Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the operations of AUSSOM
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the operations of AUSSOM
Date | 11 February 2026
Tomorrow (12 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1330th session at ministerial level to receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), as one of its agenda items.
Badr Abdelatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Chairperson of the PSC for February, will deliver opening remarks, followed by an introductory statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Statements are expected from the representatives of Somalia, as the concerned state, and Djibouti in its capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as from the representatives of the League of Arab States and the United Nations (UN). The representatives of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are also expected to deliver statements.
The consideration of Somalia and Sudan under a single session may signal a deliberate effort to frame the discussion around the growing risk of state fragmentation in the Horn of Africa and its broader implications for regional peace and stability. The ministerial session will also discuss progress in the operationalisation of AUSSOM, the challenges it continues to face, and ways forward. The discussions on AUSSOM are likely to build on PSC’s 1317th session held on 15 December 2025 and the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted to that session.
Tomorrow’s session is also likely to situate the discussion within the context of the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, particularly following Israel’s recognition of the self-declared region of Somaliland in December, as well as the increasingly visible rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
On 26 December 2025, Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland—a move that was strongly rejected by many states and regional and international organisations, including the AU and the League of Arab States. Beyond its legal and political ramifications, the decision has intensified regional geopolitical tensions. Emerging alignments among external and regional actors appear to be taking shape, with potentially serious consequences for peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, Djibouti, and several other states firmly opposed the recognition. By contrast, the UAE— the first Arab state to formally sign the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020—is widely perceived as having facilitated Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.
Against this backdrop, on 12 January, the Federal Government of Somalia terminated all agreements with the UAE relating to port operations, government institutions, and security and defence cooperation. This decision followed Somaliland’s recognition by Israel and the transit of a pro-UAE separatist figure from Yemen through Somali airspace without Mogadishu’s knowledge. Meanwhile, Israel’s Foreign Minister visited Somaliland in January to consolidate relations, while Somaliland authorities publicly expressed expectations of concluding a trade deal with Israel and indicated willingness to grant access to valuable mineral resources as part of a broader arrangement.
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has been simmering for some time and has become more pronounced amid divergences over developments in Yemen, now appears to be drawing countries of the Horn of Africa more directly into its orbit. In this context, Somalia risks becoming an arena within a wider geopolitical contest. The emerging alignment around Saudi Arabia appears particularly opposed to the normalisation of parallel political entities that undermine state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It is recalled that the PSC convened its 1324th ministerial session on 6 January, dedicated to the preservation of Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and stability. The Communiqué adopted at that session strongly condemned and rejected Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland and called for its immediate revocation. The PSC further emphasised that such a declaration is null and void and without legal effect under international law, warning that it risks undermining peace and stability on the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa.
Tomorrow’s ministerial session will therefore be confronted with the challenge of how to mitigate the growing risks posed by intensifying regional rivalries as they play out in Somalia. These external pressures are compounded by Somalia’s internal political and security challenges, especially as the current government mandates are set to expire in May 2026. Persistent disagreements over electoral models and proposed constitutional amendments—both among Somali political actors and between the Federal Government and some of the Federal Member States, notably Puntland and Jubaland—remain unresolved.
In December, district council elections were conducted peacefully in the Banadir region, including Mogadishu, marking the first implementation of direct elections in the capital in over five decades. This development aligns with the Federal Government’s stated objective of transitioning to a nationwide one-person, one-vote electoral model. However, while the Government has reiterated its intention to extend district elections to Federal Member State capitals and secondary cities, opposition leaders, along with the authorities in Puntland and Jubaland, continue to reject a shift toward direct elections and any extension of the current government’s mandate beyond May. In the absence of inclusive dialogue with Mogadishu, they have threatened to proceed with their own electoral processes, further heightening political uncertainty. Meanwhile, the Presidents of Puntland and Jubaland arrived in Mogadishu on 10 February for high-level talks on contentious issues, including the upcoming elections.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s discussions is expected to be AUSSOM. At its last session, held on 15 December, the PSC considered the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, which highlighted progress and challenges in the implementation of AUSSOM’s mandate during the period from July to December 2025 and outlined three options regarding the future of the Mission.
AUSSOM continues to face a range of serious complications. First, the Mission has been unable to secure multi-year, predictable, and adequate financing, despite the AU’s efforts to convince the UN Security Council to activate its Resolution 2719 for AUSSOM. Troops have gone extended periods without receiving stipends, likely to affect morale and operational readiness, while compelling troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to subsidise the Mission—an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable. The estimated budget for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 stands at approximately USD 190 million, in addition to substantial financial liabilities inherited from ATMIS, including unpaid troop allowances and outstanding reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment (COE). While there are indications that the European Union (EU) may commit to covering up to 85 per cent of troop stipends, the sustainability of this support, as well as the availability of additional funding to address the remaining budget gap, remains uncertain. PSC members are therefore likely to seek clarification on the status of the disbursement of the USD 20 million allocated by the AU for the Mission, as a follow-up to its 1317th session, which directed the Commission to fast-track the release of these funds and report on their implementation at the subsequent meeting.
A second major complication arises from the United Nations’ liquidity crisis and its implications for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which is funded through the UN peacekeeping assessed budget and mandated to provide logistical and related support to AUSSOM. UNSOS has faced a 25 per cent budget reduction—approximately USD 130 million—from its approved USD 520 million budget for the current financial year (June 2025 to July 2026). This reduction is expected to have significant repercussions for AUSSOM’s core operational capabilities, particularly aviation support, COE management, force sustainment, and broader logistical support.
Operational challenges have also emerged in relation to troop realignment. The transition of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was expected to be completed by the end of June 2025 and required the repatriation of Burundian forces alongside the deployment of Egyptian troops. Pending the latter’s deployment, the PSC has been compelled to suspend the repatriation of Burundian contingents. The Chair of the PSC for the month may brief the Council on progress toward deployment, including the technical assessment conducted in August 2025 in preparation for deployment planning, as well as updates on AU-UN coordination efforts. Meanwhile, uncertainty over the future of the mission has been further compounded by a public statement posted on 26 January by Uganda’s army chief, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, indicating an intention to withdraw Ugandan forces from Somalia after 19 years of engagement. Although it remains unclear whether this reflects official government policy, the statement underscores growing uncertainty surrounding the Mission’s future.
Against this backdrop of financial, logistical, operational, and political constraints, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in his report to the 1317th session, outlined three options for the PSC’s strategic consideration regarding the future of AUSSOM.
The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions, resulting in the continued accumulation of deficits with no certainty regarding resource predictability. The second option entails transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.
Rather than providing immediate strategic direction, the PSC requested the Commission to submit a more detailed report on the proposed options, including their implications for the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations. The Council also requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of AUSSOM TCCs and PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces to deliberate on the three options and submit their recommendations for the PSC’s consideration. As highlighted above, the financial, logistical, operational, and political challenges confronting the Mission have reached a critical point, requiring serious consideration of the options proposed by the Chairperson of the Commission. Tomorrow’s engagement is therefore expected to follow up on PSC’s request for a detailed report by the Commission on these options.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to reiterate its condemnation of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and reaffirm its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Somalia. It may further urge Member States and international partners to refrain from any action that undermines Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The PSC may also express its concern over the geopolitical competition among regional and global powers in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and its potential in turning Somalia into a geopolitical theatre with serious repercussions to its peace and security. It may reiterate its call on the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and political actors to engage in an inclusive political dialogue to address outstanding issues on the election model and constitutional amendments and the importance of such dialogue for the conduct of a credible election. In this connection, the PSC may welcome the high-level talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States on the upcoming elections. On AUSSOM, the PSC is expected to follow up on its request for a detailed report on the three options outlined by the Chairperson of the Commission on the future of the mission, based on consultations with the TCCs/PCCs, and to provide strategic guidance on the way forward.
LE SOUDAN: UNE TRAGÉDIE AFRICAINE QUI EXIGE UN SURSAUT COLLECTIF
LE SOUDAN: UNE TRAGÉDIE AFRICAINE QUI EXIGE UN SURSAUT COLLECTIF
Date | 10 février 2026
INTRODUCTION
Le Soudan est aujourd’hui l’épicentre de l’un des conflits les plus meurtriers au monde et de l’une de ses pires crises humanitaires. Les chiffres parlent d’eux-mêmes : depuis 2023, plus de 150 000 personnes ont perdu la vie du fait des violences perpétrées par les belligérants et d’autres causes connexes ; environ 7,3 millions ont été nouvellement déplacées à l’intérieur du pays – s’ajoutant aux 2,3 qui l’avaient déjà été avant le déclenchement du conflit actuel, ce qui porte le chiffre total des déplacées à 9,6 millions ; 4,3 millions ont trouvé refuge dans les États voisins; et plus de 30 millions de personnes –soit les deux tiers de la population – dépendent désormais de l’aide humanitaire. Les atrocités commises dépassent l’entendement. La bataille pour le contrôle d’El-Fasher – sa chute aux mains des Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) et les récits insoutenables qui ont suivi – a ravivé les échos les plus sombres d’une tragédie antérieure : la politique de la terre brûlée pratiquée au Darfour en réaction à la rébellion armée qui y éclata en 2003. La crainte est aujourd’hui vive de voir ce qui s’est déroulé dans cette localité se reproduire ailleurs.
The 2026 Elections of the Ten Members of the Peace and Security Council: The Dynamics, Process and Candidates
The 2026 Elections of the Ten Members of the Peace and Security Council: The Dynamics, Process and Candidates
Date | 5 February 2026
INTRODUCTION
30 March 2026 will mark the end of the mandate of 10 members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) who were elected for a two-year term in February 2024 during the 37th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Since the election for the three-year term was held during the 38th AU Assembly in February 2025, the 2026 election of the PSC will be limited to these ten two-year term seats in the Council. Unlike the three-year term seats, which are allocated equally to the five regions of the AU, the regional allocation of the ten two-year term seats is based on the number of states in the different regions at the time of the adoption of the PSC Protocol. Thus, pursuant to the Protocol Establishing the PSC and the Modalities on the Elections of the PSC, the two-year term membership of the PSC is allocated for the five regions as follows: three seats for West Africa, two seats for Central, East and Southern Africa regions, and one seat for North Africa.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for February 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for February 2026
Date | February 2026
The Arab Republic of Egypt will assume the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of February. The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month includes four substantive sessions covering five agenda items. Among the five agenda items, two will cover country-specific situations, two will cover thematic issues, and another session will consider and adopt the ‘Report of the Activities of the PSC and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.’ The country-specific sessions will be convened at the ministerial level, while the thematic sessions will be held at the ambassadorial level. In addition, the PPoW includes two informal consultations – one with Sudan and another with Member States in Political Transition. The 48th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council and the 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly will also be held during this month. A field visit is also planned for the last week of the month. Two meetings will be conducted physically, while two others will take place virtually, with virtual meetings having become part of the norm through practice.
On 3 February, the PSC will convene its first substantive session of the month to consider and adopt the ‘Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.’ The session was initially scheduled for January 2026 but was subsequently postponed. Pursuant to Article 7 (q) of the PSC Protocol and in keeping with established institutional practice, the Council will, following its deliberations, transmit the report to the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, which is scheduled for 14 to 15 February 2026. The report is anticipated to present a consolidated account of the PSC’s undertakings during the reporting period, alongside an analytical appraisal of prevailing trends and developments shaping the continent’s peace and security environment.
On 10 February, the PSC will receive two briefings on the situations in Sudan and Somalia at the ministerial level. The session will begin with a briefing on Sudan, preceded by an informal consultation at the ministerial level, which is expected to feature Sudan’s minister. The briefing follows the PSC’s 1319th session held in December 2025, during which the Council agreed to convene a Ministerial meeting on Sudan on the margins of the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly. During that session, the Council welcomed the establishment of the Quintet—the latest configuration in Sudan’s peace efforts—bringing together five multilateral organisations (the AU, IGAD, the UN, the Arab League, and the EU) with the aim of anchoring the political and civilian peace process under AU leadership. Cognisant of the emergence of a de facto two-pronged peacemaking architecture for Sudan (one focusing on ceasefire or humanitarian truce and the other involving the political/civilian track), the Council also called on members of the Quintet and the Quad to work closely together to ensure greater synergy in mediation efforts. In this context, one of the updates expected in the upcoming briefing concerns the consultative meeting of the Quintet held in Egypt in mid-January and the outcomes of that engagement. The briefing is also expected to provide a platform for the PSC to follow up on its previous decisions, including the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Task Force to coordinate humanitarian efforts, receive the latest updates on the security situation since the December meeting, explore ways to enhance coordination among the various mediation initiatives, and recalibrate the AU’s engagement in support of an inclusive, Sudanese-led political dialogue. It would not also be surprising if the issue of the lifting of Sudan’s suspension would arise, more so on account of the fact that it would be one of the issues that the representative of Sudan may likely raise during the informal consultation.
On the same date, the PSC will also receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia, expectedly with a particular focus on the operation and financing of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). At its last meeting, held on 15 December 2025, the PSC considered the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, which highlighted key developments in Somalia and progress in the implementation of AUSSOM’s mandate during the period from July to December 2025. The report covered, inter alia, progress towards the operationalisation of the mission, as well as the financial and logistical challenges it continues to face. Against the backdrop of the financial, logistical, operational, and political constraints affecting the mission, the Chairperson of the Commission outlined three options for the PSC’s strategic guidance on the future of AUSSOM. During that session, the Council, instead of pronouncing itself on the proposed options, requested the AU Commission to submit a detailed report elaborating on each option, including their implications for the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations. The Council further requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces to deliberate on the three options and submit their recommendations for the Council’s consideration. Of immediate interest for the upcoming ministerial session will be to hear from the AU Commission on the PSC’s request for the Commission to fast-track the immediate release of the allocated funds to AUSSOM and to report on its implementation to the next meeting of the Council.’
After the 39th AU Summit, on 19 February, the PSC will hold an open session on Climate, Peace and Security. The last time the PSC held a session on this subject was at its 1301st session of September 2025, which situated the climate-security engagement firmly within the wider climate change policy framework, thereby eschewing the risk of bifurcation between the climate change policy process and the climate, peace and security policy making. Apart from the impact of climate change induced depletion of scarce natural resources on which people depend for their livelihoods including water and pasture on conflicts in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, discussions are likely to focus on strengthening evidence-based and conflict-sensitive approaches, mobilising adequate and predictable climate finance for adaptation, loss and damage and a just transition, and advancing the integration of climate indicators into early warning and peace and security mechanisms. The session may also provide an update on progress toward the Common African Position (CAP) on Climate, Peace and Security, including ongoing consultations with AU Member States, the African Group of Negotiators and RECs/RMs, as well as its expected alignment with AU climate frameworks and the Paris Agreement – with finalisation now anticipated ahead of COP31.
On 24 February, the PSC will hold a consultation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) on the nexus between food, peace and security. The session aims to deepen the Council’s understanding of how conflict, climate shocks and food insecurity reinforce one another across the continent. While the PSC has previously addressed food insecurity within its humanitarian agenda, it was at its 1083rd session of 9 May 2022 that the Council explicitly dedicated attention to the link between food security and conflict and requested regular briefings by the AU Commission in collaboration with relevant regional institutions. The discussion is additionally expected to build on issues observed in various conflict settings, including the impact of armed conflict on agricultural production, food systems, displacement and market access, as well as on how food assistance, rural development and resilience-building interventions can contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. FAO is expected to provide technical analysis on food security trends and agricultural systems, WFP will draw on operational data from conflict-affected settings where millions depend on emergency food assistance, and IFAD is expected to highlight long-term investments in smallholder livelihoods and rural resilience in fragile contexts. The urgency of this consultation is underscored by ongoing conflicts such as in Sudan, where violence has driven famine in parts of the country, and in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where sustained insecurity has disrupted farming and supply chains, contributing to acute food insecurity affecting tens of millions.
On 25 February, the PSC is expected to have a field visit. However, not much detail is provided at the time of finalising this edition of Insights on the PSC and going to print.
The month will conclude on 27 February with an informal consultation between the Council and Member States currently in political transition, namely Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Sudan. This will be the fifth such consultation since the PSC institutionalised this format within its working methods following its 14th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. Held in accordance with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, the consultations are held to enable direct engagement with representatives of Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. The session will assess progress made and challenges encountered in ongoing transition processes and consider how the PSC can further strengthen its support for the political normalisation of the affected Member States, building on discussions held during the December 2025 session. No formal outcome document is expected.
The PPoW in footnotes also includes the presentation of the Report on the Activities of the PSC for 2025 and the State of Peace and Security in Africa to the AU Assembly. This is expected to happen on 14-15 February during the 39th AU Summit of the Assembly. As per the current practice, Egypt, as Chairperson of the PSSC, will introduce and present a summary followed by a full presentation of the report by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). However and in a commendable working methods improvement, for the first time, the proposed draft agenda of the AU Assembly introduces a different approach that singles out the major conflict situations for a dedicated and focused discussion. These are: a) progress report on the AU mediation in Eastern DRC, b) Situation in Sudan and South Sudan, and c) Situation in the Sahel.
In addition to the foregoing, the PSC’s Committee of Experts (CoE) is scheduled to convene two virtual meetings and one physical meeting during the month. The first virtual meeting, to be held on 5 February, will focus on preparations for the ministerial-level sessions on Sudan and Somalia scheduled for 10 February. The other will be a physical meeting on 20 February to convene the inaugural meeting of the PSC Subcommittee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The final CoE meeting of the month will be held virtually on 23 February and will feature a briefing by the AU Artificial Intelligence Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for February 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for February 2026
Date | February 2026
The Arab Republic of Egypt will assume the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of February. The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month includes four substantive sessions covering five agenda items. Among the five agenda items, two will cover country-specific situations, two will cover thematic issues, and another session will consider and adopt the ‘Report of the Activities of the PSC and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.’ The country-specific sessions will be convened at the ministerial level, while the thematic sessions will be held at the ambassadorial level. In addition, the PPoW includes two informal consultations – one with Sudan and another with Member States in Political Transition. The 48th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council and the 39th Ordinary Session of the Assembly will also be held during this month. A field visit is also planned for the last week of the month. Two meetings will be conducted physically, while two others will take place virtually, with virtual meetings having become part of the norm through practice.
On 3 February, the PSC will convene its first substantive session of the month to consider and adopt the ‘Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.’ The session was initially scheduled for January 2026 but was subsequently postponed. Pursuant to Article 7 (q) of the PSC Protocol and in keeping with established institutional practice, the Council will, following its deliberations, transmit the report to the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, which is scheduled for 14 to 15 February 2026. The report is anticipated to present a consolidated account of the PSC’s undertakings during the reporting period, alongside an analytical appraisal of prevailing trends and developments shaping the continent’s peace and security environment.
On 10 February, the PSC will receive two briefings on the situations in Sudan and Somalia at the ministerial level. The session will begin with a briefing on Sudan, preceded by an informal consultation at the ministerial level, which is expected to feature Sudan’s minister. The briefing follows the PSC’s 1319th session held in December 2025, during which the Council agreed to convene a Ministerial meeting on Sudan on the margins of the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly. During that session, the Council welcomed the establishment of the Quintet—the latest configuration in Sudan’s peace efforts—bringing together five multilateral organisations (the AU, IGAD, the UN, the Arab League, and the EU) with the aim of anchoring the political and civilian peace process under AU leadership. Cognisant of the emergence of a de facto two-pronged peacemaking architecture for Sudan (one focusing on ceasefire or humanitarian truce and the other involving the political/civilian track), the Council also called on members of the Quintet and the Quad to work closely together to ensure greater synergy in mediation efforts. In this context, one of the updates expected in the upcoming briefing concerns the consultative meeting of the Quintet held in Egypt in mid-January and the outcomes of that engagement. The briefing is also expected to provide a platform for the PSC to follow up on its previous decisions, including the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Task Force to coordinate humanitarian efforts, receive the latest updates on the security situation since the December meeting, explore ways to enhance coordination among the various mediation initiatives, and recalibrate the AU’s engagement in support of an inclusive, Sudanese-led political dialogue. It would not also be surprising if the issue of the lifting of Sudan’s suspension would arise, more so on account of the fact that it would be one of the issues that the representative of Sudan may likely raise during the informal consultation.
On the same date, the PSC will also receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia, expectedly with a particular focus on the operation and financing of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). At its last meeting, held on 15 December 2025, the PSC considered the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, which highlighted key developments in Somalia and progress in the implementation of AUSSOM’s mandate during the period from July to December 2025. The report covered, inter alia, progress towards the operationalisation of the mission, as well as the financial and logistical challenges it continues to face. Against the backdrop of the financial, logistical, operational, and political constraints affecting the mission, the Chairperson of the Commission outlined three options for the PSC’s strategic guidance on the future of AUSSOM. During that session, the Council, instead of pronouncing itself on the proposed options, requested the AU Commission to submit a detailed report elaborating on each option, including their implications for the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations. The Council further requested the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces to deliberate on the three options and submit their recommendations for the Council’s consideration. Of immediate interest for the upcoming ministerial session will be to hear from the AU Commission on the PSC’s request for the Commission to fast-track the immediate release of the allocated funds to AUSSOM and to report on its implementation to the next meeting of the Council.’
After the 39th AU Summit, on 19 February, the PSC will hold an open session on Climate, Peace and Security. The last time the PSC held a session on this subject was at its 1301st session of September 2025, which situated the climate-security engagement firmly within the wider climate change policy framework, thereby eschewing the risk of bifurcation between the climate change policy process and the climate, peace and security policy making. Apart from the impact of climate change induced depletion of scarce natural resources on which people depend for their livelihoods including water and pasture on conflicts in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, discussions are likely to focus on strengthening evidence-based and conflict-sensitive approaches, mobilising adequate and predictable climate finance for adaptation, loss and damage and a just transition, and advancing the integration of climate indicators into early warning and peace and security mechanisms. The session may also provide an update on progress toward the Common African Position (CAP) on Climate, Peace and Security, including ongoing consultations with AU Member States, the African Group of Negotiators and RECs/RMs, as well as its expected alignment with AU climate frameworks and the Paris Agreement – with finalisation now anticipated ahead of COP31.
On 24 February, the PSC will hold a consultation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) on the nexus between food, peace and security. The session aims to deepen the Council’s understanding of how conflict, climate shocks and food insecurity reinforce one another across the continent. While the PSC has previously addressed food insecurity within its humanitarian agenda, it was at its 1083rd session of 9 May 2022 that the Council explicitly dedicated attention to the link between food security and conflict and requested regular briefings by the AU Commission in collaboration with relevant regional institutions. The discussion is additionally expected to build on issues observed in various conflict settings, including the impact of armed conflict on agricultural production, food systems, displacement and market access, as well as on how food assistance, rural development and resilience-building interventions can contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. FAO is expected to provide technical analysis on food security trends and agricultural systems, WFP will draw on operational data from conflict-affected settings where millions depend on emergency food assistance, and IFAD is expected to highlight long-term investments in smallholder livelihoods and rural resilience in fragile contexts. The urgency of this consultation is underscored by ongoing conflicts such as in Sudan, where violence has driven famine in parts of the country, and in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where sustained insecurity has disrupted farming and supply chains, contributing to acute food insecurity affecting tens of millions.
On 25 February, the PSC is expected to have a field visit. However, not much detail is provided at the time of finalising this edition of Insights on the PSC and going to print.
The month will conclude on 27 February with an informal consultation between the Council and Member States currently in political transition, namely Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Sudan. This will be the fifth such consultation since the PSC institutionalised this format within its working methods following its 14th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. Held in accordance with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, the consultations are held to enable direct engagement with representatives of Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. The session will assess progress made and challenges encountered in ongoing transition processes and consider how the PSC can further strengthen its support for the political normalisation of the affected Member States, building on discussions held during the December 2025 session. No formal outcome document is expected.
The PPoW in footnotes also includes the presentation of the Report on the Activities of the PSC for 2025 and the State of Peace and Security in Africa to the AU Assembly. This is expected to happen on 14-15 February during the 39th AU Summit of the Assembly. As per the current practice, Egypt, as Chairperson of the PSSC, will introduce and present a summary followed by a full presentation of the report by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). However and in a commendable working methods improvement, for the first time, the proposed draft agenda of the AU Assembly introduces a different approach that singles out the major conflict situations for a dedicated and focused discussion. These are: a) progress report on the AU mediation in Eastern DRC, b) Situation in Sudan and South Sudan, and c) Situation in the Sahel.
In addition to the foregoing, the PSC’s Committee of Experts (CoE) is scheduled to convene two virtual meetings and one physical meeting during the month. The first virtual meeting, to be held on 5 February, will focus on preparations for the ministerial-level sessions on Sudan and Somalia scheduled for 10 February. The other will be a physical meeting on 20 February to convene the inaugural meeting of the PSC Subcommittee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The final CoE meeting of the month will be held virtually on 23 February and will feature a briefing by the AU Artificial Intelligence Advisory Group on Governance, Peace and Security.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - December 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - December 2025
Date | December 2025
In December, under the chairship of Côte d’Ivoire, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled provisional pgramme of work (PPoW) consisting of four substantive sessions covering five agenda items. After the revision of the programme, five sessions were held, covering eight agenda items and an informal consultation with countries in transition, as well as the 12th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa.
Africa’s Multilateral Reckoning: Mediation, Leadership, and Survival in 2026
Africa’s Multilateral Reckoning: Mediation, Leadership, and Survival in 2026
Date | 30 January 2026
Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow at Amani Africa and Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan
Multilateralism has never been an inspiring word. It is procedural, abstract, and emotionally thin. No one rallies under its banner, and no leader wins popularity by defending it. Yet for Africa, multilateralism has never been a luxury of orderly times or a matter of institutional aesthetics. It has been, repeatedly and painfully, a strategy of survival. When collective systems fracture or lose authority, Africa is not a marginal casualty of global disorder; it is among the first and hardest hit.
As the continent enters 2026, this reality confronts Africa’s institutions with unusual force. Across the continent—from Sudan and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo to the Sahel—war is no longer episodic or exceptional. It is increasingly systemic, durable, and profitable. Violence has become a bargaining instrument, fragmentation a political asset, and mediation itself a competitive marketplace. In such conditions, the question confronting Africa’s leaders is no longer abstract: can the continent’s multilateral institutions still exercise authority, or have they become spectators to conflicts they were created to prevent?
This question bears directly on the current leadership of the African Union. There will be no new leadership arriving in 2026. The current leadership, elected in 2025, now confronts its first true test. The coming year will not be a grace period; it will be a reckoning. Africa’s conflicts are deepening, external pressures are intensifying, and the margin for procedural caution is narrowing. The credibility of the present leadership will be judged not by intentions or rhetoric, but by political judgment and action.
Africa enters 2026 institutionally fatigued, politically fragmented, and increasingly exposed to assertive external actors pursuing bilateral advantage at the expense of collective order. The global environment has become harsher: geopolitical rivalry has replaced cooperation, transactional diplomacy has displaced norms, and multilateral restraint is no longer assumed. In this context, the African Union cannot afford leadership that confuses restraint with responsibility or equates neutrality with wisdom.
The challenge before the current leadership is therefore stark. It is not a question of managing institutions, refining processes, or preserving consensus for its own sake. It is a question of whether those at the helm are prepared to exercise authority, take political risks, and defend continental principles when doing so is uncomfortable. Multilateralism, in dark times, is not about convening meetings; it is about drawing lines.
The year 2026 will thus be decisive. If the African Union continues to drift—speaking in careful language while conflicts harden and authority leaks outward—it will confirm a dangerous perception: that Africa’s premier multilateral institution is no longer capable of shaping outcomes. If, however, the current leadership rises to the moment, reasserts political purpose, and treats mediation as an exercise in consequence rather than ceremony, the African Union may yet recover its relevance. The test is immediate, and it cannot be deferred.
On paper, the African Union should be a formidable mediation actor. It possesses peace and security institutions, mediation capacities, and panels of eminent persons. Yet in practice, it has struggled to shape outcomes in the continent’s most consequential conflicts. The problem is not absence of tools, but erosion of authority. Mediation succeeds when norms are backed by leverage and when institutions are willing to impose political costs.
The Union’s recent record in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Sahel underscores this pattern. In Sudan, early warning and legal authority existed, yet hesitation prevailed as war escalated. In eastern Congo, fragmented initiatives and militarized responses crowded out political solutions. In the Sahel, inconsistent enforcement of norms and reactive diplomacy allowed coups and counter-coups to consolidate. In each case, the vacuum created by African caution was filled by external actors pursuing their own interests.
Looking ahead, Africa’s conflicts increasingly resemble political marketplaces. Loyalty is purchased, fragmentation rewarded, and violence normalized as a negotiating tool. In such environments, moral persuasion alone is insufficient. Norms without leverage are priced out, and multilateralism that avoids imposing costs becomes performative.
The African Union’s comparative advantage is not financial or military. It lies in legitimacy: the ability to confer recognition, set benchmarks, and insist that peace, rights, and governance are inseparable. Reclaiming this role requires a renewal of Pan-Africanism as an intellectual and moral tradition—one that insists on sovereignty as responsibility, not exemption.
If the African Union is to remain relevant in 2026, it must reassert convening authority, enforce coordination, benchmark mediation participation, and place civic legitimacy at the center of peace processes. Above all, leadership must rediscover courage. Unity without principle is not unity; it is abdication.
Africa’s multilateral institutions were never designed to deliver perfection. They were designed to prevent catastrophe. Whether the African Union can rise to this challenge in 2026 will determine not only its own credibility, but Africa’s capacity to navigate an unforgiving world.
This article was first published on Diplomacy Now and can be accessed on https://dialogueinitiatives.org/the-african-unions-biggest-test/
