Briefing on the situation in eastern DRC
Briefing on the situation in eastern DRC
Date | 27 November 2025
Tomorrow (28 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to meet to receive a briefing on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Council last discussed this issue in February during its summit-level meeting. Since then, there have been several developments, both regarding the security situation on the ground and ongoing mediation efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the longstanding crisis in eastern DRC.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, followed by an introductory statement of Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Representatives of DRC and Rwanda, as countries concerned, are also expected to make a statement in the open segment of the session. It is also expected that the representatives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Eastern Africa Community (EAC), as concerned RECs/RMs and the UN, are also expected to make statements.
Since January, the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group has expanded its control over territory in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, capturing strategic cities including Goma and Bukavu, and the respective provincial capitals. Not only did the M23 expand its territorial control, but it also went on to institutionalise its control through the establishment of its own administrative structures in the territories under its control. This has created concerns over the threat of territorial fragmentation of the DRC.
In the PSC’s summit meeting on 14 February 2025, it ‘unequivocally condemned the activities of M23 and its supporters, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and other armed groups’ and called for ‘the immediate withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, armed and terrorist groups operating in the DRC.’ On 21 February, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2773 on the situation in eastern DRC, which, among other elements, demanded the immediate cessation of further M23 military advances, calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and expressed the Council’s readiness to consider additional measures against those contributing to the continuation of the conflict in eastern DRC.
The security situation in eastern DRC has continued to deteriorate, with further fears that the M23 will expand its territorial control into Uvira. Tension between DRC and Rwanda also continues, with both countries persisting in trading accusations. In his 23 September address during the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, President Tshisekedi accused Rwanda of deliberately obstructing peace efforts and continuing its support for the M23, and he called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. Speaking at the General Assembly on 25 September, Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, accused the DRC of renewed militarisation and ongoing collaboration with ‘genocidal and sanctioned armed groups,’ including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) —an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda—and Wazalendo militias.
As peace efforts from continental initiatives face setbacks, efforts have been underway to reorganise continental efforts. In March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process. The operationalisation of this process remains slow.
Despite the setbacks faced in the Luanda process and attempts to reorganise continental efforts, new peace efforts emerged, albeit outside of the AU and African regional bodies. Following the collapse of the meeting of the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda in December 2024, on 18 March, the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, facilitated a meeting in Doha between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. According to a joint statement issued afterwards, the two leaders ‘reaffirmed the commitment of all parties to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.’
On 25 April, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, hosted DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and La Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, and Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, in Washington, D.C. During the meeting, he facilitated the signing of a Declaration of Principles aimed at supporting a ‘pathway to peace, stability, and integrated economic development in the eastern DRC region and the resumption of normal bilateral relations.’
Negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda under US auspices ultimately led to the signing of a peace agreement on 27 June in Washington, D.C. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened four meetings so far.
The US has been working through the mechanisms established under the 27 June agreement to ease tensions and help the DRC and Rwanda translate their commitments into concrete action. Most recently, the fourth meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism was held in Washington, D.C., on 20 November. This mechanism is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the harmonised plan to neutralise the FDLR and to facilitate the disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the DRC and Rwanda reaffirmed their commitment to what is referred to as the Operations Order (OPORD), developed as the implementation plan for advancing the CONOPS.
On 7 November, the Joint Oversight Committee—established under the peace agreement to resolve any disputes arising during implementation—met in Washington, D.C. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the parties committed to refraining from any hostile actions or rhetoric that could undermine the full implementation of the 27 June peace agreement. They also initialled the text of a Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF), which outlines key areas for fostering economic cooperation and development between the two countries. During the meeting, Qatar provided an update on the ongoing negotiations in Doha, including progress on prisoner exchanges and the first meeting of the Doha ceasefire monitoring mechanism, established in October to oversee implementation of the ceasefire between the Congolese government and M23.
Meanwhile, following a first direct encounter between representatives of the Congolese government and the M23 in Doha under Qatar’s facilitation, the two sides issued a joint declaration on 23 April reaffirming their ‘commitment to an immediate cessation of hostilities, a categorical rejection of any hate speech, intimidation, and call on local communities to uphold these commitments.’
Since then, negotiations have continued in pursuit of a comprehensive peace agreement. Several contentious issues have emerged. For example, the M23 insisted on implementing confidence-building measures—such as the release of prisoners of war—as a precondition for further progress, while the Congolese government maintained that such measures could only be considered once an agreement is signed, including on the restoration of state authority. Other sensitive matters, including the restoration of state authority and broader governance arrangements, have reportedly elicited strong reactions from both sides.
Nonetheless, Qatar has continued its facilitation efforts, and both the Congolese government and the M23 remain actively engaged in the process. Ultimately, the two parties agreed on a prisoner exchange mechanism, under which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will oversee the identification, verification, and safe release of detainees held by both sides.
On 19 July, the Congolese government and M23 signed a Declaration of Principles in Doha, including a commitment to a ceasefire. Subsequent Qatari-led negotiations paved the way for the signing of the Doha Framework for Peace on 15 November. Under this framework, the parties affirmed their commitment to addressing the root causes of the conflict through structured dialogue, confidence-building measures, and a phased approach to de-escalation and stabilisation. The Doha Framework for Peace is intended to serve as the foundation for a comprehensive peace process, with a series of protocols, annexes, and technical arrangements to be negotiated in due course. These are expected to address specific issues, including the consolidation and verification of the ceasefire, modalities for troop disengagement, humanitarian access, reintegration, and support for national dialogue. Media reports have indicated a planned summit this month between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington, D.C. The signing of the Doha Framework could provide the necessary momentum for this summit.
The situation was a subject of deliberation in the consultative meetings, both between the PSC and the UNSC and the PSC and the European Political and Security Committee (EUPSC). In the joint communiqué of the PSC and the EUPSC, which, unlike the PSC-UNSC joint communiqué, contained substantive elements that reflect the current policy thinking on the state of the situation in Eastern DRC. First in relation to the M23, the PSC-EUPSC joint communiqué, reaffirming ‘the imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC’ as essential to resolving the country’s conflict, expressed grave concern over M23’s military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the ‘dismantlement of the so-called ‘parallel administration’ by the rebel Movement of M23.’ Second, the joint communiqué called ‘for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw in line with UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025).’ While the EUPSC-AUPSC avoided naming who ‘uninvited foreign forces’ refers to, the reference to UNSC Resolution 2773 leaves very little doubt about who it refers to.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express concern over the continuation of the conflict in Eastern DRC and the tension between the DRC and Rwanda. It may reiterate the imperative for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and its call for unconditional cessation of hostilities. The PSC may also welcome the various peace processes, including the signing of agreements in Washington, D.C., and Doha and call on the parties to the peace processes to abide by the commitments they have made. It may also underscore the need for coordination of the peace processes led by the US and Qatar with the efforts of the AU mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators for the DRC. It may also welcome the decisions of the joint EAC-SADC Summit and the merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. In this respect, the PSC may also call for the activation of the joint secretariat under the AU for enhancing the role of the continent in peace efforts in Eastern DRC.
Will the AU-EU summit move from performative dialogue to meaningful listening for joint action?
Will the AU-EU summit move from performative dialogue to meaningful listening for joint action?
Date | 24 November 2025
The 7th AU-EU summit kicked off earlier today under the theme ‘Promoting Peace and Prosperity through Effective Multilateralism.’ As the nearly 80 leaders of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) convene in Angola’s capital, Luanda, on 24-25 November 2025, a major question in the minds of many is whether this summit will mark a departure from the previous summit.
The last time the two sides met at a summit level was in February 2022. It is to be recalled that the summit was held under the theme ‘Two unions, one vision’. As it was clear for many close observers at the time, coming against the background of major policy dissonance over the COVID-19 pandemic, including over access to the vaccine, the idea of the AU and EU having ‘one vision’ was seen as nothing more than an illusion. What unfolded soon after that summit in February 2022, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, made it clear that the idea of ‘one vision’ was anything but grounded in reality.
The reality is that there are areas of shared interest between the AU and the EU. This has been in full display in the robust partnership and cooperation of the AU and the EU on peace and security. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the operationalisation of the peace and security architecture of the AU without the critical role played by this partnership. Understandably, the peace and security partnership, for which the EU established the African Peace Facility, was premised on the recognition that the AU’s enhanced role in peace and security is a useful contribution to the global public good of the maintenance of international peace and security, which the EU has an interest in promoting.
Parallel to such a major area of convergence, the other equally important reality is that there are many policy areas in respect of which the interests of the two sides diverge, at times fundamentally. The policy dissonance regarding COVID-19 brought this into sharp relief. While the AU Assembly advocated for a TRIPs waiver regarding COVID-19 vaccines underscoring the need for a just international system, the EU was not supportive of the demand for TRIPs waiver. Although not the same situation, in the context of the war in Ukraine and unsurprisingly, the lack of shared policy position between the EU and the AU on the response to the war became a deal breaker in three consecutive annual consultative meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council. As a result, the annual consultative meetings held during 2022, 2023 and 2024 ended without adopting a joint communiqué.
Given that it is being held in a much more fraught global context and regional dynamics that further strain multilateral cooperation, the AU-EU summit in Luanda needs to be informed by the lessons from these experiences. For example, AU’s support for multilateralism is increasingly accompanied by the demand by AU member states (which is getting louder and was evident during the G20 summit in Johannesburg) for both a) reform, among others, of the global tax regime and the international financial institutions and b) delivery on commitments made in relation to the sustainable development goals and measures for addressing the threat of climate change.
This requires both sides treating the relationship with the seriousness it deserves. Despite being courted by many, the reality is the AU needs the EU. A case in point is the EU’s critical support for the AU’s mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). If mobilised towards priorities set by Africa and jointly designed and implemented, investments from the EU under the Global Gateway would be catalytic to advance some of the flagship projects of Agenda 2063 of the AU. The EU, on its part, needs Africa’s endowment with critical minerals, the demography that will be a major source of labour for the global economy and its growing market. It also needs, like others, AU member states in multilateral negotiations. Despite the power asymmetry and the different institutional arrangement for developing positions still working in its favour, the EU would do well not to perpetuate the business-as-usual model of engaging the AU, hence being comfortable with setting the agenda and dominating the process of shaping the outcomes of the AU-EU partnership meetings.
There is a lot of dialogue between the AU and the EU. As the cases referenced above show, the dialogue does not always translate into listening and mutual understanding. As the EU would do well not to perpetuate the business-as-usual-model of engaging the AU, for member states of the AU, there can be no exercise of agency without being able to set and negotiate the agenda of the AU-EU partnership meetings. Similarly, the rhetoric and ambition of speaking with one voice should be supported by a negotiated common position premised on Agenda 2063.
These were barely on display during the AU-EU ministerial on the part of the AU member states. By contrast, the AU adopted a different posture in the preparations for the summit. Instead of taking the easy road of copying and pasting from the AU-EU ministerial outcome document, the AU initiated a draft with new elements that reflect the interests and policy positions of Africa on the various agenda items agreed between the two sides.
In the negotiation on the outcome document for the AU-EU summit in Luanda, initially, there was no real discussion both on what informed the elements of the draft that the AU initiated and on why the EU side responded by deleting and replacing with its proposed formulations. This was far from an ideal way of engaging in negotiations. It became clear to both sides that there was a lot of value in engaging in direct negotiations held on 11 and 12 November. A critical factor in creating such an atmosphere was the role of the chair on the side of the AU. It has become apparent that there is a need for a more flexible engagement grounded in principle.
In an era in which the competition for Africa’s attention and partnership is fierce, for the EU-AU partnership to be meaningful, it also needs to shift the approach to the development and delivery of partnership projects from being supply-heavy to being demand-driven. A case in point in this respect is the very important EU infrastructure program of Global Gateway. As perceptively observed, the projects ‘were perceived—rightly or wrongly—to have been defined by Brussels, rather than together.’ Additionally, follow through and clear accounting for commitments made under the AU-EU summit will be one of the key issues that will advance enhanced trust and closer coordination between the AU and the EU.
Is Africa charting its own destiny?
Is Africa charting its own destiny?
Date | 21 November 2025
By Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga
Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the
African Union and Head of UNOAU
Delivered during the High-Level Seminar on Charting Africa’s Agency in Uncertainty and Transforming Global Order, Sheraton Hotel, Lalibela Conference Room, Addis Ababa, 21 November 2025
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Many thanks Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Ambassador Stian Christensen, Permanent Representative of Norway to the African Union, for your kind invitation to UNOAU to join you today in this timely High-Level Public Seminar under the theme ‘Charting Africa’s Agency in Uncertainty and Transforming Global Order’.
Looking at today’s theme, ‘Is Africa charting its own destiny?’ is the first question that comes to mind. My answer is yes. But if not, which are the forces at work, both internal and external, that are obstructing the continent’s agency. In other words, what would it take for Africa to be the sole or the main agent of its own future?
And if non-African agents are still at work in influencing or even dictating the continent’s trajectory, what forces, means or kind of power are they applying to determine Africa’s fate?
If, as it may be the case, such forces are jostling for global power, is Africa equipped to take advantage of their conflicting interests or would the continent continue to be just a battle ground, the grass trampled by fighting pachyderms?
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
I will not attempt to answer these and other questions as we are truly gifted to have such an eminent panel of scholars doubled with unquestionable panafrican credentials.
Suffice for me to stress that for a continent that was ‘absent’ at the creation of this passing world order, Africa cannot afford to leave it to others to redraw the emerging new distribution of power and roles.
I said ‘absent’, because those representing the continent, including our host country, were lacking the critical mass to influence for Africa’s own benefit the policies and normative frames that have been serving for over 80 years as the basis for the global political, economic, financial, military, and technological trajectory of world affairs.
Yet, as we all agree that the world is indeed in flux and more fragmented, mainly because what I have come to call the ‘San Francisco Consensus’ no longer serves its intended purpose in the eyes of dominant powers, we should guard from believing that the fundamentals of the new ‘power equilibrium’ that is in the making will be drastically different from the prevailing ones.
The emerging new world is likely to be a measure of the capacity of major blocs, states, and other entities, including major corporations, to ascertain their agency in the evolving global power redistribution. The question before us today may therefore be ‘will Africa be ready or what would it take for the continent to influence and count in the emerging global order’?
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I dared raising these questions because I know Africa is not coming to this conversation void of any options.
The news of the ‘end’ of global justice and the ‘end’ of sustainable development is a forewarning of emerging global challenges. But have the universalism, the democratic and the development ideals of the AU, the AU Constitutive Act, and the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance been defeated?
Are AU injunctions against unconstitutional changes of government, or AU imperatives for good democratic governance suddenly passé? Or are African aspirations for unity, promising a global role for African agency?
Have we sacrificed the values of continental unity on the altar of global power-privilege? Or do enlightened collective ideals, or universal rights of recognition and redistribution enshrined in the UN Charter still have a seat at the global table?
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Today, thanks to its forward leaning and ambitious normative frameworks, currently under review, the AU is unquestionably a bastion of multilateralism and a home to universalist and democratic ambitions. APSA and AGA present a vision not only for a just African order, but also a just world order. However, Africa alone and/or Africa divided, cannot achieve its ambitions. The fact that implementation remains a daunting challenge should not be a reason for despair but rather a reminder of the imperative to forge ahead with greater impetus.
The UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, the UN-AU Strategic Partnership for the Implementation of UN Agenda 2030 and AU Agenda 2063, and the UN-AU Human Rights Framework exemplify democratic and development values and present a model for a networked multilateralist system called for by Secretary-General Guterres and Chairperson Youssouf.
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Whether as a matter of ‘polarization’, ‘particularism’, or ‘pluralism’, global competition is heightening not lowering, as evinced by this year’s convention of the G7 in Canada, or the International Conference on Financing for Development in Spain, to mention just a few intergovernmental processes.
Likewise, global competition is currently on display in Belém and will certainly be palpable during the upcoming G20 meeting in South Africa, where the African Union will take its seat for the first time (22-23 November).
The question we need to address in these circumstances is: Will Africa position itself to negotiate collective interests amidst this prolific and plural competition, or will African countries get picked off one by one?
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
With a proliferation of external actors in increasingly protracted African conflicts and a proliferation of external actors in their resolution, there is admittedly ground for concern.
However, the agenda for sustainable development, including AU Agenda 2063, with a focus on international economic and financial reforms, the agenda for global social justice and a just green transition, and the agenda for multilateral cooperation, where small and big states share decision-making powers, remain alive in AU and UN relations. Indeed, with the support of the AU, the UN member States endorsed such a vision in the ‘Pact for the Future’ (September 2024).
These values were reaffirmed recently at the UN HQ during the 9th Annual Conference of the UN Secretary-General and the AU Commission Chairperson.
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
We are certainly witnessing the move towards a ‘multi-polar world’, and consequently need a more robust multi-lateral framework to address emerging challenges. The Pact for the Future offers a path to strengthen multilateral approaches to peace and security, and represents a key step toward more effective, inclusive and networked multilateralism.
In this context of networked multilateralism, the AU and UN partnership is by no means the only venue for African agency, alongside the G20, the AU can look to other global blocs, including ASEAN, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of American States.
And, if united around key strategic interests as outlined in Agenda 2063 and related Moonshots, the AU can enter into mutually beneficial partnerships with other major players such as the US, China, the Russian Federation or the EU, but also mid-level powers using capital to leverage power in the world today.
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Power and prestige continue to play an oversized role in international relations. Africa’s power resides in African unity, its vibrant people, particularly its dynamic youth and, of course, its immense endowments in strategic minerals. African prestige relies on Africa’s ability to discriminate its interests from those of its partners and competitors.
For Africa, by virtue of the many tragedies that marked its history over the past several centuries, unity and regional integration should not be treated as optional rather an existential and strategic imperative.
And, as history has shown since immemorial times, nations that have invested in their human capital and mastered science and technology have often been better equipped to create wealth and amass capital, which in turn have enabled them to establish strong institutions underpinned by respect for the rule of law and human rights.
To succeed, Africa’s renaissance, as enshrined in Agenda 2063, will be no exception.
While the Secretary-General stresses the need for a global order that works for everyone, Africa can seize this moment to truly own African values, and to assert African interests.
The time has come for Africa to decide, and Africa can count on the UN to always stand by its side.
I thank you for your kind attention.
Reimagining Africa’s Role in the emerging multipolar world order that resembles ‘English Premier League’
Reimagining Africa’s Role in the emerging multipolar world order that resembles ‘English Premier League’
Date | 21 November 2025
Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
In an era where the global order resembles less a hierarchical pyramid and more a shifting but rugged playing field, Africa finds itself at a decisive juncture. The growing competition by old and new as well as middle powers for Africa’s support in international affairs and access to its resources continues to shape Africa’s rising visibility in global affairs. This visibility is reflected, among others, in African Union’s admission into the Group of 20 (G20) as a permanent member and the increase in the number of African states in the BRICS. Yet visibility is not the same as influence and influence same as outcome. The central question confronting Africa today is how Africa position itself in a shifting geopolitical landscape to break its historic standing as a marginal player and become an active actor and shaper of the process of the redefinition of the rules and structure of the game for the emerging multipolar world order.
This question lay at the heart of a two-day conference co-convened by Chatham House, Amani Africa, and UNDP, which brought together policymakers, scholars, and practitioners from across the continent to reflect on Africa’s role in a rapidly evolving world order. The discussions were rich in insight, examining how Africa’s agency can be strengthened through coherence, strategic partnerships, and leadership anchored in the values of Pan-Africanism.
A metaphor shared by Gedion Timotheos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, in his keynote address in the opening session served as a useful analytical frame that shaped much of the discussion during the conference. Drawing from the world’s most-watched sport, he likened today’s global order to the ‘English Premier League’, unpredictable, competitive, and full of surprise victories. No longer a two-team league of superpowers (as during the Cold War) or a one-club show (the post Cold War unipolar moment), the world is increasingly multipolar, with many players vying for influence. The implication for Africa is clear: it must decide whether to maintain its marginal place or to step confidently onto the field as a united, disciplined, and strategically minded team.
Kicking off the substantive segment of the conference, the panel on Power, Partnerships, and the Global Order, explored the contours of this changing landscape. Participants emphasized that Africa must move from being an arena of competition to a player of consequence. The continent’s demographic vitality, resource wealth, demonstrated self-awareness and historical moral vision position it to be a strategic actor, not merely a passive recipient of global shifts. But agency requires more than awareness, it demands deliberate strategy and coordinated action rooted in principle. The modern reinterpretation of non-alignment and Africa’s role as a moderating and balancing power articulated in the Joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System emerged as a central idea. The reinterpretation of non-alignment rather than signaling just neutrality or indecision or not taking sides, it represents strategic independence whereby Africa partners with all actors based on its interests.
Pan-Africanism, participants reminded, remains the philosophical compass guiding this endeavor. It is not merely a historical sentiment but a living principle, one that ties Africa’s global engagement to solidarity, justice, and collective progress. In a fragmented world where power often speaks louder than principle, in addition to harnessing its resources for advancing its agency, Africa’s moral voice, anchored in Pan-African ideals, constitutes its most valuable currency.
A second theme that echoed throughout the discussions was the need for coherence between Africa’s national and continental institutions. The discussions underscored a long-standing paradox: while Africa is institutionally rich, it often struggles to harness that abundance into collective strength. Participants observed that Africa’s effectiveness abroad begins with alignment at home. As Hannah Tetteh, Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of UN Mission in Libya, put it, the first and critical level of alignment is between continental frameworks and policies on the one hand and national level politics and policies. The other level is the one between the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The challenge here is not the absence of frameworks, but the need for clarity in their division of labour, stronger accountability mechanisms, and above all, political will in delivering jointly, collaboratively and complementarily.
As several speakers put it, Africa’s problem is not a deficit of policy frameworks and institutions, but a deficit of implementation. The continent must transform existing commitments into concrete outcomes, bridging the gap between policy ambition and practice.
Not surprisingly, the other issue that received particular attention was financial autonomy. The conference’s exchanges laid bare a structural paradox: despite its vast resources, Africa’s financial dependency often constrains its political independence. Without self-sustaining financial mechanisms, even the most well-crafted strategies remain vulnerable to external pressures. ‘Africa’s political liberation must now be matched by financial emancipation,’ one speaker noted. This perspective reflects a growing consensus that Africa’s agency begins to systematically weigh in global affairs and materially advance its interests when Africa takes leadership in financing its priorities, leveraging, among others, its vast natural resources endowment, through increasing beneficiation and better terms of trade and pushing for a more just global tax regime.
If financial independence defines the foundation of agency, sustainable development and climate diplomacy represent its forward-looking frontier. Discussions during the session on ‘African Priorities in Sustainable Development, Climate Diplomacy, and Biodiversity’ highlighted Africa’s growing leadership in shaping global environmental governance. Through the two Africa Climate Summits and related initiatives, the continent is articulating a development model that integrates climate action with economic transformation, a ‘climate-conscious growth’ paradigm that links decarbonization with industrialization on the basis of the principle of just transition.
Without being oblivious to the fact that climate change is driven by greenhouse gas emissions for which advanced economies largely bear the responsibility and the attendant burden of responsibility for addressing it, participants also pointed to the crucial role of local and sub-national actors whose initiatives in renewable energy, waste management, and urban sustainability are driving meaningful change from the ground up. Their experiences illustrate how climate governance is most effective when it is both localized and inclusive.
At the global level, the discussions called for a unified African voice in negotiations on critical minerals, carbon markets, and climate finance. As a recent Amani Africa policy brief compellingly argued, a unified negotiation position on critical minerals can be achieved through the establishment of a continental natural resource governance authority. Additionally, Mechanisms such as the African Group of Negotiators and the African Green Mineral Strategy were identified as essential instruments for ensuring that Africa engages with global markets on fair and transparent terms. Equity, community benefit, and transparency in carbon trading were seen as non-negotiable principles if Africa’s green transformation is to be both just and sustainable.
Turning attention to the economic engines that must drive Africa’s transformation, it was indicated that despite mounting challenges, from debt distress to declining aid inflows, Africa’s economic fundamentals remain promising. However, as participants observed, the path forward requires diversification, industrialization, and inclusive growth that empowers youth and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) not merely as beneficiaries but as architects of innovation and resilience.
The conversation also linked peace, governance, and prosperity as inseparable dimensions of Africa’s progress. Economic growth cannot flourish in contexts of instability or exclusion. Sustainable peace and inclusive development are mutually reinforcing, the twin pillars of a resilient Africa. Building on this understanding, the reflection on African-led peace and security initiatives shifted the focus from abstract aspirations to the practical question of how Africa can exercise genuine ownership over its security and governance agenda.
On peace and security, the conversation underscored a necessary shift from reactive peacekeeping to proactive prevention and peacemaking, where conflict is addressed through governance reform, inclusive dialogue, and creative diplomacy rather than militarized responses. Financing emerged as a critical fault line, emphasizing the need for enhanced financial contribution from Africa while recognizing that international peace and security on the African is not a matter to be left to be financed by Africa but is a collective global responsibility that directly implicates the UN which bears primary responsibility for international peace and security, including in Africa. Interestingly, the debate also highlighted that more than resources, what matters most for advancing Africa’s leadership in peace and security is the provision of technical and strategic analytical leadership by the AU and its ability to mobilise a unified position and voice by its member states. It is on these bases that the session called for a recalibration of Africa’s peace and security architecture, anchored in human security, knowledge production, and political courage, to ensure that African leadership defines the continent’s peace agenda to contain the worrying trend of reacting to external designs.
This two-day dialogue (which reaffirmed the importance of African perspectives through collaboration between research organisations in shaping not only Africa’s future but the global order itself) was not an end in itself but a catalyst, a moment to connect ideas with strategy, reflection with resolve. As Amani Africa’s policy brief for the conference showed, the emerging multipolar world presents both opportunities and risks. Yet, this emerging order also offers space for Africa to assert its agency. But this demands coordination and foresight based on, as the policy brief outlined, deliberate and well-thought-out strategy and foreign policy to avoid fragmentation and marginalization.
Across the sessions, a powerful consensus emerged: the era of aspiration and norm development has passed; this is the time of implementation and action. As the Chief of Staff of the AU Commission, Souef Moahmmed El-Amine underscored in his opening address, this is the moment to convert Africa’s visibility into influence and its influence into outcomes that improve lives.
This transition from symbolism to substance depends on Africa’s ability to act in consistent unity grounded in solidarity. When its nations, regions, and institutions work in harmony, Africa’s collective voice resonates more strongly in global forums. But disunity frustrates agency. To borrow again from football metaphor of Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the question is not whether Africa can play the game. Africa can. It even has shown flashes of brilliance as documented in the policy brief Amani Africa released to accompany this conference. The question is rather whether it can play as a team and consistently. The continent has talented players, from Tunis to Cape Town, Lagos to Nairobi, Addis to Dakar. But as any football fan knows, talent without teamwork wins no championship.
The match of global politics is already underway; the referee will not wait for Africa to warm up. The task now is to train together, strategize together, and play for the same side. That requires coherence in policy, consistency in diplomacy, and commitment to collective action.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts
Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts
Date | 20 November 2025
Tomorrow (21 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1314th session, which will be an open session on children affected by armed conflicts (CAAC).
Following the opening remarks from the Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. It is expected that Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and Co-Chair of the African Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC), will deliver a statement. Robert Doya Nanima, Member of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and Special Rapporteur on CAAC, is also expected to address the Council. Statements are also expected from representatives of the respective Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children International.
In August 2025, the PSC convened its 1296th session, focusing on ‘Education in Conflict Situations,’ in which, among other decisions, it emphasised the need to ‘strengthen the protection of children in conflict situations and promote children’s rights in AU peace, security and development programmes.’ Council went further and tasked the AU Commission to ‘develop a comprehensive and dynamic matrix listing all AU legal frameworks, strategies and initiatives aimed at promoting inclusive education for all, particularly ensuring continuity of education in times of conflict in Africa and to develop an action plan on activities to be undertaken in this area from 2025 onwards.’
This meeting is being held just a day after the ‘World Children’s Day’ – also known as the Universal Children’s Day – which is observed annually every 20th of November. It was on 20 November 1959 that the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Exactly thirty years later, on 20 November 1989, the Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, often called the UNCRC. This year also marks the 35th anniversary of the adoption of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), which was adopted on 11 July 1990.
The session takes place as conflicts on the continent worsen and the humanitarian crises resulting from them deepen. Mirroring the depiction of the grim state of peace and security captured in the research report titled Africa in a new era of insecurity and instability, noting how civilians are bearing the brunt of the rising number and spread of conflicts on the continent, the UN reported that violence against children in armed conflict reached ‘unprecedented levels’ in 2024. In Africa, such incidents of violence were recorded both in situations on the agenda of the PSC and those that are not, namely, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Lake Chad basin, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Of these, the countries with the highest number of reported violence are the DRC with 4043, Somalia with 2568, and Nigeria with 2436 and those that experienced what the UN report called ‘sharpest percentage increases’ are Mozambique with a 525% increase and Ethiopia with a 235% increase.
With violence-driven displacement tripling from 11 million people in 2015 to 34 million in 2024 and with more than one in every five children globally now affected by war, the futures of an entire generation hang in the balance. The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner also highlighted that ‘some 473 million children were affected by armed conflict globally in 2024, approximately one in six children, according to estimates by Save the Children.’ In Africa, it was reported that 218 million African children (32.6% of the continent’s entire child population) were living within 50 kilometres of armed violence, which is ‘an all-time high both in absolute numbers and global share.’
In the Central African Republic (CAR), UNICEF reported that from January to June 2025, the humanitarian situation in CAR showed some relative improvement, yet the overall context remains highly fragile. Civilians, including children, continue to face serious threats to their lives and well-being due to persistent insecurity, natural disasters (especially recurrent flooding) and new waves of displacement triggered primarily by armed violence. Although the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) decreased from the previous year to 446,722, displacement surged again during the first half of 2025. The main drivers were renewed fighting between armed groups in the south-east, the sporadic violence in the north-west and widespread flooding.
The UN report noted that attacks on civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, dramatically increased the vulnerability of children. In Nigeria, recently, gunmen attacked the Government Girls Science Secondary School in Maga, Kebbi State (Northwest Nigeria), killing the school’s Vice-Principal and abducting at least 25 students. This incident is part of a disturbing pattern of attacks on educational institutions in northern Nigeria, where hundreds of children (especially girls) have been kidnapped in recent years, seriously undermining the safety of children in schools and denying many their right to education.
In the Sahel, it has also been reported that ‘about four million people are now displaced across Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and neighbouring countries (around two-thirds more than five years ago) reflecting insecurity, limited access to services and livelihoods and the effects of climate change.’ Women and children account for 80% of all forcibly displaced people. The widespread insecurity across the region continues to endanger civilians, children in particular, exposing them to physical violence, forced recruitment into armed groups, severe restrictions on movement and arbitrary detention.
It is to be recalled that the war in Sudan has created the world’s largest child displacement. This pattern has continued with the escalation of violence in recent months. The latest, November 2025 UNICEF Humanitarian Flash Update in Sudan, with a specific focus on the North Darfur (Al Fasher) and Kordofan Crisis, highlighted that in North Darfur State, escalating violence since 26 October has displaced over 81,000 people from Al Fasher town, severely restricting humanitarian access and preventing the delivery of life-saving aid. Displaced families urgently require shelter, food, water and medical care, while protection risks, especially for women and children, are rising amid reports of widespread killings, sexual violence and looting of health facilities. In the Kordofan States, on the other hand, nearly 37,000 people have been displaced from various localities in North and South Kordofan due to recent conflict and shifting frontlines, with many seeking refuge in White Nile, Kassala and other states where host communities are absorbing large numbers of families, placing severe strain on already limited local resources and services.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The Council is likely to express deep concern over the rise in armed conflicts in parts of the Continent and over the heightening, devastating impact conflicts are having on children in particular. In this regard, the Council is expected to urge all actors in conflict situations on the continent to fully respect international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) and to uphold children’s rights. Council may emphasise the importance of strengthening advocacy efforts to ensure the safety and security of children in conflict zones, such as by integrating AP-CAAC in PSC field missions. The PSC may also request the systematic monitoring, documentation, and annual reporting on the state of protection of children in armed conflict in Africa, as a critical vehicle for adopting relevant measures informed by such comprehensive data and analysis. It may also request that the protection of children be specifically highlighted in briefings and reports on specific conflict situations, to facilitate the adoption of tailored measures to enhance child protection. The PSC may also encourage those Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, and to take concrete steps toward the full and effective implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, as well as other relevant international instruments. It may further appeal to all relevant stakeholders, including regional and international partners, to strengthen their support and assistance for children affected by conflicts in Africa.
Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Date | 18 November 2025
Presented at the joint Amani Africa, PSC Chairperson for November 2025, Republic of Cameroon, and UNOAU policy dialogue on ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’ held on 18 November, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
By SALIMATTA TOURAY, Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the African Union and member of the Peace and Security Council
Excellency Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Ambassador of the Republic of Cameroon and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November,
Excellency Elizabeth Mary Spehar, Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support,
Representative of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and head of UN-OAU,
Excellency Ambassador Erastus Ekitala Lokzale, Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN,
Excellency Ambassador Ricklef Johannes Beutin, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission
Dr. Solomon A. Dersso, Founding Director, Amani Africa Excellencies, distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
Firstly, allow me to extend my warm congratulations to you, Chairperson for the month of November 2025, the Republic of Cameroon, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) and Amani Africa for convening this high-level policy forum on the ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’. The outcome of today’s forum will complement and guide the joint peacebuilding work undertaken by the AU PSC.
It is therefore my honour to address you today on the significant peacebuilding journey undertaken by The Gambia since 2017, under the auspices of the United Nations Peacebuilding Programme. Our nation has made notable strides, focusing on a transition to democratic governance and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, with invaluable international support.
In The Gambia, we are implementing peacebuilding through a transitional justice programme that happens to be the most holistic transitional justice programme globally, and perhaps in this regard, The Gambia is challenging us all to think differently- more broadly, innovatively and intentionally- about local, regional and international partnerships- for more robust coordination, resource mobilization and implementation of national reform programmes in post-conflict settings.
Main message: The Gambia’s transitional justice experience demonstrates complementarity between the UN, AU and even ECOWAS’ peacebuilding architectures, but also provides valuable lessons
learnt around coordination.
I will not delve into ECOWAS’s contributions to peace, security and peacebuilding in The Gambia, but it goes without saying that in the case of The Gambia, ECOWAS’s strict coercive diplomatic means directly led to peacefully resolving our political impasse in December 2016, and was able to do so whilst equally abiding by United Nations Charter and prohibition to use of force principle.
ECOWAS’s intervention has served as the bedrock upon which all other transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts being undertaken by the UN and AU are built.
Today, ECOWAS also continues to stabilize, and augment to capacity of the security sector through the ECOMIG forces, and in more recent times, the approval of ECOWAS Heads of States to establish a Special Tribunal for the prosecution of international crimes committed in The Gambia between July 1994 and January 2017, directly enables attainment of transitional justice peacebuilding.
The Gambian experience demonstrates that the legitimacy of regional and international organizations is not a zero-sum game. Rather than competing for legitimacy, the UN, AU and ECOWAS complement each other, leveraging respective strengths, convening powers and capacities to address shared security challenges.
The Gambia encourages synergy and cooperation between global organisations to create more robust and inclusive security framework capable of handling the complex security issues of the twenty-first century. I will now focus on how the AU and UN have worked collaboratively, and complementarily in The Gambia on transitional justice:
Firstly, on sustaining political support for, both the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU Commission have exercised their convening powers for The Gambia and have provided several strategic platforms to the Government of The Gambia to engage with Member States.
The PBC and the AUC frequently inviting the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Ambassadors at the UN and AU to engage in high-level discussions on our processes. These in several instances has equally invited our civil society organizations, led to further bilateral engagements with Member States, the exchange of experiences and knowledge and the successful mobilization of financial contributions.[1]
On the elaboration of national plans and strategies, the Gambia’s transitional justice model has been heavily influenced by both the Secretary General’s Guidance Note on Transitional Justice, as well as the AU’s Transitional Justice Policy, with technical assistance and advice having been consistently available to the Government through the UN and AU’s respective departments of political, peacebuilding/security affairs.
While international organisations like the UN and AU provide a forum for multilateral cooperation and diplomacy, the AU and ECOWAS have provided a more localized approach to transitional justice and security governance, adapted to the unique requirements and dynamics of our individual Gambian context. This complimentary nature has promoted a unified and inclusive framework that supports a broad range of perspectives and notions.[2]
When it comes to the operationalization of transitional justice mechanisms and processes, both the UN and AU have provided technical and financial support through a variety of facilities: The UN Peacebuilding Funds, which has demonstrated the ability to provide swift, immediate relief to the Government through catalytic funding only 4 months into the transition in May 2017- has Programmatic funding channeled through implementing agencies- UNDP, OHCHR, the International Center for Transitional Justice etc. Between 2017 and 2022, the PBF provided such support in the country through 16 projects and a total investment of USD 30,913,673.
The AU Technical Support to The Gambia was a pragmatic initiative launched in 2018, that seconded 10 of the continents top experts in rule of law, democracy, transitional justice and security sector reform to Government ministries and national institutions, providing strategic advice and mentorship over 1 to 2 years.
More recently, in 2024 and 2025, the AU-EU Initiative to Transitional Justice in Africa has equally deployed 2 experts upon the request of the Government of The Gambia for the newly established Reparations Commission, in policy development and strategic communications.
The Gambia looks forward to engaging with the AU Peace Funds in the near future, to push the transitional justice agenda to a logical conclusion of at least, the full operationalization of a reparations programme and prosecutions in The Gambia.
Excellencies our process has not been without challenges, and we have learnt hard lessons:
At such a nascent and highly unstable stage of our transition comes one of the most difficult technical demands of transitional justice- the design of a programme, sincerely informed by a unique national context and embraced by national and local ownership. A delicate balance must be struck between the goodwill of external advisors and experts, which may not always be in line with national or local priorities.
This was The Gambia’s experience, specifically in security sector reform, whereby weak national coordination and contradictory advice of various advisers from the UN, EU, ECOWAS and AU, led
to wastage and created confusion and rather than propel, stagnated the elaboration of national plans and strategies. Transitional justice programmes cannot be divorced from the national development agenda, and therefore, technical assistance facilities can prove to be more useful when designed to accompany mechanisms and processes with a focus on the post-conflict environment of reconstruction and development agenda.
In this regard, the role of international financial institutions and facilities, such as the EU and World Bank budget support programmes, should equally be understood as complementary to the peacebuilding efforts of international and regional organizations such as the AU and the UN, as the formulation of budget support indicators should mirror critical transitional justice objectives and milestones. Equally, the important role of CSOs in supporting transitional justice processes from design to implementation, cannot be overstated.
In light of the stated challenges and lessons learnt, we would like to offer the following recommendations around coordination.
In a climate of shifting global financial and political dynamics, whereby peace and security challenges are both increasing and evolving, further stretching limited resources, the onus remains on Governments to establish from the onset, robust frameworks for coordination with UN, AU and other international and regional actors, including IFIs and civil society, supported by monitoring and evaluation approaches to ensure accountability and responsiveness.
We have learnt in The Gambia that local and regional organizations exhibit a higher level of ownership and legitimacy since members participate more directly in decision-making and implementation methods. Beyond ownership, grassroots approaches to transitional justice develop a sense of accountability, hence increasing the overall legitimacy of transitional justice activities.
Thus, The Gambia is operating as an incubator for novel approaches to transitional justice and security governance, which has also been influenced by global standards of practice, but also now, contributing to that global discourse.
A missed opportunity and strong recommendation for other countries in pursuit of peacebuilding, is that robust coordination framework should be designed from the onset to play an important role in bridging the gap between global security standards and local realities. The UN and AU with their far reaching networks are uniquely designed to support government-led coordination efforts.
Excellencies,
In conclusion, now, more than ever, we call upon our partners in the international community, regional organizations, and all stakeholders to stand with The Gambia. In this regard, I would like to convey the Government of The Gambia’s thanks and appreciation to ASG Elizabeth Spehar and Ambassador Monono for their invaluable technical and financial support. Let us renew our commitment to peace, justice, and inclusive development. We urge you to continue your support—politically, technically, and financially—to ensure that the gains we have made are not only preserved but built upon.
Together, let us work to transform challenges into opportunities, foster unity, and secure a peaceful and prosperous future for all Gambians.
Thank you.
[1] We have received bilateral contributions from Ireland (approx. $400,000 channeled through UNDP for victims and survivors of SGBV), Switzerland (several grants to Gambian CSOs, at least $200,000 worth since 2017, prioritizing victim and women led organizations) just to name a few.
[2] If looking for examples of how The Gambian TJ model is so “Gambian” you can cite how we started the entire process of designing our TJ model by holding intensive, inclusive national dialogues, consultations and conferences (from May to December 2017, and we continue to employ a very consultation approach in the continued design of TJ- for example in the design of the Victims Reparations Act in 2023 and as we continue to design the Peace and Reconciliation Commission Bill). The outcome of these discussions have been listened to, translated into tangible laws, policies and strategies, and complemented by lessons learnt from other contexts such as Sierra Leone and South Africa. So, in the TRRC Act for example, the nationality of Commissioners being restricted to Gambians only, but reflecting all ethnic, gender, age and geographical differences of people- was as a direct result of the outcome of local consultations. The fact that the Commission was granted the powers to provide interim reparations too was a result of consultations with the victims, and lessons learnt from other places such as South Africa and Sierra Leone, whose reparations programmes stall to date.
Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Date | 18 November 2025
Presented at the joint Amani Africa, PSC Chairperson for November 2025, Republic of Cameroon, and UNOAU policy dialogue on ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’ held on 18 November, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
By SALIMATTA TOURAY, Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the African Union and member of the Peace and Security Council
Excellency Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Ambassador of the Republic of Cameroon and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November,
Excellency Elizabeth Mary Spehar, Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support,
Representative of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and head of UN-OAU,
Excellency Ambassador Erastus Ekitala Lokzale, Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN,
Excellency Ambassador Ricklef Johannes Beutin, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission
Dr. Solomon A. Dersso, Founding Director, Amani Africa Excellencies, distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
Firstly, allow me to extend my warm congratulations to you, Chairperson for the month of November 2025, the Republic of Cameroon, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) and Amani Africa for convening this high-level policy forum on the ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’. The outcome of today’s forum will complement and guide the joint peacebuilding work undertaken by the AU PSC.
It is therefore my honour to address you today on the significant peacebuilding journey undertaken by The Gambia since 2017, under the auspices of the United Nations Peacebuilding Programme. Our nation has made notable strides, focusing on a transition to democratic governance and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, with invaluable international support.
In The Gambia, we are implementing peacebuilding through a transitional justice programme that happens to be the most holistic transitional justice programme globally, and perhaps in this regard, The Gambia is challenging us all to think differently- more broadly, innovatively and intentionally- about local, regional and international partnerships- for more robust coordination, resource mobilization and implementation of national reform programmes in post-conflict settings.
Main message: The Gambia’s transitional justice experience demonstrates complementarity between the UN, AU and even ECOWAS’ peacebuilding architectures, but also provides valuable lessons
learnt around coordination.
I will not delve into ECOWAS’s contributions to peace, security and peacebuilding in The Gambia, but it goes without saying that in the case of The Gambia, ECOWAS’s strict coercive diplomatic means directly led to peacefully resolving our political impasse in December 2016, and was able to do so whilst equally abiding by United Nations Charter and prohibition to use of force principle.
ECOWAS’s intervention has served as the bedrock upon which all other transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts being undertaken by the UN and AU are built.
Today, ECOWAS also continues to stabilize, and augment to capacity of the security sector through the ECOMIG forces, and in more recent times, the approval of ECOWAS Heads of States to establish a Special Tribunal for the prosecution of international crimes committed in The Gambia between July 1994 and January 2017, directly enables attainment of transitional justice peacebuilding.
The Gambian experience demonstrates that the legitimacy of regional and international organizations is not a zero-sum game. Rather than competing for legitimacy, the UN, AU and ECOWAS complement each other, leveraging respective strengths, convening powers and capacities to address shared security challenges.
The Gambia encourages synergy and cooperation between global organisations to create more robust and inclusive security framework capable of handling the complex security issues of the twenty-first century. I will now focus on how the AU and UN have worked collaboratively, and complementarily in The Gambia on transitional justice:
Firstly, on sustaining political support for, both the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU Commission have exercised their convening powers for The Gambia and have provided several strategic platforms to the Government of The Gambia to engage with Member States.
The PBC and the AUC frequently inviting the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Ambassadors at the UN and AU to engage in high-level discussions on our processes. These in several instances has equally invited our civil society organizations, led to further bilateral engagements with Member States, the exchange of experiences and knowledge and the successful mobilization of financial contributions.[1]
On the elaboration of national plans and strategies, the Gambia’s transitional justice model has been heavily influenced by both the Secretary General’s Guidance Note on Transitional Justice, as well as the AU’s Transitional Justice Policy, with technical assistance and advice having been consistently available to the Government through the UN and AU’s respective departments of political, peacebuilding/security affairs.
While international organisations like the UN and AU provide a forum for multilateral cooperation and diplomacy, the AU and ECOWAS have provided a more localized approach to transitional justice and security governance, adapted to the unique requirements and dynamics of our individual Gambian context. This complimentary nature has promoted a unified and inclusive framework that supports a broad range of perspectives and notions.[2]
When it comes to the operationalization of transitional justice mechanisms and processes, both the UN and AU have provided technical and financial support through a variety of facilities: The UN Peacebuilding Funds, which has demonstrated the ability to provide swift, immediate relief to the Government through catalytic funding only 4 months into the transition in May 2017- has Programmatic funding channeled through implementing agencies- UNDP, OHCHR, the International Center for Transitional Justice etc. Between 2017 and 2022, the PBF provided such support in the country through 16 projects and a total investment of USD 30,913,673.
The AU Technical Support to The Gambia was a pragmatic initiative launched in 2018, that seconded 10 of the continents top experts in rule of law, democracy, transitional justice and security sector reform to Government ministries and national institutions, providing strategic advice and mentorship over 1 to 2 years.
More recently, in 2024 and 2025, the AU-EU Initiative to Transitional Justice in Africa has equally deployed 2 experts upon the request of the Government of The Gambia for the newly established Reparations Commission, in policy development and strategic communications.
The Gambia looks forward to engaging with the AU Peace Funds in the near future, to push the transitional justice agenda to a logical conclusion of at least, the full operationalization of a reparations programme and prosecutions in The Gambia.
Excellencies our process has not been without challenges, and we have learnt hard lessons:
At such a nascent and highly unstable stage of our transition comes one of the most difficult technical demands of transitional justice- the design of a programme, sincerely informed by a unique national context and embraced by national and local ownership. A delicate balance must be struck between the goodwill of external advisors and experts, which may not always be in line with national or local priorities.
This was The Gambia’s experience, specifically in security sector reform, whereby weak national coordination and contradictory advice of various advisers from the UN, EU, ECOWAS and AU, led
to wastage and created confusion and rather than propel, stagnated the elaboration of national plans and strategies. Transitional justice programmes cannot be divorced from the national development agenda, and therefore, technical assistance facilities can prove to be more useful when designed to accompany mechanisms and processes with a focus on the post-conflict environment of reconstruction and development agenda.
In this regard, the role of international financial institutions and facilities, such as the EU and World Bank budget support programmes, should equally be understood as complementary to the peacebuilding efforts of international and regional organizations such as the AU and the UN, as the formulation of budget support indicators should mirror critical transitional justice objectives and milestones. Equally, the important role of CSOs in supporting transitional justice processes from design to implementation, cannot be overstated.
In light of the stated challenges and lessons learnt, we would like to offer the following recommendations around coordination.
In a climate of shifting global financial and political dynamics, whereby peace and security challenges are both increasing and evolving, further stretching limited resources, the onus remains on Governments to establish from the onset, robust frameworks for coordination with UN, AU and other international and regional actors, including IFIs and civil society, supported by monitoring and evaluation approaches to ensure accountability and responsiveness.
We have learnt in The Gambia that local and regional organizations exhibit a higher level of ownership and legitimacy since members participate more directly in decision-making and implementation methods. Beyond ownership, grassroots approaches to transitional justice develop a sense of accountability, hence increasing the overall legitimacy of transitional justice activities.
Thus, The Gambia is operating as an incubator for novel approaches to transitional justice and security governance, which has also been influenced by global standards of practice, but also now, contributing to that global discourse.
A missed opportunity and strong recommendation for other countries in pursuit of peacebuilding, is that robust coordination framework should be designed from the onset to play an important role in bridging the gap between global security standards and local realities. The UN and AU with their far reaching networks are uniquely designed to support government-led coordination efforts.
Excellencies,
In conclusion, now, more than ever, we call upon our partners in the international community, regional organizations, and all stakeholders to stand with The Gambia. In this regard, I would like to convey the Government of The Gambia’s thanks and appreciation to ASG Elizabeth Spehar and Ambassador Monono for their invaluable technical and financial support. Let us renew our commitment to peace, justice, and inclusive development. We urge you to continue your support—politically, technically, and financially—to ensure that the gains we have made are not only preserved but built upon.
Together, let us work to transform challenges into opportunities, foster unity, and secure a peaceful and prosperous future for all Gambians.
Thank you.
[1] We have received bilateral contributions from Ireland (approx. $400,000 channeled through UNDP for victims and survivors of SGBV), Switzerland (several grants to Gambian CSOs, at least $200,000 worth since 2017, prioritizing victim and women led organizations) just to name a few.
[2] If looking for examples of how The Gambian TJ model is so “Gambian” you can cite how we started the entire process of designing our TJ model by holding intensive, inclusive national dialogues, consultations and conferences (from May to December 2017, and we continue to employ a very consultation approach in the continued design of TJ- for example in the design of the Victims Reparations Act in 2023 and as we continue to design the Peace and Reconciliation Commission Bill). The outcome of these discussions have been listened to, translated into tangible laws, policies and strategies, and complemented by lessons learnt from other contexts such as Sierra Leone and South Africa. So, in the TRRC Act for example, the nationality of Commissioners being restricted to Gambians only, but reflecting all ethnic, gender, age and geographical differences of people- was as a direct result of the outcome of local consultations. The fact that the Commission was granted the powers to provide interim reparations too was a result of consultations with the victims, and lessons learnt from other places such as South Africa and Sierra Leone, whose reparations programmes stall to date.
Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar
Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar
Date | 19 November 2025
Tomorrow (20 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1313th session to receive a briefing on the Situation in Madagascar.
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. The Special Envoy of the AU Commission Chairperson, Mohamed Idris Farah, and Dominitien Ndayizeye, former Burundian President and member of the Panel of the Wise, are expected to brief the Council. It is also expected that a representative of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) will make a statement.
The session comes as the Council seeks to assess follow-up on the implementation of its 15 October decision following the coup in Madagascar and the country’s suspension from AU activities. It is to be recalled that the PSC held two sessions just one day apart, before and after the coup (1305th and 1306th Sessions).
Following the seizure of power by the leader of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) and the dissolution of parts of the constitution and all institutions except the lower house of parliament, the PSC, at its 1306th session on 15 October, suspended Madagascar from Participation in AU activities. Declaring the military coup a clear violation of AU principles and governance frameworks, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the PSC demanded the restoration of constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government and the organization of elections as soon as possible, while urging all units of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and refrain from meddling in political affairs.
The political landscape in Madagascar has evolved since the PSC’s previous session. Colonel Michael Randrianirina was formally sworn in as President of the ‘Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar’ on 17 October and has since moved to consolidate his authority while projecting an image of reform-minded governance. In his public statements, Randrianirina has dismissed allegations that Rajoelina’s removal amounted to a coup, stressing that it occurred without violence, and rejected claims of judicial retaliation, asserting that ongoing investigations reflect justice rather than vengeance.
On 28 October, Randrianirina unveiled a new 29-member government featuring several prominent opponents of former President Rajoelina in key positions, including Christine Razanamahasoa as foreign minister, Fanirisoa Erinaivo as justice minister, and Hanitra Razafimanantsoa as state minister for ‘refoundation,’ alongside businessman Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as Prime Minister. Randrianirina announced priorities of fighting impunity, enforcing budget austerity, and stabilising the business climate, warning ministers that failure to show results within two months could lead to their replacement.
The military authorities have articulated what they describe as a comprehensive reform agenda. Randrianirina outlined a six-step plan purporting to respond to the collective will to break with past crises and build a just, stable, sustainable, and fully legitimate country. The steps include restoring trust between the state and its citizens, strengthening governance and transparency, intensifying the fight against corruption, guaranteeing the republican nature of the responsibilities of the armed forces, drafting the fundamental texts that will govern the new Republic, and organising a constitutional referendum followed by free and fair elections recognised by all. The proposed roadmap envisages nationwide consultations led by the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (FFKM) to establish a new governance system, followed by a referendum and presidential election within two years, alongside plans for a Youth Assembly and strengthened Malagasy language and history education.
The proposed two-year transitional timeline and the plan for a new constitution are further indicators of the unconstitutional seizure of power. It is worth recalling that the High Constitutional Court that ‘invited’ Randrianirina to seize power, thereby giving a semblance of legality to the military seizure of power, tasked him to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant. While he accepted the ‘invitation’ of this Court and defended the ‘constitutionality’ of his seizure of power on that basis, after seizing power, he ignored the court order on the timeline for holding elections. The decision for the two-year transition is not a result of a process of national consultation or dialogue.
The military’s self-determined two-year governance timeline directly contradicts the AU’s call for immediate handover to a civilian-led transitional authority. More significantly, the military’s appointments of key figures, including Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo without consultation, and its unilateral extension of the transition timeline have reportedly fostered growing disillusionment among the youth protesters whose demonstrations precipitated the political upheaval. What began as a convergence of interests between CAPSAT and the youth-led movement has given way to a troubling divergence between the protesters’ demands for genuine democratic renewal and the military’s consolidation of its own authority. This pattern is increasingly familiar in the many instances of such military seizure of power on the continent from Gabon to Guinea, where military forces initially embraced as allies by civilian protesters subsequently sideline protest movements after seizing power, failing to fulfil revolutionary aims and instead entrenching their control under the guise of stabilisation and reform.
Acting on the PSC’s decision of its 1305th session, the AU Commission Chairperson announced on 3 November that he appointed Mohamed Idriss Farah as Special Envoy for Madagascar. The Special Envoy commenced his first visit on 6 November. Along with the Farah’s mission to Madagascar and as a follow-up of the decisions of the 1305th and 1306th sessions of the PSC, the AU Commission dispatched a High-Level Delegation to Madagascar from 7 to 11 November, led by Ndayizeye. These visits had the primary objective of engaging in constructive dialogue with Malagasy authorities and national stakeholders to address the current political crisis. The delegation was received by the leader of the transition, Randrianirina, Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo, and the Foreign Minister, Razanamahasoa, in meetings described as taking place in ‘an excellent atmosphere’ that allowed both parties to share views on the current situation.
According to official AU communications, particular emphasis was placed during these exchanges on the need to maintain frank and constructive dialogue between the AU and Malagasy authorities to support their efforts to overcome the political situation, facilitate national reconciliation, and respond to the legitimate political and socio-economic aspirations of the Malagasy people. The Head of the AU delegation welcomed the openness of the authorities to dialogue and their expressed commitment to the African Union and the values of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, while reiterating the continental organisation’s commitment to supporting and accompanying the Malagasy people and authorities in their quest for peace, stability and justice. These positive characterisations of the engagement suggest that diplomatic channels remain open and suspension does not preclude but rather necessitates AU’s robust engagement.
Yet the critical question confronting tomorrow’s session is whether this diplomatic reception translates into a genuine willingness to meet the AU’s core demands for civilian-led transition and constitutional restoration. The AU delegation’s positive assessment of the authorities’ openness must be carefully weighed against the fact that the military leadership arrogated to itself the role of deciding the transitional process without any national consultative process. There is a tangible risk that the military authorities may seek to leverage diplomatic engagement to gain time and legitimacy while pursuing their predetermined course, rather than genuinely engaging with AU requirements. The articulation of reform commitments and the appointment of opposition figures to ministerial positions without the participation of political and civilian forces of the country is a clear entrenchment of the military’s control of the transitional process. It is worth recalling that the PSC in its decision demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections.’ Yet, the developments since mid-October, instead of representing meaningful steps toward the civilian-led transition it demanded, indicate a consolidation of military authority dressed in reform rhetoric.
It is expected that the SADC representative will update the PSC on SADC’s initiatives. It is to be recalled that SADC differed on the determination of whether what transpired in Madagascar was a military seizure of power, contrary to the constitutional processes established in Madagascar for seizure of power. The PSC in which five SADC member states including the Chairperson of the PSC for October were represented did not deem difference of determination necessary as there was no any uncertainty about the occurrence of a military seizure of power contrary to established constitutional processes In a communiqué issued after the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, held virtually on 16 October 2025, the Organ urged all political actors in Madagascar to engage in inclusive dialogue as the only path toward lasting peace and endorsed the deployment of a technical fact-finding mission to Madagascar by 22 October 2025. SADC sent a fact-finding mission led by the Panel of Elders, including former Malawian President Dr. Joyce Banda, ‘to engage all stakeholders, ease tensions, promote dialogue, and identify the root causes of the crisis.’ The extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 7 November resulted in acknowledgement of Madagascar’s relinquishment of its role as Chair of SADC due to its incapacity to discharge the responsibilities of the position following recent political developments, and South Africa became Interim Chair of SADC until August 2026. It did not, however, address the outcome of the visit of the SADC Panel of Elders. From the information available, there is no indication as yet that the report from the SADC visit has yet been received and validated by the SADC Organ Troika Summit.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may also recall its previous decisions of the 1306th sessions, urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed-upon transitional civilian authority and reaffirm its stand in that respect. The PSC may commend the AU Chairperson and the AU Commission Chairperson for assigning a dedicated mechanism that follows on the decisions of the 1305th and 1306th sessions and may in this respect welcome the visit by the Special Envoy to Madagascar immediately after his appointment along with the deployment of the high-level delegation. The Council may acknowledge the military authorities’ articulation of a reform agenda and their reported openness to dialogue and call on them to continue collaboration with the AU and SADC mechanisms within the framework of the communiqués its 1305th and 1306th sessions, including on the need for civilian-led rather than military-directed. It may in this respect call for inclusive national dialogue that centres the voices of civil society, youth movements, and political stakeholders and the development of a transitional roadmap on the basis of such inclusive national dialogue with the support of SADC and the AU. The PSC may emphasise the need for close coordination between the AU and SADC in providing comprehensive accompaniment to the transitional process in Madagascar on the basis of joint responsibility. The Council may stress that the reform process for restoration of constitutional order must address not only the political crisis but also the underlying socio-economic challenges and poor governance that sparked the protests. The PSC may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decisions of the Council and the initiatives of the AU and SADC toward addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth, and supporting the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.
