The Zohran Way: A New Dawn for Africa’s Youth and Progressive Politics
The Zohran Way: A New Dawn for Africa’s Youth and Progressive Politics
Date | 10 November 2025
By Abdul Mohammed
When Zohran Nkrumah Mamdani won the mayoralty of New York City at the age of 34, it was more than a political victory — it was the triumph of an idea. The son of Africa, born in Kampala to parents of Indian origin, Zohran embodies the very fusion of histories that define our times: migration, resilience, and plural identity. In him converge the moral inheritance of Africa, the intellectual heritage of South Asia, and the cosmopolitan energy of the world’s most diverse city. His ascent is therefore not only an American event; it is an African, Asian, and global affirmation — a triumph of belonging over exclusion, courage over fear, and moral clarity over cynicism.
Zohran’s middle name, Nkrumah, is not incidental. It was bestowed by his father in honor of Kwame Nkrumah, the great Pan-Africanist and Ghana’s founding leader. It is a name that signifies belief in liberation, self-determination, and the moral purpose of politics. That inheritance — Nkrumah’s dream, Nyerere’s integrity, Mandela’s forgiveness, Mbeki’s intellect, and Meles’s strategic vision — flows through Zohran’s political journey. He stands as a continuation of that lineage of African thinkers and reformers who believed that power must serve humanity.
Zohran’s story is a tapestry woven across continents. His great-grandparents migrated from India to East Africa at the dawn of the twentieth century, joining communities of traders, workers, and artisans who built their lives across the shores of the Indian Ocean. His grandparents were born in Tanzania; his father in Uganda. They faced adversity — colonial discrimination, economic displacement, and postcolonial turbulence — yet remained steadfast. Out of struggle they built dignity, and out of diversity they forged strength.
That multicultural lineage shaped Zohran’s worldview. His father, Mahmood Mamdani, the distinguished scholar of African politics and a Ugandan Muslim and his mother, Mira Nair, the acclaimed Indian filmmaker and a Hindu whose art breaks boundaries and celebrates humanity in all its contradictions, nurtured in Zohran a compelling political philosophy and sensibility: the courage to think freely, to act boldly, and to belong everywhere without apology.
In an age of resurgent nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric, Zohran’s very being is a political statement. His life and victory rebuke the poisonous myth that immigration erodes nations. On the contrary, his story affirms that migration, when fused with conviction and contribution, renews societies. For African youth, whose families have known migration within and beyond borders, this lesson is profound: identity is not confinement; it is possibility.
Zohran’s campaign was not powered by wealth or privilege. It was built by people — tenants, immigrants, workers, dreamers — who saw in him the rare politician who listened before speaking and stood his ground after listening. In a political age defined by noise, he spoke with clarity. He ran not to please but to persuade, not to divide but to organize. When attacked by demagogues, including former president Donald Trump, he did not retreat. He welcomed debate and drew clear lines between cooperation and capitulation. His courage was moral, not performative.
In his victory speech, Zohran declared, ‘This campaign was never about me. It was about us — about the belief that dignity belongs to every person, and that hope is not naïve; it is necessary.’ Those words, calm but commanding, resonated beyond New York. They are words Africa’s youth must make their own. At a time when politics across the continent has become a contest of power, not purpose, Zohran’s victory reclaims politics as a vocation of public service.
Africa’s demographic majority — its youth — are agitating for change. In the protests on various cities across the continent, they are campaigning for ending the sources of their suffering: unemployment, inequality, and the suffocating dominance of old elites. They see democracy manipulated, elections staged, and opportunities hoarded. Many are tempted by despair or radical rejection of politics altogether. It is precisely in this moment that Zohran’s ascent becomes symbolic.
He did not inherit power; he earned it. He built a movement from the ground up, grounded in progressive ideals — fairness, solidarity, climate justice, housing rights, and respect for labor. He embodied political discipline and youthful optimism in equal measure. His path shows that one can be radical in vision and pragmatic in method. His life disproves the cynical notion that integrity and victory are incompatible.
For African youth, the Zohran Way offers three essential lessons. First, organize before you speak — ideas only endure when built upon collective action. Second, build politics of care — solidarity, not slogans, changes lives. Third, never fear power; speak to it — respect yourself enough to challenge authority without hatred.
Zohran Nkrumah Mamdani represents a renaissance of progressive politics — the rebirth of moral conviction in public life. His campaign was not about ideology but about ethics. Like the African progressives of earlier generations — Nkrumah, Nyerere, Mandela, Mbeki, and Meles — he saw politics as an extension of moral duty, not personal ambition. His multicultural background made him more inclusive, not less; his African upbringing gave him empathy; his South Asian heritage taught him endurance; his American platform gave him voice. From those threads, he wove a universal message: that justice, when local, becomes global.
Zohran Nkrumah Mamdani’s victory is more than a milestone in New York’s history. It is a message to the world, not least of all in Africa: that a new generation, unburdened by inherited fears and unashamed of its plural identity, is ready to lead. It is a message to Africa’s youth — that leadership does not wait for permission; it is claimed through courage, discipline, and compassion.
In the age of fear, Zohran’s journey and electoral victory become the symbol of hope —He is not merely the mayor of a city; he is a mirror of what is possible. Africa’s youth must look into that mirror — and recognize themselves.
The future belongs to those who are unafraid to imagine it. Zohran Nkrumah Mamdani has imagined and courageously pursued it. The time has come for Africa’s youth to use the example and turn their agitation for change into a political movement that will usher the change they dared to imagine.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security
Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security
Date | 10 November 2025
Tomorrow (11 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1310th session focusing on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in Africa. This annual thematic session on YPS will be held as an open session.
Following opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, the Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. A statement is also expected from the Migration Division of the AU Commission Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS). The five Africa Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAP), namely: Julien Vikemba, Central Africa Region; Nashiba Nakabira, East Africa Region; Arif Abdeljalil Moussa, North Africa Region; Mpule Kgetsi, Southern Africa Region; and Simone Mbode Diouf, West Africa Region, are also expected to make statements. It is also expected that the representatives from the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU) and the European Union Delegation to the AU will make remarks.
The session is being held just days after the conclusion of the 5th Pan-African Youth Forum, held from 4 – 6 November 2025 in Djibouti, under the theme ‘From Aspiration to Action: Youth as Catalysts for Sustainable Development.’
It is worth recalling that the PSC, during its 807th session held in November 2018, decided to ‘institutionalise and regularise an annual open session dedicated to Youth, Peace and Security in Africa.’ Since then, as shown in the table below, the PSC held a session on YPS annually except in 2021, with some years featuring more than one session on YPS.
This year’s session is expected to be held under the theme ‘Migration, Youth and Security,’ linking the month’s Chair regular focus on humanitarian issues with the YPS agenda. Deprived of opportunities at home by the pervasive extractive national and international development and governance systems, many young Africans are compelled to migrate under perilous conditions that threaten their safety and dignity.
The focus on migration puts a spotlight on how the chronic development and governance challenges lead to increasing youth migration and the entanglement of migration with various threats to peace and security, including transnational organised crime, such as smuggling of persons and terrorism. Despite challenges to accurate migration data in Africa, as one study from 2019 pointed out, youth constitute the largest percentage of African migrations. According to this study, ‘over 60% of African migrants are estimated to be under 35 years old.’ Additionally, highlighting increasing pressure facing the youth, drawing on data from the Afrobarometer survey, the study observed that ‘almost 1/3rd of young Africans have thought somewhat or a lot about moving to another country, almost twice as many as those older than 35.’
Of particular significance from the study referenced above is that almost 80.0% of migration in Africa is motivated by the search for better economic and social prospects. This echoes the observation by the African Centre for the Study and Research on Migration that ‘most young African people (hard hit by poverty, unemployment, underemployment, severe social and economic hardships, and lack of quality education and training, among other challenges) see migration internally or internationally as a fundamental resilience or social mobility strategy as they are desperate to change their lives.’
However, during the past five years, the share of conflict and climate change as drivers of migration has increased significantly. This corresponds to the increase in the number and geographic spread of conflicts that the continent has witnessed during this period. Such increasing interface between youth migration and peace and security in Africa signifies the need for integrating migration as one major thematic pillar of the YPS agenda.
Addressing this migration crisis is not only a development priority but also a critical step towards tackling the human security dimension of Africa’s migration challenges, thereby contributing significantly to advancing the YPS agenda in Africa. The upcoming meeting also provides an opportunity to advance discussions on the imperative of a Common African Position (CAP) on Migration and Development, particularly in light of recurring incidents of mass expulsions across the continent.
While this is the first session dedicated fully to migration in the context of YPS, it is not the first time that the PSC referenced migration in relation to the YPS agenda. In the communiqué of its 807th meeting, the PSC, among other things, reiterated the terms of the communiqué of the 771st PSC meeting held on 11 May 2018, as well as paragraph 23 of the Assembly Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.695(XXXI)] adopted by the 31st Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 2018 relating to the establishment of the African Observatory for Migration, with a view to ‘create conditions conducive to orderly migration of the African youth.’ Following its launch in 2020, the African Migration Observatory (AMO) has become increasingly active, including, among others, on addressing harmonisation and standardisation of migration statistics across African states and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as the data landscape is still highly fragmented.
This session also comes in the context of rising incidents of Generation Z (GenZ) protests on the continent during the course of the year, as reported in several countries, of which the one in Madagascar led to the unseating of the president. It is the same conditions of socio-economic and political governance deficits that push youth into the perilous journey of migration, precipitating the youth protests.
This session (which comes just a year before the African Youth Charter commemorates its 20th year, in 2026, since coming into force) will build on its previous session on YPS, held in November 2024 at PSC’s 1243rd meeting. Among others, the Council directed the AU Commission to present the draft Continental Guideline for the Development and Implementation of the National Action Plans (NAPs) on YPS to the PSC Committee of Experts for validation and, ultimately, to the Council for consideration and adoption within three months.
As captured in our analysis on the previous substantial session of youth, peace and security held in 2024, it emerged that there has been a notable surge in interest in adopting the NAPs for YPS, with at least four countries (Ethiopia, Liberia, The Gambia and Zimbabwe) reporting to be at different phases. As of November 2024, only two Member States – DRC and Nigeria – had officially launched their NAPs on YPS. Over to 2025, five additional countries – Burundi, Malawi, The Gambia, Liberia and Cameroon – have followed suit, bringing the continental total to seven. This marks the highest number of YPS NAPs in any region globally. Nonetheless, with only seven countries out of the AU’s target of 25% of Member States having adopted NAPs, much work still lies ahead to achieve the desired level of implementation. Against this backdrop of an increasing number of AU Member States expressing interest to develop NAP on YPS, the Guideline – upon adoption by the PSC – will create an opportunity for the AU, RECs/RMs and other stakeholders to have a common reference point to assist these countries in developing NAP. With tomorrow’s session focus on migration, the integration of youth migration and the issues facing youth on the move as an area of focus in NAPs on YPS would be of interest for PSC members.
The session is also expected to feature a briefing by the AYAP members, who are expected to share reflections on the activities undertaken across their respective regions to date, as well as efforts in enhancing regional capacity strengthening of the youth and youth-led initiatives. In this regard, their presentations are expected to feature efforts made to promote the adoption of NAPs; experiences from their engagement in advancing the YPS agenda; and discussions for enhancing its implementation, particularly through AYAP contribution.
At the continental level, the efforts in operationalisation of the Network of African Youth in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (WiseYouth Network) are also expected to receive attention. Following the beginning of the mandate of the new members of the first Cohort of the WiseYouth Network, the WiseYouth Network convened the first African Youth Consultation on Mediation, Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Processes from 30 September to 2 October 2025, in Kigali, Rwanda. The platform brought together young peacebuilders from over 30 AU Member States to, among others, ‘map and assess the level of youth engagement in peace processes; identify emerging challenges and opportunities for youth participation; and develop a strategic roadmap on upscaling the role of African Youth in Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation.’
In terms of coordination with RECs/RMs, the Youth for Peace (Y4P) Africa programme, for instance, has worked closely with COMESA and other partners in convening key platforms such as the 4th Ministerial High-Level Meeting on YPS in Madagascar (2024) and the 4th Intergenerational Dialogue Forum focused on Island States (2025). Additionally, youth mainstreaming within AU Organs and RECs has gained traction through the implementation of the Youth Engagement Strategy (YES), which has inspired entities like the APRM to appoint youth officers and institutionalise youth engagement programmes.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may express serious concern about the extractive national and international development and governance systems, depriving African youth of opportunities for a dignified life, further aggravated by insecurity and climate change, forcing them to venture into dangerous migration. It may also underscore the need for addressing the root causes of youth migration, most particularly the socio-economic and political governance deficits and may, in this respect, urge all AU Member States to adopt policy measures responsive to the needs of the youth, including unemployment. Council may call on the AU Commission to present the Guideline for the Development and Implementation of NAPs on YPS for adoption. The PSC is also expected to stress the urgent need to search for a lasting solution to the deplorable situation of African migrants, with whom most are youth, as a shared responsibility of all Member States. The PSC may call on the AU Commission to ensure the integration of migration as one major thematic pillar of the YPS agenda and as an area of focus in NAPs. Council is also expected to underscore the need for continued close collaboration and complementarity of efforts between the AYAPs, the WiseYouth Network, the Youth for Peace Africa programme, the AGA-APSA Secretariat, as well as Youth Focal Points in the RECs/RMs and youth networks, to ensure that efforts and programmes are context-specific and synergised for greater impact. In this context, the PSC is likely to highlight the imperative of the implementation of the outcomes of the 3rd Continental Dialogue on YPS, which include leveraging coordination, partnerships and resource mobilisation for the implementation of the YPS agenda and the integration of peace education in school curricula.
Repositioning Africa for a multipolar global order: Insights from negotiating the Pact for the Future
Repositioning Africa for a multipolar global order: Insights from negotiating the Pact for the Future
Date | 6 November 2025
INTRODUCTION
For Africa, this era, in which the world is living through a historic transition from a multilateral system underwritten by a dominant hegemon backed by a strong bloc to a world order characterised increasingly by multipolarity, brings both perils and opportunities. Both the perils and opportunities necessitate the repositioning of the continent. This is imperative both for shielding the continent from the perils that the uncertainties and tensions that accompany the transition and for enabling it to seize the opportunities for ending the marginal place to which it has hitherto been relegated in the order that is coming to an end and become an active player to make the emerging global order more amenable for securing the wellbeing of its peoples.
Speech of Amb Souef Mohamed El-Amine, Chief of Staff of the African Union Commission during the opening of the joint Amani Africa, Chatham House & UNDP high-level event on 5 November 2025
Speech of Amb Souef Mohamed El-Amine, Chief of Staff of the African Union Commission during the opening of the joint Amani Africa, Chatham House & UNDP high-level event on 5 November 2025
Date | 5 November 2025
Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République fédérale démocratique d’Ethiopie,
Messieurs et Mesdames les Ministres, les Ambassadeurs et Représentants permanents des Organisations internationales
Distingués invités,
Honorable Assistance
Mesdames et Messieurs,
A l’entame de mon propos, je voudrais adresser les remerciements de l’UA à Chatham House, à Amani Africa, au PNUD et au gouvernement éthiopien pour avoir pris l’initiative d’organiser ce forum. Je tiens également à vous adresser les salutations du Président de la Commission de l’UA, S.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf en route pour le Brésil pour faire entendre la voix de l’Afrique.
C’est un privilège de m’adresser à vous aujourd’hui ici à Addis-Abeba, au cœur des institutions continentales africaines, pour discuter de l’influence croissante de notre continent et de sa capacité accrue à agir dans la gouvernance mondiale. L’Afrique n’est plus un observateur passif des affaires mondiales ; nous participons activement à façonner les résultats, définir les agendas et promouvoir des solutions qui servent non seulement nos peuples, mais aussi l’humanité tout entière.
À travers le continent, l’Afrique fait preuve d’un leadership concret. Les initiatives régionales renforcent les cadres de sécurité collective, font progresser les efforts de consolidation de la paix et favorisent la résilience économique. Aujourd’hui, les opérations de maintien de la paix dirigées par l’Afrique mobilisent plus de 75 000 personnes déployées sur plusieurs missions, démontrant notre capacité à maintenir la stabilité et à gérer les conflits. Sur le plan économique, le commerce intra-africain dans le cadre de la ZLECAF a atteint plus de 100 milliards de dollars au cours de ses deux premières années, signe d’une intégration régionale croissante. Dans le domaine de l’énergie, l’Afrique est en bonne voie pour doubler sa capacité de production d’énergie renouvelable à plus de 300 gigawatts d’ici 2030, tandis que les initiatives d’industrialisation verte devraient créer des millions d’emplois durables à travers le continent.
L’influence croissante de l’Afrique repose sur la confiance, le respect mutuel et un engagement partagé envers l’humanité. Au sein de nos institutions, la collaboration s’approfondit, le pouvoir de négociation augmente et l’action collective devient plus efficace. En alignant les politiques, en échangeant des expertises et en promouvant l’intégration régionale, l’Afrique transforme son potentiel en résultats tangibles et mesurables qui profitent à nos peuples et contribuent à un ordre mondial plus équitable. Par exemple, des efforts de santé publique coordonnés ont permis de réduire l’incidence du paludisme de plus de 20 % dans plusieurs régions, illustrant la puissance de la solidarité continentale en action.
À l’échelle mondiale, l’Afrique retrouve la place qui lui revient. D’abord au G20 dont le prochain Sommet se tient pour la première fois en terre africaine dans deux semaines. L’Afrique oeuvre pour avoir sa place au sein du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, mais aussi dans les institutions financières internationales. L’Afrique s’engage de manière stratégique avec ses partenaires, en influençant les discussions sur le commerce, l’investissement, le climat et le transfert de technologie, tout en affirmant sa voix dans la définition des normes en matière de paix, de sécurité et de développement durable. L’innovation africaine, l’influence culturelle et l’énergie entrepreneuriale créent un soft power qui amplifie les priorités et les perspectives du continent dans le monde entier. L’économie numérique à elle seule devrait atteindre 150 milliards de dollars d’ici 2030, avec plus de 450 millions d’utilisateurs mobiles d’internet, offrant une plateforme pour l’innovation, l’entrepreneuriat des jeunes et la connectivité panafricaine.
Mais l’influence seule ne suffit pas. L’Afrique recherche des résultats tangibles, fondés sur l’équité, la solidarité et le respect de la dignité humaine. Plus précisément, nous appelons à :
- Un accès fiable et prévisible aux financements climatiques et au développement, visant au moins 100 milliards de dollars par an pour soutenir les transitions énergétiques, l’industrialisation et des infrastructures résilientes.
- Un soutien aux initiatives africaines dans le domaine de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité régionale, garantissant un financement soutenu de l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité, qui sous-tend plus de 75 000 personnels déployés.
- En 2007, l’Afrique a réussi à remettre la Somalie sur la carte.
- Des partenariats renforçant la souveraineté économique, favorisant l’intégration régionale et libérant le plein potentiel de la ZLECAF, dont la croissance commerciale devrait passer de 100 milliards de dollars aujourd’hui à 450 milliards de dollars d’ici 2030.
- La reconnaissance du leadership africain dans les solutions durables, depuis l’expansion de la production solaire et éolienne jusqu’au développement des pôles industriels verts, qui pourraient générer plus de 15 millions d’emplois d’ici 2030 et contribuer de manière significative aux objectifs mondiaux de réduction du carbone.
This is the moment for Africa to move from aspiration to achievement, from potential to performance. By leveraging our resources, creativity, and collective resolve and by building partnerships grounded in trust, mutual respect, and humanity, we can advance a vision of global governance that is inclusive, just, and effective.
Let us therefore commit, here in Addis Ababa, to tangible action, bold partnerships, and outcomes that transform influence into impact. Africa is ready to lead, to innovate, and to deliver. The world is watching and Africa will rise.
I Thank you.
Keynote Address by H.E. Dr. Gedion Timothewos Minister of Foreign Affairs of the F.D.R.E At the Chatham House Conference on “Africa’s Rising Influence: Advancing Agency in Foreign Policy and Global Governance” 5 November 2025
Keynote Address by H.E. Dr. Gedion Timothewos Minister of Foreign Affairs of the F.D.R.E At the Chatham House Conference on “Africa’s Rising Influence: Advancing Agency in Foreign Policy and Global Governance” 5 November 2025
Date | 5 November 2025
Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to Addis Ababa, the diplomatic capital of Africa and the home of our continental union. This city has been the site for some of the most consequential moments in modern Africa’s political history. Therefore, it is a fitting venue for a collective reflection on how our continent can shape the global order during this time of profound change.
Only a few days ago, a convoy of trucks as well as cargo planes left Ethiopia carrying the first shipment of goods traded under the African Continental Free Trade Area. They were bound for Kenya, Somalia, and South Africa, filled with coffee, fruits, and processed foods. It was a modest start, yet deeply symbolic.
Those trucks and planes carried more than merchandise — they carried the promise of a continent trading with itself, investing in itself, and believing in its own capacity.
Such seemingly simple acts capture the essence of what this gathering seeks to advance: African agency, solidarity and cooperation as the foundations of our rising collective influence.
We are meeting at a moment when global power is dispersing and the old assumptions of international politics are being redefined. As the world transits toward multipolarity, Africa must not be a bystander or a prize in someone else’s contest for influence.
In a continent that is obsessed with football, I hope you will forgive me if I use a soccer metaphor to illustrate the reality of multipolarity.
If we were to use a football analogy to provide a simple depiction of the Cold War era, the best parallel would be with the Spanish La Liga. As most of those who follow the European football leagues understand, in the Spanish La Liga, the main contenders for the championship are Barcelona and Real Madrid. The real competition is between these two clubs.
Of course, there are other clubs in the league, but it is these two clubs are more often than not, the most likely to finish at the top of the league. During the Cold War, just like the Spanish La Liga, there were two contenders for global supremacy. There were two superpowers, and everybody else was playing second fiddle.
Then, the Cold War came to an end. The world witnessed a unique unipolar moment that is very similar to the French Ligue 1, where PSG is the sole dominant force. Year after year, one entity takes the top position without much difficulty or serious challenge.
But this era of unipolarity seems to be coming to an end. Right now, international relations are more akin to the English Premier League, where several clubs compete fiercely to finish in the top five. In this League, competition is intense and outcomes cannot be predicted with confidence.
Today, we find ourselves in such a context. We live in a world where competition is becoming more salient than cooperation. The entities engaged in this competition are not just the big powers. There are also middle powers in intense competition with one another as they each try to carve out a sphere of influence for themselves.
The scope of competition includes the economic, technological, and military spheres. It is rife with transient alliances, pragmatic transactions, and a complex web of considerations that are difficult to pin down.
Normative frameworks, established national doctrines, multilateral institutions and procedures seem to be having a diminished effectiveness.
The question we need to consider is how the African continent should approach this situation.
What are the opportunities and risks this multipolar world present to Africa?
In this context, is there room for collective continental action?
Will Africa be subject to another scramble or would it emerge as a rising power in its own right?
How can we expand and consolidate our influence?
This and many other related questions require serious deliberation. We need to reflect deeply and critically on these questions.
If Africa is to be a co-author of the evolving global order, we need to be conscious of the new reality and wide awake to its implications.
The African Union’s accession to the G20 is a recognition that the world’s challenges — from equitable growth to climate resilience — cannot be solved without African participation and leadership.
Yet participation alone is not enough. Our task now is to turn presence into influence, and influence into tangible outcomes for our people.
For Ethiopia, the key lies in synergetic unity of purpose, institutional strength, and shared prosperity. Our continental frameworks already provide the tools we need — the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, and the AfCFTA.
What we must do now is make them work in harmony and effectively. The existence of the institutions should not be an end in itself.
Regional organizations such as IGAD, ECOWAS, and SADC should serve as operational engines of continental integration. When these regional blocks are better aligned with the AU Commission and the AfCFTA Secretariat, Africa can act with one voice — in trade negotiations, in peace initiatives, and in shaping global norms.
Ethiopia’s own experience shows that regional cooperation is not a choice but a necessity. In the Horn of Africa, we are working with our neighbours to expand cross-border infrastructure, trade corridors, and power interconnections.
This imperative of interdependence is a principle that should guide our thinking and action.
The reform of global governance structures is another pillar of our collective aspiration. Institutions created eight decades ago no longer reflect today’s realities. The United Nations Security Council, for instance, should include full permanent African representation.
This is not a demand for privilege but for fairness — a recognition that Africa contributes the most to peacekeeping, bears the greatest cost of global instability, and deserves to have a meaningful voice in global decision making.
Similarly, the international financial architecture must also be reformed to reflect our economic realities. Ethiopia supports the establishment of a regional credit rating agency that captures the real dynamism of African economies, free from outdated perceptions.
We also advocate for reforms that expand access to development finance, climate adaptation resources, and debt restructuring mechanisms that enable countries to invest in their future.
Peace and prosperity are inseparable. Our continent’s security challenges cannot be outsourced; they must be met through African-led solutions that prioritize prevention, dialogue, and regional solidarity. Ethiopia continues to support the African Peace and Security Architecture and efforts to secure predictable financing for peace operations.
Africa’s influence, however, will not be defined only by political and economic factors. It will also be shaped by its culture, its creativity, and its people.
From music to innovation, from fashion to technology, our youth are reshaping global perceptions of Africa continent. This soft power — the power of ideas and identity — must become an integral part of our foreign policy.
It is through telling our own stories, in our own voices, that we will secure a rightful place in global discourse.
Excellencies,
the world is watching Africa with renewed attention. The question is no longer whether Africa matters — but how Africa will choose to lead.
From the AfCFTA trucks crossing our borders to the African Union’s seat at the G20 table, from our peace missions to our green energy ambitions, every initiative signals a continent asserting its voice and shaping its own destiny.
Nevertheless, we need to bear in mind the fact that progress is not linear and that we still face many challenges. Our rise should not be a short-term phenomenon. Africa’s rise should not be seen as a transient illusion built on fashionable platitudes.
In this vein, we should remind ourselves, we are still very far from the Africa we want. We are still not close to an African century.
Excellencies,
We need to look at the longue duree and imagine a future where we have not just influence but decisive impact. We need to lay the foundations for an African century.
If demographic trends are anything to go by, the 22nd century is bound to be the African century. For that to be a reality, the choices we make, the commitments we enter into and the priorities we adopt today make all the difference.
Preserving our sovereignty over our resources, channelling the energy and dynamism of the youth in more constructive and productive directions are among the paramount duties of our generation.
Ethiopia stands ready to work with all African nations and our international partners to ensure that this moment of possibility becomes a sustained era of progress.
The future we seek — one of dignity, solidarity, and prosperity — depends on how we deploy our collective capacity as a continent with bold strategic foresight.
Thank you.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - September 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - September 2025
Date | September 2025
In September 2025, under the chairship of Angola, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled programme of work consisting of six substantive sessions covering six agenda items. All six planned sessions were convened, with one meeting held at Heads of State and Government level, one at ministerial-level and four at ambassadorial-level. Of the six agenda items, three focused on country- or region-specific situations, two addressed thematic issues.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for November 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for November 2025
Date | November 2025
In November, the Republic of Cameroon will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The month’s Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) includes five substantive sessions. Two of the sessions will focus on thematic issues, while the remaining three will address country-specific situations, as well as an informal consultation with countries in political transition. The PPoW also envisages holding the 17th Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods and Abuja Lessons-learned Forum, from 6 to 9 November in Abuja, Nigeria. The PSC will also host the 8th Annual Consultative Meeting with the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) during the month. All sessions are expected to take place at the ambassadorial level.
The PSC will begin the month with its 17th Annual Retreat on the Review of its Working Methods and Abuja Lessons Learned Forum, to be held in Abuja, Nigeria, from 6 to 9 November. It is expected that this year’s retreat will primarily focus on the Ad-hoc mechanisms established to enhance the effectiveness of the PSC, particularly in the implementation of its decisions. A new addition in this year’s retreat will be a mock PSC simulation featuring 15 university students, who will simulate the deliberations of PSC member states. After the retreat, the Abuja Lessons-Learned Forum on peace operations will be held.
On 11 November, the PSC will hold its first substantive session of the month, in an open format, focusing on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in Africa. This is a standing annual thematic agenda that the PSC decided to institutionalise as an annual session in November 2018. This session is expected to be held under the theme ‘Migration, Youth and Security,’ linking the monthly Chair’s regular focus on humanitarian issues with the YPS agenda. As Africa’s youth, deprived of opportunities at home by the web of extractive national and international governance systems, are the ones that are forced into migration often under conditions that endanger their security and lives, the focus on migration could be used to shed light on the intersection between migration and youth and peace and security in Africa.
On 13 November, the PSC will hold an informal consultation with countries in political transition, namely Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan. It is worth recalling that informal consultations with countries undergoing political transitions were added to the PSC’s working methods since April 2023, following its 14th Retreat on its working methods in November 2022. These consultations were introduced to enable direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government, in accordance with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. This session will seek to evaluate the progress achieved and challenges faced in the ongoing transition processes, while also examining how the PSC can more effectively support and contribute to the political normalisation of these Member States, building on its March 2025 session.
On 14 November, the Council will have a session on media, peace and security. This will be held in line with the commemoration of the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, observed every 2 November. This year’s commemoration will be held under the theme of Chat GBV: Raising Awareness on AI-facilitated Gender-Based Violence against Women Journalists, highlighting ‘the threats women journalists face in the digital space and the chilling effect this can have on freedom of expression more broadly.’ This builds on the PSC’s inaugural session held in September 2024, dedicated to the protection of journalists in conflict situations. The 1230th PSC open session saw the Council tasking the AU Commission ‘to put in place comprehensive, forward-looking and action-oriented actions on the protection and safety of Journalists in times of armed conflict.’ In addition, the Council directed the AU Commission, in cooperation with the ACHPR, APRM, AUCIL and AU ECOSOCC, ‘to produce a comprehensive study on the legal, institutional and policy framework and map the protection of journalists and access to information in Africa.’ This year’s session on the protection of journalists is expected to focus on women journalists and the online attacks they face, which become particularly dangerous in times of crisis and conflict.
As part of the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Awareness Raising Week from 17 to 21 November, the PSC is scheduled to convene a session on the launch of the PCRD week and consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on PCRD on 17 November. On the same day, the Council will also hold a joint meeting with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC). Related to PCRD, the Joint Statement adopted during the last joint consultations, the 7th, the two bodies emphasised the role of the PBC in convening stakeholders and garnering international support, as well as the role of the AU in implementing and advancing PCRD policy, noting that ‘strengthened cooperation between the AUC-PCRD in Cairo and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (PBSO/DPPA), is essential for implementing the AU-UN MoU on Peacebuilding.’ The two are also expected to exchange on the ongoing UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture Review. Recalling AU’s contribution to the last Peacebuilding Architecture Review, in the previous 7th Joint Annual Consultations, the PBC ‘invited the AUPSC to again contribute to the review in 2025,’ and to this end, the two bodies called for the ‘implementation of the remaining tasks emanating from the Joint Annual AUPSC and PBC meetings.’ It is expected that this year’s meeting may follow on the agreement that ‘their annual consultative meetings should be preceded by at least one preparatory meeting of the experts of the AUPSC and PBC to examine the status of implementation of agreed commitments and sundry issues.’
On 19 November, the Council will convene for a briefing on the Situation in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite the openings that the diplomatic initiatives involving the Washington and Doha agreements provide for progress, the situation on the ground remains unchanged – dominated by fighting involving M23 and the DRC forces, proxy confrontations, competition over minerals like coltan and weak state authority. The last meeting the PSC discussed this file was in February 2025 during its 1261st meeting held at the summit level. The agenda was also included in the provisional programme of work for March 2025 under the topic ‘Briefing on the Matrix Relating to the Situation in Eastern DRC’; however, it did not take place. This meeting comes as France is set to host a peace conference on the African Great Lakes. The French president, in coordination with Togo, the AU mediator, plans to host the conference in Paris on 30 October, and between 50 to 70 countries and international organisations are expected to attend, which will mostly be closed-door.
On 21 November, the PSC will receive an update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin. The session is expected to provide an update on the security and humanitarian situation in the region. In the 1282nd PSC meeting held in June 2025, Council requested the AU Commission ‘to enhance its support to and collaboration with the LCBC in the implementation of the revised Five-Year RS-SRR.’ This came after it was highlighted that ‘despite the sustained efforts being deployed by the LCBC and MNJTF, Boko Haram remains an existential threat to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin and the wider region.’ The gravity of this threat has not diminished, and the MNJTF has not been able to break this status quo. At the same time, the emergence of developments weakening the MNJTF and persisting vulnerabilities due to climate, security and governance fragilities are fast bringing the MNJTF to a turning point.
The last session of the month will be an open session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts, to be held on 28 November. The last time the PSC discussed this theme was in July 2025 during its 1290th meeting, in which, among other things, it reiterated the importance of ‘the operationalisation of the Banjul Process as a key initiative to sustain high-level advocacy, coordination and knowledge-sharing on the protection of children affected by armed conflict.’ This meeting also comes a few days after the commemoration of World Children’s Day, which is celebrated on 20 November.
In addition to the foregoing activities, the PPoW envisages, in the footnote, the 7th EU-AU Summit, to be held on 24 to 25 November in Luanda, Angola and the AU Summit on AU Reforms to be held on 26 November 2025 in Luanda, Angola.
Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR 1325
Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR 1325
Date | 29 October 2025
Tomorrow (30 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1309th open session virtually on Women, Peace and Security in Africa: 25 years of UNSCR.
Following opening remarks by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and Chair of the PSC for October 2025, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), will deliver the introductory statement. Liberata Mulamula, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), is also expected to brief the Council on the progress of implementing the WPS agenda. Statements are also expected from Justice Effie Owuor, Co-Chair of FemWise-Africa; a representative of UN Women; a representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the AU; and representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
As the AU marks the 25th anniversary of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 (2000), this session provides a forum to review results, address persistent gaps and set a practical course for implementation. It comes fifteen years after the PSC institutionalised annual deliberations on WPS at its 223rd meeting in March 2010. The Council may assess performance over this period, identify obstacles to effective delivery and agree on corrective actions.
The Council last considered the agenda in March 2025 at its 1268th meeting. On that occasion, Council underlined ‘the need to advocate for the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1325, which addresses the impact of armed conflict on women and emphasises the importance of women’s participation in peace and security efforts.’ The Council also ‘underscored the need for the AU Commission to carry out an assessment’ to assist Member States in advancing national policy and stressed ‘the need to establish clear indicators and robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms’ to enable regular reporting on commitments.
This year additionally marks the 15th anniversary of the PSC decision to institutionalise the WPS agenda. In tomorrow’s session, the Council may review the progress registered in advancing the WPS within the framework of the AU and the persisting challenges. The Special Envoy on WPS, established in 2014, serves as the lead and anchor of the effort for advancing the WPS agenda within the AU. It has helped initiate measures and institutional frameworks to advance women’s inclusion across peace support operations (PSOs), election observation and mediation. Developed through the Special Envoy on WPS, the Continental Results Framework (CRF) is the principal roadmap for tracking commitments across four pillars: participation, prevention, protection and relief and recovery; covering National Action Plans (NAPs) now adopted by 37 Member States, the growth of regional women’s mediation networks and recognition of women’s leadership in peace processes. A June 2025 high-level workshop on ‘Reinvigorate CRF Monitoring’ recommended a simplified digital reporting tool, biennial reporting, real-time feedback loops, harmonised AU reporting timelines and the use of CRF reports to inform policymaking and budget allocations.
Established in 2017, FemWise Africa and the African Women Leaders Network (AWLN) advance mediation and the promotion of women’s leadership, respectively. FemWise Africa, a subsidiary mechanism of the AU Panel of the Wise, identifies, trains and deploys women mediators in AU peace efforts and election observation processes, while AWLN increases women’s participation in decision making through peer learning, mentoring, solidarity, advocacy and capacity building.
Despite the emphasis on Resolution 1325, the WPS agenda has a strong normative foundation in the AU legal instruments. The Maputo Protocol (2003) aligns with and advances obligations consistent with Resolution 1325, with Articles 10–11 requiring participation in peace processes and protection in situations of conflict. The AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004) is a pledge by Heads of State to accelerate women’s rights and parity across governance, peace and security, education, health and economic life, with annual reporting to track progress. The AU Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (2018 to 2028) aligns Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to mainstream gender equality across AU organs and Member States, prioritising dignity and security, effective laws and institutions, economic empowerment and leadership and voice. The AU Policy on the Prevention of and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Support Operations (2018) establishes zero tolerance and a survivor-centred system with vetting, mandatory training, confidential reporting, immediate support services and clear accountability, including investigations, repatriations, sanctions and referrals for national prosecution. And, the recent AU Convention on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (2025) further reinforces existing legal guarantees, requiring states to prevent, protect, prosecute and provide survivor-centred support for all forms of violence, including cyberviolence and femicide, complements the Maputo Protocol.
In view of the foregoing, the session may deliberate on prioritising the concrete operationalisation of existing instruments, anchored in a forward-looking implementation strategy and tested by a rigorous stocktake of how deliberations have translated into practice. As recorded in Amani Africa’s special research report, the Council’s deliberations called for action on five priority issues: accountability that ends impunity and expands access to justice for women; meaningful representation across prevention, mediation, PSOs and post conflict reconstruction; attention to structural gender disparities and other drivers of conflict; formal institutionalisation of the agenda; and the systematic deployment of gender advisers. Yet outputs remain largely programmatic and weakly tied to measurable targets, time-bound delivery and independent review. Although the AU is positioned as a global leader in policy architecture, credibility now rests on converting commitments into measurable gains for citizens, articulating coherent African positions and mobilising Member States and civil society through implementation.
Critical review of the realities shows that the major gap has nothing to do with a lack of normative, policy and institutional frameworks but the lack of implementation and disregard of the commitments thereunder. Instruments to prevent and mitigate sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) in PSOs have yielded limited protection gains; declarations to end impunity are rarely paired with conflict-sensitive monitoring, adequate investigative capacity or accountability pathways with clear, realistic timelines. Gender analysis is inconsistently integrated into briefings, situation reports and mandate renewals and findings from the Office of the Special Envoy’s field missions seldom inform corresponding country and regional deliberations. Follow-through is uneven and senior-level ownership is fragile, while conflicts continue to target civilians, including the strategic use of sexual violence as warfare, terrorism and torture. The most recent Windhoek+25 Declaration urges bold action to ‘bridge persistent gaps’, an ‘intergenerational imperative’ to sustain gains, use of regional strategies and NAPs for implementation and review, and alignment of ‘political will, institutional reform and societal transformation’ grounded in unity, resilience and inclusion. In the same vein, on 31 July 2025 in Benin, the Cotonou Meeting reviewed implementation and urged accelerated responses to ‘climate insecurity, digital threats, and persistent gender inequalities’, ‘terrorism, climate-related insecurity, gender-based violence’, and the ‘weaponisation of digital technologies’.
For Council deliberation, a notable finding from the UN Secretary-General’s 2025 WPS report is that approximately 676 million women lived within 50 kilometres of deadly conflict in 2024, the highest level since the 1990s. Rising global military spending and an evident backlash against gender equality are straining the WPS agenda. Funding shortfalls are closing clinics, shrinking food aid and cutting education in Somalia, the DRC and the Sahel (including Mali). Protracted crises across the Sahel, Great Lakes and Horn of Africa disproportionately expose women and girls to GBV, displacement and marginalisation. In Ethiopia, the World Food Programme (WFP) cut refugee rations from 60 per cent to 40 per cent due to shortages. Without new funds, programmes for breastfeeding women and malnourished children will end in December 2025. In Somalia, women and children, who face heightened risks of GBV, sexual exploitation and eviction, accounted for more than 80 per cent of the displaced population. In South Sudan, violence is at the highest level since the 2017 cessation of hostilities, with women and girls often targeted. In El-Fashir, Sudan, reports indicate that 38 per cent of pregnant and breastfeeding women are malnourished. In its 2025 open letter to UN permanent representatives, the NGO Working Group on WPS underscores that the agenda’s norms remain far from realised and condemns the escalating backlash against women’s autonomy, rights and the advocates who defend them.
Tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to put women’s meaningful participation in peace processes front and center, heeding the Swakopmund Process Conclusions of 23 March 2024 that call for gender parity across all AU led and co-led mediation tracks. Such a policy should guide the selection and appointment of mediators, technical experts and special envoys, embed gender analysis in terms of reference and set measurable participation targets at every stage. Yet women remain underrepresented, particularly in high-stakes negotiations and security sector reform processes. With inadequate commitments, shrinking resources and efforts to roll back protection measures, obligations under the CRF and NAPs are under-enforced. Although the AU endorses a gender-parity policy for AU-led mediation and a 30 per cent minimum quota for women’s participation in peace missions and processes, accountability and regular reporting mechanisms are lacking. UN data from 2020 to 2024 show women’s participation in peace processes stayed far below targets. In 2024, women were 7 per cent of negotiators and 14 per cent of mediators; nearly 90 per cent of negotiation tracks and about two-thirds of mediation efforts had no women. Although Africa hosts many UN peace operations, including in the DRC and South Sudan, women still make up a small share of peacekeepers globally: 6.4 per cent of military personnel and 12 per cent of police personnel as of 2023. In light of this, the PSC may shift the focus towards identifying specific interventions for advancing the level of women’s participation in peace processes and periodic monitoring and reporting on trends in this respect.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The Council may call for clear, realistic roadmaps and a pivot from norm setting to implementation, prioritising systematic integration of the WPS agenda across the conflict continuum from prevention to post-conflict. Member States may be urged to embed the agenda in national and local processes, and those without NAPs to adopt costed plans with meaningful participation of women, youth and grassroots groups. In terms of protection, the PSC may request the AU Commission to mainstream update on WPS in briefings and reports of conflict situations submitted to the PSC and task the Special Envoy to monitor, track and document violations against women in conflict and crisis situations in Africa and prepare a dedicated annual report on the same. The PSC is expected to condemn conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and reiterate the need for full and effective participation of women in early warning, prevention, mediation and dialogue, backed by adequate, predictable and sustained financing. It may seek concrete steps to implement the 30 per cent quota at the AU, REC/RM and national levels. It may encourage well-resourced national and regional FemWise chapters to expand the pool of women peace experts. It may press for stronger delivery across the four pillars and for integrating climate risks into implementation strategies. It may underline the coordinating role of the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS.
