Rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts
Rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts
Date | 21 July 2025
Tomorrow (22 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1289th session focusing on the rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts.
Following opening remarks from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Rebecca Amuge Otengo, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Presentations and statements are also expected from Nts’iuoa Sekete, Permanent Representative of Lesotho to the AU and Vice Co-Chair of Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC). Nonceba Losi, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the AU will also share insights from her experience. Robert Doya Nanima, Member of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and Special Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict. More presentations and statements are expected to be delivered from Grace Acan, Social Worker and Survivor Rights Activist and and Victor Ochen, Founder, African Youth Initiative Network (AYINET) as well as representatives from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) office to the AU and ECA, Save the Children International. The Permanent Mission of Norway to the AU will also make intervention, as Partner Member of AP-CAAC.
While tomorrow’s session is fully dedicated to rehabilitation and reintegration of children affected by armed conflict, this is not the first session of the PSC to address the subject. At its 661st session, the PSC ‘underlined the need for governments to institutionalise the protection of children within their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes, as well as to include rehabilitation and opportunities for education to former child soldiers… and make full use of DDR and SSR, especially paying attention to rehabilitation of child soldiers, re-skilling and integrate them into the community.’ Additionally, apart from urging member states to share their experiences in rehabilitating ex-child soldiers and integrating them into the societies, the PSC emphasised ‘the need to include negotiation on the release of all children to child protection actors/officers in the mediation efforts undertaken to end conflict.’
The immediate past session of the PSC dedicated to the use of child soldiers held on 20 February 2025 during its 1262nd session emphasised the need for ‘implementing child-focused reintegration strategies in post-conflict settings’ and ‘to prioritise the provision of essential services such as education, healthcare, psychosocial support, and social care, while designing tailored reintegration programmes to restore the dignity and rights of children recruited and exploited in armed conflicts.’ It is worth recalling that Member States issued a similar stance in the Banjul Conclusions of 2023, in which they stated, ‘children’s interests should meaningfully be considered in DDR to facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration into communities and effectively address the phenomenon of re-recruitment of children in situations of conflict, particularly in protracted conflicts.’
Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to build on these previous sessions. In doing so, it would first offer an opportunity to assess whether and how the measures identified in these sessions on the subject of rehabilitation and reintegration have been implemented. Second, the session also helps to bring together into a single coherent text the steps identified in the outcome of the previous sessions on rehabilitation and reintegration of children affected by armed conflicts.
A critical point of departure for tomorrow’s session is to have clear data and analysis both on the state of engagement of children in armed conflicts and on whether and how the issues of rehabilitation and reintegration of children are addressed in peace agreements and in post-conflict and reconstruction processes. While there is no data specific to the situation of conflicts in Africa, according to the UNSG 2024 Children and Armed Conflict Annual Report, ‘22,495 children [were] affected by recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual violence and abduction.’ It recorded a 17 per cent increase in the number of child victims of multiple grave violations (3,137) involving the convergence of abduction, recruitment and use, and sexual violence, representing an alarming escalation in brutality.’ Indicating the persistence of the recruitment of child soldiers, the report pointed out that 7,402 children were recruited and used. Of the five countries with the highest numbers of children recruited and used, three were in Africa (the DRC, Nigeria and Somalia).
In terms of how rehabilitation and reintegration are addressed in peace processes, there are emerging practices in some settings despite persisting challenges. For example, according to the UN report, of the four countries in which 16,482 children formerly associated with armed forces or groups were provided with protection or reintegration support, two of them, namely DRC and South Sudan, are from Africa. In the countries affected by Boko Haram and its splinter groups in the Lake Chad Basin, the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of children is integrated into the regional stabilisation initiatives including DDR processes at the national levels. It emerges from this limited available data that there is a need for monitoring and documentation, including the systematic collection of information. The development and implementation of tailored measures for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in each of the conflict settings has to be informed by the nature and scale of the problem of children associated with armed forces or armed groups.
Also of significance for tomorrow’s session is the review of lessons learned on rehabilitation and reintegration of children from the experience of countries that implemented or are implementing DDR and SSR processes in post-conflict settings such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and South Sudan or those pursuing stabilisation measures such as countries affected by the conflict involving Boko Haram. The experience of Liberia, for example, shows not only that child protection has to be thought of from the outset of the design of DDR processes, but also that dedicated attention has to be paid to the needs of the girl child who is associated with an armed force or armed group. Other useful insights include the necessity of community participation and the use of relevant rituals in the rehabilitation and reintegration of children.
Tomorrow’s session also affords an opportunity to discuss the challenges to an effective and rights-based approach to the rehabilitation and reintegration of children. Reintegration is at times hindered by community stigma, especially for girls who face rejection due to sexual violence or pregnancies resulting from their exploitation. Without well-resourced programs that also cater for their needs, families and communities, often dealing with their own conflict-related trauma, may struggle to support returning children. Structural barriers also limit this endeavour. For instance, the widespread poverty and lack of access to education drive child recruitment, as children join armed groups for survival or to support their families. In addition, political instability and ongoing conflicts disrupt rehabilitation efforts and increase the risk of re-recruitment. Funding shortfalls are also another challenge. Humanitarian operations, including child protection programmes, face severe underfunding. In 2024, only 50% of UNICEF’s thematic humanitarian funding went to four emergencies (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Syria, Ukraine), leaving operations in high-need areas like the DRC, Burkina Faso, Mali and Somalia critically underfunded. This trend is expected to continue in 2025, impacting reintegration efforts. Its 2024 Annual Report noted that resources for child protection programmes continue to shrink amidst rising needs. A 20% projected budget reduction for 2026 suggests that 2025 funding for reintegration programmes remains constrained, particularly in conflict-affected regions.
Despite the policy advances made and the regularisation of the issue of child protection on the agenda of the PSC, systematic integration of the issue across the peace and security policy spectrum from early warning to PCRD remains a work in progress. For example, despite its mediation role during the negotiation of the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022, the AU did not include the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of children associated with the armed forces or groups in the mediation process.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Council is expected to encourage Member States to adopt national policy and action plans as well as legislative measures that prevent the participation of children in armed groups. It may also reiterate its call for mainstreaming child protection into the early warning system both to facilitate measures for mitigating the risk of recruitment of children and to integrate child protection measures into mediation and peace-making processes for ensuring that peace initiatives and PCRD interventions ensure rehabilitation and reintegration of children based on the best interest of the child including through prioritising education and access to schools and skill development opportunities. The PSC may call on states to integrate child protection and reintegration into national DDR and peacebuilding strategies, with adequate resourcing for long-term, holistic support to affected children and communities that also counters the stigmatisation of children affected by armed conflicts. The PSC may call on the AU Commission to ensure that reports or briefings on specific conflict situations or peace processes include a dedicated section on child protection and how to advance rehabilitation and reintegration of affected children. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission and the ACERWC to identify and assemble lessons learned and best practices on rehabilitation and reintegration of children as an authoritative reference for guiding national actors, the RECs/RMs and the AU in designing and implementing rehabilitation and reintegration processes. The PSC may also call for giving particular attention to and ensuring dedicated support measures for girls in the design and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programs, having regard to the vulnerability and special needs of girls. The PSC may also emphasise the need for leveraging the cultural resources of the community that affected children belong to and ensuring community engagement in the design and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programs. It may also underscore the need for allocating adequate resources for rehabilitation and reintegration programs.
African Youth Perspectives on the New Agenda for Peace
African Youth Perspectives on the New Agenda for Peace (NA4P)
Date | 16 July 2025
INTRODUCTION
This report is the outcome of the project of the African Union Commission’s (AUC) Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), in partnership with the Embassy of Switzerland in Addis Ababa and Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa), initiated to foster structured dialogue with African youth on the nexus between YPS and the New Agenda for Peace. Accordingly, regional dialogues were held between 31 July and 7 August 2024 across Central, East, North, South and West Africa. These dialogues provided a platform for young people to share their perspectives on the future of peace and security in Africa and globally. The regional consultations were followed by a three-day continental consultation to synthesise all the regional perspectives and proffer practical recommendations. This report captures the voice of African youth representatives that seeks to contribute to the broader conversations around the implementation of the New Agenda for Peace, highlighting how youth voices are and should be made central to the global peace and security discourse.
Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Date | 16 July 2025
On July 17 & 18, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a two-day session dedicated to the annual joint consultative meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in Midrand, South Africa.
The consultative meeting is expected to be co-chaired by the President of the PAP and the Chairperson of the PSC. This will be the fourth meeting being held within the framework of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol.
The session will commence with opening remarks to be delivered by Rebecca A. Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for July, and Chief Fortune Charumbira, the President of the PAP. It is expected that this will be followed by an address by Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.
Although it is not being held on time as previously decided, the consultative meeting is being held in accordance with the outcome of the last consultative meeting of the two bodies held in June 2023, contained in the 1160th Communiqué of the PSC. Most particularly, the two bodies committed to to institutionalise and regularise the annual consultative meeting, between the PSC and PAP, on peace and security in Africa to be hosted alternatively in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and in Midrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and, in this respect, decide[d] that the next annual consultative meeting will be held in June 2024, in Midrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Since the meeting was not held in 2024 as per the terms of the communiqué of the 1160th session, tomorrow’s meeting is accordingly being held in Midrand, Johannesburg, hosted by the PAP.
The holding of the session is preceded by a preparatory meeting. Apart from the usual preparatory work of the PSC Committee of Experts, recently, on the sidelines of the AU Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM) in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the two bodies held a high-level preparatory meeting to set the stage for their Joint Consultative Meeting.
Tomorrow’s session is being held in accordance with the legal instruments that set out the mandate of the two bodies. First and most importantly, Article 18 of the PSC Protocol stipulates that the PSC establishes a close working relationship with the PAP, recognising the complementarity of their respective roles in the promotion of peace, security, stability, human rights and democratic governance in Africa. Second, this consultative session also draws on the core objectives of the PAP, which, as stated in the 2001 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP, cover the promotion of peace, security, stability, human rights and democratic governance. Additionally, the PAP is invested with the role of receiving reports from the PSC. Article 18 (2) and (3) of the PSC Protocol require the PSC to submit reports to the PAP through the AU Commission Chairperson whenever requested.
The consultative meeting is expected to have two dimensions. The first dimension is expected to involve exchange between the two bodies on the state of peace and security, as well as democratic governance in Africa. This exchange is expected to draw on the address by Adeoye. Within this framework, it will not be surprising for the deliberation to focus, among others, on the various conflict situations and the peace and security issues on the agenda of the PSC. These may include conflict hotspots, including the Sahel, the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan), Eastern DRC and thematic issues such as countries in transition, unconstitutional changes of government, terrorism and the AU’s engagement in advancing the reform of the multilateral system. As the first vice-president of PAP indicated during the preparatory meeting, the meeting is also expected to engage on the need to include women and youth in continental fora focusing on peace, security and governance.’ In this context, the issue of children affected by armed conflict (CAAC) is expected to receive particular attention, drawing on the focus given to it in the program of work of the PSC for the month and the role of the PSC Chairperson as Co-Chairperson of the Africa Platform on CAAC.
The second dimension of the meeting is expected to address working methods and modalities in operaitonalising Article 18 of the PSC Protocol. The development of the working methods in the relationship between the two concerns the follow-up to commitments made in previous meetings. It is worth recalling in this context that the PSC in the communiquéof its 1160th meeting on the previous consultative meeting underscored ‘the need for the two organs to continue to explore piratical means and way of further enhancing their collaboration and cooperation in the promotion of peace and security as well as African common positions on peace and security matters, particularly, in the international fora.’ It is expected that the PAP would put forward specific proposals on modalities for a close working relationship, as it did during the consultative meeting preceding the last one held during the 344th session of the PSC. Underscoring ‘the importance of building durable working methods,’ at the time of the preparatory meeting held in Malabo, the President of PAP proposed the following modalities: ‘formation of specialised parliamentary committees to support peace and security hotspots; enhanced use of parliamentary diplomacy in conflict resolution and management; institutional and operational synergies backed by time-bound action plans; and consideration of technical and financial capacity-building for PAP’s engagement in peace efforts.’
Tomorrow’s meeting will be held under the theme, ‘Enhancing Institutional Synergy and Collaboration for Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa.’ As such, in addition to the foregoing modalities, it is expected that the exchange will also focus on establishing mechanisms to enhance the PAP’s advocacy role in implementing AU peace and security initiatives.
In the communiqué of its 1160th session on the last consultative meeting, the PSC also requested ‘the PAP to regularly engage with it on its initiatives on the promotion of peace and security and democracy and good governance.’ There is no data to indicate that the PAP took on this invitation and engaged the PSC. Indeed, the report of PAP to the AU policy organs on its activities for 2024, other than the use of vague language of PAP engaging in fostering ‘collaboration on governance and security with AU and peace institutions,’ does not contain that the PAP engaged the PSC. The only notable engagement on peace and security contained in the PAP report is a reference to a resolution on peace and security in Africa and a recommendation on peace and security in Africa.
It clearly emerges from the foregoing that, notwithstanding, the solid legal foundation and the potential for a close working relationship, both the legal provisions and the potential remain unrealised. This is in no small part due to the governance and institutional challenges that have afflicted the PAP over the years. Apart from tarnishing the image and public standing of the continental body, PAP’s governance problems and the resulting institutional instability, including the controversy over the appointment of the clerk of PAP and the procedure followed in suspending the appointment, have had a direct bearing on the conduct of the activities of the institution. There is also the issue of the lack of ratification of the 2014 Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU Relating to the Pan-African Parliament (the 2014 PAP Protocol), which designates the PAP as the legislative body of the AU. The status of signature and ratification did not change from the analysis we produced on the last consultative meeting in June 2023, which put States that signed at 22 and those who deposited the instrument of ratification at 14. While the PSC in the communiqué of its 1160th session on the last consultative meeting held encouraged member states to ratify the protocol in order to enable it to enter into force, the recurring governance issues at PAP do not give confidence to member states on the wisdom of speeding up the entry into force of the protocol.
As such and in the face of the serious peace and security challenges on the continent that require the best performance of all AU institutions, it would be of interest to PSC members to ensure that the consultative meeting does not end up being an exercise in ticking boxes and that PAP organises and conducts itself for delivering on its role in advancing peace, security and stability and democratic governance in Africa. This necessitates not only the articulation of practical modalities for harnessing the mandate of the PAP but also the provision of mutual accountability in delivering on their common mandate.
Similarly, the proper functioning of the PAP would also facilitate the presentation on an annual basis by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the state of peace and security within the framework of Article 18 (2) & (3) of the PSC Protocol. Since this is a mutual responsibility, the PSC in its 1160th communiqué encouraged the AU Commission to enhance its engagement and continue to work closely with the PAP towards the implementation of these provisions.
The expected outcome is a joint conclusion identifying key areas for collaboration, to be adopted by the PSC as a Communiqué at a later session. It is expected that the PSC and PAP would resort to a unanimous roadmap for structured engagement between the two. In this regard, the two bodies would chart down thematic areas of engagement, including, but not limited to, youth in peacebuilding, climate security, women in peace processes, among others, in order to foster collaboration. It is also expected that the PSC would commend the AU Commission for the renewed efforts to enhance its engagements with PAP and stress the need for the AU Commission to continue to work closely with the Parliament. The outcome is also expected to reiterate the decision of the previous consultative session on institutionalising and regularising the annual consultative meeting and commits to holding the next meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It is also expected to highlight and welcome the need for ensuring proper functioning of the PAP as a necessary condition for ensuring that the PAP effectively executes its mandate towards contributing to peace and security and democratic governance in Africa, working in collaboration with the PSC. Given the capacity issues clearly stated by the PAP President, the joint conclusions may also highlight the imperative of strengthened capacity of PAP both in terms of the role of its Committees on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution and the use of parliamentary diplomacy by the PAP to advance conflict prevention, management and resolution.
Le Conseil de Paix et de Securite de l'Union Africaine - Manuel 2024
Amani Africa
2024
REMERCIEMENTS
Le Manuel du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine est une initiative d’Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa), qui fournit des informations et des analyses faisant autorité sur le CPS et son travail. Comme pour les deux éditions précédentes du Manuel, la présente édition du Manuel a bénéficié de l’engagement d’Amani Africa avec les acteurs clés du travail du CPS. Je tiens à remercier les membres du CPS, en particulier les présidents mensuels du CPS, les Secrétariats du CPS et les membres du Comité d’experts pour leur soutien à la préparation de cette troisième édition du Manuel.
Je tiens à remercier tout particulièrement S.E. Bankole Adeoye, Commissaire aux Affaires politiques, la Paix et la Sécurité (PAPS) pour avoir honoré le présent manuel d’un avant-propos, soulignant l’importance de la recherche et de l’analyse pour soutenir la mise en œuvre du Protocole relatif à la création du CPS.
Permettez-moi également de reconnaitre avec appréciation le soutien habituel du personnel du Secrétariat du CPS, en particulier Neema Nicholaus Chusi, chef par intérim du Secrétariat du CPS.
La présente édition du Manuel est le produit de l’engagement d’Amani Africa avec l’ensemble du personnel du Département du PAPS à qui nous exprimons également notre gratitude.
Nous tenons à remercier le Gouvernement de la Suisse qui a apporté son soutien en tant que partenaire au projet de mise à jour et de publication de cette nouvelle édition du Manuel.
Dr. Solomon Ayele Dersso, au nom de l’équipe d’Amani Africa
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From estrangement to engagement: PSC and ECOWAS MSC call for a cooperation framework for engaging AES States
From estrangement to engagement: PSC and ECOWAS MSC call for a cooperation framework for engaging AES States
Date | 9 July 2025
The severance of ties by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger— from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), marking a watershed moment in the deterioration of solidarity (as former AU Commission Chairperson aptly put it) and regional integration, was top on the agenda of the 16 May 2025 Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting convened between the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS MSC).
The outcome of the consultation was adopted as a joint communiqué. It is of significance that the consultative meeting reaffirmed the principles of the PSC Protocol, including, most notably, the ‘primary responsibility of the AUPSC in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.’ The meeting also recalled Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, the 2008 MoU and the 2020 Revised Protocol on Relations between the AU and RECs.
It emerges from the outcome of the consultation that the deliberation, not surprisingly, touched on a wide range of issues. Of these, those that are of substantive significance and deserving of particular attention include the threat of terrorism and the democratic governance deficit afflicting the sub-region. In this respect, the two sides expressed deep concern over ‘the worsening insecurity resulting from the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa, particularly, in the Sahel region, with potential expansion to the littoral states’ and ‘the slow pace of transition in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger.’
While the two Councils were on target in addressing the democratic governance deficit and adherence to governance norms of the AU and ECOWAS, ‘especially in relation to the principle of zero-tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government,’ the lack of reference to some of the significant manifestations of the democratic governance deficit beyond coups makes the call hallow. Apart from coups the region has also experienced in the past years the abuse of electoral processes as experienced in Senegal (See concern expressed by AU Commission in this respect here) and Sierra Leone (here and here) leading to political instability in both countries (with AU, ECOWAS and Commonwealth launching mediation in Seirra Leone) and the disregard of constitutional rules of separation of powers and checks and balances as in Guinea Bissau and manipulation of nationality laws and term limits in Cote d’Ivoire. The lack of reference to these forms of the democratic governance deficit creates a credibility gap, as the AU and ECOWAS express zero tolerance for military coups while failing to clearly pronounce themselves on flawed or rigged elections and the extension of constitutional term limits.
Concerning the persisting threat of conflicts involving terrorist groups particularly in the Sahel, the PSC and the ECOWAS MSC agreed ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS for engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’ Given how conflicts involving terrorist groups have been ravaging these central Sahel countries for more than a decade, the fact that such a mechanism was instituted only in 2025 is reflective of the lack of proactiveness of the continental and sub-regional bodies. Even then, the test of this decision depends on the proverbial pudding of implementation. In this respect, one of the significant issues that the AU and ECOWAS need to address, apart from ensuring follow-through, is rebuilding trust with the three central Sahel states. Considering that the three Sahelian states are pursuing their regional integration processes and announced the building of the Alliance of Sahelian States’ (AES) 5,000-member joint force, the success of the planned engagement with these states (including the joint framework for addressing the threat of terrorism) depends also on building on and accommodation of these efforts.
Acknowledging the poor delivery of existing policy responses, the PSC and ECOWAS MSC also stressed ‘the need for reinvigorating the Nouakchott Process, the ECOWAS Plan of Action Against Terrorism, the Accra Initiative, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and PSC comm.1275 on a combined maritime taskforce for addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.’(emphasis added) They also highlighted the need for addressing exogenous factors that accentuate the threat, such as ‘the supply of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)’ and ‘small arms and light weapons’ as well as ‘the influx of mercenaries and foreign fighters.’ The next step is for the AU and ECOWAS to work on specific modalities of addressing these ‘exogenous factors’ or drivers of insecurity in the region, including by updating the 2014 AU Sahel Strategy.
As part of the effort to bolster joint action to address the terrorism menace in the sub-region, the two Councils called for the establishment of a ‘Joint Threat Fusion and Analysis Cell as part of the proposed AU-ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform, with the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) designated as the continental coordination point.’ Additionally, the emphasis on the need to review and update the dated AU legal instruments (such as the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its 2004 Protocol) is timely, to ensure that these instruments address some of the new dimensions, including, most notably, technology and transnational networks.
Although the communiqué advances APSA and AGA objectives, particularly through Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and counterterrorism efforts, its effectiveness requires complementing these mechanisms with instruments such as the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and a revised and updated version of the 2014 AU Sahel Strategy. The AU and ECOWAS can use the revision and updating of this 2014 strategy, which has so far been dormant, as a platform for advancing policy coherence and joint action in their engagement with AES states.
The communiqué directly addressed the withdrawal of AES states from ECOWAS on 29 January 2025, expressing ‘deep concern’ and urging the three states to ‘reconsider’ their decision. Yet, considering the lack of follow-up on the previous call of the PSC, their reiteration of the need to ‘continue engaging’ with the AES countries does not inspire confidence that it will lead to any breakthrough. This is in part due to the lack of recognition of addressing the concerns of the AES states. Additionally, beyond the critical role of the leaders of Ghana, Senegal and Togo, the lack of implementation of previous PSC decisions casts serious doubt on the effectiveness of this call to ‘continue engaging.’ The fact that AU neither deployed effective mechanisms nor ensured the effective functioning of existing ones prompted the PSC during its 1212th session to reiterate its request for the AU Commission ‘to appoint a High-Level Facilitator at the level of sitting or former Head of State to engage with the Transitional Authorities.’ Additionally, taking note of ‘the leadership vacuum within the African Union Mission for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL),’ the PSC requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ensure the nomination of a High Representative, which remains a crucial interface in ensuring collective oversight between the Commission, Council, and the Countries in transition.’ The position has been vacant since the departure of Maman Sambo Sidikou in August 2023.
The call by the PSC and the ECOWAS MSC for a cooperation framework to engage AES states signals a change from a policy of passive estrangement to one of active engagement. The success of this policy shift, however, depends on another shift from policy statement to action through effective follow-through and a dedicated mechanism for sustained diplomacy.
