Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for August 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for August 2025
Date | August 2025
In August, the Republic of Algeria will assume the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month outlines eight substantive sessions covering nine agenda items and a field mission to South Sudan. All sessions are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. Only two of the nine agenda items will focus on country-specific situations, while the other seven will address thematic issues and PSC’s meetings with relevant bodies.
The first session of the month, scheduled for 4 August, is set to consider the evolving situation in Sudan. This session follows a sequence of high-level engagements by the PSC, the most recent being its 1292nd meeting on 29 July 2025, which came in direct response to the 26 July 2025 announcement by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of the establishment of a parallel civilian administration, referred as the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis) in areas under its control. The PSC, during this emergency ‘meeting’ held via email exchange, strongly condemned and rejected the formation of this so-called ‘parallel government,’ affirming the AU’s unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Sudan. The Council emphasised that the AU recognises ‘only the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the recently formed civilian transitional government’ until a consensual arrangement is reached that aligns with the aspirations of the Sudanese people. These pronouncements came just months after the Council’s 1261st Summit-level session held on 14 February 2025, on the margins of the 38th AU Summit, which had attracted the participation of high-level figures including AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, IGAD Chair Djibouti (represented by its Foreign Minister), UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and a representative from the League of Arab States. Despite the elevated diplomatic engagement at the February summit, the meeting failed to produce substantive decisions. Its outcome communiqué simply reiterated prior calls, such as a humanitarian truce, that both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF disregarded. Since February, the conflict in Sudan has evolved further. The RSF’s consolidation of control in parts of the west and south, alongside its establishment of a competing political authority, has intensified fears of territorial fragmentation of Sudan along the lines of what is playing out in Libya. Meanwhile, the SAF has maintained its dominance in the north and east, bolstering its presence in strategic areas, while trying to consolidate the diplomatic edge it has over the RSF in regional and international forums.
Despite the persistence of the fragmentation of the diplomatic space and lack of effective diplomatic engagement in recent months, efforts are underway for reinvigorating diplomacy. Egypt has increased bilateral engagements focused on containing instability along the Sudan-Libya-Egypt border, triggered by incidents involving the RSF. On the international front, before its postponement the U.S. was set to convene a peace talk that set to start on 29 July in Washington with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt to revive the ‘Quad’ initiative, emphasising dialogue over military action. Simultaneously, the U.N. is preparing mediation efforts led by envoy Ramtane Lamamra, coordinating with the AU in Addis Ababa and focusing on talks for civilian protection, aiming to bring the Sudanese parties into proximity negotiations as soon as possible. It is therefore expected that the PSC will discuss these recent developments and follow up on its previous decisions, such as investigations into human rights violations, a plan for civilian protection, and identifying external actors involved in supplying arms and financial support, fueling the fire of the war in Sudan.
On 6 August, the second substantive session will assess the role of ad hoc governance, peace, and security mechanisms in supporting the PSC’s mandate. This will be the first time that PSC will be assessing the effectiveness of ad hoc mechanisms in the implementation of its mandates. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC authorises the PSC to establish subsidiary bodies as needed. Specifically, Article 8(5) empowers the PSC to create such bodies, including ad hoc committees, as it deems necessary to undertake tasks such as mediation, conciliation, or fact-finding enquiries. In operational practice, the PSC exercises this mandate through formal communiqués and AU Assembly decisions, which authorise or request the establishment of these mechanisms in the form of ad hoc committees or high-level panels. The session is expected to reflect on how such mechanisms contribute to conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Against the backdrop of increasingly complex crises across the continent, the session provides a timely opportunity to assess the lessons learned from the operation of such mechanisms in reviewing the African Peace and Security Architecture, for making it fit for the evolving and complex security situation and geopolitical context of the continent. The Council is anticipated to examine how these bodies support early warning, strategic mediation, and inclusive dialogue, while also identifying the challenges facing them and ways of adapting them to the fundamentally changing realities of Africa and the world.
On 8 August, the PSC will convene its session dedicated to consultations with the AGA-APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights. During the 1098th session in August 2022, an inaugural consultation was held between the PSC and the AGA-APSA Platform, which decided to institutionalise and regularise this engagement as an annual event. A similar decision was taken at the 1095th session of the PSC, which was held for consultation with the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance, affirming that these joint engagements should also be held annually. In August 2023, during its 1167th session, the PSC brought together both mechanisms, the AGA-APSA Platform and the PRC Sub-Committee, for a joint consultation, recognising their shared mandate in promoting governance, democratisation, and constitutionalism. Although these consultations were intended to be held annually, no session took place in 2024. The upcoming consultation is expected to reinvigorate and deepen collaboration among PSC members, the PRC Sub-Committee, and the AGA-APSA Platform. It will build on past engagements, evaluate progress in fulfilling joint commitments, and explore innovative approaches to strengthen coordination in promoting the AU’s shared values.
Between its scheduled sessions, the PSC will conduct a field mission to South Sudan from 10 to 12 August. The visit comes against the backdrop of the escalating political and security crisis that threatens to unravel the hard-won gains of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). During its 1283rd session, the PSC voiced deep concern over the deteriorating situation, warning of the risk of a full-scale war due to serious ceasefire violations, the detention of political figures, and a growing erosion of trust among the signatories to the agreement. The field mission will provide the PSC with an opportunity to directly assess the situation on the ground, engage with key stakeholders, including the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), civil society actors, and regional partners and reinforce its calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the unconditional release of political detainees, and the full implementation of the R-ARCSS.
On 13 August, the PSC will convene the only open session of the month to discuss the theme ‘Education in Conflict Situations.’ The last time the Council considered this particular theme was in August 2024 during its 1229th meeting, in which it decided to ‘regularise the Open Session as an annual event of the Council.’ It is expected to build on and follow up on its previous commitments which included, but not limited to, the need for establishing a quality control mechanism to monitor and evaluate inclusive education initiatives to ensure effectiveness and accountability; the need for improving data collection and evidence-based policymaking, to effectively address the unique challenges facing education in conflict situations; and the proposal of mainstreaming inclusive education as an integral component of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) in countries emerging from conflict situations. The session is also expected to advance its discussions from the recent PSC sessions held in July 2025 on the humanitarian situation in Africa and rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts, as these naturally extend to education. This meeting also comes just a few months before the AU Education Summit 2025 – a conference aimed at rallying the AU member states, schools and educators from the African continent behind the AU strategic objective that seeks to address the educational challenges the African continent faces.
On 15 August, the PSC will convene to consider two agenda items, beginning with a discussion on the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the PSC Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism. Although the Sub-Committee has long been part of the PSC’s structure, it has never been operationalised since its establishment. During its 1182nd meeting in October 2023, the PSC underscored the importance of fully activating and operationalising the Sub-Committee. In preparation for the Ambassadorial-level session, the Committee of Experts is scheduled to meet tomorrow (1 August) to deliberate on the ToRs.
The second part of the session will be dedicated to the consideration and adoption of the PSC Field Mission Report on South Sudan. Building on the objectives of the field visit and the key findings outlined in the report, the Council is expected to reflect on the current state of the escalating political and security situation. The session will provide an opportunity to assess the impact of recent developments and guide the PSC’s next steps in supporting the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), as well as to address and resolve the ongoing violence in South Sudan.
On 25 August, the PSC will hold its second annual consultative meeting with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. This meeting, scheduled to take place virtually, builds on the commitment made during the inaugural session held on 30 August 2024 in Gaborone, Botswana, where both parties agreed to institutionalise annual consultations alternating between Addis Ababa and Gaborone. Rooted in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, the meeting reflects efforts to strengthen coordination and collaboration in promoting peace and security in the region. The consultative session is expected to assess progress made since the inaugural meeting, particularly in light of developments in eastern DRC and in terms of enhancing joint efforts in resource mobilisation for peace operations.
On 27 August, the PSC will convene for a briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa. The session will feature contributions from key AU institutions, including the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), and the AU Counterterrorism Centre (AUCTC). This session is expected to provide a comprehensive analysis of political, security, and socio-economic dynamics shaping existing and emerging conflict and security challenges on the continent, building on the AU’s commitment to preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention as outlined in the PSC Protocol and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The session follows related PSC engagements, including most recently the 1247th session held on 27 November 2024, where CISSA, AUCTC, and AFRIPOL briefed the PSC on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook. During that session, the PSC emphasized the need for enhanced collaboration and information sharing among Member States and international partners to counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and extremist groups and tasked the AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL, and other specialized AU agencies to collaborate with Member States toward establishing a joint Cybersecurity Task Force to prevent the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and emerging technologies for radicalization, recruitment, training, and funding by terrorist groups. Furthermore, the 1251st PSC session on 17 December 2024 underscored the need for greater visibility and prominence of CEWS within the proposed restructuring of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department, signalling a push for institutional reforms to enhance CEWS’s operational efficiency. Additionally, the 4th Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and APRM on 7–8 April 2025 highlighted the importance of leveraging APRM’s governance-focused peer review reports to enhance early warning strategies, building on prior pronouncements which emphasised closer coordination between APRM and PSC to address structural vulnerabilities and governance deficits that fuel conflicts. The upcoming session offers an opportunity to explore how early warning analysis would be holistic by going beyond the recent intelligence and security-focused analysis from CISSA, AFRIPOL, and AUCTC and including APRM’s governance-centred and CEWS all-encompassing analyses. Discussions may also address challenges such as Member States’ denialism of early warning reports, as noted in previous sessions, and the need for enhanced coordination with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to tackle transnational threats like terrorism, cybercrime, and human trafficking.
The last meeting of the Council will be held on 29 August, which will be a briefing by the African Members to the UN Security Council. Algeria, Sierra Leone and Somalia, serving as non-permanent members for the 2024 – 2025 term are expected to brief the UNSC on several critical peace and security issues on the continent which is expected to include the security situation in eastern DRC, Sudan’s ongoing civil war and humanitarian crisis, South Sudan’s political and security developments, push for UNSC reform and African representation, regional Counter-terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel and cooperation with regional organizations. This meeting comes after the PSC recently adopted the ‘Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the PSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3)’ at its 1289th meeting of 24 July 2025. From the manual, it highlights that, to bolster A3’s influence and impact in the UNSC, the A3 shall consult with relevant stakeholders, including the Non-Aligned Movement and all strategic partners of the AU, on peace and security issues of interest to Africa. In this context, the A3 is tasked with mobilising greater political support in championing the African positions and interests on peace and security issues on the agenda of the UNSC. This being in alignment with the language and commitments from the Conclusions of the 11th Oran Process held in December 2024 in which, it was agreed that there is an imperative to have a synchronization of the meetings of the PSC and those of the UNSC on matters relating to peace, security and stability in Africa, which come under the joint mandate of the two Councils, to ensure proper guidance to the A3 Plus. In addition, it was underscored that there is a need for ensuring a continued push for the A3 to take effective pen-holders or co-pen-holding on African files on the UNSC Agenda. Therefore, the meeting is expected to provide updates on modalities for strengthening coordination between the PSC and A3 based on the experience of the current A3 members and recent trends in the UNSC. The session may also further explore operationalising the manual’s provisions, strategising around UNSC reform efforts, and advancing Africa’s broader multilateral objectives.
CGTN: "Amani Africa Director Spoke to CGTN on the Qatar led talks between DRC and M23"
Amani Africa Director Spoke to CGTN on the Qatar led talks between DRC and M23July 29, 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - June 2025
Date | June 2025
In June, Tanzania chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC initially planned to convene six substantive agenda items. However, after the revision of the program of work (PoW), it held five sessions with six agenda items. Four of the agenda items were on thematic issues, while two focused on country-specific situations. All five sessions were held at the ambassadorial level.
The Imperative of a Unified AU Health Architecture: A New Era of Collaboration
The Imperative of a Unified AU Health Architecture: A New Era of Collaboration
Date | 24 July 2025
Ibraheem Bukunle Sanusi 1
A pivotal meeting recently took place at the Africa CDC headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Her Excellency Ambassador Amma Twum-Amoah, the new African Union (AU) Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, held fruitful discussions with Africa CDC Director General H.E. Dr. Jean Kaseya. Their deliberations, focused on pressing health and humanitarian issues confronting the continent, culminated in a significant agreement: the establishment of a joint coordination team. This team, comprising experts from the AU Commission and Africa CDC, along with representatives from the Africa Medicines Agency (AMA), AUDA-NEPAD, Africa Humanitarian Agency (AfHA), and AfCFTA, is mandated to ensure policy coherence, enhance productivity and efficiency, and forge common positions in implementing health policies across Africa.

This initiative is a welcome and crucial step. It signals a deeper commitment to coordination and collaboration among Africa’s continental health, development, and integration institutions. This article argues that this agreement should be a powerful impetus to explore and ultimately establish a comprehensive African Health Architecture.
A Global Turning Point in Health Governance
We stand at an inflexion point in global health governance. The global health landscape is shifting amid ideological realignments and financial strains occasioned by geopolitical rifts. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for health in Africa has plummeted by 70% from 2021 to 2025, as donor countries redirect funds toward domestic priorities and even military spending in the wake of geopolitical crises. After a peak during COVID-19, global aid fell 7.1% in 2024, the first drop in years, with the U.S. slashing USAID programs by over 50% and others like the UK and Netherlands following suit. The decline “stems largely from shifting global economic conditions, evolving political priorities, and rising geopolitical tensions”. In short, the era of abundant donor support is waning.
As noted in the article Global Health and the “Second Independence of Africa”, global power dynamics around health are changing. During the COVID-19 pandemic, wealthy nations competed aggressively for vaccines and supplies, eroding faith in multilateral mechanisms. Health has emerged as a battleground in today’s geopolitical struggle, reminiscent of past contests for influence in Africa. As powerful countries pursue their own interests, Africa’s health needs too often take a backseat, leading to fragmented responses and a troubling lack of international cooperation during crises. The inequitable vaccine access in the pandemic and the exclusion of Africa CDC from the initial governance of the World Bank’s Pandemic Fund are stark reminders of Africa’s marginalisation. All of these points point to a simple truth: now is a critical moment for Africa to step forward with a cohesive vision and assert its health priorities on the global stage. African leadership and domestic commitment to health have never been more needed. As one expert noted, ultimate responsibility for Africa’s health security rests with African governments investing in health and citizens holding them accountable. The African Union (AU) must seize this moment to unite its institutions, voices and resources for health.
Pressure on Africa’s Health Systems and the Cost of Fragmentation
The changing global health governance dynamics have put Africa’s health systems under immense pressure. As clearly articulated in the “Africa’s Health Financing in a New Era” concept note, the financing crisis alone is staggering, with ODA collapsing, vital programs for pandemic preparedness, maternal health, and disease control at risk. This comes as Africa faces a surge in public health threats: outbreaks on the continent jumped 41% from 2022 to 2024, including Ebola, cholera, Marburg and more, all colliding with climate disasters and conflicts. Yet more than 20 years after pledging to spend 15% of budgets on health (the Abuja Declaration), only 3 African countries meet that target, while most languish below even 10%. The result is chronically fragile health systems now strained to the breaking point.
Current global health governance has often failed to alleviate these strains and, in some cases, exacerbated them. Donor-driven initiatives have saved lives but have also fostered dependency and duplication. When donors abruptly cut funds, decades of health gains can unravel. For example, SpeakUp Africa argued that neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), which afflict over 580 million Africans, saw major progress through partnerships, yet sudden bilateral funding cuts recently exposed the fragility of those gains. African countries were left scrambling for emergency funds to fill the gap, an alarming situation that underlines the risk of relying solely on external charity. As one advocate put it, African nations must not remain in “a position of vulnerability” dependent on donors’ whims. In the realm of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), the story is similar. Chronic conditions like heart disease, diabetes and cancer now account for 37% of all deaths in sub-Saharan Africa (up from 24% in 2000), a “hidden epidemic” that threatens to overwhelm health services. Yet global health financing has historically prioritised infectious diseases, meaning efforts to combat NCDs remain fragmented and under-resourced. Without a unified strategy, African institutions struggle to address cross-cutting issues like NCD prevention, mental health, and lifestyle diseases that don’t fit neatly under any single donor-funded program.
Compounding these challenges is the fragmentation among AU’s own health institutions. The African Union has no shortage of organs and agencies devoted to health or have health as part of their mandates: the AUC Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (AUC-HHS) sets policies; the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) leads on epidemics and broader health topics; the new African Medicines Agency (AMA) will regulate drugs and vaccines; AUDA-NEPAD drives developmental projects and agenda; the AU’s IBAR and PANVAC focus on animal health and vaccines (crucial for zoonoses and food security); and more. Each plays a vital role, but too often they operate in silos or with overlapping mandates. Coordination is ad hoc at best, and critical issues risk falling through the cracks. For instance, Africa CDC has launched initiatives for local vaccine production (like the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing, now called Platform for Harmonised African Health Manufacturing – PHAHM) while the AMA is tasked with harmonising regulatory standards. Yet without structured collaboration, these efforts may stall. Likewise, “One Health” threats, diseases that leap from animals to humans, cannot be tackled by the Africa CDC or AU-IBAR alone. Recognising this, the AU in 2022 had established an Interagency One Health Coordination Group bringing together Africa CDC, AU-IBAR, the AUC, and others to jointly address zoonotic disease control. This was a positive step, but it underscores the point: when institutions are fragmented, Africa’s response to health challenges is fragmented. In areas from boosting pharmaceutical manufacturing to combating NCDs and NTDs, Africa’s myriad health actors need to move in unison, or risk working at cross purposes.
An AU Health Architecture: A Vision for Coordination and Cooperation
Central to addressing fragmentation is to foster cooperation. There is a need for continental health institutions and related organs with key health-related mandates to work more coherently under an African Union Health Architecture. This would not be a new brick-and-mortar institution, but rather a platform and framework that ties together all AU health-related bodies under a common vision for health security and development. In essence, it would serve as a continental coordination mechanism, similar to the successful African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the security realm or the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in the governance realm. The AGA, for example, functions as a dialogue and coordination framework among various AU-recognised institutions working on governance. We can do the same for health: create a structured forum for the AUC-HHS, Africa CDC, AMA, AUDA-NEPAD, IBAR, PANVAC, and others to share information, align strategies, and speak with one voice.
What would an AU Health Architecture actually do? First, it would institutionalise regular information sharing among these bodies. An architecture’s platform (perhaps an “AU Health Platform”) could convene quarterly coordination meetings, similar to the Senior Officials Meeting under APSA, joint task forces on specific issues, and a unified data hub. Imagine the Africa CDC and AMA jointly monitoring the rollout of a new vaccine with surveillance data feeding directly into regulatory decisions, and AUDA-NEPAD and AfCFTA representatives planning how to scale up manufacturing and distribution. Such synergy is only possible with a formal mechanism for cross-agency communication.
Second, a health architecture would enable joint advocacy and policymaking. Too often, Africa’s health priorities are fragmented when presented on the global stage. A unified AU Health Architecture can coordinate a continental voice in global health forums. Instead of Africa CDC, health ministers, and other agencies each making separate appeals, the AU can assert a single, loud position on issues like pandemic preparedness, financing, or intellectual property for medicines. We saw the power of unity during the TRIPS waiver negotiations at the WTO, with African states that spoke together on vaccine patent waivers having far greater influence. An AU Health Architecture can make this the norm, preparing common African positions for the World Health Assembly, G20 health discussions, and beyond. As African leaders have emphasised in the New Public Health Order (NPHO) initiative, Africa must secure “equitable and fair representation” in global health decision-making. Speaking as one through a coordinated platform is the best way to ensure Africa’s voice is heard and its interests defended. This is also a key pillar of the AU reforms agenda.
Third, an AU Health Architecture will directly address fragmentation on health priorities. It can set overarching continental targets, for example, reducing NCD mortality or eliminating specific NTDs and align the efforts of various organs behind those goals. This means less duplication and more coherence: one AU health agenda that leverages the strengths of each institution. The AU already has high-level strategies (the Africa Health Strategy 2016–2030, the Catalytic Framework to end AIDS, TB and Malaria, etc.), but implementation often falters without coordination. The architecture could establish thematic working groups (on NCDs, NTDs, maternal health, etc.), drawing experts from all relevant agencies. This platform would also help bridge human and animal health agencies in a One Health approach, ensuring that human health, veterinary services, and environmental experts jointly tackle issues like antimicrobial resistance or zoonotic outbreaks. Already, there is a proof of concept: with the AU’s One Health interagency group (co-hosted by Africa CDC and IBAR), which recently launched the One Health strategy for zoonotic diseases. An AU Health Architecture would take such collaboration continent-wide, so that whether it’s Ebola or Ebola in animals (like swine fever), the response is synchronised across sectors.
Finally, the architecture will serve as a platform for coordinating health product manufacturing with regulatory and trade considerations. Africa is making bold moves to produce its own vaccines, medicines, and diagnostics, a crucial step toward health security and self-reliance. But success requires aligning multiple pieces: manufacturers need a favourable trade environment and swift regulatory approvals, and countries need assurances of quality and market access. The African Medicines Agency and the AfCFTA cannot work in isolation; they must work hand-in-hand. Under the AfCFTA agreement, fragmented regulatory systems will be harmonised, and intra-African trade in pharmaceuticals is set to grow. The member states are already leading in this regard with the recently established MoU on Regulatory Reliance Mechanism, agreed to by the eight Maturity Level 3 (ML3) regulatory agencies in Africa. At the continental level, a health architecture would operationalise this by linking AMA’s regulatory harmonisation with the AfCFTA Secretariat’s trade facilitation, guided by input from Africa CDC on public health needs. In practical terms, this could mean creating an African Medicines & Vaccines Forum under the architecture, where AMA, Africa CDC, AUDA-NEPAD (which also has pharmaceutical manufacturing under its mandate), and AfCFTA representatives jointly plan how to boost local production and remove trade barriers. The benefits would be immense: with 61% of Africa’s pharmaceutical needs currently imported and only 3% of medicines traded within Africa, a coordinated approach can change that equation. During a high-level AU side event at the UN, leaders from Africa CDC, AUDA-NEPAD, and AfCFTA together underscored the need to invest in research, strengthen regulatory bodies, and enhance local production for health security. The AU Health Architecture provides the home for turning those commitments into action, aligning investments, regulations, and industrial strategy so that African-produced health products can travel seamlessly across African borders.
Amplifying Africa’s Voice and Sustaining Political Commitment
A consolidated AU Health Architecture would not only streamline internal coordination, but it would amplify Africa’s external voice and help sustain high-level political commitment to health. One of the great lessons of recent years is that Africa can no longer afford to be a passive recipient in global health. Our continent must set its own agenda. With a unified health architecture, the AU can articulate a bold, cohesive vision for health and back it up with collective weight. Consider Agenda 2063, the continent’s development blueprint. Its first aspiration envisions “a high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens,” including “healthy and well-nourished citizens”. Health is central to Africa’s long-term prosperity. By creating a central health coordination platform, the AU would demonstrate to citizens and the world that it is serious about achieving those goals. A health architecture can regularly track progress toward health targets in Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals, holding leaders accountable if commitments waver.
Importantly, an AU Health Architecture would help keep health security at the top of the political agenda even when there isn’t a scary epidemic making headlines. It can do so by instituting accountability mechanisms, for instance, annual “State of Africa’s Health” reports delivered to the AU Assembly, or a scorecard on each country’s fulfilment of pledges (like domestic health financing or immunisation coverage). Just as the AU’s Peace and Security Council meets routinely to address conflicts, a standing health coordination platform would ensure that health doesn’t slip into neglect between crises. This sustained focus is critical to, for example, finally realising the Abuja promise of 15% budget allocation to health. Peer pressure is a powerful tool: if finance and health ministers know that their performance will be reviewed in a continental forum, they have greater incentive to prioritise health in national budgets. An architecture could also facilitate joint resource mobilisation, presenting a united front to development partners for funding strategic priorities, rather than fragmenting donor engagement across many small initiatives. Development partners have long urged “country ownership”; through a health architecture, African nations collectively can take ownership, setting priorities and asking partners to align behind Africa’s plan and priorities, not the other way around.
Crucially, the architecture would bolster Africa’s position in global health governance. When negotiating the new Pandemic Accord or reforming the International Health Regulations, an organised African bloc can shape the outcome, for instance, pressing for equitable benefit-sharing of vaccines and data. African nations want and deserve a seat at the table in shaping global health initiatives. By coordinating continentally, Africa can approach these negotiations not as 55 separate voices but as one powerful voice representing 1.3 billion people. We have already seen the beginnings of this: the Lusaka Agenda (adopted in December 2023 by African and global health stakeholders) called out imbalances in global health and stressed alignment with national plans. An AU Health Architecture would embody that principle of alignment and give Africa the platform to assert its rights in global forums, whether it’s advocating for pandemic financing mechanisms that include African institutions, or championing issues often neglected globally (like NTDs or climate-health links).
Finally, the benefits extend to Africa’s broader integration projects like the AfCFTA and the free movement of people agenda. As the continent breaks down borders for trade and travel, public health cooperation must tighten. With freer movement of persons and goods, these initiatives will certainly impact public health across the continent, as Africa CDC itself noted. A health architecture can work closely with those implementing the Free Movement Protocol to harmonise health regulations, for example, standardising vaccination certificates or collaborating on cross-border disease surveillance so that viruses do not hitchhike along with increased human mobility. It can also inform the AfCFTA on health-related trade measures (ensuring, say, that essential medicines and health equipment enjoy low tariffs and smooth customs procedures across Africa). In doing so, the architecture would help unlock the synergies between economic integration and health security, a link that requires increasing emphasis. Healthy populations are more mobile and economically productive; conversely, integrated markets can support stronger health systems (through pooled procurement, larger markets for local manufacturers, and so on). By embedding health in Africa’s grand integration schemes, the AU Health Architecture would contribute to the vision of Agenda 2063’s “Africa We Want” – an Africa of free movement, one voice, and self-reliant, robust health systems supporting our development.
Learning from the African Governance Architecture: Feasibility and Accountability
Skeptics might ask: will creating an AU Health Architecture add another layer of complexity to an already crowded AU institutional landscape? It’s a valid concern, Africa’s health ecosystem is vast, and coordination is never easy. However, the solution to complexity is not to shy away from it, but to manage it through smart design. Here, the AU can draw inspiration from its own experience. In 2011, faced with numerous bodies dealing with democracy and human rights, the AU established the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as a coordination mechanism for dialogue among stakeholders. This platform did not replace or duplicate the mandates of those bodies; instead, it provided a structured forum for them to collaborate, align their activities, and monitor progress on shared goals. The AGA (and its associated African Governance Platform) clarified roles and created a one-stop framework for governance issues. Crucially, it also introduced accountability mechanisms, for example, an annual, now biennial, high-level dialogue and routine reviews of how AU members uphold governance commitments. The result has been greater coherence in AU actions on governance and human rights, even if challenges remain.
The proposed AU Health Architecture can emulate this model. Defined roles and responsibilities would be a cornerstone: each organ’s comparative advantage should be codified (e.g., Africa CDC as lead on health emergencies and surveillance, AMA as lead on regulatory harmonisation, HHS Department on policy development and health diplomacy, AUDA-NEPAD on program implementation and resource mobilisation, IBAR on animal health, etc.), so that they complement rather than compete with each other. A coordination platform, perhaps the “AU Health Platform”, would meet regularly (as an example, heads of these agencies could convene once or twice a year on the margins of the AU Summits, with working-level coordination more frequently) to ensure everyone is steering toward common objectives. This platform could also include regional representation (from the RECs or Regional Health Organisations) to connect the continental strategy with regional and national implementation. By formalising these interactions, the architecture would move us from the current patchwork of informal cooperation to a predictable, structured collaboration.
Accountability must be the other pillar. Here, lessons from both AGA and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) are instructive. APSA, through the Peace and Security Council and its early warning system, set up clear procedures for conflict prevention and response. A health architecture could strengthen the existing Specialised Technical Committee on Health in this regard. The STC would track countries’ compliance with agreed health commitments (for instance, reporting on how many have met the Abuja 15% target or how preparedness scores are improving). It could also provide a mechanism to rapidly escalate health concerns, such as an emerging pandemic threat, to the highest political level, ensuring AU heads of state take swift, coordinated action. Far from adding bureaucracy, such structures streamline decision-making by cutting through institutional silos. They make the sum greater than the parts.
It’s also worth noting that creating an AU Health Architecture does not necessarily mean setting up a large new institution with heavy costs. Much can be achieved with political will, a clear mandate from the AU Assembly, and a small coordinating secretariat (potentially housed within the AUC or Africa CDC). In fact, the AU Assembly could simply repurpose an existing mechanism, for example, expanding the mandate of the Specialised Technical Committee on Health to function as the political oversight of the Health Architecture, supported by a technical secretariat that coordinates across agencies. The key is to embed the architecture in the AU’s structures so it has teeth: decision-making authority, reporting lines, and the blessing of heads of state. Once that is in place, the various health agencies will naturally orient their work to align with the collective framework. Yes, there will be growing pains such as turf wars and resource questions, but these can be managed by clearly demonstrating that everyone stands to gain. Each institution will be more effective in its mandate when supported by others: Africa CDC gains a broader reach through community networks; AMA gains political backing to enforce standards; AUDA-NEPAD gains technical input for its projects; member states get one coherent guidance instead of multiple voices.
From personal experience, the African Governance Architecture took time to mature, but it showed that complex challenges demand coordinated solutions. Health is no different. By learning from AGA’s experience, setting a unifying vision, creating dialogue platforms, and instituting peer accountability, the AU Health Architecture can be both feasible and transformational. As the saying goes, if you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together. Africa cannot afford isolated, short-term fixes for its health challenges. We need to go far and fast together.
Seizing the Moment for Africa’s Health Security
In conclusion, there is no better time to establish an African Union Health Architecture. We are at a pivotal juncture with traditional pillars of global health support wavering, even as the continent faces rising health demands from all sides. Yet within this challenge lies an opportunity to reimagine Africa’s health governance on its own terms. By strengthening coordination and cooperation among our health institutions, we strengthen Africa’s ability to withstand shocks, whether from pandemics or funding cuts. By speaking with one voice, we ensure African priorities like local manufacturing, NCDs, NTDs, and One Health are no longer neglected on the world stage. By aligning health with our broader agendas of economic integration and self-reliance, we move closer to the Africa envisaged in Agenda 2063: prosperous, united, and taking charge of its destiny.
Yes, building an AU Health Architecture will require leadership, political will, diligence, and perhaps a shift in mindset among our leaders and institutions. But the alternative is to continue muddling through fragmentation and that is a recipe for stagnation and vulnerability. Our continent has experienced enough of that already. The COVID-19 crisis has already sparked the vision of a New Public Health Order for Africa, emphasising better coordination, increased domestic financing, and expanded manufacturing. The proposed Health Architecture is the vehicle to drive that vision forward. It would hard-wire collaboration into the AU system and help sustain the momentum for health development long after the headlines fade.
African countries often say, “African solutions to African problems.” This is our chance to apply that credo to health. Let us not wait for the next pandemic or the next donor conference to get our act together. The AU, in partnership with development partners and global health actors, should move now to design and implement a unifying health architecture. It is an investment in our collective security and well-being that will pay dividends for generations. With unity of purpose and structure, Africa can turn this global inflexion point into a launch pad from a continent often spoken about in global health, to a continent that speaks for itself and leads. The health of 1.3 billion Africans, and indeed global health security, will be the better for it.
1 Ibraheem Sanusi is the Sector Coordinator for Health and Social Development at the GIZ Office to the African Union, where he leads the implementation of strategic programmes aimed at strengthening the institutional and technical capacities of continental health bodies, including the Africa CDC, the African Pharmaceutical Technology Foundation, and the African Medicines Agency. He coordinates GIZ’s support to the African Union’s health agenda across areas such as pandemic preparedness, One Health, pharmaceutical regulation, and digital health governance.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya
AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya
Date | 23 July 2025
Tomorrow (24 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1291 session on the situation in Libya, at the level of Heads of State and Government.1
Tomorrow’s summit-level session marks the first time since the PSC’s 294th session in September 2011 that Libya will be discussed at the level of Heads of State and Government. It will be the 27th session of the PSC since the PSC was seized of the situation in Libya in February 2011.

The session is expected to start with an opening remark by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for July 2025. It is also expected that Mahamoudi Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, will make an introductory statement setting the context for the session. As a country concerned, the representative of Libya is expected to make a statement. As per the usual practice of the PSC, Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative of the Secretary-general of the UN for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is expected to deliver a statement. A representative of Congo may also make a statement as Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya.
Coming only in two months from the last session, tomorrow’s session follows the 23 May PSC convening that was prompted by clashes between rival militias in Tripoli on 12 May. Apart from calling for unconditional ceasefire, the PSC underscored ‘the imperative of maintaining order and demilitarising the non-state forces in the capital and efforts to restore civilian order.’
As a follow-up to this immediate past session, the PSC is expected to hear during tomorrow’s session the fragile truce of 14 May that calmed down the situation in Tripoli, about the mechanisms established to monitor its implementation, and broader security and military arrangements aimed at easing tensions among rival factions in Tripoli.
It is of interest for members of the PSC to take stock of the persistence of insecurity and political instability in Libya. It is to be recalled that after Libya’s descent into civil war and anarchy following the 2011 military campaign that toppled the government of Muammar Gaddafi, the civil war came to an end with the signing of the ceasefire agreement of October 2020 and the establishment of the Libyan Dialogue Forum in November 2020. Despite the fact that this was supposed to lead to a transitional process set to culminate in the convening of elections at the end of 2021, the persistence of political and security divisions impeded agreement on the process and modalities for the holding of elections, leading to indefinite postponement of the elections.
Beyond the indefinite postponement of the elections that left Libya in a transitional limbo, the 2020 peace process that ended the civil war has not been able to overcome the political and security fragmentation that has become the characteristic feature of the political and institutional landscape of Libya. At the level of government entities, Libya operates on the basis of two rival governments. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, operates from eastern Libya. Each command has some influence in the political and economic spheres and is supported by rival local and external backers. This has direct bearing on the economy reflected, among others, in the significant deterioration of the purchasing power of the Libyan dinar and the lack of agreement on a unified budget.
The other factor that carries particular significance for security and stability is the absence of a unified and professional security sector and the prevalence of various armed groups with various levels of links with the rival governments. These armed groups that emerged and proliferated following the descent of Libya into civil war in 2011 exercise control over various territories and have ties with various parts of Libya.

Tensions between these armed groups over territorial control and competition of political actors for influence over state institutions and access to state resources have on various occasions led to the eruption of violence between these armed groups. One of the major conflict databases, ACLED, reported that it recorded ‘64 instances of battles, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups.’ The most recent of these violent episodes that shook Tripoli took place in May 2025. While the leaders of GNU described the violent clashes as law enforcement operations against criminals, aimed at enforcing judicial orders issued by the Libyan Attorney General with the goal of upholding the rule of law, it is viewed as a manifestation of patterns of inter-elite competition. Thus, in her briefing to the UN Security Council on 24 June, Tetteh observed that ‘narratives have emerged, that risks pitting cities and neighbourhoods within western Libya against one another, threatening social cohesion and potentially fomenting further escalation.’ She further warned that the ‘continued inflow of weapons into Tripoli has led to the proliferation of heavy arms and weapons depots in densely populated civilian areas, posing serious risks to civilian lives. There is also growing concern that further instability will draw in eastern security actors and undermine the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement.’
Further compounding the political and institutional division and the fragmentation of the security landscape with the persistence of rival armed groups exerting influence on and loosely affiliated to government institutions are competing external interests. External actors have further destabilised the situation by supporting opposing sides, effectively turning Libya into a proxy battleground and complicating international mediation efforts.
Considering the fact that the rivalry between armed groups feeds into and reinforces the political and institutional division in Libya and that stability in Tripoli is held by transactional arrangements and financial cooption by the GNU rather than formal arrangements and institutional reform, it will be of interest for the PSC to interrogate whether and how a political roadmap that will lead to elections can be agreed to by the major actors under the prevailing conditions and without pursuing effective security sector reform.
The other issue that is of interest to PSC members is the state of the peace process and recent developments concerning the peace process and reconciliation in Libya. The UN remains the main actor in the Libyan peace process. Its recent efforts, under the leadership of Tetteh, focused on achieving consensus on the process and modalities for holding the long-delayed elections in Libya by promoting dialogue between the country’s rival factions. Following Tetteh’s appointment, in February, UNSMIL established an Advisory Committee to propose technically sound and politically viable solutions, building on frameworks like the Libyan Political Agreement, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Roadmap and the 6+6 Committee’s electoral laws. By 20 May 2025, after more than 20 meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi, the committee delivered a comprehensive report to UNSMIL, outlining four options to address critical disputes, including the linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, candidate eligibility criteria, voting rights and the electoral appeals mechanism. These options were: (1) holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously; (2) conducting parliamentary elections first, followed by the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution; (3) adopting a permanent constitution prior to holding elections; and (4) establishing a political dialogue committee—based on the Libyan Political Agreement—to finalise electoral laws, determine the structure of the executive authority, and adopt a permanent constitution.
Following the submission of the committee’s report, UNSMIL has been conducting a series of nationwide consultations aimed at facilitating an inclusive dialogue among Libyans on the committee’s proposed options and on how best to overcome the country’s prolonged political gridlock. These consultations have revealed widespread frustration among Libyans over the current security, political, and economic conditions. Many have reportedly lost trust in existing institutions and expressed a strong desire to see the transitional period come to an end. UNSMIL intends to use the views and perspectives gathered from a broad cross-section of Libyan society to develop a consensus-based roadmap toward national elections and the reunification of state institutions. At Thursday’s meeting, the PSC may receive updates on these developments and express support to the UN’s efforts in this regard.
Another notable recent development that is of interest to PSC members was the meeting of the Berlin Process International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL), held on 20 June for the first time in four years. The IFCL was established to coordinate international efforts in support of the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led political process. The June meeting brought together representatives from 19 countries and three regional organisations, including the African Union. According to the meeting’s summary, participants reviewed the work of the advisory committee, wherein countries such as Türkiye requested the dropping of one of the four options proposed by the committee, highlighting an instance of external actors determining the scope of choices for Libyans. Indicating renewed effort for coordinated action, participants agreed to hold regular meetings to strengthen coordination in support of the UN-led process.
While the UN continues to lead mediation efforts in Libya, the AU has also played a supportive role in advancing the United Nations-led political process. The AU is a member of the Libya Quartet—alongside the United Nations, the European Union, and the League of Arab States—which was established to ensure a coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis. Notably, the AU High-Level Committee on Libya, chaired by President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, led on the national reconciliation efforts. In February, the Committee facilitated the signing of a Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation by Libyan stakeholders in Addis Ababa. However, some Libyan political actors voiced reservations about the Charter, and several prominent leaders were notably absent from the signing ceremony. Despite the fact that the head of the Presidential Council was in Addis Ababa, he did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation accord.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to summon the leadership and the compromise required to end the prevailing political stalemate and instability in the country. It may also express support to the efforts of the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya and reiterate its call on those Libyan actors who did not sign the Charter signed on the sidelines of the AU summit to sign and join the Charter. The PSC may also welcome the truce that was agreed in Tripoli and reiterate its call for unconditional ceasefire. The PSC may call for renewed effort for the adoption of a roadmap on implementation of security sector reform, focusing on the integration of the various security groups into a unified and professional national security institution and the disarmament and reintegration into society of others. With respect to the political process, it may express its support to the latest initiative of the UN for achieving a consensus among the various Libyan political and security actors on a roadmap for unification of national institutions and conducting the long-delayed elections. The PSC may call on external actors to end interference in the affairs of Libya and cease their support of rivalry among contending Libyan actors. It may also reiterate its plan for undertaking a field mission to Libya and the decision for moving the AU office to Tripoli.
1 This is the third year in a raw that Uganda convenes a session on specific conflict situation at the level of Heads of State and Government during its chair-ship of the PSC, signifying the interest on the work of the PSC at the highest levels in Uganda.