Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2026
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2026
Date | June 2026
In June, under the chairship of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, standing in for the Republic of Sierra-Leone, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions, covering five agenda items. Following the revision of the PPoW, three substantive sessions took place, covering four agenda items. Out of the four agenda items, only one focused on a country-specific issue, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All the substantive sessions during the month were held at the level of ambassadors.
Why the African Union and Somalia need to plan for the worst-case scenario of AUSSOM’s withdrawal
Why the African Union and Somalia need to plan for the worst-case scenario of AUSSOM’s withdrawal
Date | 30 July 2026
On 29-30 July, once again Kampala plays host to the technical, ministerial and summit-level meetings of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Troop Contributing and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) plus Somalia. The meeting kicked off yesterday with a session of the Chiefs of Defence Forces of TCCs/PCCs of AUSSOM.
Initially, this meeting was requested by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU in view of the existential financial crisis facing AUSSOM. It was the 1317th session of 15 December 2025 of the PSC that tasked ‘the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit a detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ This request was further reiterated by the PSC during its 1342nd session of April 2026.
It was the letter that the United States (US) Mission to the AU (USAU) sent to the African Union on 1 July 2026 that led to the speedy convening of this meeting. In the letter, the US informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of AUSSOM comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal ‘if it includes UNSOS or any UN logistical or operational support.’
While the decision was not completely surprising given that it came in a context in which the US has been reconsidering its funding of UN missions and an earlier decision cutting 25% of UNSOS budget, it came before the AU and Somalia acted timely on PSC’s request and put in place a plan on the immediate future of AU’s long-running and largest peace operation to date.
As pointed out in an earlier Amani Africa article, the end of UNSOS and the critical logistics support on which AUSSOM depends for all its operations would practically make the continuation of the AU mission, which suffers from major funding shortfalls, untenable. The unplagging of UNSOS from AUSSOM is like pulling the life support from a patient whose life depends on it. While AUSSOM has sustained and can continue its operation while facing a major shortfall of funds, it cannot continue with its operations without UNSOS logistics support or without finding, within the short time left, an alternative logistics support arrangement fully replacing UNSOS.
The Kampala meeting comes following a series of meetings in response to the US letter, including ‘an information briefing’ of 3 July for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM, an informal consultation of the PSC of 8 July, and a meeting of experts of TCCs & PCCs of AUSSOM plus Somalia of 24 July. The key meeting of 24 July deliberated on the three options on the future of AUSSOM referenced in the 1317th session of the PSC of 15 December 2025.
The three options PSC proposed for further interrogation, were initially outlined in the AU Commission Chairperson’s report to the 1317th session of the PSC. The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions. The second option involved transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.
It emerged from the meeting of 24 July that the options further updated without UNSOS were not deemed feasible due to the significant risks they posed to operational continuity, force sustainment and the potential for security gaps. The meeting proposed the presentation of the three options to the Chiefs of Defence Forces of AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs along with this conclusion on the options and a proposal for engaging the US ‘to negotiate for the continuation of’ the 2024-2029 transition supported by UNSOS. The three options as updated and the report of the 24 July meeting were presented to the meeting of Chiefs of Defence Forces held yesterday in Kampala, Uganda.
The proposal for preserving UNSOS for the duration of the transition is understandable from the point of view of avoiding a security gap, getting Somali forces to a level where they are able to preserve the security gains made and ensuring a planned withdrawal. However, its feasibility is contingent on having the US reverse its decision. Addressing the Chiefs gathered in Kampala, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces called for ‘African-led alternative arrangements that would sustain the mission beyond 2026,’ noting the indications that the US would not support the current UN support framework. As a recent policy brief cogently argued, another option that the Kampala summit may consider envisages minimal logistic support through a hybrid mechanism from funds other than UN assessed contributions, including AU, anchored on a negotiated transition compact.
These are best-case scenario options but with significant variation. They assume either reversal of the US decision on unplugging UNSOS or the possibility of the establishment of a viable alternative option within the very short time available to ensure the sustenance of AUSSOM beyond December 2026.
In addition to a plan for exploring these options, the Kampala summit needs to consider and adopt a contingency plan for the worst-case scenario too. This is a scenario where reversal of the US decision on supporting UNSOS mandate beyond December 2026 could not be secured, or an alternative to it or any middle ground could not be arranged to sustain AUSSOM beyond December 2026.
Given the risks identified during the 24 July meeting of experts and the dangers that AUSSOM’s withdrawal by December 2026 poses, planning for this worst-case scenario should accordingly involve ways of managing such risks. This necessitates the designing and implementation of measures that mitigate the risks to the minimum possible and ensure as orderly a withdrawal as possible while simultaneously facilitating alternative security support to Somalia that may involve a combination of bilateral support along with a regional joint force modelled on the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin adapted to the Somalia context.
The worst-case scenario is not necessarily inevitable. Nor is it one to be embraced. However, the AU, TCCs/PCCS of AUSSOM and Somalia could not afford not to plan for it.
Update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger
Update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger
Date | 26 July 2026
Tomorrow (27 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene a session dedicated to an update on the Political Transition in Burkina Faso and Niger.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for July, followed by a statement by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The Special Representative of the AU Commission for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Mamadou Tangara, is expected to brief the Council.
The last time the PSC formally considered the situation in Burkina Faso and Niger was on 30 September 2025, during its 1304th session, when it addressed the Sahel region as a whole. That session, convened at ministerial level and attended by AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, produced perhaps the most notable Sahel-related decision the Council has taken in years: a request to the Chairperson of the Commission to establish a Task Force to support the countries of the Sahel in fighting terrorism, addressing the security, socio-economic and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. It endorsed Angola’s proposal, advanced through its Chairmanship of the AU, to convene a Summit on the region. The Council has also engaged the situation in both countries directly using its informal consultation; the last one being held in February 2026 when the PSC held an informal consultation with suspended Member States in political transition, in which representatives of Burkina Faso and Niger took part.
Since April, the Council’s country-specific engagement on the central Sahel has also become more differentiated in response to evolving security dynamics. Mali has effectively been addressed through a separate track. Following the deadly attacks of 25 April 2026, the PSC convened its 1342nd session on Mali on 28 April, engaging MISAHEL and ECOWAS, and subsequently held an informal consultation on 14 May with Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Abdoulaye Diop. Against this backdrop, Mali does not feature on tomorrow’s agenda, reflecting the Council’s recent and sustained engagement on the country.
On the ground, Burkina Faso continues to face a severe and evolving terrorist threat, with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) remaining the dominant armed group while the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) maintains operations in parts of the country. Signifying some shifts in the terrorist conflict dynamics in the country, terrorism-related deaths and attacks declined significantly in 2025, according to the Global Terrorism Index, despite the country being the second country on the list of most impacted countries by terrorism. JNIM accounted for more than 80 per cent of attacks during the year and has continued to intensify its campaign through coordinated assaults. Following major early-year operations targeting Titao, Kourakou and Tondobi, JNIM carried out coordinated, multi-pronged assaults between 4–5 July 2026 that overran a military camp in Di (Sourou province) and struck Dalan and Tiéré, inflicting casualties on Defence and Security Forces (FDS) and Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP). These actions underscore the group’s growing operational reach into Central-North and Sahel urban perimeters.
Niger presents the starker deterioration. The AU Counter Terrorism Centre’s data for the second quarter of 2026 shows both attacks and fatalities in Niger nearly tripling compared to the equivalent period in 2025, with the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and ISGS the most active perpetrators across the Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso regions. Two attacks on Niamey’s international airport, one in January, claimed by ISSP, and a second on 18 June that killed 11 members of the armed forces and two civilians, illustrate a widening geographic reach that now touches the capital itself. The Chairperson of the Commission’s own statement, issued after the 17 July ambush of a Nigerien detachment on the Bankilaré–Téra axis in Tillabéri, described a resurgence of terrorist attacks across the Sahel exacting a heavy toll on both security forces and civilians. Nigerian authorities responded with the December 2025 declaration of a ‘general mobilisation,’ and the March 2026 plan to establish territorial self-defence organisations, echoing what Burkina Faso adopted earlier. Since then, clashes were reported between self-defence militias and armed Islamist groups in Tillabéri, leading to a fresh wave of reprisal killings and displacement.
The humanitarian toll behind these trend lines is severe. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) figures for the first quarter of 2026 record 2,640 conflict-related deaths and 1,179 security incidents across the Central Sahel. The region hosts 2.8 million internally displaced persons, 2.1 million of them in Burkina Faso and 283,000 in Niger, alongside 444,400 refugees. An estimated 11.4 million people require food assistance, including 2.7 million facing IPC Phase 3-or-worse acute food insecurity, and 401,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition. These figures give texture to what the Council is likely to describe, once again, as a humanitarian emergency inseparable from the security crisis.
Politically, with the withdrawal of AES states becoming effective, the states are entrenching their own independent trajectory. In Burkina Faso, in February, the Transitional Legislative Assembly made a move that went beyond a transitional measure by voting unanimously to abolish political parties, effectively nullifying the 2001 charter and the 2009 legislation governing party financing and opposition status. The transitional Legislative Assembly unanimously adopted a new ‘Charter of the Popular Progressive Revolution’ on 27 March 2026, replacing the 2022 Transition Charter and its 2024 amendment outright. The new text does not merely extend the timeline; it retires the word ‘transition’ altogether, formally enshrining what Traoré has termed the ‘Progressive Popular Revolution’ as the governing framework, renaming Parliament the ‘People’s Legislative Assembly,’ abolishing the seat quota previously reserved for political parties and movements, and confirming Traoré’s own eligibility to contest future elections whenever these are eventually held. Traoré also assumed the rotating chairmanship of the AES College of Heads of State in December 2025.
Niger’s trajectory mirrors this pattern. The ‘Refoundation Charter’, promulgated in March 2025, granted General Abdourahmane Tchiani a five‑year mandate lasting until 2030. It simultaneously dissolved all political parties, required that any future establishment of foreign military bases be subject to a referendum, and authorised extensions of the transition period based on the ‘security situation’, without providing a definitive timeline for a return to constitutional order.
In terms of AU’s engagement, a major development, which follows the PSC’s call in its 1304th session for the ‘intensification of diplomatic engagements with the countries of the Sahel’, was the AU Commission Chairperson Youssouf’s first visit to Ouagadougou, on 15-16 July, meeting Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré and Prime Minister Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo. In view of the existential threat facing the countries of the Sahel, this is a long overdue mission. Youssouf stated that his visit was ‘intended to convey the Union’s solidarity with the Government & people of Burkina Faso in their efforts to restore peace, combat terrorism & promote stability.’ He went on to reaffirm ‘the Commission’s commitment to accompanying Burkina Faso, through the relevant organs & institutions of the AU, in support of humanitarian response, public health & sustainable development.’
This mission was undertaken as part of what the PSC at its 1304th session called ‘constructive engagement’ for restoring the strained relations through direct and high-level AU Commission engagement with the AES states. In this context, Youssouf underscored the importance of strengthening regional cooperation to address shared peace, security & development challenges. He also called for revitalising the Nouakchott Process on security cooperation and for closer AES-ECOWAS harmony, while committing the Commission to a three-pillar Sahel strategy of governance, security and development. In what signals the recognition of the need for a multidimensional approach inclusive of addressing governance issues, the Chairperson noted that the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance ‘remains an important continental framework for promoting good governance & responsive institutions.’
Tomorrow’s session will follow up on its earlier decisions. In this context, it is of interest for the Council to receive an update on the establishment of the Task Force adopted at the 1304th session of the PSC. It may also follow up on whether the PCRD Centre has developed its promised Sahel programming, and whether Ndayishimiye’s mandated field visit to all three AES countries, so far realised only in Burkina Faso, will be completed. Other previous decisions of the PSC that warrant follow-up during tomorrow’s session include the 1279th session that called for an AFRIPOL-anchored mechanism to map transnational criminal networks and a joint AUC-AFRIPOL-CISSA study on organised crime in the Sahel.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC could express deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso and Niger, particularly the persisting terrorist activities by groups affiliated with JNIM, ISGS and ISSP, and underscore the urgent need for strengthened regional and continental coordination to address the evolving threat landscape. The Council may condemn continued terrorist attacks targeting civilians, national defence forces and security institutions, while expressing solidarity with the people of Burkina Faso and Niger and emphasising the importance of responses that address not only immediate security threats but also the governance, development and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. The PSC may call for enhanced coordination among the AU, ECOWAS, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and other regional and international actors, to ensure that the limited resources available are organised around addressing the growing threat endangering the collective existence of affected countries. The PSC may welcome the visit that the AU Commission undertook to the Sahel countries and encourage the AU Commission to sustain its engagement with Burkina Faso and Niger through high-level diplomatic channels. The PSC may request that the Chairperson to develop a strategy to deliver on the commitment he expressed during his visit for AU’s accompaniment of the Sahel countries in their quest for restoring peace, addressing humanitarian challenges and advancing regional cooperation. The PSC may also reiterate its decision on the establishment of the AU Task Force for supporting the Sahel countries in the fight against terrorism and efforts for restoring peace and security. The PSC may also emphasise the importance of addressing governance challenges alongside efforts for restoring peace, including through taking steps that progressively facilitate the creation of conditions for implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance thereby ensuring that suspension of fundamental rights can only be justified for a limited period of time and be carried out only in the public interest and in strict compliance with the principles of necessity, legality and proportionality. The PSC may express concern about and call for enhanced effort for ameliorating the severe humanitarian consequences of the crisis, and may encourage the AU Commission, in coordination with humanitarian actors and regional organisations, to reinforce interventions anchored on a peace-security-development nexus approach that recognises the interconnected nature of the sources of vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs in the Sahel.
Consideration of the Half-Year Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Elections in Africa for the Period January–June 2026
Consideration of the Half-Year Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Elections in Africa for the Period January–June 2026
Date | 21 July 2026
Tomorrow (22 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1355th session to consider the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period from January to June 2026.
The session will commence with an opening remark by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of July. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to present the half-year report. Statements are also expected from representatives of Member States that held elections during the reporting period.
The half-year report is presented pursuant to the PSC’s decision at its 424th session in March 2014 to receive regular updates on elections in Africa. The previous briefing took place at the PSC’s 1327th session on 26 January 2026 and covered elections held between July and December 2025. In addition to reviewing elections conducted during the first half of 2026, tomorrow’s briefing is expected to provide an overview of elections scheduled for the remainder of the year and highlight broader governance trends, including positive developments and emerging challenges.
Between January and June 2026, six AU Member States held presidential, legislative or general elections: Benin, Uganda, the Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Cabo Verde and Ethiopia. The AU deployed election observation missions to all six countries.
Benin held legislative and local elections on 11 January, followed by presidential elections on 12 April, against the backdrop of an attempted coup in December 2025. The parties aligned with President Patrice Talon secured all parliamentary seats after the principal opposition party, The Democrats, failed to meet the electoral threshold introduced under the new Electoral Code. The same party was subsequently unable to field a presidential candidate after failing to obtain the required parliamentary endorsements, allowing Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni, Talon’s endorsed successor, to win decisively, securing 94 per cent of the vote. While the elections were conducted peacefully, opposition parties criticised the electoral framework as limiting political competition. Voter turnout stood at 36.7 per cent in the legislative elections and 58.75 per cent in the presidential poll.
Uganda held general elections on 15 January, with President Yoweri Museveni securing a seventh term in office with 71.65 per cent of the vote. While noting that the elections were conducted in a relatively calmer environment than the 2021 polls, the AU-COMESA-IGAD observation mission expressed concern over reports of ‘harassment, intimidation, and arrests of opposition leaders, candidates, supporters, media and civil society actors, as well as the suspension of NGOs and the internet shutdown.’ Voter turnout, at 52.5 per cent, was the lowest recorded in the country’s electoral history.
The Republic of the Congo held presidential elections on 15 March, with President Denis Sassou Nguesso re-elected to a fifth consecutive term after securing 94.9 per cent of the vote. While the AU observation mission assessed the elections positively, the process was criticised by opposition groups, two of which boycotted the polls, citing an uneven electoral environment. Election day also saw nationwide internet and telephone service disruptions.
Djibouti’s presidential election on 10 April likewise returned the incumbent, President Ismail Omar Guelleh, with 97.8 per cent of the vote. The election followed a constitutional amendment removing the upper age limit for presidential candidates, enabling Guelleh to seek another term. The AU observation mission concluded that the electoral process complied with national, regional and international standards.
Cabo Verde’s parliamentary elections on 17 May once again demonstrated the country’s stable democratic practice. The African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV) defeated the incumbent Movement for Democracy (MpD), leading to a peaceful transfer of executive authority after Prime Minister Ulisses Correia e Silva conceded defeat. Presidential elections are scheduled for later this year, completing the country’s electoral cycle.
Ethiopia held its seventh general election on 1 June. According to the National Election Board of Ethiopia, the ruling Prosperity Party won around 90 per cent of parliamentary seats and more than 80 per cent of regional council seats, with reported voter turnout exceeding 96 per cent. Elections were not conducted in 46 constituencies—38 in Tigray and eight in Amhara— owing to security conditions. The AU observation mission noted that the elections took place amid persistent challenges in parts of the country, particularly in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, with stakeholders raising concerns over the impact of conflict on political participation, campaigning and voter access.
In addition to reviewing elections held during the first half of the year, the Chairperson’s report is expected to provide an overview of elections scheduled between July and December 2026. Algeria has already held legislative elections on 2 July, with the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) emerging as the largest party after winning 90 of the 407 parliamentary seats. The elections were marked by record-low voter turnout of 21 per cent and controversy surrounding the disqualification of a significant number of prospective candidates.
São Tomé and Príncipe also held its presidential election on 19 July, followed by parliamentary elections at the end of September. Cabo Verde will elect its President later in the year, while Zambia is scheduled to hold general elections on 13 August, with President Hakainde Hichilema seeking a second term. Morocco will elect a new House of Representatives on 23 September. The Gambia’s presidential election is scheduled for 5 December, with President Adama Barrow contesting for re-election. Cameroon is also expected to hold parliamentary and municipal elections later this year following repeated postponements, although an election date has yet to be announced.
Among the remaining electoral processes, South Sudan’s planned general elections, scheduled for 22 December and expected to be the country’s first since independence, are likely to require the closest attention. The elections are expected to take place amid heightened political and security tensions, including the continued detention and prosecution of senior officials of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), among them First Vice President Riek Machar. At its most recent meeting on South Sudan, the PSC requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to expedite the deployment of a multidimensional technical needs assessment mission. Given the potential implications of the elections for South Sudan’s fragile peace process and regional stability, preventive diplomatic engagement will remain critical. Particular attention may also be required to electoral boundary disputes, including South Sudan’s designation of Abyei as one of its electoral constituencies, with possible implications for relations with Sudan.
Beyond the electoral calendar, the report is expected to identify broader governance trends. One issue that deserves particular attention, as highlighted in Amani Africa’s recent policy brief, is the gradual normalisation of a minimalist approach to electoral assessment. Increasingly, election observation appears to place greater emphasis on the peaceful conduct of polling than on the overall integrity and competitiveness of the electoral process. As a result, elections are frequently characterised as peaceful—and in some instances as free, fair and credible—even where domestic observer groups and opposition actors have documented significant shortcomings in the electoral process. If left unaddressed, this trend risks weakening the credibility of the AU’s electoral assessment framework and diminishing the value of election observation as a tool for promoting democratic governance and conflict prevention. For a more detailed analysis of this emerging trend in AU’s election observation practice, see Amani Africa’s recent policy brief.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may adopt the Half-Year Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa covering the period from January to June 2026 and the outlook for elections scheduled during the second half of the year. It may commend Member States that conducted elections during the reporting period and welcome the deployment of election observation missions to all six countries. The PSC may request the Commission to strengthen technical assistance to Member States, within available resources, to support more credible, inclusive and transparent electoral processes and to help ensure that elections are conducted in a conducive environment. It may also emphasise the need to improve the analytical quality of election observation reports and the Chairperson’s half-year report so that their conclusions reflect the realities of electoral processes rather than relying on standardised formulations. While expressing concern over declining voter turnout in some countries, the PSC may encourage Member States to address voter apathy by expanding civic and political space and strengthening civic and voter education. Regarding forthcoming elections, it may request the Commission to continue monitoring developments closely and, where necessary, deploy preventive diplomacy and other conflict prevention measures to help mitigate electoral tensions before, during and after polling.
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa
Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa
Date | 20 July 2026
Tomorrow (21 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its virtual 1354th ministerial-level meeting on ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa’.
The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for July, Haruna Kyeyune Kasolo, will deliver opening remarks, followed by introductory remarks by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, and a representative of the United Nations (UN) will also deliver statements.
Tomorrow’s session will build on and follows the PSC’s 1266th meeting of March 2025 on ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa’ expressed grave concern over increased terrorist activity and the return or relocation of foreign terrorist fighters, highlighted structural drivers of radicalisation and called for counter-radicalisation measures to be incorporated into the AU action plan on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism. It also offers an opportunity to follow up on the PSC’s 1111th meeting of October 2022, which emphasised national reconciliation and social cohesion, including dialogue and negotiation to facilitate voluntary surrender and rehabilitation, and requested the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African best practices.
The session is expected to assess recent trends and whether and how to adapt the mobilisation of effective response to the threat that terrorism continues to pose in various parts of the continent.
The more consequential test is whether the Council identifies practical follow-up measures. The AU does not lack frameworks. Its architecture includes the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), its Protocol (2004), and the Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2022). These are the Nouakchott Process, the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL, CISSA and the Djibouti Process (2015). The gap lies in implementation, coordination, institutional follow-through, and the political and socio-economic governance deficit-based diagnosis for anchoring responses.
Related to implementation and in terms of response, two issues stand out for tomorrow’s PSC session. The first relates to the impact of major power geopolitical rivalry, such as the rivalry between Russia and France in the Sahel, on regional and continental strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism. The second concerns the state of political cohesion at the regional and continental levels for advancing an effective strategy for countering terrorism and violent extremism.
As a 2022 special research report observed, policy has remained disproportionately security-centred despite the political, governance, socioeconomic and environmental dimensions of the threat, particularly in marginalised territories with weak state–society relations, deficient local governance and absence of service delivery. Tomorrow’s session may therefore steer the PSC towards an implementation-oriented roadmap that combines the provision of capable and legitimate security institutions along with the consolidation of legitimate local governance, the delivery of essential services, development, and community-centred prevention and stabilization measures. The 13th Africa Security Symposium, held in Accra from 7 to 9 July 2026, similarly underscored African-led solutions, inclusive partnerships, practical cross-border cooperation and translating diagnosis into action.
The first substantive issue for tomorrow’s session is the geography of terrorism in Africa. According to GTI 2026, despite a 28% global decline in terrorism deaths in 2025, Africa remained the principal geographic concentration of terrorism-related deaths and highly affected countries. Six of the ten countries most affected by terrorism worldwide were in the region. The Sahel alone accounted for more than half of global terrorism deaths, compared with less than 1% in 2007, while four African countries were among the five states that together accounted for 70% of global fatalities.
This persistence of the threat of terrorism nevertheless coexists with uneven and, in some respects, improving regional trends. Across much of Africa, terrorism deaths fell by 23.5% and incidents by nearly 28%. Eighteen countries improved their overall GTI scores, while only four deteriorated. These aggregate declines may, however, obscure the consolidation of territorial influence by some groups, such as through imposing economic blockades.
Thus, it is of particular significance for tomorrow’s session that account is given to recent developments illustrating terrorism’s regionalised and adaptive geography across the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and Somalia. In Mali, coordinated attacks on 25 April struck Kati and several other locations, including Bamako, Gao, Kidal and Sévaré. The attacks also killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara when assailants targeted his residence in Kati. In Niger, the January IS-claimed attack on the airbase at Diori Hamani International Airport, the April spillover of fighting between JNIM and IS into Tillabéri, and the June attack on the airport and adjoining military airbase, which killed 11 security personnel and two civilians, demonstrated growing pressure on strategic infrastructure and centres of power. Chad’s Lake Chad region similarly illustrated Boko Haram’s continuing lethality. The May attack on the Barka Tolorom military base killed at least 23 soldiers and wounded 26, followed two days later by an ambush that killed two Chadian generals. Further analyses (here and here) point to the consolidation of jihadist activity across the Benin–Niger–Nigeria borderlands and the southward expansion of Sahel-based groups towards coastal West Africa.
In the Horn of Africa, the UN Panel identifies al-Shabaab as the most immediate threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the wider region, highlighted by its activities during 2025. Apart from the 18 March 2025 attempted assassination of the Somali President near the presidential palace, in the first quarter of 2025, the group’s monthly attacks increased by about 50% compared with 2024 in areas such as Hiraan and Middle Shabelle. It also averaged around six attacks per month in Kenya, while the estimated number of Ethiopian fighters within its ranks rose to approximately 600, highlighting the increasing regionalisation of the group’s reach.
The other issue that is also expected to feature in tomorrow’s session is how terrorist groups are increasingly leveraging advanced technologies to mobilise support, recruit, undertake reconnaissance operations and increasingly carry out attacks. Terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab and ISWAP have leveraged the digital era by utilising a variety of tools and platforms to plan, communicate, and organise their operations. Some terrorist groups, for example, as highlighted in relation to the Lake Chad Basin region, Boko haram, have sought to use drone technology for surveillance and weapon delivery. The ISWAP, for instance, increased its use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). In the Sahel too, drone use has increased in 2025. JNIM has conducted repeated drone-enabled attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo in 2025, often coordinating drone use with ground assaults. Attention should also be paid to the risk that such actors may employ cyber warfare tactics to disrupt crucial infrastructure and communication networks.
Another issue that tomorrow’s session is expected to address relates to the terrorism–transnational crime nexus. Terrorist groups sustain their operations through illicit taxation, smuggling, kidnapping, illegal mining, livestock theft, fuel trafficking and protection economies. It is worth recalling that the PSC’s 1345th meeting warned of an ‘integrated, hybrid and transnational criminal ecosystem’ in which terrorism, trafficking, environmental crime, cybercrime and financial crime share corridors, financing mechanisms and logistics.’ The 2026 UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) report frames the relationship as a continuum from transactional cooperation and coexistence to, more rarely, organisational convergence. Among the terrorist groups operating in West Africa, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) are known for taking advantage of transnational criminal networks, including for financing their activities and the recruitment of new members.
Counter-terrorism cannot therefore be effective without addressing the economic factors that enable and sustain terrorist groups, including arms trafficking, illicit financial flows and illicit natural resource extraction. The analytical report accompanying the PSC’s 1320th meeting similarly presents terrorism and violent extremism as interconnected threats sustained by illicit economies, digital recruitment, cross-border financing and governance gaps. The resulting communiqué placed greater emphasis on institutional coordination, early warning and early action.
The prevention dimension should focus on conditions that enable recruitment rather than on treating radicalisation as predominantly ideological. UNDP’s ‘Journey to Extremism’ study shows that recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa is shaped by economic hardship, limited opportunities, fractured state–society relations and security-force abuses rather than religion alone. 17 % of voluntary recruits cited religious ideas as their primary motivation, while 25% identified employment opportunities. Among the 48% who experienced a specific tipping-point event, 71% cited government action, including the killing or arrest of family members or friends. These findings echo Amani Africa’s aforementioned assessment that terrorism has often been misdiagnosed primarily as a security threat, producing excessive reliance on militarised responses despite the political, governance and development conditions sustaining it. Strengthening state legitimacy, accountable governance, socioeconomic development and community resilience should therefore be treated as central components of a sustainable counter-terrorism strategy.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its concern over the continuing scourge of terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, coastal West Africa and the Horn of Africa. It may also express concern over their growing convergence with illicit economies, transnational organised crime, and the use of new technologies, including digital and drones. It may underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multidimensional counter-terrorism strategy that combines security measures undertaken by legitimate security institutions with prevention, deradicalisation, stabilisation, recovery, reconciliation, dialogue, service delivery, and the building of legitimate local governance infrastructure. The PSC may also emphasise the need for member states to put aside their difference when it comes to the mobilisation of collective action to address the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. In this respect, it may emphasise the need for AU, ECOWAS and UN to join ranks in support of the counter-terrorism efforts of the Sahel countries that are the major theatre of terrorist activities on the continent, with a growing threat of expansion into coastal West Africa. It may also call for strengthened coordination among the AU Commission, AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA, RECs/RMs and relevant regional mechanisms, particularly in advancing intelligence-sharing, border management, and investigations into terrorist financing. Furthermore, the PSC may call on the AU Commission to develop an implementation-oriented roadmap identifying priority borderlands, practical channels for operational cooperation, support for national and regional deradicalisation programmes, and stronger linkages between counter-terrorism operations, civilian protection, stabilisation and recovery.
