Briefing by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa
Briefing by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) on its Activities and the Humanitarian Situation in Africa
Date | 23 October 2025
Tomorrow (24 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene for its 1307th session to receive a briefing from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its activities and the humanitarian situation in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2025, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Dr Gilles Carbonnier, ICRC Vice-President, is expected to brief the Council. Ambassador Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, and Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU, are also expected to make statements.
Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to present an update on current trends in the humanitarian situation across the continent. The discussion will include country-specific assessments, with a particular focus on Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and the Sahel. In addition to highlighting major ongoing crises, the session will examine the underlying factors and dynamics driving the worsening conditions. It will also provide an opportunity to spotlight the key challenges hindering effective humanitarian action and the sustainable resolution of these crises.
The last time the ICRC briefed the PSC was at the PSC’s 1239th meeting held on 29 October 2024, in which, among other decisions, reiterated the request for the AU Commission, ‘in consultation with the UN humanitarian Agencies and other key partners, to redouble resource mobilization efforts, in order to ensure the provision of adequate and flexible funding for humanitarian action in Africa, as well as for the AU Commission to undertake a comprehensive study, identifying the financial shortfalls and make concrete and practicable proposals on how to address the financial challenges for meeting Africa’s humanitarian needs.’
In Sudan, as of early September 2025, a devastating landslide in Tarasin, located in the Marrah Mountains of Central Darfur, reportedly claimed over 1000 lives, with a Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) official reporting on 4 September that 370 bodies had been recovered and buried. The region is grappling with compounded crises, as famine grips areas like El-Fasher and the nearby Zamzam displacement camp, where the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have trapped approximately 260,000 civilians, including 130,000 children. The World Food Programme highlighted the dire situation, noting that 24.6 million people—about half of Sudan’s population—are facing acute food shortages, with 637,000 enduring catastrophic levels of hunger. Compounding the crisis, the ICRC, in mid-September 2025, reported that Sudan is experiencing its worst cholera outbreak in years, driven by war-ravaged infrastructure, with over 5000 cases of malaria, typhoid and dengue fever, alongside dozens of deaths, reported in one area of the capital in the past month. Meanwhile, the desperation to flee the conflict has led to further tragedy, with at least 50 Sudanese refugees perishing after their vessel caught fire in the Mediterranean Sea.
In South Sudan, a rapidly shifting political landscape and worsening humanitarian crises are creating an alarming situation. According to UNOCHA, as of September 2025, severe challenges – including flooding, food insecurity, violence and disease outbreaks – continue to devastate communities. Floods have affected over 639,000 people across 26 counties in six states, with Jonglei and Unity hit hardest. Meanwhile, ongoing conflict in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria has driven mass displacement, with 497,000 people newly displaced between January and September 2025 – 321,000 due to conflict and 175,000 due to flooding. Recent clashes in Western Equatoria alone displaced tens of thousands, including nearly 21,000 from Nagero County to nearby villages. Compounding these challenges, multiple disease outbreaks, such as cholera (93,200 cases, 1565 deaths across 55 counties), anthrax, hepatitis E and mpox, continue to strain communities.
DRC, on the other hand, is grappling with a complex humanitarian crisis driven by conflict and natural disasters, resulting in widespread internal displacement. According to a recent IOM report, approximately 4.9 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were recorded in the DRC as of September 2025, a 2% decrease since August. Conflict, particularly in eastern provinces like North Kivu, accounts for 85% of displacements, with the advance of the M23 armed group in early 2025 triggering new and repeated displacements in existing camps. Natural disasters, such as flooding, contribute to the remaining 15%. Meanwhile, repatriation efforts are showing progress, with 5.2 million IDP returnees recorded, representing a 4% increase since August 2025. Beyond displacement, conflict and disasters in regions like South Kivu and Ituri continue to exacerbate the crisis, driving UNHCR’s estimate that 27 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2025.
In the Sahel region, escalating violence, armed conflict and climate shocks have intensified a humanitarian crisis, displacing millions and devastating livelihoods. According to UNOCHA’s September 2025 Humanitarian Overview, 31.3 million people urgently need aid and protection in 2025. The region hosts 5.7 million IDPs and 2.4 million refugees. However, funding shortages – with only 18% of the required $4.9 billion secured – have forced humanitarian organisations to prioritise support for 10.4 million of the most vulnerable, down from 20.6 million previously targeted. Aggravating the situation, a cholera outbreak is spreading across West and Central Africa, with over 1,600 cases and 52 deaths reported in Nigeria. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania remain at high risk.
In Somalia’s northern and eastern regions, severe drought due to poor rainfall from April to June has worsened food insecurity, water scarcity and pasture shortages, driving increased pastoralist migration, according to UN agencies and local authorities. Compounding this crisis, nearly 142,000 people – 81% in the Banadir region – have been evicted from temporary shelters since January 2025, severely disrupting community stability. Further escalating concerns, a diphtheria outbreak threatens children, with the Federal Ministry of Health reporting 2,109 suspected cases and 99 deaths (a 5 % case fatality ratio) across 10 health facilities between January and August 2025. Most cases involve unvaccinated individuals over five years old, with infections surging fourfold compared to 2024.
Of importance to tomorrow’s deliberations will also be the humanitarian impact of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA). The discussion is expected to address critical concerns regarding the means and methods of warfare, both new and longstanding. Despite decades of progress and growing consensus on the need to universalise humanitarian disarmament treaties to minimise civilian casualties and the human cost of conflict, there remains a significant risk of regression. Recent developments concerning the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) are particularly concerning, with some States considering withdrawal, which could undermine years of hard-won achievements. It is worth recalling that the PSC, in April 2025, held its 1271st session dedicated to the theme of Mine Action, in which it reiterated its call ‘for the establishment of a continental mechanism for mine action…’ This also saw the AU Commission being tasked ‘to continue sensitizing Member States in promoting a better understanding of the humanitarian impacts of explosive weapons, including landmines and cluster munitions in populated areas, as well as the importance of EWIPA Political Declaration and the policy and practical changes it seeks to generate,’ and in this context, encouraged Member States that have not yet done so, to endorse the EWIPA Political Declaration.
Relatedly, the humanitarian impact of digital technologies in armed conflict cannot go unmentioned. The rise of autonomous weapons, AI, surveillance systems and combat drones in African conflicts is transforming warfare. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies to these technologies, setting limits to protect civilians and infrastructure from harm, including digital threats. Understanding their legal, ethical and humanitarian implications is critical for action.
Finally, it is worth noting that the ICRC recently launched the Global IHL Initiative in collaboration with six other states – including Brazil, China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan and South Africa – to ‘galvanise political commitment to IHL.’ With South Africa notably leading as a co-founder, the initiative prioritises IHL politically, develops actionable recommendations across seven workstreams – co-chaired by African states including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone – and adapts IHL to modern warfare’s rapid evolution. Several African Member States have joined, with hopes that more will participate with the Council’s support, culminating in a High-Level Meeting in 2025 to promote humanity in conflict.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express concern over the escalating humanitarian crises across Africa, particularly highlighting the combined impact of armed conflicts, violent extremism, climate-driven extreme weather and epidemics. Council may condemn attacks by conflict parties on humanitarian workers, medical facilities, civilians and civilian infrastructure. Council may also highlight the imperative of the establishment, protection and expansion of the necessary humanitarian space, especially in the countries affected by conflict, which extends to the protection of critical infrastructure. Council is also expected to highlight the critical importance of ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict to address escalating crises. The PSC may call upon parties to conflicts to implement practical measures to ensure civilian protection and unimpeded humanitarian access, including the protection of and access to schools and other learning institutions.
Annual Joint Informal Seminar and Consultative Meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council
Annual Joint Informal Seminar and Consultative Meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council
Date | 15 October 2025
Tomorrow (16 October), the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold their 10th annual informal joint seminar, ahead of the 19th annual consultative meeting taking place on 17 October.
The informal seminar and the consultative meeting are expected to be jointly chaired by the Chairperson of the PSC for October and the President of the UNSC for October, respectively. Ahead of the seminar and the annual consultation, the AUPSC Committee of Experts and the UNSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa held a preparatory meeting on 13-14 October 2025 on the agenda and the draft joint communiqué prepared by the PSC as host of this year’s consultative meeting at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The meeting also addressed working methods issues, most notably, as highlighted in the 2024 edition of Insight on the PSC dedicated to the annual consultation, monitoring and review of implementation of joint commitments undertaken during annual consultations, by designating a mechanism for follow-up, building on the commitment they made from the 2024 annual consultative meeting.
This year’s informal seminar has three agenda items: Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, the status of implementation of Security Council resolution 2719 (2023) on the financing of AUPSOs.
This year marks the 25th anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), a landmark resolution that laid the foundation for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Namibia, then a member of the Security Council, played a key role in facilitating its adoption. The AU has actively promoted the WPS agenda and worked to integrate gender perspectives into its peace and security initiatives. 2025 marks the 15th anniversary of the decision of the PSC to have the WPS agenda as a standing thematic agenda of the Council. On 26 August, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf appointed Ambassador Liberata Mulamula of Tanzania as the new AU Special Envoy on WPS, who succeeded the inaugural Special Envoy, Bineta Diop. The AU also established FemWise-Africa, a network of women mediators aimed at enhancing the meaningful participation of women in mediation, election observation, and other peace processes across the continent. In 2017, the AU, in collaboration with the UN, launched the African Women Leaders Network (AWLN), which serves as a platform for advocacy, mentorship, and capacity-building for women leaders.
On 6 October, the Security Council held an open debate on the WPS agenda. Secretary-General António Guterres, addressing the meeting, highlighted ‘troubling trends in military spending, more armed conflicts, and more shocking brutality against women and girls,’ as outlined in his annual report on the WPS agenda. The AUPSC is scheduled to hold an open session on 28 October. The 25th anniversary of the WPS agenda presents an important opportunity for both Councils to reflect on the progress made and the ongoing challenges in its implementation, with a particular focus on the African context.
The growing threat of terrorism continues to affect multiple conflict zones across Africa. In April, the AUPSC held a meeting focused on deradicalisation as a leverage for the fight against violent Extremism in Africa. The meeting expressed grave concern over the alarming surge in terrorist activities across the continent, which has resulted in devastating consequences, including loss of life, destruction of livelihoods, and population displacement, creating a severe humanitarian crisis. In this regard, the meeting underscored the need to holistically address the deep-rooted structural causes of terrorism and violent extremism, as well as the factors that fuel and facilitate them, based on the nexus between peace, security, and development. It also emphasised the importance of enhancing collaboration between and among all critical stakeholders at all levels: local, national, regional and continental as well as international. The discussion with UNSC members at the joint informal seminar is expected to advance this objective. The informal seminar is also expected to reflect the outcome of the PSC meeting in August and welcome the non-binding principles on preventing, detecting, and destroying the use of the new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes as adopted by the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee in January 2025, referred to as the Algerian Guiding Principles.
The financing of AUPSOs has remained a recurring topic at the joint informal seminar in recent years. It is expected that the two sides would reaffirm the importance of AU-UN cooperation in peace and security and the critical role of AU-led PSOs and UN PKOs in advancing peace and security. This year, AUPSC proposed its inclusion again, with a specific focus on following up on the implementation of resolution 2719. Although the AUPSC specifically proposed a discussion on Somalia and the financing of AUSSOM, the agenda item faced opposition in the Security Council from Somalia itself, while European members advocated for its inclusion. Due to this disagreement, the Security Council proposed to address it within the broader context of enhancing and supporting AUPSOs. Nonetheless, AUPSC members held that while the reference to Somalia could be removed, there is a need for a dedicated section on the deployment of AUSSOM, inclusive of its financing, particularly given the fact that AUSSOM personnel have gone without allowances for the past 15 months. Despite recent pledges at a high-level meeting on AUSSOM financing held on 25 September in New York, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, the total amount committed remains far short of the $196 million required to cover troop allowances.
17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting
On 17 October, the AUPSC and members of the UNSC will hold their 19th joint consultative meeting. Conflict situations in three regions in Africa will be on the agenda: the situation in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin; the situation in the horn of Africa, including Sudan, South Sudan and Abyei (not sure if the AUPSC has accepted its inclusion); and the Situation in the Great Lakes, particularly the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The security situation in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin has markedly deteriorated this year, with a surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists operating in the regions. The threat of terrorism is increasingly spreading from the Sahel states to coastal West Africa, with cross-border attacks affecting several countries. The escalating security situation has further worsened the humanitarian and human rights crisis in the region, with civilians bearing the brunt of increasing violence and instability.
Sahel countries have been undergoing political transitions amidst these security dynamics, which constitute a very challenging context for the effective pursuit of the transitional process. Although there had been tensions between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the three Sahelian States─Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali─ that decided to withdraw their membership from the regional bloc, ECOWAS has been seeking to maintain constructive engagement with them. The ECOWAS Summit in June decided to appoint a Chief Negotiator to lead the discussions with the three countries to ensure an orderly withdrawal.
The AU has also been promoting renewed engagement with the Sahel countries. In July, the Chairperson of the AU appointed President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel. Additionally, the Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as his Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and Head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), based in Bamako. On 30 September, the AUPSC held a ministerial-level meeting to receive a briefing on the latest developments in the Sahel. During the annual consultations, the two Councils are expected to explore how to reinvigorate joint UN-AU efforts in addressing the root causes of the crisis in the region and stem the tide of terrorism. In this regard, they may reiterate their continued support to the implementation of the regional strategies for the Sahel as well as for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of areas affected by Boko Haram activities in the Lake Chad Basin.
On the Situation in the Sudan, the AU has been insisting on a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned inclusive political dialogue, as the only viable pathway forward for resolving the current crisis. The AU High-Level Panel (HLP) on the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan is leading the AU’s efforts aimed at resolving the conflict in Sudan in coordination with other regional and international partners. However, the raging conflict in Sudan does not show any sign of abating, and the involvement of external actors has complicated the situation. The parties to the conflict appear determined to pursue a military solution, with the escalation of fighting in Darfur and South Kordofan. This has exacerbated the humanitarian situation on the ground, including in El-Fasher, which remains under siege. Two-thirds of the Sudanese people need urgent humanitarian assistance, according to the UN.
During the high-level week of the UN General Assembly last month, the AU, together with other bilateral and multilateral partners, convened a ministerial meeting which brought a spotlight on the dire humanitarian situation in the Sudan. The meeting urged the warring parties to resume direct negotiations to achieve a permanent ceasefire and implement a humanitarian pause in El-Fasher. Recent efforts by the US to revive the peace process through the convening of a Quad meeting, comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have drawn attention. The foreign ministers of Quad countries issued a joint statement on 12 September that called for a humanitarian truce, for an initial three months, to enable the swift entry of humanitarian aid to all parts of Sudan, to lead immediately to a permanent ceasefire, then an inclusive and transparent transition process should be launched and concluded within nine months. This had no bearing on the conflict.
The situation in Sudan has had a significant impact on security in Abyei, contributing to growing instability in the region. The A3+ proposed adding the issue of Abyei to the agenda. In November, the Security Council is expected to review the situation in Abyei and renew the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). However, it has been some time since the AUPSC formally addressed the issue. Although a meeting was scheduled for March last year, it did not take place as the Sudanese representative in Addis Ababa sent a letter requesting that the AUPSC not proceed with the meeting.
On South Sudan In August, members of the AUPSC conducted a visit to South Sudan in response to the escalating political and security crisis in the country. During the visit, they engaged with South Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders on the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), as well as preparations for the general elections scheduled for December 2026—critical steps toward completing the country’s transitional period. On 7 October, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) convened an extraordinary meeting in Juba to address the growing difficulties facing the R-ARCSS, amid escalating political and security tensions. It warned that the risk of relapse back to conflict has heightened, and it could materialise unless there is a change of course in the situation in the country. In light of these developments, preserving the R-ARCSS and averting further instability in South Sudan is likely to feature prominently in the annual consultations.
On Great Lakes and the DRC, despite progress in ongoing mediation efforts to address the situation in eastern DRC—including commitments made during the Washington and Doha talks—the security situation on the ground remains largely unchanged. In recent months, a number of meetings have been held to facilitate the implementation of the 27 June agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda. Further follow-up meetings between the two sides are expected later this month. A key issue remains the neutralisation of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures. On 10 October, the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) issued a communiqué calling on all FDLR factions to disarm and surrender in accordance with the 27 June agreement. Meanwhile, negotiations between the Congolese government and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group had stalled, but reports indicate that talks are expected to resume this week. Amid externally driven mediation efforts, African-led processes appear to have been overshadowed. Against this backdrop, efforts have been made to merge regional and continental initiatives and to ensure that external mediation efforts are aligned with a unified, African-led approach. AUPSC members may emphasise this issue during the annual consultations. It is anticipated that the two sides would express concern about the situation in Eastern DRC, focusing in particular on the fighting involving the M23. In this context, they may affirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and reject the establishment of parallel regional administration. They may also call on the parties to honour the commitments they have made under the recent mediation process in Washington, DC and Doha.
Session on the situation in Madagascar
Session on the situation in Madagascar
Date | 15 October 2025
Today (15 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session to consider the constitutional rapture in Madagascar. This 1306th session of the PSC has been called following the risk of a military seizure of power becoming a reality, following weeks of public protests and the President’s escape from the country, declaring fear of a coup after an elite force of the military took the side of protestors.
The session will commence with the opening remarks of Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement framing the policy issues for the PSC decision and the AU Commission’s assessment of the situation. The PSC may also hear from the Representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Madagascar. The concerned Regional Economic Community/Regional Mechanism, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), will make a statement, so as to the Chargé d’affaires of Madagascar, as representative of the country concerned.
This meeting comes just less than 24 hours after the emergency session of the PSC held on Monday, 13 October. The 1305 session of the PSC, held as an emergency session, was called following a major escalation in the political instability of Madagascar. It in particular came after tensions escalated dramatically over the weekend of 11–12 October, when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protestors and marched alongside demonstrators in Antananarivo and entered symbolic public spaces such as May 13 Square. Their support for the protestors, reportedly welcomed by some protesters, has blurred the line between civilian unrest and exploitation of the situation by some in the army. In the communiqué that it adopted after the meeting, the PSC stated, among others, that it ‘totally rejects any attempt at unconstitutional changes of government.’ It further urged ‘all united of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate, and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country.’
News outlets reported that the public protest was initially triggered by widespread frustration over chronic power and water outages, compounded by rising living costs, unemployment, and public disillusionment with governance. What began as localised, youth-led (Gen Z) protests in late September quickly evolved into a nationwide movement calling for greater accountability and political reform. It attracted the support of opposition politicians.
The state’s response has been increasingly heavy-handed, with security forces employing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. The UN reported that over 22 people were killed, a number the government contested. Civil society groups and international media report dozens of fatalities, while hospitals in the capital struggle to treat casualties amid growing shortages. The government has justified its actions as necessary to preserve order, but its credibility has been further eroded by the visible divisions within the security establishment and by mounting accusations of repression.
With the heavy-handed response failing to yield fruit and a key segment of the army taking sides with the protestors, the government also attempted to make symbolic concessions. President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the government and named a new prime minister, demanding an effective response to the demands of the public. As the situation further escalated during the weekend, he also called for dialogue. These efforts did not placate protestors who insisted on his departure from power.
It did not take long after the elite CAPSAT unit of the military expressed support to protestors that Rajoelina fled the country to an unknown destination. With no segment of the political, institutional and social sectors of society coming to his defence, the President’s attempt to assert his authority solely on the basis of constitutional technicalities, such as his declaration of dissolution of the national Assembly, did not last nor did it succeed. What started as a support of an elite segment of the army for the public protest against governance failures evolved into the full-fledged ouster of the President and the seizure of political power by the army.
Ahead of the announcement of the seizure of power by the army, the National Assembly, which Rajoelina tried to dissolve through a letter that did not carry the seal of authority, adopted a motion impeaching Rajoelina with those members of the Assembly present and voting supporting the impeachment, except one who voted against the motion.
The Constitution of Madagascar envisages the processes that need to be followed in the event of the vacancy of the position of the president due to impeachment or abandonment of the position by the president. Following the adoption of the motion of impeachment, the National Assembly submitted the matter of filling the vacancy to the High Constitutional Court. It was reported that despite the provisions of the Constitution which stipulate that the President of the Senate or, in his or her absence, the President of the Assembly assumes the role of President temporarily, the High Constitutional Court ‘invited’ CAPSAT leader Col. Michael Randrianirina to ‘exercise functions of head of state.’ Yet, there is no provision in the Constitution that vests authority in the Court to assign such functions to the army. The court also asked Randrianirina to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant.
Notwithstanding the attempt on the part of the National Assembly and the Court to follow the Constitution, albeit selectively on the part of the Court, Colonel Randrianirina, after announcing the seizure of power, declared the dissolution of all institutions except the lower house of parliament. ‘The following institutions are suspended: the Senate, the High Constitutional Court, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the High Court of Justice, and the High Council for the Defence of Human Rights and the Rule of Law,’ a statement from the country’s military leaders read. Contrary to the Constitution and what the High Constitutional Court stipulated, a committee led by the military would rule the country for a period of up to two years alongside a transitional government before organising new elections.’
In the light of these series of developments, the PSC has to make a determination of whether an unconstitutional change of government took place in Madagascar during tomorrow’s session. While provision has been made by the PSC for sending a joint mission to Madagascar in the communiqué of its 130th session, and SADC took a decision to deploy a fact-finding mission, there are adequate facts that are incontestable for enabling the PSC to make the determination. First, it is not contested that the President of the country no longer holds the office: He had fled the country, the National Assembly impeached him, and the High Constitutional Council declared the position of the President vacant. Second, the High Constitutional Court’s invitation of Colonel Randrianirina to step in for exercising the role of President does not have any constitutional basis. It is nothing more than an exercise in giving a military seizure of power a semblance of ‘legality,’ similar to what happened in Chad in 2021. Third, it cannot also be contested that the army that took power froze the country’s Constitution by suspending key institutions of the Constitution. Fourth, in the statement it issued, the army that seized power declared that a committee that is led by itself will lead the country for two years. Taken together, these incontestable facts that don’t need any verification establish the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government, involving seizure of power by the army. As such, the PSC has no option but to treat the situation in Madagascar as an unconstitutional change of government.
Internal dynamics of the PSC is such that some member states may argue against the application of Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol, which requires the PSC to suspend a country that experienced an unconstitutional change of government, even when they may agree that what happened was a coup or an unconstitutional change of government. Such an approach would constitute a serious deviation from the clear terms of not only the PSC Protocol but also the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and most importantly the AU’s grand law, the Constitutive Act. Additionally, there is no advantage to be gained by the AU if it considers the situation as a coup but fails to attach the consequences relating thereto as clearly stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the AU. However, the PSC may face a backlash if it falls short of applying the AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government fully. It loses whatever leverage that the application of the rules fully would give the AU for ensuring that the grievances of the people are addressed through reforms and in pushing for the restoration of constitutional order. Further to this, the PSC may face charges of selective application and double standards. It would also face an increasing crisis of legitimacy and credibility in continuing to keep the suspension of the five AU member states currently under suspension.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its condemnation of the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, with the seizure of power by the army. It may decide to apply Article 7(1)(g) of the Protocol and suspend Madagascar from the AU pending the transfer of political power by the army to a civilian administration in accordance with the procedures set in the constitution and the restoration of the suspended constitutional processes. The PSC may reiterate its position of the 1305th session, urging the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country. It may also urge that the PSC may take note of the plan of SADC to dispatch a fact-finding mission and request the AU Commission to send a delegation that accompanies the SADC mission. The PSC may additionally express its readiness to receive the report on the fact-finding mission and review, as necessary, its policy position on the situation on the basis of SADC’s fact-finding report. It may also reiterate its request that the Chairperson of the AU Commission urgently appoint a special envoy on Madagascar. Echoing the Statement of the Chairperson of the SADC Organ, the PSC may also impress upon the de facto authorities their obligations under various AU instruments to respect and safeguard the rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens. It may also call for close coordination between the AU and SADC. It may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decision of the PSC and the initiatives of the AU and SADC towards supporting measures for addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth and the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.
Emergency Session on the political unrest in Madagascar
Emergency Session on the political unrest in Madagascar
Date | 13 October 2025
Today (13 October 2025), at 3:00 PM, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session to consider the political unrest in Madagascar. This 1305th session of the PSC has been called following the escalating tensions and signs of a military coup in the wake of the widespread protests that gripped the island nation for the past few weeks.
The session will be chaired by Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and will feature opening remarks from the Chairperson of the PSC. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make an introductory remark. As Madagascar is also the current chairperson of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), apart from the representative of Madagascar, who will make a statement as a concerned country, the PSC is also expected to receive a statement from SADC. During the closed segment of the session, the Representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Madagascar is expected to make a presentation to the PSC.
The meeting follows alarming developments in the country, where soldiers have reportedly joined mass anti-government protests, and an elite military unit has declared that it is assuming control of parts of the armed forces. The situation, described by the Malagasy presidency as an ‘attempted illegal seizure of power,’ marks one of the most serious political ruptures in Madagascar since the 2009 military-backed change of government.
News outlets reported that the current unrest was initially triggered by widespread frustration over chronic power and water outages, compounded by rising living costs, unemployment, and public disillusionment with governance. What began as localised, youth-led protests in late September quickly evolved into a nationwide movement calling for greater accountability and political reform. It attracted the support of opposition politicians. Despite the fact that President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the government and appointed a general as the Prime Minister (read as an attempt to maintain the military’s allegiance) and called for dialogue, the effort did not placate protestors who insisted on his departure from power. Tensions escalated dramatically over the weekend of 11–12 October, when members of the elite CAPSAT unit, the same corps implicated in previous coups, marched alongside demonstrators in Antananarivo and entered symbolic public spaces such as May 13 Square. Their support for the protestors, reportedly welcomed by some protesters, has blurred the line between civilian unrest and exploitation of the situation by some in the army, hence heightening fears of a potential coup.
The state’s response has been increasingly heavy-handed, with security forces employing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. The UN reported that over 22 people were killed, a number the government contested. Civil society groups and international media report dozens of fatalities, while hospitals in the capital struggle to treat casualties amid growing shortages. The government has justified its actions as necessary to preserve order, but its credibility has been further eroded by the visible divisions within the security establishment and by mounting accusations of repression. As part of the stabilisation measures, it may be of interest for the PSC members to call for an end to the use of excessive force by security forces and for people to exercise their rights to peaceful protest without resort to violence.
Regional and international actors, including SADC and the AU Commission, have voiced grave concern over the situation, urging restraint and respect for human rights. In a statement released on 27 September, SADC expressed deep concern over violent protests in Madagascar and offered full support and solidarity to the government and people of Madagascar, commending the government’s commitment to restoring peace and stability. The statement also called on all stakeholders to exercise calm, restraint, and engage constructively and peacefully to resolve differences in the interest of national unity and reconciliation. On 12 October, the AU Commission Chairperson issued a statement emphasising adherence to the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, calling on all parties to demonstrate responsibility and patriotism to preserve the country’s unity, stability, and peace within constitutional and institutional frameworks.
The crisis reveals deep-seated structural fragilities in Madagascar’s political order. It underscores the volatile nexus between socioeconomic hardship, governance deficits, and eroding civil–military boundaries. If left unchecked, the situation could slide into protracted instability, with severe implications for the broader Indian Ocean region. Already, curfews, internet restrictions, and disrupted flights point to a rapidly deteriorating security environment that could undermine Madagascar’s fragile economic recovery and displace populations toward neighbouring islands and mainland southern Africa.
For the PSC, the immediate challenge lies in containing the crisis before it hardens into a full-fledged coup or civil conflict. As such, the Council is expected to deliberate on deploying preventive diplomacy measures, including the dispatch of a high-level AU mission to engage with the government, opposition leaders, and civil society representatives. Such a mission could serve to create conditions for facilitating dialogue and facilitating reform measures for addressing the grievances of the public, particularly the youth.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the deteriorating political and security situation in Madagascar. The PSC is also expected to condemn the use of excessive force and guarantee independent investigations into the deaths of civilians. It may also call for restraint by all actors, including the need for protestors to observe rules on the right to peaceful protest. The PSC may reaffirm the AU’s zero-tolerance policy for unconstitutional changes of government. The Council may also reaffirm its support for SADC’s mediation efforts and request the AU Commission Chairperson to coordinate closely with SADC to promote a peaceful and credible electoral process. In this regard, the PSC may endorse AU-SADC-led joint mediation to bring the government, protest representatives (including youth leaders), political parties, and civil society into an urgent dialogue to address immediate grievances and to agree on a roadmap for political and socio-economic reforms and deepening democratic processes. Additionally, the PSC may call for inclusive dialogue among political actors to address grievances related to the electoral process. It may encourage the government to guarantee civic and political freedoms, including freedom of expression and assembly, in the run-up to the elections. The PSC may also call on the security forces to maintain their impartiality and restrain from actions that undermine conditions for dialogue and addressing the grievances of the public.
16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC
16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC
Date | 8 October 2025
Tomorrow (09 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 16th annual joint consultative meeting. This follows the 8th annual joint retreat taking place today in Brussels, Belgium, where the consultative meeting is also being held.
Opening remarks at the 16th consultative meeting are expected from Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Delphine Pronk.
This year’s consultative meeting comes against the background of three consecutive years of the AUPSC and the EUPSC being unable to adopt a joint communique due to disagreement over the language to be included with specific reference to the war in Ukraine. It is anticipated that this trend will finally come to an end during this year’s consultative meeting.
The members of the PSC reviewed and provided inputs on the draft joint communiqué only yesterday 6 October after the draft was sent by the EU side to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October. The agenda for this year’s consultative meeting reflects continuity with past discussions, focusing on developments in the Horn of Africa—particularly Somalia/AUSSOM and Sudan—, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes Region. In addition, the two sides are expected to address broader global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’. Additionally, the final agenda included ‘Working lunch on Women, Peace and Security’ during which the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security is scheduled to make a presentation.
Horn of Africa
Under the Horn of Africa agenda item, two situations are envisaged to receive particular attention: the situation in Somalia, including the deployment of AUSSOM, and the ongoing crisis in Sudan.
With Ethiopia and Eswatini leading the intervention of the PSC on Somalia and AUSSOM, the dominant concern remains the mission’s funding. AUSSOM is faced with an existential crisis, arising from mounting debts and the lack of a predictable and sustainable financing arrangement to sustain operations until its planned exit at the end of 2029.
The AU had pinned its hope on UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations as a viable framework for predictable financing. However, efforts to operationalise the resolution stalled in May after the UN Security Council failed to reach an agreement, primarily due to U.S. opposition to applying the resolution as a test case for AUSSOM.
The AU has long explored alternative mechanisms, particularly the convening of a pledging conference. Following repeated delays—including earlier plans for Doha to host—progress was made on 25 September 2025 when the AU, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the UN, and the United Kingdom co-convened a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. The AU has already committed an unprecedented amount of USD 20 million from its Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility for the mission’s 2025 operations, in addition to the provision of personnel and logistical enablers to strengthen operational effectiveness. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each appeared to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, contributions are also anticipated from Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Given the nearly $200 million annual budget of AUSSOM, the pledges—though symbolically important—remain insufficient to bridge the gap. The co-chairs’ summary of the New York event underscored that ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial’. Yet, in the immediate term, there may be a possibility for significantly reducing the financing gap if the EU comes to the rescue of the mission through additional renewed support, considering the EU investment into this mission as the single largest contributor to AU missions in Somalia, providing close to €2.7 billion since 2007.
While the EU has not yet announced a specific funding package for AUSSOM, following the signal from the EU during the pledging conference in New York, expectations remain high that the EU may make an announcement in the near future. Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to provide more clarity on the EU’s thinking in this respect.
Meanwhile, Somalia’s political landscape remains tense, with disagreements sparked by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s introduction of a ‘one person, one vote’ electoral model for the 2026 elections, replacing the long-standing clan-based indirect system. The move has generated friction with opposition figures and some of the federal member states, notably Jubaland and Puntland. These tensions risk diverting focus from the fight against al-Shabaab and, if left unresolved, could potentially escalate into violence.
It is also expected that, despite the fact that the attempt to apply Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM did not succeed, reference will be made in the outcome document to the continued relevance of Resolution 2719 and the imperative for its implementation.
With Tanzania and Algeria leading PSC’s intervention on Sudan, discussions are expected to focus on the security, political, humanitarian situations and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Fierce fighting has continued around El-Fasher and the Kordofan region between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
On the political front, a particular point of concern for both counterparts will be the establishment of parallel governing structures and their implications for Sudan’s territorial integrity. In May 2025, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister and announced a technocratic government based in Port Sudan. In response, the RSF-led Tasis coalition declared its own parallel government in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, in July 2025, naming Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as Prime Minister, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo as head of a Presidential Council, and SPLM-N leader Abdel Aziz al-Hilu as his deputy.
The PSC, during its 1264th, 1292nd, and 1293rd sessions, firmly rejected the RSF’s creation of a parallel government and urged AU member states and the wider international community not to recognise it. Similarly, the 24 September 2025 Co-Chairs’ statement issued by the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK following a ministerial meeting on Sudan ‘strongly’ rejected the establishment of parallel governing structures. In tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC and the EU PSC may reiterate the more neutral language of the co-chairs’ statement, rejecting the establishment of parallel governments in Sudan, while emphasising the need for a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned transition process.
Signs of a more concerted diplomatic process gained momentum in September, though it remains fragile and without any breakthrough. On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (the Quad) issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire, followed by the launch and conclusion of an inclusive and transparent transition process within nine months. The conflict parties did not heed the call.
On 24 September, the Quad’s foreign ministers met again on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. That same day, the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with relevant actors to discuss Sudan and coordinate efforts toward de-escalation and civilian protection. The Co-Chairs’ statement, while welcoming Quad’s joint statement, expressed support for the AU and IGAD’s efforts to coordinate international and bilateral initiatives to pressure all Sudanese parties towards a ceasefire, humanitarian action and political dialogue. While these peace initiatives are encouraging, the lack of coordination among various initiatives remains a major challenge to launching a credible single peace process for Sudan—a challenge that tomorrow’s meeting is likely to reflect upon further.
The two counterparts are also expected to discuss ways of increasing pressure on the warring parties to allow unhindered humanitarian access, urge foreign actors to refrain from fueling the conflict, and step up humanitarian assistance in response to what has become the world’s most devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis—with over two-thirds of the population (30 million people) in need of assistance and more than 24 million facing acute food insecurity.
Great Lakes Region
With The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea leading PSC’s intervention, on the Great Lakes Region, as before, the focus remains on the situation in eastern DRC and the renewed diplomatic efforts to address it—particularly the involvement of the US and Qatar alongside the AU and relevant regional blocs (SADC and EAC). Diplomatic activity has intensified since M23’s significant territorial advances in eastern DRC beginning in January, including control of mineral-rich Goma in North Kivu Province.
A major breakthrough was the US-brokered peace agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June 2025. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened three meetings so far, the latest held earlier this month. In parallel, Qatar has been facilitating direct peace talks between the DRC and M23 since late March. This separate but coordinated track with the US produced a preliminary peace agreement in July, but missed the mid-August deadline for a final deal. Talks are expected to resume during the week of 6 October.
Meanwhile, in March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process.
Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s meeting will grapple with at least three issues. First, despite progress in implementing the US-brokered peace agreement, hostilities and hostile rhetoric persist, with the parties trading blame for obstructing peace efforts. Second, accountability in the region is critical in light of continued allegations of human rights violations against civilians, as evidenced in the 5 September report of the Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu. Third, there is also the issue of how the three peace initiatives could be consolidated into one credible process.
Sahel and Lake Chad Basin
On the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria will lead the intervention of the PSC during tomorrow’s meeting. The security and political situation in the Sahel has continued to deteriorate since the last consultative meetings of the two organs in November 2024. JNIM and ISGS have intensified their attacks in the Central Sahel and expanded their operations into coastal West Africa. This worsening insecurity is compounded by protracted political transitions, with the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger consolidating power and extending military rule until 2030.
The approach of the AU and the regional body ECOWAS was primarily focused on the unconstitutional change of government, with no due regard to the priority issue of saving the countries from the existential threat facing them due to terrorism. In a departure from this flawed policy approach, at their second annual joint consultative meeting, they held in May, the PSC and ECOWAS agreed to develop a security cooperation framework with the three countries to more effectively respond to the crisis.
Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to discuss recent AU efforts, including the AU Commission Chairperson’s meeting with representatives of the three countries in May, the visit of Angola’s Foreign Minister as special envoy on behalf of AU Chairperson João Lourenço, and the July appointments of President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel and former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of MISAHEL. The meeting is further expected to deliberate on ways to step up engagement with the three countries to address the security crisis as a critical avenue for facilitating a return to constitutional order.
On Lake Chad Basin, tomorrow’s discussion is expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the status of implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR). The EU has pledged €30 million over 18 months from January 2025 to strengthen MNJTF operations, while the AU Commission has also been providing support through the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund and equipment from the Continental Logistics Base. A key regional development of interest to the consultative meeting is Niger’s March announcement of its withdrawal from the MNJTF, raising fears that this could weaken the Force and create a security vacuum that can be exploited by terrorist groups active in the region.
This year, beyond African peace and security issues, the agenda also reserves space for Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments. As an agenda proposed by the EU side, it remains unclear what the focus of the discussion on this agenda would be. However, there is increasing recognition that the major global geopolitical changes, characterised by, among others, the emergence of a multipolar world, are not without serious implications for both the AU and the EU and for their relationship. In this context, the flagrant breaches of international law norms, including international humanitarian law and related challenges to multilateralism and global governance reform, may also feature in the discussions.
As noted earlier, for the past three years, the PSC and the EU PSC have been unable to adopt a joint communiqué, primarily due to disagreements over the language to be used on the war in Ukraine. As highlighted in our earlier insights on the PSC, the recent AU–EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025 and the ongoing negotiations toward the outcome document of the forthcoming AU–EU Summit, expected in November 2025, have created optimism that both sides may reach common ground to adopt a joint communiqué this time. Indications are that the draft communiqué of the consultative meeting reproduced the formulation used in the joint ministerial communiqué which expressed support for ‘a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sahel and in other major wars and conflicts around the globe, including Syria.’ With this, the two sides are expected to adopt a joint communiqué, ending the past three years of deadlock in adopting such a communiqué.
