Provisional Program of Work for the Month of July 2023
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of July 2023
Date | July 2023
Senegal will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of July 2023. The PSC’s Provisional Programme of Work includes four substantive sessions. One of the sessions will address country/region-specific issues, while the remaining three will cover thematic topics. All of the planned sessions are expected to be held physically, except for the only session that will be held at the ministerial level. The PSC is also expected to conduct a filed mission to the Sahel during the month.
On 6 July, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its first substantive session of the month through a consultative meeting with representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). The holding of this meeting is in line with Articles 5 and 22 of the AU Constitutive Act, which establishes the ECOSOCC, and Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC. This is the second time that the PSC will be convening a consultative meeting with CSOs and ECOSOCC. It is to be recalled that the inaugural consultative meeting took place in September 2022. The convening of this second consultation promises to regularize the annual consultative meeting pursuant to the decision of the inaugural session. In the exchange, a selected CSOs from the five regions are expected to brief the PSC on their programs and activities. Those CSOs are also expected to share their proposals on how to enhance their cooperation with the PSC.
On account of the mid-year meeting of the Executive Council and the coordination meeting of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) taking place during the week of 10 July, members of the PSC will be occupied with the session of the Permanent Representatives Committee of the AU and the will not accordingly convene session during that period.
On 21 July, the PSC will hold its second substantive and the only country specific session for the month. In this session, the PSC will be briefed on the situation in the Sahel. The last time the PSC discussed this issue was during its 1166th session in October 2022. However, discussions were focused on the political transition of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali during a session held in April 2023. During this session, the PSC requested for the revitalization of the Transition Monitoring Mechanisms for all countries in political transition as set out in PSC decisions. It is envisaged that the session will be briefed on the activities of the ECOWAS and CEN-SAD on the transition support mechanism.
Previously, the PSC also held its 1127th session that was dedicated to the deployment of 3000 troops in the Sahel Region. In the light of the decision of the Security Council to end the UN Mission in Mali the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on the request of the de facto authorities of Mali, this session will serve to consider the requisite measures that should be taken to avoid the emergence of security vacuum and address the impact this may also have on the G5 Sahel operation which benefits from the support of MINUSMA.
On 25 July, the PSC will hold the third session of the month which will be aimed at discussing community responses to the security challenges on the continent. The session, which will be held at ministerial level, will be addressing the theme for the first time. In the light of the increasing militarization of the civilian population and the resort also of affected communities to self-defence groups and the associated challenges that arise from these developments, this session helps to understand these and related issues in community response to security challenges and explore relevant policy response measures.
The fourth session is scheduled to take place on 31 July to consider the Mid-Year Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on elections in Africa.The report aims to provide an overview of the outcomes of elections in Africa that were held or scheduled for 2023. The Chairperson’s report is expected to provide an outlook on the scheduled elections for 2023, as well as recommendations on how to improve electoral processes and outcomes. This session presents an opportunity for the PSC to engage in discussions and deliberations on upcoming elections in Africa. Moreover, given the potential for electoral violence in some countries, this session is also an opportunity for the PSC to explore ways to help member states prevent such violence.
In addition to the activities of the PSC, the programme of work encompasses the meeting of the Committee of Experts (CoE). The CoE is scheduled to convene on 18 July, to deliberate on the Terms of Reference for the PSC’s field mission to the Sahel. The field mission is anticipated to take place from 26 – 29 July. The visit is expected to enable the PSC to engage with member states in the region on developments related to the security situation in the wider region as well as political transitions in concerned member states
Furthermore, the CoE will discuss the preparation for the 3rd Annual Consultation meeting between the PSC and RECs/RMs Policy Organs. This item is intended to develop a comprehensive plan for the consultation in order to enhance the coordination and cooperation between the PSC and RECs/RMs. The issue of coordination and policy coherence between the PSC and RECs/RMs has increasingly become a major area of policy concern particularly since the past few years.
Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Australian Embassy in Ethiopia for the support in the production of this Insight on the Monthly Programme of Work of the AU Peace and Security Council
Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Date | 29 June 2023
Tomorrow (29 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1161st Session that is dedicated to an annual consultative meeting of the PSC with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).
The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the AU, Sophia Nyamudeza will be delivering the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. The President of the PAP, Fortune Charumbira is also expected to deliver a statement.
The convening of this session is grounded upon two legal bases. Firstly, the mandates of the PAP and the PSC are intertwined. One of the core objectives of the PAP, as stated in the 2001 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP, is the promotion of peace, security and stability. Thus, PAP’s mandate has a component that overlaps with that of the PSC, although the PSC holds primacy on matters of peace and security.
Second and most importantly, tomorrow’s session is also convened within the framework of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol. This article provides for the establishment of a close working relationship between the PSC and the PAP, recognizing the complementary nature of their respective roles in the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent.
Despite this, the working relationship between the two in advancing peace and security has not been institutionalized. To-date, only two interactive sessions have taken place within the framework of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol. The first consultative meeting with the PAP was the 148th session that was held in August 2008, and the second and the last meeting was the 344th session held in November 2012. At the 344th session, a delegation from PAP’s Committee on Cooperation, International Relations, and Conflict Resolution (CCIRCR) engaged with the PSC on the relations between the two organs. The outcomes of those two sessions in 2008 and 2012 were a press statement.
The PAP’s general mandate, which is to ensure the full participation of the African people in the economic development and integration of the continent is stipulated under the Abuja Treaty, the Constitutive Act of the AU, and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP. Additionally, the PAP is invested with the role of receiving report from the PSC. Article 18 (2) and (3) of the PSC Protocol, the PSC is required to submit reports to the PAP through the AU Commission Chairperson whenever requested. The Chairperson also has the responsibility to present an annual report on the state of peace and security in the continent.
Yet, these mechanisms are as yet to be fully institutionalized. The lack of interaction between the PSC and PAP has been observed in the previous years, with the exception of statements delivered by the PSC Chairs during the Parliament’s Ordinary Sessions. During a debate on the status of peace and security in Africa on the second day of the First Ordinary Session of the Sixth Parliament in Midrand last November, the Chairperson of PAP’s CCIRCR has expressed concern that the relationship between the PSC and PAP has not developed as it should.
The above concern is true. The last time the PSC held a consultative meeting with PAP through CCIRCR at its 344th session, it commended the CCIRCR for the proposal it put forward at that session and ‘agreed to look in-depth into these proposals and other modalities for strengthening its relations with the PAP and to meet in due course to review the issue. Indeed, next steps towards addressing these concerns would require the elaboration of modalities for the operationalization of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol on close working relationship. The PSC may also invite PAP to update the proposal made during the last meeting in the light of developments since that meeting. Indeed, if the experience of the PSC with other AU bodies like the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights under Article 19 of the PSC Protocol is useful guide, it would become most useful if proposal on how to operationalize Article 18 comes from PAP having regard to its mandate and how best the mandate can be leveraged in the implementation of the objectives of the PSC Protocol.
There are also institutional challenges that affect the effective operationalization of the relationship. One such challenge relates to the management issues afflicting the PAP over the past years, which tarnished the image of the institution and led to loss of confidence in the execution of its mandate. There is also the issue of the lack of ratification of the 2014 Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU Relating to the Pan-African Parliament (the 2014 PAP Protocol), which designates the PAP as the legislative body of the AU. As of 28 June 2023, 22 Member States had signed and 14 had deposited the instrument of ratification for the 2014 PAP Protocol. It is worth noting that only four of the current rotating chairs of the PSC have ratified the Protocol. This leaves the Protocol with half of the required member states to ratify the instrument for it to enter into force and for the Parliament to start implementing its legislative role. This continues to limit the substantive role of PAP, which in its current mandate is largely advisory. These should not however impede enhancing close working relations for leveraging the role of PAP.
For purposes of the peace and security component of its mandate, PAP has the CCIRCR, which is one of the ten (10) Permanent Committees of the PAP. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26(d) of the Rules of Procedure of PAP, the CCIRCR has the specific responsibility of introducing issues of peace and security in Africa for consideration of the Chamber.
In its consultative\advisory role, the PAP has since its earlier years sent various fact-finding missions to different conflict areas across the continent, including Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur/Sudan, Libya, Rwanda, Mauritania and Chad. These missions have produced reports, which are used to provide recommendations. It has also adopted resolutions for conflict resolution. Despite its mandate to forward these recommendations to all relevant bodies, including the PSC, there is no established means of communication for the PAP to transmit its recommendations. As a result, there is no record of the interaction between the PAP and the PSC regarding its recommendations on peace and security issues. Therefore, it is difficult to assert that the recommendations of the Parliament have been reflected in the decisions of the PSC.
In the earlier years of its establishment, the PAP also conducted election observation missions in various countries such as Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zimbabwe for election observation. However, these election observation missions of the PAP have been discontinued since 2008. In a recent visit to the Parliament’s Headquarters in Midrand, South Africa, Commissioner Bankole Adeoye reaffirmed the decision taken by the Executive Council in February 2010. The decision stipulates that both the PAP and the AU Commission, through the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, should collaborate in a joint AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM). Furthermore, it allowed the PAP to contribute 40% of the observers to the mission. Tomorrow’s session may reflect on the follow up on this plan and whether PAP can best contribute to promoting free and fair elections other than through being part of AU election monitoring. This latter part is particularly important as PAP could deploy ahead of the convening of elections and share its observations on measures that need to be taken for enhancing credibility of elections in countries planning to have elections.
Although the outcome of the session is uncertain, the expressed need for collaboration between the two organs by Ambassador Emilia Ndinelao Mkusa, the PSC Chair for the month of November 2022, and the readiness to work together by Commissioner Adeoye, creates an expectation that the PSC adopts modalities for enhancing close working relationship with the PAP.
Irrespective of the format of the outcome of the consultative meeting, the PSC is expected to welcome updates from the PAP on the activities undertaken in relation to peace and security and to continue cooperation through the annual consultative meeting within the framework of Article 18. In addition, the PSC may call for modalities to operationalize Article 18 and in this respect invite PAP to update and present for PSC’s consideration the proposal it made at the 344th session of the PSC. The PSC may indicate that such proposal consider establishing a mechanism for the communication of decisions and recommendations of PAP on peace and security in order to ensure coherence and complementarity in decision-making processes. Furthermore, the PSC may decide to hold regular interactions between the PSC Chairperson and the Chairperson of the PAP. The PSC may also welcome the engagement of PAP in peace and security issues including through the issuance of statements on peace and security developments and indicate the importance of coordination to enhance effectiveness and coherence. Lastly, the PSC may urge Member States to ratify the 2014 PAP Protocol to fully operationalize the Parliament.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2023
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2023
Date | May 2023
In May, Uganda chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). In total, the PSC held seven meetings. For the first time, the PSC also held an informal engagement with the Chairperson of the AU, President Azali Assoumani of the Comoros. In early May, the PSC held the annual consultative meeting with its European Union (EU) counterpart, the European Political and Security Committee (EU PSC).
On why Darfur deserves a special attention
On why Darfur deserves a special attention
Date | 22 June 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Tsion Hagos
Senior Researcher, Amani Africa
Zekarias Beshah Abebe
Senior Researcher, Amani Africa
Since the outbreak of fighting in Sudan on 15 April 2023, the part of the country that has come to experience the most violence is Darfur. Outside Khartoum, Darfur is the one region where the fighting affected most parts of the region. It is in Darfur that the fighting has taken worrying levels of intercommunal dimension. It is also here that the fighting not only endangers to tear apart the already fragile and violence ridden relations between various communities, but also to result in mass atrocities. This is accordingly a situation that warrants special attention of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC).
It is in Darfur that the fighting has taken worrying levels of intercommunal dimension. It is also here that the fighting not only endangers to tear apart the already fragile and violence ridden relations between various communities, but also to result in mass atrocities.
Although the signing of local peace agreements led by local leaders and committees initially sought to minimize the degeneration of the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Force (SAF) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) into widespread inter-communal violence, it was unable to forestall it.
El Geneina, capital of West Darfur and a city close to the border with Chad, is perhaps the most affected by the violence. It reportedly witnessed the killing of significant number of people, widespread damage and destruction of both public and private property and lootings. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian update for 22 June, ‘[t]here are also reports of ethnically-motivated targeted killings, sexual violence, widespread burning of homes and mass displacement of non-Arab residents–particularly in and around the city of Ag Geneina (sic)–by the RSF and allied Arab militias.’
According to various reports, the violence in West Darfur taking the form of ethnic cleansing turns out to be one of, if not the, deadliest thus far and most atrocious. According to Sudan’s Doctors Union, the conflict in El Geneina has led to the death of over 1000 people. It has also forced tens of thousands into internal displacement or into crossing to Chad to seek refuge.
It is the fact that the outbreak of fighting between the RSF and SAF has come to intersect with existing conflict dynamics that makes the situation in Darfur particular and deserving of its own special attention. Despite some improvement in the overall conflict situation, Darfur did not recover peace fully. Not only that the conditions that led to the outbreak of war in 2003 have not been fully resolved but the war and most importantly the atrocities committed along ethnic lines targeting in particular non-Arab communities also created new grievances.
It is the fact that the outbreak of fighting between the RSF and SAF has come to intersect with existing conflict dynamics that makes the situation in Darfur particular and deserving of its own special attention.
In recent years and particularly since the ouster of Bashir and with new recruitment drives and the deepening of ties between the RSF and Arab militias, these conflict issues have become more acute and induced recurring incidents of violence. This is most notable in Western Darfur. According to the 2022 report of the UN Sanctions Committee, ‘[t]he city of El Geneina and neighboring areas of West Darfur have experienced regular and significant outbreaks of violence since 2019. In April 2021, the upsurge of violence had reached catastrophic dimension.’ It went on to report that ‘[l]ocal sources argued that the events took the form of ethnic cleansing, directed against the Masalit and other non-Arab communities.’
The fighting between the RSF and the SAF therefore seems to affect Darfur in two ways. First, it has adda a new axis of conflict in Darfur between entities that previously fought against Darfur armed groups jointly. Perhaps, most importantly, this fighting has made the resurgent conflict dynamics in Darfur much more violent and destructive. Media reports indicate that the attacks in El Geneina are largely by Arab militias and the RSF and they mainly targeted non-Arab groups, particularly the Masalit.
On 14 June, West Darfur’s Governor, Khamis Abdullah Abbaker, was killed in El Geneina shortly after he implicated the RSF for the atrocities being committed in the town. Reports attributed the killing to Arab militias and the RSF, although the paramilitary group denied the assertions. Following this killing, the OCHA update reported that ‘at least 15,000 people, including Sudanese refugees and 3,000 Chadian returnees have reportedly crossed into Chad.’
Other parts of Darfur are also experiencing increasing levels of violence. It is reported that the RSF has stepped up attacks elsewhere in Darfur in attempt to ascertain its dominance in Darfur. The outbreak of clashes in North Darfur, in Tawila town on 16 June, led to killing and injury of civilians, including internally displaced people and widespread displacement.
While much of the diplomatic attention is focused on the fighting between SAF and RSF generally, this should not lead to overlooking the specificities of the conflict dynamics in Darfur that warrant its own attention and intervention.
The nature and the scale of the violence as well as its impact on civilians of the targeted communities raises risks of a repeat of the genocidal violence of the previous Darfur war. What makes the situation particularly dangerous is that those being attacked are not receiving any protection from the SAF, which reportedly withdrew from El Geneina. On 13 June, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Volker Perthes, released a statement warning that the violence in El Geneina could amount to crimes against humanity. He indicated an ‘emerging pattern of large-scale targeted attacks against civilians based on their ethnic identities, allegedly committed by Arab militias and some armed men in Rapid Support Force (RSF)’s uniform.’
The PSC has both a legal and historical responsibility. The situation in Sudan, involving the war in Darfur and the north-South conflict, has attracted the most attention from the PSC. Since 2004, the PSC dedicated the largest number of sessions to Sudan pursuant to Amani Africa’s database.
Nearly 2/3 of PSC sessions on Sudan were tied to Darfur. Darfur was the first of conflict situations that featured on the agenda of the PSC when the PSC became operational in March 2004. It is also here with respect to the conflict in Darfur that PSC deployed various conflict management and resolution tools.
The first peace support operation that the PSC deployed was the AU Mission to Sudan (AMIS) that provided the first international presence in Darfur, contributing to reduction of violence against civilians. It is also here that the PSC for the first time established a high-level panel, the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) which later became AU High-level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), setting an example for the high-level panel as a model of AU’s diplomatic action for mediation and peacemaking.
The nature of the violence in Darfur involving mass atrocities including those that may amount to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing legally implicate PSC’s action. Additionally, the role the PSC played with respect to the Darfur war also places historical responsibility for it to pay special attention to Darfur. Urgent action by the PSC can contribute towards averting the situation in Darfur from spiraling completely out of control. This the PSC can accomplish at the very least through convening a dedicated session for mobilizing diplomatic and humanitarian attention and action the situation in Darfur demands.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’