Briefing on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action and Review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS)
Briefing on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action and Review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS)
Date | 16 December 2024
Tomorrow (17 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1250th session with two related agenda items. The first agenda item is on ‘Consideration of the AU/UN Policy Paper on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action’. The other agenda item concerns the review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS). This edition of Insights on the PSC accordingly presents an analysis of both of these agenda items.
The Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the AU and Chair of the PSC for the month of December, Abdi Mahamoud Eybe, will deliver opening remarks and set the scene for the session. This is followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. It is expected that Adeoye will share elements from the policy paper and update the PSC on the CSVRA and CSVMS.
In terms of background to tomorrow’s session, it was at its 1208th session convened on 16 April 2024 that the PSC discussed ways to unblock obstacles and ensure effective early warning and response. During the session, the PSC not only expressed its commitment to fully implement Article 12 of the PSC Protocol on the establishment and operationalisation of AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) but also tasked the AU Commission (AUC) to take specific measures to enhance early warning and early response. The Commission is also required to report back to the PSC before the end of the year. One such measure highlighted in the communiqué is to ‘hasten the ongoing AUC institutional reforms to enhance the utility of the CEWS in PSC decision-making processes as one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).’
While the 1208th session is the most immediate background for tomorrow’s session, the task that the PSC entrusted during that session to the AU Commission for reporting back before the end of the year draws on prior engagements of the PSC on the subject. Revamping the AU early warning system was one of the focuses of the Mombasa retreat held in May 2021. The conclusions of the retreat emphasised the need for regular horizon scanning briefings and informal consultations as platforms for the AU Commission and the PSC to share particularly ‘sensitive’ early warning information. The 1000th session of the PSC underlined ‘the need to promote the early warning system in the spirit of identifying at early stages conflict and crises situations while underscoring the imperative to confer the required importance to conflict prevention efforts.’ At its 1073rd meeting in April 2022, the PSC took note of the critical importance of early warning to avert most of the peace and security threats faced in the continent, including the recurrence of unconstitutional change of government.
Yet, despite the critical place that conflict prevention occupies in the PSC Protocol and the various pronouncements of the PSC, challenges persist. One of the major limitations identified in the implementation of the PSC Protocol in the context of the 20th anniversary of the PSC is its conflict prevention mandate broadly and Article 12 of the Protocol that establishes CEWS specifically. On the political front, the major hurdle, as alluded to by the PSC in various of its sessions, including the 1208th session as well as the May 2024 High-Level Colloquium, is the ‘culture of denialism’ by Member States and RECs/RMs regarding credible early warning reports of looming crisis and conflict situations, while invoking sovereignty as a shield. This denial prevents timely action, including the deployment of preventive diplomacy and mediation. At times, Member States are backed by RECs/RMs, claiming the principle of subsidiarity, to block a looming situation/crisis from reaching the agenda of the PSC.
Technically, one of these identified in the 527th session of the PSC is the gap between early warning and early action. The call for the establishment of a ‘trigger mechanism and indicators’—a request first made during the Cairo Retreat held in October 2018—to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing whether a given situation calls an early action by the PSC remains unheeded. The need for establishing a trigger mechanism was reiterated in the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. This may be an area where the members of the Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NET4PEACE) working in concert with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and the AU Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) – formerly African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)).
Institutionally, CEWS suffered a major blow in the context of the institutional reform of the AU. Unlike the previous structure, which had a division dedicated to conflict prevention and early warning in the now-defunct Department of Peace and Security, the new PAPS structure does not have such a dedicated structure. Under the PAPS structure, early warning, for example, falls under the ‘Conflict Management’ directorate and is said to have been ‘mainstreamed’ into the regional desks. Similarly, the Situation Room, established as part of the CEWS under Article 12, is envisaged under the new structure to serve the PAPS department in its entirety rather than being part of the conflict prevention directorate. This restructuring not only fails to confirm with Article 12 of the PSC Protocol but also has downgraded CEWS, leading to operational difficulties, as CEWS is deprived of a fully dedicated structure for its regular and effective functioning. In light of the foregoing, the AU/UN Policy Paper on Enhancing the AU Continental Early Warning System and Early Action is expected to recommend the reestablishment of a dedicated CEWS division.
The brief that Adeoye is expected to share with PSC members responding to the 1208th session also comes in the wake of the Dar es Salaam Declaration’s commitment ‘to enhancing the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises and fully utilising all available preventive diplomacy tools.’ This policy preoccupation with revamping CEWS also comes against the backdrop of the renewed emphasis on conflict prevention globally, as elaborated in the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future.
Apart from reinvigorating diplomacy at international and regional levels for advancing prevention, both the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future call for the establishment of national prevention capacities and infrastructure for peace. Action 18 of the Pact of the Future commits member states of the UN to build and sustain peace through, most notably, building ‘national capacity to promote, develop and implement their nationally-owned prevention efforts and address the root causes of violence and conflict.’ It is worth recalling that the PSC was the first to identify the establishment of mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts at the national level as a key action for advancing peace as far back as 2013. The 360th session of the PSC held in March 2013 thus called on Member States ‘to put in place comprehensive national prevention mechanisms that would operate in conjunction with the relevant AU and RECs/RMs structures.’
The establishment of the CSVRA and CSVMS was in part initiated to facilitate the establishment of national infrastructure and mechanism for prevention. The second agenda of tomorrow’s session accordingly focuses on review of CSVRA and CSVMS.
Tomorrow’s session marks the third time in less than two years that the PSC has included the CSVRA and CSVMS on its agenda. Similar reviews were scheduled in March and May 2023 but did not take place as planned.
Developed by the now-defunct Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division (CPEWD) of the Peace and Security Department, these tools are integral to the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). They aim to provide a coordinated, Commission-wide approach to structural conflict prevention. The CSVRA identifies structural vulnerabilities to conflict, while the CSVMS outlines medium- to long-term strategies to mitigate such vulnerabilities and build resilience.
However, the institutional restructuring that transformed the Peace and Security Department into the PAPS has undermined these efforts. The removal of a dedicated CEWS division has left the CSVRA and CSVMS without clear institutional support, raising questions about the tools’ future coordination and implementation. Recent policy discussions on reinstating a dedicated conflict prevention and early warning division offer hope for revitalising the CSVRA and CSVMS tools.
The CSVRA/CSVMS came within the framework of a continental early warning system and as a follow-up to PSC’s 360th session, held in March 2013, a session that stressed the need for a strategic focus on addressing the structural/root causes of conflicts. During its 463rd session that took place in October 2014, the PSC commended the Commission for its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF as well as to develop a Structural Vulnerability Assessment tool and further requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s 502nd session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to avail all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict.
The AU Assembly, during its 35th ordinary session, held in February 2022, encouraged Member States to ‘utilise the opportunities afforded by the Commission and RECs/RMs to address structural causes of violent conflict through the implementation of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment/Country Structural Vulnerability and Mitigation Strategies (CSVRA/CSVMS) processes.’ In that summit, the Assembly went on requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision.
The CSVRA/CSVMS are voluntary processes and, hence, should be implemented by Member States through a request simultaneously addressed to the AU Commission and the concerned REC. The request may come at the initiation of the AU. Following the request, a team of experts composed of an expert nominated by the Member States, the CEWS staff, representatives of relevant AUC departments, representatives from the concerned REC, as well as representatives from other stakeholders will be formed to work on the CSVRA report, which is envisaged to be finalised within three months. Once the report is finalised, the next phase will be for the concerned state, in coordination with the AUC and the relevant REC, to start working on the CSVMS.
Indeed, the status of implementation of the CSVRA/CSVMS leaves a lot to be desired, highlighting the need for revamping implementation of these tools. In that context, there are at least three points that the PSC may consider in tomorrow’s deliberation.
As voluntary processes, the success of the CSVRA and CSVMS hinges on stronger political buy-in of Member States. The fact that only three countries—Ghana (2017), Côte d’Ivoire (2019), and Zambia (2020)—have initiated structural vulnerability assessments highlights both limited buy-in and the lack of a dedicated structure in PAPS in effectively promoting the tools and their benefits. While it is encouraging that Seychelles, Madagascar, and Mauritius have shown interest, as well as more recent indications from Malawi and Kenya, these developments reflect only modest progress.
Enhancing political buy-in and wider subscription will require concerted efforts from the PSC and the Commission to demonstrate the practical advantages of these tools to Member States, including addressing concerns about the framing of the process as a ‘vulnerability assessment,’ which may deter some states. The AU may leverage the commitment to prevention in the Pact for the Future, which puts focus on promoting the bolstering of national conflict prevention mechanisms, for advancing buy-in and collaboration with UN and international partners for using CSVRA and CSVMS as critical platforms for rolling out the establishment and strengthening of national prevention capacities and infrastructure for peace.
Beyond advancing political buy-in on the part of member states, the other issue of clarifying the relationship between the CSVRA/CSVMS and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as the APRM also involves structural vulnerability analyses as part of its country reviews. The PSC should provide policy guidance to ensure these mechanisms complement one another and avoid overlaps, thereby enhancing their collective effectiveness. Similarly, there is also a need to establish and strengthen coherence and coordination in early warning analysis between the CEWS on the one hand and CISSA, AFRIPOL, and AUCTC on the other hand.
Additionally, strengthened coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RMs/RMs) is critical to advancing the implementation of the CSVRA and CSVMS. Recent efforts in this area appear promising, as demonstrated by the interest from Malawi and Kenya, which could be partly attributed to closer engagement between the AU and RECs/RMs on early warning systems. Building on this momentum, the AU should further leverage partnerships with RECs/RMs to expand the adoption of these tools among a broader range of member states.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may extend its support for the efforts of the CPAPS to reinvigorate the CEWS within the framework of the communique of the 1208th session of the PSC. It may reiterate the commitment under the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC, to enhancing the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises. It may request full implementation of Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, which requires the reinstitution of the CEWS structure in the PAPS department as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. The PAC may also underscore the need for clarifying the relationship between the respective roles of various AU entities with relevant areas of work and the modalities for ensuring coherence with CEWS while affirming the centrality of CEWS for early warning and conflict prevention as established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol. It may also task the AU Commission to work with the NET4PEACE, CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL in the development of a trigger mechanism with clear criteria and indicators and the threshold for activating early action. The PSC may underline the critical importance of CSVRA/CSVMS tools to the structural prevention of conflict and consolidation of peace and stability in the continent. Considering the benefits that the CSVRA/CSVMS tools offer, particularly in identifying and addressing the structural vulnerabilities of member states that may evolve into violent conflicts, the PSC is expected to encourage member states to take full advantage of these tools. It may also request the Commission to provide all the required support to Member States. It may further request the Commission to develop a strategy to better popularise these tools and ensure greater buy-in of Member States so that more countries undertake the assessment. The PSC may underscore the importance of CSVRA/CSVMS as the vehicle for cooperation between the AU, the UN and other international actors for the implementation of Action 18 of the Pact for the Future. In the light of the fact that the institutional reform had left the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework without a structure for its effective operationalisation, the PSC may call for a dedicated capacity within PAPS for taking responsibility for CEWS and in promoting and implementing CSVRA/CSVMS.
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Dec 6, 2024
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for December 2024
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for December 2024
Date | December 2024
In December, the Republic of Djibouti will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) under the leadership of H.E. Ambassador Abdi Mahmoud Eybe, Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the AU.
The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions covering six agenda items. Except for one session envisaged to take place at the ministerial level, all the sessions are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. Five of the six agenda items are on thematic issues. The remaining one agenda is dedicated to a country situation. No open session is stipulated in the PPoW. All sessions are scheduled to be held virtually.
In addition to the sessions, the PSC will also hold the annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa and its retreat with the African Peer Review Mechanism in Johannesburg. Additionally, the PSC is expected to hold informal consultation with countries suspended from the AU on the transition processes and the peace and security issues affecting them.
On 1 December, the month will kick off with the ‘11th Annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in enhancing cooperation between the AU PSC and the African Members of the UN Security Council in Addressing Peace and Security issues on the Continent’. This is held in accordance with Article 17(3) of the PSC Protocol which stipulates close working relationship between the PSC and the African members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
As outlined in the information note, this year’s edition of the High-Level Seminar is envisaged to focus particularly ‘on: a) Building Integrated Capacities for effectively combating terrorism and violent extremism; b) Implementation of the Pact of the Future focusing on UN Security Council Reform and Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023); and c) Coordination between the PSC and the A3 Plus. The Seminar will also receive a Briefing on the Conclusions of the Ministerial Meeting of the A3 Plus, and last but not least, it will consider the status of implementation of the Conclusions of the 10th Annual High-Level Seminar held in December 2023 and also adopt the Manual on the Modalities of Engagements between the PSC and the A3 Plus (Oran Process).’ It is to be recalled that the adoption of the Manual was postponed from last year in order to allow further inputs from member states. It remains to be seen whether the adoption of the Manual will actually take place as planned. In addition to members of the PSC, the seminar is expected to feature, as per the established practice, the current A3 members Plus One, incoming members of the A3 and Friends of the High-Level Seminar.
After Oran, on 5 December, the PSC will convene a session to review the implementation of PSC Decisions. This session, indicated in the Annual Programme of Work to take place twice a year, aims to review the state of the implementation of the decisions of the Council. As with the decisions of the AU, including that of the Assembly, non-implementation is a major challenge facing the decisions of the PSC. In 2017, the PSC took a decision following its retreat on its working methods that ‘the Committee of Experts shall, every six months, before the Ordinary Session of the Assembly, submit a matrix of implementation of all PSC decisions for consideration by the PSC.’ Since 2022, the PSC Secretariat took responsibility and developed the matrix for the implementation of PSC decisions as an instrument for monitoring follow-up. It is within this framework that the PSC will convene this proposed session.
On 10 December, the PSC will hold a session with two related agenda items. The first is on Consideration of the AU/UN Policy Paper on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action. This is a paper prepared, under the guidance of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), through technical input from the UN, which provides an assessment of the institutional and operational issues affecting the CEWS and AU’s conflict prevention work. It is anticipated that the CPAPS will share with PSC members the contents of the paper. The second agenda item concerns the review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS). The CSVRA and CSVMS are developed following the request of the PSC in its 463rd session for the development of a structural vulnerability assessment. Subsequently and following the completion, the PSC at its 901st meeting, the PSC encouraged ‘Member States to make full use of the tools available at the Commission for structural conflict prevention, including the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS).’ As voluntary instruments developed to help member states in assessing their vulnerability and resilience, these instruments did not attract a large number of subscribers. Thus far, only Cotd’Ivoire, Ghana, and Zambia have volunteered to undertake the assessment. While Ghana completed the assessment, Zambia went through the assessment in 2021, and Cotd’Ivoire’s is still pending.
The following session is scheduled for 12 December, focusing on two agenda items. The first is an update on the progress made towards silencing the guns. This is being convened within the framework of the decision of the AU to review the implementation of the flagship project every two years. The 14 Extraordinary Summit of the AU decided to extend Silencing the Guns for a period of ten (10) years (2021-2030), with periodic reviews every two (2) years.’ This session is thus expected to present the PSC with the opportunity to review the state of peace and security on the continent and the gap between the ambition of the STG flagship project and the realities on the ground. As a review session, it is expected that it would put a spotlight on the setbacks being faced in the journey to achieve this noble objective and how and what kind of adjustments can be made to stem the tide of the increase in the number and geographic spread of conflicts. The second agenda focuses on the consideration and adoption of the draft program of work for the month of January 2025.
The following week, the PSC will travel to Johannesburg, South Africa, for the 4th Annual Joint Retreat between the PSC and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which will be held on 16 and 17 December.
The same week, on 19 December, the PSC will convene its first and only country-specific ministerial-level session for the month on ‘Consideration of the situation in Somalia and Post-ATMIS security Arrangements.’ This session is initiated in a context in which the end of ATMIS is envisaged to be 31 December 2024 while progress in finalising the preparations for and the design of the successor mission, the AU Stabilization and Support Mission to Somalia (AUSSOM), has stalled (See the 27 October 2024 edition of Insights on the PSC). On the one hand, this ministerial session has to provide guidance on how to manage the possibility of AUSSOM not becoming operational by 1 January 2025. On the other hand, it also needs to find a way out of the dispute over the participation of Ethiopia in AUSSOM as a troop contributing country. While Ethiopia as troop contributing country of ATMIS expects to continue to be part of AUSSOM, Somalia expressed its opposition to participation of Ethiopian troops unless Ethiopia retracts the memorandum of understanding it signed with Somaliland on access to the sea and the establishment of a naval base.
The final substantive activity of the PSC for the month concerns informal consultation on countries in political transition. Since April 2023, the PSC adopted the format of informal consultation as a way of overcoming the limitations that comes with suspension of AU member states from the AU and facilitating direct engagement with representatives of affected countries. It takes place in a venue different from the chambers of the PSC. No formal outcome is anticipated.
In addition to the foregoing, the PPoW encompasses a meeting of the Committee of Experts (CoE) on 9 December in preparation for the ministerial meeting on Somalia and Post-ATMIS security Arrangements. They are also scheduled to consider the annual indicative program of work for 2025. The CoE will also have a meeting to consider the Draft Report of the PSC on its activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - October 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - October 2024
Date | October 2024
In October 2024, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) undertook its activities under the chairship of the Arab Republic of Egypt. The PSC’s initial Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) envisaged eight substantive sessions with nine agenda items to be covered for the month. While the PPoW underwent two revisions, this mainly led to shifts in planned sessions and activity dates.
