Said Djinnit* and El-Ghassim Wane*

And so it is that, on 8 April 2025, Amara Essy left us, joining the long lineage of servants of the Pan-African ideal who are no longer of this world. He was 80 years old.

An accomplished diplomat and man of vision, he marked a historic turning point in the life of the continental body.

We truly came to appreciate Essy’s exceptional qualities after his July 2001 election in Lusaka as the last Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), assuming a year later the role of interim Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission. He succeeded Salim Ahmed Salim, who had steered the OAU’s evolution through the post-Cold War era and was assigned the delicate mission of ensuring the transition to the AU.

This task, he carried out with rigor, determination, and humility. In Durban, in July 2002, the texts governing the functioning of the main organs of the AU were adopted and the new Union officially launched during a grandiose ceremony.

Before taking over the leadership of the OAU General Secretariat, Essy had notably served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire and as his country’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where he held the presidency of the General Assembly, playing a leading role in defending African positions. His experience, network, strategic insight, and benevolent leadership made him uniquely qualified to ensure this successful transition between the two institutional incarnations of Pan-Africanism: the OAU and the AU.

Numerous other accomplishments can be credited to Essy’s leadership during his productive twenty-four-month tenure—from his election as head of the continental organisation’s executive to his departure following the July 2003 Maputo summit. Indeed, this transformative period saw the adoption of several landmark documents, including the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)—an initiative that articulated a bold vision of governance and development in Africa; the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council; the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption; and the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women. All these instruments remain highly relevant to this day.

While guiding the successful transition from OAU to AU and advancing these normative frameworks, Essy remained fully engaged with other pressing issues of the time. He was actively involved in finding solutions to the crises affecting various regions of the continent, particularly in Madagascar, the Central African Republic, and Burundi, skillfully wielding the tools of African diplomacy, even when facing the most assertive leaders.

Well-versed in the intricacies of the international system, Essy had an acute awareness of the asymmetrical distribution of power within it and the inequalities and injustices that characterized it. He was fond of quoting this West African proverb: ‘The hand that gives is above the one that receives,’ as he advocated for a financially autonomous and politically sovereign African Union. Throughout his tenure, he championed this vision with remarkable persistence.

Essy’s management style was one of quiet authority, delegating with confidence and mobilizing energies in a spirit of genuine collaboration.

But what struck people most about him was the man behind the diplomat. He was remarkably humble, generous, discreet, and loyal in friendship. Everywhere he went, he left a profound imprint and earned universal esteem and respect. Those who knew and worked with him cherish memories of his exceptional kindness and attentiveness, qualities that extended well beyond his professional obligations. To the very end, he maintained meaningful bonds with his former collaborators, offering comfort and recognition with the dignified silence of the truly great.

His mandate concluded in July 2003 with the election of former President Alpha Oumar Konaré, yet his role as a bridge-builder between the OAU and AU remains indelible in the continent’s history. In today’s uncertain times, his example continues to inspire: ethics, commitment, discretion, and effectiveness stand as the enduring pillars of his legacy.

Essy often invoked another African adage: ‘In the village, everyone knows who the best dancers are.’ With his passing, Africa has lost one of its most graceful performers on the multilateral stage.

Our grief is profound. Yet we find solace in the wisdom of Birago Diop, who reminds us that:

« Those who die are never gone,

They are in the shadow that grows brighter,

And in the shadow that grows darker …,

They are in the trembling trees,

They are in the whispering wood,

They are in the water that runs,

They are in the water that sleeps … ».

Indeed, Essy’s spirit lives on in the memories, actions, and pathways of countless individuals he inspired across Africa and throughout the world.

Farewell, Mr. Amara Essy! May your noble soul rest in eternal peace.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

* Said Djinnit, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in West Africa and Former Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region. He served as Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the Organisation of African Unity and Commissioner for Peace and Security at the African Union during Amara Essy’s tenure.

 * El-Ghassim Wane, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali and Head of MINUSMA and Former Peace and Security Director at the African Union Commission. He served as Senior Political Officer/Acting Deputy Head of the OAU/AU Conflict Management Centre during Amara Essy’s tenure.

L’Afrique perd l’un de ses illustres fils et un grand panafricain

Said Djinnit* et El-Ghassim Wane*

Ainsi donc Amara Essy nous a quittés le 8 avril 2025, rejoignant la longue lignée des serviteurs de l’idéal panafricain qui ne sont plus de ce monde. Il avait 80 ans.

Diplomate accompli et homme de vision, il aura marqué un tournant historique de la vie de l’institution continentale.

Nous avons véritablement découvert Essy après son élection, en juillet 2001, à Lusaka, comme dernier Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine (OUA), devenant un an plus tard Président intérimaire de la Commission de l’Union africaine (UA). Il succédait alors à Salim Ahmed Salim, artisan de l’adaptation de l’OUA à la période d’après-Guerre froide, et s’était vu assigner la mission délicate d’assurer la transition vers l’UA.

Cette tâche, il la mena avec rigueur, détermination et humilité. À Durban, en juillet 2002, les textes régissant le fonctionnement des principales instances de l’UA furent adoptés et la nouvelle Union officiellement lancée lors d’une grandiose cérémonie.

Avant de prendre la direction du secrétariat général de l’OUA, Essy avait notamment exercé les fonctions de ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Côte d’Ivoire et de représentant permanent de son pays auprès des Nations unies, où il assuma la présidence de l’Assemblée générale, jouant un rôle de premier plan dans la défense des positions africaines. Son expérience, son réseau, sa lucidité stratégique et son leadership bienveillant ont fait de lui l’homme idéal pour assurer ce passage réussi entre les deux incarnations institutionnelles du panafricanisme que sont l’OUA et l’UA.

Bien d’autres résultats peuvent être mis à l’actif du leadership d’Essy, pendant les vingt-quatre mois de travail intense qui ont séparé son élection à la tête de l’exécutif de l’institution continentale de son départ après le sommet de Maputo en juillet 2003. Cette période a en effet vu l’adoption de textes majeurs, comme le Mémorandum d’entente de la Conférence sur la sécurité, la stabilité, le développement et la coopération en Afrique (CSSDCA) – une initiative fondée sur une vision audacieuse de la gouvernance et du développement en Afrique; le Protocole portant création du Conseil de paix et de sécurité; la Convention de l’UA sur la prévention et la lutte contre la corruption et le Protocole de Maputo sur les droits des femmes. Autant d’instruments qui restent, aujourd’hui encore, d’une brûlante actualité.

Tout en œuvrant à la réussite de la transition entre l’OUA et l’UA et à ces avancées normatives, Essy ne négligea point la gestion des autres dossiers prioritaires de l’époque. C’est ainsi qu’il s’impliqua activement dans la recherche de solutions aux crises qui affectaient diverses régions du continent, en particulier à Madagascar, en Centrafrique et au Burundi, maniant avec finesse les outils de la diplomatie africaine, y compris face aux dirigeants les plus affirmés.

Rompu aux arcanes du système international, Essy avait une conscience aiguë de la distribution asymétrique du pouvoir en son sein et des inégalités et injustices le caractérisant. Il aimait à répéter ce proverbe ouest-africain : « La main qui donne est au-dessus de celle qui reçoit », plaidant pour une Union africaine financièrement autonome et politiquement souveraine. C’était là l’un de ses combats constants.

Essy gérait les dossiers avec une autorité tranquille, déléguant en toute confiance et mobilisant les énergies dans un esprit de collaboration sincère.

Mais ce qui frappait le plus chez lui, c’était l’homme derrière le diplomate. Il était d’une rare humilité, généreux, discret, et fidèle en amitié. Partout où il est passé, il a laissé une empreinte profonde et a toujours joui de l’estime ainsi que du respect de tous. Nombreux sont ceux qui, l’ayant côtoyé et pratiqué, gardent le souvenir de sa sollicitude et de sa bonté, bien au-delà des exigences du devoir. Jusqu’à la fin, il aura maintenu un lien cordial avec ses anciens collaborateurs, leur offrant réconfort et reconnaissance, dans le silence digne des grands.

Son mandat prit fin en juillet 2003 avec l’élection de l’ancien président Alpha Oumar Konaré, mais son rôle de bâtisseur de ponts entre l’OUA et l’UA restera inoubliable. En ces temps d’incertitudes, son exemple demeure une source d’inspiration : éthique, engagement, discrétion et efficacité sont les piliers de son héritage.

Essy se plaisait à rappeler cet autre adage africain: « Dans le village, on connaît les meilleurs danseurs ». Avec sa disparition, l’Afrique vient de perdre l’un de ses plus fins danseurs sur la scène multilatérale.

Notre peine est immense. Mais, nous nous consolons avec la certitude, comme le rappelle Birago Diop, que:

« Ceux qui sont morts ne sont jamais partis,

Ils sont dans l’ombre qui s’éclaire,

Et dans l’ombre qui s’épaissit …,

Ils sont dans l’arbre qui frémit,

Ils sont dans le bois qui gémit,

Ils sont dans l’eau qui coule,

Ils sont dans l’eau qui dort … ».

Bref, Essy continuera à vivre dans la mémoire, les gestes et pas de ceux, nombreux, que son exemple a inspirés – tant en Afrique qu’en dehors du continent.

Adieu Monsieur Amara Essy ! Que ton âme repose éternellement en paix.

 * Said Djinnit, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies en Afrique de l’Ouest et ancien Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies pour la région des Grands Lacs. Il a servi comme Secrétaire général adjoint aux Affaires politiques à l’Organisation de l’unité africaine et Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité à l’Union africaine pendant le mandat d’Amara Essy.

 * El-Ghassim Wane, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies au Mali et chef de la MINUSMA et ancien Directeur Paix et Sécurité à la Commission de l’Union africaine. Il a servi comme fonctionnaire politique principal/chef adjoint par intérim du Centre de gestion des conflits de l’OUA/UA pendant le mandat d’Amara Essy.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Almost a year ago, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) faced a test to its anti-coup norms during Chad’s presidential elections, where interim leader Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno ran for office despite the Council’s affirmation of his non-eligibility . This position was rooted in the AU’s established norm prohibiting coup leaders from contesting post-coup elections. In the 9 April 2024 edition of Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba, published ahead of Chad’s elections, it was presciently warned: ‘If the PSC is unable to enforce the rule on non-eligibility concerning Chad, it would be the end of any future application of this rule as well.’ In an edition of Amani Africa Dispatch of 2 May 2024, it was also observed that the election of Debi, despite PSC’s decision on non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that he was a member of, may set a precedent that juntas in other suspended AU member states may follow.

Election of Debi, despite PSC’s decision on non-eligibility of members of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that he was a member of, may set a precedent that juntas in other suspended AU member states may follow. This prediction is now imminent to materialise in Gabon.

This prediction is now imminent to materialise in Gabon. On 12 April, as Gabonese voters make their way to the ballot booth for casting their votes to elect their president, marking the end of 18-month political transition following the August 2023 military coup that deposed President Ali Bongo, General Brice Oligui Nguema, the interim president and leader of the coup, will be on the ballot. Nguema’s candidacy raises normative challenges for the AU, particularly in relation to Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits individuals who perpetrate unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections aimed at restoring democratic order or from holding positions of political responsibility.

Following the 30 August 2023 coup, the PSC, during its 1172nd session, suspended Gabon from all AU activities until constitutional order is restored. The PSC called for the swift restoration of civilian authority, including through free, fair, credible, and transparent elections under AU observation. The timely conclusion of the transition and the convening of the elections are positive developments towards meeting PSC’s demand under its 1172^nd session. Yet, as clearly anticipated in Amani Africa Dispatch on the election in Chad, Nguema’s candidacy, contrary to established AU norm, will carry significant implications for the continuing credibility of the norm and for AU’s broader engagement with other countries under political transition in respect to the application of this norm.

While Nguema’s bid for the presidency was widely anticipated, the PSC did not indicate that the candidacy of members of the transitional government in Gabon would be contrary to established AU norms. At least when it came to Chad, the PSC made that clear, despite not being able to enforce it. The fact that the PSC did not make this clear during its visit to Gabon drew criticism for ‘going easy’ on the transitional authorities. During the field mission, civil society representatives raised concerns that the upcoming election would entrench Nguema’s rule and derail the prospect of a genuine democratic transition. Yet, the mission report contains no indication that the PSC used the visit to press Gabon’s military leaders to uphold AU principles, including the prohibition against coup leaders contesting elections, nor was there any such indication in the communique the PSC adopted on its field mission to Gabon.

While Nguema’s bid for the presidency was widely anticipated, the PSC did not indicate that the candidacy of members of the transitional government in Gabon would be contrary to established AU norms.

In respect to the election in Chad, while the AU Commission Chairperson refrained from issuing the customary congratulatory statement and later clarified that doing so would have violated PSC decisions, the PSC itself moved past Chad’s disregard of its decision and established AU norm. On top of not designating as coup the seizure of power by the TMC following suspension of the constitution of Chad, following the election, the PSC listed Chad among countries that had ‘successfully’ held elections in the first half of 2024. And in a communiqué adopted at its 1224th session, it congratulated Chad —effectively disregarding its standing decision and the clear terms of Article 25(4) of ACDEG. The PSC went further by inviting Chad to address that session, which considered the AU Commission’s half-year report on elections in Africa.

The immediate question that these developments raise for the AU and the PSC is whether the holding of the election in which Nguma becomes victorious would mark the restoration of constitutional order that would warrant the lifting of Gabon’s suspension. Indeed, all indications are that AU member states are disposed not only to accept such an outcome but also to welcome the conclusion of the transitional process within the agreed timeline despite the fact that aspects of the process fly in the face of a clear provision in Article 25 (4) of ACDEG.

Questions are also being asked on why we are witnessing this departure from ACDEG’s Article 25 (4) norm, hence this regressive trend. The first factor that is put forward to explain this could be the weakening of the consensus of member states around the AU’s anti-coup norm. Indeed, this may have a role but has only limited explanatory power. The other explanation relates to the inconsistencies in the application of AU’s anti-coup norm and the legitimacy crisis that arose to the application of the norm due to the failure of AU and regional bodies to act against conditions of unconstitutionality such as manipulation of presidential term limits. Beyond these, the current disposition of member states to tolerate disregarding of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm arose from the increasing challenge that the prolonged suspension of a significant number of AU member states poses to regional cooperation and mobilising collective responses to other challenges.

The current disposition of member states to tolerate the disregarding of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm arose from the increasing challenge that the prolonged suspension of a significant number of AU member states poses to regional cooperation and mobilising collective responses to other challenges.

Notwithstanding the force of such justification, the result of the aforementioned trends with respect to Chad and Gabon is actually the emergence of a tendency of laxity in enforcing ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm on the part of AU member states and the AU itself. One way of looking at this could be to consider this tendency as indicative of a possible evolution towards the emergence through practice of a customary norm of international law in Africa accepting the eligibility of coup makers for elections that are held for restoring constitutional order. However, such a reading would be implying that the practice is of such a nature that it firmly implies the emergence of the element of lawmaking through custom in international law, namely opinio juris, meaning that states believe that they intend to depart from the existing norm and be legally bound by the new practice.

One way of looking at this could be to consider this tendency as indicative of a possible evolution towards the emergence through practice of a customary norm of international law in Africa accepting the eligibility of coup makers for elections that are held for restoring constitutional order.

That would mean that representatives of AU member states are actually engaging in the formation of a norm through practice that is detrimental to the stability of governments, hence contrary to their interest. Because, despite their practice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest that member states accept the full consequences of the demise of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm, which includes the unravelling of the AU’s entire anti-coup norm.

Indeed, the implications of the cost arising from disregarding this norm in Chad and Gabon are not confined to the question of how to deal with the remaining five suspended countries if military leaders in these countries opt to run for elections. It would have far wider consequences for AU’s electoral and constitutional norms writ large.

The demise of this norm will have a heavy price on account of the fundamental reason for the adoption of this particular norm. Notably, it would signal to members of the militaries of all other AU member states that the cost of perpetrating a coup is now lifted. It may thus unintentionally suggest to the militaries across the continent that a coup has once again become a viable avenue for ascending to power with the possibility of it being recognised by the AU following the coup’s legitimisation through elections. Because in a scenario in which most of the coup makers, in the countries that experienced military seizure of power, legitimise themselves through elections, it would be difficult to imagine that members of the militaries of other AU member states would not take note. Accordingly, to suggest that AU member states are engaging deliberately in the process of removing ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm and replacing it by one that allows coup makers to legitimise themselves through elections would mean to accept that member states are removing a key disincentive that discourages their militaries from considering coup as an option for ascending to power. Although their practice may unintentionally signal such an outcome, they cannot be considered as engaging in such a self-harming enterprise by design.

Yet, this would still leave us with another question: How else should we then understand this current trend in which ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm is being put aside?

Perhaps, the most accurate way to understand this trend is as an aberration specific to this particular season as opposed to one that is generalisable as setting a standard for all occasions. This, of course, does not exonerate nor reduce the seriousness of the blow that the laxity of the AU in enforcing the norm on non-eligibility of coup makers for elections organised for restoring constitutional deals to the AU’s anti-coup norm and AU’s credibility itself. As such, there is a need for a well-considered, deliberate and candid reflection on the impact of non-enforcement of ACDEG’s Article 25(4) norm in order to ensure that AU’s anti-coup norm survive a scenario in which the military leaders of all suspended AU member states run for elections following the precedent in Chad and Gabon.

Perhaps, the most accurate way to understand this trend is as an aberration specific to this particular season as opposed to one that is generalisable as setting standard for all occasions.

Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa

The elections of the African Union (AU) Commission leadership held during the 38^th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly that took place from 12 to 16 February 2025 could mark a turning point for the continental organisation. While they reveal strains in the state of intra-African cohesion and procedural gaps and complexities, what makes the elections of the AU Commission leadership remarkable is the timing of the elections. The elections were held, and the new AU Commission leadership was constituted at a time when major challenges and changes are unfolding both in Africa and globally, bringing Africa and the continental body to a crossroads.

Economic pressures, including soaring debt levels, a worsening cost-of-living crisis, and punishingly expensive cost of access to development finance, are eroding some of the gains made in recent decades as millions of people are pushed into extreme poverty. Meanwhile, conflicts are reaching unprecedented levels in both scale and geographic spread, further destabilising the continent as outlined in two major Amani Africa research reports (here and here), making the AU appear helpless and irrelevant. Efforts toward regional integration are also facing setbacks, exemplified by rising inter-state tensions and the recent withdrawal of the three Sahel countries from ECOWAS, exemplifying a fragmentation of regional blocs threatening the AU’s foundation. While demand for a democratic and accountable system of governance continues to rise and several countries show electoral democratic resilience in the face of challenges, democratic governance and constitutional rule remain under strain, with disputed elections and a resurgence of military coups threatening stability. At the same time, the global order is shifting, marked by the rise of multipolarity, rising geopolitical tensions, rapid technological advancements, and a dismembering and failing multilateral system.

As per the decision of the 22^nd extraordinary session of the AU Executive Council, which decided the election to be based on the principle of inter-regional rotation, the Eastern region is to submit candidates for the role of Chairperson, and the Northern region is to submit candidates for the role of Deputy Chairperson. As a result, while the eastern region submitted three candidates from Djibouti, Kenya, and Madagascar for the chairperson positions, the Northern region submitted six candidates from Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Morocco.

The three candidates listed for the position of Chairperson were Raila Odinga, Former Prime Minister of Kenya; Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Foreign Minister of Djibouti; and Richard Randriamandrato, Former Foreign Minister of Madagascar. Despite having three candidates in the race, the main contenders were Mahamoud Ali Youssouf and Raila Odinga.

Mahmoud Ali Youssouf steadily gained votes across all seven rounds, increasing from 18 votes in Round 1 to 33 votes in Round 7. His main competitor, Raila Odinga, maintained a relatively stable vote count, starting with 20 votes in Round 1 and ending with 22 votes in Round 6, failing to expand his support base. Meanwhile, Richard J. Randriamandrato experienced a sharp decline, dropping from 10 votes in Round 1 to just 5 votes by Round 3, after which he was eliminated. This suggests that he had limited backing, and his supporters likely shifted to other candidates, primarily Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, contributing to him assuming a lead during subsequent rounds.

Interestingly, abstentions remained low in the early rounds (one vote per round) but surged to 14 in the final round. This spike suggests that some member states either refused to back the remaining candidate, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, or preferred to abstain once their favored candidates had been eliminated. The significant increase in abstentions also indicates that some member states may have sought to postpone the election. If that had happened, the Assembly might have followed the precedent of suspending the entire election as it did in 2016.

Before the election, it is recalled that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) urged its 16 member states to support Madagascar’s candidate, Richard Randriamandrato, in a last-minute letter published on February 12, 2025. The timing of the endorsement, just days before the election, suggests a last-minute push to consolidate regional votes, potentially influencing undecided member states. One can assess that the last-minute lobbying efforts have failed, but they were also decisive in shaping the final outcome of the elections.