Engagement between the PSC and the AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL) on international law and cyberspace

Engagement between the PSC and the AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL) on international law and cyberspace

Date | 9 November 2022

Tomorrow (9 November), the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1120th session to engage with the AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL) and discuss the issue of international law and cyberspace.

Permanent Representative of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November, Emilia Ndinealo Mkusa, is expected to make opening remarks, followed by a statement from AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Guy Fleury Ntwari, the AU Legal Counsel, will make a presentation touching on the role of international law in the advancement of peace and security and the importance of the role of the AU in shaping international law rules governing peace and security in cyberspace. The PSC also expects presentations on the thematic focus of the session from Hajer Gueldich, Chairperson of AUCIL, and Mohamed Helal, Special Rapporteur on Cyberspace and International Law and a member of the AUCIL.

Tomorrow’s session, during which the PSC will interact for the first time with the AUCIL in relation to its mandate, is expected to provide an opportunity for the PSC and the AUCIL to harness their respective mandate for the articulation of an African position on the formulation of international law rules governing cyberspace with a particular focus on the making of international law rules and peace and security in the cyberspace. The AUCIL is an 11 members independent advisory organ established in 2009 in line with article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act. As envisaged under article 4 of AUCIL Statute, the Commission is envisaged to undertake activities related to codification and progressive development of international law in Africa, with particular attention to the laws of the AU; propose draft framework agreements and model regulations; assist in the revision of existing treaties and identify areas in which new treaties are required; conduct studies on legal matters of interest to the AU and its Member States; encourage the teaching, study, publication and dissemination of literature on international law, specifically the laws of the AU.

The nature of the mandate of the AUCIL is such that it can also advise the AU and contribute to the crafting of African positions on the development of international law rules for the governing of global matters that affect peace and security in Africa. Tomorrow’s session falls within this category of the mandate and work of the AUCIL.

The technological advance particularly in information and communication technologies (ICT) is a double-edged sword, offering both benefits and risks. Despite the enormous benefits that ICTs continue to produce in the social, economic, political spheres, State and non-state actors are increasingly using the cyberspace to carry out cyber-attacks on critical national infrastructure and democratic institutions, steal and launder money, illegally transfer funds, propagate hate speech, and incite violence. A worrying trend has been also emerging in the continent with the increasing use of the cyber space by terrorist groups who often exploit the platform for radicalization, lure recruits into their ranks, mobilize fundings and logistics, as well as train individuals, incite and stage violent attacks. Furthermore, it has been used to influence domestic political outcomes that would destabilize governments of another state.

The PSC has addressed itself to the issue of cyber security and the need for addressing the deficit in the rules regulating cyberspace in earlier sessions. In this context, PSC’s 627th session of September 2016 noted that ‘cybersecurity concerns are broader than national security and that they can become a planetary emergency with the potential of amplifying the traditional security threats that include terrorism and violent extremism’. In the absence of regulation, the cyberspace therefore poses a serious risk to the national, regional, and international peace and stability. The 627th session recognized ‘a safe and secure cyber space’ as a ‘necessary condition for reaping the benefits of the digital transformation of Africa and for ensuring the positive impact of ICTs on human and economic development throughout the continent’. Furthermore, Council, in the same session, stressed the importance of ‘regional and global frameworks for promoting security and stability in the cyberspace’.

The AU has taken steps in developing framework to govern the cyber space at a continental level with the adoption of the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), but such kind of tailor-made frameworks for regulating cyberspace at a global level are still missing. Yet, efforts are underway to clarify and develop a normative architecture for cyberspace. Such effort of developing normative architecture is happening within the UN with the establishment of two working groups with the mandate to study how international law applies to states’ operations in cyberspace. The two groups are: UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). While the GGE is comprised of approximately 25 states, the OEWG is envisaged to be more inclusive, accepting participation of any interested state. Round of talks under these separate and independent processes indeed reveal consensus on variety of norms of general behavior in cyberspace including the applicability of international law in cyberspace, but the issue of how international law applies in this space remains contested. Some countries are of the view that there is no need for new rules regulating cyber activities. Others favor agreed non-binding norms that complement existing international law, while others have questioned whether existing international law as it stands is capable of regulating states’ cyber interactions hence call for the development of new rules.

There is also contention over the application of some of the core principles and rules of international law such as sovereignty, intervention, state responsibility, legal response options to malicious cyber activity, as well as the rules governing the use of force (jus ad bellum) and international humanitarian law (jus in bello) within the context of cyberspace. On sovereignty, one of the controversial issues remains the question of whether cyber operations affecting networks in another state’s territory would amount to a violation of state’s sovereignty. Regarding intervention, while there could be common understanding that the principle of non-intervention applies to state conduct in cyberspace within the context of the fulfillment of two conditions that the action constitutes coercive interference and falls into the domaine réservé of a state. Yet, there is no clarity on the threshold of the coercion element as well as which specific acts falls within the domaine réservé of a State. For instance, it is not clear whether cyber operations to manipulate electoral results of another state could constitute as a breach to the international obligation of non-intervention. Again, on the prohibition of use of force, there is unclarity on which specific cyber operations could constitute the use of force (armed attack) against another state and therefore trigger the right to self-defence. On due diligence, while states are under obligation not to allow knowingly their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states under international law, there is a need for clarifying how far this obligation applies in the cyberspace. With respect to state responsibility, the main confusion concerns the technical aspect of the application of the attribution standard to cyberspace given the anonymity, interconnectedness, transboundary nature, and the use of proxies in cyberattacks. On legitimate response to cyber attacks, while there seems to be agreement among some states about the availability of at least three options (retorsion, countermeasures, and the plea of necessity), there is unclarity on whether collective countermeasures are permitted, whether there is a duty of prior notification of the response options, and whether states are allowed to take non-cyber-based countermeasures for cyberattacks. The other uncertainty is on the extent of the application of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyberspace.

Despite the growing importance of the cyberspace to the life of individuals, communities and societies on the continent and the grave threat that cyber attacks pose to the peace and stability of Africa, the discourse on the making of the international law rules for governing peace and security in the cyberspace is dominated by the global north. In this respect, countries such as Germany, Canada, Sweden, Australia, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States have released their comprehensive positions on the application of international law in cyberspace. There should be similar efforts from the continent of Africa in developing and publishing its views and perspectives on how international law applies to cyberspace so that African voices are taken onboard in the ongoing effort towards developing rules of international law governing cyberspace in general and peace and security in cyberspace in particular. Tomorrow’s PSC engagement with the AUCIL therefore comes within this framework of developing African common position on the issue.

The expected outcome from tomorrow’s engagement is a communique.  Among others, Council may express its concern over acts of violence in the cyber security, which constitute serious threats to national, regional, and international peace and security. While highlighting the need to harness the potentially of information and communication technologies for enhancing democratic governance and socio-economic advancement, Council may also reiterate its concern over their increasing use by state and non-state actors of cyberspace for malicious activities, including the spread of misinformation and disinformation, propagation of hate, cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, manipulation of elections, and incite violence. It may encourage all Member States, which have not yet done so, to expedite the signature and ratification of the Malabo Convention. The PSC may welcome the engagement with the AUCIL on the issue of international law and peace and security in the cyberspace. Cognizant of the role that Africa should play in the development of rules of international law in the area of cyberspace, Council may emphasize the importance of having Africa’s common position on the application of international law to cyberspace. In this respect, it may request the Commission, together with the AUCIL, to prepare the common position and submit for its consideration within a specified timeframe. While preparing the common position, Council may direct the Commission to engage Member States with the view to getting their respective national perspectives on the issue of the application of international law in cyberspace and their positions on contested issues.


Ministerial meeting on the situation in Mozambique and Operations of SAMIM

Ministerial meeting on the situation in Mozambique and Operations of SAMIM

Date | 7 November 2022

Tomorrow (7 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1119th session on the situation in Mozambique and operations of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). Indicating the high political weight Namibia attached to the agenda, the session is to be convened at ministerial level.

Opening remarks is expected from Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of Namibia and Chairperson of the PSC for November followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). SAMIM Force Commander is scheduled to make presentation. Veronica Nataniel Macamo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mozambique as the concerned state, and Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’Apala, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as the Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the representative of the SADC Secretariat are expected to make statements. The Representative of the European Union (EU) may also deliver statement.

Southern Africa region had been less affected by terrorism and violent extremism compared to other regions until the advent of Islamist insurgents known as Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jamma’ah (ASWJ) in Mozambique’s gas-rich province of Cabo Delgado. Since its first attack launched on 5 October 2017 in Mocimboa da Praia, the group has become a major security threat not only to Mozambique but also to the wider region. Amid the uptick of violence unleashed by this group, on 23 June 2021, the extraordinary SADC summit approved deployment of SAMIM as a regional response to support Mozambique to combat terrorism and act of violent extremism under Scenario 6 of the African Standby Force. When its deployment commenced on 15 July 2021, SAMIM is envisaged to be made up of 2,916 soldiers including two special forces squadron, 4 military helicopters, two surface patrol ships, 1 submarine and 1 maritime surveillance aircraft and support personnel. Troop contributing countries include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Just ahead of SAMIM’s deployment, earlier on 9 July 2021, Rwanda also deployed 1,000 troops to assist Mozambique in its fight against terrorism.

SAMIM’s deployment was initially for three months, but its mandate was renewed in October 2021, January, July and most recently in August 2022. The latest mandate renewal, during the 42nd SADC summit held on 17 August, extended SAMIM’s mandate for one year while ‘de-escalating the intervention from scenario 6 to scenario 5 and subsequently scenario 4’. This signals the intention to expand SAMIM’s orientation to include and focus on peacebuilding activities. SADC has already initiated a Peacebuilding Support to Mozambique with the financial support from Early Response Mechanism (ERM). At the national level, it is to be recalled that the government of Mozambique unveiled the Reconstruction Plan for Cabo Delgado (PRCD) in September last year.

Tomorrow’s session will be the second time that Council considers SAMIM since its deployment in July last year. It was during its 1062nd session in January 2022 that Council discussed SAMIM for the first-time focusing on the financial and logistical support to the mission. Apart from endorsing the mission, it is to be recalled that the 1062nd session took important decisions, including to provide SADC with required equipment from the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, and deliver ‘substantial additional equipment’ from the second batch of military aid being donated by China to the AU.

Among others, tomorrow’s session will focus on assessing progress made towards the implementation of these decisions. On the logistical support, as highlighted in the PSC’s briefing note, the first batch of equipment from the CLB was airlifted to Mozambique in July 2022. Angola and Zambia have availed airlift capability for the shipment of the remaining equipment. However, no progress has been made in the shipment of equipment from the second batch, which is expected to be donated by China and shipped directly to Mozambique as agreed during the 1062nd PSC session. On the financial support, the major update will be EU’s financial support of around EUR 2 million and EUR 15 million under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) and European Peace Facility (EPF), respectively. 70 percent of the 2 million funding has already been disbursed to SADC while the remaining amount is expected to be received soon. The 15 million funding seems to be also in the pipeline following the Commission’s endorsement of the amount.

The security situation in Cabo Delgado and progress in the implementation of SAMIM’s mandate is expected to be the other focus of the session. The presentation by SAMIM’s Force Commander is likely to focus on these issues. Sixteen months of military intervention by SAMIM, alongside Rwandan forces and Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM), has considerably degraded the capabilities of the terrorist groups, restoring calm to some parts of Cabo Delgado and creating conducive conditions for the return of displaced people in some localities. Despite the major setback that terrorist groups have suffered, they also proved to be adaptable. According to the data provided by African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), in the first quarter of 2022 (1 January-31 March 2022), northern Mozambique witnessed a ‘leap in violence spilling rapidly into Cabo Delgado’, registering 55 terrorist attacks and 186 resultant deaths. The same source recorded a slight decline in the second quarter (1 April-30 June) with 45 terrorist attacks and 110 resultant deaths. While central and northern districts of Cabo Delgado province have continued to experience violence, terrorists have further advanced into Cabo Delgado’s southern districts of Ancuabe and Chiure. They have also crossed Cabo Delgado province southward into the neighbouring province of Nampula in June for the first time since the onset of the insurgency in 2017. On how this situation aggravates the humanitarian situation, the UN Refugee Agency reported that ‘displacement figures have increased by 20 per cent to 946,508 in the first half of this year.’

Tomorrow’s session is also an opportunity to deliberate on some of the challenges that SAMIM is facing and discuss the way forward. In this regard, the first and most obvious one is the resource challenge. So far, SADC uses its own resources to sustain the deployment, which the regional bloc praised this experience during its January extraordinary summit as ‘a unique precedent on the African continent’. While the reliance over its own funding is indeed a reflection of the resoluteness of the regional bloc and its member states to resolve the crisis within their jurisdiction, the nature of the challenge is such that financing SAMIM is not something that SADC alone can bear. While EU’s announcement of EUR 15 million funding to SAMIM in September to provide its military component with camp fortifications and storage containers, medical equipment, vehicles, and boats, as well as technological devices goes some way in addressing the financial challenge, SAMIM requires further support not only for logistics but also for the sustenance of the troops as well.

The second challenge is lack of strong coordination among the different forces operating in the same theatre of operation. In this regard, AU’s ACSRT observed that ‘the fact that insurgent groups appear to enjoy apparent freedom of movement within Northern Mozambique reflects a poor level of strategic coordination between the deployed international forces that are each responsible for their own operational areas.’ There is accordingly a need for working with the host country to ensure that the forces operate complementarily and with smooth coordination as a matter of strategic necessity.

The third is the absence of an effective cooperation and coordination mechanism between the AU and SADC regarding the mission. SADC does not seem to be keen to involve AU in the operation of the mission, which perhaps emanates from the regional bloc’s perception that the mission remains exclusively a regional matter. This is despite the expectation that the deployment of African Standby Force should happen within the context of a closer AU-RECs partnership, as highlighted in the first PSC-RECs/RMs annual consultative meeting. It was also within that expectation that PSC during its 1062nd meeting requested the Commission and SADC Secretariat to ‘provide regular updates to the Council on the progress in the implementation of SAMIM’s mandate…’ However, as pointed out in the briefing note prepared for the session, ‘information sharing and enhanced cooperation and coordination between the AU and SADC are still limited’.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC may commend SAMIM for degrading the capabilities of the terrorist groups while expressing concerns over the continued attacks in Cabo Delgado and the expansion of the threat to the neighbouring province of Nampula. Council may endorse the communique of the 42nd ordinary summit of SADC that extended the mandate of SAMIM.  Cognizant of the need to address the structural causes of the scourge in northern Mozambique for a lasting peace and stability in the region, Council may emphasize the importance of adopting a comprehensive strategy that combines both military and non-military measures. In this regard, it may welcome the transition of SAMIM from Scenario 6 to Scenario 5 as envisaged in the communique adopted at the 12 April 2022 extraordinary summit of the Organ Troika of SADC Summit. It may also commend the peacebuilding efforts of SADC as well as the government of Mozambique for the recovery and rehabilitation of the affected areas. Council may encourage the government to effectively utilize the AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre in Cairo. Regarding the financial constraints of the mission, Council may call up on the EU to expedite the release of the 15 million financial supports to SAMIM. It may also make similar call up on China to expedite the shipment of the pledged equipment directly to Mozambique to partly address the logistical challenge of the mission. In relation of coordination, Council may once again request the Commission and SADC Secretariat to provide regular updates to the Council on progress in the implementation of SAMIM’s mandate; and may further request both to explore and operationalize an agreed modality to enhance cooperation and coordination between the two sides.


Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security in Africa

Open Session on Youth, Peace and Security in Africa

Date | 3 November 2022

Tomorrow (03 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a virtual, open session on Youth, Peace and Security in Africa. The session will form Council’s 1118th meeting.

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Emilia Ndinealo Mkusa, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Chido Cleopatra Mpemba, AU Youth Envoy and the African Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAPs) are expected to make presentations. Sharonice Busch, Chairperson of the National Youth Council of Namibia and Jayathma Wickramanayake, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth are also expected to make statements.

The last time Council convened a meeting on Youth, Peace and Security in Africa was at its 1080th session held on 25 April 2022. Tomorrow’s session constitutes the third meeting convened on the theme during 2022, reflecting growing interest among PSC members on the theme of youth, peace and security in Africa. Ensuring implementation of the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security in line with its 10-Year Implementation Plan has been one of the critical points of Council’s focus since the finalisation of the Framework in 2020, which Council welcomed at its 933rd session. Further to assessing latest developments relevant to the agenda, tomorrow’s session may serve as an occasion for Council to be updated on progress made in implementing the Continental Framework through the development of National Actions Plans (NAPs), in line with the request of its 1080th session. Council may particularly follow up on the request made at its 1067th session convened on 03 March 2022, for the AU Commission to submit ‘Guidelines for the Development and Implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) for the AU Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security’.

With the purpose of advancing the role of young people in promoting peace and security in the continent, the AU has taken various measures from the adoption of relevant normative instruments such as the 2006 African Youth Charter to the articulation of youth contributions in key AU documents including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol and the Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns (STG) in Africa (Lusaka Roadmap). In addition to integrating issues affecting youth in peace and security at the normative level, the AU has also launched initiatives and structures on youth, peace and security. The AU, for example adopted, the Youth for Peace (Y4P) Programme. Within its overall purpose of effectively involving African youth in the promotion of peace and security, the YP4 programme has for instance spearheaded the Youth STG Campaign, a campaign aimed at meaningful mobilisation and engagement of youth agency in realising the STG goals. It has also facilitated the development of the study on the roles and contributions of youth to peace and security and the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security, which the PSC considered and adopted in May 2020.

In terms of initiatives, one key initiative is the commemoration of ‘Africa Youth Day’ on the first of November each year and the designation of the month of November as ‘Africa Youth Month’ which affords the opportunity to undertake various activities that aim to strengthen intercultural exchanges among the youth and promote commitment of relevant stakeholders to invest on African youth. This year’s Africa Youth Day/Month is being celebrated under the theme “Breaking the Barriers to Meaningful Youth Participation and Inclusion in Advocacy”. Tomorrow’s session is accordingly convened as part of the annual ‘Africa Youth Day’.

To advance the message of this year’s Africa Youth Day/Month, Council may deliberate on some of the challenges impeding meaningful youth participation in the maintenance of peace and security in the continent and reflect on effective approaches that can address these challenges. Limitation of financial resources and technical expertise committed to youth initiatives, limited role and space for youth in formal peacebuilding programmes, poor coordination and lack of inclusivity among youth groups and limited awareness among young people of the contributions they can make are some of the constraints to meaningful youth engagement and participation that have been highlighted in the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security. Addressing these challenges primarily requires serious regard by governments and political leaders that take youth as serious and critical partners in promoting peace and security rather than viewing them as either victims or perpetrators of threats to peace and security or merely as actors to just be talked to.

Of particular significance in addressing these issues and creating avenues for realising the policy commitments is the establishment of the national youth, peace and security action plan by member states. It is worth recalling that the continental strategy has the ambition of having 40% of AU member states adopting the national action plan by 2029. The members of the PSC may seek to reflect on the progress made towards achieving this and the strategy the AU is deploying towards this end.

Not only does over 60% of Africa’s population consist of young people, the continent also has the youngest, largest and fastest growing population globally. This youth population is one of Africa’s key resources which if harnessed well, could play a fundamental role in achieving the continent’s developmental aspirations and goals. It is in that spirit that AU’s Agenda 2063 recognises the potential and important role of Africa’s youth in achieving the aspiration of a prosperous Africa. Ensuring meaningful participation and engagement of the youth in Africa’s peace and security agenda is an essential component of harnessing the capacity of this significant portion of the continent’s population. It is hence important to take deliberate steps to ensure that African youth are well engaged in the various efforts for conflict prevention, including in the promotion of a culture of peace, conflict management and resolution measures. This in turn requires that the issues affecting youth and the role of youth are factored in from the early stages of the designing and planning of conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, mediation, peace making, and other conflict management and resolution processes to the process of implementation of the same.

In terms of translating the various policy commitments and initiatives on youth, peace and security, it may be of interest to the PSC to have a targeted approach that takes account of the variabilities of issues relating to youth, peace and security across counties and different youth groups. For example, it is critical that AU’s work on youth, peace and security prioritises the needs and role of youth in context of situations of conflict and political crisis. Attention should be given not only to ensure the integration of youth in initiatives to address such situations but also to promote the development and implementation of programs dedicated to supporting and rehabilitating youth with particular attention to female youth affected by violence in such situations of conflict and political crisis. With respect to conflict prevention, early warning and conflict analysis work of the AU need also to incorporate youth specific indicators for enabling responses that enhance the role of youth and address the issues affecting youth, including those specific to female youth.

Further to noting the importance of active involvement of the youth in efforts along the lines highlighted above and the various advocacy and promotional work of the AU Youth, Peace and Security Program, the Youth Envoy and the AYAPs undertake in pursuit of the agenda of youth, peace and security in Africa, it may also interest the Council to reflect on some of the socio-economic and political conditions that create insecurity for youth. Corrupt government practices, marginalisation, unemployment, exploitative youth employment and violations of human rights and freedoms can be mentioned as few examples of governance related issues that make Africa’s young population susceptible to insecurity, including being lured into organized crimes, militia groups and radicalisation by terrorist groups. Addressing governance deficits is therefore key aspect of preventing the continent’s young population from being victims and participants of various conditions of threats to peace and security. As such, it is critical for the AYAPs, the AU Youth Envoy and other relevant actors to promote the initiation and implementation of political and socio-economic governance reforms, including by harnessing the recommendations and decisions of AU governance and human rights institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Peer Review Mechanism and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Press Statement. Council may take note of progress made in implementing the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security and encourage member States to strengthen efforts aimed at adopting NAPs. It may commend the continued efforts and contributions of the AU Youth Envoy and AYAPs towards the full realisation of the Continental Framework and other relevant AU norms and policies on peace and security. It may emphasise the need for meaningful involvement of the youth in peace efforts and encourage member States to take deliberate measures to create space for youth participation in various aspects of peace processes including decision-making roles. Council may further underscore the importance of strengthening trust between governments and their young populations for the sustainability of peace and development and for attaining the aspiration of a prosperous Africa. It may also call on the AU Commission to strengthen its collaborations with Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in supporting member States’ efforts to develop NAPs for the implementation of the Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security. The PSC may also call for a more targeted approach to the implementation of the youth, peace and security agenda with a focus on youth in situations of conflict and political crisis, with particular attention to female youth and request in this respect that the AU Commission develops strategy which prioritizes situations of conflict and political crisis. The PSC may also underscore the need to mainstream the youth, peace and security theme in all the peace and security and governance work of the AU from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction and development by deploying youth centred analytical lens in conflict analysis and policy response proposals and initiatives.


MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022

Date | November 2022

Namibia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in November. The Provisional Program of Work initially envisaged six sessions with eight substantive agenda items. One of these sessions – a briefing on the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel – was postponed to December. Two sessions that were not initially envisaged were added to the monthly program. Accordingly, the PSC held seven sessions in total. Of the seven sessions, four had two substantive agenda items (the 1117th, 1120th, 1121st, and 1122nd). Six of these agenda items were committed to country/region specific situations while three addressed thematic issues and one was a preparatory meeting held to receive key messages on climate change and peace and security nexus ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 27). The remaining agenda was a consultative meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (UNPBC).

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MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - NOVEMBER 2022

Date | November 2022

Namibia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in November. The Provisional Program of Work initially envisaged six sessions with eight substantive agenda items. One of these sessions – a briefing on the deployment of 3000 troops to Sahel – was postponed to December. Two sessions that were not initially envisaged were added to the monthly program. Accordingly, the PSC held seven sessions in total. Of the seven sessions, four had two substantive agenda items (the 1117th, 1120th, 1121st, and 1122nd). Six of these agenda items were committed to country/region specific situations while three addressed thematic issues and one was a preparatory meeting held to receive key messages on climate change and peace and security nexus ahead of the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP 27). The remaining agenda was a consultative meeting of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Commission (UNPBC).

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