Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Date | 24 August 2025
Tomorrow (25 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its second annual joint consultative meeting with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
Following opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025 and Stella Chiripo Ndau, Chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks.
This year’s meeting, scheduled to take place virtually, builds on the commitment made during the inaugural consultative meeting held on 30 August 2024 in Gaborone, Botswana, where both parties agreed to institutionalise annual consultations alternating between Addis Ababa and Gaborone. Rooted in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, the meeting reflects ongoing efforts to strengthen coordination and collaboration in advancing peace, security and stability in the Southern Africa region.
At last year’s inaugural meeting, the PSC and SADC Organ reflected on lessons learned from SADC’s engagements through the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). The agenda covered terrorism and violent extremism in Southern Africa, the situation in eastern DRC, resource mobilisation for regional peace operations, and peacemaking efforts under the AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative. The meeting also underscored the historic significance of institutionalising a structured PSC–SADC platform as a vital step toward enhancing regional responses to peace and security threats.
One of the agenda items in tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to be the situation in Eastern DRC and SADC’s engagement. SAMIDRC, launched to stabilise eastern DRC, officially began a phased withdrawal on 29 April 2025 and concluded its military mandate earlier than anticipated, raising concerns about the sustainability of SADC’s military interventions. The forced withdrawal, announced on 13 March 2025 following military setbacks, further highlighted the need for reassessing the processes, including the coordination required with the AU, in the deployment of such a mission and the need for aligning of the legal basis in initiating and deploying such missions at the SADC level with that of the AU both for ensuring coherence and avoiding the kind of setbacks that SAMIDRC experienced.
Both the PSC and the SADC Organ have previously raised alarm over inadequate, unpredictable, and unsustainable funding for peace operations. This issue became a major challenge for SADC’s missions in both Mozambique and DRC, despite the fact that SADC tried to self-finance a significant portion of the funding for the missions. The issue of funding is another major area where the experience of both SAMIM and SAMIDRC highlight the necessity for rethinking SADC’s approach and find ways of aligning its processes with that of the AU as a critical step to establish the ground work for enabling future missions to benefit from UN assessed contributions within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2719.
The recent development in the DRC Peace Process is also expected to be of central concern in tomorrow’s agenda. Despite the withdrawal of SAMIDRC, SADC continues to provide ongoing support for political and diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict in the region. Following the direction by the Joint EAC-SADC summit of 8 February 2025 for the merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes, former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Uhuru Kenyatta, Sahle-Work Zewde, Mokgweetsi Masisi and Catherine Samba-Panza as facilitators.
In a further step to rationalize and create a single structure, a meeting of the co-chairs of the Joint EAC–SADC summit and the Panel of Facilitators held on 1 August 2025 in Nairobi adopted a framework for the merger of the Nairobi and Luanda processes and agreed to integrate AU, EAC, and SADC mediation structures under a joint secretariat led by the AU Commission in Addis Ababa to overcome fragmentation and enhance coherence in mediation efforts. Two of the outcomes are of particular interest for tomorrow’s meeting.
The first of this is the decision that entrusted the lead role to the AU Commission in respect to the joint secretariat of the merged peace process, thereby assigning an enhanced coordination role of the AU on this file. The consultations are expected to explore strategies on how to take this forward in practical terms.
Second and most notably, the outcome document called for ‘all other ongoing initiatives and stakeholders to align with the Africa-led process’, hence purporting to assert primacy.
This is where the merged framework also intersects with other external initiatives. The US-mediated Washington Peace Accord of 27 June 2025 sought to de-escalate tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, while Qatar facilitated dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23, culminating in a 23 April 2025 Declaration of Principles. Although Doha’s attempt to broker a peace agreement in August is yet to materialise, Qatar’s continued involvement underscores the growing role of external actors in African peace processes, a dynamic with both opportunities and risks to African-led conflict prevention and resolution practices.
At the political level, the 45th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government on 17 August 2025 reaffirmed commitment to peace and stability in the DRC and welcomed the AU – EAC -SADC joint mediation efforts. The summit also called for complementarity and harmonisation between Africa-led processes and other initiatives, underscoring the importance of maintaining continental leadership while leveraging external support.
Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is also expected to deliberate and make actionable decisions towards responding to the need for sustainable funding for peace operations, building on commitments from last year’s consultative meeting to jointly explore innovative means of joint internal resource mobilisation for peace operations, including special levies, private sector partnerships and continental financial entities.
The expected outcome of the second annual joint consultative meeting is a joint communique. The meeting is expected to reiterate the primacy of the role of the PSC as provided for in Article 16 of the Protocol establishing the PSC and the role of the SADC organ as provided for in the relevant SADC instruments. The two organs are expected to also reaffirm their commitment to regular, structured cooperation and interoperable early warning systems that respond to identified gaps in coordination due to structural differences. They may also call on the AU Commission and SADC Secretariat on identifying ways and means of enhancing policy coherence of SADC with the AU based on the lessons from SAMIDRC and the need for creating the foundation for operationalising UNSC Resolution 2719 for future deployments. On the DRC, the meeting is anticipated to welcome the outcome of the meeting of EAC–SADC Co-Chairs and call on the AU Commission to work with SADC and EAC secretariats to speed up the process of the joint secretariat and joint mediation framework. It is also expected that while welcoming some of the progress registered with the signing of agreements in Washington and the Declaration of Principles in Doha, the two bodies may echo the call of the joint SADC-EAC co-chairs meeting on the need for closer coordination and alignment with African initiatives.
Consideration of the ToRs of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD
Consideration of the ToRs of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD
Date | 14 August 2025
Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1297th session to consider the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism. Although not initially on the August 2025 programme of work, the PSC is also expected to consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).
Following opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make introductory remarks. Michael Wamai, Expert from Uganda and the Chairperson of the Committee of Experts (CoE) of the PSC for July 2025, is expected to make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on PCRD. In addition, Mohamed Lamine Nait Youcef, Expert from Algeria and Chairperson of the CoE of the PSC for August 2025, will make a presentation on the ToR of the PSC Sub-committee on Counter-Terrorism.
Building on the CoE’s 78th meeting on the ‘review of the Draft Terms of Reference of the Peace and Security Council Subcommittee on Counter-Terrorism’ held on 1 August, the Sub-Committee’s establishment aligns with the Malabo Decision of May 2022, the 249th PSC meeting of November 2010 and the 1182nd PSC meeting of 2023, which emphasised the urgent need to activate this body to address the growing complexity of terrorism in Africa. The proposed ToR outlines the Sub-Committee’s objectives, mandate, composition and operational modalities, aiming to enhance the PSC’s ability to respond to terrorism through African-led strategies, coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and collaboration with AU bodies like the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), AFRIPOL and CISSA. The Sub-Committee is tasked with monitoring PSC decisions, assessing trends in continental terrorism, and promoting a multidimensional approach to addressing the structural causes of terrorism.
Africa continues to face an unprecedented surge in terrorist activities, with the Sahel region emerging as the global epicentre of terrorism. According to the AUCTC, terrorist attacks increased by 99% and related deaths by 53% in 2023 compared to the previous year, with West Africa accounting for 45% of attacks and 62% of deaths in Q2 of 2024. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remain the most affected, with groups like Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Al-Shabaab and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) expanding their reach. The spread of terrorism to coastal West African states like Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire, alongside emerging links between piracy and terrorism in the Gulf of Guinea, underscores the evolving threat landscape. Initiatives such as the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism (AUMCCT) and the African Counter-Terrorism Coordination Task Force (A2CTF), as mandated in the 1237th PSC meeting of October 2024, have been established to mitigate this. However, challenges such as the dissolution of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, political instability and foreign interference have hampered regional coordination. The 2024 Global Terrorism Index highlights Burkina Faso as the world’s most terrorism-affected country, emphasising the need for a shift from military-centric to holistic, governance-focused strategies.
The PSC and AU Assembly have issued several decisions to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts. The 2022 Malabo Declaration called for the immediate operationalisation of the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the establishment of the AUMCCT. The 1182nd PSC meeting, on the other hand, urged the full activation of the Sub-Committee and the A2CTF, emphasising context-specific interventions. Additionally, the 1237th PSC meeting welcomed the AU Commission’s report on combating terrorism, condemning foreign interference and calling for sustainable funding for AU-led peace support operations (PSOs) under UNSC Resolution 2719. It also emphasised psychosocial support for victims and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism. Notwithstanding, The Abuja Process Declaration of 2024 reinforced the need for regional cooperation and institutional building to address terrorism’s evolving nature. Despite these decisions, implementation gaps persist, including delays in operationalising the Sub-Committee, limited funding for counter-terrorism initiatives, and weak coordination between AU bodies and RECs/RMs. The PSC further noted the growing nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime, such as illicit resource exploitation, which remains inadequately addressed.
The draft ToRs provides a foundational framework for the Sub-Committee’s role in coordinating counter-terrorism efforts, monitoring PSC decisions, and promoting African-led solutions. However, several gaps warrant attention. First, there is ambiguity in the mandate scope: while the ToR outline broad functions such as recommending strategies and monitoring PSC decisions, they lack specificity on operational mechanisms, timelines and accountability frameworks. Funding mechanisms are also insufficiently addressed; although a proposed annual budget is mentioned, sustainable funding sources are not identified, despite the PSC’s call for predictable financing in its October 2024 meeting and the operationalisation of the AU Special Fund for Counter-Terrorism remains stalled. In addition, while the ToR references a multidimensional approach to addressing structural causes of terrorism, it does not explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, or climate-induced insecurity, which the AU Commission’s 2024 report identified as key drivers. The framework does not also address the growing use of advanced technologies, including drones and digital platforms, by terrorist groups and finally, the need for psychosocial support for victims, particularly women and youth, is imperative. The ToR does not incorporate mechanisms to ensure gender-sensitive or victim-centered approaches.
To strengthen the ToRs and enhance the Sub-Committee’s effectiveness, the PSC and AU Commission should clarify operational mechanisms by defining specific procedures for punitive measures, intelligence sharing and strategy development, including timelines for reporting and decision-making and adopt a quarterly review mechanism to track progress on PSC decisions. In light of the increasing number of PSC Sub-Committees, the PSC should give due consideration to ensuring that the Sub-Committees receive the necessary support to execute their given mandates effectively and efficiently, while exploring partnerships with international donors without compromising African ownership. Regional coordination can be improved by establishing a formal framework with RECs and RMs, including joint task forces and regular consultations, to harmonise regional counter-terrorism strategies and address gaps left by the G5 Sahel’s dissolution. The mandate should explicitly integrate governance, socioeconomic development, and climate resilience, potentially in collaboration with the AU Centre for PCRD, to address the root causes of terrorism. Emerging technologies should also be addressed by including measures to counter drones, cyberattacks and digital propaganda, leveraging technical partnerships with AFRIPOL and CISSA. Victim-centred approaches, on the other hand, should be prioritised through programmes for psychosocial support and reintegration, particularly for women and youth, with gender mainstreaming embedded in all activities. Finally, accountability should be strengthened by introducing a robust monitoring and evaluation framework, with regular reporting to the PSC and AU Assembly on progress and challenges.
On the other hand, the PSC will consider the ToR for the Sub-committee on PCRD. The establishment of the Sub-Committee on PCRD is rooted in the AU’s recognition of the evolving nature of conflicts in Africa, which demand coherent, coordinated and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction strategies. The AU’s Policy on PCRD, revised in 2024, emphasises holistic approaches combining peacebuilding, institutional capacity-building, socio-economic recovery and reconciliation. The Sub-Committee, established under Article 8(5) of the PSC Protocol, is designed to receive assignments and mandates on specific post-conflict situations from the PSC. It will monitor political, socio-economic, and security developments across the continent in collaboration with the relevant units of the AU Commission, the AU PCRD Center, AUDA-NEPAD, APRM, other AU organs, institutions, entities and RECs/RMs and make recommendations to the PSC on required interventions. The Sub-Committee will oversee the implementation of PCRD activities and decisions adopted or endorsed by the PSC, providing regular updates on progress. It will also seek, at a technical level, relevant information from AU Member States, RECs/RMs, and partners regarding actions taken to implement PCRD measures, and offer recommendations to enhance their effectiveness. Furthermore, it will identify key areas for capacity building, financial support and technical assistance needed by Member States in post-conflict situations, and propose appropriate measures for PSC consideration. Lastly, the Sub-Committee will advise on resource mobilisation strategies, including innovative financing solutions, to sustain long-term PCRD efforts and ensure lasting recovery and development.
Recent PSC and Assembly decisions underscore the urgency of this initiative. The 1293rd PSC meeting on 4 August highlighted the worsening humanitarian and security crisis in Sudan, calling for enhanced PCRD efforts to address famine and conflict escalation. Similarly, the 1291st meeting in July 2025 addressed the situation in Libya, emphasising the need for coordinated post-conflict strategies. The AU Assembly’s Decision [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.(XVI)] and 1122nd PSC meeting of November 2022 further reinforced the mandate for PCRD, stressing the prevention of conflict relapse through governance and socio-economic interventions. The Sub-Committee’s formation comes at a time when Africa faces persistent and emerging threats, including terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government and complex political transitions. The PSC’s recent engagements, such as the July 2025 Joint Consultative Meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in Midrand, South Africa, emphasised enhancing institutional synergy to implement PSC decisions and promote post-conflict recovery.
To afford this sub-committee its relevance, institutional synergy is important. In this regard, the Sub-Committee should prioritise coordination with RECs/RMs, the PCRD Centre in Cairo, AUDA-NEPAD and the APRM to prevent fragmented efforts, while leveraging existing platforms like the I-RECKE Policy Sessions to share best practices. Tailored PCRD strategies are also essential, with the Sub-Committee developing country-specific frameworks to address unique post-conflict challenges. Finally, sustainable financing must be pursued, with the AU Commission exploring innovative funding models, including public-private partnerships, to ensure the long-term sustainability of PCRD initiatives.
It is also worth noting that the Sub-Committees will be composed of the fifteen (15) Member States of the PSC, represented at the level of experts. Given the nature of their work, each Member State on the Council—and therefore in each Sub-Committee—will designate two experts, with one serving as the main representative and the other as a substitute, though both will be able to participate in the Sub-Committees’ activities.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué or a summary record. The PSC may welcome and endorse the refined ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committees on Counter-Terrorism and PCRD, commending the Committee of Experts for their engagement in the process. Council is also likely to direct the AU Commission to utilise the ToRs on counterterrorism and PCRD in the mandating, implementation, management and oversight of all counterterrorism and PCRD efforts, with a view to enhancing institutional coordination between relevant AU Organs, as well as between the AU and AU-RECs/RMs in the prevention, response and resolution of conflicts on the Continent. Furthermore, Council may urge the prompt operationalisation of the Sub-Committees, encourage regular and robust monitoring and evaluation and call for sustainable and predictable financing.
Education in Conflict Situations
Education in Conflict Situations
Date | 12 August 2025
Tomorrow (13 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1296th open session, focusing on education in conflict situations.
The Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of August 2025, Mohamed Khaled, will deliver opening remarks, followed by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The PSC will receive presentations from Prof. Mohammed Belhocine, Acting Commissioner for Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (ESTI) and Wilson Almeida Adao, the Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU, and Co-Chair of the Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC) and the Representative of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), will also brief the session.
The last time the PSC convened a session on the theme was at its 1229th meeting, held in August 2024. In that session, the PSC resolved to institutionalise education in conflict as an annual thematic focus. It also stressed the need to uphold the right to education for all, even in conflict, urging Member States to adopt conflict-sensitive, crisis-resilient policies, strengthen data-driven policymaking, integrate inclusive education into post-conflict recovery and appoint a Special Envoy on Children in Conflict. The upcoming session also precedes the 2025 AU Education Summit, intended to mobilise Member States and stakeholders around the continent’s educational priorities. The session is expected to first examine the current state of education in conflict and post-conflict settings, with attention to the systemic collapse of educational services caused by ongoing violence and institutional fragility.
Armed conflict and instability are significant barriers to education in Africa, depriving millions, especially girls, children with disabilities and displaced populations, of safe and inclusive learning. Attacks on schools, the militarisation of facilities and child recruitment erode national education systems, deepening poverty and inequality. In many conflict zones, school closures remove vital protection and create a causal link between attacks on education and the rise in harmful coping mechanisms, particularly child marriage. The loss of schooling exposes adolescents, especially girls, to heightened risks of violence, displacement and economic hardship, reinforcing cycles of vulnerability and deprivation.
Conflict continues to severely undermine access to education across Africa, with an estimated 80 million children affected, amounting to ‘one in three’ on the continent. In West and Central Africa, insecurity has led to the closure of over 14,000 schools as of June 2024. The Central Sahel region has seen a ‘fourfold increase’ in school shutdowns over the past five years, disrupting education in Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad.
The gravity of the situation is most acute in Sudan, where the ongoing armed conflict has produced one of the continent’s worst education emergencies. Recent estimates place the number of out-of-school children and adolescents at over 16.5 million. Many of these children reside in displacement sites, often with no access to formal education. Prolonged violence has severely disrupted learning, with attacks on schools and the militarisation of educational facilities compounding an already fragile system.
In Ethiopia, an estimated 9 million children remain out of school due to the compounded impact of conflict, climate-related disasters and displacement. Around 18% of educational institutions have either been damaged or destroyed, particularly in conflict-affected regions. This has further aggravated school dropout rates and negatively affected female students, especially in rural and border areas.
In Somalia, data from humanitarian partners indicate that approximately 4.5 million children—representing 56 per cent of the school-age population—are currently out of school. Insecurity, displacement and a lack of access to basic services have left children particularly vulnerable to violence, exploitation and recruitment by armed groups.
In the Central African Republic, conflict continues to affect education severely. Despite a reduction in violence in some areas, 1.2 million children still face significant barriers to schooling, with ‘seven out of ten’ not attending classes regularly. The country has also witnessed attacks on education infrastructure, further straining the capacity of national authorities and humanitarian partners to deliver education in affected areas.
In Nigeria, the northeast region has suffered for over a decade of insurgency. Since 2009, more than 313 schools have been attacked, over 2,000 teachers have been killed, and more than one million children have been displaced. Boko Haram’s systematic targeting of education represents one of the clearest cases of education being weaponised as part of a broader ideological conflict.
In South Sudan, protracted violence has left ‘only about 2.3 million of the country’s 6.3 million school-age children’ enrolled in school. Conflict-related displacement, combined with inadequate infrastructure and limited teacher deployment, continues to hinder educational progress, especially for children residing in camps or border regions.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), more than 2,500 schools in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri have been closed since early 2025. Many of these buildings have been damaged or repurposed, leaving an estimated 1.6 million children out of school in the region—nearly double the previous year’s figures.
In this context, the open session is expected to consider a broad range of strategic responses, including urging Member States to accelerate the domestication and effective implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD), adopted in 2015 and endorsed by 33 African states. This global intergovernmental commitment seeks to advance the protection of education, restrict the use of schools and universities for military purposes, collect data on attacks against educational facilities and victims, ensure the continuation of learning during conflict and investigate violations to deliver justice and assistance to survivors. These efforts form part of a broader agenda to prevent the military use of educational facilities, strengthen legal protections for learners and educators and establish local monitoring and reporting mechanisms for attacks on education. Within this framework, discussions are anticipated to align with the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) 2026–2035, particularly Strategic Area 6, which prioritises inclusive education for marginalised and crisis-affected populations.
A key priority will be ensuring the continuity of learning during emergencies. Integrating education contingency planning into national crisis response strategies is expected to be one of the discussion points in tomorrow’s session, reflecting commitments articulated in the Nouakchott Declaration of December 2024 that declares 2025-2034 as the ‘AU Decade of Accelerated Action for Education Transformation, Youth Skills Development and Innovation in Africa’. The declaration commits to safeguarding the right of children and youth to quality education in all circumstances, including during conflict; integrating education in emergencies into national education strategies to enhance system resilience; ensuring schools are protected from attack or military use in line with the SSD; advancing peace education and safe learning environments by embedding violence prevention and response in curricula and adopting conflict-sensitive approaches, especially in humanitarian and fragile contexts; and promoting peaceful conflict resolution while supporting the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns by 2030’ initiative to foster inclusive learning, particularly in protracted crises. The PSC is expected to promote contingency planning, mobile classrooms and alternative forms of delivery such as digital and radio-based learning—backed by the AU Digital Education Strategy (2023–2028). Enhanced capacity-building for local education actors, support for trauma-informed education and better coordination with civil society are likely to be encouraged to sustain educational continuity in crisis-affected regions.
The session is also expected to devote substantial attention to the psychosocial impacts of conflict on learners. The recent 1290th meeting voiced concern over the rising recruitment of children by armed forces and groups, noting that released children often face severe psychological distress, social stigma and exclusion from education. In response, the current session is likely to advocate integrating mental health services into education systems and providing trauma-informed teacher training to build resilience, improve learning outcomes and prevent long-term harm. Echoing the 597th meeting’s alarm over sexual violence and attacks on educational infrastructure, the PSC may revisit calls—aligned with UN Security Council Resolutions 2143 (2014) and 2225 (2015)—to deter the military use of schools.
Discussions may also explore the link between conflict and the high prevalence of out-of-school children, including those recruited as child soldiers, as highlighted in the 706th meeting’s call for robust child protection frameworks within the AU Commission covering education, health and security. Emphasis may be placed on AU instruments such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, particularly Article 22, prohibiting child recruitment, and on ensuring the protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflicts. The PSC could further call for stronger coordination between the AU’s Departments of Social Affairs and PAPS to address these issues comprehensively. Stronger inter-ministerial frameworks and improved cooperation between AU bodies such as the African Humanitarian Agency and African Risk Capacity could be highlighted as critical to delivering holistic and effective responses.
Furthermore, education in peace support operations (PSOs) will be addressed as a pillar of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Embedding peace education, supporting the reintegration of former child soldiers through education and training peacekeepers to protect learning spaces will all be positioned as strategic components of broader peacebuilding agendas.
Particularly significant for the session is the expected focus on the critical challenge of financing education in emergency settings. Among the proposals likely to be explored are the establishment of pooled funding arrangements and the targeted use of the AU Peace Fund to finance infrastructure rehabilitation, teacher deployment and trauma-informed educational programming. Mobilising adequate and sustained financing, notably to support education for children affected by conflict, will require stronger coordination and alignment of donor contributions with continental frameworks.
The other important area of deliberation is expected to be strengthening data and monitoring systems. Improving the AU Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) could be explored as a strategy to enhance policies and practices that reinforce Member States’ national education systems, to achieve equitable quality education for all (Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 4)) and accelerating CESA implementation. This may include promoting EMIS use to track attendance, safety and learning outcomes in conflict settings, as well as supporting Member States in reporting on SDG 4.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may voice grave concern over armed conflict’s impact on education and its implications for Agenda 2063, reaffirming Member States’ commitment to safeguarding education in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It may urge integration of protection and recovery measures into AU PSOs and PCRD frameworks with accountability mechanisms, call for stronger coordination across sectors, increased domestic funding, and alignment of international support with CESA 2026–2035 and Agenda 2063. The PSC could recommend AU Guidelines on Education in Conflict, commission a Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (HHS)–ESTI study on links between attacks on education and harmful practices, and push for faster domestication and implementation of the SSD. It may also promote integrating child protection and education into the Silencing the Guns initiative, encourage endorsement of the SSD by non-signatories and strengthen implementation by signatories. It may also emphasise stronger coordination among AU sectors working on education, peace and security, humanitarian affairs and social development, and propose a continental platform or task force to monitor and respond to education crises in line with the CESA Cluster on Education in Emergencies. Additionally, it could propose a continental platform for crisis response coordination and an observatory to track child marriage trends in conflict settings for targeted interventions.
PSC to undertake a field mission to South Sudan as it warns of ‘the potential of a full-scale war’
PSC to undertake a field mission to South Sudan as it warns of ‘the potential of a full-scale war’
Date | 8 August 2025
From 10 to 12 August 2025, the premier standing decision-making body of the African Union (AU), the Peace and Security Council, is scheduled to undertake a preventive field mission to South Sudan. This field visit comes against the background of various and high-level engagements by the AU, including through the PSC, as part of the effort to contain the situation in South Sudan and sustain the transitional process.
Following the eruption of fighting in March this year and the ensuing political and constitutional crisis in South Sudan, concerns have been rising about the risk of the situation unravelling the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and precipitating the relapse of South Sudan back to conflict. Since then, the PSC has had three engagements on the situation in Sudan, two of them in the course of March 2025, indicating heightened attention and effort to stabilise the situation and avoid further deterioration.
The most recent engagement of the PSC was when it convened its 1283rd session to receive an updated briefing on the situation in South Sudan on 12 June.
The PSC went further from its earlier pronouncements on the situation in South Sudan in its assessment of the gravity of the situation in the country. Expressing ‘deep concern’ over the deteriorating political and security situation, in the communiqué it adopted, the Council warned about ‘the potential of a full-scale war, in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement, thus reversing all the gains registered thus far… in the implementation of the R-ARCSS.’ The PSC called for an ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ between the South Sudan Peoples’ Defence Forces (SSPDF), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the White Army, and all other affiliated groups.’ It reiterated that the R-ARCSS remains the only viable framework for achieving sustainable peace in South Sudan. As it calls on the parties to ‘agree to mediation and pursue genuine dialogue’, the PSC expressed ‘deep concern over the continued detention of Riek Machar Teny, First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan’ and ‘the dismissal and detention of SPLM-IO officials from the Revitalised National Government of Unity (R-TGoNU), in blatant violation of the R-ARCSS.’ It thus reiterated its call ‘for their immediate and unconditional release and reinstatement.’ The PSC considered these measures to be necessary not only ‘to de-escalate the ongoing political tension’ but also ‘to prevent the total collapse of the R-ARCSS.’
Cognisant of how the erosion of trust and the ensuing breakdown of relations between the leaders of the signatories of the R-ARCSS, the Council urged ‘the pursuit of dialogue aimed at restoring mutual trust and confidence.’ Reaffirming the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for lasting peace in South Sudan and calling for the signatory parties to use peaceful and legal means to resolve their differences and refrain from undermining the agreement and the coalition under RTGoNU, PSC urged them to respect the provisions of the R-ARCSS and desist from undermining peace.
While the PSC was right in calling for an investigation of all violations of the R-ARCSS and warning that peace spoilers will be held accountable, it did not outline the modalities of how these steps need to be followed up. However, in terms of further steps for addressing the deteriorating situation, the PSC envisaged the deployment of sustained diplomatic efforts. First, it encouraged ‘the Panel of the Wise to continue its engagement and mediation efforts with all actors, and the parties to the R-ARCSS.’ Second, it also encouraged the AU Commission Chairperson ‘to sustain engagements with President Salva Kiir and regional leaders to foster inclusive dialogue, facilitate the release of political detainees and support the full implementation of’ R-ARCSS.’
The PSC’s call on the AU Commission Chairperson to sustain engagement with ‘regional leaders’ is particularly notable considering the influence that Uganda, in particular, has in South Sudan, including as a major guarantor of the R-ARCSS. Indeed, it would be difficult for any mediation effort for de-escalating tension and restoring full commitment of the parties to the R-ARCSS to be effective without harnessing and relying on Kampala’s support and leverage.
The threat that the recent fighting and continuing risk of violence pose to the protection of civilians also received the attention of the PSC. Condemning ‘violence against civilians, particularly women and children,’ which, in its view, constitutes violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, the PSC called for ‘an immediate end to indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.’ It also urged South Sudanese authorities to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable ‘while taking immediate action to ensure protection of civilians.’
The other issue that was the centre of discussion during the session, as it had been in recent years, was the implementation of the R-ARCSS. In this respect, apart from encouraging the parties to the Tumaini Initiative and those yet to join ‘to reach a timely consensus for an inclusive peace process,’ the PSC first called on ‘the RTGoNU to expediate the deployment of the Necessary United Forces…facilitate the civic and political space for inclusive engagement.’ Second, it encouraged ‘the South Sudanese parties to commit to implementing all outstanding transitional tasks, such as security sector reform, including undertaking the second phase of the unification of forces, and the harmonisation of the command structure with a national character under one commander in chief.’ This is profoundly critical as success in reform of the security sector and its governance is central to ensuring the fragmentation of the security landscape in South Sudan. Third, it urged the RTGoNU to mobilise resources for the three institutions critical to the implementation of transitional tasks, critical to the holding of elections: the National Elections Commission (NEC), the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and the Political Parties Council (PPC).
In terms of advancing mediation efforts, the PSC also encouraged the Trilateral Mechanism to work with the RTGoNU ‘to reactivate the Government-Trilateral Joint Task Force (JTF) and facilitate the implementation of pending R-ARCSS provisions, including constitution making and electoral processes.’
The PSC field mission session came following high-level visits to South Sudan, a) by the Panel of the Wise, which the PSC had called for during its 1265th and 1270th sessions, and b) by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It is expected that the PSC visit will build on these previous engagements of the relevant AU structures, including at the highest levels by the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The visit also affords the PSC an opportunity to follow up on its various previous decisions, as highlighted above from its 1283rd session. Whether the mission succeeds in securing critical concessions and gets the parties back on track for implementing the transitional process will be a major test of whether South Sudan can conclude the transitional process for holding national elections in 2026 and avoid relapse.
This article builds on an analysis of the June 2025 PSC session on South Sudan that first appeared on The Monthly Digest on the PSC for June 2025.
Consultation of PSC with the AGA-APSA Platform/Human Rights Subcommittee
Consultation of PSC with the AGA-APSA Platform/Human Rights Subcommittee
Date | 7 August 2025
Tomorrow (8 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1295th Session for the consultation between the African Governance Architecture-African Peace and Security Architecture (AGA-APSA) Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).
The session is expected to start with an opening statement by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council of the AU for August 2025 and the introductory remarks by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Presentations are also expected from Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Burundi, and the Ag. Chairperson of the PRC Sub Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG) and Wilson Almeida Adao, Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts on Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and Chairperson of the AGA Platform.
The PSC last convened such a consultation during its 1167th session in August 2023, marking the first time it brought together both the AGA-APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG in a joint session. Previously, the PSC had engaged with these two bodies separately, holding its inaugural consultation with the AGA-APSA Platform at its 1098th session in August 2022, and a separate meeting with the PRC Sub-Committee during its 1095th session in the same month. Both sessions underscored the importance of these engagements and recommended that joint consultations be held annually. This collaborative approach is not only supported by previous PSC decisions but is also grounded in the PSC Protocol, which mandates the Council to promote democratic governance, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights across the continent. The joint consultation seeks to deepen coordination among PSC Members, the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG, and the AGA-APSA Platform, fostering a more coherent and impactful response to governance-related peace and security challenges in Africa.
The consultation is expected to deliberate on the engagement of the PRC sub-committee on pressing governance and human rights issues related to peace and security challenges in tomorrow’s session. This is expected to put the spotlight on governance challenges faced on the continent. Beyond the unconstitutional changes of government, the challenges identified include a lack of transparency and accountability, weak institutions, corruption, repression of expressions of dissent, a lack of inclusivity, and increasing disaffection of the majority youthful population with failure of governments to deliver services, as well as human rights violations. Exacerbated by the spread of jihadist violence and growing public disillusionment with civilian leadership, as well as the extension of term limits, inconsistent responses of AGA Platform institutions, including the PSC, have exacerbated the situation. A case in point is the lack of enforcement of Article 25(4) of ACDEG that bars perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from participating in elections in two recent cases of Chad and Gabon. This trend undermines the AU’s democratic norms, making it critical for the consultations to meaningfully address the root causes of instability and safeguard the continent’s hard-won peace, security, and democratic governance gains.
The consultation is also expected to focus on the widespread and interconnected conflicts across the continent, with Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and the Sahel serving as key examples of protracted regional conflict systems that are increasingly affected by external meddling, geopolitical rivalry, and the scramble for natural resources. This affords the PRC Sub-committee and the PSC to interrogate the ways in which the changing global geopolitical context is increasingly exacerbating governance challenges and conflict dynamics on the continent and how the AU can leverage AU instruments for mitigating these trends. Discussions will likely examine the persistent challenges in effectively implementing post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) strategies in countries emerging from violence. The session is also anticipated to address recurrent election-related violence, emphasising the urgent need for stronger preventive and governance measures.
Beyond the foregoing, the discussions are expected to also focus on prioritizing the design of joint, coordinated initiatives by leveraging the PSC’s authority, utilizing the AGA platform coordination role, and engaging the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG oversight function to directly address the root causes of instability, namely, weak democratic institutions, lack of accountability, and governance-related grievances. These initiatives are vital not only for reinforcing AU norms such as the ACDEG but also for enhancing early warning systems, bolstering preventive diplomacy, and grounding post-conflict recovery efforts in democratic consolidation and the rule of law.
Among the key decisions adopted by the PSC in its previous session was a call for a joint consultative meeting between the AU Commission, the African Governance Platform (AGP), and the AGA-APSA Secretariat to identify concrete, action-oriented initiatives that go beyond periodic experience-sharing. These included conducting joint promotional visits by the PSC, the PRC Sub-Committee, and the AGP to advocate for the ratification and implementation of AU shared values instruments. However, no such joint promotional visits have taken place to date. Another component of the decision emphasised the need to involve the PSC in the planning and implementation of AGA Flagship Initiatives and to establish robust follow-up mechanisms to ensure that decisions from joint sessions lead to tangible outcomes. While the PSC has held separate consultations with some AU organs that are members of the AGA-APSA Platform, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), African Union Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), there is currently no clear framework or evidence to assess the extent of the PSC’s involvement in AGA Flagship Initiatives.
In line with the previous decision, tomorrow’s session is expected to prioritise the development of coordinated action plans that facilitate the joint implementation of shared mandates and strengthen synergy between the AU’s governance and peace and security pillars. In this regard, a key development expected to inform the discussions is the ongoing formulation of the Joint AGA-APSA Roadmap. This strategic document aims to serve as a guiding framework for enhancing operational synergy between the governance and peace and security pillars of the AU. Its development responds directly to the PSC’s repeated calls for more structured, outcome-driven engagement between the two architectures. It seeks to move beyond ad hoc collaboration towards a more institutionalised and programmatic partnership. Once finalised, the Joint Roadmap is expected to provide a common results framework that will facilitate alignment of interventions, monitor implementation of joint decisions, and promote a proactive, preventive approach to addressing the root causes of conflict on the continent.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm its commitment to holding annual joint consultations with the AGA-APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG). The Council may also underscore the importance of institutional synergy between governance and peace and security actors in addressing structural drivers of conflict. Concerning governance-related root causes of instability, the PSC may commend ongoing joint efforts to tackle democratic deficits and call for the more consistent application of AU norms, particularly those relating to unconstitutional changes of government, to strengthen their deterrent effect. Regarding the Joint AGA-APSA Roadmap, the PSC is expected to encourage its timely finalisation and adoption as a guiding framework for coordinated action. In the same vein, the Council may reiterate its previous request for the AU Commission to expedite the operationalisation of the African Governance Facility, emphasising its importance for supporting Member States and AGA activities, especially in preventive governance. The PSC may also restate its earlier decision to conduct joint promotional visits, together with the AGP and the PRC Sub-Committee, to advocate for the ratification and implementation of AU shared values instruments. In an effort to enhance the PSC’s role in AGA Flagship Initiatives, the Council is likely to stress the need to develop a precise mechanism for its involvement in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of these initiatives. It may also call for the establishment of a regular reporting channel or periodic briefing mechanism to keep the PSC updated on progress. Furthermore, the PSC may emphasise the need to strengthen collaboration between governance and peace and security actors in early warning and preventive diplomacy, including the conduct of joint assessments and missions to countries facing elevated risks of instability. Similarly, it may highlight the importance of integrating governance dimensions into post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) processes, recommending that governance assessments be considered when mandating AU support to countries emerging from conflict. Lastly, the PSC may request the establishment of a joint follow-up mechanism or working group to monitor the implementation of decisions emanating from this and previous joint consultations, and to report periodically to both the PSC and the PRC Sub-Committee on HRDG.
