Update on the situation in Somalia and activities of ATMIS
Update on the situation in Somalia and activities of ATMIS
Date | 13 September 2023
Tomorrow (14 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive updates on the situation in Somalia and activities of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), at its 1173rd meeting.
The session commences with the opening remark of the Chairperson of the PSC for September, Churchill Ewumbue Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). It is expected that the PSC will receive briefing from Souef Mohamed El-Amine, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS. Others that may also deliver statement include the representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).
Tomorrow’s session will address a number of issues. The first of these relates to the preparations for the drawdown of ATMIS in accordance with the phased timeline set for the transfer of responsibility from ATMIS to Somalia Security Forces (SSF) and eventual withdrawal of ATMIS by December 2024. The second drawdown in accordance with the phased timeline is scheduled to take place by the end of this month. This is expected to involve the withdrawal of 3000 ATMIS troops.
During tomorrow’s session, the PSC is expected to hear from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of ATMIS about the state of preparedness of ATMIS for the drawdown. On 31 July, the top military commanders of ATMIS held a four-day meeting in Mogadishu both to evaluate the first drawdown and to plan the second drawdown. The meeting thus deliberated on the FOBs that will be handed over to the government of Somalia under Phase two. During the 27 August joint visit to Baidoa in the South West State, ATMIS Deputy Force Commander in Charge of Logistics and Support, Maj. Gen. Muteti, who also leads the ATMIS technical evaluation committee, confirmed that ‘preparations are at an advance stage to drawdown 3000 ATMIS troops’. Earlier this week, El-Amine, the Head of ATMIS, along with the Under-Secretary-General of UN Department of Operational Support undertook a mission to Dhusamareb to review preparations for the second phase of the withdrawal of troops. El-Amine also held a meeting with President Hassan Shiekh Mohamed of Somalia for updating him on the second phase of ATIMS drawdown and the technical assessment of the first drawdown.
The second drawdown is also premised on not only the identification of the 3000 troops to be withdrawn but also the generation of forces by Somalia for taking over security responsibilities from the departing ATMIS troops. It would be of interest to the PSC to be updated on the preparations of SSF for taking over responsibilities. As outlined in the CONOPs, the FGS is expected to generate forces in each phase of the mission along with the phased drawdown of ATMIS. ATMIS drawdown and force generation by the FGS will take place concurrently. Accordingly, the FGS would generate 3,850 security forces at the end of the first phase, whereas 8,525 forces would be generated in the second phase. In other words, while ATMIS withdraws a total of 5,000 troops at the end of phase two, the FGS is envisaged to generate more than 12,000 forces. Yet, taking over security responsibility from ATMIS requires more than generating the requisite number of soldiers. It requires making those soldiers fit for purposes of both fighting Al-Shabaab and significantly holding and stabilizing territories freed from the terrorist group. It is thus imperative that they are equipped with the necessary logistics, technical capacities and financial provisions as well as workable command and control and political and military strategy that has firm support of both the federal government and federal member states.
There seem to be doubts about this given some of the recent setbacks in the offensive operations, which has created concerns about the risk of leaving a security vacuum that could be exploited by Al-Shabaab. The joint assessment report will be critical in understanding these challenges and informing future decisions on the ATMIS drawdown. During the negotiation on resolution 2687, some UN Security Council members were opposed to referencing December 2024 as the timeline for the mission’s final drawdown and exit because of these concerns but other members insisted on the need to state the December 2024 deadline. This is likely to be a controversial issue in the upcoming negotiations on the ATMIS mandate in December with a further drawdown of ATMIS personnel anticipated next year.
The other issue that is expected to feature during tomorrow’s session is the ongoing offensive that the federal government in concert with local militias have initiated. The first phase of Somali-led offensives against al-Shabaab was launched between August of last year and January with Central Somalia (starting in Hirshabelle and then expanding to Galmudug state) as the main theatre of operation. It was hailed as successful, which according to some reports, enabled Somalia to reclaim one-third of its territory formerly lost to the terrorist group. In his briefing to the UN Security Council on 22 June, the Head of ATMIS, Ambassador Souef also reported that the military offensive under the leadership of SSF dislodged Al-Shabaab from over 70 locations across Somalia.
The second phase was announced at the end of March with the aim to expand the military operation toward the southern regions – Southwest and Jubaland states, but it was off to a slow start. Challenges including coordination with local leaders and communities are being encountered, leading to loss of momentum. During the past weeks, Somali security forces reportedly retreated from several areas liberated in recent months as Al-Shabaab launched deadly counter-attacks to retake lost territories. Speaking from Dhusamareb, the capital of Galmudug state, to galvanize support for the ongoing offensive operation, President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud vowed to continue the fight against Al-Shabaab until a final victory is achieved.
Apart from the offensive launched against Al-Shabaab, Somalia has also sought to bolster its capacity in the face of the drawdown of ATMIS via joint military operation involving the frontline states bordering Somalia. Within this framework, it was preparing to launch an offensive codenamed “Operation Black Lion” and it is banking on the support of frontline states namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya who pledged at a regional summit hosted by Mogadishu on 1 February to support the Somali government’s efforts. The PSC may also seek update on whether and how this planned joint operation is progressing. In this respect, one issue that deserves attention is the attacks Al-Shabaab orchestrated targeting the forward operating basis (FOBs) that ATMIS troops handed over to SSF as part of the drawdown, highlighting the need to pay attention to addressing the vulnerability of the forces taking over from ATMIS.
On the issue of Somalia’s campaign for the lifting of the arms embargo, President Mohamud attended a UN Security Council meeting on 22 June to make a strong appeal underscoring the significance of the issue to the fight against Al-Shabaab. The three African members and China supported Somalia’s request, while other Council members stressed the need for the country to strengthen its weapons and ammunition management. Council members expect to receive during September an assessment report from the Secretary-General on progress in Somalia’s weapons and ammunition management ahead of their negotiations on the extension of the 751 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime in November.
Another important issue that deserves the attention of PSC members at tomorrow’s meeting is the security situation in Las Anod, a disputed area between Puntland and Somaliland. The region saw rising tensions since February because of fighting between Somaliland and Khatumo forces who want to be governed from Mogadishu rather than from Hargeisa. Somaliland accuses Puntland of supporting and abetting the Khatumo forces. Several days ago, renewed fighting commenced, resulting in significant casualties among Somaliland forces. Somaliland’s President Musa Bihi is now vowing to retaliate and there seems to be a major mobilization in this regard. ATMIS, IGAD, the UN, and other bilateral and international partners issued a joint statement on 27 August strongly condemning the escalating violence in Las Anod and urged all sides to agree to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. They also called for an end to the mobilization of fighters and to the provision of supplies and armaments, underscoring the need to resolve all grievances and tensions peacefully and through dialogue.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the Government of Somalia for the ongoing operation against Al-Shabaab and for the support from ATMIS. The PSC may encourage Somalia to continue enhancing the effectiveness of its troops and the strategy for holding territories reclaimed from Al-Shabaab. The PSC may also welcome the preparations undertaken by ATMIS and Somalia for the second phase of the drawdown and may call on them to ensure that the lessons learned from the first drawdown are adequately applied in order to avoid some of the gaps observed, including in relation to the transfer of FOBs from ATMIS troops to SSF. In the light of the capacity to orchestrate attacks that Al-Shabaab continues to display and the need for averting the emergence of security vacuum, the PSC may request that the drawdown is undertaken with due regard to the need for sustaining momentum and avoiding security relapse. PSC may reiterate its support for the lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia and the need for the provision of support for expanding Somalia’s capacity in ammunition stockpile control and management. With respect to the fighting in Las Anod, the PSC may welcome the 27 August joint statement and echo the call on all parties to agree to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire and seek to resolve their disputes through negotiation.
Why African Union’s membership in the G20 matters for both the G20 and Africa
Why African Union’s membership in the G20 matters for both the G20 and Africa
Date | 11 September 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso with contribution from Lea Mehari
On Saturday 9 2023, which coincides with the African Union (AU) Day marking the anniversary of the decision for its establishment, the G20 in its meeting in New Delhi, India announced its decision of welcoming the AU as its new member. This can be transformative in profound ways for both the AU and the G20.
As with many key global governance multilateral platforms, Africa (despite its 55 AU member states, 1.3 billion people and resources on which developed and emerging economies depend for their economic growth) remained without seat at the G20, except the membership of South Africa.
The continent has thus largely remained receiver rather than shaper of decisions made at this global and major, but unrepresentative, forum of decision-making. With the entry of the AU, representing its 55 member states, into the G20 as a member, Africa is posed to change its status as an object of decision-making at the G20. On its part the global body enormously expanded its legitimacy and representativeness.
The G20 is a forum consisting of 19 of the most advanced and key economies plus, economically the largest regional organization, the European Union. The forum represents 75% of the world’s GDP, shaping global economic and political cooperation. Initially an informal platform to discuss international economic cooperation, it has evolved into a significant platform for global governance focusing on mobilizing policy responses to economic stability and global challenges.
By the nature of its composition, it is a body that gives the major powers and economies of the world heavy sway in global decision-making. At the same time, as a body deciding on major global economic and social issues, its role is not without consequences on the UN, as the most representative global forum for addressing global challenges. For Africa, which has the largest regional membership in the UN, the reduction of the role of the UN on account of the G20 becoming the major forum of decision-making on some of the most consequential global issues is not anything short of detrimental for its agency and representation in global economic and financial decision-making.
Without a voice at the table, Africa has thus far remained a passive receiver rather than an active contributor to discussions shaping its economic destiny. This has led to decisions that are not responsive to the needs of the countries of the region. Key initiatives, such as the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatment have fallen short in part due to the lack of African representation, rendering these decisions inefficient, slow, and ambiguous. Africa’s exclusion from the table also tilts the scales towards creditor nations, disproportionately affecting low-income countries within the continent.
These experiences are emblematic of how Africa’s exclusion is limiting the G20’s ability to formulate fully responsive policies even on matters of direct concern for Africa, thus limiting its capacity to devise inclusive and equitable solutions that are truly beneficial to the global community as a whole. AU’s active participation promises to ensure that G20’s policy decisions are fair for all stakeholders in the global economy: debtors and creditors.
For Africa as well, its representation through the AU would provide a platform for it to also put on the agenda of the G20 matters of concern that require international cooperation. For instance, consider the staggering illicit financial flows from Africa estimated at $88.6 billion, equivalent to 3.7 percent of Africa’s GDP, as per the United Nations estimates in 2020, encompassing revenues from unlawful activities, tax evasion, corruption, and more. This diversion of resources poses a significant impediment to economic development, hindering the progress towards both the UN’s 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. Measures that could be adopted on this scourge at the level of the G20 could contribute enormously in countering this scourge, thereby contributing to availing huge resources that contribute to Africa’s development and the global goals of the Sustainable Development Goals.
Similarly, AU’s membership can also help to achieve clear strategic recognition at global level on the enormous potential of Africa to contribute to the global challenge of climate change. This the AU may achieve through, among others, facilitating understanding and clear appreciation of Africa’s enormous potential to play leading role in powering the global green transition and for developing cooperation framework for realizing this potential on a win-win basis.
The membership of the AU also provides the opportunity to redress the void created by the reduced role of the UN on economic policy making as a result of the emergence of the G20 as the main locus of international economic and development decision-making. AU’s membership would enable Africa to make up for the loss from the diminished role of the UN. It also gives Africa the opportunity to bring its standing as the largest block in the UN to bear on the work of the G20 and through that to also elevate its influence in the international financial system.
For AU’s membership in the G20 to harvest the expected dividends, there is a need for the AU to put in place effective structures and processes. Effective participation and influence in the G20 depend on such structures and process. In terms of representation, the decision of the AU is for the rotating Chairperson of the Union to seat on the AU seat in the G20 assisted by the AU Commission Chairperson. This essentially reflects the current practice of AU’s participation in G20 based on invitation. Yet, for this arrangement to work for the benefit of all the members of the AU, it is essential that the policy positions that the Chairperson of the AU presents at G20 are positions negotiated and adopted as common policy positions of the Union.
Beyond the representation at the G20 summit level, securing the interest of the continent through AU’s membership in the club necessitates that the AU is effectively represented in the meetings of the ministers, central bank governors and the G20 Finance Track and Sherpa Track technical working groups. Both for the participation in these key technical working groups and for helping with the development of the common positions, the AU Commission plays a key role. The AU Department of Economic Development, Trade, Tourism Industry and Minerals, properly staffed and capacitated, is best placed to play the role of the technical focal point in the AU Commission. For purposes of developing and negotiating common African policy positions both on matters on the agenda of the G20 and those that Africa wishes to advance as part of its membership in the G20 such as its vision of the reform of the multilateral financial institutions, there is a need for having a dedicated sub-committee of the AU Permanent Representatives Committee.
Considering the large number of meetings involved in G20 (over 200 such meetings were held for the G20 held in New Delhi), it is imperative that AU policy makers appreciate how AU’s membership in G20 transforms its role in global governance. The AU needs to move fast in developing a strategy for making the most out of its membership. Considering the enormity of the demand for active role, the AU also needs to articulate the capacity requirements, both at the level of the AU Commission, member states and in its representation in G20 countries, for it to fully shoulder the new and heavy responsibility in global governance that its membership in the G20 brings with it. Beyond AU actors, the role of the UN Economic Community for Africa, the African Development Bank and policy research organizations also needs to be effectively harnessed.
In the current multipolar world, the G20 needs Africa just as much as, if not more than, Africa needs the G20. With Africa’s full engagement, the G20 can reinvent itself and prevent the risk of the emerging decline of its relevance, particularly in the face of the increasing significance of BRICS. AU’s membership would be of enormous strategic consequence for global governance not just in terms of representation of Africa but also its potential to contribute to repurposing the G20 to be the vehicle for building a fairer, more prosperous, and sustainable world by leveraging multilateral bodies including the UN.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Amani Africa Dispatch Ep3 - AU Membership in the G20: Boosting the Legitimacy of the Global Body
https://youtu.be/rJ3zfoHw_Po?si=-CXayDONYN2CULXs
