PSC@20. Brainstorming: “Summit of the Future”
PSC@20. Brainstorming: “Summit of the Future”
Date | 4 July 2024
Tomorrow (5 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1220th meeting to brainstorm on the Summit of the Future. The meeting is expected to be held as an open session.
Following opening remarks from Miguel Cesar Domingos Bembe, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Angola to the AU and PSC Chairperson for July 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to deliver a statement. Emilia Ndinelao Mkusa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU is also expected to make a statement alongside Stephan Auer, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ethiopia and representatives from the United Nations (UN) Office to the AU (UNOAU) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to the AU.
The meeting is being convened following the adoption of UN75 Declaration by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2020 which tasked the UN Secretary-General António Guterres to give prospective recommendations to enhance global governance following the exponential threats and minimum progress in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. This subsequently led to the secretary-general releasing the report, ‘Our Common Agenda’ on 5 August 2021, which gave an outfit of his vision for the future of multilateralism, in which he proposed to have the ‘Summit of the Future’, which is to be convened in September 2024 in New York.
Under the theme, ‘Summit of the Future: Multilateral Solutions for a Better Tomorrow’, the upcoming summit is expected to converge leaders from across the world, to enhance efforts to accelerate progress on current global commitments and address emerging challenges, with the aim of revitalising the multilateral system. The summit will culminate in the endorsement of a negotiated document called the ‘Pact for the Future’ – to be adopted by consensus – which will focus on Sustainable Development and Financing for Development; International Peace and Security; Science, Technology and Innovation and Digital Cooperation; The Rights of Youth and Future Generations; and Transforming Global Governance. The Pact for the Future is a global commitment to address the importance of human rights, gender equality and the ‘need to leave no one behind.’ The zero draft Pact of the Future additionally calls for increased funding for sustainable development and peacebuilding efforts and highlights the need for new models of peace operations to address the evolving nature of conflict. To achieve this, the Pact calls for increased funding for sustainable development and peacebuilding, alongside new approaches to peacekeeping that can adapt to the changing nature of conflict.
The developments leading into the Summit of the Future have been led by Germany and Namibia. They released a starting point for zero draft of the Pact of the Future in January 2024. Before that, there were discussions in late 2023 where many countries and other groups gave their ideas. In July 2023, the UN Secretary-General proposed a new approach to peace and security (“A New Agenda for Peace” – NA4P) which underscored the need to strengthen the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, recognising that regional organisations, like the AU, are the critical building blocks of multilateral cooperation and central to conflict prevention, management and resolution. UN Secretary-General highlighted the significance of peace support operations as a key area of cooperation between the UN and AU and emphasised the need for reliable, predictable and sustainable funding for such operations.
Noteworthy, the AU has a number of existing policies and common positions that can be adapted to assist in drafting a common position for the Pact for the Future. It is important for the AU to highlight these to its member states to enable the region to negotiate as a collective bloc, which would benefit Africa’s overall development. Specifically, the AU can draw from the following:
Chapter 1: Sustainable Development and Financing for Development:
- Agenda 2063 – The AU’s strategic framework for socio-economic transformation.
Chapter 2: International Peace and Security:
- AU’s understanding on Resolution 2719.
- Common African Position on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
Chapter 3 – Science, Technology, Innovation and Digital Cooperation
Chapter 4 – Youth and Future Generations
Chapter 5 – Transforming Global Governance:
- Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations (Ezulwini Consensus)
Over and beyond, stakeholder engagements have occurred, offering insights for developing common positions among African States and exploring AU positions. From 9 to 11 May 2024, a UN Civil Society Conference took place in Nairobi, Kenya which provided preliminary discussions and data ahead of the Summit of the Future. UN outreach efforts were also conducted at regional and country levels between February and April 2024, including regional fora. Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) hosted the tenth Africa Regional Forum on Sustainable Development (ARFSD-10) from 23 to 25 April 2024 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to, among others, mobilise Africa’s priorities and inputs for the Summit of the Future. In conjunction with the Pact for the Future zero draft, a Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations was developed. Co-facilitated by Sweden and Zambia, the Global Digital Compact underwent informal consultations from February to May 2024. Notably, it underwent three readings: the first on 5 April 2024, the second on 2 May 2024 and the third on 16 May 2024. The Netherlands and Fiji originally co-facilitated the Declaration on Future Generations, with Jamaica succeeding Fiji as co-facilitator and the informal consultations took place in January 2024 and virtual consultations with stakeholders on the 15 and 16 January. Written inputs were provided by 26 February enabling a zero draft on the Declaration, which was circulated in March. To date, there have been four readings, the first reading on 8 April, second reading on 14 May, third reading on 10 June and the fourth reading on the 26 June 2024.
In relation to this, Amani Africa has also been instrumental and resourceful in contributing to the developments leading to the Summit of the Future, with publications and organising events. Its Policy Brief titled: Africa and Peace and Security Diplomacy in a Time of the New Agenda for Peace, released in June 2023, provided thoughts on crisis management (peace and security) diplomacy in the changing global order through the prism of what this means for Africa and its role. The policy brief recommended a multifaceted approach to peacebuilding that extends beyond military solutions. An approach that should leverage regional organisations, development tools and non-military means for conflict prevention, such as early warning systems and addressing the root causes of conflict. The policy brief further emphasised the importance of strong regional partnerships and a networked multilateral system for effective peacebuilding efforts. In addition, it was also recommended that peacebuilding efforts extend beyond conflict resolution to include delegitimising war economies, supporting local communities and fostering regional cooperation in post-conflict situations. The policy brief also acknowledged the emergence of new threats like pandemics and climate change, necessitating the development of updated diplomatic strategies, and called for strengthened arms control efforts to address traditional threats like nuclear weapons. It also underscored the critical role of robust humanitarian diplomacy in protecting civilians caught in conflict and maintaining legitimacy in a complex global landscape. This emphasis included utilising frameworks like Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), alongside broader civilian protection measures.
Building on this, in February 2024, Amani Africa released a Dispatch on Why Africa needs a new strategy on how to position itself in the face of tectonic global shifts and the quest for reform of multilateralism. In addition Amani Africa’s Special Research Report: Africa and the Summit of the Future: Seizing the New Window of Opportunity for the Reform of the UN Security Council, released in June 2024, dissected the renewed push for the reform of the UNSC, and how Africa comes in, in this push for reform. In general, the special research report highlights the historical point of view of Africa not being well-represented when the UN was formed, and today, the continent lacking permanent seats in the Security Council, and having limited non-permanent ones. The desired outcome however from the recommendations of the research outlined that Africa wants a UNSC that is: more just: Fixes the historical imbalance in representation; more effective: Addresses global peace and security challenges better; and more reflective of today’s world: Represents the rise of multipolarity (more than just a few powerful countries). In this regard, Amani Africa underscored that the Summit of the Future will not change how the Security Council works, rather it will be a stepping stone for future reforms.
Subsequently, Amani Africa has organised a series of events on this discourse since July 2023 under the Joint Namibia and Amani Africa high-level panel of experts on Africa and the reform of the multilateral system project. On 17 to 18 July 2023, Namibia and Amani Africa jointly convened the meeting of a High-Level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System held in Windhoek, Namibia, which brought together experts to deliberate on the nature of the multidimensional changes or transformations taking place in the world, the challenges and opportunities these developments present for Africa in its engagement in the multilateral system and the negotiating position that Africa needs to articulate to secure its interest in the ongoing varied processes for the reform/transformation of the multilateral system, including for redressing the historical injustice of Africa’s exclusion from the UN Security Council. This led to the adoption of a strategic document articulating the objectives, methodology and program of work of the panel of experts towards elaborating a report on ‘Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System.’
On 26 September 2023, at the sidelines of the UNGA 78, the continuation of the series of events of the High-level Panel took place in New York with the Africa and the transformation of the Multilateral System – Side Event in which the discussion centred on Africa’s desired outcomes from the reform of the multilateral system. The core concerns from the event were how to ensure Africa has a strong voice and can achieve its development goals. These included reforming financial and trade structures, as well as securing a more just and influential role in the UN Security Council, potentially including permanent membership. Beyond just a veto on the Council, the discussion explored other ways for Africa to contribute meaningfully to global peace and security. Amani Africa also convened a Dialogue on the New Agenda for Peace: Reimagining the UN-AU Partnership in Peace and Security on 12 December 2023 which converged stakeholders from the UN, AU and other independent entities in the space of peace and security in Africa, to discuss how to strengthen the partnership between the UN and AU in maintaining peace and security in the continent.
On 14 to 15 December 2023, Amani Africa convened the joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System in Nairobi, Kenya, which served as a platform to consider the draft report of the High-Level Panel on the reform of the multilateral system. The Final Convening of the Joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-Level Panel on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System was held on 18 to 19 March 2024 in Addis Ababa which saw discussions delving into reflections on global digital architecture and Africa’s place in shaping norms for the regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other Transformative Technology; Reflections on Reform of Global Financial Architecture and Establishment of AU Financial Institution; Reflections on UNSC Reform – which focused on options and pathways for Africa’s equitable representation. The high-level panel also focused on multilateral negotiations on Climate Change and enhancing Africa’s negotiation architecture on climate change; and Reflections on ‘AU as a pillar of reformed multilateralism’ with a particular interest in Resolution 2719 and AU at G20 as signifiers. This convening provided the platform for the finalisation of the High-level report on the reform of the multilateral system.
Tomorrow’s meeting therefore will serve as a platform for the AU to involve its member states and other stakeholders to discuss on how to address current and future challenges, and restore trust in multilateralism ahead of the ‘Action Day(s)’ on 20 to 21 September 2024, which will prompt additional action and commitments from member states, civil society and other stakeholders. The cardinal elements that will guide the AU to augment Africa’s peace and security priorities will be the push to reform the UNSC; A new peace operation doctrine that surpasses traditional peacekeeping in favour of the realities on the ground; A reaffirmation of the primacy of politics – which involve resolving conflict through dialogue and not militarily. More so, the discourse on the reform of the Global Financial Architecture (GFA) is of significance, alongside (a just) climate change agenda; a global digital architecture; an Effective Representation of Africa in the G20; and women and youth representation. In this regard, a reformed multilateral system should be guided by a number of principles which include representation, in essence, having a seat the decision-making table. Second, equity, fairness and justice. Third, equality of the dignity of all nations and peoples; transparency; and lastly, the reaffirmation of commitment for the principles of the UN Charter and international law.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique or a summary record. Council may commend the contributions of member states, partners and civil society for their contribution to the preparation to the Summit of the Future, and particularly extend its appreciation to Namibia and Germany who are co-facilitating the Summit. Council may also call for strengthened cooperation and coordination among member states to address current and emerging peace and security challenges on the continent. Council may also raise awareness of the preparations for the Summit of the Future and mobilise the member state’s contribution to the draft Pact of the Future in addressing Africa’s priorities and common positions to be included in the Summit of the Future on peace and security and global governance. Council may urge AU member states to actively engage in the Summit of the Future and promote common positions to increase the voice of Africa as a region and also to renew multilateral system support to the realisation of the AU’s Agenda 2063 aspirations and silencing the guns flagship project. Furthermore, the meeting may provide guidance on approaches Africa should adopt to reflect its interests and voice in the Pact for the Future.
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of July 2024
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of July 2024
Date | July 2024
In July 2024, the Republic of Angola will take over the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) from the Republic of Uganda. The provisional program of work of the month envisages a total of five substantive agenda items. Additionally, the program of work also includes a field mission to Mozambique and an informal consultation between the PSC and the Commissioner of Political Affairs and Peace and Security (C-PAPS) on Early Warning. Of the five substantive agenda items, two will address country-specific situations while the remaining three will focus on thematic issues. One of the sessions is scheduled to take place at ministerial level. Apart from the activities of the PSC, the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the Committee of Experts (CoE) will also be meeting during the month.
The first session of the month is scheduled for 5 July and as part of the commemoration of the PSC at 20 it will hold an open session to brainstorm on the ‘Summit of the Future’. On 21 September 2020, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the UN75 Declaration, tasking United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres with providing recommendations to enhance global governance amidst escalating threats and the lack of progress in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. In response to this mandate, Secretary-General Guterres released a report titled ‘Our Common Agenda’ on 5 August 2021, outlining his vision for the future of multilateralism and proposing the ‘Summit of the Future’. Scheduled for September 2024, the Summit of the Future aims to bring world leaders together to accelerate efforts toward fulfilling current global obligations and to take concrete actions addressing emerging challenges and opportunities. This summit is designed to revitalise the multilateral system and will culminate in the endorsement of a document named the ‘Pact for the Future,’ which is currently being negotiated through consensus-based intergovernmental negotiations. Therefore, this session is expected to take stock of the state of participation of African states in the negotiations and to contribute towards the articulation of shared perspectives on the proposals that African states could advance collectively regarding the various chapters of the Pact of the Future.
On 9 July, the PSC will convene an informal consultation with the C-PAPS on Early Warning. This consultation aligns with the 13th PSC retreat on its working methods within the context of AU institutional reforms, which agreed to a monthly informal consultation between PSC Ambassadors/Charge d’Affaires and the C-PAPS. As stated in the retreat’s conclusions, the meeting will serve as a platform for the Commission and Council to share particularly sensitive early warning information. Additionally, the discussions are expected to explore ways to enhance and fully operationalise the CEWS to improve anticipation, preparedness, and early response to conflicts across the continent. The meeting may also address institutional and technical challenges to CEWS and follow up on previous decisions, particularly those from the PSC’s 1208th session held on 14 April 2024.
On 11 July, the PSC will hold its second substantive session of the month for an update on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). The last time the PSC held a session on CAR was at its 1157th session, which was held before the local elections that were scheduled for July 2023. During the session, it emphasised the responsibilities of the government and all political and social stakeholders to ensure the elections occurred as scheduled. However, the local elections were postponed to prepare for a constitutional referendum that was held on 30 July 2023. In relation to the local elections, the PSC is expected to receive a briefing on the necessary arrangements for CAR’s rescheduled local and regional elections, now set for 13 October 2024, and 26 January 2025. Furthermore, the session is expected to review the implementation status of the peace agreement, including the integration of the African Union Observer Mission in the Central African Republic’s (MOUACA) mandate into the AU Mission in CAR and the mission’s capacity to follow up on these tasks. Additionally, considering the PSC’s previous requests for the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo against CAR, and with the CAR sanctions regime set to expire on 31 July 2024, as extended by UNSC Resolution 2693 adopted on 27 July 2023, the PSC is expected to discuss developments on this matter. Another issue that has particular resonance with the current continental policy discussion on unconstitutional changes of government and may receive attention is the July 2023 constitutional amendment that removed the two-term limit on the mandate of the President.
On 15 July, the PSC will consider the role of mediation and reconciliation in conflict resolution in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), focusing on the Luanda and Nairobi Processes. During its 1203rd session, the PSC highlighted the importance of the diplomatic efforts embodied in these processes. The Nairobi and Luanda processes are ongoing regional initiatives under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The Nairobi Process aims to mediate a resolution between the Government of the DRC and various armed groups active in the eastern regions of the country. Concurrently, the Luanda Process seeks to address the inter-state dimension of the crises in the Eastern DRC through dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda. Considering the persistence of the fighting involving the M23 and the fact that both the Nairobi and Luanda processes are stalled, the PSC, apart from receiving updates on the state of the conflict and the peace efforts, faces the challenge of how to overcome the impediments to the two peace processes. The other issue that this session is expected to address concerns how the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Mission to DRC (SAMIDRC) can support and align with the Nairobi and Luanda processes.
On 24 July, the PSC scheduled a key thematic session to discuss the future of Peace Support Operations (PSOs), focusing on financing, new configurations, coordination, lessons learned, and best practices. This session follows the 14 June 2024 PSC session on UN Security Council Resolution 2719(2023), in which member states expressed differing viewpoints on the matter. It is therefore anticipated that PSC members will have further discussions on the modalities for the implementation of Resolution 2719.
On 25 July, the fifth and the last session of the month will convene to consider the Mid-Year Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa, covering the period from January to June 2024. This report aims to provide an overview of the elections conducted during the first half of the year, January to June 2024. In addition to reviewing these past elections, the report will offer an outlook on upcoming elections scheduled for the second half of the year, from July to December 2024. It is expected to highlight the evolving situations in Rwanda, Algeria, Mauritius, Namibia, and Ghana as these countries prepare for elections. Special attention may be given to Mozambique due to the worsening security situation in the northern part of the country. Furthermore, considering the potential for elections in conflict-affected countries such as Libya and South Sudan, the report is expected to provide updates on recent developments regarding elections in these Countries. Besides, this session presents an opportunity for the PSC to explore ways to assist member states in preventing electoral violence, addressing potential risks in some countries that are prone to election-related violence. Moreover, the Chairperson’s report is anticipated to include recommendations for improving electoral processes and outcomes.
Aside from these substantive sessions, the program of work for July indicates in the footnote the convening of the 3rd Policy Session of the African Union Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange (I-RECKE) on 20 July 2024 in Accra, Ghana with a theme, ‘Joint Resource Mobilisation for Regional and Continental Conflict Peace and Security Initiatives’ 20 July 2024, Accra, Ghana. The program also anticipates a meeting of the MSC on 8 July, scheduled for a discussion on the proliferation of mercenaries and its impact on peace and security in the continent. The CoE is also scheduled to meet on 12 July for the preparation of the 18th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the UNSC and AUPSC, in preparation for the induction of the newly elected members of the PSC.
The field mission to Mozambique is expected to be the last activity of the PSC for the month of July 2024. The field mission is scheduled to be held from 29 to 31 July. The mission is expected to enable the PSC to engage with the Government of Mozambique on developments related to the security situation in the country. Given the field mission is coming after the 15 July 2024 deadline for the withdrawal of SAMIM, during the field mission, the PSC will also assess the measures being put in place to avoid the emergence of a security vacuum post-SAMIM.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - May 2024
Date | May 2024
In May, under Tanzania’s chairship, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) initially planned to conduct five sessions, addressing six agenda items and including a field mission to the Tigray region of Ethiopia. After several revisions of the programme of work, five sessions were held and seven agenda items were considered.
Consideration of the situation in Sudan
Consideration of the situation in Sudan
Date | 20 June 2024
Tomorrow (21 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1218th session at the level of Heads of State and Government to consider the situation in Sudan. This will be the second time Uganda has convened a summit-level session on Sudan during its chairship of the PSC since the conflict erupted in April 2023, the first being held last year in May.
Uganda’s President and chairperson of the PSC for the month of June, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, is expected to preside over the session. The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, and Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the chair of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan and High Representative for Silencing the Guns, are expected to brief the PSC. António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Workneh Gebeyehu, Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Executive Secretary of the League of Arab States (LAS) are also anticipated to deliver statements.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to discuss the state of the stalling regional and international diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. It is likely that the PSC will hear from the High-Level Panel on the efforts to the convening of an ‘all-inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue.’ As per a briefing note prepared for the 1209th session, the Panel has developed a three-pronged approach to address the situation in Sudan: shuttle diplomacy with various stakeholders to mobilise support; enhanced coordination with partners and regional organisations to consolidate mediation efforts and avoid duplication; and convening an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue focusing on ending the conflict and charting a course for the future of the country.
This dialogue, intended to complement the Jeddah Process, is envisaged to proceed in two phases: the planning phase and the main phase. The planning phase is expected to address a variety of issues that will set the tone for the main phase, including the categories of entities or individuals to be invited, quotas of representation, agenda, structure of management of the dialogue, venue, date, funding and logistics, and the role of the international community. Since its last update to the PSC, a major development that the Panel is expected to highlight concerns its plan for holding a preparatory meeting. The Panel has sent out invitations to Sudanese civilian forces for a preparatory meeting to be held on 10-15 July 2024 that is meant to pave the way for the convening of ‘all-inclusive inter-Sudanese Dialogue’. Some of those who received the invitation are sounding alarm that there was no adequate consultation such as on the invitation extended to the representatives of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
One of the challenges for the peace process in Sudan is the plethora of initiatives for peace, with overlapping, if not competing, engagements and initiatives. Apart from spreading thinly diplomatic resources and giving rise to ‘forum shopping,’ the diversity of, and at times competing, initiatives are undermining the effectiveness of regional and international engagements. Apart from the proposed preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa scheduled to begin on 9 July, for which the AU Panel sent out invitations, it is reported that a conference for Sudanese political forces is expected to be hosted in Egypt at the end of June 2024.
Despite expectations for the resumption of the Jeddah process with expanded participation of key regional actors, it remains in abeyance with facilitators not getting a commitment for decisive negotiation from both parties. On his part, the UN Special Envoy for Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, has continued with his consultations including for the convening of the major actors involved in peace efforts in Sudan including on how to enhance coordination and joint efforts. The only notable recent international convening for peace on Sudan was concluded on 12 June 2024 in Cairo, Egypt hosted by the LAS. The consultative meeting was attended by, among others, representatives of AU, UN, IGAD, the European Union (EU), the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Republic of Djibouti, in which it concluded with a communiqué.
On the part of the civilian actors, there were two developments worth highlighting. On 8 May 2024, the SAF-aligned political coalition ‘National Forces Coordination’, which comprises some 48 political and civil groups, signed a political Charter in Cairo, Egypt, proposing a non-partisan transitional government with a joint military-civilian Sovereign Council after the conflict, while a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue is envisaged to determine the form and system of governance for the country. Meanwhile, the other civil coalition known as Taqadum, which claims neutrality between warring parties, convened its founding conference in Addis Ababa on 27 May 2024. Attended by more than six hundred participants, the conference outlined its political vision to end the conflict, approved its bylaws and structure, and elected former Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, as the head of Taqadum.
The other aspect of the situation in Sudan that tomorrow’s session is expected to pay particular attention to is the state of the war and its humanitarian consequences. The last time the PSC considered the situation in Sudan on its programme was on 21 May 2024, during its 1213th session, which came against the backdrop of escalating violence around El Fasher, North Darfur—the last major town in Darfur not under the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In a press statement adopted at the session, the PSC not only raised the alarm over the ‘increasing likelihood of grave atrocities’ but also took specific decisions aimed at mitigating the impact of the war on civilians and ensuring accountability. Most specifically, the PSC requested ‘the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to urgently investigate the human rights violations in El Fasher and other areas in Darfur.’ It also requested the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan to ‘work with the newly-appointed AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide to develop proposals on how to address ongoing atrocities, prevent further escalation in Darfur, and develop a plan for the protection of civilians.’ Reiterating the statement issued by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on 26 April 2024, the PSC also urged the warring parties to return to the local truce in El Fasher, lift the siege on the city, and return to an expanded negotiation platform in Jeddah.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to focus on receiving updates on the situation in the country since the last meeting. The discussion is expected to review the state of, and challenges faced in the implementation of the Roadmap for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan that the PSC adopted during the last summit-level meeting in May 2023, and explore further steps that should be taken to address the escalating situation.
The fighting between SAF and the RSF continues to rage in various parts of the country. Despite the call from AU and the UN to halt the offensive on El Fasher, the city and its surrounding areas have become a site of major fighting and atrocities. El Fasher has continued to experience atrocious violence targeting civilians that is reminiscent of some of the brutal atrocities inflicted on West Darfur last year and the genocidal violence that Darfur experienced two decades ago. In a statement issued on 5 June 2024, the Special Advisor of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, noting the displacement of an estimated 130,000 people due to the fighting in El Fasher, expressed ‘serious concern’ over reports of ethnically motivated attacks against the non-Arab communities in and near the city, including by the RSF and their allied militias, while also noting reports of retaliatory attacks targeted against Arab civilians in the region. She raised the alarm that ‘risk factors and indicators for genocide and related crimes are present, and the risks are increasing.’
Against these worrying developments in North Darfur, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2736 (2023) on 13 June, demanding that the RSF halts the siege of El Fasher and calling for an immediate cessation of the fighting and de-escalation in and around the city. The Council demanded that all parties to the conflict have to ensure that civilians are protected, and further requested them to allow and facilitate the ‘rapid, safe, unhindered and sustainable passage’ of humanitarian relief for civilians. The Council also asked the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the Sudanese authorities and regional stakeholders, to make recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan. However, a day after the adoption of the resolution, intense fighting was reported in the city, reportedly claiming the life of Ali Yaqoub Gibril, RSF operation commander in North Darfur.
The violence was not limited to the Darfur region but also escalated across several other areas including Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Kordofan, and White Nile. In one major incident of violence in Jazirah, at least 150 civilians, including at least 35 children were killed on 5 June amid attacks on the capital Wad al Nourah, prompting the Chairperson of the AU Commission to issue a statement on 7 June, condemning the ‘massacre’ in the ‘strongest terms’.
As of 10 May 2024, the conflict in Sudan has reportedly killed 16,650 people since its eruption on 15 April 2023, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). It has also created the worst humanitarian crises in the world, displacing 10 million people, leaving more than 25 million (half of the population)—of whom over 14 million children—in need of humanitarian aid. At least 5 million people are ‘teetering on the brink of starvation,’ with more than 40 hunger hotspots at a high risk of slipping into famine in the coming month. If the war continues to escalate, it is not clear how it would not push the current dire situation into humanitarian catastrophe.
The fast-worsening humanitarian situation in Sudan is not the only concern for the AU and the wider international community, rather, of equal concern is the grave threat that the continuation of the war poses to regional and international peace and security. Despite the fact that neither the SAF nor the RSF stand a chance to achieve military victory, there is no sign of the war coming to an end. Weapons and funds channelled from those backing the two sides have continued to fuel the raging fire of the brutal war. As a result, there are growing concerns that the persistence of the war could precipitate the fragmentation and/or collapse of Sudan. In her briefing to the UN Security Council on 18 June, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Martha Pobee, warned that ‘Without swift action, Sudan risks becoming engulfed in more ethnic violence and fragment even further.’
With many conflict-affected neighbouring states, Sudan’s fragmentation (Libya scenario) or collapse (Somalia scenario) is sure to have a knock-on effect on these countries, for some with dire consequences. Considering Sudan’s location, its collapse is also sure to reverberate across parts of Lake Chad, Great Lakes, North Africa and the Horn of Africa regions. As the experience of Somalia also showed, the consequences of Sudan’s fragmentation or collapse are unlikely to be confined inland. It is inevitable to spill over into the Red Sea, with grave consequences to international maritime trade and economic stability. The vacuum that the deterioration of the situation in Sudan creates may end up attracting terrorist networks from the Sahel and Horn of Africa as well as from beyond Africa.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express its grave concern over the escalating violence in and around North Darfur and other regions of Sudan, as well as the dire humanitarian situation in the country. The PSC may welcome the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2736 and reiterate its call for the RSF to lift the siege of El Fasher and immediately halt the fighting in and around the city. It may particularly express its concern over the worrying trend of grave human rights violations by the warring parties, who are disregarding international human rights and humanitarian laws. The PSC may strongly condemn the recent killings of civilians in Wad al Nourah, Gezira State, echoing the statement from the AU Commission Chairperson on 7 June 2024. In this regard, it may follow up on its previous decisions adopted at its 1213th session to address the escalation of atrocities and hold perpetrators accountable. Other measures that the PSC may take include the establishment of a) internationally monitored humanitarian corridors for preventing further humanitarian catastrophe b) a mechanism for monitoring, documenting and reporting on compliance with international humanitarian law c) disengagement from hostilities in major civilian population centres supervised by a joint monitoring mechanism of the AU, IGAD and LAS supported by the UN, and d) heads of state and government level ad hoc Committee to mobilize and leverage the collective weight of AU member states for bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table. The PSC may also urge the warring parties to immediately and unconditionally return to the expanded Jeddah platform.
