Updated briefing on support for Somalia after the withdrawal of ATMIS
Updated briefing on support for Somalia after the withdrawal of ATMIS
Date | 20 May 2024
Tomorrow (21 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1213th session on the Report of the post-ATMIS Assessment. Initially scheduled for 13 May and removed from the monthly program, this session is brought back to the agenda of the PSC after the finalisation of the report due for submission by the AU Commission.
The session is expected to commence with an opening remark from Ambassador Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for May 2024. Subsequently, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to provide a statement to the Council, introducing the report prepared for the session. It is also expected for Souef Mohamed El-Amine, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, to provide a briefing on the report.
This is the fourth meeting of the PSC inclusive of the informal consultation it held since March on support for Somalia post-ATIMS. The most recent session was held on 4 April during its 1205th session, dedicated to the session to an analytical briefing on the strategic planning for the post-AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) Somalia. In the communique adopted on the session, the PSC requested the AU Commission ‘to undertake comprehensive and detailed planning based on the situation on the ground, including undertaking threat assessments, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, ATMIS Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and the UN.’ Tomorrow’s session constitutes a follow-up to this specific decision.
The session focuses on the post-ATMIS Assessment report. In order to prepare the report, AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) deployed a team to Somalia from 24 to 20 April 2024 to conduct a strategic assessment, including for a possible post-ATMIS AU peace support operation in Somalia. The team engaged and canvased the views of a wide range of stakeholders involving representatives of FGS, some Federal Member States, ATMIS troop-contributing countries, UN, EU and bilateral states accredited to and based in Somalia.
The report is expected to provide an update on the security situation, including the threat assessment. Among others, this is expected to highlight the threat that Al Shabaab poses, including the balance of power between Somalia security forces and the terrorist group. In this respect, a recent analysis pointed out that while the major offensive that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) undertook building on a wave of clan-based resistance to Al Shabaab in the Hiraan and Galmudug regions which succeeded in recovering over 200 settlements, the war stalemated again following the setback that the FGS faced in the second round of its offensive campaign. Noting the UN Monitoring Group’s January 2024 report estimation that the strength of Al Shabaab is between 7,000 and 12,000, the same analysis pointed out that the force strength of Al Shaabab shows the group’s ‘ability to withstand significant casualties and recruit new fighters, including children.’
Tomorrow’s session and report are also expected to discuss ATMIS drawdown. At the moment, there is a little over a month for the implementation of the third phase of the drawdown. In accordance with the ATMIS drawdown timeline, the third phase of drawdown envisages the withdrawal of 4,000 ATMIS troops and the generation of approximately 19000 troops by the FGS. Preparation for the drawdown of the third phase of ATMIS has been underway since February when ATMIS fulfilled the second phase drawdown a month behind schedule. Some of the preparations undertaken by ATMIS and the AU since the second phase drawdown concluded include a four-day conference that aimed to plan for the next phase of the drawdown of the additional 4000 troops in June 2024 and conduct an impact assessment of Phase 1 and Phase 2 drawdowns.
On the part of the federal government, in addition to submitting its proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS, the National Security Advisor also hosted the head of ATMIS and UNSOS to discuss plans for the third phase of drawdown. This was followed by two additional meetings one among the tripartite leadership (FGS, ATMIS, and UNSOS) to further discuss the drawdown in alignment with the SSF Trust Fund as well as the Post ATMIS plans and the second involving FGS, ATMIS troop contribution countries and a delegation from the AU PAPS Peace Support Operations (PSOD) to further identify post-ATMIS security plans. As the focus has been on preparation for the post-ATMIS phase and as can be discerned from the FGS proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS, there is little indication of a delay in the implementation of this third phase of the drawdown.
On the security front, it is worth noting that there are legitimate concerns about the emergence of a security vacuum on the departure of ATMIS at the end of December 2024. This was highlighted in the FGS document on the proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS. Despite the launch of a second phase of the counter-insurgency by the FGS and the most recent new phase of a military campaign against al-Shabaab with the aid of US military command, al-Shabaab has significantly increased its target towards federal and ATIMS forces. Between March and April, al-Shabaab orchestrated 26 attacks and 6 explosions targeting the Somali security force.
The other issue that will be of interest for tomorrow’s session and expected to be highlighted in the report is the political environment in Somalia. The tension surrounding the constitutional amendment undertaken by the FGS, which recently saw the approval of amendments to parts of the constitution by Parliament, has heightened tensions among various clan members. This friction plays into the hands of Al Shabaab and undermines counter-insurgency coordination. The most serious fallout from the tension that arose between the FGS and Federal Member States (FMS) is Puntland renouncing its ties with the FGS and announcing its independence. While it has not reached the breaking point as with Puntland, there are reports of discontent in other FMS such as Southwest and Jubaland. Although the FGS has attempted to neutralize the tension, these persisting and recurring tensions between FGS and FMS are indicative of recurring challenges of cohesion that undermine the consolidation of cohesive state authority necessary to narrow down the space of maneuver for Al Shabaab.
In terms of the post-ATMIS presence that the AU may have, one of the other issues expected to be highlighted is the continuity that is expected to be maintained between the end of ATMIS mandate and the start of the new mission. While there seems to be agreement on the need for avoiding the emergence of vacuum, it is far from clear whether and which of the ATMIS contingents constitute the nucleolus of or remain part of the post-ATMIS mission that Somalia has requested to have. In the light of the tension that erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia following the signing of an MoU between Ethiopia and Somalia, there is uncertainty on whether the FGS would like to see a withdrawal of ATMIS troops and their replacement by contingents from countries it may consider more friendly to it. This is not without its own ramifications for relations between FGS and some of the FMS and for avoiding the emergence of a security vacuum. The PSC may therefore underscore the need for consensus on the matter having regard to the imperative for ensuring continuity and avoiding any security vacuum.
The report is also expected to present both the options for the form that the post-ATMIS mission could take and the sources of funding for the mission. While options for the post-ATMIS mission may range from a regional mission involving troops of countries of the region along the lines of the East African deployment to Eastern DRC to another AU mission of a limited mandate and duration, the most realistic option is another AU mission, which was already hinted at in the FGS’s proposal for strategic planning for post-ATMIS presented on 27 March to the PSC.
The one issue which is of pressing concern in this context is the source of funding for this post-ATMIS mission. The funding shortfalls that ATMIS faced have created gaps in the operational capacity of ATMIS, including in effecting payment to ATMIS troops. It is thus expected that from the options that the strategic assessment report would present PSC’s decision would be informed by these experiences. As such, it is not expected that the PSC would opt for the current and AMISOM/ATMIS model of funding. Both FGS and the PSC are expected to have a shared view that the post-ATMIS mission is not as hamstrung by similar financial shortfalls as ATMIS. The option that PSC members are expected to endorse is one that ensures predictable funding of the mission for the duration of its mandate. This requires the current AMISOM/ATMIS model plus payment for troop allowance and death and disability benefits which would be sourced either from UN assessed contributions or another dedicated source that is not a trust fund.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to commend the AU Commission for producing a Post ATMIST report promptly. In this regard, the PSC may welcome the findings of the post-ATMIS Assessment report and request the AU Commission to work closely with the FGS to ensure the post-ATIMS Security arrangements reflect the key finding of the report. As for ATMIS drawdown, the PSC may commend the preparation by the FGS and ATMIS for the third phase of drawdown. In light of the limited time ahead of the third drawdown, the PSC may in alignment with the UN recommend the third phase go hand in hand with the preparations by the FGS for a post ATMIS Security Plan as well as their capacity to produce the next set of federal forces. The PSC may also reiterate its call for adequate and sustainable financing of post-ATMIS Security arrangements and in this respect may urge the UN to give serious consideration for use of UN assessed contributions either under UN Resolution 2719 or as a special case for such funding as AU and UN finalize the necessary preparations for the implementation of Resolution 2719. In relation to the political tensions particularly between the FGS and FMS, the PSC may welcome the efforts by the Somalia to de-escalation the tension and underscore the need for maintaining political cohesion and national reconciliation as the foundation for the success of any post-ATMIS deployment. Furthermore, the PSC may reiterate the need for a coordination among key stakeholder in the region to combat the threat posed by al-Shabaab.
Briefing on political transitions in Africa
Briefing on political transitions in Africa
Date | 19 May 2024
Tomorrow (20 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1211th session to receive updates on countries undergoing political transitions, including Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Gabon.
The session will commence with opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May 2024. This will be followed by a statement by Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). As the concerned regional economic communities (RECs), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) may participate in the session.
The last time the PSC met to discuss political transitions was on 21 December 2023, when it engaged Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso in an informal consultation. On 23 October 2023, the PSC also received updates on the situation in Gabon and Niger at its 1180th session. During that session, PSC members emphasized the need for informal consultations with the member states undergoing political transition, in line with the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance to support them in restoring constitutional order and identifying issues that require timely interventions.
Reports indicate that the security situation in Burkina Faso worsened since the coup in 2022 with an upsurge of terrorist attacks and an increasing number of civilian casualties. Burkina Faso is facing the twin challenges of constitutional crisis induced by the coup and even more worryingly the spike in conflict involving terrorist groups. Despite the grave threat that the expansion of terrorist violence poses both to Burkina Faso and the region, it receives no meaningful AU support in its efforts to contain this menace. While it is understandable, much of the focus of the policy engagement of the AU on Burkina Faso has a singular focus on restoration of constitutional order. The lack of adequate attention to the terrorism dimension makes the engagement on restoration of constitutional order disconnected from the totality of the reality in Burkina Faso. The coup leaders had agreed on a 24-month transition period with the ECOWAS to restore constitutional order. With the end of this transitional timeline fast approaching, however, the country did not make any preparations to organize elections. It comes as no surprise that the transitional government appears to have prioritized its offensive operations against terrorist groups and decided in September 2023 to postpone the elections indefinitely.
Burkina Faso aligned itself with Mali and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahel States in October 2023. This is aimed at coordinating their efforts in the fight against the threat of terrorism in the region and defending themselves from any possible external intervention. It happened against the backdrop of an ECOWAS decision to intervene militarily in Niger following the July 2023 coup. Subsequently, the three countries notified ECOWAS of their decision to withdraw from the community. In its extraordinary summit in February, ECOWAS examined the political, security, socio-economic, and financial implications of this decision and instructed the ECOWAS Commission to engage the AU, UN, and other partners on the matter to convince the three member states to remain in the Community.
Additionally, Burkina Faso and Niger withdrew from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) joining Mali which withdrew earlier. In a joint statement they issued in December 2023, the remaining two other members, Chad and Mauritania, expressed their readiness to dissolve the G5 Sahel following the decision by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from the group. According to the G5 Sahel founding document, the alliance can be dissolved at the request of at least three member states. These developments continue to unfold in the context of deepening geopolitical tussle between western powers that historically exerted enormous influence on the region and Russia that is emerging as a significant player as the military administrations reportedly wish to chart a more autonomous path. France and the US are scaling back their military presence in the region, while Russia is increasing military cooperation with the three countries.
In January, the Malian authorities ended the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The decision was made after Malian forces with the support of the Wagner group, a Russian security company renamed recently as Africa Corps after the death of its leader, took over major cities and towns in northern Mali at the end of last year from Tuareg separatist groups following MINUSMA’s departure. The decision also came amid heightened diplomatic tension with Algeria, which played an important role in facilitating the Algiers agreement. Following recent attacks by Malian forces on southern Mauritanian villages pursuing Tuareg armed groups, it appears that tensions are also rising between Mali and Mauritania.
The Malian authorities replaced the peace agreement with a national dialogue to promote peace and reconciliation. The month-long dialogue process concluded on 10 May with recommendations including extending the transition period for three more years and allowing the leader of the transitional government, Colonel Assimi Goita, to run for elections. However, armed groups were not involved in the process and the Malian opposition parties and civil society groups boycotted it.
Mali was expected to hold elections in February in line with the agreement reached with ECOWAS but, in September 2023, the Malian authorities postponed the elections indefinitely. This is the second time they postponed the election after their first promise to hold an election in February 2022 prompting ECOWAS to impose sanctions on the country. In February 2024, ECOWAS decided to ease the sanctions signaling its willingness to engage with the Malian authorities. In June 2023, Mali adopted a new electoral law and conducted a referendum, but the Malian opposition and civil society expressed serious concerns about the lack of credibility of the process. In April, the military leaders suspended all political activities and clamped down on opposition figures, journalists, and human rights activists.
Following the July 2023 coup in Niger, the coup leaders had proposed a three-year transition period but did not provide further details. They did not also agree on a transitional arrangement with ECOWAS similar to the one Burkina Faso and Mali did. ECOWAS, which imposed sanctions on Niger and threatened to take military action, subsequently lifted the economic and financial sanctions imposed on Niger in February. In an admission of the inadequacy of an approach that singularly focused on the coups and explaining the need for lifting the sanctions on the three central Sahelian states, Nigeria’s President in his address to the ECOWAS summit that lifted the sanctions pointed out that ‘the complexities of the issues at hand necessitate a comprehensive and collaborative approach.’
In its last meeting on the situation in Niger in October, the PSC expressed deep concern over the lack of a clear, practical, and time-bound timetable for the implementation of the transition period in Niger, particularly the holding of a national dialogue and elections to facilitate the swift return to constitutional order. It also requested the AU Commission to appoint a High-Level Representative for Niger and deploy a high-level mission to Niger to determine the country’s needs for the return to constitutional order and assist the transitional Government in organizing national dialogue which the Nigerien authorities announced in July 2023. The AU Commission has as yet to act on this decision of the PSC.
Like Mali and Burkina Faso, Guinea’s coup leaders agreed to a 24-month transition period with ECOWAS. Based on this agreement, the country is expected to organize elections by the end of this year. However, Guinea has not made the necessary preparations to hold elections. In February, ECOWAS decided to lift the financial and economic sanctions imposed on Guinea. Nevertheless, the Guinean authorities suddenly dissolved the transitional government indicating their intention to postpone the elections until at least 2025. Guineans have been holding protests against the authorities, expressing frustration over the lack of progress in restoring constitutional order, and the main Guinean opposition coalition strongly opposed postponing the elections.
Gabon’s transitional authorities have now announced plans to hold elections in August 2025. They also convened an inclusive national dialogue in April which saw the participation of more than 600 people, including opposition and civil society representatives. The meeting reportedly concluded with several recommendations, including a two-year transition period, and a seven-year presidential term renewable once. It seems, however, that the proposal to suspend political parties until the issuance of stricter political rules was controversial.
Subsequently, a new constitution is expected to be submitted for a referendum to pave the way for elections at the end of the transition period. During the last quarter of 2023, the transitional government’s leader, General Brice Nguema was on a regional tour that took him to several ECCAS member states to seek their support for lifting the suspensions imposed by ECCAS and the PSC. In his campaign for the lifting of suspension and a clear attempt to achieve a treatment similar to that of Chad’s, the General met with the leadership in Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo, two of which are members of the PSC. In its ordinary summit held in Equatorial Guinea on 9 March, ECCAS decided to lift the suspensions imposed on Gabon and temporarily relocate the ECCAS headquarters to Malabo. The summit also instructed the President of the ECCAS Commission to undertake an advocacy mission to the AU and the UN to explain this decision.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reaffirm AU’s zero tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government and urge all member states currently undergoing political transitions to pave the way for quick restoration of constitutional order, including through the adoption and proper implementation of clear transition timetables. The PSC may urge Mali to lift the ban on political activities and end repression against human rights activists. It may express concern over the repeated postponement of elections by a number of countries undergoing political transitions and call on the transitional leaders to commit to the timely conduct of elections to enable handover of power to a legitimate civilian leadership elected by citizens. It may also reiterate its call for the AU Commission to develop tailored support programs for the countries in transition, in conjunction with the relevant RECs, to provide the necessary political and diplomatic accompaniment and technical support with respect to issues related to national reconciliation, governance, security sector reform (SSR) and other relevant areas. It may further call on the AU Commission to undertake an assessment of how the fight against terrorism and the accompanying insecurity in the central Sahelian countries affects efforts for making progress towards constitutional order and submit a report outlining how the effort for restoring constitutional order can be pursued along with provision of support by the AU together with ECOWAS for the fight against terrorism.