Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for February 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for February 2025
Date | February 2025
Equatorial Guinea will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of February. The Provisional Programme of Work for the month prepared under Equatorial Guinea’s leadership envisages three substantive sessions. This is much less than the usual number of sessions the PSC convenes in the course of the month. The sessions are scheduled to take place at all three levels.
The first session of the PSC on 4 February will be convened at the ministerial level for a session on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Since 2013, the PSC has held various sessions addressing maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. The Council last addressed this issue during its 1209th session held on 18 April 2024. During the session, the PSC emphasised the profound impact of maritime insecurity on the Continental Blue Economy and the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The PSC had also requested an assessment of the implementation of existing maritime security instruments, for which it may seek to get a status update during this session. Given the proliferation of maritime security initiatives, it is of interest for the PSC to request a comprehensive mapping exercise to harmonise efforts, maximise resources and ensure stronger engagement with all relevant regional bodies in enhanced intelligence sharing, joint implementation of robust counter-terrorism measures. The session may also follow up on the activation of the Committee of the Heads of African Navies and Coastguards (CHANS), which the Council had previously emphasised. The PSC may also seek to follow up on the developments of the first ASF maritime exercise, which is still pending.
On 14 February, the PSC will convene a Summit-level meeting to Consider the Situation in Sudan. The last time Sudan was formally on the PSC’s agenda was on 9 October 2024, during its 1235th session, which examined the report of the PSC’s field mission to Port Sudan and Cairo. That visit allowed the Council to engage with Sudanese stakeholders, including the Sovereign Council of the Transitional Government. In discussions with Sovereign Council head and SAF Commander Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, the PSC heard SAF’s perspective on the war, the RSF’s responsibility in the conflict, and Burhan’s expectations for peace. A key contentious issue raised when the PSC held the session to consider the report was the lifting of Sudan’s suspension. More recently, on 31 October, the PSC addressed Sudan again under Any Other Business (AOB) during its 1242nd session, which primarily focused on Women, Peace, and Security. That discussion was triggered by escalating violence in Al-Jazirah State and Al-Damazein following the defection of an RSF commander to the SAF. Since then, the conflict has continued, with the SAF retaking Wad Medani in early January 2025 and advancing into Khartoum while fighting rages on in North Darfur around El Fasher. Civilians remain at grave risk, facing deliberate attacks, torture, summary executions, and widespread sexual violence. The humanitarian crisis has worsened, with nearly half of Sudan’s population—24.6 million people—facing acute food insecurity and famine conditions continuing to expand and deepen. The RSF has been accused of mass atrocities, including genocide. AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, has also expressed deep concerns over escalating violence, including mass killings, summary executions, abductions, and sexual violence, warning that the full scale of atrocities remains obscured due to a telecommunications blackout. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have been scattered, with Türkiye being a recent addition to the already crowded arena of mediation offering to mediate.
On 18 February, the Council will consider and adopt the Provisional Programme of Work for the month of March.
The last session for the month is an ambassadorial-level session on the fight against the use of child soldiers, scheduled to take place virtually on 20 February. The Council’s last session on the matter was during its 1202nd meeting held on 27 February 2024. At the time, it expressed deep concern over the increasingly asymmetrical nature of armed conflicts in Africa that heightened the vulnerability of children to grave rights violations, particularly their recruitment and use by armed forces, non-state armed groups, and terrorist organisations. In the upcoming session, it is expected that the Council will follow up on the decisions it had passed to develop a best practice document of reference to prevent and end the recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed groups and operationalise Child Protection Architecture. Additionally, the session presents an opportunity for taking stock of trends and developments around challenges to the protection of children in the various conflict settings on the continent and the factors and actors responsible for the plight of children affected by conflicts; this session also presents the PSC the opportunity to review the status of implementation of the various decisions it adopted on the protection of children during armed conflicts.
The PSC, during its emergency session on the situation in Eastern DRC on 28 January had also proposed to convene a PSC session on the situation in Eastern DRC at the Head of State and Government level on the margins of the AU Summit taking place 15 – 16 February 2025. However, this proposed session is not indicated in the Provisional Programme of Work.
On 15-16 February during the summit, the Chairperson of the PSC and the Commissioner for PAPS will present the Report on the activities of the PSC for 2024 and the state of peace and security in Africa.
The Withdrawal of AES from ECOWAS: An opportunity for re-evaluating existing instruments for regional integration?
The Withdrawal of AES from ECOWAS: An opportunity for re-evaluating existing instruments for regional integration?
Date | 31 January 2025
Colonel Festus B. Aboagye (Retired)
The fragmentation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is no longer a theoretical concern but a stark reality. On January 29, 2025, despite a six-month extension offer from ECOWAS, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—formally withdrew from the Community, marking the most significant crisis in West Africa’s regional integration since the founding of ECOWAS in 1975. This second major rupture, after Mauritania’s exit in 2000, deals a significant blow to African regional integration and cooperation architecture.
Mauritania left primarily to pursue cultural and economic alignment with the Maghreb. However, weaker levels of economic, political and social connections with the wider ECOWAS members also played a role. The AES departure reflects a complex web of security concerns, geopolitical realignments and institutional failures. Despite the quarter-century gap, both exits share a common thread: dissatisfaction with ECOWAS’ capacity to address member-specific needs. However, the AES withdrawal poses more significant regional implications given these countries’ strategic position and collective emphasis on security cooperation to address the existential security threats facing them over economic integration.
The Sahel states’ exit from ECOWAS stems from a complex interplay of factors triggered by ECOWAS’ mishandling of the July 2023 Niger coup through swift, indiscriminate sanctions and military intervention threat—actions that revealed a disconnect between institutional responses and regional realities in the milieu of stalled governance reforms since 2015. This crisis exposed deeper issues: ECOWAS’ ineffectiveness in addressing terrorism and insurgency in the Sahel, economic marginalisation concerns, particularly regarding the CFA franc, and sovereignty issues over perceived French and Western influence in ECOWAS decision-making. Russia’s growing regional influence has provided these countries with alternative partnership options, reducing their dependence on traditional Western alliances and arguably accelerating their exit plans.
The rift also exposed ECOWAS’ fundamental flaws: over-reliance on sanctions without adequate diplomatic engagement, ineffective handling of political transitions and security challenges, and poor communication with affected populations. These missteps reveal an uncomfortable truth: the organisation’s traditional tools of influence—sanctions, isolation, and military threats—have become counterproductive, in a context that demands addressing legitimate issues and given that member states have alternative diplomatic and security options. Furthermore, ECOWAS’ limited recognition of changing geopolitical dynamics in the Sahel and insufficient engagement with civic stakeholders has undermined its credibility and legitimacy.
The implications of the coming into effect of the exit of the AES on 19 January have major consequences not just for the countries and ECOWAS but for the wider African regional integration process. For AES states, the withdrawal affects cross-border trade, financial transactions, and the movement of people, posing significant challenges for its members. They face potential economic isolation and increased maritime access costs as landlocked nations. Additionally, they risk reduced foreign direct investment due to perceived instability and limited market access. The announcements that they have made on establishing their own regional confederation and a 5-000-strong force suggest that these countries need to invest in building from scratch alternative frameworks for regional cooperation, particularly in areas previously covered by ECOWAS protocols—trade facilitation and security cooperation.
The withdrawal also carries significant implications for ECOWAS coastal states. The immediate impact includes the potential disruption of established trade routes and economic zones. Port cities and transit trade could experience an economic downturn. In contrast, cross-border communities and traditional trade networks may face challenges, given that Mauritania and Morocco are enhancing Sahel-Saharan integration and facilitating AES access to the Atlantic Ocean. From a security perspective as well, these states now face increased security vulnerabilities due to weakened regional cooperation mechanisms. The situation could also exacerbate illegal migration and trafficking, creating new security challenges.
Institutionally, it has also dented ECOWAS’ institutional credibility and regional integration vision, which has guided West Africa for nearly half a century. It also represents a loss of its collective bargaining power. This may weaken its position within the AU and broadly in international negotiations. Beyond weakening its position as a model for African regional integration and affecting international partnerships, the organisation faces reduced financial contributions and diminished influence.
The ECOWAS split poses profound implications for the African Union’s (AU) broader integration agenda, challenging current realities and future assumptions. As a precedent for regional bloc fragmentation, it calls into question the AU’s fundamental principle of regional integration as a pathway to continental unity. Furthermore, it presents significant risks to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in which ECOWAS is a crucial pillar. The emergence of alternative groupings like the AES signals a shift towards fluid, issue-based regional cooperation rather than strictly geographical arrangements. This suggests security concerns take precedence over economic considerations in shaping regional alignments. This development could impact the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and influence other sub-regional mechanisms, critically questioning the viability of regional economic communities as building blocks for continental unity. The 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in February 2024 expressed ‘grave concern of (sic) the joint communiqué of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrawing from ECOWAS’ and called on the AES countries to reconsider their decision and engage in Dialogue with ECOWAS in the spirit of Africa’s integration agenda consistent with AU Agenda 2063. The fact that there was no follow up on this and the AU did not initiate any robust facilitation between the two sides was a missed opportunity.
Despite the major setback the withdrawal represents, ECOWAS’s measured and pragmatic announcement on the day the exit of the AES countries came into effect on 29 January offers the basis for building bridges with the AEC countries. ECOWAS has established transitional arrangements preserving crucial privileges for citizens of these countries, including recognition of ECOWAS-branded documents, trade benefits under ETLS, visa-free movement rights, and support for ECOWAS officials from these nations. This balanced approach, which marks a departure from how ECOWAS handled the coup in Niger, aims to maintain diplomatic channels while protecting citizens’ and businesses’ interests. ECOWAS has chosen to keep its “doors open” while setting up structures for future engagement.
Yet, while ECOWAS’ transitional arrangements endeavour to minimise disruption, they do not address underlying issues or bridge the growing divide between Sahel states and coastal Guinea countries. Their withdrawal underscores the need to re-evaluate regional frameworks to better address Sahel’s unique challenges and update the instruments and mechanisms of regional cooperation at both the ECOWAS and AU levels.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Commemoration of Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation
Commemoration of Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation
Date | 30 January 2025
Tomorrow (31 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1258th session where it will discuss the third commemoration of the ‘Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation’ as an open session.
Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2025, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Mr Domingos Miguel Bembe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Angola to the African Union, may also provide a briefing on the efforts of Angola as the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation. Other members that may participate in the session include Lady Justice (Rtd) Effie Owuor, Judge of the Court of Appeals of Kenya and Chairperson of the AU Panel of the Wise, Welile Nhlapo, Senior Adviser to the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and representatives from the UNOAU and the RECs/RMs.
The Commemoration comes immediately after the end of the ‘Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa,’ which was declared to be from 2014 – 2024 and adopted through Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.501(XXII)] by the 22nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held on 30 and 31 January 2014 in Addis Ababa. We can also recall that during the 899th meeting held at the ministerial level on 5 December 2019, in Luanda, Angola, on the theme: ‘National Reconciliation, Restoration of Peace, Security and Rebuilding of Cohesion in Africa,’ in line with the Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa, the PSC decided, among others, to ‘dedicate a session, once a year, aimed at experience sharing and lessons learning on national reconciliation, restoration of peace and rebuilding of cohesion in Africa; [a]nd to undertake a review of the implementation of the Madiba Nelson Mandela Decade of Reconciliation in Africa, based on the common African position on the review of the UN Peace Consolidation Framework to be developed by the AU Commission…’
On 31 January 2024, the PSC convened for its 1198th meeting, in which it adopted the communiqué for the second Commemoration of Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation. Expressing concern over ‘the deterioration of State institutions, the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government and the outbreak of conflict in some Member States, including the growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism,’ Council underscored the importance of ‘justice in the reconciliation process as a fundamental pillar of peaceful and just societies’ and the need to ‘strengthen the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) to adequately address structural and cyclical instability…’ The concern that the PSC expressed during its last session continues to persist into this year. Tomorrow’s commemoration comes amidst the deteriorating security situation in Eastern DRC and the raging war in Sudan. The commemoration may thus serve as a platform to galvanise support for the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, with the aim of improving coordination and clarifying responsibilities among the involved parties, including DRC and Rwanda, to implement peace agreements. The focus may highlight elements of inclusivity.
Tomorrow’s session, therefore, will seek to get an update on the efforts of the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation in supporting regional peace process efforts. The Luanda Process for mediating between DRC and Rwanda has registered notable milestones. Several rounds of talks at technical and ministerial levels produced, most notably, the signing of a ceasefire agreement, although it has not, in the end, prevented the recent upsurge in violence and escalation of conflict in Eastern DRC. It should also be recalled that on 27 June 2023, Angola hosted the ‘Quadripartite Summit of the East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Southern African Development Community (SADC),’ in Luanda. The Summit adopted the ‘Joint Framework on Coordination and Harmonisation of Peace Initiatives in Eastern DRC by the EAC, ECCAS, ICGLR, SADC and the UN under the auspices of the AU’ which seeks to promote coherence of the existing peace initiatives of the Quadripartite in line with the relevant instruments and decisions with a clear division of responsibilities and agreed timelines. Following this, on 6 October 2023, the AUC convened the First Quadripartite Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence (CDFs) of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as concerned countries of the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda on Coordination and Harmonisation of Regional Peace Initiatives in Eastern DRC. The meeting was convened to ensure coherence and harmonisation in the execution of existing peace initiatives in the region, in line with the decisions of the Quadripartite Summit held in Luanda on 27 June.
In this regard, fostering an inclusive reconciliation process that engages vulnerable groups such as women, youth and community leaders in alignment with the AU’s framework of ‘Silencing the Guns by 2030.’ Additionally, the humanitarian crisis, marked by widespread displacement and violations of human rights, may be underscored, with calls for enhanced humanitarian access and aid in conflict-prone situations. With the invitation of Lady Justice (Rtd) Effie Owuor as one of the presenters, the meeting is an opportunity to take stock of the AU’s achievements and leadership in mediation and peacemaking processes by highlighting the role of the AU Special Envoys, High Representatives, Panel of the Wise and other mediators in promoting dialogue, reconciliation and national healing. This is expected to culminate in proposing recommendations on enhancing cooperation and complementarity of efforts between the AU Champion, the PSC, the AU Commission and other actors on the Continent.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to applaud the efforts of H.E. João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, President of Angola and AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation, for his unwavering commitment to fostering peace and reconciliation across the continent and for mobilising support for conflict prevention and resolution. It may call on all parties involved in any cessation of hostility agreements to fully commit to the implementation of such agreements, fostering trust and paving the way for lasting reconciliation, as well as all the reinforcement of AU mechanisms, including the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) frameworks and the Continental Early Warning Systems, to effectively address emerging conflicts and promote long-term stability. The council may also emphasise the importance of aligning the ‘Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation’ with efforts to advance the implementation of the AU Transitional Justice Policy. The council may further highlight the imperative of further enhancing cooperation and complementarity of efforts between the AU Champion, AU High Representatives and Envoys, RECs/RMS and other actors on the Continent.
Exclusive interview: H.E. Amb. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security
Exclusive interview: H.E. Amb. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security
Jan 29, 2025
Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF)
Update on the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF)
Date | 29 January 2025
Tomorrow (30 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1257th session with two agenda items. Following the Consideration of the Report of the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa; and the Report on the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, the Council will receive Updates on the status of the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF).
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of January, Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the progress made in the operationalisation of the Force with a specific focus on the steps undertaken to facilitate the consultative process for the Strategic Review of the ASF.
The ASF, envisioned under Article 13 of the PSC Protocol as a cornerstone of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), was designed to serve as Africa’s primary mechanism for peace support operations (PSOs) and crisis intervention. Despite being declared fully operational in 2015, the ASF continues to face significant challenges, particularly in political coordination, logistical readiness, and rapid deployment capabilities.
The last time the PSC convened on the ASF was during its 1159th session held at the ministerial level on 22 June 2023, where it requested the AU Commission, among other things, to expedite ‘the strategic review of the ASF in order to align it with contemporary security challenges facing the continent’ drawing on Conclusions of the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations that was held in November 2022, in Abuja, Nigeria and subsequently adopted by the Council. Previously, the PSC, in its 1129th session, had also requested the Commission to use the identified lessons in reviewing and reconceptualising the ASF Concept, with a view to ensuring its alignment with the AU Doctrine on PSOs and to ensure the readiness of the ASF to address the contemporary complex, multifaceted and dynamic peace and security challenges facing Africa. The process seeks to ensure that the ASF remains fit for purpose while ensuring its integration with the AU’s peace support operations doctrine.
It is expected that in tomorrow’s session the Commission will provide updates regarding the engagements it had with key stakeholders for the strategic review of the ASF. It is to be recalled that the Commission had held a technical consultative meeting with ASF RECs/RMs Planning Elements (PLAMELMs), strategic partners and subject matter experts and resources persons in in Algiers from 2-4 December 2024.
A major impediment to the ASF’s operationalisation has been the lack of political consensus and institutional alignment between the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). While the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during the 15th Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety, and Security (STCDSS) in May 2023 was a step forward that clarified roles and responsibilities in planning, deployment, and post-deployment stages, it has not fully resolved underlying tensions. Political sensitivities, including competing interests among RECs, continue to impede seamless coordination. This misalignment complicates decision-making and affects the ASF’s ability to plan, deploy, and manage missions efficiently. The ASF’s operational readiness requires clear frameworks and greater harmonisation of roles and responsibilities under AU leadership.
The ASF’s readiness varies across regions. While the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) have made substantial progress, other regions face ongoing challenges that include resource shortages and limited coordination, which are exacerbated by debates over the balance of authority between RECs and the AU. ECOWAS, for instance, has expressed a strong desire to retain control over deployments within its jurisdiction, creating potential conflicts with the AU’s broader coordination role. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will take an interest in enhancing coordination between the Planning Elements (PLANELMs) of the RECs/RMs and the Continental PLANEL in order to facilitate harmonisation of decision-making on the deployment of the ASF based on the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages to ensure that the ASF can operate as a unified and effective force. To this effect, the AU Commission has held consultations with the five ASF PLANELMs, including EASF, ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC and NARC, on 5 December 2024 in Algiers.
Logistical readiness also remains another significant obstacle to the ASF’s operationalisation. The establishment of the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, in 2018 was a step forward, but the incomplete development of Regional Logistics Depots (RLDs) continues to hinder the ASF’s capacity for rapid deployment. Strategic airlift capabilities, vital for moving troops, equipment, and supplies, also remain inadequate. Recognising this gap, the PSC’s 1159th session had requested the AU Commission to expedite the assessment exercise of pledged strategic lift aircraft as part of efforts to enhance strategic lift capability and the finalisation of the agreements for the utilisation of the pledged strategic lift assets to enable ASF rapid deployment of troops, reinforcement of troops, casualty evacuations and timely logistic supplies in conflict zones. The ASF’s maritime readiness is also another area requiring attention as preparations for the first ASF maritime exercise are undergoing progress, but further investment is still required to establish a robust maritime component within the ASF. On the Continental Logistics Base, while welcoming the structures approved by the 36th ordinary session of the Assembly, the PSC may appeal to Member States to support the efforts for the mobilisation of the required budget of USD 4,717,606.45 for the approved structures.
In the context of the shift in the nature of conflicts with conflicts involving terrorist groups having become dominant in recent years, the ASF’s potential role in counter-terrorism is another area of strategic importance. The growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism across the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and other regions necessitates adapting the assumption that underpinned the conception of the ASF with its focus on intra-state conflicts. This has prompted questions on the need for specialised and rapid-response capability. It was against this background that the PSC adopted a decision to establish a counter-terrorism unit within the ASF during its 960th session in October 2020, which remains a key priority. Tomorrow’s session will also present an opportunity to follow up on this decision.
Despite the challenges it faces, the ASF framework offers an unparalleled opportunity for standardising training, enhancing interoperability, and building institutional resilience across Africa’s security architecture. Many troops have benefited from ASF-led training programs, which have built a shared understanding of operational procedures and improved readiness. While RECs and ad hoc arrangements have often deployed peace support operations independently, integrating such initiatives into the ASF framework will enhance collective security efforts and optimise resources.
In terms of follow-up on the request for a strategic review of the ASF, including by the PSC, initial steps were taken last December with the convening of the meeting in Algeria. The consultative meetings held in Algiers, Algeria, which included the Technical Consultative Meeting on the ASF and consultations with ASF RECs/RMs, have been centred around the themes of legal and policy framework of the ASF, the political challenges facing its operationalisation, securing predictable and sustained financing, operational challenges facing ASF and mechanisms to enhance the capacities of ASF. However, the AU Commission claims that the strategic review process of the ASF continues to face delays due to funding gaps. One way of overcoming this is to leverage the Network of Think Tanks for Peace that the PAPS department assembled.
Efforts to develop the ASF’s cost-sharing model must continue, as this approach promotes joint regional solutions and shared responsibility in addressing security challenges. By refining this model, the ASF can encourage greater financial commitment and ownership among member states and RECs/RMs. The efforts in collective resource mobilisation and sharing need to be aligned with the legal expectations of the PSC Protocol. The AU also needs to seize the opportunity that Resolution 2719 presents in affirming the central role of the AU and its leadership as envisaged in the PSC protocol in the deployment of peace support operations.
The PSC’s directive to integrate ASF principles into all AU peace support operations represents a significant step toward institutionalising the framework. Moreover, the alignment of the ASF’s concept with the AU’s doctrine on PSOs would ensure that its operations are guided by a coherent strategic vision. As Africa faces increasingly complex and multifaceted security threats, the ASF remains an indispensable tool for promoting peace and stability.
The ASF remains central to realising the vision of African-led peace and security, but its potential can only be fully realised through concerted efforts to overcome its enduring challenges. As the PSC deliberates on the ASF’s future, it must prioritise ensuring unity of purpose among AU member states and RECs, ensuring that the ASF serves as a symbol of African solidarity and a practical mechanism for achieving peace and security.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique.
