance (Africa Re) ($1 million), United Bank for Africa (UBA) ($500,000), and the African Trade & Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI). Despite these contributions, available resources remain inadequate to meet the continent’s growing peace and security needs.
Across his engagements at the AU in March, Kaberuka stressed the broader objective of strengthening the Union’s financial sovereignty, particularly in light of shifting geopolitical dynamics that are placing increasing strain on the financial position of multilateral institutions. In his X post, Kaberuka further noted that while international solidarity remains important, the AU should fund itself, characterising the financing challenge as ‘longstanding’ but now requiring resolution.
One of the important avenues for advancing the aspiration of self-financing lies in the implementation of decision AU/Dec.605(XXVII) of July 2016, which instituted the 0.2% import levy on eligible imports as a sustainable financing mechanism for the Union. However, progress in this regard has been limited. In 2018, the AU reported that only 16 Member States were implementing the Kigali Decision on the 0.2% levy; by 2025, that number had increased by only one.
The dismal state of progress in meeting the Kigali targets is not without consequences. As the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission pointed out in her address to the opening of the 50th ordinary session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of the AU on 9 June 2025, apart from perpetuating heavy reliance on external funding and thereby deferring the ambition of ownership, the funding challenge significantly ‘constrained the AUC’s capacity to effectively implement the decisions of the Policy Organs and strategic priorities.’ Additionally, this funding constraint, Haddadi pointed out, ‘has significantly hindered the effective implementation of security and safety standards.’
In addition to the adverse impacts of the funding challenges to AU’s mandate, Kaberuka’s engagements took place against the backdrop of decisions adopted by the AU Assembly at its 39th Ordinary Session on financing the Union. The Assembly adopted several key measures aimed at strengthening the Union’s financial sustainability. Among others, it:
- Requested the High Representative for Financing the Union, with the support of the Commission, to undertake further consultations with Member States to strengthen consensus on key strategic financing issues.
- Requested the High Representative to expedite consultations on progress made in the overall financing of the Union.
- Directed the Executive Council to convene an Extra-Ordinary Session, bringing together Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance of Member States to strengthen the Financing of the Union and the Peace Fund, in line with Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.687 (XXX) of January 2018, not later than November 2026.
- Requested the AU High Representative for Financing the Union to present a report to the above-mentioned Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council.
- Decided to leverage internal financial resources and the support of African Financial Institutions to complement Member States’ contributions in financing the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
- Directed the Executive Council to invite Chief Executive Officers of African Financial Institutions to participate in the Extraordinary Session to consider funding modalities for the priority programmes of Agenda 2063.
- Requested the Chairperson of the Commission and the AU High Representative for Financing, in close consultation with the Bureau of the Assembly, the PSC and the three African Members of the UN Security Council (A3+), to re-engage and advocate for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) on predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).
It remains to be seen if this upcoming executive council extraordinary session will adopt a decision that fundamentally changes the current funding trajectory of the AU.
Annual Activity Report of Amani Africa 2025
Annual Activity Report of Amani Africa 2025
Message from Our Founding Director
Solomon A. Dersso, PhD
Founding Director
Dear friends of Amani Africa,
It is certain that the 2020s would be registered in history as the most defining decade in the unravelling of the post-1945 world order. Events in 2025 both here in Africa and the world over from the emergence of a new era of insecurity and instability and African Union’s eroding influence in advancing peace and security to the collapse of development aid, the proliferation of internationalised wars fought without limits and with impunity and the replacement of principled peace-making with transactional ceasefire deals are reflections of the shifts constituting this unravelling.
While these disruptive developments are making the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy more daunting, they make it more urgent and necessary to, at least, mitigate suffering, if not to resolve the sources of such suffering. In this context, the work of institutions like Amani Africa contributing to the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy in this age of disorder is more, not less, necessary than ever before. As we also face growing constraints amidst pressing needs, we persisted in sustaining our work, through both optimising the limited, and even shrinking, resources we have and leveraging existing and new partnerships.
In this context of disorder and constraints, we focused our efforts on making our work count through catalysing sustained multilateral engagement in the most pressing conflict situations and issues through the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) in particular but not exclusively. Even when such engagement fell short of changing the fundamentals of those situations, our work contributed to its sustenance in order to keep the plight of affected populations caught in the crossfire of conflicts on the spotlight and to push against the normalisation of violent conflicts. As the outputs and results produced during 2025 attest, the work of Amani Africa also continues to serve as repository of knowledge and institutional memory and to advance transparency and enhanced understanding of AU’s policy making and Africa’s role in a changing global dynamic. At the same time, it also sought to push against and chart out ways of arresting the further erosion and risk of loss of established norms and institutional legitimacy.
The increasing attention we continued to dedicate in our work to global governance is not just as response to and about addressing the challenges posed by the unravelling world order with a particular focus on Africa. It is also in pursuit of identifying and supporting how Africa can expand the projection of its voice, including through the AU, in the thinking and working towards the transformation of the world order.
Clearly, the nature of the challenges of this era has intensified the force of the temptation to give in not just to despair but even to cynicism. Yet, these are also times for more responsibility and doubling down on the search for peace and for ending the human suffering that the unravelling occasions and contributes to. It is in this spirit that Amani Africa undertook its activities during 2025 and presents highlights of these activities in the pages that follow.
I wish to thank all of you who accompanied and supported us during 2025. May all our collective efforts open the avenues for a peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa that is a force for good in the world!
Please read our annual report for more from the link here: https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Annual-Activity-Report-of-Amani-Africa-2025.pdf
Message from Amani Africa Founding Director
Annual Activity Report of Amani Africa 2025
Message from Our Founding Director
Solomon A. Dersso, PhD
Founding Director
Dear friends of Amani Africa,
It is certain that the 2020s would be registered in history as the most defining decade in the unravelling of the post-1945 world order. Events in 2025 both here in Africa and the world over from the emergence of a new era of insecurity and instability and African Union’s eroding influence in advancing peace and security to the collapse of development aid, the proliferation of internationalised wars fought without limits and with impunity and the replacement of principled peace-making with transactional ceasefire deals are reflections of the shifts constituting this unravelling.
While these disruptive developments are making the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy more daunting, they make it more urgent and necessary to, at least, mitigate suffering, if not to resolve the sources of such suffering. In this context, the work of institutions like Amani Africa contributing to the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy in this age of disorder is more, not less, necessary than ever before. As we also face growing constraints amidst pressing needs, we persisted in sustaining our work, through both optimising the limited, and even shrinking, resources we have and leveraging existing and new partnerships.
In this context of disorder and constraints, we focused our efforts on making our work count through catalysing sustained multilateral engagement in the most pressing conflict situations and issues through the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) in particular but not exclusively. Even when such engagement fell short of changing the fundamentals of those situations, our work contributed to its sustenance in order to keep the plight of affected populations caught in the crossfire of conflicts on the spotlight and to push against the normalisation of violent conflicts. As the outputs and results produced during 2025 attest, the work of Amani Africa also continues to serve as repository of knowledge and institutional memory and to advance transparency and enhanced understanding of AU’s policy making and Africa’s role in a changing global dynamic. At the same time, it also sought to push against and chart out ways of arresting the further erosion and risk of loss of established norms and institutional legitimacy.
The increasing attention we continued to dedicate in our work to global governance is not just as response to and about addressing the challenges posed by the unravelling world order with a particular focus on Africa. It is also in pursuit of identifying and supporting how Africa can expand the projection of its voice, including through the AU, in the thinking and working towards the transformation of the world order.
Clearly, the nature of the challenges of this era has intensified the force of the temptation to give in not just to despair but even to cynicism. Yet, these are also times for more responsibility and doubling down on the search for peace and for ending the human suffering that the unravelling occasions and contributes to. It is in this spirit that Amani Africa undertook its activities during 2025 and presents highlights of these activities in the pages that follow.
I wish to thank all of you who accompanied and supported us during 2025. May all our collective efforts open the avenues for a peaceful, prosperous and integrated Africa that is a force for good in the world!
Please read our annual report for more from the link here: https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Annual-Activity-Report-of-Amani-Africa-2025.pdf
Update on the political transition and security situation in Guinea-Bissau
Update on the political transition and security situation in Guinea-Bissau
Date | 17 May 2026
Tomorrow (18 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1347th session to receive an update on the political transition and security situation in Guinea-Bissau.
The session will proceed in two segments. In the opening segment, an opening statement will be delivered by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, followed by introductory remarks by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Patrice Émery Trovoada, AU Special Envoy for Guinea-Bissau, is also scheduled to brief the Council, while the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is expected to make a statement. Ovídio Manuel Barbosa Pequeno, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission to Guinea-Bissau will make presentation during the closed segment.
This will be the second time the PSC meeting on the situation in Guinea-Bissau in less than three months, with the previous meeting having been convened on 5 March during its 1333rd session. At that session, the PSC took note of the adoption of a Transitional Roadmap for the restoration of constitutional order, which provides for a one-year transitional period culminating in elections scheduled for 6 December 2026. In this context, the PSC urged the full, timely, inclusive, and transparent implementation of the roadmap in accordance with the agreed timelines, in order to create the necessary conditions for the successful organisation of credible elections. The PSC also called on the interim authorities in Guinea-Bissau to immediately and unconditionally release Mr Domingos Simões Pereira and all other political detainees, and to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens of Guinea-Bissau. In addition, the Council directed the AU Commission to sustain engagement with the transitional authorities, including through the provision of technical support to the National Election Commission, while stressing the importance of an inclusive national dialogue involving all political movements, civil society, women, and youth. Furthermore, the Council also expressed its anticipation for the AU-ECOWAS joint assessment mission and decided to undertake a field mission to the country during the course of 2026.
As noted in our Monthly Digest for March 2026, the PSC’s focus appears to have shifted from the position it adopted at its 1315th session — where the Council specifically urged the military leaders to allow the completion of the electoral process disrupted by the military coup of 26 November 2025 — towards supporting the country’s progression towards the envisaged elections in December 2026. Against this background, tomorrow’s engagement is expected to focus on ways of steering the country towards a timely, inclusive, transparent, and credible electoral process, while also assessing recent political and security developments that have taken place since the Council’s last session in March.
Political repression appears to have worsened following the November 2025 military coup, with conditions for media freedom and civil liberties also deteriorating. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights characterises the political environment in the country since the coup as reflecting a ‘progressive reduction in civic and democratic space.’ It has been noted that members of the opposition and human rights defenders have been arbitrarily detained, assaulted, harassed and intimidated, that demonstrations have been dispersed, and that radio stations have been suspended.
Two recent developments in particular underscore this characterisation of worsening political repression and the shrinking of political space, with serious implications for the creation of an enabling environment for the upcoming elections.
The first is the killing of Vigário Luís Balanta, a civil society activist and critic of Guinea-Bissau’s military authorities. His body was found on 31 March 2026 on the outskirts of Bissau, reportedly bearing signs of torture. The killing triggered protests in the capital following his funeral, which were subsequently dispersed by police. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed shock at the killing and called for an urgent, thorough, and impartial investigation and for those responsible to be brought to justice through fair trial proceedings. It further reiterated concerns that members of the opposition and human rights defenders have been arbitrarily detained, assaulted, harassed and intimidated, and that demonstrations have been dispersed.
The second concerning development is the reported crackdown on media outlets, particularly radio stations, allegedly linked to issues of licensing fees. The PSC may also wish to follow up on the status of Domingos Simões Pereira, leader of the opposition PAIGC, who was detained following the coup and, although reportedly released in late January, is still said to remain under house arrest.
As the elections are now less than seven months away, robust high-level diplomatic engagement by the AU Commission is imperative to keep the transition on course and ensure the successful completion of the transitional process through the holding of timely elections in a politically conducive environment. While the appointment of a Special Envoy for Guinea-Bissau by the Chairperson of the AU Commission is an encouraging step towards sustaining diplomatic engagement with the country and accompanying it throughout the transition period, this should also be complemented by high-level political engagement, including a mission to the country at the level of the Chairperson of the Commission or the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, aimed at creating conditions conducive to competitive elections. Such engagement would be particularly effective if undertaken jointly with ECOWAS, in order to maximise leverage on the transitional authorities and ensure coherent messaging by both organisations.
Moreover, as highlighted during the PSC’s 1333rd session, there is a need for the AU to provide technical support to strengthen the capacity of institutions relevant to the conduct of credible elections, including the National Electoral Commission and the independence of the Supreme Court, which serves as the ultimate judicial authority overseeing the electoral process in the country. To translate this into concrete action, the PSC may consider requesting the AU Commission to dispatch a technical assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau to evaluate the electoral environment and identify priority support needs.
Another issue of interest to the Council could be ensuring that the upcoming elections are conducted in line with the AU’s anti-coup norms, particularly article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections organised to restore constitutional order. This issue is particularly significant in light of the recent trend within the Council of retreating from strict adherence to article 25(4), as reflected in the lifting of sanctions on Gabon and Guinea in 2025 and 2026, respectively, despite elections in both countries conducted in apparent contravention of this provision. The PSC also omitted reference to the provision during its recent sessions on Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar held in March 2025. It is recalled that the AU Chairperson for 2025, Angola’s President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, emphasised during the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February 2026 that the restoration of constitutional order cannot be deemed complete where those who seize power unconstitutionally subsequently organise elections and legitimise their rule through electoral victory. In this regard, it remains important for the Council to stress the continued relevance of this provision and to clearly remind the transitional authorities of their ineligibility to participate in the upcoming elections.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may emphasise the importance of creating political conditions conducive to credible elections in Guinea-Bissau, as a prerequisite for the successful completion of the transition process. It may further underline the need to respect fundamental human rights and the rule of law in the country. In this regard, and echoing the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Council may express concern over the deteriorating civic and democratic space following the November 2025 military coup. It may also condemn the brutal killing of civil society activist Vigário Luís Balanta and call for an urgent, thorough, and impartial investigation into the killing, as well as the prosecution of those responsible. The PSC may further reiterate the importance of strengthening electoral institutions and ensuring the independence of the Supreme Court in order to safeguard the integrity of the upcoming December elections. In this context, the Council may request the AU Commission to dispatch a technical assessment mission to evaluate electoral conditions and identify the necessary support needs. While emphasising the imperative of sustained and coordinated diplomatic engagement with the transitional authorities to ensure a successful transition, the PSC may request the Commission to undertake a high-level political mission led by the Chairperson of the Commission or the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, in coordination with ECOWAS. It may also follow up on its previous decision to undertake a field mission by specifying a clear timeline, as well as by establishing an AU monitoring mechanism to effectively track developments in the country.
Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)
Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)
Date | 14 May 2026
Tomorrow (15 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to discuss the Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG).
Following opening remarks by Nasir Aminu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the AU and Chair of the PSC for May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that presentations will be delivered by Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), representative of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF), and the Representative of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to deliver statements.
The Gulf of Guinea remains one of Africa’s most strategically significant maritime spaces due to its role in international trade, energy exports, and access to strategic natural resources. Stretching approximately 6,000 kilometres from Senegal to Angola and encompassing 19 coastal states, the region facilitates nearly 90% of the international trade of West and Central African coastal countries. The Gulf also contains substantial oil, gas, and mineral reserves, including cobalt, manganese, bauxite, uranium, tin, and diamonds, which continue to reinforce its economic and geopolitical importance. The increasing strategic value of the region has also intensified both regional and international interest in securing maritime routes and protecting offshore infrastructure.
The PSC’s discussion is expected to take place against the backdrop of important progress in reducing piracy. Since the peak of piracy incidents in the 2010s, the region has recorded a significant decline in attacks. Reported incidents declined from 115 in 2020 to 22 in 2023, 18 in 2024, and 21 in 2025. According to the ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre, only one reported theft-at-sea incident was recorded in the first quarter of 2026. This decline reflects the cumulative impact of improved regional coordination, increased naval patrols, international maritime cooperation, and strengthened maritime surveillance mechanisms. Regional frameworks such as the Yaoundé Architecture, combined with national initiatives including Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project, have contributed significantly to enhancing maritime domain awareness and response capabilities.
However, despite these improvements, the PSC is expected to note that the reduction in piracy has not necessarily translated into a fully secure maritime environment. Rather, maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea have evolved and diversified. Criminal actors are increasingly shifting toward less visible but more sophisticated forms of maritime criminality, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of narcotics and arms, fuel smuggling, oil theft, and maritime-linked organised crime networks.
Among these threats, IUU fishing has emerged as one of the most serious and persistent challenges confronting the region. Estimates indicate that between 40% and 65% of fish catches in parts of the Gulf of Guinea may result from illegal fishing activities, with annual regional losses estimated at approximately $2.3 billion. Beyond economic losses, IUU fishing has become an important security concern due to its impact on food security, livelihoods, and social stability within coastal communities. The depletion of fish stocks and declining livelihoods for artisanal fishers contribute to economic desperation and increase vulnerability to criminal recruitment and participation in illicit maritime economies.
The PSC is also likely to consider the growing interconnection between maritime insecurity and wider regional instability. Maritime trafficking routes are increasingly linked to inland conflict economies and armed groups operating across the Sahel. The Gulf of Guinea has become an important corridor for the movement of narcotics, arms, fuel, and other illicit goods connecting Latin America, West Africa, Europe, and the Sahel. In 2022 alone, authorities reportedly seized more than 16,000 kilograms of cocaine in West Africa. The increasing use of ‘dark vessels’ that disable tracking systems further illustrates the growing sophistication of criminal networks operating in the region.
At the same time, the southward spread of violent extremism from the Sahel into northern areas of coastal states such as Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire is increasingly blurring the distinction between inland and maritime security threats. This evolving security environment has contributed to a growing recognition that maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea must be addressed through integrated approaches that combine maritime operations with governance reform, development interventions, and regional security cooperation.
It is within this context that the PSC is considering the implementation of the CMTF in tackling maritime insecurity in the region. The PSC first introduced the need for a maritime task force during its 1012th session held on 23 July 2021, where it called for enhanced cooperation among African littoral states through the establishment of a Maritime Task Force. This political commitment gradually evolved into concrete operational planning through subsequent PSC sessions.
In this regard, during its 1275th session held on 23 April 2025, the PSC formally endorsed the CMTF as a standing and ready-to-deploy maritime force for the Gulf of Guinea, reaffirming its vision of promoting a secure and resilient maritime environment free from transnational organised crime and maritime insecurity. This endorsement marked an important step in transitioning the CMTF from a conceptual initiative into an institutionalised regional maritime security mechanism within the AU peace and security architecture. To this end, the CONOPS explicitly requires formal PSC authorisation to secure broader political, technical, and financial support from the AU, the United Nations, and international partners. Such authorisation is critical not only for providing continental political legitimacy to the Task Force, but also for anchoring it within broader continental frameworks, including the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS), the Lomé Charter, and the ‘Silencing the Guns’ initiative.
Beyond the Gulf of Guinea, the operationalisation of the CMTF is also likely to contribute to broader continental maritime security efforts, particularly the implementation of the Regional Maritime Command Post Exercise within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF), proposed by the PSC during its 1128th session in December 2022. In this respect, the PSC is expected to follow up on progress toward strengthening the maritime dimension of the ASF through enhanced interoperability, joint operational planning, and coordinated maritime responses. The CMTF could therefore serve not only as a regional security mechanism for the Gulf of Guinea, but also as a pilot framework for strengthening the ASF’s maritime component and advancing AU-led maritime operational readiness more broadly.
While the CMTF is designed as an operational maritime security mechanism, the CONOPS makes clear that its effectiveness will depend fundamentally on sustained political, institutional, and strategic support from the PSC. In this regard, the PSC’s role extends beyond political endorsement to encompass strategic legitimacy, coordination, oversight, and resource mobilisation. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s role in mobilising political will among Member States will be discussed during tomorrow’s session. The CONOPS identifies weak political commitment and inadequate resources as some of the principal limitations undermining the effectiveness of the Yaoundé Architecture. Given the sensitivities surrounding sovereignty and cross-border maritime operations, the PSC remains uniquely positioned to foster trust, sustain collective ownership, and encourage Member States to fulfil operational commitments and force pledges. The Council’s engagement is also expected to be essential in strengthening coordination between the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, CRESMAO, and national maritime structures to reduce institutional fragmentation and improve interoperability and information-sharing across the region. Regarding this, the PSC may also follow up on its previous decision for the establishment of a Maritime Security Coordination Unit within the AU Commission.
Beyond political coordination, the PSC is also expected to play a decisive role in addressing the structural and operational constraints affecting the implementation of the CMTF. One of the most significant challenges identified in the CONOPS relates to sustainable financing and operational readiness. The successful deployment of the Task Force requires substantial maritime assets, surveillance systems, trained personnel, and logistical infrastructure, all of which necessitate predictable and long-term financing arrangements. In this respect, the PSC’s engagement will be critical in mobilising AU support, encouraging burden-sharing among Member States, and facilitating strategic partnerships with international actors and maritime industry stakeholders. The implementation of the CMTF currently relies heavily on Nigeria’s leadership and logistical support. While this demonstrates important regional leadership, excessive dependence on one state may create sustainability and ownership challenges over the longer term, particularly for smaller coastal states with limited naval and financial capacities.
The Council is also expected to deliberate on creating mechanisms to exercise oversight over legal and normative harmonisation efforts, particularly regarding the implementation of international maritime law, the criminalisation of piracy, judicial cooperation, extradition arrangements, and adherence to human rights standards during operations. This role is particularly important given the persistent legal inconsistencies and weak prosecution mechanisms that continue to undermine maritime security responses in the region. Different states continue to prioritise maritime threats differently depending on their economic interests and national vulnerabilities. While oil theft and attacks on offshore infrastructure remain major concerns for some countries, smaller coastal states may prioritise IUU fishing and coastal criminality. Additionally, the PSC is likely to discuss how it can play a broader strategic oversight role through regular monitoring, reporting, and evaluation of the CMTF’s implementation progress and operational effectiveness.
Another important element in the CONOPS that is expected to be featured in the discussions is the importance of integrating maritime security into continental peace and security priorities by addressing longstanding ‘sea blindness’ within African security frameworks. In this regard, the PSC’s engagement will be important in elevating maritime security within the AU agenda and linking it to broader continental priorities such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Africa’s blue economy strategy.
Tomorrow’s session is also expected to assess recent developments toward operationalising the CMTF. During the 6th Meeting of the ECOWAS Sub-Committee of Chiefs of Naval Staff held in February 2026, Nigeria announced practical measures to support the launch of the Task Force, including the provision of three ships, one helicopter, eight vehicles, and temporary office facilities for the headquarters in Lagos. Earlier, during its 67th Ordinary Session held in June 2025, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government formally endorsed Nigeria’s offer to host the headquarters of the CMTF. Additionally, six countries, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, confirmed readiness to participate in the ceremonial flag-off of the CMTF scheduled for 31 May to 1 June 2026 in Lagos. The PSC is likely to consider these developments as important steps toward transitioning the CMTF from a conceptual framework into an operational regional maritime security mechanism.
Beyond the discussion on the CMTF, the PSC may also emphasise in its discussion that sustainable maritime security cannot rely exclusively on military deterrence and naval deployments. Maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea remains deeply linked to broader socio-economic and governance conditions, including poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, weak institutions, and limited economic opportunities within coastal communities. Consequently, long-term maritime stability will require integrated approaches that combine security operations with governance reform, economic development, institutional strengthening, and community resilience initiatives.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate the need to strengthen coordination between the CMTF and existing regional maritime mechanisms, particularly the Yaoundé Architecture and maritime coordination centres, to improve intelligence-sharing and operational responsiveness. The Council may also encourage continued political and financial support from the Gulf of Guinea states for the operationalisation of the Task Force and request the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of the Maritime Security Coordination Unit. Additionally, the PSC may call for the development of sustainable financing arrangements, harmonised legal frameworks, and enhanced burden-sharing mechanisms to ensure the long-term effectiveness and collective ownership of the CMTF. Finally, the Council may emphasise that durable maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea requires balancing operational responses with investments in governance, development, environmental sustainability, and coastal community resilience.
