Briefing by the African Members to the UN Security Council
Briefing by the African Members to the UN Security Council
Date | 28 August 2025
Tomorrow (29 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1299th session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representatives of the A3 members—Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—are then expected to brief the PSC on their activities.
This engagement is in line with the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa, held in December 2013 in Algiers, where participants agreed that the A3 would brief the PSC quarterly on African issues on the agenda of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, adopted during the PSC’s 1289th session on 24 July 2025, also stipulates that A3 coordinators shall provide regular briefings and quarterly reports to the PSC. This mechanism is designed to ensure accountability of the A3 to the AU and amplify Africa’s common voice within the UNSC. Although this commitment was made more than a decade ago, the quarterly briefings have not been carried out as regularly as envisaged. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to help revive this practice and give it greater institutional weight.
The A3 are expected to brief the PSC on activities undertaken within the UNSC over the past quarter. In particular, they will highlight efforts of the A3+ (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) in coordinating joint statements, engaging in collective negotiations, and increasingly assuming roles as penholder or co-penholder on African files. These activities are aimed at ensuring that Africa’s perspectives are integrated into UNSC decision-making and outcomes. One example likely to be cited is the joint statement delivered by the A3+ on 22 August during the UNSC’s meeting on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In that statement, the A3+ called for impartial investigations into atrocities committed by armed groups, demanded accountability for perpetrators, underscored the leading role of the AU and sub-regional mechanisms under Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé, and urged the establishment of a credible verification mechanism to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement.
The A3 are also expected to reflect on their role in negotiating UNSC outcome documents. Recent examples include negotiations on a draft resolution and statement concerning the situation in the DRC, as well as renewal of the sanctions regime in July and August. Earlier this month, the A3+ worked alongside the United Kingdom—penholder on the Sudan file—to draft a press statement following the RSF-led Tasis alliance’s declaration of a parallel governing authority. These instances underscore the growing contribution of the A3+ in shaping UNSC outcomes on African files.
Another positive development likely to be highlighted is the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3. Adopted on 24 July 2025, this milestone consolidated practices and commitments developed over years of PSC sessions and HLS conclusions. The request for a manual was first raised at the 8th HLS in December 2021, when participants urged the AU Commission to prepare guidelines for A3 engagement and PSC–A3 cooperation, drawing on previous experiences. The draft was subsequently refined through successive HLS discussions before its final adoption last month.
While the adoption of the manual is a step forward, the main challenge lies in ensuring its implementation. As highlighted in our special research report ‘Making Africa’s Voice Matter in the UN Security Council: Bridging the Gap between Ambition and Reality in the Role of the African Three Members of the UNSC’, A3–PSC coordination over the past decade has often been irregular and ad hoc. The manual provides an opportunity to shift from fragmented practice to more consistent engagement, but this will only be achieved if agreed commitments are translated into action.
For example, modalities such as inviting the A3 to participate in PSC meetings on agenda items also under discussion at the UNSC, holding quarterly video teleconferences (VTCs) between the PSC Troika (outgoing, current, and incoming chairpersons) and the A3, and aligning the PSC’s monthly programme of work with the UNSC on African files have not been implemented regularly. Moreover, the PSC’s annual report to the AU Assembly has not systematically reflected A3 activities, instead annexing HLS conclusions without substantive assessment. The manual seeks to address this by requiring the A3 Secretariat, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in New York, to submit an annual report to the PSC Secretariat by the end of October each year. This year presents an opportunity to begin incorporating A3 activities into the PSC’s annual report, a task that will be considerably easier if quarterly engagements between the PSC and the A3 are regularised.
The A3 briefing may also highlight efforts to institutionalise and strengthen strategic engagements between the African and Caribbean members of the UNSC, with the aim of amplifying the voice of both regions in advancing their interests at the Council. In this context, the briefing may spotlight the annual A3 Plus retreat, held in Georgetown, Guyana, in February 2025, which provided an important platform for strengthening modalities of internal coordination.
Another activity likely to be highlighted in the briefing is the Arria-formula meeting convened by Sierra Leone on ‘The Global Race for Critical Minerals: Addressing Resource-Driven Insecurity in Africa,’ with Guyana and the incoming UNSC non-permanent members (the DRC and Liberia) as co-sponsors in July. This was an important engagement, providing a forum to deliberate on the ongoing global race for critical minerals in Africa and its implications for the continent’s peace and security.
The A3 are further expected to update the PSC on preparations for two major upcoming engagements: the Oran Process, scheduled for later this year, and the annual PSC–UNSC joint consultative meeting, expected in October in Addis Ababa. The Oran Process will include, for the first time, participation of the DRC and Liberia, both of which were elected in June to serve as non-permanent members of the UNSC for two-year terms starting in January 2026. Early involvement of these incoming members will help build continuity and strengthen institutional memory within the A3.
No outcome document, in the form of a communiqué or press statement, is expected from tomorrow’s briefing. However, the PSC may commend the A3 for their efforts in enhancing internal cohesion and promoting Africa’s common voice within the UNSC. It may also welcome the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 at its 1289th session and emphasise the importance of translating agreed modalities and commitments into practice, including the regularisation of quarterly briefings to the PSC by the A3. As highlighted in the manual, the PSC may further request the A3 to submit its report by October so that it can be included in the PSC’s annual report to be presented at the upcoming AU Summit.
Briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa
Briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa
Date | 26 August 2025
Tomorrow (27 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene for its 1298th session to get a briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa.
The session commences with an opening statement of the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Mohamed Khaled. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, will make an introductory remark. The session is expected to get presentations from Marie-Antoinette Rose QUATRE, Chief Executive Officer of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); Lallal Idris Lakhdar, Acting Director, African Union Counter Terrorism Centre; Jalel Chelba, Acting Director, African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation; and Maxwell Yaw Kumah, Principal Researcher and Analyst of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA). A representative from the African Regional Standby Forces is also expected to make a statement.
The session will build on previous discussions on the theme, with the recent engagement being the 1247th session held on 27 November 2024, where CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL briefed the PSC on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook. From the communiqué of the session, the Council encouraged these institutions ‘to continue to provide technical assistance and to increase the dissemination of early warning reports and operational intelligence to Member States and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), with a view to enabling them to more effectively respond to emerging threats.’ In addition, Council tasked the AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL, other specialised AU agencies and Member States ‘to work together towards the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force focusing on preventing the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and emerging technologies by terrorist groups for radicalisation, recruitment, training and funding.’
According to INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report, a growing share of reported crimes in Africa is cyber-related. The report goes further and highlights that, despite the rising caseloads, most African states surveyed still lack essential IT infrastructure to combat cybercrime. Just 30 per cent of countries reported having an incident reporting system, 29 per cent a digital evidence repository and 19 per cent a cyberthreat intelligence database. Additionally, while cybercrime routinely crosses national borders, 86 per cent of African countries surveyed said their international cooperation capacity needs improvement due to slow, formal processes, a lack of operational networks and limited access to platforms and foreign-hosted data. Against this backdrop, this upcoming PSC meeting will present an opportunity to advance the discussions from the 1247th meeting and brainstorm a concrete plan for the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force.
Relatedly, of concern for tomorrow’s session will be the issue of violent extremism on the continent. It has been reported that, in the past year, nearly half of the fatalities (10,685) occurred in the Sahel, while Somalia accounted for about one-third of Africa’s total fatalities (7,289). Together with the Lake Chad Basin, these three regions comprised 99% of the continent’s militant Islamist-linked deaths. According to one recent report, ‘all five African theatres (including Mozambique and North Africa) remain highly dynamic with militant insurgents mounting offensive operations in each, especially in the Sahel and Somalia.’ There was a 14-per cent rise in battle-related deaths across the continent (15,678).’ Militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia expand their hold on territory.
Organised Transnational Crime is also another element of discussion to be addressed. In May 2025, the Council held its 1279th meeting to discuss this theme, with a focus on the Sahel region. From the communiqué of the meeting, Council expressed concern ‘over the growing operational sophistication of transnational criminal networks exploiting structural vulnerabilities across the Sahel, including governance deficits, legitimate or popular grievances, porous borders and limited state presence.’ Yet, organised transnational crime does not take the same form across various regions of the continent. Thus, Council tasked the AU Commission to coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other critical stakeholders ‘in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities…’ From Amani Africa’s Insight of the session, the PSC was in the spotlight as it faces ‘the challenge of how to push away from fragmented, security-heavy responses to more holistic, coordinated strategies that address the structural drivers of transnational organised crimes and terrorism’.
It would also be of interest for PSC members to follow up on PSC’s earlier decisions on the need for anchoring the sessions on early warning on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). It is worth recalling that during its 1251st session held on 17 December 2024, the PSC underscored the need for greater visibility and prominence of CEWS within the proposed restructuring of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department. Previously, the 1208th session of the PSC underscored the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts.’
Following the merger of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peace and Security, the structure that housed CEWS disappeared despite it being a statutory structure. Since then, instead of CEWS, established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, this session on early warning has been organised around the work of CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL. This tends to limit the scope of analysis of threats to the domain of intelligence and law enforcement-based threats, hence making it hard security-focused. The implication of this is that it does not fully account for risks of conflict, political, social, economic and environmental issues. A case in point is the lack of attention given to intercommunal conflicts. In recent years, these conflicts have represented the majority of non-state conflicts in Africa.
During tomorrow’s session, the role of the APRM in early warning is also expected to feature. As the entity that identifies risks through its governance assessment of participating states, APRM stands to make a notable contribution in drawing attention to the governance-related risks of conflict. It is to be recalled that the 4th Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and APRM on 7 to 8 April 2025 highlighted the importance of leveraging APRM’s governance-focused peer review reports to enhance early warning strategies. This builds on prior pronouncements, which emphasised closer coordination between APRM and PSC to address structural vulnerabilities and governance deficits that fuel conflicts.
From the perspective of institutional coordination on early warning and continental security outlook, an issue that deserves attention during tomorrow’s session concerns the role of the early warning mechanisms of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). In May 2025, during the 2nd Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS MSC), the two bodies reaffirmed in their joint communique ‘the commitment to continue enhancing cooperation between the AU PSC and the ECOWAS MSC on Peace, Security and Governance issues, including by developing stronger and more structured cooperation on conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. In this respect, they ‘underlined the need to enhance Early Warning and joint analysis capabilities, and to further strengthen the synergy between the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), including joint scenario planning, data exchange and rapid deployment of early response teams to contain potentially explosive situations.’
Discussions may also address challenges such as climate change vis-à-vis peace and security, as it is a critical factor in Africa’s complex crises, intensifying conflicts, driving forced migrations and worsening socio-economic challenges. Identified as a ‘threat multiplier,’ it amplifies existing vulnerabilities and poses new risks to human security and regional stability. The concept note of PSC’s 1263rd session of March 2025 highlighted that ‘climate change also weakens state governance, making it harder to maintain security and public welfare. This creates opportunities for terrorist and criminal groups, who exploit climate-related frustrations to recruit and expand their influence, further threatening regional stability. Thus, climate change is not just an environmental threat – it undermines social cohesion and governance, necessitating an integrated approach that combines climate adaptation and resilience, sustainable development and peacebuilding.’
Acute competition for natural resources is a key issue slated for discussion at tomorrow’s PSC session, recognised as a significant threat to peace and security across Africa. The growing demand for limited resources like water, arable land, and minerals intensifies tensions within and between communities and states, particularly in regions such as the Sahel, Great Lakes, and Horn of Africa. This competition drives intercommunal clashes, banditry, and interstate disputes, with conflicts over water and fertile land escalating pastoralist-farmer tensions, and contests for valuable minerals fueling armed groups and transnational crime networks. The PSC is expected to explore integrating resource governance into early warning systems, prioritising sustainable management and equitable access to reduce conflict risks. This will likely involve using geospatial tools to track resource-related tensions and collaborating with RECs/RMs to craft tailored, region-specific strategies for preventing resource-driven conflicts.
Beyond these pressing challenges, the PSC is expected to address a set of emerging threats that further compound Africa’s security landscape. Among these are escalating inter-state tensions, intensifying geopolitical rivalries, and the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government. Youth restiveness, driven by widespread political exclusion and deep-seated structural unemployment, is identified as a particularly significant risk. The Council will also consider the effects of prolonged humanitarian crises, characterised by forced displacement and the weaponisation of sexual and gender-based violence, alongside the cascading impact of post-COVID-19 economic shocks and the growing burden of unsustainable external debt, all of which continue to erode state resilience.
The PSC is also expected to look into how tools like digital maps, satellite images, smart computer analysis, and future risk monitoring can help them better understand security situations and prepare for possible threats before they happen.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to emphasise the need for enhanced collaboration, including information sharing, between and among Member States, as well as with international partners, including technology firms, in order to more effectively counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and violent extremist groups. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the establishment of a joint cybersecurity taskforce and, importantly, call on AFRIPOL to develop an action plan on expanding the institutional and infrastructural preparedness of AU member states to deal with the increasing cybersecurity threats and enhance transnational cooperation for addressing the cross-regional nature of these threats. Considering the increase in intercommunal conflicts, the PSC may request the CEWS to undertake the mapping of intercommunal conflicts and their trends in close coordination with the concerned RECs/RMs. The PSC may reiterate its decision from its 1208th session on the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts’. In this regard, it may call for the need for anchoring the CEWS in a structure dedicated to CEWS.
Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Date | 24 August 2025
Tomorrow (25 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its second annual joint consultative meeting with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
Following opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025 and Stella Chiripo Ndau, Chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks.
This year’s meeting, scheduled to take place virtually, builds on the commitment made during the inaugural consultative meeting held on 30 August 2024 in Gaborone, Botswana, where both parties agreed to institutionalise annual consultations alternating between Addis Ababa and Gaborone. Rooted in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, the meeting reflects ongoing efforts to strengthen coordination and collaboration in advancing peace, security and stability in the Southern Africa region.
At last year’s inaugural meeting, the PSC and SADC Organ reflected on lessons learned from SADC’s engagements through the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). The agenda covered terrorism and violent extremism in Southern Africa, the situation in eastern DRC, resource mobilisation for regional peace operations, and peacemaking efforts under the AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative. The meeting also underscored the historic significance of institutionalising a structured PSC–SADC platform as a vital step toward enhancing regional responses to peace and security threats.
One of the agenda items in tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to be the situation in Eastern DRC and SADC’s engagement. SAMIDRC, launched to stabilise eastern DRC, officially began a phased withdrawal on 29 April 2025 and concluded its military mandate earlier than anticipated, raising concerns about the sustainability of SADC’s military interventions. The forced withdrawal, announced on 13 March 2025 following military setbacks, further highlighted the need for reassessing the processes, including the coordination required with the AU, in the deployment of such a mission and the need for aligning of the legal basis in initiating and deploying such missions at the SADC level with that of the AU both for ensuring coherence and avoiding the kind of setbacks that SAMIDRC experienced.
Both the PSC and the SADC Organ have previously raised alarm over inadequate, unpredictable, and unsustainable funding for peace operations. This issue became a major challenge for SADC’s missions in both Mozambique and DRC, despite the fact that SADC tried to self-finance a significant portion of the funding for the missions. The issue of funding is another major area where the experience of both SAMIM and SAMIDRC highlight the necessity for rethinking SADC’s approach and find ways of aligning its processes with that of the AU as a critical step to establish the ground work for enabling future missions to benefit from UN assessed contributions within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2719.
The recent development in the DRC Peace Process is also expected to be of central concern in tomorrow’s agenda. Despite the withdrawal of SAMIDRC, SADC continues to provide ongoing support for political and diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict in the region. Following the direction by the Joint EAC-SADC summit of 8 February 2025 for the merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes, former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Uhuru Kenyatta, Sahle-Work Zewde, Mokgweetsi Masisi and Catherine Samba-Panza as facilitators.
In a further step to rationalize and create a single structure, a meeting of the co-chairs of the Joint EAC–SADC summit and the Panel of Facilitators held on 1 August 2025 in Nairobi adopted a framework for the merger of the Nairobi and Luanda processes and agreed to integrate AU, EAC, and SADC mediation structures under a joint secretariat led by the AU Commission in Addis Ababa to overcome fragmentation and enhance coherence in mediation efforts. Two of the outcomes are of particular interest for tomorrow’s meeting.
The first of this is the decision that entrusted the lead role to the AU Commission in respect to the joint secretariat of the merged peace process, thereby assigning an enhanced coordination role of the AU on this file. The consultations are expected to explore strategies on how to take this forward in practical terms.
Second and most notably, the outcome document called for ‘all other ongoing initiatives and stakeholders to align with the Africa-led process’, hence purporting to assert primacy.
This is where the merged framework also intersects with other external initiatives. The US-mediated Washington Peace Accord of 27 June 2025 sought to de-escalate tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, while Qatar facilitated dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23, culminating in a 23 April 2025 Declaration of Principles. Although Doha’s attempt to broker a peace agreement in August is yet to materialise, Qatar’s continued involvement underscores the growing role of external actors in African peace processes, a dynamic with both opportunities and risks to African-led conflict prevention and resolution practices.
At the political level, the 45th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government on 17 August 2025 reaffirmed commitment to peace and stability in the DRC and welcomed the AU – EAC -SADC joint mediation efforts. The summit also called for complementarity and harmonisation between Africa-led processes and other initiatives, underscoring the importance of maintaining continental leadership while leveraging external support.
Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is also expected to deliberate and make actionable decisions towards responding to the need for sustainable funding for peace operations, building on commitments from last year’s consultative meeting to jointly explore innovative means of joint internal resource mobilisation for peace operations, including special levies, private sector partnerships and continental financial entities.
The expected outcome of the second annual joint consultative meeting is a joint communique. The meeting is expected to reiterate the primacy of the role of the PSC as provided for in Article 16 of the Protocol establishing the PSC and the role of the SADC organ as provided for in the relevant SADC instruments. The two organs are expected to also reaffirm their commitment to regular, structured cooperation and interoperable early warning systems that respond to identified gaps in coordination due to structural differences. They may also call on the AU Commission and SADC Secretariat on identifying ways and means of enhancing policy coherence of SADC with the AU based on the lessons from SAMIDRC and the need for creating the foundation for operationalising UNSC Resolution 2719 for future deployments. On the DRC, the meeting is anticipated to welcome the outcome of the meeting of EAC–SADC Co-Chairs and call on the AU Commission to work with SADC and EAC secretariats to speed up the process of the joint secretariat and joint mediation framework. It is also expected that while welcoming some of the progress registered with the signing of agreements in Washington and the Declaration of Principles in Doha, the two bodies may echo the call of the joint SADC-EAC co-chairs meeting on the need for closer coordination and alignment with African initiatives.
Consideration of the ToRs of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD
Consideration of the ToRs of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD
Date | 14 August 2025
Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1297th session to consider the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism. Although not initially on the August 2025 programme of work, the PSC is also expected to consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).
Following opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make introductory remarks. Michael Wamai, Expert from Uganda and the Chairperson of the Committee of Experts (CoE) of the PSC for July 2025, is expected to make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on PCRD. In addition, Mohamed Lamine Nait Youcef, Expert from Algeria and Chairperson of the CoE of the PSC for August 2025, will make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism.
Building on the CoE’s 78th meeting on the ‘review of the Draft Terms of Reference of the Peace and Security Council Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism’ held on 1 August, the Sub-Committee’s establishment aligns with the Malabo Decision of May 2022, the 249th PSC meeting of November 2010 and the 1182nd PSC meeting of 2023, which emphasised the urgent need to activate this body to address the growing complexity of terrorism in Africa. The proposed ToR outlines the Sub-Committee’s objectives, mandate, composition and operational modalities, aiming to enhance the PSC’s ability to respond to terrorism through African-led strategies, coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and collaboration with AU bodies like the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL and CISSA. The Sub-Committee is tasked with monitoring PSC decisions, assessing trends in continental terrorism, and promoting a multidimensional approach to addressing the structural causes of terrorism.
Africa continues to face an unprecedented surge in terrorist activities, with the Sahel region emerging as the global epicentre of terrorism. According to the AUCTC, terrorist attacks increased by 99% and related deaths by 53% in 2023 compared to the previous year, with West Africa accounting for 45% of attacks and 62% of deaths in Q2 of 2024. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remain the most affected, with groups like Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Shabaab and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) expanding their reach. The spread of terrorism to coastal West African states like Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire, alongside emerging links between piracy and terrorism in the Gulf of Guinea, underscores the evolving threat landscape. Initiatives such as the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism (AUMCCT) and the African Counter-Terrorism Coordination Task Force (A2CTF), as mandated in the 1237th PSC meeting of October 2024, have been established to mitigate this. However, challenges such as the dissolution of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, political instability and foreign interference have hampered regional coordination. The 2024 Global Terrorism Index highlights Burkina Faso as the world’s most terrorism-affected country, emphasising the need for a shift from military-centric to holistic, governance-focused strategies.
The PSC and AU Assembly have issued several decisions to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts. The 2022 Malabo Declaration called for the immediate operationalisation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the establishment of the AUMCCT. The 1182nd PSC meeting, on the other hand, urged the full activation of the Sub-Committee and the A2CTF, emphasising context-specific interventions. Additionally, the 1237th PSC meeting welcomed the AU Commission’s report on combating terrorism, condemning foreign interference and calling for sustainable funding for AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) under UNSC Resolution 2719. It also emphasised psychosocial support for victims and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism. Notwithstanding, The Abuja Process Declaration of 2024 reinforced the need for regional cooperation and institutional building to address terrorism’s evolving nature. Despite these decisions, implementation gaps persist, including delays in operationalising the Sub-Committee, limited funding for counter-terrorism initiatives, and weak coordination between AU bodies and RECs/RMs. The PSC further noted the growing nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime, such as illicit resource exploitation, which remains inadequately addressed.
The draft ToRs provides a foundational framework for the Sub-Committee’s role in coordinating counter-terrorism efforts, monitoring PSC decisions, and promoting African-led solutions. However, several gaps warrant attention. First, there is ambiguity in the mandate scope: while the ToR outline broad functions such as recommending strategies and monitoring PSC decisions, they lack specificity on operational mechanisms, timelines and accountability frameworks. Funding mechanisms are also insufficiently addressed; although a proposed annual budget is mentioned, sustainable funding sources are not identified, despite the PSC’s call for predictable financing in its October 2024 meeting and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism remains stalled. In addition, while the ToR references a multidimensional approach to addressing structural causes of terrorism, it does not explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, or climate-induced insecurity, which the AU Commission’s 2024 report identified as key drivers. The framework does not also address the growing use of advanced technologies, including drones and digital platforms, by terrorist groups and finally, the need for psychosocial support for victims, particularly women and youth, is imperative. The ToR does not incorporate mechanisms to ensure gender-sensitive or victim-centered approaches.
To strengthen the ToRs and enhance the Sub-Committee’s effectiveness, the PSC and AU Commission should clarify operational mechanisms by defining specific procedures for punitive measures, intelligence sharing and strategy development, including timelines for reporting and decision-making and adopt a quarterly review mechanism to track progress on PSC decisions. In light of the increasing number of PSC Sub-Committees, the PSC should give due consideration to ensuring that the Sub-Committees receive the necessary support to execute their given mandates effectively and efficiently, while exploring partnerships with international donors without compromising African ownership. Regional coordination can be improved by establishing a formal framework with RECs and RMs, including joint task forces and regular consultations, to harmonise regional counter-terrorism strategies and address gaps left by the G5 Sahel’s dissolution. The mandate should explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, and climate resilience, potentially in collaboration with the AU Centre for PCRD, to address the root causes of terrorism. Emerging technologies should also be addressed by including measures to counter drones, cyberattacks and digital propaganda, leveraging technical partnerships with AFRIPOL and CISSA. Victim-centred approaches, on the other hand, should be prioritised through programmes for psychosocial support and reintegration, particularly for women and youth, with gender mainstreaming embedded in all activities. Finally, accountability should be strengthened by introducing a robust monitoring and evaluation framework, with regular reporting to the PSC and AU Assembly on progress and challenges.
On the other hand, the PSC will consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on PCRD. The establishment of the Sub-Committee on PCRD is rooted in the AU’s recognition of the evolving nature of conflicts in Africa, which demand coherent, coordinated and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction strategies. The AU’s Policy on PCRD, revised in 2024, emphasises holistic approaches combining peacebuilding, institutional capacity-building, socio-economic recovery and reconciliation. The Sub-Committee, established under Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, is designed to receive assignments and mandates on specific post-conflict situations from the PSC. It will monitor political, socio-economic, and security developments across the continent in collaboration with the relevant units of the AU Commission, the AU PCRD Center, AUDA-NEPAD, APRM, other AU organs, institutions, entities and RECs/RMs and make recommendations to the PSC on required interventions. The Sub-Committee will oversee the implementation of PCRD activities and decisions adopted or endorsed by the PSC, providing regular updates on progress. It will also seek, at a technical level, relevant information from AU Member States, RECs/RMs, and partners regarding actions taken to implement PCRD measures, and offer recommendations to enhance their effectiveness. Furthermore, it will identify key areas for capacity building, financial support and technical assistance needed by Member States in post-conflict situations, and propose appropriate measures for PSC consideration. Lastly, the Sub-Committee will advise on resource mobilisation strategies, including innovative financing solutions, to sustain long-term PCRD efforts and ensure lasting recovery and development.
Recent PSC and Assembly decisions underscore the urgency of this initiative. The 1293rd PSC meeting on 4 August highlighted the worsening humanitarian and security crisis in Sudan, calling for enhanced PCRD efforts to address famine and conflict escalation. Similarly, the 1291st meeting in July 2025 addressed the situation in Libya, emphasising the need for coordinated post-conflict strategies. The AU Assembly’s Decision [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.(XVI)] and 1122nd PSC meeting of November 2022 further reinforced the mandate for PCRD, stressing the prevention of conflict relapse through governance and socio-economic interventions. The Sub-Committee’s formation comes at a time when Africa faces persistent and emerging threats, including terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government and complex political transitions. The PSC’s recent engagements, such as the July 2025 Joint Consultative Meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in Midrand, South Africa, emphasised enhancing institutional synergy to implement PSC decisions and promote post-conflict recovery.
To afford this sub-committee its relevance, institutional synergy is important. In this regard, the Sub-Committee should prioritise coordination with RECs/RMs, the PCRD Centre in Cairo, AUDA-NEPAD and the APRM to prevent fragmented efforts, while leveraging existing platforms like the I-RECKE Policy Sessions to share best practices. Tailored PCRD strategies are also essential, with the Sub-Committee developing country-specific frameworks to address unique post-conflict challenges. Finally, sustainable financing must be pursued, with the AU Commission exploring innovative funding models, including public-private partnerships, to ensure the long-term sustainability of PCRD initiatives.
It is also worth noting that the Sub-Committees will be composed of the fifteen (15) Member States of the PSC, represented at the level of experts. Given the nature of their work, each Member State on the Council—and therefore in each Sub-Committee—will designate two experts, with one serving as the main representative and the other as a substitute, though both will be able to participate in the Sub-Committees’ activities.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué or a summary record. The PSC may welcome and endorse the refined ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committees on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD, commending the Committee of Experts for their engagement in the process. Council is also likely to direct the AU Commission to utilise the ToRs on counterterrorism and PCRD in the mandating, implementation, management and oversight of all counterterrorism and PCRD efforts, with a view to enhancing institutional coordination between relevant AU Organs, as well as between the AU and AU-RECs/RMs in the prevention, response and resolution of conflicts on the Continent. Furthermore, Council may urge the prompt operationalisation of the Sub-Committees, encourage regular and robust monitoring and evaluation and call for sustainable and predictable financing.
Education in Conflict Situations
Education in Conflict Situations
Date | 12 August 2025
Tomorrow (13 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1296th open session, focusing on education in conflict situations.
The Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August 2025, Mohamed Khaled, will deliver opening remarks, followed by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The PSC will receive presentations from Prof. Mohammed Belhocine, Acting Commissioner for Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (ESTI) and Wilson Almeida Adao, the Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU, and Co-Chair of the Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC) and the Representative of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), will also brief the session.
The last time the PSC convened a session on the theme was at its 1229th meeting, held in August 2024. In that session, the PSC resolved to institutionalise education in conflict as an annual thematic focus. It also stressed the need to uphold the right to education for all, even in conflict, urging Member States to adopt conflict-sensitive, crisis-resilient policies, strengthen data-driven policymaking, integrate inclusive education into post-conflict recovery and appoint a Special Envoy on Children in Conflict. The upcoming session also precedes the 2025 AU Education Summit, intended to mobilise Member States and stakeholders around the continent’s educational priorities. The session is expected to first examine the current state of education in conflict and post-conflict settings, with attention to the systemic collapse of educational services caused by ongoing violence and institutional fragility.
Armed conflict and instability are significant barriers to education in Africa, depriving millions, especially girls, children with disabilities and displaced populations, of safe and inclusive learning. Attacks on schools, the militarisation of facilities and child recruitment erode national education systems, deepening poverty and inequality. In many conflict zones, school closures remove vital protection and create a causal link between attacks on education and the rise in harmful coping mechanisms, particularly child marriage. The loss of schooling exposes adolescents, especially girls, to heightened risks of violence, displacement and economic hardship, reinforcing cycles of vulnerability and deprivation.
Conflict continues to severely undermine access to education across Africa, with an estimated 80 million children affected, amounting to ‘one in three’ on the continent. In West and Central Africa, insecurity has led to the closure of over 14,000 schools as of June 2024. The Central Sahel region has seen a ‘fourfold increase’ in school shutdowns over the past five years, disrupting education in Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad.
The gravity of the situation is most acute in Sudan, where the ongoing armed conflict has produced one of the continent’s worst education emergencies. Recent estimates place the number of out-of-school children and adolescents at over 16.5 million. Many of these children reside in displacement sites, often with no access to formal education. Prolonged violence has severely disrupted learning, with attacks on schools and the militarisation of educational facilities compounding an already fragile system.
In Ethiopia, an estimated 9 million children remain out of school due to the compounded impact of conflict, climate-related disasters and displacement. Around 18% of educational institutions have either been damaged or destroyed, particularly in conflict-affected regions. This has further aggravated school dropout rates and negatively affected female students, especially in rural and border areas.
In Somalia, data from humanitarian partners indicate that approximately 4.5 million children—representing 56 per cent of the school-age population—are currently out of school. Insecurity, displacement and a lack of access to basic services have left children particularly vulnerable to violence, exploitation and recruitment by armed groups.
In the Central African Republic, conflict continues to affect education severely. Despite a reduction in violence in some areas, 1.2 million children still face significant barriers to schooling, with ‘seven out of ten’ not attending classes regularly. The country has also witnessed attacks on education infrastructure, further straining the capacity of national authorities and humanitarian partners to deliver education in affected areas.
In Nigeria, the northeast region has suffered for over a decade of insurgency. Since 2009, more than 313 schools have been attacked, over 2,000 teachers have been killed, and more than one million children have been displaced. Boko Haram’s systematic targeting of education represents one of the clearest cases of education being weaponised as part of a broader ideological conflict.
In South Sudan, protracted violence has left ‘only about 2.3 million of the country’s 6.3 million school-age children’ enrolled in school. Conflict-related displacement, combined with inadequate infrastructure and limited teacher deployment, continues to hinder educational progress, especially for children residing in camps or border regions.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), more than 2,500 schools in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri have been closed since early 2025. Many of these buildings have been damaged or repurposed, leaving an estimated 1.6 million children out of school in the region—nearly double the previous year’s figures.
In this context, the open session is expected to consider a broad range of strategic responses, including urging Member States to accelerate the domestication and effective implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD), adopted in 2015 and endorsed by 33 African states. This global intergovernmental commitment seeks to advance the protection of education, restrict the use of schools and universities for military purposes, collect data on attacks against educational facilities and victims, ensure the continuation of learning during conflict and investigate violations to deliver justice and assistance to survivors. These efforts form part of a broader agenda to prevent the military use of educational facilities, strengthen legal protections for learners and educators and establish local monitoring and reporting mechanisms for attacks on education. Within this framework, discussions are anticipated to align with the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) 2026–2035, particularly Strategic Area 6, which prioritises inclusive education for marginalised and crisis-affected populations.
A key priority will be ensuring the continuity of learning during emergencies. Integrating education contingency planning into national crisis response strategies is expected to be one of the discussion points in tomorrow’s session, reflecting commitments articulated in the Nouakchott Declaration of December 2024 that declares 2025-2034 as the ‘AU Decade of Accelerated Action for Education Transformation, Youth Skills Development and Innovation in Africa’. The declaration commits to safeguarding the right of children and youth to quality education in all circumstances, including during conflict; integrating education in emergencies into national education strategies to enhance system resilience; ensuring schools are protected from attack or military use in line with the SSD; advancing peace education and safe learning environments by embedding violence prevention and response in curricula and adopting conflict-sensitive approaches, especially in humanitarian and fragile contexts; and promoting peaceful conflict resolution while supporting the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns by 2030’ initiative to foster inclusive learning, particularly in protracted crises. The PSC is expected to promote contingency planning, mobile classrooms and alternative forms of delivery such as digital and radio-based learning—backed by the AU Digital Education Strategy (2023–2028). Enhanced capacity-building for local education actors, support for trauma-informed education and better coordination with civil society are likely to be encouraged to sustain educational continuity in crisis-affected regions.
The session is also expected to devote substantial attention to the psychosocial impacts of conflict on learners. The recent 1290th meeting voiced concern over the rising recruitment of children by armed forces and groups, noting that released children often face severe psychological distress, social stigma and exclusion from education. In response, the current session is likely to advocate integrating mental health services into education systems and providing trauma-informed teacher training to build resilience, improve learning outcomes and prevent long-term harm. Echoing the 597th meeting’s alarm over sexual violence and attacks on educational infrastructure, the PSC may revisit calls—aligned with UN Security Council Resolutions 2143 (2014) and 2225 (2015)—to deter the military use of schools.
Discussions may also explore the link between conflict and the high prevalence of out-of-school children, including those recruited as child soldiers, as highlighted in the 706th meeting’s call for robust child protection frameworks within the AU Commission covering education, health and security. Emphasis may be placed on AU instruments such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, particularly Article 22, prohibiting child recruitment, and on ensuring the protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflicts. The PSC could further call for stronger coordination between the AU’s Departments of Social Affairs and PAPS to address these issues comprehensively. Stronger inter-ministerial frameworks and improved cooperation between AU bodies such as the African Humanitarian Agency and African Risk Capacity could be highlighted as critical to delivering holistic and effective responses.
Furthermore, education in peace support operations (PSOs) will be addressed as a pillar of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Embedding peace education, supporting the reintegration of former child soldiers through education and training peacekeepers to protect learning spaces will all be positioned as strategic components of broader peacebuilding agendas.
Particularly significant for the session is the expected focus on the critical challenge of financing education in emergency settings. Among the proposals likely to be explored are the establishment of pooled funding arrangements and the targeted use of the AU Peace Fund to finance infrastructure rehabilitation, teacher deployment and trauma-informed educational programming. Mobilising adequate and sustained financing, notably to support education for children affected by conflict, will require stronger coordination and alignment of donor contributions with continental frameworks.
The other important area of deliberation is expected to be strengthening data and monitoring systems. Improving the AU Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) could be explored as a strategy to enhance policies and practices that reinforce Member States’ national education systems, to achieve equitable quality education for all (Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 4)) and accelerating CESA implementation. This may include promoting EMIS use to track attendance, safety and learning outcomes in conflict settings, as well as supporting Member States in reporting on SDG 4.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may voice grave concern over armed conflict’s impact on education and its implications for Agenda 2063, reaffirming Member States’ commitment to safeguarding education in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It may urge integration of protection and recovery measures into AU PSOs and PCRD frameworks with accountability mechanisms, call for stronger coordination across sectors, increased domestic funding, and alignment of international support with CESA 2026–2035 and Agenda 2063. The PSC could recommend AU Guidelines on Education in Conflict, commission a Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS)–ESTI study on links between attacks on education and harmful practices, and push for faster domestication and implementation of the SSD. It may also promote integrating child protection and education into the Silencing the Guns initiative, encourage endorsement of the SSD by non-signatories and strengthen implementation by signatories. It may also emphasise stronger coordination among AU sectors working on education, peace and security, humanitarian affairs and social development, and propose a continental platform or task force to monitor and respond to education crises in line with the CESA Cluster on Education in Emergencies. Additionally, it could propose a continental platform for crisis response coordination and an observatory to track child marriage trends in conflict settings for targeted interventions.
