Update on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau
Update on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau
Date | 4 March 2026
Tomorrow (5 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.
The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in its capacity as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), may also deliver statements.
The PSC last considered Guinea-Bissau at its 1315th session on 28 November 2025, following the 26 November military seizure of power that interrupted the 23 November electoral process – a process that had been characterised as free, transparent and peaceful by election observation missions, including from AU and ECOWAS. At that session, the PSC determined that the military takeover constituted an unconstitutional change of government and suspended Guinea-Bissau from participation in all AU activities. Both the PSC and ECOWAS adopted an aligned position: restoration of constitutional order required the completion of the interrupted electoral process.
In the same vein, the extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, held on 27 November 2025, called on the coup leaders to respect the will of the people and allow the National Electoral Commission to proceed without delay with the declaration of election results. Recognising the need for swift, high-level engagement, it mandated the Chair of the ECOWAS Authority to lead a high-level mediation mission to Guinea-Bissau to engage the military authorities.
Similarly, the PSC urged the military authorities to respect the popular will, finalise the tabulation and proclamation of results, and accompany the process through to the inauguration and assumption of office of the duly elected winner. It also decided to establish an AU Monitoring Mechanism on Guinea-Bissau and to convene a Summit-level PSC meeting on the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.
Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to assess steps taken towards restoring constitutional order and progress in implementing the PSC’s earlier decisions. ECOWAS is expected to brief on its diplomatic engagements with the transitional authorities of Guinea-Bissau in this regard. The session may also serve to explore a more coordinated approach between the PSC and ECOWAS in engaging the military authorities and securing a swift return to constitutional order. This includes ensuring compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from contesting subsequent elections, as well as adherence to the same commitment undertaken in the transitional charter.
Initially, both the PSC and ECOWAS were unequivocal that restoration of the constitutional order meant concluding the November elections rather than pursuing negotiations or interim arrangements for transition. These calls went unheeded. The military authorities consolidated their position, swearing in coup leader General Horta N’Tam as interim president for a one-year period and scheduling presidential and legislative elections for 6 December 2026. Although the transitional charter bars N’Tam and his prime minister from contesting, questions remain as to whether this commitment will be upheld, particularly in light of recent transitions elsewhere on the continent and the AU’s uneven application of Article 25(4) of ACDEG. In cases such as Gabon and Guinea, the PSC lifted suspensions following elections conducted in apparent contravention of this provision.
As noted in a recent analysis featured in Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba, the ECOWAS and, by extension, the AU did not follow through on their earlier decisions. Despite the firm and appropriate initial response from both ECOWAS and the PSC, neither was able to follow through on their initial demand nor on the warning from ECOWAS that it reserved the right to use all options ‘including sanctions on all entities deemed culpable of disrupting the electoral and democratic process.’ Thus, when the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government met in mid-December 2025, ECOWAS changed its approach from seeking the conclusion of the electoral process and safeguarding the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau to a short transition that will culminate in another election. Thus, despite reiterating its earlier decision and noting that the elections held on 23 November were free and fair, ECOWAS called for ‘institution of a short transition to be led by an inclusive government that reflects the political spectrum and society in Guinea-Bissau, with a mandate to undertake constitutional, legal, and political reforms and the organisation of credible, transparent and inclusive elections.’ Meanwhile, ECOWAS rejected the one-year transition timetable announced by the military authorities, calling for a shorter timeframe.
At its ordinary session of 14 December 2025, ECOWAS further requested its Chair to undertake another high-level mission to Guinea-Bissau and directed the immediate dispatch of a delegation from the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff to engage the military authorities. While intensifying diplomatic engagement, ECOWAS also reiterated its readiness to impose targeted sanctions on individuals or groups obstructing a return to constitutional order through an inclusive process. It called for the immediate release of political detainees and for their full participation in the country’s political processes.
Relations between the military authorities and ECOWAS appeared to deteriorate in December. The authorities requested the immediate withdrawal of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission and reportedly cancelled a planned visit by the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff. In January 2026, however, the military authorities appeared to take steps aimed at easing tensions. In late January, they announced measures including the release of some political leaders and improvements in the detention conditions of former Prime Minister and PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira, who had been arrested following the coup. They also indicated plans to form a more inclusive transitional government by allocating three ministerial portfolios to the PAIGC and three to the political group led by Fernando Dias Da Costa, a candidate in the November presidential election. In addition, ten representatives from the two groups would be appointed to the National Transitional Council, the transition’s legislative body. It should be noted, however, that opposition leaders reportedly declined participation. The authorities also withdrew their earlier request for the departure of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau.
In its communiqué of 31 January 2026, ECOWAS welcomed the measures announced by the transitional authorities and urged all stakeholders to work collaboratively in support of a peaceful and credible transition leading to democratic elections. It further called for the full and effective release of Domingos Simões Pereira and for guarantees of the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens.
It appears that both the AU and ECOWAS have stepped back from their earlier firm position that restoration of constitutional order required completion of the interrupted electoral process. As argued in the recent Ideas Indaba analysis, a range of options remained available to the continental and regional bodies. ECOWAS, for example, could have drawn on its experience in upholding the outcome of the December 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, including through the use of sanctions. Measures aimed at increasing the cost to the coup leaders—such as leveraging the West African Economic and Monetary Union, as it did in the Côte d’Ivoire case—were within its reach. Additionally, both ECOWAS and the AU could have initiated a process towards giving recognition of the outcome of the election results, as they did both in respect to Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia in 2011 and 2017, respectively. Such steps would have slammed shut any route for the military leaders in Guinea-Bissau to entrench their illegal usurpation of power. As a show of their seriousness about their zero tolerance for coups, ECOWAS and the AU could also have launched an investigation into the circumstances leading to the interruption of the electoral process and the attempt to frustrate the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.
With the military authorities entrenching themselves in political power, and given that both the AU and ECOWAS failed to act swiftly in following up on their decisions, the issue before the Council at tomorrow’s session will be, first, securing a shorter transition timeframe in place of the proposed one-year period. The second will be to ensure that the military authorities do not contest the planned elections, in compliance with Article 25(4) of ACDEG. Third, reinforcing coordination between the AU and ECOWAS in order to exercise greater leverage on the military authorities and secure the country’s swift return to constitutional order.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome recent measures taken by Guinea-Bissau’s transitional authorities, including the release of opposition political figures, while echoing ECOWAS’s call for the ‘full’ and ‘effective’ release of Domingos Simões Pereira. It may urge the adoption of a shorter transition period led by an inclusive government and emphasise the need for a swift return to constitutional order through credible elections. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its earlier request for the AU Commission to provide the necessary support to Guinea-Bissau to facilitate a return to constitutional order, including through national dialogue, institutional as well as constitutional, legal and political reforms, and the organisation of credible, transparent and inclusive elections. It may also reaffirm the obligation to adhere to Article 25(4) of ACDEG, underscoring that the military authorities should not participate in the upcoming elections. Finally, the PSC may follow up on its previous decisions regarding the establishment of a monitoring mechanism on Guinea-Bissau and the convening of a Summit-level meeting dedicated to the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for March 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for March 2026
Date | March 2026
The Kingdom of Eswatini will assume the Chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of March. The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages five substantive sessions. Of these, three will address country-specific situations, while the remaining two will focus on thematic issues. All sessions are scheduled to be held at an ambassadorial level. In addition to the substantive meetings, the PPoW provides for a capacity-building programme for the Committee of Experts (CoE) and an induction session for the newly elected members of the PSC.
On 5 March, the PSC is expected to hold its first substantive session of the month on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. The PSC last met on Guinea-Bissau during its 1315th session on 28 November 2025, at which the Council characterised the 26 November military takeover as an unconstitutional change of government and suspended Guinea-Bissau from AU activities. It stressed that restoring constitutional order required completion of the electoral process—not negotiations or interim arrangements—and called on the military to step aside, finalise the November 2025 election results, and allow the declared winner to assume office. These demands were not heeded. Instead, the military consolidated power, swearing in coup leader General Horta N’Tam as interim president for a one-year transition and scheduling presidential and legislative elections for 6 December 2026. Although the transitional charter bars N’Tam and his prime minister from contesting, it remains uncertain whether the authorities will honour both the charter and Article 25(4) of the ACDEG, which prohibits coup leaders from running for office, particularly in light of recent transitions elsewhere on the continent. The PSC may wish to consider the prohibition in the Guinea Bissau transitional charter as an opportunity to express its continuing support for Article 25(4) of ACDEG which it failed to do in relation to Gabon and Guinea. It also offers a platform to review progress toward restoring constitutional order and to follow up on decisions adopted at the 1315th session, including the establishment of an AU Monitoring Mechanism on Guinea-Bissau and the convening of a PSC meeting at Heads of State and Government level on the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.
On 9 March, the PSC will convene its annual open session on women, peace and security (WPS) in Africa. This session is in line with its decision at the 223rd meeting in March 2010 to dedicate one open session each year to this agenda. In October last year, the Council similarly held a session on WPS, marking 25 years of Resolution 1325 and the 15th anniversary of the PSC’s decision to institutionalise the agenda. As with previous meetings, the upcoming session is expected to take stock of progress and challenges in advancing the agenda on the continent and explore the way forward, particularly in closing implementation gaps.
On 10 March, the PSC will deliberate on coordinated AU–Southern African Development Community (SADC) support for Madagascar. This provides an opportunity for following up previous decisions of the PSC. In its communiqué adopted at its 1313th meeting of 20 November 2025, the Council underscored the urgent need for ‘continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of the situation in Madagascar’ and explicitly mandated the ‘undertaking of a Field Mission in early 2026 to gather first-hand information on the realities on the ground.’ A March 2026 session would therefore provide the necessary deliberative platform to determine the next steps on this commitment and also enable Council to assess progress made by the Transitional Authorities in implementing the recommendations set out in the 1305th and 1306th PSC meetings of 13 and 15 October respectively and to evaluate compliance with the call for a consensual, inclusive and time-bound Transition Roadmap aimed at the swift restoration of constitutional order.
The upcoming session is particularly important in light of the divergence between the PSC and SADC regarding the characterisation of the October 2025 military seizure of power and the response adopted. While the PSC, at its 1306th session, decided to suspend Madagascar on the grounds of unconstitutional change of government, SADC opted instead to dispatch a fact-finding mission. Subsequently, the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, held in December 2025, directed the Transitional Government of Madagascar to submit a dialogue-readiness report and a draft National Roadmap by 28 February 2026. The Summit further approved the deployment, by March 2026, of the SADC Panel of Elders, led by former President Joyce Banda of Malawi, and called for coordination with the AU and the broader international partners to avoid fragmentation of efforts. In late January 2026, the Panel of Elders commenced its mission in Antananarivo to facilitate an inclusive dialogue. In addition, it will serve as a platform to ensure coherent political messaging and coordinated mobilisation of the necessary technical and financial support for securing a consensual, inclusive and time-bound transition process towards the swift restoration of constitutional order that is consistent with AU norms including Article 25(4) of ACDEG.
On 12 March, the PSC will receive a briefing from the Five-Member Panel of Facilitators on the Peace Process in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) regarding their recent activities. The session takes place amid concerns over renewed escalation and risks to the fragile peace process following reports of drone strikes in February that killed the M23 military spokesperson and others in eastern DRC. This session also came following the announcement by the United States of the imposition of sanctions on Rwanda military leaders, including the chief of defense forces for breach of the Washington peace deal. The AU through its mediator the President of Togo convened the High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, convened in Lomé, Togo, in mid-January with the Panel of Facilitators. The Panel subsequently held separate consultations in late January with President Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, as well as with Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni in early February. On the margins of the 39th AU Summit, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye held consultations with the Facilitators. It is to be recalled that at its 1323rd session in December 2025, the PSC requested the Facilitators to propose urgent measures to de-escalate the situation in eastern DRC and report to the AU Mediator, who in turn presented the proposals to the February Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly. In their forthcoming briefing helps to follow up on the PSC’s earlier decision and to get the views of the Facilitators on how their role is organized, how best they can contribute towards creating conditions for implementation of the peace agreements signed in Washington DC and Doha and the support mechanism required for their effective facilitation of their mandate.
On 17 March, the PSC is scheduled to receive a briefing from the AU Panel of the Wise on its activities. The Panel, an important pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture for preventive diplomacy, last briefed the Council in March last year. Although such briefings were envisaged to take place quarterly, as agreed at the PSC’s 665th session in March 2017, they have in practice become annual engagements. At its previous briefing, during the PSC’s 1264th session, the Council directed the AU Commission to strengthen the provision of frequent early warning analysis to the Panel and to undertake joint scenario-building exercises with experts, including members of the African Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace). In the forthcoming session, the Panel is expected to provide updates on its activities since the last briefing, including its missions to South Sudan and Madagascar, as well as a consultative roundtable with eminent religious and traditional leaders from the Sahel and West Africa. The meeting will also provide an opportunity to reflect on ways to enhance the Panel’s preventive role.
In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC’s Committee of Experts (CoE) is scheduled to meet on 19 March to prepare the induction programme for the newly elected PSC members, which will take place later in the month (28-31 March) in Mbabane, Eswatini. A capacity-building session for the CoE is also planned in Mbabane from 25 to 27 March. In the footnote, the PPoW indicates that a Ministerial and High-Level Session on the promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of children in situations of conflict in Africa (Banjul Process) may be held subject to confirmation.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - January 2026
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - January 2026
Date | January 2026
In January, under the chairship of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) consisting of six substantive sessions. After the revision of the programme, five sessions were held. Out of the five, three focused on country-specific situations while the rest addressed thematic issues. Apart from one session held at the ministerial level, the rest were held at the level of ambassadors. There was also one open session during the month.
Africa at a Crossroads: Pan-Africanism, Global Disorder and Collective Security
Africa at a Crossroads: Pan-Africanism, Global Disorder and Collective Security
Date | 27 February 2026
El-Ghassim Wane
Africa today faces not simply a difficult moment, but a structural turning point. The issue is not whether the world is becoming more unstable and messy — it clearly is. The real question is: What does a disorderly world mean for African security?
My core argument is straightforward: The erosion of the global order is transforming Pan-Africanism from a political aspiration into a security imperative.
Let me start with few remarks on the changing global environment and why this matters specifically for Africa.
Many of the trends now worrying the world are not new to Africans and to the Global South more broadly. For decades, stakeholders in the Global South warned about selective application of international law, unilateral action, and power politics.
For Africa, this carries a host of consequences.
First, frequent violations of international law and the increasing use of coercion, including force, in pursuit of national interests affect all states, but weaker states are affected more severely. African countries depend disproportionately on rules because they lack comparable hard power. When rules weaken, their vulnerability increases.
Second, while the current multilateral system is imperfect and unbalanced — and was designed with very little African input — it has nonetheless provided some clear advantages: coalition-building, forums to address global challenges, mediation frameworks, peacekeeping operations. As multilateralism weakens, Africa loses diplomatic leverage to advance its interests and conflict-management tools simultaneously.
Third, declining external support is not just a development issue. It is a security issue. Peace operations, DDR programmes, elections support, humanitarian assistance and even state administration in some fragile states have depended heavily on external financing.
Fourth, with heightened geopolitical competition inside Africa, the continent’s conflicts are becoming increasingly internationalized (see also here). External actors increasingly shape battlefield dynamics, while African institutions struggle to influence outcomes.
Clearly, Africa is entering a period in which it is more exposed to instability while simultaneously losing the external mechanisms that had so far contributed to manage instability. In other words, the trends described earlier do not merely create a more dangerous world — they remove the external pillars that helped African mechanisms function.
It is important here to keep in mind that Africa’s conflict management system was designed as part of a cooperative international security framework — one only needs to look at the provisions of the Peace and Security Council Protocol, especially those concerning its relationship with the United Nations and other international partners. That framework is now less predictable, less available and, in some cases, internally divided.
This raises an important question: Can African institutions maintain stability if external stabilisers become inconsistent or absent? That is the crossroads Africa is now approaching — not a philosophical choice about Pan-Africanism, but a practical challenge of collective security.
Pan-Africanism has often been treated as history, memory, or political sentiment. Today it is becoming a functional necessity. In many ways, this vindicates Kwame Nkrumah. In the early 1960s, he argued that unity was not primarily ideological — it was a condition for sovereignty in an unequal international system.
Howard French, the author of the book Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World, 1471 to the Second World War and of the more recent book The Second Emancipation: Nkrumah, Pan-Africanism, and Global Blackness at High Tide, captures this well. He writes: ‘With no one in the world serving up favors to the continent, Nkrumah’s insight about the gains to be had through federation is as salient as ever. What is lacking is sufficient action. The time has come for a continent cut loose in the world to take the next step.’
And this is precisely the issue. At the very moment when the international environment is becoming more hostile, African states are not acting with the level of collective cohesion that the situation requires. And more broadly, we see a weakening reflex of continental solidarity.
The result is predictable: fragmented bargaining power, unequal deals, and diminished leverage (see also here). In peace and security, this situation also complicates the search for lasting solutions that require engagement within a coherent continental framework.
Against this backdrop, what collective security actually requires in practice?
The starting point is simple: unity is no longer an emotional or rhetorical ideal. It is strategic necessity. It determines the continent’s negotiating power, its ability to manage conflicts, and ultimately its political survival in a more competitive international environment.
So what does that mean concretely for African countries?
First, it entails deepening our collective investment in the institutions we have created. Our leaders cannot be more present at summits with external partners than at AU meetings. That sends a message — to others and to ourselves. As Désiré Assogbavi recently remarked, ‘As the world order shifts, summits in foreign capitals make the continent look like a guest at its own table.’
Second, it means cooperating fully with African conflict-management institutions. Africa already has one of the most elaborate peace and security architectures in the world: norms, institutions and expertise exist. The PSC Protocol is explicit — Member States are expected to support and cooperate with African efforts to resolve conflicts. This does not mean excluding external partners. Our crises are connected to global dynamics. But external support must reinforce African leadership, not replace it.
Third, it means honoring a commitment our leaders themselves made at the launch of the Peace and Security Council in May 2004: No African conflict should be ‘out of bounds’ for the AU, and when grave abuses occur ‘Africa should be the first to speak and the first to act.’ If we do not act when crises unfold on the continent, we should not be surprised when others step in.
Fourth, collective security does not mean isolation. It requires close partnership with the United Nations and other international stakeholders. Already in 1990, Salim Ahmed Salim, then OAU Secretary-General, argued that while Africa must strengthen its ‘inner strength’, it should continue to prioritize the UN as the principal multilateral forum through which it defends its interests internationally. That remains true today. Africa should be at the forefront of efforts to reinforce the UN and make it more fit for purpose.
Finally, collective security is also a question of responsibility. Everyone in the AU ecosystem — governments, institutions, and officials — must recognize the seriousness of the moment. Africa is entering a more demanding international environment. Routine approaches will not suffice (see here). This period requires commitment, discipline and steadfastness.
How, then, do we operationalize this ambition? What role should the AU Commission play in moving it forward ?
Stronger political commitment will clearly be required. At present, the level of collective resolve does not fully match the demands of the moment. This is a reality we must acknowledge.
But paradoxically, this makes the role of the AU Commission — which is not only an administrative body (the Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and several other instruments are clear in this respect) — more important, not less. Political will does not simply appear. It has to be generated, encouraged, nurtured.
In periods of geopolitical transition, tensions among Member States and inward-looking approaches as countries focus primarily on their domestic challenges, institutions matter more than ever. The Commission must act as the engine of collective action. It must engage proactively, build coalitions around sensitive issues, and create the conditions in which states feel both empowered and compelled to act.
To conclude, the world is becoming more dangerous and less structured. For Africa, the consequence is clear: external stabilizers are weakening at a time of rising internal vulnerabilities. Therefore, the question before us is not ideological. It is whether African states will face insecurity individually or manage it collectively.
Pan-Africanism, in this context, is about survival and agency. Africa can either become an arena where global competition plays out or an organized actor capable of shaping its own security environment. The decisions taken in the period ahead will determine which of the two it becomes.
Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition
Informal Consultation with Member States in Political Transition
Date | 26 February 2026
Tomorrow (27 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultation with countries in political transition—namely Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger and Sudan.
This meeting will be the latest in the PSC’s series of informal consultations, introduced into its working methods in April 2023 following the 14th Retreat on Working Methods in November 2022. Grounded in Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, the mechanism enables direct engagement with representatives of Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG). Tomorrow’s session is expected to take stock of progress and outstanding challenges since the late 2025 consultation, in light of evolving regional dynamics.
The PSC scheduled an informal consultation on Sudan early in the month, with Sudan ahead of the PSC ministerial session held on 12 February 2026 on the situation in Sudan. While there is no public record of whether the PSC held such an informal consultation, the Foreign Minister of Sudan was present and made a statement at the opening segment of the 1330th meeting of the PSC dedicated to the situations in Sudan and Somalia.
Two notable developments are notable in relation to countries in transition. First, military coups in Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar have kept the number of states under suspension unchanged despite the lifting of the suspension of Gabon. Second was the lifting of Guinea’s suspension from the AU, notwithstanding concerns regarding compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which renders perpetrators of UCG ineligible to contest elections organised to restore constitutional order. At its 1325th meeting on 22 January 2026, the PSC determined that the political transition in Guinea had culminated in ‘the successful organisation of the presidential election on 28 December 2025’ and consequently lifted the suspension. Yet, this step did not change the number of states under suspension in 2026 from the number in 2024.
What was problematic with respect to the decision to lift suspension of Gabon and Guinea, thereby endorsing the legitimisation of coup makers through election, was not simply PSC’s lack of consideration of Article 25(4) of ACDEG. It was rather the PSC’s repeated inability to explicitly state that the provision of the AU norm on non-eligibility of those who participated in unconstitutional changes of government for elections organised for restoring constitutional order remains part of the AU anti-coup norm, and it stands by that provision. This issue took the spotlight during the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly when the Chairperson of the AU, Angola’s President Jõao Manuel Lourenço, during the opening session of the Assembly in his address, pointed out.
While informal consultations have now become regularized as a format of PSC meeting, it remains far from clear that their potential and value is adequately explored. One issue with the informal consultations is how to use them beyond just being a platform for the exchange of information. The critical test for the value of the informal exchange is whether it facilitates improved understanding and relationship between the AU and the countries in transition, and how the insights gleaned from the consultations help to improve and advance a more effective AU policy engagement in the countries in transition.
What additionally limits the value of the informal consultation in its current design is the fact that it does not afford tailored discussion on the specificities of each country’s situation. The transitional dynamics of the different countries are unique to each and deserve dedicated attention for advancing a more effective policy reflective of and responsive to the needs of each. Best practice from the UN Security Council suggests that, unless it is for thematic issues, country situations are dealt with individually, even in informal meetings. In this respect, the inclusion in the program of work for February 2026 of an informal consultation dedicated to Sudan sets a good example in taking the use of informal consultations to the next level.
Another challenge, not unrelated to the above, witnessed during 2025 was the lack of participation on the part of representatives of some of the member states to engage in some of the informal consultations. For example, it was the lack of confirmation of participation by the representatives of some of the member states that led to the cancellation of the planned informal consultation in November 2025. Tomorrow’s informal consultation provides an opportunity for taking stock of what worked and how to improve this engagement for enhancing effective policy engagement of the AU in support of both implementation of reform processes for transition and efforts towards achieving peace in Sudan and containing the terrorist menace in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
During tomorrow’s informal consultation, representatives of the affected countries are expected to provide an update on the transitional process of each of their respective countries.
As noted in the analysis in the Insight for the December 2025 informal consultations, a central challenge in relation to the AES is how the AU and ECOWAS can integrate the restoration of constitutional order into a broader stabilisation and state authority expansion strategy, supported by a jointly developed and deployed security mechanism. These concerns resonate with warnings issued at the UN Security Council meeting last November, where ECOWAS Commission President Omar Alieu Touray described terrorism as an ‘existential threat’ to West Africa, while President Julius Maada Bio, Sierra Leone’s President, Chair of ECOWAS and UNSC President for November, outlined the need for engaging directly with Sahel states, rebuilding trust, and supporting nationally owned transitional processes. Stating that the time is ‘for bold and coordinated action,’ he proposed an ECOWAS-AU-UN compact for peace and resilience in the Sahel as an instrument for addressing the grave situation facing the Sahel and viewing the AES not as an adversary but as a partner that can complement ECOWAS and AU. The informal consultation may serve as an opportunity to discuss with AES states for taking these outlines forward.
In relation to Madagascar, tomorrow’s informal consultation will present an opportunity to hear from the representative of Madagascar on the progress made in the development of a transitional roadmap and the inclusivity of the process for elaborating the roadmap. Madagascar had earlier launched a National Consultation on 10 December 2025 to advance constitutional reform toward a Fifth Republic through a six-month, inclusive, nationwide process. It may additionally consider how the AU, working in close coordination with SADC, in accordance with the communiqué of its 1313th meeting on 20 November, can enhance its engagement for ensuring that the reforms necessary for preventing the recurrence of coups in Madagascar are crafted and implemented as part of the transitional process. The consultation may thus additionally consider how the AU, working in close coordination with SADC, in accordance with the communiqué of its 1313th meeting on 20 November, can enhance its engagement for ensuring that the reforms necessary for preventing the recurrence of coups in Madagascar are crafted and implemented as part of the transitional process.
With respect to Guinea-Bissau, the consultation is expected to assess the extent to which steps taken by the military junta towards creating inclusive political conditions towards the development of a transitional roadmap for the restoration of constitutional order. It is expected that the representative of Guinea-Bissau will provide an update on the steps taken. These may include the formation of a transition government, the allocation of three ministerial posts each to the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde and the political group led by Fernando Dias Da Costa (the leading candidate in the November election), the appointment of 10 representatives from the two blocs to the National Transition Council, the release of political prisoner and the withdrawal of the request for the departure of the ECOWAS Stabilization Support Mission. However, it is worth noting that opposition leaders decline participation. Subsequently, the transitional authorities announced that legislative and presidential elections would be held on 6 December 2026, with Horta Inta-a asserting that ‘all the conditions for organising free, fair and transparent elections have been met.’ Given that the transitional charter issued in early December barred him from contesting the polls, the PSC members may use the opportunity of the informal consultation to applaud this step as a measure that ensures compliance with Article 24(5) of the ACDEG and urge its compliance.
On Sudan, there has been no major development since the PSC meeting of 12 February as far as the transitional process is concerned. Tomorrow’s informal consultation, however, will afford the representative of Sudan to reflect on the outcome of the PSC ministerial session on Sudan held early in the month.
Similar to prior consultations, tomorrow’s session is not anticipated to produce an outcome document.
2026 Election of the 10 Members of the PSC: Rejuvenation or Continuing Decline?
2026 Election of the 10 Members of the PSC: Rejuvenation or Continuing Decline?
Date | 24 February 2026
INTRODUCTION
The 2026 election for the 10 members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was held by the Executive Council on 11 February 2026 at its 48th Ordinary session, in line with the power vested in it pursuant to Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.106 (VI) of the Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. The outcome of the election was endorsed by the Assembly during its 39th ordinary session on 14 and 15 February. The result of the election produced a significant change in the composition of the PSC, bringing to the PSC more than 1/3 new members, including Morocco and South Africa.
In a notable development, Somalia became the latest AU member state to be elected to the PSC for the first time, after three earlier unsuccessful attempts. Also notable was the large number of withdrawals between the closing of the submission of candidacy and the day of the election. The number of candidates shrank by nine (9) at the time of voting. As a result, there were only two AU regions (North Africa and Southern Africa) that had a list of candidates that was in excess of the number of seats available.
This policy brief provides an analysis of the conduct and outcome of the elections. It also highlights the key dynamics that transpired in the lead-up to and during the election, as well as the ways in which the new composition of membership would affect the PSC between rejuvenation and persisting decline in effectiveness and impact.
Consultation meeting with FAO, WFP, and IFAD on the nexus between Food, Peace, and Security
Consultation meeting with FAO, WFP, and IFAD on the nexus between Food, Peace, and Security
Date | 23 February 2026
Tomorrow (24 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1332nd meeting with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) on the nexus between Food, Peace, and Security.
The session will commence with an opening statement from Obeida A. El Dandarawy, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February, followed by introductory remarks by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. It is expected that Moses Vilakati, AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Development will make a statement. The representatives of FAO, WFP and IFAD will also be expected to make their respective presentations.
The PSC had last scheduled a similar agenda item on its programme for May 2025. However, the session did not happen as planned. In 2017, during its 660th and 708th sessions, the PSC framed drought and food shortages as drivers of instability. It warned that climate-driven droughts are ‘major triggers of tensions and violence in communities.’ However, the PSC did not hold a session dedicated directly to food insecurity and conflict nexus until 2022. This changed at its 1083rd session, when the Council held a session fully dedicated to ‘Food Security and Conflict in Africa,’ as part of the 2022 AU theme on nutrition and food security. Later in 2022, the PSC again took up food security in the context of climate change. As highlighted in the communiqué of the 1083ʳᵈ session of the PSC, one of the ways that armed conflicts contribute to food insecurity is by severely disrupting agriculture and food systems. Later on in July 2025, this issue received attention during the PSC’s 1286th meeting on the ‘Humanitarian Situation in Africa,’ where it underscored ‘the importance of adopting a holistic strategy in food systems that addresses both production and consumption, focusing on sustainability, resilience, and equity.’ In this regard, it called for the ‘implementation of an African renaissance in agri-food systems approach and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Kampala Declaration.’ This is where, during tomorrow’s session, the engagement with FAO and IFAD can highlight how their interventions can build on and leverage CAADP and the CACDP Kampala Declaration to advance early planning and intervention.
In July 2025, Addis Ababa co-hosted the 2nd United Nations Food Systems Summit Stocktake (UNFSS+4) building on the momentum of the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS) and the first Stocktake in 2023 (UNFSS+2) to reflect on global progress in food systems transformation, strengthen collaboration, and unlock finance and investments to accelerate action towards the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Summit saw the launch of the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025 (SOFI) report, which revealed a modest decline in global hunger – but a troubling rise in food insecurity in Africa. The report highlighted how persistent food price inflation has undermined access to healthy diets, especially for low-income populations, calling for coherent fiscal and monetary policies to stabilise markets, emphasising the need for governments and central banks to act in alignment. It also called for open and resilient trade systems to ensure the steady flow of goods across borders. Additionally, it urged the implementation of targeted social protection measures to support at-risk populations most vulnerable to economic shocks, and also stressed the importance of sustained investment in resilient agrifood systems to strengthen food security and long-term stability. In this context, care should be taken to ensure that short-term interventions do not compromise African biodiversity in sources of food, thereby undermining long-term food security.
Food insecurity remains prevalent in various parts of the continent, with conflict settings hit particularly hard. According to the globally recognised Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)—a standard tool for assessing food insecurity severity—more than two-thirds of African countries are currently classified as IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or higher. Since the PSC’s last session dedicated to this agenda, various cases on the continent have come to show that food insecurity is accelerating, exacerbated mostly by conflict and insecurity. The nexus between food insecurity and armed conflict reinforces each other in a vicious cycle. On the one hand, conflict is a primary driver of hunger, as violence displaces farmers, destroys crops and infrastructure, and disrupts supply chains. Conflict and insecurity also exacerbate food insecurity by impeding response and humanitarian access, including the use of humanitarian access as a weapon of war.
One conflict situation that aptly illustrates the deadly interface between food insecurity and conflicts in which humanitarian access is used as a weapon of war is in Sudan. The intensification of the war and notably the weaponisation of humanitarian access, particularly by the RSF, has culminated in ‘the world’s worst famine.’ Beyond Zamzam camp and neighbouring areas in North Darfur, the UN’s IPC latest report established that levels of acute malnutrition have surpassed famine thresholds in two other areas in North Darfur, Um Baru and Kernoi. This means that Sudan possesses a new humanitarian record of having ‘the most areas of active famine on the planet.’ Altogether, according to WFP, an estimated 834,000 people in the region are experiencing famine, representing over 40 per cent of the global famine caseload.
Food crises categorised as IPC Phase 3 and above are no longer limited to conflict-affected states. Through WFP, it has been reported that the latest analysis from the Cadre Harmonisé – the equivalent of the IPC for West and Central Africa – also projects that over three million people will face emergency levels of food insecurity (Phase 4) this year – more than double the 1.5 million in 2020. Four countries – Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger- account for 77 per cent of the food insecurity figures, including 15,000 people in Nigeria’s Borno State at risk of catastrophic hunger (IPC-5) for the first time in nearly a decade. While these conditions are accelerated by insecurity, they also contribute to the aggravation of insecurity.
The ‘WFP 2025 Global Outlook’ highlighted that the Eastern Africa region faces compounded crises driven by conflicts, widespread displacement and climate shocks, leaving nearly 62 million people acutely food insecure. The region grapples with more than 26 million displaced people, with Sudan representing the largest crisis globally at 11.3 million. In Sudan, in addition to the Zamzam, 13 additional areas with a high presence of IDPs and refugees are at risk of famine.
FAO’s ‘State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025’ paints similar pictures as the other reports. Among the African countries with the largest numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity were Nigeria, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Ethiopia, while the countries with the largest share of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity were Sudan and South Sudan, among others globally. More than half of the people living in South Sudan and the Sudan faced high levels of acute food insecurity. While it is not the only factor that accounts for these conditions of food insecurity in these countries, in all of them, conflict and insecurity constitute a significant contributor and factor.
Increasingly, relatively stable countries are slipping into crisis due to economic shocks and climate change. The rising cost of living and widespread economic hardship have made food insecurity a catalyst for social unrest and political instability in various parts of the continent, including the mass protests witnessed in countries such as Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Kenya and Nigeria during 2022, 2023 and 2024, as well as Madagascar in 2025. These cases highlight that it is particularly in contexts in which there are widespread perceptions of ineffective, unresponsive, corrupt and weak systems of governance that food-related grievances spark broader political discontent and mass protests. Debt distress facing some countries and the increasing diversion of resources from key sectors like agriculture and social security also play a part in these cases. Additionally, scarcity, accelerated by climate change, raises tensions over land, water and food resources, making disputes more likely to turn violent. Competition between herders and farmers over dwindling pasturelands and fields has triggered thousands of casualties in West and Central Africa.
As part of its exploration of how to enhance ways of addressing food insecurity in conflict settings, the PSC may also consider the role of the African Peace and Security Architecture and other AU entities that play a role in humanitarian affairs. In this context, tomorrow’s session may assess progress made in the development and implementation of anticipatory tools for crisis preparedness and early action, as well as the use of humanitarian diplomacy as part of the toolbox for responding to the humanitarian dimension of conflicts in Africa, including conflict-induced food insecurity. The session may also revisit the AU’s ongoing challenge in financing humanitarian assistance and emphasise the need for Member States to fulfil their commitments, particularly the decision to increase contributions to the Refugees and IDPs Fund from 2% to 4% as outlined in EX.CL/Dec.567(XVII). Additionally, tomorrow’s session may also consider the contribution that the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) could make. For instance, the introduction of a new parametric insurance product in 2023 to help African countries deal with flood-related impacts. Furthermore, the PSC may highlight the importance of the Special Emergency Assistance Fund (SEAF) in supporting populations affected by drought, famine, and food insecurity, while urging continued international support as a lifeline for vulnerable groups across the continent.
The expected outcome of the session could be a communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the worsening food security situation across Africa, particularly in conflict-affected regions such as Sudan, the DRC, and the Sahel. Council may reaffirm its condemnation of the use of starvation as a weapon of war and the deliberate targeting of food systems and humanitarian access, in breach of international humanitarian law. To build resilience, the Council may urge Member States to increase public investment in agriculture and rural development in accordance with the Malabo Declaration target of allocating 10% of national budgets to the sector. Recognising the dual role of food insecurity both as a consequence and a driver of conflict, the Council may emphasise the need to strengthen early warning mechanisms that integrate food security indicators with conflict risk assessments. It may also encourage the establishment of joint task forces that bridge peace, humanitarian, and development actors to enhance coordinated responses. Furthermore, the PSC could call for fast-tracked operationalisation and financing of the African Humanitarian Agency (AfHA) and emphasise the role of Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) and the Special Emergency Assistance Fund (SEAF) in supporting anticipatory action and crisis response. The PSC may also call for the inclusion of the explicit requirement in the mandate of mediators, special political missions and those entrusted with peacemaking to dedicate time and effort to address the crisis of food security for conflicts on which they work. Finally, in light of the burden of unsustainable debt on public budgets, inducing and exacerbating food insecurity, the Council may advocate for coordinated debt relief, reform of the international financial system, and safeguarding domestic resource mobilisation from being redirected to servicing debt at the expense of ensuring adequate investment in food systems and peacebuilding efforts.
