Consideration of the situation in Somalia and AUSSOM Operations
Consideration of the situation in Somalia and AUSSOM Operations
Date | 14 December 2025
Tomorrow (15 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1317th session to consider the situation in Somalia and the operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
The session is expected to begin with opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of AUSSOM, may also brief the PSC. The Permanent Representative of Somalia is expected to deliver a statement as the concerned state, and representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) may also deliver statements.
On the situation in Somalia, major current issues include the relationship between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, implementation of the Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan, consensus on power and resources sharing, including fiscal federalism, and the constitutional review process. In terms of the review of the Constitution, the progress made thus far remains limited to the first four chapters.
During the year, the question of the implementation of one man one vote in the organisation of the upcoming elections has emerged as a major point of contention. Opposition to President Mohamud comes from two main quarters: the Federal Member States—most notably Puntland and Jubaland—whose leaders remain at odds with Villa Somalia and have both suspended relations with Mogadishu; and political opposition groups, including former presidents and prime ministers. Critics accuse the government of contemplating an extension of the president’s term and of using the move toward direct voting as a means to entrench himself in power while disrupting the informal clan-based power-sharing arrangements that underpin the current electoral model. They also question the neutrality of the Independent National Electoral and Boundaries Commission.
On 25 August 2025, the president made a significant concession by signing a political agreement with elements of the Somali Salvation Forum, the main opposition alliance—a development welcomed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The agreement’s key provision is that members of Parliament will be elected through universal suffrage, while the president will continue to be elected by Parliament. This partially reverses the provisional constitutional amendment of March 2024 and the October 2024 electoral framework agreement, both of which envisaged a directly elected presidency.
Despite this step, political discord has persisted. In October, a new political alliance—the Somali Future Council—was formed by the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland together with figures from the Somali Salvation Forum, aiming to coordinate positions on political and security matters, including the 2026 elections. The alliance reportedly rejected proceeding with the election without first securing a broad national consensus. In November, another political party—the Union of National Pride—associated with influential political figure and former intelligence Chief Fahad Yasin, was launched, announcing former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon as its presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the president’s efforts to mend relations with the Jubaland leadership appear to have made little headway, despite his October 2025 visit to Kismayo.
With only five months left before Mohamud’s term expires, moving ahead with elections without agreement on a workable electoral modality risks triggering heightened tensions with serious repercussions for the country’s fragile peace and stability. In the meantime, political infighting affects not only political and institutional stability but also continues to divert government attention from the fight against al-Shabaab, reversing earlier security gains over the terrorist group.
In relation to AUSSOM, this session takes place as the UN Security Council is expected to re-authorise the Mission’s mandate later this month, informed by the joint UN–AU–Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) technical assessment of progress. In a recent appearance on Amani Africa’s Pan-Africanist Podcast, the AU Special Representative, El Hadji Ibrahima Diene, confirmed that the Mission is undergoing an adjustment and that its exit strategy is being updated in consultation with the UN and the FGS. AUSSOM’s one-year mandate under Resolution 2767 (2024) is set to expire at the end of the month. According to the Mission’s Concept of Operations (CONOPs), the realignment of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM was initially scheduled for completion by the end of June 2025. However, this timeline was suspended by the PSC at its 1287th meeting, which extended the realignment phase by an additional six months. Against this backdrop, PSC members may receive an update from the Special Representative on the current status of the realignment—particularly with respect to the repatriation of Burundian troops and the deployment of Egyptian forces. It would not be completely surprising if the timeline for the realignment and the repatriation of Burundian troops is extended for a further period of at least six months.
The PSC may also follow on its previous decisions, made at its 1287th session, requesting the AU Commission to update the CONOPs with regard to the increased number and location of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), their logistical support and aviation requirements of the operation, and submit these new requirements to the PSC within six weeks. It is recalled that the PSC requested the Chiefs of Defence Forces of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) plus Somalia to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al Shabaab.
A major issue of concern for the PSC is the mission’s funding. During its 1287th session, the PSC not only decided to raise the ceiling of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) by an additional USD 10 million—bringing the total for 2025 to USD 20 million to support AUSSOM—but also mandated the AU Commission to engage the UN, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Somalia, and other bilateral partners to convene a resource-mobilization conference for the mission. The long-delayed and repeatedly postponed pledging conference was finally held as a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York on 25 September. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million, while Italy and Spain each were reported to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, pledges are also expected from Japan and the Republic of Korea. The total amount pledged stands at approximately USD 44 million—far below the USD 196 million required for the mission in 2025.
According to the co-chairs’ summary of the New York event, ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial.’ The largest anticipated contribution is expected from the EU, likely to be announced early next year. However, a key question remains: will the EU’s funding help close the severe 2025 budget gap and establish sustainable financing for 2026 and beyond, or will it focus primarily on future years while leaving the immediate shortfall unresolved?
The 2025 funding gap has already created an enormous strain on the mission. Troop-contributing countries have not received allowances for a year and a half. As the UN Secretary-General aptly noted during the High-Level Financing Event, this situation is ‘untenable,’ and ‘asking those who risk their lives against Al-Shabaab—and who have lost so many colleagues—to serve without pay is unacceptable.’ This level of financial pressure risks pushing TCCs to the breaking point and could ultimately threaten the mission’s viability. Currently, as the Secretary-General underscored, TCCs are ‘essentially subsidising the mission,’ an arrangement that is fundamentally unsustainable.
Looking ahead, and as rightly underscored by the Secretary-General, two urgent priorities should be addressed: closing the 2025 budget gap and securing predictable financing for the remainder of the mission. Without predictable funding, the AU may be compelled to reconsider its original exit timeline, currently envisaged for the end of 2029. During the high-level financing event, the Chairperson of the AU Commission stressed that AUSSOM is ‘not an open-ended mission.’ Yet, instead of exploring such other options as bilateral deployments, ad hoc coalition support and importantly, the development of an effective political strategy for the resolution of the conflict in Somalia, there seems to be a single-minded focus on finding a financing-only solution to the existential challenge facing AUSSOM.
Compounding the financial challenges, AUSSOM is expected to lose around USD 130 million from the UN logistics support package due to the liquidity crisis affecting UN peacekeeping operations. In a letter dated 10 October 2025, the UN Secretary-General instructed all peacekeeping missions funded through the peacekeeping budget to activate contingency plans reflecting a 15 per cent expenditure reduction. The UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS)—mandated for providing logistical and related support to AUSSOM—has been required to implement an even steeper 25 per cent reduction within the current fiscal year. While the AU and the UN are working on determining and mitigating the impact of this significant cut, there is little doubt that this would affect the kind of support AUSSOM receives and hence the operational efficacy of the mission. The Head of AUSSOM may also update the PSC on the implications of this reduced support and on efforts to mitigate its impact.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. On the political situation in Somalia, the PSC may welcome the signing on 25 August 2025 of the Agreement on the Revised Electoral Framework between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and one political wing of the Salvation Forum. At the same time, the PSC may urge all Somali political actors to pursue inclusive political dialogue and to reach a broad-based consensus on contentious issues related to electoral and constitutional reforms ahead of the 2026 elections. On AUSSOM, the PSC may express deep concern over the significant funding shortfall facing the mission. It may also express concern over the envisaged budget cuts to UNSOS and their implications in further exacerbating the Mission’s operational challenges. The PSC may welcome the convening of the recent high-level financing event and express appreciation to partners that have contributed to the Mission. The PSC may further appeal to both traditional and non-traditional partners to increase financial support in order to close the significant 2025 budget gap, and to commit to predictable and adequate multiyear financing to enable the Mission to effectively discharge its mandate. In this regard, the PSC may encourage the AU Commission and the UN to work out modalities that ensure the least minimum impact on the operational efficacy and safety of AUSSOM in their ongoing exploration of options for mitigating the impact of the reductions to the UNSOS budget and encourage close coordination between the two for ensuring that they mobilise timely response to challenges and risks that the financial shortfall may precipitate. Concerning the operationalisation of the Mission, the PSC may commend the Burundian troops for their flexibility and other troops for their continued commitment and reiterate the need for the AU Commission to expedite the finalisation of the realignment of AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM and implement the next phases of the Mission in line with the approved CONOPs. In the event of inability to find the funds to fill in the significant financial gaps of AUSSOM, the PSC may consider tasking the AU to work with the FGS and partners on developing options for alternative ways of protecting the gains made and develop a political strategy for enhanced effort on advancing national reconciliation and a sustainable path for political settlement in Somalia.
Consideration of the Report of the Commission on the MNJTF Mandate
Consideration of the Report of the Commission on the MNJTF Mandate
Date | 14 December 2025
Tomorrow (15 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1318th session to consider the report of the Commission on the MNJTF mandate.
Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU, Chairperson of the PSC for December, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement introducing the Chairperson’s report. Statements are also expected from Mamman Nuhu, the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Major General Saidu Tanko Audu, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Commander.
The PSC last renewed MNJTF’s mandate at its 1254th session on 13 January 2025 for a further twelve months, to expire on 1 February 2026. The meeting also requested ‘the LCBC to renew the Memorandum of Understating (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF TCCs, which will guide the provision of AU additional support to the MNJTF, for a period of one year, effective 1 February 2025.’ The Council last considered the MNJTF following this mandate renewal at its 1282nd session, held on 10 June 2025, which provided an ‘Update on the activities of the MNJTF and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR).’ On that occasion, it requested the AU Commission to enhance its support to, and collaboration with, the LCBC in implementing the revised five-year RS-SRR, noting that ‘despite the sustained efforts being deployed by the LCBC and MNJTF, Boko Haram remains an existential threat to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the wider region.’ That threat remains pronounced, as the MNJTF has yet to generate a decisive shift in the situation on the ground. Meanwhile, emerging developments that undermine the MNJTF, combined with persistent climate, security and governance fragilities, are pushing the force toward a critical inflection point. Tomorrow’s session is therefore likely to revisit these priorities, with particular attention to the evolving security dynamics and the region’s dire humanitarian situation, which may argue for the continued operation of the MNJTF.
The LCB, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian and governance challenges. In addition to the impact of climate change and underlying historical and socio-political governance factors, these challenges are largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).
In terms of the activities of armed violent groups, the reporting period has been marked by an intensifying pattern of insurgent attacks, an issue expected to feature prominently in tomorrow’s session. According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, militant Islamist-related fatalities in the LCB region rose 7 per cent over the past year to 3,982, representing 18 per cent of the continental total, while civilian targeting increased by 32 per cent to 880, the highest since 2016. Nigeria recorded an 18 per cent rise in fatalities, with Borno state alone accounting for 74 per cent of regional deaths; Cameroon registered 467 deaths with a 45 per cent decline, whereas Chad more than doubled to 242. This escalation is accompanied by notable tactical advancements; ISWAP reportedly overran 15 Nigerian military bases, introduced night vision and deployed armed and surveillance drones. Since June, JAS has attacked positions at Baga, Goldavi near Talakatchi, and Kirawa, with night assaults aided by night vision and modified commercial drones, and with reports citing rocket-propelled grenades, armed drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Meanwhile, Insurgent infighting has also resurged. From 5 to 8 November 2025, JAS attacked ISWAP across Lake Chad islands and river routes for control of extortion revenues, arms and fuel smuggling corridors through Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
The other issue expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and placed both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCC’s national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have continued to use surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements and started using drone attacks, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to both terrorist forces intelligence and drone attacks. In this respect, the PSC may reiterate from its last session its call on the AU Commission and international partners to mobilise support required to address these deficits through availing assets, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.’
As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4th LCB Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond.’ The Tumbuns serve as logistics hub, secure havens and staging grounds for terrorist groups. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities. In this respect, the 5th LCB Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’
Another issue for tomorrow’s session is the follow-up on PSC’s decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the June 2023 coup was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. A major factor for Niger’s severance of ties with MNJTF appears to be the withdrawal of support for Niger. The Communique of the LCB 5th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisation Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’ Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF has created a security void in its Area of Operations in Sector 4 (Diffa), complicating cross-border coordination and patrols along key stretches of the Lake Chad frontier. In this regard, the Council may wish to seek an update on efforts to restore the support to Niger and facilitate its return to MNJTF, recalling its 1282nd meeting at which it took note ‘with deep concern of the withdrawal of the Republic of Niger from TCCs and its impact on the operations of the MNJTF.’
The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilization strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger, on 27 February 2025, adopted the revised strategy. Subsequently, during its 1282nd session, the PSC endorsed and validated the revised RS-SRR as adopted by the 70th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the LCBC. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy.
Another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s meeting is the humanitarian situation, which has remained dire over the reporting period. Insecurity, attacks and violence continue to affect millions. Recurrent flooding is devastating the region, exacerbating existing humanitarian challenges and forcing counterterrorism assets to be diverted to relief operations. MNJTF canoes and army drones were deployed to support evacuations. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that in the first half of 2025, 487 security incidents were recorded, causing 415 deaths. By June 2025, IDPs still numbered 2.9 million, reflecting only a 6 per cent decrease. Around 330,000 refugees have been registered, marking a 23 per cent rise since January 2025. Nigeria remains the epicentre of the crisis, hosting 2.1 million IDPs due to persistent insecurity in the northeast, followed by Cameroon, where over 476,000 people have fled violence in the Far North. An estimated 220,000 children are severely malnourished, with more than 87 per cent of them in Nigeria. As of June 2025, violence and attacks had forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the LCB, 80 per cent of which are in Chad, the most severely affected country. As of September, humanitarian actors had received US$618 million, just 19 per cent of the total funding required. The Council may therefore call for an urgent and coordinated scale-up of humanitarian access and funding, prioritising the protection of civilians, support for severely malnourished children and the reopening and safeguarding of schools, while urging member states and partners to close the 2025 funding gap and align relief with longer-term resilience in the LCB as part of the stabilisation strategy.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the MNJTF for its efforts to degrade terrorist groups and stabilise affected areas in the LCB, while noting with concern that Boko Haram and its splinter groups remain an existential threat to the region. Given the persistent threat posed by terrorist groups in the region and the need to preserve existing gains, the PSC may extend the MNJTF’s mandate for another 12 months. It may also call for the AU, LCBC and MNJTF TCCs MoU and SIA to be extended for an additional year. The Council may also reaffirm its continued support for the Force and the need for predictable and sustainable resources for its operations. Taking forward its call from its last session on the need for provision of additional modern technological capabilities, including drone and anti-drone and jamming technology, the PSC may call for the LCBC working together with the AU Commission to develop a realistic plan on the mobilisation of such capabilities. It may also call for restoring the support given to Niger in its capacity as MNJTF TCC in order to facilitate its return to the MNJTF and remove the void created due to its withdrawal. The PSC may further highlight the need to deepen cooperation between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in order to ensure more coherent cross-border responses commensurate with the transnational nature of the threat. In addition, considering that the Council held its last field mission to the region in July 2017, whose report was considered at the PSC’s 721st meeting in September 2017, the Council may seek to follow up on its 1207th decision to conduct a solidarity field mission to the LCB.
G20 and the AU-EU: A tale of two international summits in Africa
G20 and the AU-EU: A tale of two international summits in Africa
Date | 5 December 2025
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Africa played host to two major international summits. Under South Africa’s Presidency, Johannesburg played host to the 2025 Group of 20 (G20) summit. Under Angola’s chairship of the continental body, the African Union (AU), Luanda was the stage for the 7th AU and European Union (EU) summit. They took place one after the other, on 22-23 November and 24-25 November respectively.
Despite minor differences in the issues they cover, they share major convergence on the major themes covered by the agendas of the two summits. The G20 summit, being held for the first time on African soil under the theme ‘solidarity, equality and sustainability, focused, among others, on issues dubbed to be of particular interest for developing countries, particularly Africa. This can be seen from the broad thematic areas that the G20 presidency advanced: Debt reform, climate resilience, inclusive development and a more democratic global governance system.
As can be gathered from the Leaders’ Declaration, the G20 addressed, among others, debt crisis, energy transition, critical minerals for growth and sustainable development, inclusive economic growth, industrialisation and reduced inequality, sustainable financing, and equitable global governance.
These are all issues covered in the joint AU-EU Summit Declaration under the sub-themes of ‘shaping a prosperous and sustainable future for Africa and Europe’ and ‘a stronger commitment to multilateralism.’
One of the successes of the Johannesburg G20 summit was the adoption of the Leaders’ Declaration at the start of the summit in a departure from usual practice and despite the boycott and pressure from the United States (US.) The successful convening and the adoption of a substantive leaders’ declaration is applauded for showing how multilateral diplomacy can be pursued without the US (and even in the face of opposition from it), the architect and anchor of much of the multilateral platforms of the post-World War II world order, including the G20.
With at least 25 African states in debt distress and at least three of them defaulting on their debt payment, the debt crisis is one of the most pressing issues of particular concern for Africa that was at the centre of the G20 summit agenda. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 2025 Economic Report on Africa, African countries spent about US$163 billion on debt service in 2024 alone. Despite having a lower debt-to-GDP ratio than G7 countries, African governments spend, according to a report from Tony Blair Institute, on average 18% of all revenue just on interest payments, which is up to 6 times more than G7/EU countries.
It was no surprise that debt became one of the four high-level priorities identified by the G20 under South Africa’s presidency. As President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa observed in his opening of the summit, the ‘G20 needs to renew its efforts to advance debt sustainability, with a particular emphasis on African countries.’ The Johannesburg G20 leaders’ declaration did not downplay nor shied away from acknowledging the gravity and adverse developmental consequences of the debt crisis. Thus, it recognised that ‘a high level of debt is one of the obstacles to inclusive growth in many developing economies, which limits their ability to invest in infrastructure, disaster resilience, healthcare, education and other development needs.’ (Emphasis added)
By contrast, the 7th AU-EU summit adopted a more reluctant framing, potentially downplaying the cost of debt distress. It thus stated ‘high level of debt can be an obstacle to inclusive growth and ‘may limit their ability to invest in infrastructure, disaster resilience, healthcare, education and other development needs.’ (Emphasis added) While the G20 recognised a high level of debt as factually being an obstacle to inclusive growth, the AU-EU summit declaration used ‘can be’ and ‘may’, hence casting uncertainty about whether high-level debt carries such consequences for affected countries. There is, however, ample evidence, including from UNECA and UNCTAD, that debt is, to use the words of President Ramaphosa, ‘stifling public spending and economic growth’. The AU draft enjoined the AU-EU to a number of targeted commitments, including ‘to take decisive actions to address the high debt premium of borrowing countries, especially in Africa, that pay significantly higher interest rates compared to their peers despite similar risk ratings.’
Both the G20 and AU-EU summits failed short of adopting robust measures that address the structural conditions embedded in the international financial order that create cyclic debt distress, including those advanced in the joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System and the AU’s Common African Position on debt, including the proposal for a UN framework convention on sovereign debt. Even then, while the joint AU-EU summit declaration called for qualified ‘reform of the international debt architecture’, the G20 declaration adopted a more specific and emphatic language, by underscoring ‘the need for enhancing the representation and voice of developing countries in decision making in multilateral development banks (MDBs) and other international economic and financial institutions.’
What is striking about the changes introduced is not just that they watered down the already reasonable formulations in the draft from the AU. The deletion even included a reference to support for the recent initiative to find a sustainable solution to the debt crisis. One example of such deletion is ‘we welcome the Sevilla Forum on Debt launched at UNCTAD 19 to tackle entrenched debt crises in developing countries.’ Signifying the lack of common ground on addressing the structural conditions perpetuating the debt crisis, it was reported that the EU voted against a resolution on sovereign debt under discussion in New York just as the summit was being held.
The AU draft commenced the section on ‘shaping a prosperous and sustainable future for Africa and Europe’ with ‘We further reaffirm our commitment to accelerating economic transformation and sustainable development to achieve inclusive growth and sustainable development to create economic opportunities for all, particularly for youth and women.’ After the changes introduced by the EU, not only was the reaffirmation of such commitment left out, but the section commences with a language that foregrounds the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative as reflected in the final copy of the declaration adopted in Luanda. It is worth noting that, as opposed to the very positive framing reflected in the summit declaration, the AU draft on the Global Gateway emphasised ‘the need for greater transparency, timely delivery, and measurable impact to ensure that the promised investment effectively supports Africa’s priorities and is fully aligned with the vision and goals of the AU’s Agenda 2063. The selection and implementation of projects must be conducted jointly to ensure full African ownership and appropriation.’
The substantive issues raised in the draft by the AU member states around Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), including its potential for increasing costs, limiting competitiveness and undermining efforts to sustainably manage natural resources, such as biodiversity-based exports and the reference to ensuring in this regard respect for implementation of Article 3(5) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were also removed. After negotiations, the final version commits only to ‘maintaining open, transparent, and inclusive channels of dialogue, including on trade-related environmental measures, such as CBAM and EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).’ Instead of the reasonable and clear language calling for provision of adequate time, capacity building support and flexibility for African countries to adapt to such new regulatory measures, the final declaration stated ‘the EU and AU will tackle together challenges posed to African exporters in sustainably managing natural resources, including biodiversity-based exports.’ This language and the reading of the entire paragraph 10 hide the concern raised in the AU draft that the challenge ‘in sustainably managing natural resources’ is a potential challenge posed by trade-related environmental measures, such as CBAM and EUDR.
By contrast, despite not going far enough and falling short of making direct reference to CBAM, the G20 declaration is explicit in stating that ‘measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.’
These are just some of the examples that highlight the contrasting outcomes of two international summits hosted on African soil, one after the other and covering similar issues. Despite all the appearances of progress and the symbolic changes on display in the lead-up to and during the AU-EU summit, substantively, the examples cited above suggest that the summit in Luanda did not mark a departure from the past. It shows the entrenchment of the power asymmetry and the reflex of being comfortable with dominating in setting the agenda and the process of shaping the outcomes of partnership meetings. The contrast between what the opening speeches projected and this outcome is reflective of what Carlos Lopes called the self-deception trap.
This outcome is not just to be blamed on the EU. After all, the AU, particularly its member states, were not without the possibility of achieving a different outcome. This can be gathered from the draft that they initiated, which sought such a different outcome. Yet, the push of the AU, particularly its member states, failed short. Whatever success was achieved in bringing back elements initially proposed, produced formulations that substantively changed the essence of the original formulation or hugely watered-down language on substantive policy issues, as those cited above exemplify.
It is worth noting that the effort to regain the momentum succeeded in securing the removal of the reference to the ambiguous and problematic language of ‘rules-based international order’ and the restoration of the reference to the work towards the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, which was deleted from the AU draft. Thus, ‘rules-based international order’ was replaced with the neutral and accurate framing of ‘commitment to international order based on international law and effective multilateralism grounded in international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its Purposes and Principles, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.’ (Emphasis added)
No doubt that this outcome could have been avoided. It happened not for lack of ways of avoiding it, but proposals advanced in various European and African publications, such as here and here, as well as earlier counsel from Lopes, were not heeded.
While the G20 summit outcome carried content that projected Africa’s interest and had about 5 times more to ‘Africa’ than the previous record of 18 references to Africa during the G20 in 2017, the AU-EU summit was a major missed opportunity to move the partnership meeting beyond performative dialogue.
This tale of the two summits amply affirms that the observation (made ahead of the two summits) that the G20 summit ‘appears to generate more excitement in the AU and Africa than the AU-EU summit’ was not without merit.
Exclusive interview: Amb. El Hadji Ibrahima Diene , Special Representative of the Chairperson of African Union Commission & Head of AUSSOM
Exclusive interview: Amb. El Hadji Ibrahima Diene , Special Representative of the Chairperson of African Union Commission & Head of AUSSOM
3 December 2025
Ahead of the upcoming meetings of the AU PSC and the UNSC on the AU Support & Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), the latest edition of The Pan-Africanist brings to you the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission & Head of AUSSOM. In this very first ever media interview since assuming office, Amb Boly discussed with our Director the current state of AUSSOM including state of deployment, financing, scenarios & plans for managing the huge financial shortfall facing the mission & the work underway on exit plans.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - October 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - October 2025
Date | October 2025
In October 2025, under the chairship of Botswana, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled programme of work consisting of three substantive sessions, made up of two thematic sessions and one session on a conflict situation. Additionally, it provided for the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month and the Council’s annual statutory meetings with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC). After the introduction of three sessions on crisis/conflict situations and the revision of the programme of work, the PSC held six substantive sessions. Out of the six, four focused on country-specific situations, while the rest addressed thematic issues. All six sessions were convened at the ambassadorial level.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for December 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for December 2025
Date | December 2025
In December, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions covering five agenda items. Three of the sessions will focus on country- and region-specific situations, while the remaining sessions will address thematic issues. In addition to the sessions, the PSC will also hold the annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, held at the ministerial level, and an informal consultation with countries in political transition and the peace and security issues affecting them. All the sessions are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. No open session is anticipated in the PPoW.
The PSC will begin the month with the ‘12th Annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in enhancing cooperation between the AUPSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Addressing Peace and Security issues on the Continent,’ to be held on 1 and 2 December. Convened within the framework of Article 17(3) of the PSC Protocol, this year’s edition of the high-level seminar, also known as the Oran Process, will take place in Algiers, Algeria.
The programme for this year’s high-level seminar envisages: ‘i. Global Landscape of Peace and Security in Africa: Current Dynamics, ii. AU and UN Concerted Action on Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,’ and a closed session to focus on: ‘i. Taking Stock of A3+ Activities: Lessons learned and way forward, [and] ii. AUPSC and A3+: A Stronger Voice for UNSC Reform.’ It is also expected that this 12th High-Level Seminar will unveil the ‘Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the AUPSC and the African Members of the UNSC,’ adopted during the PSC’s 1289th meeting held in July 2025.
On 8 December, the PSC will convene its first substantive session to consider the Situation in Somalia and the operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). It is expected to focus on the full operationalisation of the mission and the existential financing challenges facing it. Not only is AUSSOM facing significant shortfalls, but it is also expected to lose some $130 million from the UN logistics support package, further aggravating the dire funding woes of the mission. The session will build on its previous session held at the ministerial level in July 2025, in which the Council decided ‘to increase the ceiling level of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) by an additional 10 million USD to make it 20 million USD for 2025 to support the deployment of AUSSOM.’ In September 2025, at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM jointly organised by the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU Commission, the UN and the United Kingdom (UK) saw pledges being made by both traditional and non-traditional donors for the mission. The UK pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each pledged to commit USD 1 million. Japan and South Korea also came on board to make some contribution to AUSSOM’s funding.
On 9 December, the PSC will convene for a briefing on the ‘Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook.’ The session will feature contributions from key AU institutions, including the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), and the AU Counterterrorism Centre (AUCTC). Despite the reference to ‘continental early warning, conspicuously absent from providing analysis on early warning is the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). CEWS, a statutory structure established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, was at the heart of the provision of such briefing to the PSC through horizon scanning until its demise, contrary to Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, in the context of the institutional reform that saw the merger of the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments in 2021. Since then, the PSC took decisions to rectify the situation, but this is yet to take effect. This session will also build up – and get an update – on Council’s 1298th meeting held on August 2025, in which it tasked the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools’ as well as ‘an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons-learned.’
On the same day, the PSC is scheduled to consider the Draft Conclusions of the 12th High-Level Seminar.
On 11 December, the Council will have an informal consultation with countries in political transition. This meeting was initially planned for November 2025 but was eventually postponed, in part due to lack of confirmation of participation from representatives of the three central Sahel countries. This will, however, be the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods. This practice was introduced following the PSC’s 14th Retreat on its Working Methods in November 2022, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, to allow direct engagement with representatives of Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. The upcoming session will assess the progress made and challenges encountered in these ongoing transition processes. It will also explore how the PSC can enhance its support for the political normalisation of the affected Member States. No formal outcome is expected for this session.
The following week, on 15 December, the PSC will convene to consider the Commission’s report on the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) mandate. Such a session was earlier planned by the Council in November 2025, but a decision was taken to postpone it, as Amani Africa learned, in order to address the situation together with the renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF, hence its rescheduling for this month. It is expected to provide update on implementation of previous PSC decisions including from its last 1282nd meeting on the MNJTF held in June 2025 which endorsed and validated ‘the revised Five-Year Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Resilience and Recovery of the Boko Haram Affected areas in the Lake Chad Basin’ and requested the AU Commission ‘to enhance its support to and collaboration with the LCBC in the implementation of the revised Five-Year RS-SRR… and continue supporting the MNJTF in its operations to consolidate and sustain the gains made thus far against the Boko Haram terrorist group.’ This session is also expected to evaluate the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the MNJTF’s efforts in countering Boko Haram and the two main splinter groups, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), who continue to pose significant threats to regional peace and security.
The final substantive meeting of the PSC for the month concerns the situation in Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are now advancing aggressively into Kordofan, with major cities such as Babnusa and El-Obeid squarely in their sights. Having defeated the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in El Fasher last month – an assault that triggered widespread atrocities, including the reported killing of at least 1,500 civilians and the displacement of tens of thousands – the RSF currently holds the battlefield momentum in Sudan’s escalating war. In October 2025, following the fall of El Fasher, the PSC held an emergency session on the situation in Sudan, particularly on the atrocities that ensued following the city’s fall. From the communiqué it adopted after the session, the PSC tasked the AU Commission ‘to regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, in order to put in place preventive measures and reduce the risk of recurrence; develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation; [and] develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.’ Council went further and directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee, under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda, to urgently facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary RSF, including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan. Another assignment included tasking the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. This, however, did not happen.
The meeting will also be held just weeks following Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, rejection of a ceasefire agreement proposed by the Quad. He also criticised the UAE’s involvement in the Quad, accusing it of supporting the RSF, a claim widely shared by others. For its part, the RSF recently announced an apparently unilateral 3-month humanitarian truce. The Quad mediation efforts, which have included a push from US President Donald Trump, may be one of the factors for the recent escalation in fighting as part of the push for strengthening bargaining power in the negotiations.
As per usual practice, provision is made in the footnote for the convening of Committee of Experts meetings to consider the draft report on the State of Peace and Security in Africa and the Activities of the PSC covering January to December 2025 on a date to be determined.
