Dr Tekeda Alemu
Former State Minister of Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council during the joint high-level side-event to the 36^th AU Summit on ‘Africa and reform of the multilateral system’

Thanks Prof Murithi, our moderator. I recognize my old friend Basso Sanqu, who in New York was very dynamic and set the tone in the UN Security Council.

I would like to first of all to thank Ambassador Jeobeam Shaanika, who delivered, the very rich and excellent keynote address of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of Namibia. I have taken to heart the contents of the address.

There is little doubt in my mind that at no time in the past has the theme of this meeting – Africa, the new agenda for peace and the reform of the multilateral system – been as urgent as it is today. I believe the statement delivered by Shaanika has risen to the occasion and set the tone for the presentation that will follow.

Let me also take this opportunity to thank our AU colleague Ambassador Fred Ngoga for the opening remark made on behalf of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye. It was very rich and I must say very educative for me.

I must also express appreciation to Dr Solomon for organizing this event with the Republic of Namibia and for the great effort he has been making to highlight how much the reform of the multilateral system has become so urgent as to become almost an existential imperative for Africa. I have a very deep appreciation for Amani Africa of which he is the founding director.

I must also express with great deal of gratitude and appreciation the dignified and principled manner with which Namibia has been carrying out its pan-Africanist obligation.

Excellency, Dear Moderator,

As I already said, the reform of the multilateral system which is also being prioritized by the UN Secretary-General, as underlined in his Our Common Agenda, is an objective which has increasingly become an urgent matter which can no longer be postponed.

It should be admitted that multilateral governance has placed Africa, more or less, outside of its purview. Nowhere is this more vivid than with respect to international cooperation. One recalls how much the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals were unanimously adopted with great fanfare in 2015. Now, we are at mid-point of the implementation of that agenda which has failed to deliver on the promises made in a number of areas extremely meaningful for Africa and others in the same situation.

One cannot, of course, afford to despair. It is in that light one ought to look at the proposals contained in the UN Secretary General’s Our Common Agenda, all the more since it is said that the eleven policy briefs would offer concrete ideas to advance the work.

Now, we are told that the first brief will ‘address the New Agenda for Peace and Security.’ And it is said, this ‘for a world in transition and a new era of geopolitical competition.’ Equally important is what the brief will be adopting as an approach which will be holistic in the sense of focusing on the peace continuum, from prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and sustainable long-term development.

It is indeed encouraging, though it is not entirely a novel idea, to put the issue of sustainable long-term development within the peace and security continuum. In the same vein, two other policy briefs seem to encourage hope that perhaps at the level of the UN, there is a more robust realization that multilateralism is losing credibility. The two policy briefs on finance, one focusing on metrics that go beyond GDP, and the second proposal for reform of the global financial architecture seem to show perhaps a new determination to try to repair the damage caused by the failure sustained by the 2030 SDGs.

Coming to the issue of Africa’s longstanding demand for the reform of the UN system with respect to which the reform of the Security Council is the most critical, it has been apparent that not even a small progress has been made since the Ezulweni consensus was formulated by Africa in 2005.

It seems to me there is a great need for Africa to address the challenge in two ways. One is within our domain and it has to do with our own effort to achieve real and tangible unity in pursuing the acceptance by others of the two seats as permanent members and the 5 non-permanent seats by Africa. There is no doubt that there is a feeling among member states, particularly among the permanent members, that, when the chips are down, they could prevail upon some African members to give in.

It is therefore critical that everything possible is done to ensure that Africa stands together on all critical international issues. Of course, it would not make sense to seek those two seats for Africa unless member states of the AU have the capacity for a common position on critical international and regional peace and security issues. That would be the litmus test for our capacity to occupy those seats.

The second is more problematic and requires a lot of diplomatic foot work on the part of both member states and the Commission. It must be clear, and this is not a new discovery, that all countries are driven by their respective national interests, and this is even more true in the case of the permanent members.

Though it may not always be the case, it is nonetheless very wise to be skeptical about the promises of support for the African position. It is critical to analyze the implication of the expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council for each (permanent) member of the body.

From that point of view, it is possible that those who wish for a stalemate might be supportive of the African position from conviction that doing so would discourage movement forward in the intergovernmental negotiation. This would mean that there is a lot of work to be done by member states of the AU as well as by the (AU) Commission with a view for an objective assessment of the position on the matter of the permanent members of the Council.

I have no doubt that the body that (Namibia and Amani Africa) has been trying to create might contribute greatly to this exercise.

I wish us all a most productive conversation.

I thank you.

The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa

It is that time of the year when Addis Ababa plays host to the Heads of State and Government of African Union (AU) member States. Foreign Ministers making up the Executive Council of the AU are first to congregate in Addis Ababa on 15 and 16 February. They have kicked off their meeting earlier today with the opening session.

In a push to assert African agency, the Chairperson of the Executive Council, Senegal’s foreign Minister told participants during the opening session earlier today that Africa expects to ‘be heard, consulted and, most of all, respected in the choices it makes’.

The leaders of AU member states are set to descend on Addis Ababa on 17 February and hold the ordinary session of the Assembly of the AU on 18 and 19 February. The composition of the leaders of the continent which is reflected in the family photo they take after the opening session of the Assembly show that nearly all of them are men. It is only the presence of Tanzanian President restrains observers from concluding that the Assembly is an ‘only men’ club, as former Liberian President Ellon Johnson Sirleaf’s presence did previously.

I don’t know whether to say bless the Tanzanians or praise to God or perhaps both that made possible the ascent of Samia Suluhu Hassan to Tanzania’s presidency that now will shone bright light on the long road ahead to transform the AU Assembly from remaining a ‘men’s only’ club.

I have a dream that one day, hopefully in the time of my daughter’s generation, we will have a family picture of the leaders of the continent that is female dominated and reflective of the average age of people on the continent!

This is not to say that Africa has not made progress. I was at a dinner recently where I was reminded in a conversation about the OAU times and the progress made under the AU. Unlike the OAU times when it was not uncommon for some leaders to pitch at the summit wearing their military uniforms, today all of them smile in front of the camera wearing their suits, curtesy of AU norm banning coups and other unconstitutional changes of government. Indeed, even those who are military leaders who seized power militarily will show up wearing suit rather than their military uniform.

Of course, all five leaders except one who seized power by military coup during 2021/22 are barred from participating at this upcoming summit, they are ostracized for breaching AU’s norm banning coups and other unconstitutional changes of government (to which we should return some other time). This was completely unthinkable during OAU times.

Curious to know the one military strongman who is accorded a privileged treatment of attending the summit despite seizing power unconstitutionally? If you don’t know, are you sure that you are interested in African affairs?

In addition to the gender inclusivity of the AU Assembly, which is of course a function of the gender inclusivity or lack thereof of national politics, attendance in AU summit continues to be a topic of discussion. For example, this is first and foremost an issue for African civil society organizations, who would have liked to seize the occasion for championing specific issues of concern for the wider African public by having a slot for a representative of CSOs to make a statement at the opening session and have interactions with leaders on the corridors of the AU.

I hope that in the slow and challenging but steady progress to achieve agenda 2063, the Africa We Want, we will one day see a representative of African citizens bringing in the voice of African people to Mandela Hall during the opening of the Assembly session. And allow me to also dream that we will also make, as part of the journey to realize agenda 2063, the AU a union also of peoples of Africa and African decent not just that of states and governments!

Access to the AU during the summit is also a subject of discussion among AU partner countries. More so this year. The AU sent a note inviting partner countries to attend the opening session of the summit on the basis of 1+0 representation, signaling to partners not to bother with bringing to Addis Ababa high-level representatives from their capitals. While this means that partner countries would not be able to have interaction with as many leaders as they could around the summit, for the AU this ensures that it spares the leaders from attending the summit with divided attention. Yet, it remains an issue for which workable formula is yet to be found.

It is also curious if this 1+0 invitation has been extended to Israel whose AU observer status has been in dispute, triggering a heads of state and government taskforce for which there is so far no record of any convening since its establishment. In the meantime, the lobbying from Israel is in full swing in Addis Ababa. Come this weekend, we may know if there is any resolution to this dispute, although the AU should not have been put in this situation in the first place considering the many continental issues that it should invest its time and attention on.

The other issue of attendance concerns which of the African leaders will make their pilgrimage to Addis Ababa or delegate it to their minister. This summit is billed to be one that will attract the attendance of large number of African leaders. Even if this were to happen, barring any intervening factors, you should not hold your breath that we will have as many African leaders as those who attended the EU-AU, China-Africa, US-Africa etc summits.

I dearly wish that they all come for their summit, demonstrate their pan-African commitment to the AU and its ideals. And prove me wrong.

The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’

Tsion Hagos
Researcher, Amani Africa

In the face of the dire humanitarian crises affecting parts of the continent induced mainly by violent conflicts and in some cases by extreme weather events, one of the highly anticipated events is the expected adoption by 36^th African Union (AU) Summit of the Statute of the AU Humanitarian Agency (AHA). This will bring to a close the establishment of the AUHA that was in the making for a number of years. Other activities on humanitarian issues around the summit include the presentation of a report to the summit on the state of the humanitarian situation in Africa, which according to the report has gone worse, and the ministerial side-event on ‘Towards a new humanitarian agenda in Africa’  by Rwanda and Sierra Leone in partnership with Norway, OCHA and IFRC, with a focus on the AU 10 Year Humanitarian Plan of Action taking place on 16 February, ahead of the opening of the Executive Council Session.

While the establishment of an African mechanism charged with undertaking humanitarian activities officially formed part of AU’s agenda in 2016 at the 26^th AU Summit, the need to mobilise African capacity to address growing humanitarian needs in the continent was already one of the concerning issues at the forefront of discussions among AU Heads of State and Government, in earlier years. For instance, the Executive Council’s decision in 2010 at its 17^th Ordinary Session, to increase member States’ contributions to the Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) fund from 2% to 4% [EX.CL/ /Dec.556-599(XVII)] was in recognition of the growing deterioration of humanitarian crises Africa. Similarly, at its 14^th Ordinary Session convened in the same year, the AU Assembly noted the need for an African body that can ensure coordination and harmonisation of humanitarian action in the continent [Assembly/AU/Dec.268 – 288 (XIV)].

Experiences in recent years, including the worrying deterioration of the humanitarian situation on the continent, have made it clear that Africa ill affords to deal with the humanitarian situation in a business-as-usual fashion. In an initiative that seeks to shift Africa’s place from being a mere object of global humanitarian action to being an actor in responding to the plight of Africans caught up in humanitarian crises,  in 2016, at its 26^th Ordinary Session, the AU Assembly decided to ‘establish an African Humanitarian Agency which should be anchored on regional and national mechanisms and funded with Africa’s own resources’ and requested the AU Commission to ‘embark on the process for the establishment of such an architecture anchored on principles of pan-Africanism and African shared values’ [Assembly/AU/Dec.588-604(XXVI)].

The process for translating this ambition into reality through establishing the AUHA has since been underway. A critical milestone achieved in this regard has been the development of the Draft Statutes of the AUHA articulating the objectives, mandates, functions, operational modalities and overall structure of the agency. After a few years of work and rounds of revisions, the final consideration of the Statute before submission to the Assembly for adoption was during the 8^th ordinary session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs of the AU held on 11 December 2022. While the meeting adopted the Statute, a major proposed change concerned the naming of the entity. The proposal was to change ‘Agency’ to ‘Institution’. In the text of the Statute for presentation to the Executive Council before its consideration for adoption by the Assembly, this change is not reflected.

The rationale for establishing a humanitarian agency of the Union has in fact been an important aspect of the discussions around operationalisation of the AUHA. As emphasised in a 2019 study conducted on the operationalisation of the agency, one critical factor which justifies the need for the establishment of the AUHA is the coordination void faced in the existing humanitarian response framework. For instance, while the AU has already instituted various structures such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC) that can and are playing major role to respond to natural disaster and crises, there is absence of clear modalities for coordination between these mechanisms.

Similarly, implementation of normative standards on humanitarian issues including the OAU Refugee Convention, the Kampala Convention and the AU Humanitarian Policy Framework can benefit from a more organised and coordinated approach in order to be more impactful. The need to respond to humanitarian disasters in a coordinated manner also becomes more apparent as the nature of crises in the continent growingly turns to be more complex and compounded, adding impetus to the operationalisation of the AUHA. In addition to advancing coordination of existing mechanisms and normative standards, the agency is also expected to allow a well synchronised humanitarian response at the national, regional and continental levels through harmonisation of efforts between member States, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and the AU.

Further to playing a critical role in ensuring coordination, the AUHA would also contribute considerably towards supporting the global humanitarian system which is often regarded as being ‘over-stretched’. Not only that, but having an agency which is founded upon continental policy and legal frameworks and which is ‘anchored on principles of pan-Africanism, solidarity and African shared values’ is also crucial to boost sense of ownership and commitment among African stakeholders. The war in Ukraine which broke out in February 2022 showed how humanitarian operations in Africa can easily suffer due to shifting of aid budget among major contributing countries.

In addition to filling in these gaps, the AUHA can also be deployed towards approaching humanitarian assistance in a manner that is both preventive and responsive. For the most part, humanitarian efforts in the continent are deployed in reaction to full-scale disasters and suffering, most of which could, at the very least, be minimised, if not averted, if timely and effective early warning and preventive action is taken. This applies in cases of both manmade and natural disasters and further to minimising the human cost, environmental damage and collapse of economies, a proactive preventive approach based on effective early warning system is also less costly than responding to an already aggravated humanitarian crisis.

It is against this background that a significant preventive role is assigned to the AUHA in the Statute for instance be the development and implementation of anticipatory tools for crisis preparedness and early action. Indeed, the first of the objectives of AUHA is to ‘prevent humanitarian crises through early warning for timely response to situations that may result in humanitarian crises’. In terms of armed conflicts which continue to cause the greatest humanitarian crises on the continent, the agency, in close coordination with the continental early warning system (CEWS), could for example take on the role of actively anticipating hotspots expected to experience highest loss of human life and damage to property in countries that show clear signs of looming full-blown conflicts. In case of climate change and natural disasters too, the agency can undertake a similar preparedness and early action role in collaboration with pre-existing mechanisms.

Another area of major value addition of the agency could be in advancing humanitarian diplomacy. As we have argued in our policy brief on the AU humanitarian summit in May 2022, one of the gaps in responding to conflicts relates to the use of humanitarian diplomacy as part of the tool box for responding to conflicts in Africa. The leadership of AUHA on humanitarian diplomacy would fill in a major gap and can contribute hugely to mitigating suffering by facilitating early negotiations with conflicting parties on unhindered humanitarian access, full observation and compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights principles.

While its importance therefore remains beyond doubt, the effective operation and functioning of the AUHA is more than likely to face considerable challenges when it comes to securing sustainable and sufficient funds. As specified in the Draft Statutes and in accord with the central objective of creating an African owned humanitarian agency, the AUHA’s budget is to be borne by the AU. This means the agency’s main source of financing comes from member States’ contributions. While emphasizing contribution from member states, the Draft Statutes already acknowledge the need for securing funding from outside sources, through voluntary contributions from member States, private sector contributions and contributions from AU partners. Also worth considering is as further resourceful African base to explore for funding the agency could be the African diaspora community.

No doubt it is better to resolve the main source of humanitarian crises on the continent than invest in deploying humanitarian action. Yet, while working on such long-term structural solutions such as the effective operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which is the thematic focus of the AU for 2023, the establishment of this agency is a demonstration of responsibility by the AU. With the AU in its report to this upcoming summit indicating that Africa alone accounts for 11.6 million newly Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the world triggered by conflict and violence- the highest figure ever recorded, the need for this agency, if anything, is long overdue. One hopes that it will prove its value.

The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’

Part I

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa

Tsion Hagos
Researcher, Amani Africa

In 2021, Africa experienced what the UN Secretary General termed ‘epidemic of coups’. It was in 2021 for the first time in the 20 years of operation of the AU that the AU suspended four of its member states in one calendar year. During 2021-2022, Africa has experienced six instances of military seizure of power. If one adds to the list attempted coups or plots of coups reported by states, there were a total of 14 instances of successful coups, attempted coups and plots of coups on the continent during 2021 and 2022.

While there are a number of factors that account for this ‘epidemic of coups’ as discussed in fair details (here and here), some of these are specific to the gaps in both the AU norm banning unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and in its enforcement.

One major gap in the norm is the lack of criteria and mechanism for determining the occurrence of one of the instances of unconstitutional changes of government stipulated in Article 23(5) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) – ‘any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’ manipulation of term limits or ‘constitutional coups’. This is critical considering that the Peace and Security Council, AU’s highest standing decision-making body on matters of peace and security and constitutional governance, deemed ‘manipulation of national constitutions to extend term limits’ as one of the issues threatening peace and security on the continent. The other gap is the absence of clear criteria on conditions that should be met for the lifting of suspension of a country from the AU for UCG. 

The lacunae in enforcement of the ban on UCG involves both the predictability of the process for applying suspension from AU and/or the consistency of the PSC in applying suspension and AU member states commitment to fully uphold the principle of zero tolerance to UCG and the application of suspension against states where UCG takes place without distinction.

It is to be recalled that this epidemic of coups triggered a plethora of policy actions on the part of the AU. While the PSC has been the main site of such actions, it has also led to actions at the level also of AU’s highest decision making body, the Assembly of the AU. Following its decision in January 2022 for convening a continental forum on UCG, the PSC convened the Accra Forum on UCG in March 2022. This continental forum, which brought together AU member States, AU organs, Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms, constitutional experts and CSOs including research organizations, produced the Accra Declaration on UCG, which the PSC adopted in one of its sessions subsequently.

At the level of the AU Assembly, it took a decision in February 2022 that it would convene an extraordinary summit which would have as one of its focus this upsurge of UCG on the continent. Accordingly, on 28 May 2022, the Assembly held its 16th extraordinary summit which as part of its declaration addressed the spike in the incidents of UCG, which, among others, endorsed the Accra Declaration.

The review of the plethora of policy activities shows that the AU has started to address the gaps in the enforcement of AU’s norm banning UCG, albeit progress remains uneven, slow and partially adequate.

The Accra Declaration, as endorsed by the AU Assembly, for example expresses the commitment to comprehensively address factors which lead to UCG, including manipulation of democratic processes to tamper with constitutions and effecting amendments to electoral laws within a short span before the elections and without the consent of the majority of political actors and in violation of the stipulated national democratic principles, rules and procedures for constitutional amendment.’ In this respect beyond appealing ‘to Member States to respect their respective Constitutions, especially adherence to presidential term limits and to organize free, fair, transparent and credible elections in line with national laws and international norms, as well as respecting the outcomes of election,’ the Accra Declaration, stressed the need for the AU to finalise and adopt the AU guidelines on the amendment of constitutions in Africa based on the AU’s existing laws, policies and practice relating to constitutionalism and rule of law.’

Considering the continuing challenge of manipulation of constitutional amendments for extending term limits or removing constitutional term limits, the process towards the adoption of the guidelines on amendment of constitutions remains slow. While the development and eventual adoption of the guidelines helps towards addressing manipulation of constitutional amendments for extending or removing term limits, the effectiveness of these guidelines in this respect depends on whether they provide the PSC with clear and implementable criteria for determining the occurrence of UCG under Article 23(5) of the ACDEG.

In terms of the Malabo Declaration, apart from the endorsement of the Accra Declaration, the most important element relates to what the Assembly outcome document said about commitment of member states to the norm banning UCG. As advocated in Amani Africa’s various works including the policy brief published ahead of and targeting the Malabo summit, the Declaration not only ‘unequivocally condemn all forms of unconstitutional changes of government’ and reiterated member states ‘zero tolerance’ in this respect but also recommitted member states to total adherence to ACDEG and the Lomé Declaration. This is particularly important given that the lack of strong consensus and support for AU norms by member states are among the factors for the weakening of the efficacy of the sanctions in 2021.

The translation of this reaffirmation of zero tolerance to any form of UCG into action by applying the rule consistently is the litmus test for demonstrating the firmness of the commitment of states. After all, as the old saying holds, the test of the pudding is in the eating!

The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’