Why the AU’s 2025 Theme of the Year Matters for the Reform of the Multilateral System
Why the AU’s 2025 Theme of the Year Matters for the Reform of the Multilateral System
Date | 26 June 2025
INTRODUCTION
The 2025 African Union (AU) theme of the year is ‘Justice for Africans and peoples of African descent through reparations.’ This special research report introduces the background to the theme of the year and examines how the focus on remedying the way the international system is shaped by these historical injustices can help narrow the gap between the commitments of international human rights and the Sustainable Development Goals on the one hand and how the international financial and trading system operate in practice vis-à-vis Africa and parts of the world affected by slavery and colonialism.
L’Afrique à la croisée des chemins: naviguer entre périls et opportunités dans un ordre mondial en pleine mutation
L’Afrique à la croisée des chemins: naviguer entre périls et opportunités dans un ordre mondial en pleine mutation
Date | 26 Juin 2025
Said Djinnit*, Ibrahim Assane Mayaki** et El-Ghassim Wane***
Il y a un peu moins de trente-cinq ans, en juillet 1990 plus précisément, Salim Ahmed Salim, alors Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine (OUA), présentait à la 52e session ordinaire du Conseil des ministres de l’OUA un rapport devenu historique: « Les changements fondamentaux qui se produisent dans le monde et leurs conséquences pour l’Afrique – Propositions pour une position africaine ».
L’idée de ce document remontait pratiquement à l’arrivée de Salim à la tête de l’organisation. Fort d’une riche expérience diplomatique, il était frappé par le relâchement de l’engagement des États membres envers les idéaux fondateurs de l’OUA. Avec le quasi-parachèvement de la libération du continent du joug colonial et le début de l’effondrement du régime de l’apartheid, l’organisation – dont l’action avait jusqu’alors essentiellement porté sur la lutte contre la domination étrangère et la discrimination raciale – semblait être en quête d’une nouvelle vocation.
Et pourtant, les défis ne manquaient pas – ils avaient simplement changé de nature. Si certains conflits touchaient à leur fin, d’autres persistaient ou éclataient. Le développement économique et l’intégration continentale relevaient davantage du registre des vœux pieux que de celui de la réalité vécue. La situation des droits de l’homme était tout aussi préoccupante. L’idéal démocratique connaissait certes une nouvelle jouvence, mais la trajectoire demeurait incertaine et fragile.
La nécessité pour l’Afrique de se repositionner était d’autant plus impérative que le monde traversait des bouleversements majeurs: fin de la Guerre froide, vent de démocratisation en Europe de l’Est et accélération des dynamiques d’intégration en Europe et aux Amériques. Ces mutations imposaient une adaptation en même temps qu’elles offraient de nouvelles opportunités que le continent se devait de saisir, sous peine d’être relégué en marge du nouvel ordre mondial alors en gestation.
Salim ne se contenta pas de dresser un état des lieux, sans concession: il formula également des propositions concrètes qui furent entérinées par la Déclaration sur la situation politique et socioéconomique en Afrique et les changements fondamentaux qui se produisent actuellement dans le monde, adoptée par le sommet tenu en juillet 1990. Cette Déclaration devait inspirer une série de décisions et d’initiatives couvrant l’ensemble des domaines d’intervention de l’organisation. Bon nombre des progrès accomplis par la suite par l’Union africaine (UA) se sont inscrits dans le prolongement direct de ces documents fondateurs.
Si la nécessité d’agir était déjà pressante en 1990, dans le climat d’optimisme de l’après-Guerre froide, elle l’est encore davantage aujourd’hui — non plus portée par l’espoir, mais imposée par l’incertitude.
Il existe un parallèle saisissant entre cette période et celle que nous traversons aujourd’hui: celui-ci réside dans l’ampleur des bouleversements en cours. Le système multilatéral tel qu’il a été conçu au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale traverse sans doute la crise la plus profonde de son histoire. Les égoïsmes nationaux connaissent un regain manifeste, illustré par la montée des sentiments anti-migrants et la réduction marquée de l’aide au développement. Quant au droit international – jamais totalement affranchi de la réalité des rapports de forces, il continue de faire l’objet de violations graves.
Cette nouvelle conjoncture mondiale est lourde de périls pour l’Afrique. Continent le plus vulnérable sur la scène internationale, l’Afrique subit de plein fouet la réduction de l’aide publique au développement. Les tensions géopolitiques et autres se traduisent par l’intensification des luttes d’influence sur le continent et l’internationalisation croissante des crises qui l’affligent. L’affaiblissement du système multilatéral risque de marginaliser encore davantage les pays africains, en les livrant à des rapports de force bilatéraux où leurs fragilités structurelles les désavantagent fortement.
Pourtant, cette crise peut aussi être une opportunité. Pour dévastatrice qu’elle soit sur les court et moyen termes, la contraction de l’aide internationale pourrait être un choc salutaire, en ce qu’elle constitue un rappel brutal de l’urgence que revêt la réduction de la dépendance du continent envers ses partenaires internationaux. La recomposition en cours du système international constitue un levier que l’Afrique pourrait – et devrait – mettre à profit pour peser sur l’architecture mondiale en gestation, et ce en faisant le pari résolu de l’unité.
Si l’impératif d’agir était déjà fort en 1990 – époque marquée par l’optimisme post-Guerre froide et l’éveil d’un nouvel esprit de coopération, il est aujourd’hui encore plus pressant, car dicté non plus par l’espoir, mais par la nécessité de faire face à une période d’instabilité et d’incertitudes profondes.
La bonne nouvelle est que l’Afrique dispose aujourd’hui d’atouts qu’elle n’avait pas au début des années 1990. À l’époque, il fallait bâtir les instruments politiques, normatifs et institutionnels dont le continent avait besoin pour agir collectivement. Ce travail a depuis été largement accompli. Il n’existe aujourd’hui aucun domaine stratégique pour l’Afrique – paix et sécurité (ici, ici, ici, ici et ici), gouvernance et démocratie (ici, ici, ici et ici), droits humains (ici, ici, ici, ici, ici, ici et ici) et développement (ici, ici et ici) qui ne soit couvert par un cadre continental pertinent. L’Agenda 2063 donne une cohérence d’ensemble à tous ces instruments, les inscrivant dans une vision stratégique partagée et adossée à des institutions dédiées spécifiquement à leur suivi et mise en œuvre.
L’urgence pour l’Afrique aujourd’hui ne réside pas dans l’adoption de nouveaux instruments, mais dans la mise en œuvre de ceux déjà en place.
Mais cet impressionnant arsenal normatif et institutionnel peine encore à produire les résultats attendus. La transformation économique du continent est encore à réaliser, avec des exportations toujours dominées par les matières premières. Le commerce intra-africain stagne à des niveaux anémiques – autour de 15 %. La partie subsaharienne du continent abrite près de 67% des personnes vivant dans l’extrême pauvreté dans le monde. Les besoins en infrastructures demeurent massifs, les politiques restrictives en matière de visa entravent la libre circulation des personnes, les processus démocratiques sont sous tension, conflits armés et déplacements forcés de populations affectent pratiquement toutes les régions du continent.
Ce fossé entre l’ambition normative et politique, d’une part, et la réalité du terrain, de l’autre, s’explique avant tout par un déficit de capacité de mise en œuvre. L’Afrique n’a pas besoin de nouveaux outils. Ce dont elle a besoin, c’est d’un basculement stratégique: faire de l’exécution des engagements pris la priorité absolue.
À cette aune, l’intuition de Salim Ahmed Salim en 1990 demeure plus pertinente que jamais. La nouvelle Commission de l’UA se trouve aujourd’hui à un moment charnière, qui lui donne une opportunité unique de marquer son mandat par une initiative audacieuse et structurante. Il s’agit pour elle de prendre l’initiative d’un rapport fondateur, dans la veine de celui de 1990, mais avec une ambition plus grande et une mobilisation plus forte pour être à la hauteur des urgences et enjeux de l’heure.
Un tel document devra dresser un diagnostic sans complaisance de l’état actuel du continent et proposer des réponses centrées sur la mise en œuvre effective des engagements déjà pris. Il devra aussi rappeler cette vérité fondamentale: sans unité, l’Afrique continuera à s’offrir en proie facile dans un monde qui n’a jamais eu pitié des faibles – et en a encore moins aujourd’hui.
Une fois finalisé, le rapport devrait être soumis à un sommet extraordinaire de l’UA à son siège à Addis Abeba, avec la participation au plus haut niveau de tous les États membres. Certes, un rapport seul ne résoudra pas les défis, nombreux, qui interpellent le continent. Ce n’est, au fond, qu’un document. Mais sa valeur réside dans l’élan qu’il peut susciter, s’il est bien conçu, captivant notamment les imaginaires, bien porté, et suivi d’effets.
Dans cette entreprise de renouveau, l’UA doit occuper une place centrale. En tant que cadre institutionnel légitime de l’unité continentale, elle est l’entité la mieux placée pour incarner la voix et les ambitions collectives de l’Afrique. Il faudra à cet égard inverser une tendance préoccupante, celle qui voit des sommets organisés avec des partenaires extérieurs attirer davantage de chefs d’État et de gouvernement que les propres assises de l’organisation continentale.
En mai 1963, lors du débat qui, à Addis-Abeba, opposa les tenants d’une approche graduelle de l’unité africaine à ceux qui plaidaient pour une intégration politique plus poussée dès le départ, Kwame Nkrumah eut sans doute le tort – politique – d’avoir eu raison trop tôt. L’histoire, cependant, a rétroactivement validé sa vision: les limites de l’approche qui prévalut à la création de l’OUA sont aujourd’hui manifestes, et les retards accumulés pèsent lourdement sur les perspectives du continent. Il appartient désormais aux dirigeants africains actuels de rendre justice à cette intuition visionnaire – fût-ce avec plusieurs décennies de retard.
*Said Djinnit a été Directeur de Cabinet de Salim Ahmed Salim (de 1989 à 1999), avant d’occuper par la suite les fonctions de Secrétaire général adjoint aux Affaires politiques de l’OUA et celles de Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité à l’UA. De 2008 à 2019, il a été Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des NU en Afrique de l’Ouest, puis Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général dans la région des Grands Lacs.
**Dr. Ibrahim Assane Mayaki a été Directeur général de l’Agence de Développement de l’UA (AUDA-NEPAD) de 2009 à avril 2022. De 1997 à 2000, il a assumé les fonctions de Premier ministre de la République du Niger et de Ministre des Affaires étrangères.
***El-Ghassim Wane a été Directeur du Département paix et sécurité à la Commission de l’UA et Directeur de cabinet du Président de la Commission de l’UA. Il a aussi servi comme sous-Secrétaire général des NU chargé du maintien de la paix et Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général au Mali et chef de la MINUSMA.
Consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Date | 18 June 2025
Tomorrow (19 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1284th session for a consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Chairperson of the ACHPR is expected to deliver a briefing to the PSC on the work of the ACHPR as it relates to peace and security.
The consultative meeting is being convened in line with Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which calls for close cooperation between the PSC and the ACHPR in advancing peace, security, and stability across Africa. Beyond the Protocol’s provision, the PSC, at its 866th session, agreed to institutionalise this engagement by holding annual joint consultative meetings with the ACHPR. This commitment to regular engagement is grounded in the broader legal mandates that define and reinforce the complementary roles of the PSC and ACHPR in promoting peace, security, and human rights on the continent. The two organs of the AU are both entrusted, under their respective legal frameworks, with advancing peace, security, and human rights across the continent. The PSC Protocol, under Article 3(f), outlines the Council’s responsibility to uphold human rights as an essential part of preventing conflict. Similarly, Article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights mandates the ACHPR to promote and protect the rights of individuals and communities. Additionally, Article 23 of the African Charter affirms that all people have a fundamental right to live in peace and security, both within their countries and globally. These provisions establish a shared legal and normative foundation for collaboration between the PSC and ACHPR in addressing peace and security challenges on the continent.
These consultative meetings have been held regularly since 2019; however, they were interrupted over the past three years. The most recent meeting took place in August 2021 during the Council’s 1019th session. The communiqué from that session underscored, among other key points, the vital importance of mainstreaming human rights throughout all phases of conflict prevention, management, resolution, stabilisation, and post-conflict reconstruction and development. In this context, it would be of interest to members of the PSC to explore how to operationalise this commitment, including through the engagement of specific mechanisms of the ACHPR, such as the Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situation in between the consultative sessions between the two sides.
During tomorrow’s session, the ACHPR is expected to brief the PSC on its recent efforts related to country-specific conflict situations. This may also include violations being reported to the ACHPR in relation to countries that are preparing for elections.
In terms of specific conflict situations, a key item the PSC is expected to be briefed on concerns the Joint Fact-Finding Mission to Sudan led by the ACHPR. In response to the PSC’s request during its 1213th session in May 2024 for an investigation into the human rights situation in El Fasher and other parts of Darfur, the ACHPR launched a hybrid Fact-Finding Mission to examine violations against civilians since the outbreak of the conflict. As explained during a press conference given by the ACHPR, the mission covers a wide range of issues, including civil and political rights (such as arbitrary detention and suppression of freedoms), economic and social rights (such as denial of access to food, healthcare, and education), environmental and property rights, and grave abuses like torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians. To support its investigation, the Commission invited written and oral testimonies from individuals and organisations, in which the submission window officially closed on 28 March 2025. Through this process, the ACHPR collected documentation on the kind of violations that took place in the course of the war.
In light of the ongoing crisis and the Commission’s initial findings, the ACHPR has taken further steps to strengthen its engagement through the extension of the mission’s mandate. The most recent ACHPR Resolution, ACHPR/Res.635 (LXXXIII) 2025, decided to extend the mandate of the Joint Fact-Finding Mission for an additional period of six (6) months, starting on 3 May 2025. The PSC is therefore expected to receive an update on the progress of the mission, including insights from virtual investigations, the extension of its mandate, and the ongoing challenges and opportunities for field deployment.
Regarding the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Commission is expected to update the PSC based on its Resolution ACHPR/Res.627 (LXXXII) 2025. This resolution highlights serious violations, including the destruction of camps for internally displaced persons, widespread sexual violence against women and girls, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, targeted assassinations, the burning of prisons, and the widespread collapse of social and economic infrastructure. It called on the DRC to end impunity by bringing perpetrators to justice and implored the AU and regional bodies to step up their efforts to bring an end to the long-protracted conflict.
The ACHPR is also anticipated to brief the PSC on the grave human rights situation in South Sudan, particularly in light of escalating violence and political instability in Upper Nile State and Nasir County. Drawing from its 11 March 2025 press statement, the ACHPR is likely to highlight concerns such as the arbitrary detention of political actors within the transitional government and the loss of civilian lives resulting from the ongoing unrest. It called for a) cease-fire and de-escalation; b) inclusive dialogue between the signatories of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan; c) ensuring the protection of civilians; and d) accelerated implementation of the transitional process.
Hence, building on these country-specific developments, the consultative meeting presents an opportunity for the PSC to receive rich perspectives on how to reinforce its approach to these individual conflict situations, drawing on these engagements of the ACHPR.
The ACHPR briefing may also cover thematic issues. These may include the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with a particular focus on vulnerable groups such as women, children, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and persons with disabilities. To this end, the Commission’s Resolution ACHPR/Res.513 (LXX), explicitly condemned attacks on IDP camps and urged States to uphold their civilian character and prosecute perpetrators. The Commission is also expected to spotlight the persistent and escalating use of sexual and gender-based violence as a tactic of war. This concern has been consistently addressed through its Focal Point on Conflict and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, such as Resolutions ACHPR/Res. 283 (2014) and ACHPR/Res. 365 (2017), and in its monitoring of conflict situations such as Boko Haram-affected areas and South Sudan. Another key thematic area likely to be addressed is the accountability gap for grave human rights violations and the urgent need to strengthen transitional justice mechanisms in line with the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. The ACHPR’s 2018 Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa provides a comprehensive African Charter–based framework for promoting truth, reparations, and legal redress, complementing the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. Furthermore, the Commission may raise emerging concerns related to the human rights implications of militarisation, the misuse of emergency powers, and the obstruction of humanitarian access, particularly in protracted and complex crises.
Lastly, in tomorrow’s consultations, it is expected that the two organs will revisit and follow up on key previous decisions. The communiqué adopted during the PSC’s 866th session set out concrete modalities aimed at strengthening and sustaining collaboration with the ACHPR. These include the establishment of a structured mechanism for regular information exchange—particularly through the incorporation of ACHPR’s relevant outputs into the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); periodic briefings to the PSC between annual joint sessions, focusing on the human rights dimensions of specific conflict situations or cross-cutting thematic issues; and consistent interaction between the PSC Chairperson and the ACHPR, either through the Commission’s Chairperson or its designated Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situations. These mechanisms are designed to ensure the systematic integration of human rights into the PSC’s peace and security work. However, such engagements have not been actively pursued in recent years. Tomorrow’s session, therefore, offers an opportunity to revive and operationalise these collaborative mechanisms.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its commitment to strengthening collaboration with the ACHPR and, in doing so, emphasise the establishment of a formal coordination mechanism between the PSC Chairperson and the ACHPR Chairperson or its designated Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situations to enable timely communication and decision-making on urgent human rights concerns in conflict-affected contexts. To enhance the integration of human rights in peace and security responses, the PSC may encourage the systematic mainstreaming of human rights across all phases of conflict prevention, management, resolution, and post-conflict recovery, including through the incorporation of ACHPR analyses and outputs into PSC deliberations. In this regard, the Council may underscore the importance of integrating ACHPR findings and resolutions into the Continental Early Warning System to strengthen early warning capabilities through the use of human rights indicators, particularly in high-risk countries and regions. Concerning the Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan, the PSC may endorse its continuation and adequate resourcing, and encourage facilitation of field deployment where security conditions permit. Furthermore, the PSC may stress the need to address the root causes and structural drivers of armed conflict on the Continent, urging Member States and relevant stakeholders to adopt inclusive, rights-based approaches to conflict resolution—emphasising dialogue, negotiation, mediation, and context-specific transitional justice mechanisms that promote accountability, reconciliation, and sustainable peace. In this respect, the Council may encourage Member States to establish or reinforce domestic transitional justice mechanisms in alignment with continental human rights and justice frameworks. The PSC may also highlight the importance of receiving regular briefings from the ACHPR through its special mechanisms such as the country rapporteurs, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, the Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situations and the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Asylum Seekers. The communique may also reiterate the outcomes of the previous consultative meetings and call for the adoption of a program of action for the operationalisation of the concrete measures identified in the communiques of the 866th, the 953rd, and the 1019th sessions.
Update on the situation in South Sudan
Update on the situation in South Sudan
Date | 11 June 2025
Tomorrow (12 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1283rd session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.
Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Joram Mukama Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Juba; Ismail Wais, IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan and representatives from the AU Panel of the Wise and AU Ad-Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) are also expected to deliver briefings. The representative of South Sudan, as a country of concern, is also expected to make a statement.
The session follows the Council’s 1265th and 1270th sessions on South Sudan, held on 18 and 31 March respectively, in response to the sharp deterioration in South Sudan’s political and security landscape since renewed violence erupted on 4 March. The 4 March attack on the South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) base in Nasir by the militia group known as the White Army that is reportedly loosely associated with First Vice President Riek Machar the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- In Opposition (SPLM-IO), has triggered the most severe crisis facing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) since its adoption in 2018. The situation has since devolved into military confrontations, high-level arrests, deployment of Ugandan troops and increased violence. These developments have gravely undermined the transitional process.
Tensions had been mounting even before the 4 March incident, largely due to the breakdown of relations in the presidency and a series of unilateral actions. These included replacing opposition officials with loyalists and reshuffling positions within his own faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Since February 2025, more than 20 senior SPLM/A-IO political and military officials have been arrested, while many others have gone into hiding or fled the country, further deepening the rift between Kiir and Machar. Governors in at least three states loyal to Machar have also been replaced.
The unstable political situation spiralled further down when the government arrested Machar on 26 March in Juba—a move his party denounced as marking the collapse of the 2018 peace agreement, which ended a devastating five-year civil war that claimed nearly 400,000 lives. The move was widely condemned, including by the PSC’s 1270th session press statement, which called for Machar’s ‘immediate and unconditional release’ and urged the government to uphold his safety and health.
Apart from the constitutional crisis it has triggered for the Government of National Unity under the R-ARCSS, Machar’s detention also instigated a rapid unravelling of the SPLM-IO’s cohesion. Reports indicate that key party figures, including Deputy Chairperson Oyet Nathaniel, fled or went into hiding, while internal disputes escalated into factionalism. Internal rifts within the SPLM-IO erupted publicly in April 2025 when Deputy Chairman Oyet Nathaniel, who is also the first deputy speaker of parliament, suspended four senior members of the party, including Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Koul, for allegedly plotting to replace Machar. In response, a convening of a faction of SPLM-IO members in Juba on 9 April announced the establishment of a temporary leadership structure that will cease upon Machar’s release and named Koul as the interim chairperson of the party. Despite the PSC’s firm position calling for Machar’s immediate and unconditional release, Juba did not heed this call. Machar and other political and military leaders from the SPLM-IO remain in detention.
Further compounding the difficult political situation is the major changes in the leadership of the ruling SPLM that President Kiir chairs. In a move that is widely seen to be an orchestration of a succession plan, President Kiir took steps to elevate his former financial advisor, Benjamin Bol Mel, to very senior positions. First, he appointed Bol Mel to the position of vice president of the country. Most recently, on 21 May, after dismissing James Wani Igga, a long-serving liberation struggle stalwart, Kiir appointed Bol Mel to be the first vice chairman of the ruling SPLM, a position that is viewed to be a launching pad to the presidency.
The security situation has also deteriorated markedly. Across Upper Nile and other hotspots, clashes between the SSPDF and SPLM-IO forces have intensified, resulting in widespread civilian displacement and the destruction of critical infrastructure, including the 3 May aerial bombing of a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital. The AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, condemned the attack, which he described as ‘a flagrant breach of International Humanitarian Law’ and urged for an investigation. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan also warned the attacks ‘could amount to a war crime.’ The gravity of the situation in South Sudan is further underscored by recent UNHCR data indicating that over 165,000 have fled since the resurgence of violence in March, with over 100,000 people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.
While Uganda’s military deployment in South Sudan is under a bilateral agreement for training and technical support and positions Uganda in shaping the political and security trajectory in South Sudan including as one of the guarantors of the R-ARCSS, there are concerns that Uganda’s presence tips the balance firmly in favor of President Kiir and away from SPLM-IO and may trigger militarised external interference on the side of SPLM-IO. The SPLM-IO also accuses Ugandan forces of participating in military operations, hence in a manner contrary to the R-ARCSS.
Given that the implementation of the R-ARCSS was already derailed, the current situation is feared to deal a mortal blow to the transitional process. In his briefing to the extraordinary summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan held on 12 March, the Executive Secretary of IGAD warned that ‘should tensions escalate, the risk of a return to widespread hostilities looms large, with repercussions that would echo resoundingly across the region.’ In his 16 April briefing to the UN Security Council, Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS described the conditions as ‘darkly reminiscent of the 2013 and 2016 conflicts, which took over 400,000 lives’ and warned of a trajectory that could shift from community-based violence to ‘a more complex picture involving signatory parties and foreign actors.’ He also flagged the intensifying use of hate speech and misinformation, which continue to fuel ethnic tension and violence.
In response to the growing crisis, regional and international actors have ramped up diplomatic efforts despite minimal breakthroughs. On 29 March, the AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf and UNSG António Guterres discussed the evolving situation in South Sudan. They reaffirmed their support for the R-ARCSS as the best path to lasting peace in South Sudan and agreed to coordinate efforts between the AU, IGAD, and the UN.
The PSC’s 1265th and 1270th sessions had called for the AU Commission Chairperson to deploy a high-level delegation to engage the parties in South Sudan. Led by former Burundian President Domitien Ndayizeye, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, deployed the AU Panel of the Wise to Juba on 2 April. The delegation held meetings with various stakeholders, including President Kiir, but was reportedly denied access to Riek Machar. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will consider the Panel’s report of the visit.
The Panel’s visit was followed by a joint AU–IGAD high-level visit from 5–6 May, during which the AU Commission Chairperson and the IGAD Deputy Executive Secretary met with South Sudanese leaders to reaffirm support for the R-ARCSS and preserve its hard-won gains and reiterate support for the timely, credible, and transparent implementation of the transitional roadmap. Yet again, the Chairperson did not get access to Machar.
More recently, on 8 May, the Quartet – AUMISS, IGAD, UNMISS and RJMEC- issued a joint statement urging an immediate cessation of hostilities, the release of detainees, and the revitalisation of the R-ARCSS. The statement welcomed the recent joint visit by the AUC and IGAD to South Sudan and highlighted that the 2018 peace deal remains the only viable framework for resolving the crisis. The Quartet, also called the reinvigoration of the ‘visibly stalled peace implementation by addressing all grievances through an inclusive political dialogue’, with the release of the First Vice President and other SPLM/A-IO officials as the starting point.
From 3 – 4 June, IGAD convened a consultative meeting bringing together regional and international envoys, including representatives from the AU, UNMISS, and the C5, to address South Sudan’s peace process. The discussions aimed to identify viable solutions to de-escalate tensions and reinforce support for the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), emphasising the need for coordinated efforts to sustain stability and advance the country’s transitional roadmap. (A consolidated overview of key developments, policy positions and diplomatic engagements can be accessed via Amani Africa’s regularly updated Tracker of events and diplomatic efforts on the crisis in South Sudan)
Apart from following up on its proposed policy measures from previous sessions, tomorrow’s session is expected to help the PSC take stock of both the political and security developments on the one hand and the diplomatic efforts underway, including the steps taken by the AU. Building on the mission of the Panel of the Wise and the joint AU-IGAD visit, the statement of the Quartet may help structure PSC’s deliberations on additional steps to be taken to arrest the deteriorating situation and put the transitional process in South Sudan back on track. Undeniably, for any initiative of the PSC, the role of the region and most notably Uganda, with its presence on the ground and its role as Guarantor, is expected to be paramount.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may reiterate that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable and relevant Agreement for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan. The PSC may call for immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities and restoration of strict adherence to the permanent ceasefire, with IGAD’s Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) reinforced to ensure compliance. Echoing the Quartet, the PSC may also call for the full and scaled-up return to and implementation of the R-ARCSS and the transitional process with the full and effective participation of the signatories of the R-ARCSS. To this end, the Council may reiterate its demand for the release of detained politicians, including First Vice President Riek Machar. The PSC may also call for the streamlining and coordination of diplomatic efforts. The PSC may request the AU Commission Chairperson to task a head of state of an AU member state to work with the guarantors of the R-ARCSS and the Committee of 5 to facilitate dialogue between the leaders of the main signatories of the 2018 agreement to restore mutual confidence and culminate in a joint public declaration affirming their commitment to peace.
The funding of the AU from member states is a ‘farce’, Mo Ibrahim
The funding of the AU from member states is a ‘farce’, Mo Ibrahim
Date | 10 June 2025
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
The issue of the poor state of self-financing of the African Union (AU) once again came into the spotlight. During the annual Mo Ibrahim Governance Weekend (IGW) event held from 1-3 June in Marrakech, the Kingdom of Morrocco, in a conversation with Mo Ibrahim, founder of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the former AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat in the plenary of the annual event told Ibrahim that the AU depended on external donors for about 70 per cent of its funding.
Ibrahim expressed his dismay about AU’s excessive dependence, stating that ‘70% of the 650 million annual budget of the AU is funded by foreigners is a farce.’ Faki agreed and added that ‘it is actually frustrating.’ Instructively, in an exclusive interview for Amani Africa’s podcast, The Pan Africanist, the new AU Commission Chairperson, Mohamoud Ali Youssouf, identified the issue of financing as a major priority area for his chairship of the AU Commission.
The deserved public criticism of the failure of African leaders to fund the AU comes as the AU’s landmark decision towards enhancing self-financing marks its ten-year anniversary this June. As part of her consequential tenure that set in motion the pioneer initiatives of AU’s Agenda 2063, including the AfCFTA, one of the issues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma championed was to address the perennial challenge of heavy dependency on external sources in the financing of the AU. It culminated in two key policy decisions.
AU member states’ Johannesburg and Kigali ambitions
The first was the June 2015 summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, where the AU Assembly adopted a decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.578 (XXV) on the Scale of Assessment and Alternative Sources of Financing of the AU. One of the major commitments that AU member states made under Assembly decision 578 was to fund 100 per cent of the operational budget, 75 per cent of the program budget and 25 per cent of the AU’s peace operations budget.
The second was the July 2016 Kigali summit that settled the question of the sourcing of the funds for realising the decision adopted in Johannesburg. Accordingly, the Kigali AU summit adopted Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) decision which committed to ‘institute and implement a 0.2 per cent levy on all eligible imported goods into the Continent to finance AU Operational, Program and Peace Support Operations Budget starting from the year 2017.’
AU’s non-implementation malady
Signifying the fast-expanding gulf between the ambitions of AU summit outcomes and the realities of acting on such outcomes, the Johannesburg and Kigali decisions have faced the same fate as other decisions of the AU – non-implementation. This malady of non-implementation that became prominent during Faki’s tenure promoted him to lament during his address of the opening of the February 2024 AU summit that ‘the frantic tendency to make decisions without real political will to implement them, has grown to such an extent that it has become devastating to our individual and collective credibility.’
As a result, little progress has been made in the ambition of the financial reforms introduced since Johannesburg to ensure financial autonomy and reduced dependency and secure timely, adequate, reliable and predictable payments by member states of their assessed contributions.
The story that the 2025 AU budget tells
The 2025 budget of the AU, adopted during the 45th ordinary session of the Executive Council held in Accra, Ghana in July 2024, was US$608,248,415. Of these, the regular budget was at US$555,319,415. The operational budget to which AU member states contributed 98 per cent, short of 2 per cent from the Johannesburg target, was only 167,045,485. By contrast, AU member states, along with African institutions and internal sources, covered only 22.5 % of the US$ 388,273,929 programme budget of the AU. While this represents a notable increase from the less than 6 per cent contribution of member states to the programme budget in 2015, it is a far cry from the Johannesburg target, which member states committed to realise by 2025. Considering the significance of the programme budget for advancing the major AU objectives, the failure to meet the Johannesburg target is emblematic of the growing gulf between the policy ambitions of the AU and its actual performance.
When it comes to member states’ contribution to peace operations, the lack of progress becomes even more glaring. The July 2024 Executive Council decision (EX.CL/Dec.1265(XLV) carrying the 2025 budget indicated that ‘peace support operations with a budget of US$52,929,131’ was ‘funded by International Partners.’
What emerges from the 2025 AU budget is that the AU has met the Johannesburg target only in relation to its operational budget. The portion of member states’ contribution to the overall AU budget renders the distance between the Johannesburg target and where the AU stands today stark. The overall budget of the AU for 2025, as captured in the July 2024 Executive Council decision, puts the balance of contributions between AU member states and partners at 32.9 per cent and 58.1 per cent, respectively.
Explaining the ‘farce’ that is the state of AU’s self-financing
A major factor behind this dismal state of the self-financing of the AU is the non-implementation of the Kigali AU summit decision. In 2018, the AU reported that only 16 of the AU member states were implementing the Kigali decision of collecting the 0.2 levy. Between that time and 2025, that number increased by only one.
Another major factor that impeded the growth of member states’ contribution to programme operations budgets was the 2019 decision of the AU capping member states’ contribution at $250 million. The result of this capping is that much of the member states’ contribution ends up funding the operational budget and leaving only small portion of as the remaining balance for the programme budget.
Additionally, despite the ambition of the AU’s financial reform to move away from reliance on a few member states, the AU did not succeed in achieving this ambition. As such, the continuing reliance on a few countries constrains the scope for expanding the contribution of member states for achieving ownership. The AU Commission Chairperson, Youssouf, told The Pan Africanist that the formula for mobilising the contributions of member states has created heavy reliance on a few countries. As he put it, ‘we need to think about a better sharing of the burden (of AU financing) …we have to look into the formula again.’
Further compounding the dismal state of the financing of the AU is the negative growth of member states’ contributions since the time of COVID-19. As the AU Commission Deputy Chairperson, Selma Haddadi, reminded members of the PRC in her address to the opening of the 50th ordinary session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of the AU on 9 June 2025, ‘the African Union’s approved budget has experienced a negative growth rate of 6 per cent, despite the establishment of new organs and the expansion of its mandates.’ She went on to note that ‘[a]lthough Member States’ contributions have been capped at US$250 million since 2019, actual assessed contributions have consistently fallen short of this ceiling.’ In fact, the statutory contribution of member states was capped at $200 million for 2025.
There is also the issue of delay or non-payment of assessed contributions on time and in full. Following the adoption of the three-tier sanctions regime in 2018 on payment of assessed contributions and the follow-up of the sanctions regime, the payment of member states has improved significantly. However, the fact that a significant number of member states, including major contributors, effect payment as late as the middle of the year represents a challenge. For the 2024 budget, the AU Ministerial Committee on Scale of Assessment reported that 13 member states did not pay into the 2024 regular budget, and a further five member states made only partial payment as of 31st December 2024.
The price AU is paying for the poor state of its funding
The dismal state of progress in meeting the Johannesburg targets entails dire consequences for the functioning of the continental body. As the Deputy Chairperson pointed out, apart from perpetuating heavy reliance on external funding and thereby differing the ambition of ownership, the funding challenge significantly constrained the AUC’s capacity to effectively implement the decisions of the Policy Organs and strategic priorities.’ Additionally, this funding constraint, Haddadi pointed out, ‘has significantly hindered the effective implementation of security and safety standards.’
AU Commission Deputy Chairperson invited member states to provide ‘guidance on the immediate way forward’ and engage in ‘reflection on this critical issue of the financial sustainability of our Union and its impact on our operations.’ In his exclusive interview with The Pan-Africanist Chairperson Youssouf, apart from proposing the revisiting of the burden sharing, he emphasised the need for other sources of financing such as the private sector and innovative finance sources.
Enter the new AU Commission leadership
Signifying the attention the new AU leadership attaches to this issue, during the opening session of the 50th Ordinary Session of the PRC, the financing woes afflicting the AU took prime place in the speech of the Deputy Chairperson (DCP) of the AU Commission. One third of the speech was dedicated to this issue.
The new AU Commission leadership is on target in prioritising the issue of the funding of the AU. ‘In (my) vision,’ the Chairperson told The Pan Africanist, ‘the mobilisation of resources is central.’ Echoeing Mo Ibrahim’s comments, Youssouf noted that ‘You can not envisage… the possibility …of ownership of the programmes while waiting the support of partners’.
It will be quite a success if this focused prioritisation of addressing the challenge of AU funding by the new AU Commission leadership leads to enabling member states to deliver on the long-delayed commitment of funding at least 75 per cent of the programme budget of the AU. While one hopes that Youssouf and Haddadi succeed in this quest, it remains to be seen how they will catalyse the required collective will of member states for overcoming the ‘farce’ that is the funding of the AU.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
