Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic
Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic
Date | 29 April 2025
Tomorrow (30 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene for its 1277th meeting to review the Political transition program of the Gabonese Republic.
The meeting will begin with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to be present at the meeting to make a presentation, followed by remarks by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Representatives from ECCAS and the Gabonese Republic are also expected to make statements.
Tomorrow’s meeting is being convened as an additional agenda item to the programme, as the session was not on the initial programme of work for April, having been proposed for May. This session also comes exactly two weeks after Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president, won the presidential election, by about 90 per cent of the vote. Following the 2023 coup, the country progressed with a transition roadmap, in which Gabon’s Council of Ministers, following the adoption by Gabon’s parliament of a new electoral code, set out the rules and conditions for organising elections in the country, which declared the presidential elections to take place on 12 April 2025. In addition, the Gabonese voters approved a new constitution in November 2024. The proposed new constitution introduced changes, including the establishment of presidential term limits and the elimination of the prime minister’s position.
It is to be recalled that following the mission it undertook to Gabon on 12 to 14 September 2024, the PSC held a session for considering the Report of the mission, which sought to legitimise the coup stating that ‘[t]he [Gabonese] interlocutors mentioned that the coup d’état of 30 August 2024, which they described as a ‘Liberation Coup’, was a peaceful coup with no bloodshed.’ The PSC failed to communicate the AU rule on non-eligibility of those who participated in the military seizure of power under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Instead, the communique of its 1241st session that considered the report of the field mission requested ‘the AU Commission to engage the Transition Authority of Gabon to identify areas of support and provide the needed technical and financial support to Gabon…’ In addition to this, the Council also requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to use his good office to engage with the leader of the Transition Authority to mediate the differences with the former President to ensure a smooth and peaceful transition in the country.’
As a follow-up to the foregoing, the AU deployed an election observation mission to Gabon. Following the election, it also welcomed the outcome of the election and expressed a congratulatory message. Tomorrow’s session comes as the presidential victory of Nguema would mark the end of the political transition in the country. The purpose of the meeting is accordingly to determine that the conclusion of the election marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of the suspension of Gabon.
The fact that Gabon’s military-led transitional government agreed to a transitional timeline and respected the timeline is notable. This together with the conclusion of the election on and of itself does not indicate that Gabon is witnessing a new dawn of democracy. Even then, the fact remains that the PSC determined that a coup happened in Gabon and suspended Gabon from participation in the activities of the AU. The nature of the process followed for restoring constitutional order does not vitiate or render inapplicable Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Even if the PSC proceeds with deciding to lift the suspension of Gabon, as it seems to be prepared to do, in the light of the outcome of its field mission, it needs to address the question of the lack of compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This is critical not just from the perspective of PSC’s credibility in the face of its policy position of zero tolerance to unconstitutional changes of government, particularly coups. It is imperative for at least two strategic considerations. The first of this is the precedent that the election of someone who led a military seizure of power sets for those involved in military usurpation of power in the other five countries with respect to the applicability of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The second strategic consideration is the message that such leniency in the enforcement of Article 25(4) sends to all militaries on the continent. If those who seize power through military coup can be legitimised through election that the AU endorses, why should not militaries across the continent feel that the benefits of engaging in a coup outweighs its risks and costs?
It emerges from the foregoing that the question before the PSC during tomorrow’s session is not a simple question of whether the ‘successful’ conclusion of the elections in Gabon marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of Gabon’s suspension. The PSC also has to address the question of the implications of the election of Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president in the face of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. As outlined in a recent analysis, this necessitates that the PSC engages in thoughtful reflection by putting the case of Gabon in the broader context of all the countries under suspension and the applicable AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government.
The process followed thus far by the PSC and the AU in relation to the transitional process in Gabon suggests that the PSC is unlikely to consider as an option non-recognition of the outcomes of the elections that marked the end of the transitional period as representing restoration of constitutional order in Gabon. If the PSC consequently lifts the suspension of Gabon, what can and should the PSC do about the implications of this with respect to Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance? First, it should be recognised that there is a breach of Article 25(4). Second, the PSC needs to state clearly that it does not condone the breach. Third and relatedly, it needs to affirm the validity of the AU rule under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Fourth, the PSC also requires to state that the breach of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in some cases does not mean to set a precedent that overturns the application of the rule under Article 25(4) in other cases. Fifth and finally, the PSC needs to express its commitment to this provision and its application in future cases.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will lift the suspension of Gabon from participating in AU activities. It remains unclear if the PSC would take account of and pronounce itself on the lack of compliance in the Gabon election process with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. At the very least, it can indicate that it stands by Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and it does not consider any deviation from this article as negating the applicability of this provision, hence the prohibition of coups and the exclusion of coup makers from benefiting from their engagement in prohibited acts. It is worth noting that there will be a press conference by the PSC Chairperson, the AU Commission Chairperson, Gabon and the Commissioner for PAPS. It is expected that they will commend Gabon for concluding the transitional process within the agreed timeline and call on others to follow the example of Gabon in having a time-bound transitional process for restoring constitutional order.
Launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations (GAPO)
Launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations (GAPO)
Date | 28 April 2025
We are excited to announce the launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations – a collective endeavour of more than 50 leading think tanks, research institutes and civil society organizations working on UN and regional approaches to peace operations (https://www.peaceoperations.net).
Coordinated by the Global Governance Institute (GGI) in Brussels, the Berlin Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and Amani Africa Media and Research Services, the Alliance brings together the expertise and brain power of close to 100 peace operations experts from around the globe. For a full list of members, please see here.
At this crucial time for peace operations, the Alliance provides comprehensive and direct civil society input to the intergovernmental deliberations at the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial 2025 in Berlin. The UN Peacekeeping Ministerial takes place at a critical juncture for the future of peace operations and the wider multilateral crisis management system. It is a key moment to mobilize collective thinking for strengthening UN peace operations in the years to come. The Alliance was created in liaison with the German Federal Foreign Office and the German Federal Ministry of Defence.
The first round of activities produced eight collaborative policy papers and close to 20 short issue papers which form the basis for concrete policy recommendations on how to strengthen UN peace operations. The recommendations will be discussed at an online workshop on 29 April 2025. On 12 May 2025, immediately ahead of the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, the Alliance will host an in-person Symposium in Berlin and seven side events on a range of aspects essential to the future of peace operations.
The Global Alliance for Peace Operations webpage (www.peaceoperations.net) features information on all events, will publish the policy papers and issue papers, and already facilitates knowledge-sharing, including by gathering prior research and publications by Alliance members. Individuals or organizations working on peace operations that are interested in joining can get in touch with the Alliance at [email protected] .
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM
Date | 28 April 2025
Tomorrow (29 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1276th session for receiving updates on the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
The meeting will commence with the opening remark of Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will deliver a briefing.
This is the second meeting of the PSC on AUSSOM during the month. As examined in detail in the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to that session, the last session was held on 10 April. During that session, the PSC received an update on the state of operation of AUSSOM with a focus on the status of its funding. With only less than 20% of the funding required for the period of January to June 2025 mobilised, the briefing session revealed that AUSSOM faces major funding shortfalls. While AUSSOM operates under conditions that militate against the moral and operational effectiveness of the mission with a much-reduced troop size of about 11,146, the security situation continues to deteriorate with Al Shabaab on the resurgence.
Tomorrow’s meeting comes following the extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AUSSOM held in Kampala, Uganda on 25 April. The summit was preceded by a preparatory senior officials and ministers meeting on 22-24 April, which concluded their respective meetings by adopting several recommendations for the summit’s consideration. Subsequently, the summit adopted a communiqué endorsing these recommendations, which are now expected to be submitted to the PSC and the UN Security Council.
The TCCs summit reviewed the security situation in Somalia and assessed the performance of the AUSSOM sector by sector to evaluate its operational effectiveness in combating Al-Shabaab. The TCCs stressed the need to increase troop strength by at least 8,000 additional personnel to address the prevailing security challenges. This proposal, endorsed by the summit, seeks ‘to address the prevailing security situation in Somalia so as not to roll back the hard-earned gains made so far and bridge manpower gaps by having more personnel than before the drawdown.’ Highlighting the gravity of the deterioration of the security situation, beyond the additional troop surge for AUSSOM, the summit also adopted the Minister’s conclusion that it is ‘urgent to consider deploying bilateral troops to augment’ AUSSOM. On its part, the Federal Government of Somalia is expected to ‘recruit community/local defence forces and mobile force in order to hold and consolidate the areas that were liberated.’ All of these are clear admissions that the drawdown of troops during the past years has not been replaced with Somali forces as planned, resulting in major gaps that Al Shabaab has been able to exploit to regain territories. In this context, the summit directed the Chiefs of Defence Forces, together with Somalia, to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al-Shabaab.
The summit also endorsed the proposal for enhancing air assets and capabilities, as well as strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), considering the fragmented deployment of AUSSOM TCCs and their limited ability to support Somali Security Forces in conducting mobile operations.
During the meeting, the Somali Federal Government provided an update on the preparedness of its security forces and the progress made in force generation and integration. It reported to the summit that over 20,000 troops had been trained over the past two years, with plans to train an additional 5,000 elite special forces in 2025. Since January 2023, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) have assumed control of 23 forward operating bases (FOBs) from the AU mission. Of these, only one position—Biyo Cade—was recaptured by Al-Shabaab, while the remaining 22 FOBs remain under SNAF control. At the same time, Somalia’s representative admitted that Somalia is ‘challenged with defeating terrorism and stabilising liberated areas’, while dismissing the portrayal of the country as being in political turmoil. Yet in apparent indication of the role of political cohesion in Somalia, the summit underscored the need for the Somalia Federal Government to strengthen its engagement with Federal Member States and traditional leaders to enhance efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab. It also emphasised the importance of bolstering civil-military coordination, prioritising humanitarian relief, and implementing quick-impact stabilisation projects in recovered areas to consolidate security gains and foster lasting community trust.
In apparent indication that there is a need for close alignment between the implementation of the mandate of AUSSOM and the political and institutional advancements in Somalia, the summit decided to establish TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism at the Heads of State and Government Level chaired by Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni supported by the AU Commission. This is envisaged to serve as an oversight, accountability, coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan (SSDP).
The elephant in the room was the funding challenge facing the mission, particularly the outstanding reimbursements for military and police personnel since January—an issue the TCCs warned is significantly undermining morale and operational effectiveness. At the meeting, it was reported that the total urgent cash requirement to cover the financial costs for the period January to June 2025 is estimated at approximately US$96 million. Thus far, the AU has secured only US$16.7 million, while the mission requires roughly US$15 million per month to meet its obligations. Therefore, the TCCs reiterated that securing predictable and sustainable financing remains a strategic priority to maintain AUSSOM’s operational viability and to ensure continued support for Somali security forces in fully assuming security responsibilities. In this context and in the light of the proposal for the additional 8000 troops surge, they emphasised the urgent need for the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy.
AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf stated in his remarks that the Commission will spare no effort in mobilising financial resources. He emphasised, however, that saving the mission will require a collective effort from member states and international partners. Youssouf underscored that the security and stability of Somalia is vital not only for the Horn of Africa but also for global peace. The summit welcomed the role of traditional and non-traditional partners to support AUSSOM and the Somali federal government. Recently, China and Japan contributed US$ 1 million and US$ 3 million, respectively, in support of AUSSOM. The AU is urging other partners to follow their example. A donors’ conference was anticipated to take place this month in Doha, Qatar, but there is currently no indication that it will proceed as scheduled.
The TCCs also recommended the allocation of additional resources from the AU Peace Fund to help address the mission’s financial shortfalls. This was the case in 2023, when the AU was authorised to use the Peace Fund’s crisis reserve facility to address the funding shortfall faced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)—the predecessor of AUSSOM—particularly with regard to troop allowances. However, given that the largest commitment from the Fund has so far been to AUSSOM, this call for use of additional funds from the Fund may face major pushback from various PSC members who express concern that the Peace Fund risks being used as a funding mechanism for AUSSOM while it is meant to cover the peace and security efforts of the AU across the continent.
Most importantly, the TCCs are placing their hopes on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which outlines a framework for financing AU-led peace support operations, as a means to address the financial challenges facing AUSSOM. However, Chairperson Youssouf acknowledged reluctance in New York regarding its application. This hesitation stems from the position of the United States, which has communicated to both the UN and the AU that it ‘will not support the application of the UNSCR 2719 framework to AUSSOM when the matter comes before the Security Council on May 15.’ The representative of the US informed the summit in Kampala that the US does not believe that ‘Somalia is the best place to trigger the resolution’ and does not ‘support the implementation of a hybrid implementation model to finance AUSSOM.’ It seems that the AU Commission leadership might travel to Washington, D.C., to engage with the US administration and other relevant stakeholders on this matter. Donald Kaberuka, the High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Financing, is also reported to be in the US in search of resolution.
In the meantime, the UN has been working with the AU to conduct an independent strategic review of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) pursuant to Security Council resolution 2767 adopted on 27 December 2024. The review is meant to facilitate the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025. The two organisations appointed Maman Sidikou of Niger and Neil Cole of South Africa to co-lead the review process. They undertook consultations in Mogadishu, Addis Ababa and New York with the Somali government, TCCs and international partners. They submitted their report by the end of March, but the Secretary-General, following consultations with the AU, requested additional time to finalise the review process by 30 April, which the Security Council granted.
The outcome of the UNSOS review is expected to enable the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting 1 July, utilising existing resources made available through the rightsizing of UNSOS. Cost savings from this process are anticipated to cover up to 75 per cent of AUSSOM’s estimated US$ 190 million budget, with the remaining funds to be jointly mobilised by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources. However, the review reportedly yielded only US$ 61 million in savings—well below the amount needed to meet the 75 per cent threshold for funding through UN-assessed contributions. This shortfall appears to have prompted the request for an extension, allowing the UN and AU to continue exploring options for additional savings (they are looking at an additional US$ 40 million).
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may condemn and express concern over the threat to the gains made by AU troops and Somali forces posed by the intensification of attacks in recent months by Al Shabaab, with territorial gains particularly in the Middle and Lower Shebelle. It may, in this regard, underscore the need for reinforcing AUSSOM’s troop levels and capabilities. The PSC may, in this respect, welcome the outcomes of the Kampala summit of TCCs. With respect to the decision of the summit for the additional surge of 8000 troops, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop a plan on the surge and deployment of the additional troops including on whether they will be deployed under AUSSOM or bilateral basis. With respect to funding, the PSC may welcome the promising outcome of the UNSOS review within the framework of Resolution 2767 and the effort to enable the hybrid implementation through cost-saving from rightsizing of UNSOS. It may express deep concern about the huge financial shortfall facing AUSSOM, undermining the effective operation of the mission. It may remind the international community that AUSSOM, as a mission authorised by the UN Security Council, represents a global public good for maintaining international peace and security, which requires the assumption of full responsibility by the UN and the international community by ensuring predictable, sustainable and reliable funding for AUSSOM. In this respect, it may reiterate its previous decision, stressing the importance of ensuring predictable, sustainable and adequate funding for AUSSOM, including through a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) as the most suitable mechanism. PSC may commend the funding contributions that some members of the international community made and the continued commitment of others. It may, echoing the Kampala summit, request the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy, including through pursuing the implementation of Resolution 2719.
The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 22 April 2025
Tomorrow (23 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will discuss the imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Following opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that presentations will be delivered by Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), Emmanuel Budu Addo, Director of Administration, Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) and the Representative of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to deliver statements.
The development of the Maritime Task Force by the PSC has evolved progressively. The first mention of the initiative was in the PSC’s 1012th session on 23 July 2021, where the Council called on the AU Commission, in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), to promote cooperation and establish a Maritime Task Force among African littoral states. Building on this, the PSC’s 1128th session on 19 December 2022 acknowledged efforts by the Chiefs of Naval Staff, who met in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, in May 2022, to advance the establishment of the Regional Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea. This marked a transition from political commitment to concrete regional action, with a call for broader support from Member States and stakeholders. By the 1174th session on 18 September 2023, further institutional advancements were made, particularly through a follow-up Technical Committee Meeting in Dakar in August 2022, where a technical expert committee was established to guide the Task Force’s development. The PSC urged continued support from Member States and stakeholders to sustain these efforts. Finally, the 1209th session on 18 April 2024 marked a significant milestone as the PSC welcomed the formal establishment of the CMTF in May 2022 and the adoption of its Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by ten Gulf of Guinea countries, solidifying the Task Force as a regional mechanism for collective rapid response to maritime security threats. This trajectory demonstrates a structured approach to addressing maritime security challenges, moving from initial policy discussions to concrete operationalisation. However, ensuring the sustainability of the Task Force and enhancing inter-agency coordination remain critical considerations for the future. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s discussion will mainly focus on those two aspects.
The imperative to sustain and institutionalise maritime security mechanisms in the Gulf of Guinea stems from its strategic significance as the largest contiguous maritime space in Africa. Unlike the relatively narrower maritime spaces of North Africa’s Mediterranean coast or East Africa’s corridor near the Middle East, the Gulf of Guinea opens into the vast Atlantic Ocean, linking Africa to North and South America. This strategic positioning makes it one of the most navigable and economically significant maritime regions on the continent. Its importance is further amplified by continent-wide initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which depend on secure and efficient maritime trade routes.
Regarding the scope of discussions during tomorrow’s session, it is important to note that while the agenda indicates the PSC will focus on the role of ‘the CMTF in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea’, the region’s security challenges extend well beyond piracy. The Gulf of Guinea faces a complex and evolving array of maritime threats, including hijackings and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Fishing vessels are often linked to broader illicit activities, worsening economic losses, depleting marine resources, and driving coastal communities into poverty—conditions that increase vulnerability to piracy and transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking, illicit trade, and arms smuggling. Adding to the instability is the growing threat of terrorism closer to coastal states. Moreover, as maritime domains become contested spaces for geopolitical rivalry and competing claims, the risk of undermining unified security efforts deepens.
In this context, tomorrow’s session presents a critical opportunity to reassess how the CMTF can be effectively leveraged not only to combat piracy but also as a broader platform to address the interlinked maritime and coastal security threats facing the Gulf of Guinea.
While the decline in incidents of piracy by 22% in 2024 from the 2023 levels, representing only 22% of all the incidents reported in 2020, highlights the contribution of regional collective action, experts caution that piracy networks remain active and capable of resurgence if current security efforts are not sustained. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus not only on maintaining the downward trend but also on ensuring the long-term institutionalisation of maritime security mechanisms and ensuring the implementation of the Lome Charter and the AU’s blue economy plans.
As outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) adopted in April 2023 by the Chiefs of Naval Staff and Coastguards of 10 countries in the GoG region, the CMTF is envisioned as a multinational, rapid-response force led by the AU and operating in coordination with regional bodies such as ECOWAS and ECCAS. Designed to provide real-time operational capacity, the CMTF aims to address a range of maritime threats, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, transnational organised crime, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and maritime terrorism. Recognising the vast and complex maritime landscape of the GoG, the CONOPS divides the area into three operational sectors to enhance coordination and responsiveness: Sector North, headquartered in Senegal; Sector Central, based in Lagos, Nigeria; and Sector South, located in Pointe-Noire, Congo. This tri-sector approach treats the GoG as a single operational theatre, enabling integrated and collaborative maritime security efforts across national boundaries. In line with this structure, President Bola Tinubu, during the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, called on the PSC to formally establish the CMTF and reaffirmed Nigeria’s readiness to host its headquarters in Lagos.
The establishment of the CMTF raises an important question: how does it align with the Yaoundé Architecture? According to the CMTF Coordinating Commander, Mohammad Saghir Shettima, the establishment of the CMTF aims to address a key limitation of the Yaoundé Architecture—its reliance on voluntary state responses, which often delays operational action due to resource and priority constraints. While the Yaoundé Architecture has proven to be effective in coordination and intelligence-sharing, the CMTF could enhance it by providing a standing, ready-to-deploy force capable of rapid, coordinated maritime responses. He also indicated that this bridges the gap between early warning and action, strengthening regional maritime security. However, despite its strategic relevance, progress toward the full establishment and operationalisation of the CMTF has been limited since its establishment in 2022. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus on outlining the financial and logistical commitments required from the side of the AU to ensure the effective deployment and functionality of the Task Force.
In addition to the foregoing, tomorrow’s session is also expected to follow up on other initiatives for coordination and enhanced collective action in the maritime domain, including those envisaged in the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS). This provided for a coordinated approach to maritime security, the establishment of a Naval Component within the African Standby Force (ASF), and the formation of a Committee of Heads of African Navies and Coastguards. The Council may also follow up on the first ASF maritime exercise. Noting the financial, logistical, and institutional challenges, the AU Commission is expected to provide updates on the planning of the upcoming maritime command post exercise, based on the concept note developed during the AU Continental Maritime Exercise Concept Development Workshop held in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2024. Members of the PSC will be particularly interested in receiving detailed information on budgetary requirements, logistical arrangements, and organisational planning. It is also anticipated that any developments regarding the establishment of the CHANs working group will be shared. More broadly, it would be of interest for PSC members to receive update on the establishment of a Group of Experts or a Task Force to provide technical support to Member States and other stakeholders in delivering on the AU 2050 AIM Strategy and the implementation of the Lomé Charter and the establishment of a coordination mechanism or Unit on Maritime Security within the AU Commission.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a communique. The PSC may reiterate the importance of strengthening collaboration with regional partners to improve intelligence sharing, coordinate joint patrols, and bolster counter-terrorism efforts for maritime security and regional stability in the Gulf of Guinea. Along those lines, the PSC may urge Gulf of Guinea Commission Member States to strengthen political backing for the effective launch of the CMTF to boost regional maritime security efforts. The PSC may in this respect take note with commendation the interest that Nigeria expressed for hosting the headquarters of the CMTF. It may also reiterate its request for the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of a dedicated Maritime Security Coordination Unit to provide institutional leadership, coordination, and oversight of the CMTF and broader continental maritime security initiatives. In this regard, the PSC may also request the Commission, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and Member States, to develop a costed implementation plan and resource mobilisation strategy for the CMTF. To enhance operational coherence, the PSC may recommend strengthened coordination between the CMTF and existing Yaoundé Architecture structures—particularly the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, and CRESMAO—supported by the development of standard operating procedures to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing and response. Furthermore, the PSC may reiterate the call for the immediate activation and formal institutionalisation of CHANs as a continental advisory and coordination mechanism, and request the AU Commission to report on its operationalisation. Lastly, the PSC may also retreat its previous decisions calling for the establishment of a Group of Experts or Task Force to provide technical assistance to Member States in implementing the AU’s maritime security agenda, including the 2050 AIMS, Lomé Charter, and CONOPS of the CMTF.
Update on the AU elections for membership in the PSC for the Northern Region and the two remaining AU Commission Portfolios
Update on the AU elections for membership in the PSC for the Northern Region and the two remaining AU Commission Portfolios
Date | 17 April 2025
INTRODUCTION
This policy brief provides an update on what transpired during the 24th Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council. During the 38th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly held last February, the issue that attracted the most attention was the elections of the AU Commission and the members of the PSC. As discussed in our various analyses on the elections, the AU Commission elections for two portfolios could not proceed. As such, a decision was taken for the election process to open promptly and for the Executive Council to hold an extraordinary session to hold the elections on 15 April 2025. As part of this extraordinary session, it was also decided that the Executive Council would hold an election for membership in the PSC for the seat of the North Africa region.
