A highlight from Amani Africa 2025 Impact profile: Promoting a coherent African policy approach on climate change
A highlight from Amani Africa 2025 Impact profile
Promoting a coherent African policy approach on climate change
Date | 14 January 2026
During 2025, in one of its most impactful engagements, Amani Africa’s work on climate change was critical to advancing a coherent African voice across different policy spaces. Informed by its recognition of the strategic significance of climate change policy-making globally for Africa, as a part of the world that least contributed to climate change but is most affected by the impacts of climate change, Amani Africa’s work focused both on overcoming fragmentation in the African Union’s engagement and charting a coherent African voice.
Amani Africa’s work in this respect involved the production of analysis, taking an active part in policy convenings, delivering presentations to AU policy organs and working closely with policy makers. Our analytical work was carried out through the specific editions of Amani Africa’s flagship publication, Insights on the Peace and Security Council (here and here) and more comprehensively in the presentation Amani Africa delivered to the Peace and Security Council of the AU (here).
There were key policy events in which we profiled our work and thinking towards advancing a coherent African voice in climate change policy-making through participation and presentations. The first was the UN Climate and Security Mechanism regional meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 23 June 3035 at the UNECA.
Our work also featured in three high-level side events held during the Africa Climate Summit held on 8-10 September 2025 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The key occasion for presenting a policy briefing to the AU policy organ was the session of the Peace and Security Council held on 17 September 2025, dedicated to climate change, peace and security.
Of particular significance was also our engagement and work with policymakers. This was critical to embed the key policy messages of our work in policy outcomes. Underscoring the need for not separating the peace and security implications of climate change from the climate change policy process with its focus on justice and development, the policy issues raised in our work including the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the trade impacts of unilateral climate action such as the common border adjustment mechanism, climate finance and just energy transition found their way in the policy outcomes of the PSC’s 1301st session and the AU-EU summit declaration. Our approach to addressing the peace and security implications of climate change as part of and not in isolation from the wider climate change policy process, with its focus on development and justice, has proved useful to building common ground between states with divergent positions on the climate peace and security nexus.
Our technical engagement with policy makers on the negotiation on the AU-EU summit declaration contributed to both leaving out the reference to the selective language of ‘rules based international order’ in the AU draft. When it was brought back after the EU rewrote the AU draft, our engagement was critical to its removal and its replacement with the use of the inclusive formulation of ‘based on international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.’
Emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
Emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
Date | 06 January 2026
Today (6 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will hold a ministerial session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. The session, not initially envisaged in the Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for January 2026, is convened following a request.
Following opening remarks by Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2026, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement. Abdisalam Abdi Ali, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, is also expected to deliver a statement as the concerned country. In addition, Abdoulkader Houssein Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Djibouti, is scheduled to make a statement in his capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the concerned regional economic community/regional mechanism (REC/RM).
Since its proclamation of independence from Somalia in May 1991, Somaliland, the territory of the northern region of Somalia, has remained without any de jure recognition from any state in the world. This changed at the very end of 2025 with Israel becoming the first state to officially recognise the independence of Somaliland. On 26 December 2026, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel and Somaliland had signed a joint declaration establishing full diplomatic relations, describing it as being ‘in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.’ Despite the willingness that Somaliland authorities expressed for joining the Abraham Accords, Israel’s recognition garnered no backing from any other country, even outside of the region.
Despite the enthusiastic reception in Somaliland of Israel’s official recognition as a historic development, Somalia, as the state with de jure authority over Somaliland, released a strong statement rejecting Israel’s decision, calling it an ‘attack on its sovereignty’ and an ‘unlawful action and asserting that the territory remains ‘an integral, inseparable and inalienable’ part of Somalia. Mogadishu was not alone in the rejection of Somaliland’s recognition. Countries in the region and beyond joined Somalia in their rejection of Somaliland’s recognition by Israel. Djibouti expressed its steadfast support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Other countries, including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, also expressed strong opposition. Similarly, the European Union reaffirmed, through its spokesperson, ‘the importance of respecting the unity, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.’ Meanwhile, the United States did not immediately follow Israel in recognising Somaliland; however, President Donald Trump reportedly stated, ‘Everything is under study… We will study it.’
For Africa and the AU, the issue of Somaliland is not completely new. Following its declaration of ‘republic’ in 2002 and invitation by Somaliland to the AU for undertaking a fact-finding mission, the AU dispatched such a fact-finding mission to Somaliland between 30 April and 4 May 2005, led by former AU Commission Deputy Chairperson, Patrick Mazimhaka. In December 2005, Somaliland submitted its application for membership in the AU. Somaliland’s President Dahir Rayale Kahin met on 16 May 2006 with the then AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare to discuss the matter.
Despite the legal issues that it raises, ordinarily it is not understandably approached as being exclusively a legal matter. Indeed, the legal dimension of Somaliland’s status has at best been approached in general terms through the lens of the AU’s and its predecessor Organisation of African Unity (OAU) principles of respect for the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states, while it has neither been adjudicated in a proper judicial setting nor a legal opinion been given on it. The prevailing wisdom in the OAU/AU at the time and since then has been that this is a matter best considered as essentially being a strategic issue that needs to be handled, having regard to sensitivities around territorial integrity of states, stability and regional peace and security, hence without totally dismissing Somaliland’s quest. During tomorrow’s session, another legal issue, namely the legality of Israel’s decision, may attract attention. However, given that recognition of states under international law is a sovereign matter, much of the focus for member states could be on the strategic implications of Israel’s actions.
This recognition came at a time of major geopolitical rivalry and rising tension along the coast of the Red Sea and Gulf of Eden, involving various regional powers, including, among others, Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Geographically, Somaliland occupies a critical position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. This chokepoint is a vital artery for global commerce and energy shipments – including oil and gas – moving between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. In recent years, the attacks by Yemeni Houthis on ships heading to Israel have significantly affected traffic. In exchange for its recognition, Israel is expected to gain a foothold across Yemen’s coast, potentially availing it access to bases or ports for maritime intelligence and security operations on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This may also enable Israel to check on the growing interest of Turkey in Somalia. There are also fears that Somaliland may be used for the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza.
More generally, Israel’s recognition also broke a longstanding diplomatic understanding internationally that any recognition of Somaliland would follow the lead of Africa and the AU. Additionally, beyond traditional concerns of opening Pandora’s box, there are also concerns, as made apparent by the statement of Somalia, that it may have adverse peace and security implications. It also lacked any regional or international support.
Some of these issues emerged in the statements from the regional grouping IGAD and the AU Commission itself. The IGAD statement, which reaffirmed its commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia, held that ‘any unilateral recognition runs contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act and the Agreement establishing IGAD’ and expressed its commitment to ‘inclusive political processes and regional cooperation in support of lasting peace, stability and prosperity for Somalia and the wider IGAD region.’ In an approach that appears to completely shut any pathway for Somaliland’s recognition, the AU Commission Chairperson, in his statement, rejected ‘firmly’ ‘any initiative or action aimed at recognising Somaliland as an independent entity.’ He warned that such action runs ‘risks setting a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.’
On 29 December, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. During the session, various members of the UNSC and others who, on request, intervened rejected Israel’s action and emphasised the need for respecting the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. Similarly, the African 3plus members of the UNSC, including Somalia, echoed the statement of the AU Commission. Highlighting the need for addressing the determination of the final status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, in his briefing during the UNSC session, UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East, Mohamed Khiari, called on ‘Somali stakeholders in peaceful and constructive dialogue, in particular recalling the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué on talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland.’
It is generally expected that members of the PSC would echo support for the principle of territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states. They may also affirm the need for respecting the position of the AU and regional bodies such as IGAD. It may not also come as a surprise if reference is made to the 2005 AU fact-finding mission and the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué, to which the UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East made reference during the UNSC session, to underscore the need for addressing the status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, with sensitivity and regard to stability, enhancement of peace and democratic system governance. Given the geopolitical context of the Horn of Africa and the dynamics in the AU, some may also caution that the situation is not instrumentalised by extra-regional actors to settle political scores and fuel division in the region.
At the time of going to press, it remained unclear what form the outcome of the session may take. It is, however, expected that the PSC, drawing on the statement of the AU Commission Chairperson, would reject Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland. It may also welcome the statement of IGAD. The PSC, echoing the AU Commission Chairperson statement, is also expected to reaffirm the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. It may also urge that all states respect the AU’s constitutive act and the longstanding principle of the territorial integrity of AU member states. The PSC may also state that no situation should be used as a theatre for advancing geopolitical interests of actors outside of the region, and instigate tension and division in Somalia and the region. It may call for constructive dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, following the December 2023 Djibouti Communiqué.
Sudan At The Zero Point: Why Seventy Years Of Independence Demand New Political Thinking
Sudan At The Zero Point: Why Seventy Years Of Independence Demand New Political Thinking
Date | 02 January 2026
Abdulgadir (Abdul) Mohammed, Former Senior Political Advisor and Head of Office, Sudan Mediation, United Nations
Today marks 70 years since Sudan emerged from colonial rule in 1956 with immense hope: hope for dignity, justice, and a state that would serve its people rather than dominate them.
Seventy years later, Sudan is at war with itself. But it is essential to say this clearly, especially on such a symbolic date: this war does not reflect the character of the Sudanese people.
Anyone who has spent time among Sudanese communities knows this. Sudanese society is marked by generosity, civic solidarity, humor in hardship, and an instinctive care for others. Even during this devastating war, ordinary people have shared what little they have, sheltered strangers, organized neighborhood aid, and protected one another across ethnic, religious, and regional lines. The humanitarian work of the emergency response rooms speaks volumes about the character and spirit of the Sudanese people.
This civic spirit deeply impressed President Thabo Mbeki during his years leading the African Union mediation on Sudan. After travelling widely across the country and engaging communities far beyond negotiating halls, he once remarked: “I hope and pray that one day Sudanese will have a government that is as good as them.”
That hope still matters. It matters because Sudan’s tragedy is not a failure of its people. It is a failure of politics.
Why Zero Point matters for Sudan
I recently read a book called Zero Point by Slavoj Žižek. I did not read it looking for answers about Sudan, and I am not an academic. I am an African political activist and mediator. I read widely because reading sometimes helps me find language for realities that are difficult to name.
Žižek writes about moments when societies reach a point where the old order has already collapsed, yet everyone continues to behave as if it still exists. Governments are recognized, institutions function in name, negotiations continue, and official language remains confident—but none of this connects with lived reality anymore.
He calls this moment a “zero point.”
It is not the end of politics. It is more dangerous than that. It is the moment when the ground under politics gives way, but we keep using the same words, tools, and assumptions as if nothing fundamental has changed. The state exists, but no longer governs.
Sudan officially has a government led by the Sudanese Armed Forces. It is recognized internationally. Ministries exist. Flags fly.
But recognition is not the same as responsibility.
The state does not protect civilians at scale. It barely provides services. It does not organize social life beyond survival and coercion. It offers no shared national vision capable of commanding consent.
On the other side, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control large parts of the country. Their leaders claim to be dismantling the unjust “1956 state,” a message that resonates with Sudanese at the peripheries who were excluded for decades. But what exists under RSF control is not reform or governance. It is rule by extreme uncertainty, displacement, and atrocity.
This is not a setback. It is disaster.
Much international engagement with Sudan treats the war as a setback: a failed transition, a power struggle between two generals, a crisis that can be managed with enough pressure and patience.
This is a profound misreading of the destructive nature of the war dynamic and its hostility to political settlement.
Defeat implies recovery. Disaster destroys the conditions of recovery.
In Sudan today, violence is not a breakdown of order—it is the order. Atrocity is not accidental—it is how control is exercised. Fear, hunger, and displacement are tools of power.
Polarization as an instrument of defeat
One of the most destructive features of Sudan’s war is polarization—not as a social by-product, but as a political strategy.
Polarization narrows political space until only existential camps remain. Compromise becomes betrayal. Politics becomes war by other means. Even if guns fall silent, politics cannot resume because trust and shared language have been destroyed.
What Zero Point teaches
The key lesson from Zero Point is this: when societies reach a zero point, repeating old formulas becomes part of the problem. Reformist language, procedural optimism, and technical fixes no longer illuminate reality; they obscure it.
At the zero point, the choice is not between good and bad options. It is between thinking honestly or surrendering to catastrophe.
Mamdani and the slow poison of collapse
This warning resonates deeply with African political thought, especially the work of Mahmood Mamdani and his recent book, Slow Poison.
Mamdani argues that many postcolonial crises are not sudden failures but the result of long-term, incremental damage—the slow hollowing out of political institutions, civic life, and popular sovereignty.
His critique of neoliberal governance is especially relevant. Neoliberalism weakens the state’s social foundations while strengthening its coercive arm. Over time, politics is emptied of meaning, leaving force to fill the vacuum.
Sudan’s collapse fits this pattern.
Beyond Islamism and neoliberalism
Sudan cannot be rebuilt within old ideological binaries. Islamism failed to build inclusive politics. Neoliberalism failed to build a socially rooted state.
New thinking must move beyond both. This does not negate negotiation or the urgency of stopping the war immediately. Ending the war is a moral imperative.
But without new thinking, a ceasefire risks freezing disaster in place.
Seventy years to nowhere—and a chance to begin again.
Seventy years after independence, Sudan stands at a painful crossroads. One could describe this history as seventy years to nowhere—a cycle of militarization, exclusion, and aborted democratic promise.
But Sudan’s people have not failed. They have resisted, organized, and cared for one another. The failure lies in political systems that never rose to their level.
The Sudanese people deserve a government as good as they are.
Politics is still possible—but only if we are willing to think differently and rebuild from the truth.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Guinea-Bissau, not Benin, the real test of the efficacy of ECOWAS’s response to coups
Guinea-Bissau, not Benin, the real test of the efficacy of ECOWAS’s response to coups
Date | 31 December 2025
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
As in the previous years, West Africa remains on the lead when it comes to being ground zero for the new era of coups in Africa. During the closing months of 2025, the region experienced a coup orchestrated by an incumbent election losing president in Guinea-Bissau and another attempted coup in Benin.
It was in the early hours of 7 December that a group of soldiers initiated a coup in Cotonou. After seizing the national broadcaster, they announced the dissolution of state institutions, the suspension of the constitution and the creation of the Comité Militaire pour la Refondation, led by Lt-Col Pascal Tigri. Despite this announcement, the putschists did not succeed in either seizing Benin’s president or gaining the full support of the army. Acting on the request of Benin’s President Patrice Talon, a series of regional actions, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), culminated in forestalling the consummation of the coup. Nigeria played a lead role, with Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu dispatching the country’s air force to strike positions held by coup makers. Within the framework of the ECOWAS Standby Force, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Sierra Leone also sent ground troops.
By the end of the day, these swift coercive measures, undertaken in close coordination with and logistical support from French forces, succeeded in foiling the coup attempt. The ECOWAS was hailed (here and here) for the role it played in foiling the attempted coup in Benin. Given the trends in recent years, the regional body’s response to the attempted coup against President Talon is rightly commended, potentially seen as marking a dawn for turning the tide against coups in the region.
Yet, given the timing of the coup in Guinea-Bissau and the attempted coup in Benin, the real test of whether the response of ECOWAS marks a turning point against coups came from Guinea-Bissau rather than Benin. What made the intervention in ECOWAS successful was a unique combination of factors, including the lack of full support from Benin’s army for the putschists, the economic and security interests of Nigeria that were at stake, as well as French logistical and intelligence support.
In Guinea-Bissau, despite the fact that the initial response of ECOWAS echoed its most successful and firm response to the post-electoral crisis in The Gambia in 2017, it was unable to follow through. Ten days before the coup attempt in Benin, after convening the national elections belatedly on 23 November and in a context meant to guarantee his re-election as President, Guinea-Bissau’s incumbent president, Umaro Sissoco Embalo, announced his own overthrow from power through a military coup. As the head of the ECOWAS election observation mission, former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan told reporters that what happened in Guinea-Bissau was a ‘ceremonial coup’, suggesting that it was orchestrated by Embalo himself to prevent his electoral loss. Following Embalo’s announcement, on 26 November, a group of army officers announced their seizure of power and suspension of all political institutions. Declaring the establishment of the High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order (HMC) as the governing body, it imposed an overnight curfew and halted the electoral process. Highlighting the close coordination of the coup between Embalo and the army, Embalo was allowed to fly out of Guinea-Bissau despite a declaration by the military of the closure of international borders and Embalo’s earlier announcement of being put under house arrest.
The Chairperson of ECOWAS, President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone, convened an extraordinary summit on 27 November. The communiqué that the summit adopted condemned the ‘coup d’etat perpetrated on 26 November.’ Most importantly (and echoing ECOWAS’s earlier actions in Cote d’Ivoire (2010/11) and The Gambia (2016/17), the ECOWAS summit rejected ‘any arrangements that perpetuate an illegal abortion of the democratic process and the subversion of the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.’ While deciding to suspend Guinea Bissau, ECOWAS demanded that the coup makers ‘respect the will of the people and allow the National Electoral Commission to proceed without delay with the declaration of the results of the elections of 23 November 2025.’ Cognisant of the imperative for swift and high-level engagement, it also mandated ‘the Chair of the (ECOWAS) Authority to lead a high-level Mediation Mission to Guinea Bissau to engage the leaders of the coup’.
Similarly, in an emergency session held on 28 November, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided to suspend Guinea-Bissau. Similar to ECOWAS, the PSC, beyond expressing its strong condemnation and total rejection of the coup, demanded that the military leaders ‘allow the National Electoral Commission to finalise the tabulation and proclamation of the results of the elections as well as accompany the electoral process to the end with the inauguration and assumption of the winner.’
Acting on the decision of the ECOWAS summit, President Bio of Sierra Leone led a delegation to Guinea-Bissau to push for ‘complete restoration of constitutional order.’ As part of the effort to safeguard the electoral process, Nigeria announced that it granted asylum and protection at its Embassy to Fernando Dias da Costa, the presumed winner of the 23 November presidential elections.
The ECOWAS and, by extension, the AU did not follow through on their earlier decisions. Despite the firm and appropriate initial response from both ECOWAS and the PSC, neither was able to follow through on their initial demand nor on the warning from ECOWAS that it reserved the right to use all options ‘including sanctions on all entities deemed culpable of disrupting the electoral and democratic process.’ Thus, when the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government met in mid-December, ECOWAS changed its approach from seeking the conclusion of the electoral process and safeguarding the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau to a short transition that will culminate in another election. Thus, despite reiterating its earlier decision and noting that the elections held on 23 November were free and fair, ECOWAS called for ‘institution of a short transition to be led by an inclusive government that reflects the political spectrum and society in Guinea Bissau, with a mandate to undertake constitutional, legal, and political reforms and the organization of credible, transparent and inclusive elections.’
What stands out in this decision is not simply that ECOWAS opted for abandoning its earlier demand for ‘respect for the will of the people’ of Guinea-Bissau, but also the regional body’s total silence about the complicity of the former president of Guinea-Bissau in the coup. This also signifies the persistent charge against ECOWAS and the AU that they tend to turn a blind eye to unconstitutional acts of incumbents.
Indeed, ECOWAS, drawing on its experience in securing the outcome of the December 2010 elections in Cote d’Ivoire, including through the use of sanctions, could have resorted to the option of adopting steps towards imposing sanctions, including by leveraging the West African Monetary Union (as it did in Cote d’Ivoire), as part of increasing the cost on the coup makers. Additionally, both ECOWAS and the AU could have initiated a process towards giving recognition of the outcome of the election results, as they did both in respect to Cote d’Ivoire and The Gambia in 2011 and 2017, respectively. Such steps would have slammed shut any route for the military leaders in Guinea-Bissau to entrench their illegal usurpation of power. Indeed, as a show of their seriousness about their zero tolerance for coups, ECOWAS and the AU, as El-Ghassim Wane proposed, could also have launched an investigation into the circumstances leading to the interruption of the electoral process and the attempt to frustrate the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau. The lack of such measures means that Embalo could continue to exploit the situation and the military junta could continue to defy ECOWAS in pursuit of its plans.
Despite the success in foiling the coup, the ECOWAS response in Benin is emblematic of the deeply flawed policy approach that has become characteristic of both the AU and regional bodies like ECOWAS: react to the symptom (coup) while remaining silent to the democratic regressions that underly the coup. Even more poignantly, the coup in Guinea-Bissau reveals that the turn of events in Cotonou does not in any way signify a new dawn in the approach of ECOWAS for turning the tide against coups in the region.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2026
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2026
Date | January 2026
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will assume the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of January. The Provisional Programme of Work outlines six substantive sessions, of which five will focus on thematic issues, while one will address a country-specific situation. All sessions are scheduled to be held at the ambassadorial level. With the exception of the open session commemorating Africa Reconciliation Day and reflecting on lessons learned for countries affected by conflict, all meetings will be conducted as closed sessions.
On 12 January, the PSC is scheduled to consider and adopt the Provisional Programme of Work for February through official email correspondence. It is not clear if the recent practice whereby the incoming chairperson presents his/her vision of what is to be accomplished with the items proposed in the program of work is not followed systematically.
On 19 January, the PSC will convene its first substantive session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan. The Council last considered the situation at its 1308th session on 28 October 2025, when it expressed grave concern over the political and security situation and the risk of relapse into violence. With much of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) systematically violated and intensifying conflicts, the PSC called for an all-inclusive, high-level political dialogue as the only viable path toward sustainable solutions. During the upcoming session, a key development likely to feature is the move to amend the R-ARCSS by delinking the general elections scheduled for December 2026 from the permanent constitution-making process, the national population census, and housing data. The Council of Ministers reportedly approved these amendments on 23 December, after which they are expected to undergo further institutional processes, including review by the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) and ratification by the national legislature. While the government of President Salva Kiir has presented the amendments as a necessary step to facilitate long-delayed elections, opposition groups have rejected them as illegal, arguing that they were adopted without the consent of all parties to the Revitalised Agreement. The PSC is therefore expected to receive updates on these and related developments and their implications for the Agreement, as well as for peace and stability in South Sudan.
On 21 January, the Council will convene its bi-annual consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa. Building on the 1288th session held on 3 July 2025, during which the PSC reviewed elections conducted across the continent in the first half of 2025, the forthcoming session is expected to focus on elections held between July and December 2025. The report is also anticipated to provide an overview of elections scheduled for 2026, with particular attention to those planned for the first half of the year. Elections held in the second half of 2025 that are likely to feature in the Council’s deliberations include those in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Malawi, Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania. Despite the attention and scrutiny that the elections in Cameroon and Tanzania attracted following reports of post-electoral violence accompanying Cameroon’s presidential election and Tanzania’s general elections, it is not anticipated that these elections will be subjected to critical scrutiny separate from other elections. The exception to this is the situation in Guinea-Bissau, where the largely credible election that had a clear winner was interrupted by a coup upon the military seizure of power by the ‘High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order’. In addition to its treatment as part of the elections held in the second half of 2025, the PSC may also have a dedicated session to consider the conclusion of Guinea’s transition period, the general elections held on 28 December 2025, despite the lack of compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG).
On 23 January, the PSC will hold its third substantive session of the month to consider the ‘Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’. Pursuant to Article 7 (q) of the PSC Protocol and in keeping with established institutional practice, the Council will, following its deliberations, transmit the report to the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, scheduled for mid-February 2026. The report is anticipated to present a consolidated account of the PSC’s undertakings during the reporting period, alongside an analytical appraisal of prevailing trends and developments shaping the continent’s peace and security environment.
On 28 January, the PSC will convene to discuss the revitalisation and consolidation of the Sanctions Sub-Committee. The session is expected to focus on clarifying the Sub-Committee’s terms of reference and mandate, as well as strengthening information-sharing and the exchange of experiences with experts from the United Nations Security Council. Notably, in 2025, the PSC did not convene any session to consider the activities of the Sub-Committee. Although the Sub-Committee was scheduled to meet on 24 June to provide updates on its work, there are no indications that this meeting took place. The forthcoming session is being held pursuant to a decision adopted by the PSC at its 1248th session, which requested the Sanctions Sub-Committee to urgently review the scope of its mandate to encompass violations of the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol beyond unconstitutional changes of government. In this context, the discussion is expected to revisit the AU’s sanctions framework, which has historically been applied primarily in cases of unconstitutional changes of government, and to assess the Union’s experience in investigating and sanctioning member states for breaches of other agreed norms. The session will also seek to draw lessons from United Nations best practices on investigations, the imposition of sanctions, and the monitoring and enforcement of compliance, with a view to adapting these processes to the AU context as relevant. Expanding the AU sanctions regime to address violations of other AU norms is therefore expected to constitute a central element of the deliberations.
On 29 January, the PSC will deliberate on the theme ‘Illegal exploitation of natural resources and proliferation of weapons in Africa as aggravating factors in conflicts: prospects for strengthening control mechanisms by the AU, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and Member States’ with a focus on the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Sudan, and the Great Lakes region. This is not the first time the DRC has placed this issue on the Council’s agenda during its chairship. In November 2024, at its 1246th session, the PSC, during DRC’s chairship, discussed strengthening mechanisms to curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed and terrorist groups. At that session, the Council requested the AU Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) to undertake a study on the issue and tasked the AU Commission with developing robust mechanisms to combat the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources. The session also comes against the backdrop of growing concern over the proliferation of weapons, which continues to fuel terrorism, organised crime, and violent conflicts across regions—from the Sahel and coastal West Africa to the Great Lakes—as recently noted by the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns. Factors such as porous borders, weak stockpile management, inadequate arms transfer controls, and the expansion of terrorism and organised crime have exacerbated the problem. The upcoming meeting will therefore provide an opportunity to assess progress on previous PSC decisions and to explore ways of strengthening continental, regional, and national control mechanisms to address the illicit exploitation of natural resources and the proliferation of weapons.
The Council’s final engagement of the month will take place on 31 January, when it will convene an open session marking the fourth commemoration of the African Day of Peace and Reconciliation, with a focus on lessons for countries affected by conflict. The session is expected to facilitate comparative reflection on national reconciliation trajectories and to distil practical insights on how the AU can more effectively advance peace and reconciliation across the continent. The African Day of Peace and Reconciliation is observed annually on 31 January and has been commemorated on that date in each of the previous three cycles, following its designation at the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, during which João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço was appointed as the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation in Africa.
In addition to the substantive sessions, the PSC’s Committee of Experts (CoE) is scheduled to convene virtually on two occasions during the month. From 14 to 16 January, the CoE will meet to consider the Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa. This will be followed by another virtual CoE meeting on 26 and 27 January, focusing on the revitalisation and consolidation of the PSC Sanctions Sub-Committee.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2025
Date | November 2025
In November 2025, under the chairship of Cameroon, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled programme of work consisting of five substantive sessions, made up of three situation-specific sessions and two thematic sessions, as well as an informal consultation with countries in political transition. It also provided for the 17th Annual Retreat of the PSC on the Review of its Working Methods, the Abuja Lessons-Learned Forum and the 8th Annual Consultative Meeting with the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). After the revision of the programme, the PSC held six substantive sessions, with only two dedicated to country-specific situations. All six sessions were convened at the ambassadorial level.
Ministerial session on the situation in the DRC
Ministerial session on the situation in the DRC
Date | 27 December 2025
On Monday (29 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1321st session at the ministerial level to discuss the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Kacou Houadja Léon Adom, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire and Chairperson of the PSC for December. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is also expected to brief the PSC, drawing on his visit to Kinshasa on 19 December. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the DRC and Rwanda, as countries concerned, are scheduled to deliver statements during the open segment of the session. In addition, Tete António, Minister of External Relations of Angola and Chairperson of the AU Executive Council, as well as Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and Robert Dussey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and African Integration of Togo and Representative of the AU Mediator for the conflict in eastern DRC, are expected to make statements.
The session was not envisaged in the PSC’s programme of work but comes amid a dramatic escalation of violence in South Kivu, eastern DRC, just days after the diplomatic breakthrough of 4 December—the Washington DC Accord signed by the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda—brokered by the United States. Earlier, on 15 November, the Government of the DRC and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) had also signed the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The session also came soon after the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until December 2026.
Despite the diplomatic advances registered in Washington, DC and Doha, a new offensive by the AFC/M23 in South Kivu has significantly altered the situation on the ground. On 10 December, the group seized the strategic town of Uvira along the border with Burundi, further expanding the territory under its control. This year has been particularly volatile for eastern DRC, with a renewed wave of fighting between the Congolese armed forces, local militias, and the M23 intensifying earlier in the year and culminating in the fall of major towns, including Goma of North Kivu and Bukavu of South Kivu. The M23 has also entrenched parallel administrative structures in areas under its control, raising serious concerns for the DRC’s territorial integrity and constitutional administration.
The latest offensive has further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC, with more than 200,000 people displaced since early December, reports of widespread human rights violations, including sexual violence, and a rapidly collapsing health system. In a statement issued on 11 December, the Deputy Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General warned that the escalation risks seriously undermining efforts to achieve a sustainable resolution to the crisis and increasing the risk of a broader regional conflagration.
The offensive also heightens the risk of regional tension, as it brings Burundi’s capital city, Bujumbura, under a very close target of attack. During the UN Security Council briefing on eastern DRC on 12 December, the representative of Burundi expressed concern over cross-border attacks, some of which he said violated Burundi’s sovereignty. He further described the 4 December attacks in Cibitoke as ‘a grave provocation,’ warning that if such attacks were to continue, ‘it would become difficult to avoid direct escalation between the two countries [Burundi and Rwanda].’
DRC and Rwanda have continued to trade accusations over the latest violence, which both sides claim constitutes a breach of the Washington Accord. On 10 December, Kigali, in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, accused the DRC and Burundian armed forces of violating the ceasefire, alleging systematic bombardment of civilian villages near the Rwandan border using fighter jets and attack drones. During the 12 December Security Council briefing, Rwanda also raised concerns over what it described as atrocity indicators affecting the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu. The DRC, for its part, criticised what it described as a Rwanda Defence Forces–M23 offensive launched less than a day after the signing of the Washington Accord. It warned that continued attacks, mass displacement, and cross-border risks pose a serious threat to regional stability.
Meanwhile, language directed at Kigali has sharpened amid growing criticism of its alleged involvement in eastern DRC. In the recent UNSC briefing, a US representative expressed ‘profound disappointment’ at the renewed violence and asserted that the Rwanda Defence Forces had provided material, logistical, and training support to the M23, even fighting alongside the group in eastern DRC. The representative also levelled a serious accusation against Rwanda, stating that ‘in recent weeks, Rwanda is leading the region towards increased instability and war.’ In a subsequent post on the X platform, Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the United States could take action, stating that Rwanda’s actions in eastern DRC constitute a clear violation of the Washington Accord.
In a statement issued on 11 December, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, expressed deep concern over the developments in South Kivu in eastern DRC, as well as in Cibitoke Province of Burundi. He reiterated AU’s ‘long-standing position that lasting peace in the Great Lakes region is predicated on full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states,’ further condemning ‘any attempt to establish a parallel administration in eastern DRC.’ Similar language was reflected in the joint annual consultative meeting held in October between the PSC and the European Political and Security Committee (EU PSC).
The joint PSC and EUPSC communiqué issued after the consultative meeting reaffirmed the ‘imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC’ as essential to resolving the country’s conflict, expressed grave concern over M23’s military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the ‘dismantlement of the so-called ‘parallel administration’ by the rebel movement of M23’. The joint PSC and EU PSC communiqué also called for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). While the communiqué did not explicitly identify the forces concerned, its reference to Resolution 2773 leaves little ambiguity. That resolution calls on the Rwanda Defence Forces to cease support to the M23 and to withdraw immediately and without preconditions from DRC territory, a matter that is now governed under the Washington Accord.
Succumbing to the mounting diplomatic pressure, the M23 announced on 15 December the unilateral withdrawal of its forces from Uvira. Despite the reluctant withdrawal of the bulk of its forces, the continued presence of M23 forces in close proximity to Uvira is reported. Thus, a US official is reported as stating that the US was not satisfied due to the fact the recognition that the withdrawal was not total.
One of the issues expected to feature in tomorrow’s discussion is how the AU can reinvigorate its role in addressing the protracted conflict and decades of suffering in eastern DRC. While the AU played a critical role in facilitating dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda under the Luanda Process—including the declaration of a ceasefire in August 2024, the adoption of the Harmonized Plan for the Neutralization of the FDLR and the Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Security Measures by Rwanda, and the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which also served as the basis for the US facilitated Peace Agreements— continental peace efforts have since faced setbacks, with mediation momentum shifting to Washington and Doha. At the same time, attempts to reorganise African-led efforts have so far made limited progress.
In March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process. A major update in this regard will be the planned High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, to be hosted by Togo, in its capacity as AU Mediator, on 17 January 2026.
The PSC may also need to accord developments in eastern DRC a level of attention commensurate with the gravity and pace of events on the ground. The PSC did not hold a session on the situation since its last meeting in February 2025, on the margins of the AU Summit. Although sessions were scheduled for 19 and 28 November, neither materialised. Without more regular engagement and closer follow-up, it will be difficult for the AU to provide strategic guidance or to play a more proactive and effective role in the peace process.
Supplementing and reinforcing the high-level meeting that Togo is expected to host, one avenue for the AU to reassert its leadership in advancing peace in relation to the conflict in Eastern DRC is to initiate and deploy initiatives for building trust between countries in the region and communities in Eastern DRC. This requires the AU to accord this file a heightened level of diplomatic attention and facilitate a more active role of the SADC-EAC facilitators in advancing confidence-building measures, including dialogue and reconciliation in Eastern DRC.
The expected outcome of the session is the adoption of a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the signing of the Washington Accord between the DRC and Rwanda in December, as well as the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded in November 2025. However, the PSC is likely to strongly condemn the escalation of violence in South Kivu and the territorial expansion by the M23, including its takeover of Uvira, and the resulting deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the region. Echoing the UNSC, the PSC may call on the M23 to halt and reverse all its military operations and end the establishment of parallel administration in areas it seized. The PSC may further urge all parties to respect their obligations under the Washington Accord and the Doha Agreement, and to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2773. The PSC may further express grave concern over the attacks affecting Cibitoke Province of Burundi and the resultant heightening risk of further regional escalation. The PSC may call on the various actors, including the DRC army and affiliated forces on the one hand and the M23 on the other, to unconditionally cease hostilities and abide by the commitments made under the Washington and Doha agreements. It may also call on the signatories of the Doha Framework to build on commitments made and finalise remaining agreements for ensuring implementation. It is also expected to re-emphasise the imperative of full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC. With respect to continental mediation efforts, the PSC may welcome the decisions of the joint EAC–SADC Summit, including the merger of EAC–SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising an AU Mediator and the EAC–SADC Panel of Facilitators. In this context, it may also call for the activation of a joint secretariat under the AU to strengthen Africa-led peace efforts in eastern DRC. The PSC may also welcome Togo’s plan to host the High-Level Meeting on the Coherence and Consolidation of the Peace Process in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region on 17 January 2026.
