Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar
Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar
Date | 19 November 2025
Tomorrow (20 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1313th session to receive a briefing on the Situation in Madagascar.
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. The Special Envoy of the AU Commission Chairperson, Mohamed Idris Farah, and Dominitien Ndayizeye, former Burundian President and member of the Panel of the Wise, are expected to brief the Council. It is also expected that a representative of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) will make a statement.
The session comes as the Council seeks to assess follow-up on the implementation of its 15 October decision following the coup in Madagascar and the country’s suspension from AU activities. It is to be recalled that the PSC held two sessions just one day apart, before and after the coup (1305th and 1306th Sessions).
Following the seizure of power by the leader of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) and the dissolution of parts of the constitution and all institutions except the lower house of parliament, the PSC, at its 1306th session on 15 October, suspended Madagascar from Participation in AU activities. Declaring the military coup a clear violation of AU principles and governance frameworks, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the PSC demanded the restoration of constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government and the organization of elections as soon as possible, while urging all units of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and refrain from meddling in political affairs.
The political landscape in Madagascar has evolved since the PSC’s previous session. Colonel Michael Randrianirina was formally sworn in as President of the ‘Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar’ on 17 October and has since moved to consolidate his authority while projecting an image of reform-minded governance. In his public statements, Randrianirina has dismissed allegations that Rajoelina’s removal amounted to a coup, stressing that it occurred without violence, and rejected claims of judicial retaliation, asserting that ongoing investigations reflect justice rather than vengeance.
On 28 October, Randrianirina unveiled a new 29-member government featuring several prominent opponents of former President Rajoelina in key positions, including Christine Razanamahasoa as foreign minister, Fanirisoa Erinaivo as justice minister, and Hanitra Razafimanantsoa as state minister for ‘refoundation,’ alongside businessman Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as Prime Minister. Randrianirina announced priorities of fighting impunity, enforcing budget austerity, and stabilising the business climate, warning ministers that failure to show results within two months could lead to their replacement.
The military authorities have articulated what they describe as a comprehensive reform agenda. Randrianirina outlined a six-step plan purporting to respond to the collective will to break with past crises and build a just, stable, sustainable, and fully legitimate country. The steps include restoring trust between the state and its citizens, strengthening governance and transparency, intensifying the fight against corruption, guaranteeing the republican nature of the responsibilities of the armed forces, drafting the fundamental texts that will govern the new Republic, and organising a constitutional referendum followed by free and fair elections recognised by all. The proposed roadmap envisages nationwide consultations led by the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (FFKM) to establish a new governance system, followed by a referendum and presidential election within two years, alongside plans for a Youth Assembly and strengthened Malagasy language and history education.
The proposed two-year transitional timeline and the plan for a new constitution are further indicators of the unconstitutional seizure of power. It is worth recalling that the High Constitutional Court that ‘invited’ Randrianirina to seize power, thereby giving a semblance of legality to the military seizure of power, tasked him to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant. While he accepted the ‘invitation’ of this Court and defended the ‘constitutionality’ of his seizure of power on that basis, after seizing power, he ignored the court order on the timeline for holding elections. The decision for the two-year transition is not a result of a process of national consultation or dialogue.
The military’s self-determined two-year governance timeline directly contradicts the AU’s call for immediate handover to a civilian-led transitional authority. More significantly, the military’s appointments of key figures, including Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo without consultation, and its unilateral extension of the transition timeline have reportedly fostered growing disillusionment among the youth protesters whose demonstrations precipitated the political upheaval. What began as a convergence of interests between CAPSAT and the youth-led movement has given way to a troubling divergence between the protesters’ demands for genuine democratic renewal and the military’s consolidation of its own authority. This pattern is increasingly familiar in the many instances of such military seizure of power on the continent from Gabon to Guinea, where military forces initially embraced as allies by civilian protesters subsequently sideline protest movements after seizing power, failing to fulfil revolutionary aims and instead entrenching their control under the guise of stabilisation and reform.
Acting on the PSC’s decision of its 1305th session, the AU Commission Chairperson announced on 3 November that he appointed Mohamed Idriss Farah as Special Envoy for Madagascar. The Special Envoy commenced his first visit on 6 November. Along with the Farah’s mission to Madagascar and as a follow-up of the decisions of the 1305th and 1306th sessions of the PSC, the AU Commission dispatched a High-Level Delegation to Madagascar from 7 to 11 November, led by Ndayizeye. These visits had the primary objective of engaging in constructive dialogue with Malagasy authorities and national stakeholders to address the current political crisis. The delegation was received by the leader of the transition, Randrianirina, Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo, and the Foreign Minister, Razanamahasoa, in meetings described as taking place in ‘an excellent atmosphere’ that allowed both parties to share views on the current situation.
According to official AU communications, particular emphasis was placed during these exchanges on the need to maintain frank and constructive dialogue between the AU and Malagasy authorities to support their efforts to overcome the political situation, facilitate national reconciliation, and respond to the legitimate political and socio-economic aspirations of the Malagasy people. The Head of the AU delegation welcomed the openness of the authorities to dialogue and their expressed commitment to the African Union and the values of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, while reiterating the continental organisation’s commitment to supporting and accompanying the Malagasy people and authorities in their quest for peace, stability and justice. These positive characterisations of the engagement suggest that diplomatic channels remain open and suspension does not preclude but rather necessitates AU’s robust engagement.
Yet the critical question confronting tomorrow’s session is whether this diplomatic reception translates into a genuine willingness to meet the AU’s core demands for civilian-led transition and constitutional restoration. The AU delegation’s positive assessment of the authorities’ openness must be carefully weighed against the fact that the military leadership arrogated to itself the role of deciding the transitional process without any national consultative process. There is a tangible risk that the military authorities may seek to leverage diplomatic engagement to gain time and legitimacy while pursuing their predetermined course, rather than genuinely engaging with AU requirements. The articulation of reform commitments and the appointment of opposition figures to ministerial positions without the participation of political and civilian forces of the country is a clear entrenchment of the military’s control of the transitional process. It is worth recalling that the PSC in its decision demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections.’ Yet, the developments since mid-October, instead of representing meaningful steps toward the civilian-led transition it demanded, indicate a consolidation of military authority dressed in reform rhetoric.
It is expected that the SADC representative will update the PSC on SADC’s initiatives. It is to be recalled that SADC differed on the determination of whether what transpired in Madagascar was a military seizure of power, contrary to the constitutional processes established in Madagascar for seizure of power. The PSC in which five SADC member states including the Chairperson of the PSC for October were represented did not deem difference of determination necessary as there was no any uncertainty about the occurrence of a military seizure of power contrary to established constitutional processes In a communiqué issued after the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, held virtually on 16 October 2025, the Organ urged all political actors in Madagascar to engage in inclusive dialogue as the only path toward lasting peace and endorsed the deployment of a technical fact-finding mission to Madagascar by 22 October 2025. SADC sent a fact-finding mission led by the Panel of Elders, including former Malawian President Dr. Joyce Banda, ‘to engage all stakeholders, ease tensions, promote dialogue, and identify the root causes of the crisis.’ The extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 7 November resulted in acknowledgement of Madagascar’s relinquishment of its role as Chair of SADC due to its incapacity to discharge the responsibilities of the position following recent political developments, and South Africa became Interim Chair of SADC until August 2026. It did not, however, address the outcome of the visit of the SADC Panel of Elders. From the information available, there is no indication as yet that the report from the SADC visit has yet been received and validated by the SADC Organ Troika Summit.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may also recall its previous decisions of the 1306th sessions, urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed-upon transitional civilian authority and reaffirm its stand in that respect. The PSC may commend the AU Chairperson and the AU Commission Chairperson for assigning a dedicated mechanism that follows on the decisions of the 1305th and 1306th sessions and may in this respect welcome the visit by the Special Envoy to Madagascar immediately after his appointment along with the deployment of the high-level delegation. The Council may acknowledge the military authorities’ articulation of a reform agenda and their reported openness to dialogue and call on them to continue collaboration with the AU and SADC mechanisms within the framework of the communiqués its 1305th and 1306th sessions, including on the need for civilian-led rather than military-directed. It may in this respect call for inclusive national dialogue that centres the voices of civil society, youth movements, and political stakeholders and the development of a transitional roadmap on the basis of such inclusive national dialogue with the support of SADC and the AU. The PSC may emphasise the need for close coordination between the AU and SADC in providing comprehensive accompaniment to the transitional process in Madagascar on the basis of joint responsibility. The Council may stress that the reform process for restoration of constitutional order must address not only the political crisis but also the underlying socio-economic challenges and poor governance that sparked the protests. The PSC may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decisions of the Council and the initiatives of the AU and SADC toward addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth, and supporting the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.
Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area
Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area
Date | 18 November 2025
Tomorrow (19 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1313rd session to receive an update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area.
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. Statements are also expected from the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Godwin Michael Mutkut, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Commander.
Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the PSC’s 1282nd session of 10 June 2025, which was convened to provide an ‘Update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR)’. At that meeting, Council requested the AU Commission to enhance its support to and collaboration with the LCBC in the implementation of the revised Five-Year RS-SRR.’ This followed the assessment that ‘despite the sustained efforts being deployed by the LCBC and MNJTF, Boko Haram remains an existential threat to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the wider region.’ That threat remains pronounced, as the MNJTF, whose mandate runs until January 2026, has yet to generate a decisive shift in the situation on the ground. Meanwhile, emerging developments that undermine the MNJTF, combined with persistent climate, security, and governance fragilities, are pushing the force toward a critical inflexion point. Tomorrow’s session may therefore revisit these priorities, with particular attention to the evolving security dynamics and the region’s dire humanitarian situation.
The Lake Chad Basin, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges. In addition to the impact of climate change, these challenges are largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).
One of the issues likely to feature prominently in tomorrow’s session is the intensifying pattern of insurgent attacks. According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, militant Islamist-related fatalities in the LCB region rose 7 per cent over the past year to 3,982, representing 18 per cent of the continental total, while civilian targeting increased by 32 per cent to 880, the highest since 2016. Nigeria recorded an 18 per cent rise in fatalities, with Borno state alone accounting for 74 per cent of regional deaths; Cameroon registered 467 deaths with a 45 per cent decline, whereas Chad more than doubled to 242. This escalation is accompanied by notable tactical advancements; ISWAP reportedly overran 15 Nigerian military bases, introduced night vision and deployed armed and surveillance drones. Since June, JAS has attacked positions at Baga, Goldavi near Talakatchi, and Kirawa, with night assaults aided by night vision and modified commercial drones, and with reports citing rocket-propelled grenades, armed drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Meanwhile, Insurgent infighting has also resurged. From 5 to 8 November 2025, JAS attacked ISWAP across Lake Chad islands and river routes for control of extortion revenues, arms and fuel smuggling corridors through Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
The other issue expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and placed both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCC’s national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have continued to use surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements and started using drone attacks, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to both enemy intelligence and drone attacks. In this respect, the PSC may reiterate from its last session its call on the AU Commission and international partners to mobilise support required to address these deficits through availing assets, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.’
As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond.’ The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities. In this respect, the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’
Another issue is the follow-up on its decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the coup of June 2023 was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. A major factor for Niger’s severance of ties with MNJTF appears to be the withdrawal of support for Niger. The Communique of the Lake Chad Basin 5th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisation Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’ Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF has created a security void in its Area of Operations in Sector 4 (Diffa), complicating cross-border coordination and patrols along key stretches of the Lake Chad frontier. In this regard, the Council may wish to seek an update on efforts to restore the support to Niger and facilitate its return to MNJTF, recalling its 1282nd meeting at which it took note ‘with deep concern of the withdrawal of the Republic of Niger from TCCs and its impact on the operations of the MNJTF.’
The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilization strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian, and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger, on 27 February 2025, adopted the revised strategy. Subsequently, during its 1282nd session, the PSC endorsed and validated the revised RS-SRR as adopted by the 70th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the LCBC. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy..
The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the dire humanitarian conditions. Insecurity, attacks and violence continue to affect millions. Recurrent flooding is devastating the region, exacerbating existing humanitarian challenges and forcing counterterrorism assets to be diverted to relief operations. MNJTF canoes and army drones were deployed to support evacuations. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that in the first half of 2025, 487 security incidents were recorded, causing 415 deaths. By June 2025, IDPs still numbered 2.9 million, reflecting only a 6 per cent decrease. Around 330,000 refugees have been registered, marking a 23 per cent rise since January 2025. Nigeria remains the epicentre of the crisis, hosting 2.1 million IDPs due to persistent insecurity in the northeast, followed by Cameroon, where over 476,000 people have fled violence in the Far North. An estimated 220,000 children are severely malnourished, with more than 87 per cent of them in Nigeria. As of June 2025, violence and attacks had forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the LCB, 80 per cent of which are in Chad, the most severely affected country. As of September, humanitarian actors had received US$618 million, just 19 per cent of the total funding required. The Council may therefore call for an urgent and coordinated scale-up of humanitarian access and funding, prioritising the protection of civilians, support for severely malnourished children and the reopening and safeguarding of schools, while urging member states and partners to close the 2025 funding gap and align relief with longer-term resilience in the LCB as part of the stabilisation strategy.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express its continued concern over the continued serious threat that Boko Haram and its splinter groups continue to pose in the region. It may also reaffirm its continued support for the MNJTF and the need for predictable and sustainable resources for the MNJTF. Taking forward its call from its last session on the need for provision of additional modern technological capabilities, including drone and anti-drone and jamming technology, the PSC may call for the LCBC working together with the AU Commission to develop a realistic plan on the mobilisation of such support. It may also call for restoring the support given to Niger in its capacity as MNJTF TCC in order to facilitate its return to the MNJTF and remove the void created due to its withdrawal. The PSC may further highlight the need to deepen cooperation between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in order to ensure more coherent cross-border responses commensurate with the transnational nature of the threat. It may also endorse the revised RS–SRR and call on member states to align their national plans with the revised strategy. In addition, considering that the Council held its last field mission to the region in July 2017, whose report was considered at the PSC’s 721st meeting in September 2017. To that end, the Council may seek to follow up on its 1207th decision to conduct a solidarity field mission to the LCB.
8th Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBC
8th Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBC
Date | 16 November 2025
Tomorrow (17 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) are scheduled to hold their 8th Annual Consultative Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November 2025, and Ricklef Beutin, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN and Chairperson of the UNPBC. Following the welcoming remark of the co-chairpersons, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), are expected to make statements. It is the second time that the consultative meeting is being held since the decision of the PSC and the PBC during the 6th Informal Annual Consultative Meeting held in November 2023, to elevate the annual informal consultation into a formal consultative meeting.
Convened during the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Awareness Raising Week, taking place from 17 to 21 November, tomorrow’s session is expected to build on the 7th consultative session. It is to be recalled that, the Joint Statement adopted during the last joint consultations, the 7th Annual Consultative Meeting, emphasised the role of the PBC in convening stakeholders and garnering international support, as well as the role of the AU in implementing and advancing PCRD policy, noting that ‘strengthened cooperation between the AUC-PCRD in Cairo and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (PBSO/DPPA), is essential for implementing the AU-UN MoU on Peacebuilding.’ The Pact for the Future, adopted at the Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024, inculcates renewed political momentum by reaffirming commitment to advancing peacebuilding efforts. The session also comes in the context of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR), which offers a timely opportunity to both sharpen focus on operational effectiveness and measurable impact and to enhance close coordination between the AU and the UN in developing and implementing peacebuilding interventions in Africa.
Against the foregoing background, the first agenda item of the 8th annual consultative meeting is the ‘Review of Collaborative Peacebuilding Efforts and Priorities.’ It is envisaged that the PSC and PSC Chair will take the lead in making a statement on this agenda item. This segment is expected to highlight the collaborative peacebuilding efforts of the AU and the PBC, as well as key achievements in peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa. It will pay particular attention to conflict prevention, sustainable financing and integration of peacebuilding with development priorities, particularly amid the ongoing 2025 PBAR. The PBAR is especially significant when viewed alongside the latest guiding multilateral frameworks, including the newly revised AUPCRD policy, the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future, which collectively call for more coherent and effective global governance approaches to conflict management. During the High-Level Dialogue on ‘Cultivating Consensus Towards a Common African Position on the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review,’ the AU engaged in developing a set of recommendations for consideration in the development of the Common African Position (CAP) on the 2025 PBAR, ensuring Africa’s ownership and leadership in advancing the peacebuilding agenda. This was informed by regional consultations, including the ACCORD-DIRCO-UNPBSO forum of October 2024, in which discussions centred on establishing stronger links between the UN PBSO and regional and national mechanisms to enhance peacebuilding efforts.
The CAP developed and adopted by the PSC in 2020, as Africa’s contribution to the first Review of the UNPBA, identified twelve core peacebuilding priorities that continue to hold relevance today. These include managing transitions which assumed particular significance during the past few years; strengthening inclusive, resilient and responsive governance institutions; advancing transitional justice; preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism; and ensuring sustainable financing for peacebuilding, among others. However, national peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts are increasingly challenged by various, at times intersecting political transitions being pursued in a context mired by terrorism and violent extremism, rising debt distress and cost of living, institutional fragility, breakdown of state-society relations, contested legitimacy of governments, pandemics, rising geopolitical fragmentation and tension and the escalating impacts of climate change. As a result, support to African countries emerging from conflict or navigating complex transitions must be planned and developed to address these interconnected pressures within and as part of a political settlement rather than just as a technical process. It is therefore essential that the current review of the UNPBA reflects and integrates these priority concerns into its deliberations.
The second agenda item focuses on Youth – linkages between development and Peacebuilding. Under this agenda item, it is envisaged that the PSC and the African Union Youth Ambassador for Peace (AYAP) will make the presentation. It is expected that the PBC will also give an update on youth engagement in the Peacebuilding Architecture. In the previous Annual Joint Consultations between the two bodies, both bodies underscored ‘the importance of the Youth Peace and Security Agenda and to leverage the AU’s Youth Decade Plan of Action and the PBC’s Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding to promote the inclusion of youth in peacebuilding efforts, including by building their capacities, skills and livelihoods to actively contribute to sustaining peace and development.’ This focus on youth comes at a time when Generation Z (GenZ) protests have become recurrent, highlighting the growing disenchantment of the majority youthful population on the continent with the state of governance and economic opportunities. As highlighted in our analysis of the PSC’s 1310th session on YPS and migration held early in the month, increasing youth migration and the entanglement of migration with various threats to peace and security is another manifestation of the discontent with the pervasive development and governance deficits in various parts of the continent. These clearly indicate the need for systematic peacebuilding interventions that address the twin challenges of development and governance deficits stunting opportunities for youth.
The PBC’s presentation is expected to highlight its involvement in initiatives such as the Africa Regional Consultation for the Second Independent Progress Study on YPS, mandated by Action 20 of the Pact for the Future. This forum provided a platform to highlight new narratives and contributions that young people are making in peace processes. Moreso, the Peacebuilding Support Office, together with partners, commissioned the 2025 Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Thematic Review on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), which highlights best practices and lessons from 41 PBF-funded projects across 33 countries (2018 – 2022). The review outlines how these initiatives expanded opportunities for youth participation in decision-making by supporting youth councils, strengthening stakeholder dialogue and fostering youth networks and YPS linkages, which also contributed to the development of National Action Plans and other national strategies on YPS.
The third and last agenda item of the 8th consultative meeting is a discussion on ‘Peacebuilding Initiatives in South Sudan, Sahel countries and the Lake Chad Basin.’ The fragile political and security situation in those areas has compelled the AU to intensify its efforts to respond effectively. Since early 2025, the PSC has intensified its engagement on the situation in South Sudan in response to escalating political and security instability. Since clashes erupted in March between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), a recent Amani Africa briefing to the UNSC on the situation in South Sudan highlighted that the fragile peace established under the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is in grave peril and the country is on the cusp of relapsing back to full-scale war. For pursuing meaningful peacebuilding, the briefing emphasized that the downward spiral to full-scale conflict should be arrested through robust and prompt preventive diplomacy; measures that restore commitment of the parties to the 2018 peace agreement such as dialogue should be urgently implemented; and support to the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), particularly in enhancing protection of civilians and advancing sub-national peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts should be sustained.
The situation in the Sahel countries epitomises the challenges to peacebuilding efforts in political transition taking place in a context of violent extremism and conflict involving terrorist groups and a geopolitical context of absence of trust and broken regional and international relationships. As highlighted in the edition of Insight on the PSC for the informal consultation with countries in transition held on 13 November, pursuing the transition process for restoration of constitutional order (and by extension peacebuilding activities) cannot be separated from and need to be part of a wider stabilization and state authority expansion strategy backed by a security mechanism they develop and deploy together with the Sahel countries to address the existential threat facing these countries.
Finally, in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), despite the sustained efforts being deployed by the LCB Commission and the MNJTF, Boko Haram remains an existential threat to peace and security in the area and the wider region. The gravity of this threat has not diminished, and the MNJTF has not been able to break this status quo. At the same time, the emergence of developments weakening the MNJTF and persisting vulnerabilities due to climate, security and governance fragilities are fast bringing the MNJTF to a turning point. Yet, given the important contribution of the stabilisation strategy for the region, the challenge is how to scale up peacebuilding interventions and expand the nature and focus of such interventions in the region.
The expected outcome is a joint statement. The two bodies are expected to encourage Member States to integrate peacebuilding and social cohesion into their National Development Strategies, emphasising strong national ownership and leadership, as well as the inclusive participation of all segments of society, particularly women and youth. The meeting is also likely to reiterate the urge for international partners, including in the UN System, as well as international and regional financial institutions, to align and coordinate their peacebuilding-related efforts in Africa, with nationally led peacebuilding, regionally and continentally supported efforts, with particular emphasis on addressing the twin challenges of development and governance deficits triggering youth protests and migration. The two bodies are also likely to stress the importance of effective partnership and cooperation, including with the regional and sub-regional organisations, to improve coordination and cooperation in peacebuilding, and increase synergies to ensure the coherence and complementarity of such efforts. The AUPSC and UNPBC are also expected to highlight the importance of political commitment on the part of national political actors and authorities and the need for pursuing peacebuilding as part of a political settlement that has solid support from various sectors of society and all political and social forces, including the youth and women.
Pan-Africanism and Its Contemporary Challenges: Reclaiming Africa’s Political Project
Pan-Africanism and Its Contemporary Challenges: Reclaiming Africa’s Political Project
Date | 13 November 2025
Abdul Mohammed*
Pan-Africanism, at its core, is not a cultural aspiration or sentimental slogan—it is a political project. It was born of struggle, forged in the furnace of slavery, colonialism, and racial domination, and matured through the anti-colonial liberation movements of the 20th century. Its essence is the sovereign determination of African peoples to shape their own destiny—to liberate themselves from all forms of external servitude, whether colonial, neocolonial, or neoliberal.
Pan-Africanism’s central purpose was never merely to unite for unity’s sake. It was a response to fragmentation—the deliberate fracturing of Africa by slavery and colonial borders. That fragmentation persists today, in new and more insidious forms: economic dependency, ideological subservience, the weaponization of identity, and the erosion of common purpose. The Pan-African project, therefore, remains unfinished.
The Political Essence of Pan-Africanism
Before African states were born, Pan-Africanism existed as a people’s movement, transcending boundaries and calling for a shared African identity anchored in solidarity, dignity, and self-determination. To renew that mission today, Africa must transcend the limits of the colonial nation-state and reconstruct Pan-Africanism as a continental and global political project of the African people.
The Founding Generation: Political Leadership in Command
Modern African history demonstrates that progress has only been made when politics was in command—when leadership was visionary, competent, and grounded in the ideals of Pan-African liberation.
The first generation of African leaders understood the task before them: to complete the decolonization of Africa and overcome the legacy of political and territorial fragmentation. Their project gave rise to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the Lagos Plan of Action—institutions that sought to translate Pan-African ideals into collective political and economic action.
These leaders—Nkrumah, Nyerere, Nasser, Haile Selassie, Senghor, and others—saw Pan-Africanism as both a philosophy of liberation and a strategy for integration. Their achievements liberated the continent from colonial rule, but the project reached its limits as post-independence politics became entangled in Cold War rivalries, coups d’état, and external domination.
The Generation that midwifed the transition from OAU to AU: Africa’s Renaissance and Reinvention
The dawn of the 21st century marked Africa’s rebirth—a period of renewal guided by a new generation of leaders who sought to restore Pan-Africanism as a credible political project. The transition from the OAU to the African Union (AU) symbolized a renaissance in African political thought and leadership.
Under initiatives such as NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Africa attempted to reclaim ownership of its governance and development. This was the golden period of the modern Pan-African project—a time of optimism, coherence, and political seriousness.
Important charters were established: the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). These instruments reflected a political reimagination of the African state as a capable, legitimate, and people-centered institution.
The Current Moment: Fragmentation, Transactionalism, and Bureaucratic Capture
The past decade has seen the degradation of leadership both at national and continental levels. A new era of transactional politics has displaced the Pan-African spirit. The continental project is now dominated by bureaucratic Pan-Africanists—functionaries without political vision or courage.
Africa’s position in global affairs has weakened despite symbolic gains such as membership in the G20 and expanded participation in BRICS. State capture and corruption have eroded leadership legitimacy. The Pan-African project has been depoliticized, reduced to administrative routine, while external powers continue to shape Africa’s strategic direction through economic leverage and military patronage. The collapse of multilateralism globally has compounded Africa’s vulnerability.
Reclaiming ‘African Solutions to African Problems’
One of the most telling indicators of Africa’s drift is the hollowing out of the once-powerful principle: African solutions to African problems. Originally conceived as part of the African Renaissance agenda, it meant the ownership of problem definition and solution design by Africans.
Today, this principle has been weaponized into inertia—a rhetorical shield for inaction. To restore its meaning, African leaders must return it to its political essence: a Pan-African commitment to self-determination, collective responsibility and accountability.
Mediation, Leadership, and the Crisis of Political Competence
Nowhere is Africa’s political decline more evident than in the domain of mediation and peace processes. From the Great Lakes to the Horn of Africa, external actors dominate African conflicts. Mediation—an inherently political act—has been reduced to transactional deal-making dominated by transactional external actors.
Yet mediation, more than peacekeeping, requires political competence, moral authority, and strategic clarity. Africa’s priority must be to reclaim the political nature of mediation—to train and empower mediators who are politically literate and Pan-African in outlook.
The Path Forward: Repoliticizing Pan-Africanism
Pan-Africanism today stands at a crossroads. Either it becomes irrelevant, buried under bureaucratic inertia, or it is repoliticized—revived as a people’s movement guided by serious, principled leadership dedicated to advancing freedom of Africans from want, fear and external domination.
The tasks before us are clear: reclaim the political identity of Pan-Africanism, nurture a new generation of competent leaders, rebuild the African state as a people-centered institution, and develop a continental strategy to navigate the emerging multipolar global order.
Pan-Africanism remains the only project that offers Africa the possibility of collective dignity and survival in an uncertain world. The time has come to return politics to command—to revive Pan-Africanism not as nostalgia, but as a living, disciplined political project rooted in the people.
* Abdul Mohammed, who served as senior official in both AU and UN mediation processes, is one of Africa’s leading mediation practitioners and experts.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Media, Peace and Security
Media, Peace and Security
Date | 13 November 2025
Tomorrow (14 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1311th Session virtually under the theme ‘Media, Peace and Security.’
Following opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, the Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. It is also anticipated that Ourveena Geereesha Topsy-Sonoo, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), will make a presentation alongside Omar Faruk Osman, President of the Federation of African Journalists (FAJ).
Tomorrow’s session builds on the Council’s growing recognition of the role that information ecosystems play in shaping peace, security, and governance outcomes on the continent. Although the PSC held sessions on media regarding the protection of journalists and access to information in conflict situations (1230th Session), in relation to emerging technologies (1097th Session), and how media can enhance accountability on Women, Peace and Security Commitments (635th Session), tomorrow’s session is expected to broaden the discussion to the larger nexus between media, peacebuilding, and democratic stability. The session comes at a time when Africa’s information landscape is transforming rapidly, marked by the expansion of digital technologies, social media platforms, and citizen journalism. While these technologies have empowered civic expression, they have also become potent tools for spreading misinformation, hate, incitement of violence and fueling polarisation in the continent’s fragile security environments.
Recently, it has been observed that in some countries, the manipulation of media at a time of conflict and elections has demonstrated how easily information spaces can turn into battlegrounds. Africa’s history demonstrates the destructive potential of media when manipulated to fuel conflict, from the role of radio in inciting violence during Rwanda’s genocide to the weaponisation of digital platforms in Sudan’s ongoing war. In Sudan, rival factions have launched aggressive online campaigns using hashtags such as #SudanIsBleeding and #ProtectSudaneseCivilians, each seeking to control the narrative and claim victimhood. Analysts describe Sudan’s online space as both a ‘coordinated theatre of emotional and political manipulation’ and a ‘parallel battlefield,’ where competing propaganda shapes perceptions as powerfully as weapons on the ground.
The rise of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has also opened a new front in disinformation across Africa, where fake audio, deep fake videos, and endorsements are being used to sway elections and trigger instability. For example, the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria, described as witnessing possibly the first large-scale use of AI-generated electoral content on the continent and the 2024 polls in South Africa, where deep‑fakes depicted the U.S. President Biden issuing threats, to influence public opinion and undermine trust in the electoral process.
On the other hand, there is the use of media by violent extremist groups. Al‑Shabaab not only crafts consistent narratives across Facebook, Telegram, X, YouTube and other media outlets, but also rapidly adapts to platform moderation, creating backup accounts and shifting platforms as needed, thus turning online spaces into an integral front of its overall insurgency strategy. In this regard, the PSC during its 1097th session held in August 2022 has also addressed the dual role of emerging technologies and new media in Africa, recognising their potential to advance democratic governance, peace and sustainable development, while expressing deep concern about their misuse for cyber‑attacks, disinformation, extremist propaganda and hate speech. During that session, the Council requested the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study on Emerging Technologies and New Media: Impact on Democratic Governance, Peace and Security in Africa, which is expected to be followed up on during tomorrow’s session.
Given that the session takes place only days after the commemoration of the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists (2 November), tomorrow’s discussions are expected to place strong emphasis on the protection of journalists in conflict settings. While Africa has made commendable progress, with 29 countries having adopted Access to Information laws, journalists, particularly those operating in conflict-affected areas, continue to face grave dangers, including harassment, arbitrary detention, and killings. Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Sahel region remain among the most perilous environments for media practitioners.
A related and equally critical dimension is the plight of women journalists, who are disproportionately impacted by gender-based violence, underrepresentation, and discriminatory media practices. Notably, the gendered nature of online abuse has become increasingly severe; a recent survey by the International Centre for Journalists revealed that 73% of women journalists have experienced online violence, with 25% receiving threats of physical harm and 18% facing threats of sexual violence. In this regard, the ACHPR, in its Press Statement marking the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, called on African states, technology companies, and civil society to adopt concrete and gender-responsive measures to end impunity for crimes against journalists and ensure a safe and enabling environment for all media professionals.
In view of the foregoing and building on earlier recommendations of the 1230th Session, the PSC could discuss developments regarding national adoption of Access to Information (ATI) laws and gender-sensitive protection mechanisms for women journalists who face distinct threats in both online and physical media environments. Furthermore, the session may consider reviewing progress made on implementing international declarations and resolutions aimed at enhancing the safety of journalists. The Council could also revisit its previous recommendation for AU member states to establish a Working Group on the Protection of Journalists and National Coordination Mechanisms for the Safety of Journalists, while also following up on its call to form a Group of Friends for the Safety of Journalists within the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to collaborate with relevant stakeholders, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) journalists’ networks to strengthen coordination, promote accountability, and ensure a secure environment for media practitioners across the continent.
Another point that is expected to be covered during tomorrow’s session is the phenomenon of media capture and exclusionary representation, which presents formidable obstacles to democratic governance and peacebuilding. On the one hand, the consolidation of media ownership by political elites or business interests, commonly manifested in state-controlled or influenced outlets, impairs independent journalism and skews public discourse: for example, a study found that in parts of Africa other than North Africa, 98 % of the 131 media outlets surveyed were either state-controlled or captured by public/state entities. On the other hand, media narratives routinely marginalise women, youth, minorities and conflict-affected communities, curtailing their voice in public dialogue and thereby eroding inclusive social cohesion.
Despite the dangers, media and technology can also be harnessed constructively to advance peace, reconciliation, and democratic resilience. UNESCO’s recent Social Media 4 Peace project, piloted in Kenya and other countries, exemplifies how digital platforms can be leveraged to promote peace-positive narratives and counter misinformation that fuels division. Similarly, country-level initiatives such as Nigeria’s PesaCheck and Ghana’s CDD fact-checking groups play a vital role in debunking false rumours and mitigating the risk of violence through real-time information verification. Building on these positive innovations, tomorrow’s PSC session presents an important opportunity not only to reaffirm the role of media in early warning and conflict prevention but also to broaden the discussion toward its strategic use in peacebuilding, transitional justice, and mediation processes. The PSC has previously underscored that access to credible and timely information is central to early warning systems and conflict-sensitive decision-making. However, beyond crisis detection, the media can be a platform for facilitating dialogue, supporting reconciliation narratives, and fostering inclusive participation in transitional justice mechanisms. As such, the Council may explore how partnerships with media actors and digital platforms can be institutionalised within the AU’s peace and security architecture, not only as tools for alert and prevention but as enduring instruments for sustaining peace, accountability, and post-conflict healing.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s PSC session is a press statement. With the aim of strengthening the role of the media in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, the PSC is expected to encourage the AU Commission to integrate media analysis, digital monitoring, and fact-checking partnerships into its early warning and preventive diplomacy initiatives. The Council may also urge post-conflict states to collaborate with media institutions to promote reconciliation narratives, amplify transitional justice messages, and give visibility to victims and marginalised communities. On the safety of journalists, the PSC may reiterate its call to establish a Working Group and a Group of Friends on the Protection of Journalists within the PRC, while urging member states to create National Coordination Mechanisms comprising government, media, civil society, and law enforcement to address threats and impunity. It may further call for the inclusion of measures addressing online and offline gender-based violence against women journalists in national policies. To counter disinformation and hate speech, the PSC may request the AU Commission to expedite completion of the study on Emerging Technologies and New Media and use its findings to develop a continental framework on Digital Peace and Information Integrity. Lastly, the PSC may urge states to align national media and digital governance laws with the ACHPR Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and promote collaboration between the AU, UNESCO, ACHPR, FAJ, and regional journalist networks to enhance training on digital literacy, conflict-sensitive reporting, and responsible media engagement in peace operations.
Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sudan)
Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sudan)
Date | 12 November 2025
Tomorrow (13 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with countries in political transition—namely Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan.
This will be the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods in April 2023, following its 14th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. The informal consultation was established to enable direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. It drew on Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Tomorrow’s consultation is expected to examine progress made and challenges encountered in ongoing transitions since the last consultation in March 2025.
One notable development since the previous consultation was the lifting of Gabon’s suspension from the AU despite the fact that the elections did not comply with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) on the ineligibility of perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government in elections organised to restore constitutional order. As noted in our April 2025 Monthly Digest, Nguema’s participation and victory, in clear violation of ACDEG, and the subsequent lifting of Gabon’s suspension without the PSC affirming its full commitment to Article 25(4), is not without consequences for AU’s purported policy of zero tolerance to coups. It signalled to coup makers and members of the military in other African countries that the PSC may be ‘willing not to insist on full compliance with AU norms if they opt for speeding up the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order as long as they hold elections.’
Not surprisingly, Guinea’s coup leader and interim president, Mamady Doumbouya, is poised to follow Gabon’s path as the country prepares for elections. The PSC is likely to discuss technical and financial support for credible elections and, echoing its 1284th session, emphasise the importance of inclusivity in Guinea’s political process. In this respect, Guinea’s representative is expected to highlight progress toward the ‘restoration’ of constitutional order, particularly the September 2025 constitutional referendum and the general elections scheduled for 28 December 2025 and the electoral support the country needs. These elections are meant to conclude Guinea’s transition period. However, Doumbouya formally entered the presidential race in early November—reneging on his earlier pledge not to run. The PSC, during its field mission to Conakry in May and its 1284th session, urged the transition authorities to honour their commitment to complete the transition by December 2025, but stopped short of reminding them of the prohibition under Article 25(4) of ACDEG against coup leaders contesting elections. With Doumbouya now a candidate—and his victory highly probable—the PSC may follow the exact approach it applied to Gabon, unless the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), raises concern. Under the circumstances, whether or not the coup leaders in other countries will run for elections is now a matter of their choice and is not expected to face any opposition from the AU for non-compliance with Article 24(5) of ACDEG.
Similarly, Sudan’s representative may raise the issue of lifting the country’s suspension, citing the May 2025 appointment of Kamil al-Tayeb Idris as civilian Prime Minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chair of the Transitional Sovereign Council and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Following the appointment, it is to be recalled that the Chairperson of the AU Commission welcomed it as ‘a step towards inclusive governance.’ However, the appointment of the Prime Minister was not a result of national dialogue, nor did it involve the participation of Sudanese political and social forces. Indeed, discussions around the lifting of Sudan’s suspension remain premature under the prevailing circumstances, where the deteriorating security situation does not allow for an inclusive political process, there is no national dialogue and a clear pathway for the eventual convening of elections. In the light of recent developments including the fall of El Fasher, the last remaining major city in Darfur, into the hands of the para military Rapid Support Forces, marking the de facto partition of Sudan, the discussion may centre on deploying a mechanism for humanitarian and civilian protection in El Fasher and identifying credible pathways for accelerating efforts for peace as well as implementing the previous decisions of the PSC on the situation in Sudan.
Meanwhile, in the remaining countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—relations with the regional bloc ECOWAS remain strained, as the three states continue consolidating their alliance through the confederation established in 2024. It is becoming increasingly clear that the security situation gets in the way of and provides a pretext for the lack of focused progress in the transition process. In Mali, the National Transitional Council adopted a bill on 3 July 2025 revising the Transitional Charter, granting General Assimi Goïta a renewable five-year term as President of the Transition ‘until peace is restored.’ Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the transition period was extended for another five years, starting in July 2024—the year initially planned for its conclusion. The new charter, signed by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, also allows him to contest in the elections. Niger has taken a similar path. A national conference on rebuilding the country in February 2025 decided that the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP), which seized power in July 2023, would remain in power for five years without any clear timeline for elections.
The Council is therefore expected to reiterate the concerns expressed during its 1304th ministerial session on 30 September 2025, which noted with ‘deep concern’ the ‘slow pace of political transition processes’ and urged the transitional authorities to accelerate inclusive transitions, engage all stakeholders, and facilitate genuine political dialogue. It may also again call on these authorities to adhere to their respective transitional roadmaps and operationalise joint transition monitoring committees.
While the issue of progress in the transition process may be the focus of the session, this cannot be separated from and is deeply tied to the possibility of arresting the deepening and widening threat facing these countries. A major issue for tomorrow’s session is the question of how AU and ECOWAS overhaul their approach by integrating the quest for restoration of constitutional order into a wider stabilisation and state authority expansion strategy backed by a security mechanism they develop and deploy together with the Sahel countries to address the existential threat facing these countries.
As such, tomorrow’s consultation needs to both situate the discussion on transition in these countries within the insecurity facing them and consider the kind of role the AU and ECOWAS bring to the counterterrorism efforts of these countries. Similar to Sudan and unlike Gabon and Guinea, the push for progress in the transitional process cannot be abstracted out of the pressing issue facing these countries, which is the terrorism menace that has grown to become an existential threat to these countries. A clear illustration of this involves the recent developments in Mali, with the capital Bamako under imminent threat and cut off from supply routes. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, has expanded operations from the north and centre into the western and southern regions of Mali. Its fuel blockade since September has caused severe shortages, power cuts, and economic paralysis in Bamako and other cities, triggering public unrest and fears of broader instability. Weekly fuel deliveries have reportedly fallen from 1,000 to 200 tankers. Facing mounting pressure, General Goïta has replaced several senior military officials, including the deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, the head of military security and the ground forces’ chief of staff, highlighting internal strains within the regime.
The PSC is also expected to discuss the AU’s recent intensified diplomatic engagement with these Sahelian countries and explore ways to enhance coordination. In May, the AU Commission Chairperson met representatives of the three countries in Addis Ababa to explore renewed engagement. This was followed by a visit from Angola’s Minister of External Relations—delivering a message from President João Lourenço, the current AU Chairperson—reaffirming the AU’s commitment to Sahel stability and counterterrorism efforts. In July, the AU Chairperson appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Angola also proposed hosting a summit on the Sahel in Luanda, welcomed by the PSC during its 1304th session. Additionally, former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara was appointed as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL). The PSC also decided to establish a Task Force to support counterterrorism in the region and called for a field visit by Special Envoy Ndayishimiye to engage directly with the transitional authorities. In this context, the informal consultation could provide an opportunity to discuss how to advance these initiatives and follow up on the decision of PSC and ECOWAS during their annual consultative meeting last May ‘to develop a security cooperation framework involving the AU and ECOWAS engagement with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, in order to more effectively address insecurity in the West Africa Region.’
On the other hand, the representative of Sudan is expected to update the PSC on the recent developments in the conflict in Sudan, including the fall of El-Fasher—the last major SAF stronghold— to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 26 October, and on reports of attacks on civilians and mass killings committed during and after the takeover. During the emergency meeting held in Sudan on 28 October, the PSC ‘strongly’ condemned the ‘criminal activities against Sudanese civilians and the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, perpetrated by the paramilitary RSF’. The emergency session further requested the AU Commission to regularly monitor and report heinous crimes committed in Sudan, develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation, develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks. It also requested the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to urgently undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. While meeting these deadlines may prove challenging, tomorrow’s consultation could consider ways Sudan might facilitate the implementation of these tasks.
As with previous consultations, tomorrow’s engagement is not expected to result in an outcome document.
