Ambassador Tareq AlBanai,

Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations in New York

Co-Chair of the IGN*

 

The question before us is not new. For decades, Member States have recognized that the composition of the Security Council no longer fully reflects contemporary geopolitical realities or the expectations of the wider membership. Yet what has changed in recent years—and particularly during the current phase of the Intergovernmental Negotiations—is the emergence of more structured and concrete approaches to reform.

A particularly important turning point occurred during the 77th Session of the General Assembly, when the IGN process—under the co-chairmanship of Kuwait and Austria—introduced, for the first time, a structured discussion of reform models. This development marked a significant evolution in the process. For many years, the debate had largely remained at the level of principles: discussions about representation, legitimacy, and effectiveness. While these principles remain vital, the introduction of models shifted the conversation from the conceptual to the concrete.

This transformation has allowed Member States to engage with reform in a far more substantive manner. Instead of speaking in generalities, delegations have increasingly begun to articulate specific institutional designs and operational arrangements for a reformed Council. As a result, positions have become clearer, and the debate has gained the level of precision that any meaningful negotiation requires.

Across the IGN, we now have a set of concrete proposals on the table—from the G4, L.69, CARICOM, the Uniting for Consensus group, Liechtenstein and Mexico—that differ along clear fault lines. One is composition: some models call for expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership, while others reject new permanent seats and instead support the expansion of elected seats only, including longer-term, renewable seats to improve continuity. Another is the question of the veto: approaches range from extending the prerogatives of the P5 to any new permanent members, to non-extension and various forms of veto restraint and transparency, including stronger accountability and transparency around veto use.

These proposals collectively represent an important step forward. They demonstrate that Member States are increasingly willing to engage in structured thinking about the architecture of a reformed Council. At the same time, we look forward to the long-anticipated African model, which I was pleased to hear was endorsed by the C-10 Heads of State and Government last month.

The model will be a critical contribution to the ongoing discussion, given Africa’s longstanding and legitimate call for enhanced representation within the Security Council. In parallel, the broader political momentum for reform has also been reinforced by the Pact for the Future, which explicitly mandates the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations to work toward the development of a consolidated model. This mandate reflects a growing recognition among Member States that the process must gradually move from the presentation of multiple proposals toward identifying areas of convergence.

However, we must also acknowledge the reality of the negotiations as they stand today. At this stage, we are not yet in a position where the wider membership can rally behind a single model. The fundamental division between those advocating for an expansion of the permanent category and those favoring an expansion limited to non-permanent seats remains deeply entrenched.

This polarization has been one of the central obstacles to progress in the reform debate. It is precisely within this context that the idea of fixed regional seats has emerged as a possible bridge between these two positions. The concept is relatively straightforward but potentially transformative. Under this approach, the Security Council would be expanded by approximately six to seven additional seats, allocated on a regional basis. These seats would be fixed to specific regions, ensuring that the major regional groupings of the United Nations receive more equitable representation within the Council. Importantly, these seats would not be permanently assigned to specific states. Instead, they would be elected through the General Assembly, ensuring that the selection process remains democratic and consistent with the broader membership’s role in shaping the Council. States occupying these seats would serve longer, renewable terms, and could be reelected up to two additional times. This structure would provide greater continuity and institutional memory within the Council while still preserving accountability to the wider membership.

In terms of privileges, these seats would carry the same prerogatives of the P5, including the veto. While this aspect of the proposal may generate debate, its purpose is to address the structural imbalance between different categories of membership while avoiding the creation of new permanently entrenched seats.

In many ways, this approach seeks to bring the Council closer to the principle of sovereign equality of states, which remains a foundational principle of the United Nations. While no reform model can perfectly realize this principle, fixed regional seats offer perhaps the closest approximation within the institutional framework of the Council.

To ensure both effectiveness and accountability, the model would also include a review clause, allowing Member States to periodically assess how the new structure is functioning and whether adjustments may be deemed necessary.

Finally, careful attention must be paid to the overall size of the Council. Any expansion should avoid creating a body that becomes too large to operate effectively. For this reason, this proposal envisions a Council of no more than approximately 22 members, balancing the need for broader representation with the imperative of maintaining operational efficiency.

In closing, the reform of the Security Council remains one of the most complex negotiations within the United Nations. Yet the developments we have witnessed in recent sessions—particularly the move toward structured models—suggest that the conversation is gradually entering a more mature and constructive phase. However, if we are to translate this momentum into real progress, we will need greater flexibility and a stronger willingness to explore bridging options. Too often, entrenched positions—held as absolutes rather than starting points for negotiation—have kept us locked in familiar debates instead of moving us toward workable compromise.

Our collective task now is to build on this momentum, identify areas of convergence, and continue working toward a reform that strengthens both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Security Council.

Thank you.

* This was delivered online during the Amani Africa-Japan joint high-level policy dialogue on UN Security Council Reform held on 4 March 2026 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Dr Wafula Okumu, Executive Director, The Borders Institute

The recent military escalation in the Middle East, initiated by a joint US-Israeli strike on Iran and followed by Tehran’s regional retaliation, has presented the international community with a profound crisis. For the African Union (AU), however, this is more than a distant geopolitical tremor. First, as an instance of what the Solemn Declaration on the Common African and Defence Security Policy (CADSP) calls ‘international conflicts and crises with adverse effects on African regional security’, this constitutes what the Policy calls common external threats. Second, it is a direct and uncomfortable test of AU’s identity as a principled actor committed to speaking in defence of the UN Charter on the world stage. The AU’s bifurcated response through the statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission—a vaguely worded initial statement on the invasion followed by a sharp condemnation of Iran’s reaction—has ignited a difficult but necessary debate: is the Union a consistent defender of international law, or is it succumbing to the very practice of ‘selective Charterism’ it has long criticized in others?

At stake is the AU’s most significant asset: its normative power. The Union’s mandate, enshrined in its Constitutive Act, is not merely to observe global events but to actively ‘promote peace, security, and stability on the continent’, ‘defend African common positions on issues of interest,’ and ‘establish necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role’ in global affairs. Global instability, whether in Eastern Europe or the Middle East, directly impacts African economies, maritime security, and food systems. These are conditions explicitly identified as ‘external threats’ by the CADSP. Silence is not a viable option. The question, therefore, is not whether the AU should speak, but whether it speaks with the disciplined legal consistency that its own history, recent experience, and principles demand.

An unsettling silence on the primary breach

The joint US-Israeli invasion of Iran, which reportedly included the assassination of its Supreme Leader, represents a grave challenge to the post-1945 international order. The foundational pillar of this order is Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which unequivocally prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This prohibition is the bedrock of peaceful coexistence.

The only clear exception to this rule, absent a UN Security Council authorisation, is the inherent right to self-defence under Article 51. However, this right is not a license for discretionary warfare. The threshold for its invocation, particularly in an anticipatory sense, is exceptionally high, requiring a demonstrably imminent armed attack. As Professor Marc Weller, Director of Chatham House’s International Law Programme, has affirmed, the doctrine of self-defence does not permit a ‘preventative war’ launched to neutralise a potential, long-term threat. It is a measure of last resort, constrained by the principles of necessity and proportionality.

The justifications offered for the invasion have yet to meet this stringent legal standard. Vague assertions of an ‘existential threat’ or a desire to ‘obliterate’ Iran’s military potential fall short of the evidence required to legitimise such a profound breach of another state’s sovereignty. This is the critical context in which the AU’s first statement, issued on February 28, 2026, must be judged. The statement expressed ‘deep concern,’ called for ‘restraint and urgent de-escalation,’ and urged all parties to act ‘in accordance with international law and the United Nations Charter.’

While well-intentioned, this language was critically deficient. It failed to name the initial act as a violation of Article 2(4). It failed to question whether the high bar of Article 51 had been met. By adopting a posture of neutrality between an aggressor and a victim of that aggression, the AU’s statement inadvertently weakened the very legal norms it purported to uphold. It created a false equivalence, treating the violation of sovereignty and the subsequent reaction as morally and legally indistinct parts of an ‘escalation.’

A tale of two statements: The glaring inconsistency

The AU’s reticence was thrown into stark relief by its second statement, issued shortly after Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks against the territories of several Gulf states. Here, the language was anything but vague. The statement held that the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, ‘strongly condemns’ Iran’s actions, defining them as a ‘clear violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and expressing ‘full solidarity with the governments and peoples of the affected states.’

This is where the charge of unjustifiable legal inconsistency becomes undeniable. The AU correctly identified Iran’s retaliation as a violation of sovereignty. Yet it failed to apply the same legal standard to the precedent-setting invasion that provoked it. This selective application of principle is precisely what Africa has long decried when powerful global actors have used international law as an à la carte menu to justify their interests.

The contradiction is made more acute when contrasted with the AU’s own robust defence of sovereignty within Africa. Just weeks prior, at its annual summit, the AU fiercely condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, reaffirming its ‘unwavering support for the Federal Republic of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ This principled stand was a powerful reaffirmation of the AU’s core tenets. How, then, can the Union so resolutely defend Somalia’s sovereignty from a diplomatic action while remaining circumspect about the violation of Iran’s sovereignty through military force?

This dissonance strikes at the heart of the AU Constitutive Act. Article 4 is unambiguous in its commitment to principles such as ‘sovereign equality,’ ‘respect of borders,’ the ‘prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States,’ and ‘non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.’ While these principles apply to intra-African relations, the AU’s moral and political authority depends on championing them universally. When the Union fails to do so, it not only undermines its credibility abroad but also risks eroding the normative consensus that underpins peace and security in Africa.

Reclaiming normative authority

This critique is not a call for the AU to take sides in a complex geopolitical conflict. It is a call for the Union to side with the law. During the recent AU summit, the AU Assembly agreed to a proposal on the elaboration of a common foreign policy to help the continent manage with principled consistency the challenges from the changing global context (see here). The only way the AU can stand a chance of becoming an effective foreign policy actor on the global stage is if its actions are firmly grounded in the rules of international law and in a consistent defence of the UN Charter. A more credible and influential AU position would not have been pro-Iran or anti-West; it would have been unequivocally pro-rule-of-law. Such a stance would involve three clear steps:

1. Explicitly reaffirm Article 2(4): The starting point for any statement must be the clear and unambiguous reaffirmation of the prohibition on the use of force as the cornerstone of international law.
2. Scrutinise claims of self-defence: The AU should publicly and consistently insist that any claim to self-defence under Article 51 be rigorously scrutinised against the high standards of necessity, proportionality, and imminence.
3. Condemn all violations consistently: The AU must apply the same legal and moral standard to all breaches of sovereignty, regardless of the actor. Condemning Iran’s retaliation is legitimate, but it is legally and morally incoherent without a prior, and equally strong, condemnation of the initial invasion.

Africa’s voice on the global stage matters now more than ever. As the world fragments and great power competition intensifies, the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the non-use of force are the primary shields for less powerful states. The AU has a historic opportunity and a profound responsibility to be the world’s leading champion of these norms. To do so, it must avoid the trap of political expediency and embrace the disciplined legal consistency that is the true source of its authority. The choice is not whether to speak, but whether to speak with a clear, principled, and unwavering voice.