The AU Commission requires leadership that is strategic, bold, collaborative, and results driven - Anil K Gayan, Candidate for AU Commission Chairperson
The AU Commission requires leadership that is strategic, bold, collaborative, and results driven - Anil K Gayan, Candidate for AU Commission Chairperson
Date | 01 November 2024
Interview with Anil K Gayan of Mauritius, Candidate for the position of AU Commission Chairperson
VISION FOR AFRICA AND LEADERSHIP PLANS
Q. Why are you running for chairship of the AU Commission and why should AU member states vote for you?
I am running for Chairperson of the AU Commission because Africa stands at a critical juncture, where bold, transformative leadership is needed to drive sustainable development, regional integration, and lasting peace. With a wealth of experience in governance, diplomacy, and international relations, I am deeply committed to advancing our continent’s unity, security, and prosperity. My candidacy is centered on delivering tangible outcomes that address Africa’s shared challenges, including deepening economic integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), promoting good governance, addressing climate change, and unlocking the blue economy. I believe in African-led solutions that empower all nations, leaving no one behind as we build a prosperous and secure future. AU member states should vote for me because I am dedicated to ensuring that Africa takes full ownership of its destiny, transforming our collective potential into real, sustainable progress.
Q. In your opinion what kind of leadership does the AU Commission require in general and at this material point in time in particular?
At this pivotal moment, the AU Commission requires leadership that is strategic, bold, collaborative, and results driven. To address complex challenges such as economic instability and climate change, we need a leader who can unite member states and adopt an ISO-like certification standard that ensures efficiency, transparency, and accountability across all operations. Streamlining decision-making and making the AU Commission more responsive and agile will be crucial for achieving common goals like peace, security, and economic integration. This leadership must focus on practical solutions and long-term outcomes, ensuring that the needs of Africans are met with bold, inclusive, and accountable action.
Q. What is your vision for the African Union under your leadership as AU Commission Chair?
My vision for the African Union is to create a more integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa that is financially independent, operationally efficient, and driven by good governance. Under my leadership, the AU will be a symbol of African strength, unity, and progress, where every country has an equal voice. We will strengthen our institutions, enhance intra-African trade, and promote economic integration, while addressing critical issues like peace, security, and climate resilience. By embedding transparent processes and performance benchmarks, the AU will deliver tangible benefits to all Africans. I am committed to advancing key goals such as infrastructure development, sustainable growth, and the full realization of Agenda 2063, ensuring that the African Union becomes a beacon of hope and progress for our continent.
Q. How would your leadership be different from the past eight years?
My leadership will focus on achieving greater financial independence for the African Union by reducing reliance on external funding and diversifying the AU’s resource base through innovative mechanisms like diaspora bonds, partnerships with the private sector, and increased member-state contributions. While building on the past leadership’s foundation, I will emphasize accelerated action and measurable outcomes, prioritizing the swift implementation of key initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). I will streamline bureaucratic processes, enhance transparency, and ensure more direct communication with African citizens to build trust and engagement. Additionally, I will strengthen the AU’s Peace and Security Council, improving conflict-prevention mechanisms and early warning systems, while aligning our operations with ISO certification standards to boost efficiency, accountability, and credibility.
Q. What key outcomes or achievements do you hope to be remembered for at the end of your term as Chairman of the AU?
At the end of my term as Chairman of the AU, I hope to be remembered for transforming the African Union into a more financially self-sufficient and effective institution, capable of acting decisively in matters of peace and security. I aim to strengthen the AU’s capacity to reduce conflicts and fortify the Peace and Security Council, while making significant progress in the implementation and expansion of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to boost intra-African trade. I also hope to leave behind measurable achievements in infrastructure, governance, and democratic development, bridging the gap between the AU’s vision and its delivery.
AU INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Q. What is your assessment of the state of the African Union, in terms of challenges that the African continent is facing and the role and place of the Union in mobilizing effective responses as well as in terms of whether and how it has advanced the development and integration agenda?
The African Union has made commendable progress, but significant challenges remain. A key issue is the gap between the AU’s ambitious vision and its ability to implement that vision, due to resource constraints and a slow pace of reforms. Regional instability, economic disparities, and insufficient infrastructure continue to hinder progress across the continent. To effectively address these challenges, the AU must strengthen its role in conflict resolution and economic integration, ensuring more rapid and decisive action. Improving coordination, resource mobilization, and collaboration with member states and regional bodies is crucial. Additionally, adopting operational standards similar to ISO certification can streamline processes, increase transparency, and enhance accountability, helping the AU deliver on its development and integration agenda more effectively.
Q. What is your assessment of the state of the AU Commission? What needs to be consolidated, and what needs to change?
The AU Commission has a solid foundation, but significant improvements are needed in efficiency, financial management, and internal accountability. To achieve this, I propose adopting an operational model inspired by ISO certification standards to enhance transparency, streamline processes, and ensure accountability in every department. Better coordination between the Commission and member states is essential for delivering tangible results. Additionally, achieving financial independence is crucial; we must reduce reliance on external donors by increasing member-state contributions and exploring alternative funding mechanisms. Furthermore, the Commission must prioritize the empowerment of youth and ensure gender parity, becoming a more dynamic and adaptive institution that can meet the evolving needs of the continent.
Q. How will you prioritize the AU’s Agenda 2063, and what key milestones will you seek to achieve during your tenure towards achieving Agenda 2063?
Agenda 2063 is the blueprint for Africa’s future, and I will prioritize fast-tracking its implementation by focusing on key milestones such as expanding the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), improving infrastructure, and advancing good governance, peace, and security across the continent. A major focus of my tenure will be achieving financial sustainability for the AU by reducing reliance on external partners and ensuring that every initiative is executed with efficiency by aligning AU operations with its ISO standards. Additionally, I will prioritize investment in green energy and innovation to support sustainable development, ensuring that the AU meets critical milestones in industrialization and economic integration outlined in Agenda 2063.
Q. What needs to be done to bridge the gap between the ambition of the African Union and the actual delivery of the Union on its ambition?
To bridge the gap between the African Union’s ambitious goals and actual delivery, the AU must enhance operational efficiency and accountability by adopting international certification standards. This will streamline processes, ensuring they are clear, transparent, and results-oriented.
Achieving financial sustainability is crucial; we must diversify our funding mechanisms by increasing contributions from member states, harnessing Africa’s own resources, and exploring innovative financing options such as public-private partnerships and diaspora bonds. By moving away from over-reliance on external donors, we can build financial independence and enhance our sovereignty.
Furthermore, fostering greater collaboration and improving communication among member states will help close the gap between ambition and tangible outcomes, enabling the AU to translate its aspirations into impactful results more effectively. Reducing bureaucracy and speeding up decision-making processes will also be essential in realizing the AU’s vision for the continent.
Q. How do you think the majority of Africans view the AU? Do you think African citizens have a positive view of the AU? Why do you think that is the case?
Many Africans view the AU as a symbol of unity but often feel disconnected from its processes and outcomes, perceiving it as a distant entity that does not fully engage with their daily lives. While there is recognition of the AU’s role in peacekeeping and governance, many citizens believe it should do more to address pressing socio-economic issues. To shift this perception, it is crucial for the AU to deliver on key programs that have a tangible impact on everyday lives, enhancing its accessibility, transparency, and accountability. By ensuring financial independence and demonstrating the direct benefits of its initiatives, the AU can foster a more positive view among African citizens, ultimately reinforcing its relevance and connection to their realities.
FUNDING OF THE UNION
Q. Despite the growing need for more from the AU and its engagement in various policy areas of continental scale, the funding for the Union has not been growing. It has indeed decreased particularly in the years since the COVID-19 pandemic. This has created a major gap between what the AU is expected to do and the dwindling means at its disposal.
What needs to be done to enhance the resource base of the AU and reverse the trend of dwindling capacity and resources?
To enhance the resource base of the African Union and reverse the trend of dwindling capacity, we must significantly reduce our reliance on external funding. This can be achieved by diversifying our funding sources and encouraging member states to honour their financial commitments, implementing accountability measures that link payments to decision-making rights within the Union. I propose introducing innovative financial mechanisms such as African diaspora bonds and a tax on multinational corporations operating in Africa, which can create new revenue streams. Additionally, expanding public-private partnerships and effectively leveraging the continent’s natural and human resources will help fund key programs. By focusing on these strategies, we can strengthen the AU’s financial sustainability and capacity to meet its ambitious goals.
Q. AU members committed to providing 100 per cent of their operational budget, 75 per cent of their program budget, and 25 per cent of their budget for peace support operations.
Seventy per cent of the operational costs of the AU are covered by its member states; however, most programmatic operations are still not financially supported by these states. As a result, the AU relies heavily on external donors to fund its programs, leading to financial dependency. What measures will you implement to enhance the AU’s financial self-sufficiency?
To enhance the AU’s financial self-sufficiency and reduce dependency on external donors, I propose implementing a comprehensive funding strategy that focuses on innovative financial mechanisms and strengthening member state contributions. This strategy will include the introduction of diaspora bonds, which will allow African citizens living abroad to invest in their home continent, thereby generating substantial funding for key initiatives. Additionally, I will work to increase financial commitments from member states by establishing clear accountability measures that ensure their contributions directly support operational and programmatic budgets.
Furthermore, fostering public-private partnerships will be crucial in diversifying revenue streams and leveraging Africa’s private sector to finance AU programs. By strengthening collaboration with the private sector and utilizing the continent’s natural and human resources, we can create a sustainable funding model that empowers the AU to operate independently. Improving financial management and ensuring transparency in resource allocation will build trust among member states and partners, encouraging them to invest in the AU with confidence. This holistic approach will pave the way for the AU’s financial independence, ensuring it can effectively fulfill its mission and enhance its sovereignty.
Q. How will you ensure member states that have indicated their commitments for the implementation of the Kigali decision follow through on their commitments?
To ensure that member states follow through on their commitments for the implementation of the Kigali decision, I will adopt a comprehensive strategy that emphasizes accountability and shared responsibility. This will involve increasing contributions from member states through a fair and transparent system, while also diversifying our funding sources by tapping into Africa’s natural resources and leveraging diaspora remittances. I will introduce sustainable public-private partnerships to finance key AU initiatives and apply ISO-like standards to our financial management, ensuring greater efficiency and transparency in fund usage. Regular reviews of financial commitments and transparent reporting on fund allocation will be crucial in fostering a culture of accountability. Additionally, I will strengthen communication with member states to highlight the long-term benefits of financial self-reliance, providing incentives for those that meet their obligations and encouraging all members to actively support the AU’s mission.
Q. What is your take on the institutional reform of the AU? What needs to change and how?
The institutional reform of the African Union (AU) is essential for enhancing its efficiency and credibility, yet the current process has fallen short of its original ambition and has not fully realized its potential. While there have been strides made, such as streamlining operations, the implementation has been slower than expected and at times controversial, leading to concerns about the marginalization of key areas within the AU’s mandate. To address these issues, we need to revisit the reform objectives to ensure they align with the continent’s needs today, avoiding redundancies while enhancing accountability and measurable outcomes. By adopting international standards and establishing performance benchmarks, we can create a more efficient operational framework that allows the AU to deliver on its mandates swiftly and effectively. Additionally, engaging member states in this reform process is crucial to ensure alignment with their expectations and strengthen their commitment to the AU’s collective goals, particularly in reforming the Peace and Security Council for improved conflict resolution and coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Overall, completing these reforms is vital for the AU to operate like a well-oiled machine, focused on advancing its critical mission for the continent.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
Q. What is your assessment of the state of socio-economic development and integration in Africa? Do you think the AU is doing enough and mobilizing action in this area at a pace and at the level matching the situation on the ground and the expectations of African people?
While progress has been made, socio-economic development is still uneven across the continent. The AfCFTA represents a major step towards integration, but more needs to be done to address infrastructure gaps, youth unemployment, and access to basic services like healthcare and education. We must ensure that the benefits of growth are distributed equitably, and that integration efforts are inclusive of all African countries.
To enhance intra-African trade and economic integration, I will prioritize the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by reducing both tariff and non-tariff barriers that hinder trade. Key measures will include investing in critical infrastructure such as transportation, energy, and information and communication technology (ICT) to facilitate seamless cross-border trade. Additionally, I will focus on strengthening the African Union’s capacity to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as they play a vital role in driving economic growth and innovation across the continent. By creating an enabling environment for SMEs to participate in cross-border trade, we can significantly boost economic integration and foster sustainable development throughout Africa.
Q. How do you plan to accelerate the full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)? Infrastructure gaps remain a barrier to economic growth. How will you prioritize infrastructure development, especially in terms of transportation, energy, and ICT?
Accelerating the AfCFTA will require strong political will from member states and the rapid construction of critical infrastructure. I will prioritize resolving logistical bottlenecks, harmonizing trade regulations, and simplifying customs procedures. Additionally, I will advocate for the expansion of transportation networks and digital infrastructure to connect markets more efficiently. The AfCFTA will be central to driving Africa’s socio-economic integration, and I will ensure its objectives are met swiftly.
PEACE AND SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE
Q. While the AU promised not to bequeath conflicts and war to the next generation and committed to silencing the guns by 2020 which was extended to 2030, instead of silencing the guns are blazing and roaring more ferociously and widely.
What is your take on this state of peace and security in Africa, which according to the constitutive act is the pre-requisite for realizing the development and regional integration agenda of the Union?
The state of peace and security in Africa is indeed concerning, as ongoing conflicts continue to destabilize various regions, undermining our collective efforts for development and regional integration. The AU’s Peace and Security Council must be empowered to take a more proactive stance in conflict prevention, moving beyond mere conflict resolution. This requires strengthening early warning systems and ensuring that peacekeeping missions are adequately funded and equipped to intervene effectively before conflicts escalate. Moreover, collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) is essential to foster a unified response to security threats. We must also address the root causes of conflict, including inequality and governance failures, to create a more stable and peaceful environment across the continent. The failure to achieve the “Silencing the Guns” target by 2020 emphasizes the urgent need for a renewed approach to peace and security in Africa.
To effectively address the backsliding in peace and security across the continent, I plan to tackle the root causes of conflicts, such as inequality, poor governance, and resource competition. Strengthening the AU’s Peace and Security Council is essential; this includes providing it with increased resources and authority to intervene early and ensuring that peacekeeping missions are well-funded, well-coordinated, and fully equipped. Enhancing early warning systems will allow us to prevent conflicts before they escalate, while collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) will facilitate a unified approach to conflict resolution. Additionally, promoting good governance and creating economic opportunities will help alleviate some of the underlying instabilities. Engaging with arms-exporting countries to curb the illicit flow of weapons into Africa will also be crucial in reducing the factors contributing to ongoing conflicts. Through these comprehensive measures, I aim to foster long-term stability and peace across the continent.
Q. What do you believe to be the biggest challenges and opportunities for good governance and democracy on the continent at this historical moment?
The current global landscape, characterized by crises, great power tensions, and the rise of middle powers, presents significant challenges to good governance and democracy in Africa, often exacerbating existing security issues and turning parts of the continent into arenas for geopolitical rivalry. Key challenges include external interference, corruption, and weak institutions, which can undermine democratic processes. However, this situation also presents opportunities for the AU to play a pivotal role in conflict resolution by acting as a mediator and facilitator of dialogue among conflicting parties while promoting regional cooperation and stability. Strengthening the AU’s Peace and Security Council and enhancing collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) can create a unified response to these challenges. By prioritizing accountability, transparency, and public participation, the AU can empower citizens and reinforce democratic governance. Leveraging Africa’s rich diversity, youth population, and emerging technologies can further foster innovative solutions to governance challenges, positioning the AU as a leader in addressing both immediate security threats and promoting sustainable democracy across the continent.
To promote democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights across the continent, I will prioritize strengthening the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to ensure that all member states adhere to established standards of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. This will involve regular reviews and consistent engagement with national governments to uphold these principles while holding them accountable for their commitments. Additionally, I will focus on empowering civil society and youth organizations, ensuring they have a significant voice in governance and play an active role in holding governments accountable. By fostering an environment of increased transparency and accountability, and by reinforcing rule of law institutions, we can combat corruption and fight impunity, ultimately ensuring that all African citizens benefit from fair governance and democratic practices.
PARTNERSHIP:
Q. How do you plan to enhance collaboration between the AU & the RECs?
To enhance collaboration between the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), I will prioritize the establishment of clear frameworks for communication and coordination, ensuring that both entities align their strategies and objectives. This involves regular consultations and joint meetings to foster a shared understanding of regional challenges and opportunities. I will advocate for integrating REC initiatives into the AU’s broader agenda, promoting a more cohesive approach to development and security across the continent. Additionally, by leveraging the unique strengths of each REC, we can enhance resource mobilization and facilitate cross-border projects that address common priorities. This collaborative effort will ensure that the AU and RECs work synergistically to drive regional integration and achieve sustainable development goals.
Q. With the AU now being a member of the G20, vying for representation at the UNSC, how will you advocate for Africa’s representation in the global arena and enhance the AU’s relationships with global powers and multilateral institutions?
Africa’s voice needs to be stronger in global decision-making platforms like the G20 and the UN. I will advocate for Africa’s representation in the UN Security Council and work to strengthen partnerships with global powers and multilateral institutions. By positioning Africa as a united, strategic partner, we can ensure that our priorities are reflected in global policies.
To strengthen the African Union’s (AU) role on the global stage and enhance African unity, I will prioritize a multi-faceted approach centered on strategic diplomacy, collective action, and economic integration. Firstly, I will advocate for a unified African voice in international forums, ensuring that the continent’s interests and perspectives are prominently represented. This includes enhancing collaboration with global partners to address critical issues such as climate change, health security, and trade. Secondly, I will promote initiatives that deepen regional integration, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which will not only boost intra-African trade but also enhance our bargaining power internationally. Furthermore, I will facilitate platforms for dialogue among member states, fostering collaboration and solidarity on common challenges, thereby reinforcing a sense of African identity and purpose. By strengthening our collective capacity and promoting shared values, we can position the AU as a formidable player in global governance and advance the cause of African unity.
Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security
Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security
Date | 31 October 2024
Tomorrow (1 November) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1243rd session focusing on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in Africa as part of its annual thematic session on YPS, as an open session.
Following opening remarks from Jean Leon Ngandu Ilunga the Permanent Representative of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. The AU Commission Youth Envoy, Chido Mpemba, and the five African Union Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAPs) are expected to brief the PSC. The agenda of the session also anticipates statements from representatives from the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU) and the European Union Delegation to the AU.
This session falls on Africa Youth Day. The African Youth Charter adopted in 2006 proclaimed the 1st of November as Africa Youth Day. The session is being held parallel to the 2024 Pan African Youth Forum, under the theme ‘1 Million Next Level is Knocking: Educate an African Fit for the 21st Century,’ taking place from 1 to 4 November 2024, in Oran, Algeria.
It is to be recalled that, the PSC during its 933rd meeting adopted the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security and underscored ‘the necessity of implementation across the five overarching priorities areas – participation, prevention, protection, partnership and coordination.’ Following the finalisation and adoption of the 10-Year Implementation Plan for the CFYPS 2020-2029, the framework is currently in its 6th year of implementation. The CFYPS advocates for the active participation of young people in all spectrums of peace and security areas at the national, regional and international levels. The framework envisions the mainstreaming of crosscutting issues, including gender, capacity development, communication, inclusivity and knowledge management and up-scaling of the contributions of youth to peace and security in Africa.
The last time PSC held a substantive session on the YPS agenda was on 3 November 2023 at its 1183rd meeting. The PSC during that meeting, among others, emphasised the need for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive assessment of implementing the continental framework for youth peace and security, identifying challenges and providing recommendations for the way forward. Tomorrow’s session may present an opportunity for the Council to follow up on the progress made in undertaking the assessment of the framework.
Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to provide a recap of the developments on the agenda of the youth, peace and security, since its last convening. Following the commencement of the mandate of the 3rd Cohort of the AYAPs after the endorsement of the new AYAPs by the AU summit in February 2024, the AU Commission held an induction for the AYAPs in May 2024. Not long after that, the Youth Ambassadors for Peace of each region embarked on holding regional consultations on youth peace and security and the New Agenda for Peace. Following the regional consultations, a continental consultation was held in Lusaka, Zambia. A major outcome of these consultations was the elaboration of a report articulating issues affecting youth in the various regions of the continent and their vision of how best to pursue the New Agenda for Peace through and in advancing the YPS agenda. The most recent interaction of the PSC with the AYAPs was on the sidelines of the annual consultative meeting with the UNSC, during which the AYAPS shared the report of the five regional consultations and the continental consultation they undertook on the New Agenda for Peace and Youth in Africa.
It is expected that AYAPs members will share their reflections on activities conducted in their regions so far. This will include efforts to promote the adoption of national action plans, insights from their involvement in the YPS agenda, and areas for enhancing the effective implementation of the YPS agenda, particularly regarding AYAP’s role. Additionally, they’ll highlight significant collective actions, such as their collaboration with Burundi in adopting the Bujumbura Declaration and their engagement in the lead-up to COP29 to be held from 11 November in Azerbaijan.
In addition, from the Communique adopted during the 1183rd session, one of the actions underscored as critical components for advancing the YPS agenda on the continent was ‘the need for the AU Commission to institutionalise the inclusion of the youth, particularly the AYAPs and WiseYouth Network, in preventive diplomacy missions and AU Election Observer Missions.’ In this regard, the 3rd Cohort of the AYAPs has undertaken at least 5 election observation missions in their regions, particularly in Tunisia, Mauritius, Rwanda, Mozambique and the late one in Botswana. The session is also expected to have discussions on the completion of the Guidelines for the Development and Implementation of NAPS for the AU Continental Framework on YPS, as mentioned in the 933rd communique. The PSC ‘requested the Commission to develop a Guideline that would assist Member States to accelerate their efforts to develop the National Action Plans (NAPS).’ This call was further reiterated by the Council also still at its 1183rd Meeting on the Open Session of YPS in November 2023, requesting for this process to be accelerated and the guideline finalised. In response, the Youth for Peace (Y4P) Africa Programme convened an expert review and validation meeting on the draft guidelines for the development and implementation of NAPS for the CFYPS. However, the report of the exercise is not yet public, although it is expected that the AU PSC Committee of Experts will convene for its consideration, prior to its submission to the permanent representatives, for adoption. Over the past year, there has been a notable surge in interest and progress among member states in supporting and initiating the development of the NAPs for YPS. Benin, Ethiopia, and Liberia have recently embarked on the process of developing their NAPs. Meanwhile, countries like Zimbabwe and The Gambia are set to launch their completed NAPs, underscoring a growing commitment across the continent to the YPS agenda.
Another development expected to receive attention is the operationalisation of the WiseYouth, established by the decision Assembly/AU/Dec.815(XXXV) of the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in February 2022. This subsidiary mechanism of the Panel of the Wise aims to foster focused and strategic youth engagement in conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. From May to June 2024, an open call for applications was made for membership to the WiseYouth Network. By August 2024, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and the Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace), twenty competent youth leaders (four per region, ensuring gender parity) were selected to form the 1st Cohort of the Network for a three-year non-renewable mandate. This was followed by Orientation and Training on Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy at the AU Commission held at the AU Commission recently. The network’s key engagements focus on empowering youth for active roles in conflict prevention, mediation and peace processes by enhancing their capacities and facilitating intergenerational exchanges with seasoned mediation practitioners, including the Panel of the Wise and its related networks (PanWise and FemWise-Africa Networks). It aims to build strategic partnerships to bolster youth-led peace efforts at regional and national levels, while also creating and utilising opportunities for network members to lead and support mediation, dialogue and peace initiatives across the continent.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is likely to commend the significant efforts by the AU, Member States and the RECs/RMs in putting in place institutional avenues for ensuring meaningful youth participation and inclusion in peace and security processes. It may commend the speed with which steps were taken to get 3rd cohort of AYAPs initiate and engage in activities for advancing the YPS agenda. It may also welcome the operationalisation of the WiseYouth. The Council may encourage Member States and RECs/RMs to intensify their efforts to promote youth as partners in enhancing peace, security and stability across the continent, including through the development and implementation of NAPs on the YPS agenda. In this regard, the PSC may also welcome the report of the AYAPs from the consultations they held and encourage the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, Member States and other stakeholders, to support the outcome and recommendations of the ‘African Youth Perspectives on the New Agenda for Peace’ to ensure that the challenges faced by African youth and their contributions to peace and security remain part of the global dialogue. The PSC is also expected to encourage the acceleration of the adoption of the ‘Guideline for the Development of NAPs on YPS,’ and furthermore, to work together with its stakeholders to strengthen the popularisation of the Guideline at all levels and promote its utilisation by Member States and other stakeholders, toward the development and implementation of comprehensive youth-centred NAPs. Council may also applaud Member States which have already signed, ratified and domesticated the African Youth Charter; and those who have developed or begun development of their respective NAPs on YPS, and in this regard encourage those Member States, which are yet to do so, to do the same. The Council may also remind member states of the need to ensure the meaningful and inclusive representation of young people at different levels of government and decision-making processes as well as resourcing youth-led and youth-focused peace and security initiatives. The Council is also likely to highlight the imperative for the AU, RECs/RMs, Member States and multi-lateral institutions to provide more practical opportunities and training to youth to engage in these fields at national, regional and continental levels. This includes through advocating for their deployment and inclusion in formal African peace processes taking place at all levels in order to strengthen youth capacity and experience in mediation, dialogue and preventive diplomacy. The PSC may underscore the need for the AU to press further in its efforts to reach more youth, through continuous sensitisation of its work and programmes, in order to bridge the gap between the youth and the AU. Finally, the PSC may highlight the need for the AU PSC Open Session on YPS to be open for facilitating representation of the diversity of African youth, cognizant of the fact that Africa youth have diverse social, cultural, historical, political, educational and economic backgrounds.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for November 2024
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for November 2024
Date | November 2024
In November, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). This is the first time that the DRC will be at the helm of steering AU’s highest standing peace and security policy making organ.
The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month, envisages seven substantive sessions. Except for one session that focuses on Libya, all sessions are dedicated to thematic issues. One of the sessions that may take the form of a seminar is envisaged to take place in Kinshasa, DRC. The PPoW also envisages holding the 16th Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods from 5 to 6 November in Djibouti, which previously hosted the 5th PSC retreat on its working methods from 9 to 10 February 2013. The PSC will also host the 15th consultative meeting with the European Union’s Peace and Security Committee. Except for one session that will be held at ministerial level, all sessions are expected to take place at ambassadorial level.
While some of the activities including the session on Libya draw on the annual indicative program of work and the proposal from the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the DRC is responsible for crafting the agenda of at least four of the sessions. One theme that seems to run through the agenda items of the PPoW is the deliberate attempt at putting a spotlight on some of the key tools and elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture.
On 1 November the PSC holds its first session on the customary annual thematic agenda scheduled for November, namely youth, peace, and security. It was in November 2018 that the PSC decided to hold a session on youth, peace and security on an annual basis. This year marks the 5th year since the establishment of this agenda as a standing agenda in the indicative annual program of work of the PSC. The previous session emphasised the need for the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive assessment of implementing the continental framework for youth peace and security, identifying challenges and providing recommendations for the way forward. This session may present an opportunity for the Council to follow up on the progress made in undertaking the assessment of the framework. A development that may also be of interest for this session is the appointment of the new cohort of AU Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAPs) and the 1st cohort of the AU network of African Youth on conflict prevention and mediation, WiseYouth representing the five regions of Africa. The most recent interaction of the PSC with the AYAPs was on the sidelines of the annual consultative meeting with the UNSC, during which the AYAPS shared the report of the five regional consultations and the continental consultation they undertook on the New Agenda for Peace and Youth in Africa.
The PSC will travel on 4 November to Djibouti for the 16th retreat on its working methods scheduled to take place on 5-6 November. Some of the working methods issues that are expected to feature during the retreat include ways of addressing denialism that impedes engagement of the PSC including it being seized with new situations, the increasing dominance of national interest in agenda setting and decision-making, lack of follow-up and implementation of PSC decisions, negotiation over draft outcomes of PSC sessions through the silencing procedure and the mismatch between the expanding workload of the PSC and the technical capacity for backstopping the workload which affects at times logistical issues such as timely circulation of working documents.
On 11 November, the PSC is scheduled to have its second session dedicated to the theme of ‘Challenges and Lessons Learned in Strengthening Mediation Efforts to Resolve Conflicts in Africa.’ Mediation is one of, if not, the most important tools in the AU peace and security toolbox for peacemaking after the eruption of conflicts/crises. To this end, it has put in place various mediation arrangements including the creative High-level Panels leveraging the influence and gravitas of former statespersons and/or senior diplomats, special Representatives/Special Envoys of the AU Commission Chairperson and ad hoc committees of leaders of member states. It has also put in place a mediation unit as part of the AU Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security. During the past two decades, the AU has deployed on its own or in coordination with RECs/RMs and the UN from Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa to Burundi in the Great Lakes and still carries mediation in various settings. While some of the mediation processes have registered success, in other instances they have run into challenges. Some mediation processes run into difficulty due to a lack of mediation strategy and/or technical infrastructure critical to their effective functioning as well as poor recording of lessons learned from various mediation processes. AU mediation also at times has fallen victim due to the absence of robust and factually grounded conflict analysis for informing mediation processes and the proliferation of mediation processes, leading to fragmentation. At times, mediators lack the skills and temperament to establish trust on the part of all parties and to mobilise solid political consensus and diplomatic and other support from AU member states. Currently, the AU runs mediation processes in Sudan through the AU high-level panel and in Eastern DRC through the Luanda process. As such, in addition to interrogating these various issues affecting AU mediation, this session also affords an opportunity to examine how the changing nature of conflicts involving the surge of terrorist groups and geopolitical tensions affect mediation and why AU is not deploying or late in deploying mediation in some conflict situations, particularly in conflicts implicating the involvement of member states. It is expected that based on such reflection, the session will help outline how to strengthen and upscale the effectiveness of mediation in view of the increase in conflicts on the continent.
On 12 November, the Council will hold its first and only country-specific session for the month to consider the situation in Libya. In 2024, the PSC has shown limited engagement with Libya compared to previous years. While the PSC held two sessions on Libya in 2023, this is the first and perhaps the only session. However, the AU ad hoc committee of heads of state and government on Libya, chaired by Congo, held a summit-level meeting on Libya on 5 February 2024, in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo in preparation for the launch of the national reconciliation process anticipated to be convened on 28 April 2024 in Sirt, Libya. In 2022, the PSC proposed a field mission to Libya, which could have facilitated more tangible engagement, but this plan was never implemented. Some decisions that the Council may address during the session include the relocation of the AU Liaison Office (AULO). An assessment mission was conducted in 2023 to evaluate the technical and logistical aspects of the relocation, leading to the adoption of a roadmap to expedite the process. Another key focus may be transitional justice within the reconciliation process, the proposed reconciliation conference, and plans to hold general elections through the formation of the 6+6 Joint Committee, which aims to establish an electoral framework for the elections.
While the AU has played a marginal role in the Libya peace process with the UN and European actors taking the lead, it has shown interest in facilitating a national reconciliation process. Earlier plans for the convening of this AU-facilitated national reconciliation conference, such as the one slated for 28 April 2024, failed to materialise for various reasons, including disagreement between the two rival governments. In apparent attempt to resuscitate the national reconciliation conference, the AU undertook a mission to Libya from 8-11 October led by the current AU Chairperson, Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ghzouani accompanied by AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat and a representative of Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of Congo, Chairperson of the High-Level Committee of Heads of State Government of the AU on Libya. In her address to the UN Security Council on 9 October 2024, Officer in Charge/Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Libya Stephanie Koury, pointed out that the national reconciliation process remains stalled due to lack of consensus. The session slated for 12 November offers the platform for getting updates on the outcome of this mission to Libya and whether any progress made for realising the call of the February 2024 summit of the AU Committee of Heads of State and Government on Libya for the Libyan ‘Presidential Council to establish as soon as possible the National Commission for Reconciliation.’
The next session of the PSC is scheduled for 15 November and will be on the theme of ‘Comparative review of the functioning of the UNSC Sanctions Committee and PSC Sanctions Sub-committee.’ This session draws attention to yet another tool in the peace and security toolbox of the AU, whose use is generally confined to situations of unconstitutional changes of government. In proposing this session, a key part of the plan is to prob AU’s extant norm on sanctions and the experience of the continental body in using investigation into (and sanctioning) for punishing acts of a state violating AU member states community norms. This session also aims at learning lessons from the best practices of the UN in terms of the process that is followed for investigating and determining violations and imposing sanctions against such violations as well as the mechanisms that are used for monitoring and enforcing such sanctions with a view to tailor processes and mechanisms adapted to the needs and realities of the AU. Considering that currently the focus of the AU sanction regime is on unconstitutional changes of government, expanding the scope of the sanctions regime to cover breaches of other AU norms is expected to attract some attention during the session.
On 19 November, the PSC will hold its session on the theme of the ‘Implementation of the DDR and PCRD Programmes for the Consolidation of Peace, Security, and Socio-Economic Activities: Challenges and Way Forward.’ While some success was registered in implementing DDR and peacebuilding in pursuit of peace agreements in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi, in other cases such as Central African Republic, DRC and South Sudan lack of effective implementation of DDR processes has impeded peace processes and, in some cases, threatened relapse of some of these countries back to conflicts. This is one of the themes advanced by DRC that aims at probing the experience from these and various other settings in Africa in DDR and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) programmes, including AU’s role in facilitating such programmes and the lessons from these experiences. Of particular interest for this session is how to go beyond the signing of ceasefire agreements or peace agreements with a security component and advance implementation of DDR and PCRD measures to prevent risks of relapse of post-conflict countries back to conflict. The session also offers an opportune platform to put a spotlight on the role of AU’s PCRD policy and lessons from AU’s experience in initiating and implementing PCRD programmes. It is expected that, among others, the UN Peacebuilding Commission will present a briefing during this session which may be held in the form of a seminar. Envisaged to be convened in Kinshasa, the DRC, this event is also expected to facilitate engagement between the PSC and various Congolese stakeholders including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, relevant Committees of the Parliament and members of Civil Society as well as the media.
On 22 November, the Council will hold its 15th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and EU PSC in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. For two consecutive years, the two Councils have struggled to adopt a joint communique capturing the outcome of their deliberations due to a lack of agreement on one issue that emerged in 2022. The centre of contention has been on the inclusion of a language on the war in Ukraine. Understandably, member states of the EU feel strongly about what may be considered to be the first major war in Europe since World War II. While AU member states may share the view that the invasion of one country by another and the breach of the sovereignty of one country by another is contrary to the UN Charter and international law and don’t support the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, they lack a common AU position to enable the PSC on adopting any measure against this particular breach of international law. While the position of the reluctance of AU member states on joining the AU and others in taking measures against Russia is informed by various considerations, one of the major factors is the belief on the part of many member states that this war is in the main a geopolitical war reminiscent of the cold war. Since the Cold War was not actually cold when it played itself on the African continent but led to hot wars, there are many who are weary of being caught up in the crossfire of confrontation between major powers. However, aside from the issue of Ukraine, the two Councils share common interests in many peace and security matters. The last session focused on various regions, including the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). During this year’s meeting, the Councils are likely to also address these and various other files. These include addressing critical country files that are high on the agendas of both the AU and EU, such as the Sahel region, Sudan due to ongoing escalations in conflict, and Somalia with a focus on the transition from the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
The next session of the PSC, slated for 26 November, will be a briefing on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook. This follows the previous session of the PSC in April 2024, which underscored the ‘imperative of a robust and fully functional Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts and expressed concern about challenges to conflict prevention. In light of the focus of DRC’s chairship of the PSC for the month on interrogating the state of the efficacy of various AU tools and structures for conflict prevention, management and resolution, this session presents another opportunity to deliberate on the institutional and political challenges militating against the CEWS and the inability of mobilising early action up on being cognizant of early warning signs and engaging in conflict prevention proactively including through the deployment of preventive diplomacy.
Building on the language agreed to in the joint communique of the 18th Annual Consultative meeting between the AU PSC and UNSC, the Council on 28 November will hold a ‘Discussion on enhancing mechanisms for curbing illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups in Africa.’ While the conversation in New York primarily centred on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it is clear that the role of exploitation of natural resources in conflicts is a pervasive issue affecting many regions across the continent, including in the Sahel, Sudan, DRC, and Mozambique. This session presents an opportunity for the Council to have a focused engagement on this issue and identify how extraction of minerals and other natural resources is used for financing conflicts, the channels used for illicit trade in such resources and the web of actors involved in creating a war economy centred on natural resources. While this session may not lead to the adoption of specific policy outcomes, it can serve as an opportunity for identifying the elements of the policy issues in respect of which the PSC may develop comprehensive strategy and specific policy action tailored to specific conflict situations.
On 28 November, the PSC will hold its ministerial level and the last session of the month. Expected to build on insights from the various sessions held during the course of the month, this session will be held under the title ‘Discussion on experiences and lessons learned in the implementation of PSC mandate in line with the AU Constitutive Act and PSC Protocol.’ Apart from reflecting on the implementation of the PSC mandate in general, this session may focus particularly on whether and why the PSC and the AU as a whole struggle to engage in tensions between AU member states and in upholding some of the fundamental principles of the AU that become threatened in the context of inter-state tensions and conflicts. The goal is to ensure that the Council and member states recommit to the key principles outlined in the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC protocol.
In addition to the foregoing activities, the PPoW envisages in the footnote the participation of the Chairperson of the PSC in COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan from 13 to 16 November. Depending on the outcome of the UN Security Council Meeting on the report of the UN Secretary-General on Somalia and ATMIS, the PSC may also hold a session on this file.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - September 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - September 2024
Date | September 2024
In September 2024, the Republic of Cameroon chaired the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month. The initial Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) envisaged five substantive PSC sessions and two field missions. After one revision of the programme of work, the Council held three substantive sessions with four agenda items and two field visits.
Briefing on Women, Peace and Security Interlinkage
Briefing on Women, Peace and Security Interlinkage
Date | 30 October 2024
Tomorrow (31 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an open session on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). This session, marking the 1242nd meeting of the PSC, is being held in the context of the 24th anniversary of Resolution 1325, adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) on 31 October 2000.
Following opening remarks by Mohamed Gad, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye and AU Special Envoy on WPS, Bineta Diop are expected to make statements. Statements are also expected from representatives of UN Women, the European Union delegation to the AU, the Representative of Switzerland and the Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF).
Since institutionalising WPS as part of its annual agenda item in line with the decision of its 223rd session held in 2010, the PSC has regularised the convening of annual meetings to commemorate UNSC resolution 1325. In addition to serving as a platform for following up on the progress and challenges of implementation of resolution 1325 in Africa, these meetings have served the PSC to reflect on a range of issues that affect women in conflict and crisis settings.
The last time the PSC discussed the WPS agenda was in March 2024 when it convened a high-level ministerial seminar on WPS with the participation of the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention (FemWise-Africa) and its regional chapters, African Women Leaders Network (AWLN), Pan African Women’s Organisation (PAWO), as well as representatives of the UN and partners, including African Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and think tanks. Participants of the high-level ministerial seminar, acknowledging the WPS agenda would benefit from a continued engagement with diverse stakeholders, agreed to institutionalise the biennial seminar, to be formally called the Swakompund process, as a platform for the PSC to engage with local, national, regional and continental actors.
It is expected that tomorrow’s session will give a special focus to women’s involvement in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). AU-led PSOs cover a wide array of tasks aimed at stabilising conflict areas, supporting peace processes, and long-term security and governance. Women’s involvement in PSOs contributes to the multidimensional goals of these operations, which range from facilitating political processes and security sector reform to protecting civilians and promoting human rights. Yet, despite established frameworks and initiatives, women remain grossly underrepresented in peacekeeping forces across Africa, suggesting a need for continued advocacy and measurable action to bridge this gap.
One of the measures that has been taken to implement the WPS agenda is the development of National Action Plans (NAPs). Though several member states have developed national and regional action plans (RAPs), many N/RAPs were created with technical and financial support from the UN and bilateral donors. While this external support has been beneficial, there is a need for African states to take greater ownership of the process through sustainable, internal financing mechanisms set up for the WPS agenda. Sustainable and well-targeted funding is critical to translating commitments of resolution 1325 into concrete actions that empower women as agents of peace. The development of a robust accountability framework to monitor the use of financial resources allocated to the WPS agenda would ensure transparency and effectiveness in the implementation of R/NAPs.
The PSC in its 987th communiqué had reaffirmed the importance of including women in PSOs and required PSOs to adhere to AU and global frameworks for rights and equality such as that of WPS. Women’s participation is essential not only for inclusivity but also to ensure the operational effectiveness of PSOs. Women peacekeepers are often deployed in roles that increase community engagement and trust such as interacting with local women and children and addressing issues of sexual violence in conflict zones. For instance, in Darfur, female peacekeepers have received higher levels of trust from local women reporting cases of harassment or violence. This has enabled adjustments in PSO strategies, like modifying patrols to enhance community safety. Similarly, Nigerian female police units deployed to Liberia in 2007 contributed to reductions in gender-based violence and improved community cooperation, further underscoring the operational value of women’s involvement.
While some countries, like Ghana and Liberia, have shown modest progress in increasing female representation in peacekeeping forces, the lack of enforcement and accountability frameworks has allowed member states to overlook gender quotas in PSO deployment. One of the key outcomes highlighted in the conclusions of the High-level ministerial seminar was the importance of adopting a gender parity policy that would ensure the appointment of mediators, technical experts, special envoys and others relevant to the facilitation of formal peace processes would take into account the meaningful inclusion of women. The PSC had also called for the AUC to develop a policy framework of quotas for women’s participation in all conflict prevention and management missions, peace processes and election observation missions led by the AU, with a mechanism for tracking and monitoring implementation. It is expected that tomorrow’s session may deliberate on setting gender quotas in PSO deployments and require gender-disaggregated data of deployments for greater transparency of a more inclusive and effective peacekeeping model.
The recent adoption of UNSCR 2719 marks a critical juncture in the nature of PSOs in Africa. This change underscores the need to refocus on the WPS agenda, with an emphasis on actionable strategies for increasing women’s participation and leadership in peace support missions. Tomorrow’s session is expected to reflect on the enduring barriers to women’s engagement in PSOs and highlight the roles of women as essential for sustainable peace in Africa.
The expected outcome of this session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will highlight the crucial role of women in the promotion of peace and security and commend the progress made in promoting women’s participation and leadership in PSOs. The session will likely call on member states who are yet to do so, to domesticate Resolution 1325 (2000) and urge for its full implementation at national and regional levels, emphasising the importance of adopting a gendered perspective for women’s involvement in peace processes, as well as the development of capacity-building programs that provide women with the skills necessary to lead in peacebuilding efforts. The Council may also condemn the violence perpetrated against women during conflicts and call for zero tolerance for sexual and gender-based violence against women. The session may also deliberate on plans for the next high-level ministerial seminar under the Swakopmund process.
