Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for May 2018
Amani Africa
Date | May 2018
Rwanda assumes the role of the monthly chairpersonship of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of May when the monthly program of work of the PSC commences on 2nd of May. As
in April, the May program is relatively heavy with the PSC expected to hold nine sessions and a field
mission to Darfur, Sudan. A wide range of thematic peace and security issues dominate the program
of the month, with two open sessions. The monthly program also envisages ministerial level session,
which will consider two of the nine agenda items on the monthly program.
The program of the month starts with a briefing on the African Union (AU) Peace Fund. This is the first session on the Peace Fund since the adoption by the PSC of the proposed governance structures and the organization of the Peace Fund at its 30 May 2017 session. It is anticipated that the AU
Special Envoy on the Financing of the Union and the Peace Fund, Donald Kaberuka, will provide updates on the status of operationalization of the Peace Fund.
The first open session is scheduled to take place on the 8th of May on the ‘Principles of Protection of Civilians in Conflict Situations in Africa’. The Department of Peace and Security (PSD) and the UN Office to the AU are expected to brief the PSC on the principles highlighting their importance, status and use in the operationalization of the African Standby Force. It is also in this same session that the PSC is expected to consider and adopt the provisional program of work of the PSC for June. On the 10th of May, the PSC is scheduled to have a session on the situation of African migrants, an update and impediments for the continental free movement of peoples in Africa. It is a follow up to the 21 July 2017 session of the PSC on the same. The PSC is expected to receive briefings from the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace and Security. Others expected to make statements include representatives of Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs).
On the 15th of May, the second open session of the month is expected to take place focusing on climate-induced conflicts. The PSD and the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture are expected to provide briefings on the theme.
From the 16th to 19th of May, the PSC is expected to undertake a field mission to Darfur Sudan. This is expected to provide the PSC the opportunity to review for itself the conditions in Drafur and the arrangements that ensure smooth transition in the context of the draw down of UNAU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As a follow up to this field mission, the PSC will convene a session on UNAMID on the 22nd of May. During this session the PSC will consider the Special Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary General of the UN on the Strategic Review of UNAMID, its field mission report and renewal of the mandate of UNAMID. Apart from the PSD, Jeremiah Mamabolo, the Joint Special Representative of the UN and the AU are expected to provide briefings.
On the 21st of May the PSC will hold a briefing on the Continental Results Framework for Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in
Africa. In this session the PSC is expected to consider a report on the theme and Bineta Diop, the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the Commission, is set to provide briefing to the PSC.
The PSC is expected to have a briefing session on ‘illicit flow and financing of arms in Africa’ on the 24th of May,. The theme of this session forms part of the areas specifically singled out for action in the AU Agenda on Silencing the Guns. The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) and the PSD are expected to provide briefings to the PSC. All members of the UN Security Council are expected to participate in the closed session. In addition to examining the trends and dynamics in the illicit flow of weapons, this session is expected to take stock of the impact of the proliferation of the establishment of military bases on the continent by various non-African countries.
The last session scheduled for the 31st of May will take place at ministerial level focusing on two themes. The first is on the ‘role of Africa in the harmonization of initiatives and operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahel’. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the Chairperson of the AU Commission is expected to brief the Council. The second expected to take place in the afternoon is on the ‘status of repatriation of migrants from Libya’. Mahamat is expected to present a report on conditions of migrants including updates on the AU and international responses to the plight of African migrants.
PSC Briefing on South Sudan and Consideration of the Report on the PSC Field Mission
Amani Africa
Date | 26 April, 2018
Tomorrow (26 April), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive briefing on the Situation in South Sudan and consider the report of the PSC field mission to South Sudan that took place
from 14-19 April 2018. Andrews Atta-Asamoah, member of the United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts on South Sudan is expected to brief the PSC on the situation in South Sudan within the framework of the mandate of the Panel. The regional bound Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is also expected to make a statement. Others expected to intervene include the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson and South Sudan.
The five-day field mission was a follow up to a decision of the PSC at its meeting held on 8 February 2018 to undertake a field mission to South Sudan in the month of April 2018. The February meeting scheduled and planned the mission with an objective of putting pressure on the stakeholders to the conflict to implement the Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), and to promote and support the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF). The mission was preceded by a crucial visit on 11-12 April 2018 to South Africa by Moussa Faki, Chairperson of the AU Commission where he discussed the peace process in South Sudan with President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, and met with the head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/iO) Riek Machar to urge support for the HLRF. Tomorrow’s meeting will receive updates on the HLRF and the third round of peace talks, initially scheduled for 26-30 April now postponed to 2 – 6 May 2018.
The PSC delegation which included all members of the Council, and led by the chair of the month for April, Nigeria, met with wide range of government officials and civil society stakeholders and with members of intergovernmental and international organizations in South Sudan. The delegation had discussions with President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Taban Deng Gai on the HLRF and the hybrid court among others. Members of the Steering Committee of the National Dialogue, the Special Representation of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) are other stakeholders the PSC delegation conversed with in its mission on the peace process, protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance. The delegation also met with the African ambassadors in Juba, leaders of faith-based organizations, and visited the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and conversed with their representatives on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan.
Tomorrow’s meeting is taking place in the background of the fresh eruption of violence last week in areas near the capital Juba, and the Gezira town in Rubkona county. The SPLM/iO accused the government of major offensive while Juba admitted heavy fighting with rebels in Gezira town. The field mission by the PSC indicates a more visible role by the Council in initiatives to resolve the South Sudan crisis, and increased interest to add impetus to the five years long peace process by IGAD. The emphasis by the PSC on the need to upscale role by the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee and the AU High Representative for South Sudan, Alpha Oumar Konare is an indication to a bigger AU role in the process while recognizing IGAD as the lead. The field mission and the call for more role for AU in South Sudan came as complementarity between the PSC and IGAD in efforts to resolve the South Sudan conflict was witnessing improvement in line with the principle of subsidiarity, and as patience run low towards the continued violation of the secession of hostilities and the broader agreement demanding a coordinated and serious response.
Increased AU role in the South Sudan crisis and peace process will demand synergy among the different organizations, initiatives and mechanisms. Ways to improve regular interactions and
updates between the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), the AU Commission and UN system to support the IGAD led efforts will be discussed by the meeting.
The IGAD Council of Ministers which held its 61st Extra-Ordinary Session on 26 March 2018 in Addis Ababa decided to impose targeted sanctions against individual violators of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). The meeting also referred the case to the PSC for ‘appropriate punitive measures’ targeting spoilers of the process. The IGAD proposed sanctions are expected to receive serious attention by council members. One of the issues that will take center stage at the briefing will be the issue of the hybrid court. The PSC delegation raised and discussed the need for enhancing cooperation between the AU and Juba to materialize the establishment of the court as an institutional foundation for the transitional justice process in South Sudan. The PSC sees the hybrid court, which is envisioned as a major component of the Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) signed on 15 August 2015, as a major pillar of the process that needs urgent attention and action. The meeting is expected to reinforce its call at its 8 February meeting for the immediate signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the establishment of the hybrid court and repeat its request on Juba to ‘ensure the timely domestication of the MoU through the Transitional Legislative Assembly and to step up efforts in establishing the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, and the Compensation and Reparations Authority as provided for by the ARCSS’. The meeting will also emphasize the need for synergy and harmony between the HLRF, the National Dialogue and the Reunification process of the SPLM.
The report by the PSC delegation will also cover the state of the humanitarian situation in South Sudan and the issue of protection of civilians. The meeting is expected to be tough on activities that disrupt and obstruct delivery and distribution of life-saving humanitarian assistance for the IDPs, and the broader South Sudanese public. In this light, the meeting will look at the delay in the deployment of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) and expected to pass strong call to the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) and troop contributing countries to realize the civilian protection unit in the next few months.
The expected outcome of this session is a communique.
Update on the AU Reform – Review of the Peace and Security Council
Amani Africa
Date | 25 April 2018
Update on PSC Reform
Today (25 April), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will receive update on the ‘AU Reform – Review of the Peace and Security Council’. Pierre MouKoko Mbonjou, Head of the AU Reform Implementation Unit (RIU) in the Office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission is expected to brief the PSC.
Currently, the RIU is in the process of undertaking the review of the various organs of the AU and is convening consultations with AU organs. In its decision Assembly/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII) on the Report on “The Imperative to Strengthen our Union: Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union, the AU Assembly decided that ‘the PSC should be reformed to ensure that it meets the ambition foreseen in its Protocol, by strengthening its working methods and its role in conflict prevention and crisis management’. This session is the first opportunity for PSC members to convene a meeting with the RIU within the framework of this Assembly decision.
In his briefing to the PSC, Mr Mbonjou is expected to offer insights both on what the review of the PSC would focus on and the methodology to be used in identifying areas for review. It would highlight that, instead of a reform requiring amendment of the PSC Protocol, the review of the PSC would follow strictly the terms f the decision of the AU Assembly, and hence limited to the ‘strengthening of its (PSC’s) working methods and its role in conflict prevention and management.’
The briefing would also highlight on how the review and assessment of the PSC is to be undertaken and the envisaged role of the PSC in the process. The review, expected to use consultant, is anticipated to deliver draft paper outlining the challenges and systematically presenting existing proposals on strengthening the role of the PSC in conflict prevention and crises management. The briefing is expected to indicate how the PSC participates in the review and assessment process, including the option of engaging the PSC Committee of Experts on the development of proposals on the reform of the PSC.
In terms of the methodology, apart from review of existing reviews, assessments and evaluations, the review and assessment process is anticipated to cover the recommendations from the conclusions of the PSC’s many working method retreats. There is already a document of the PSC Secretariat highlighting the various proposals and the lack of implementation of the various proposals. The review is also expected to rely on the ongoing APSA/AGA Study that the AU Peace and Security Department leads.
For members of the PSC questions of interest include those relating to the PSC decision-making processes, on timelines of finalization of the review and authority for validation of the proposed recommendations. Other issues of interest also include working relationships and the institutional and resource implications of PSC’s work, including on the use of the finances in the Peace Fund.
No outcome is expected from this update. But, the PSC may consider providing guidelines on modalities of the review and assessment of its works and provision of further updates on the assessment process and final adoption of the proposed reforms.
Operationalization of the African Standby Force
Amani Africa
Date | 24 April, 2018
Briefing on the ASF
Tomorrow (25 April), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will hold a briefing on ‘the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)’. The meeting will evaluate the state of readiness of Regional Standby Forces and progress made since the last briefing to the PSC. The meeting is a follow up to the decision of the PSC and Executive Council on regular updating of the PSC on the ASF.
The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is also expected to provide updates to the PSC. The focus of this briefing will be on works done at the level of the AU including in respect to the implementation of the Maputo Strategic Work Plan on the Enhancement of the ASF (2016-2020). The five-year work plan for the ASF highlighted the changing security environment and threats on the continent and outlined the dynamism and changes needed into the design and structure of the ASF to respond to the challenges. The Council will examine the progress made based on the indicators, deliverables and timelines put by the work plan. It is also expected in particular to update the PSC on progress made in elaborating AU-RECs/RMs agreement on decision-making processes on the deployment of the ASF and the launch in January 2018 of the Continental Logistics Base in Cameroon.
In its last session on the ASF held on 21 July 2017, the PSC also anticipated to review the Report of the Commission on the verification, confirmation and validation of pledged capabilities of the ASF that Professor Ibrahim Gambari led. In the light of the discussion on adapting the design and structure of the ASF with an objective of enhancing its deployment capabilities and mission effectiveness, the briefing session is expected to discuss the updates in this process.
With respect to the RECs/RMs, some member states expressed the need for the RECs/RMs to update the PSC themselves on the level of preparedness of their regional forces. In the Executive Council’s Declaration on the 10th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS), RECs/RMs are urged ‘to provide regular updates to the AU Peace and Security Council on their Regional Standby Forces and attend PSC sessions as required’. The PSC Secretariat has sent out invitations to the heads of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
The main part of the briefing will be a progress report by the chairs and representatives of the five RECs/RMs. The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) are expected to make presentations on the status of the regional brigades and the training, financing, and mobilization capacities of their respective regional forces. The statements and subsequent exchanges are also expected to cover training and exercises, airlift and mission support capabilities of the regional forces. The difficult issue of command structure and control, and matters related with logistics will also be topics that will feature in the meeting.
Despite regional differences and uneven developments of regional brigades by the regional mechanisms notably NARC, the ASF proved to be a great mechanism to build a permanent infrastructure for standardization, training and mobilization of peacekeeping in Africa. The ECOWAS, EASF and SADC are regions that showed relative progress while central and northern Africa are significantly lagging.
However, the structure of the force, and its place in the APSA is a matter of ongoing conversation at the PSC. The AU member states are relying on ad-hoc regional coalitions and deployment arrangements and alliances even after the official declaration of the operationalization of the ASF. There are various issues that member states of the PSC would raise in regard to these developments. The first is the relationship of these ad hoc arrangements with the ASF framework. In its January 2018 Declaration on the meeting of the STCDSS, the Executive Council called for the harmonization enhance cooperation with all ad-hoc coalitions, namely, MNJTF, Group of Five Sahel Joint Force and RCILRA.
There is also the issue of African Capacity for Rapid Intervention in Crises (ACIRC). There are member states who see it as an initiative that diverts and distracts the attention, energy, resources and political focus of the continent from the ASF. Although the AU Commission or the RECs/RMs may not be in a position to provide full answer, a second and related issue for discussion is the harmonization of the activities of (ACIRC) with the Framework of the ASF.
Finally, there is also the issue of the mandating and deployment of the ASF for AU peace support operations including the ad hoc coalitions within the framework of the Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC. In this respect, the briefing in the PSC is expected to cover how new initiatives are being aliened with the processes envisaged in AU founding instruments. A recent major development has been the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Smaïl Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and Maman Sidiko, Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel Secretariat on 25 March 2018.
The expected outcome of the briefing is a communiqué. It is anticipated to give guidance on the follow up to the various decisions including notably the process of alignment, harmonization and coherence of decision-making and mandating process between AU and RECs/RMs and the finalization of the draft ASF Legal Framework.
Africa’s peace and security landscape by 2023
Amani Africa
Date | 24 April 2018
Looking into the future: Africa’s Peace and Security Landscape by 2023
Tomorrow (24 April), the PSC is scheduled to hold a second open session of the month. The theme of the session is ‘Africa’s peace and security landscape by 2023 (end of the ten-year plan of Agenda 2063): A prospective analysis of peace and security challenges’. This session was slated in the original program of work for the month for 3rd April but was postponed to finalize preparations including the concept note for the session. The Peace and Security Department, the Department of Political Affairs and the Agenda 2063 Unit of the AU (SSPERM) are expected to provide briefings. The Institute for Security Studies is also envisaged to make presentation based on the concept note it initiated for the session.
In May 2013 AU member states adopted Agenda 2063, the continent’s development, governance and security vision. This session on the prospect of peace in Africa by 2023 comes half way through the first ten years plan of Agenda 2063. In looking into the future, this session draws on the peace and security trends of the continent thus far.
When Agenda 2063 was adopted in 2013, the continent has been witnessing an upsurge of conflicts and crises. Apart from ongoing protracted conflicts, new conflicts and crises erupted as post-conflict transitions unraveled in DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burundi and South Sudan. The continent also witnessed the spread of terrorism in both territorial coverage and intensity of violence. During 2014/15 Boko Haram became the most deadly terrorist group in the world until its capacity was degraded during the past year.
In West Africa, Mali, experiencing the twin challenges of unconstitutional change of government and that violent seizure by armed groups of its northern territories, saw the internationalization of its conflict with the intervention of the French to stop the southern march of the armed opposition to seize Mali’s capital, Bamako. Terrorism and armed insurgency affecting Nigeria and countries of the Sahel was on the rise. In the Central African region, Séléka’s overthrow of the government of François Bozizé of the CAR ushered in a new period of violent conflagration involving the collapse of the little that existed of the state and a brutal sectarian violence between the Seleka and the ‘anti-balaka’ that triggered major humanitarian crisis. DRC was also under the grip of a new war against the March 23 rebel group in its volatile eastern region.
In North Africa, the transitions in all the North African countries affected by the 2011 popular uprisings faltered as each suffered setbacks. All the countries in transition experienced increasing levels political upheavals and violence during the year. Most notably, downward spiral of Libya into the abyss culminated in the following years in the country’s fragmentation into violent rival armed militias and criminal networks of weapons traffickers, smugglers and terrorist groups including IS.
Another region that witnessed major deterioration in its peace and security outlook in 2013 was East and Horn of Africa. Despite limited progress in Somalia amid persisting political and security crises, the most significant development was the eruption of South Sudan into violent civil war.
Progress has been registered in arresting the worst manifestations of the newly erupted armed conflicts and the spread of the terrorist menace since 2013, albeit unevenly. Apart from highlighting the progress made, the briefings and deliberations are expected to underscore the persistence of the conflicts and violent extremist in all the regions that experienced the upsurge of these conditions around 2013. This has implications for prospects for peace and security in 2023, notably with respect to how these situations evolve in terms of resolution, continuation or further deterioration.
There are some key factors that would determine how the current conflict situations shape the peace and security landscape of Africa in 2023. Apart from the role of African and international mediation and peace operations efforts, one such factor concerns the fragility or weakness of the state that makes it vulnerable to conflicts. Another but related factor is the extent to which the underlying political, socio-economic and demographic conditions are effectively addressed.
The prospect of peace and security challenges in 2023 does not depend only on the dynamics of current conflict situations and the changing dynamics of violent extremism in Africa. It also depends on the evolution of vulnerabilities of various countries and regions to conflicts and major insecurities. The concept note anticipates much focus on what it calls the seven structural drivers of conflicts in Africa that will determine the security outlook of Africa by 2023 and beyond. These relate to poverty, democratization, regime type, population age structure, repeat violence, the bad neighborhood effect and poor governance. Other drivers of conflicts highlighted in the AU roadmap on silencing the guns by 2020 include illicit trafficking and use of weapons.
The nature and dynamics of conflicts would also witness change. Due to population pressure, increasing vulnerability of people due to pressure from large scale projects including activities of extractive industries, climate change and weak or bad governance infrastructure, resource-based conflicts notably over water and land are likely to increase and assume prominence. These would be both sub-national and cross border in nature.
Another source of security challenge for Africa is the increasing militarization of some parts of the continent. This is particularly the case in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa where various old and new powers continue to scramble for establishing military bases.
Governance related crises are also set to witness significant increase. Riots and mass protests are the dominant conflict events in 2017. Changing demographic dynamics involving mostly youthful, increasingly educated and politically conscious public coupled with the spread of information technology have led to expanding the gulf in the expectations of the public and the ability of governments to deliver in terms of political responsiveness, accountability and socio-economic inclusivity. The resulting political upheavals and conflicts taking the form of protests, riots, election induced violence and disputes over revision of presidential term limits are expected to be the most dominant conflict events.
The briefing from PSD is expected to highlight the measures envisaged under the AU Roadmap on silencing the guns by 2020. This session is expected to also highlight the importance of conflict prevention and the need for a strategy on the effective deployment of preventive instruments. In this context, the AU Unit on Agenda 2063 is expected to highlight the areas of intervention planned to address the current peace and security challenges and those expected by 2023.
As rightly pointed out in the concept note for the session, attention would also be drawn to the need for enhanced investment in and effective utilization of the governance frameworks and instruments of the AU that make up the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Other areas of intervention proposed in the concept note include greater focus on security sector reform, a rule of law based approach to counter terrorism, more independent and resourced election monitoring unit, and partnering with election monitors from other international bodies.
The expected outcome of this session is a press statement. In terms of follow up, issues worth focusing on in the press statement include the need for identifying and sharpening interventions tailored to the different security challenges and the imperative of resolving current conflicts and greater use of prevention tools with full operationalization of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention framework including through the use of the country structural vulnerability/Resilience assessment.
