Consideration of the Draft Common African Position on the Application of International Law in the Cyber Space
Consideration of the Draft Common African Position on the Application of International Law in the Cyber Space
Date | 28 January 2024
Tomorrow (29 January) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1196th Session. This session will consider the Draft Common African Position on the Application of International Law in the Cyber Space.
The session is expected to begin with opening remarks by Amma Adomaa Twum-Am, the Permanent Representative of Ghana and Chairperson of PSC January, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Kawasi Asante, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Ghana, is also expected to present the Draft Common African Position on the Application of International Law to the Use of Information and Communication Technologies in the Cyber Space.
The last time the PSC held a session to review the progress made towards developing the Common African Position (CAP) on the application of international law in cyberspace was during its 1171st session on 24 August 2023. During this session, the Council acknowledged the draft statement by the AUCIL regarding the Application of International Law to the Use of ICTs in Cyberspace and decided to establish an expert-level working group. The working group, consisting of the PSC Committee of Experts and interested AU Member States, was given the responsibility to review the Draft African Statement endorsed by the 22nd Ordinary Session of the AUCIL and presented to the 1171st session of the PSC.
The process started at the 1120th Session where the PSC acknowledged the relevance of international law to cyberspace and entrusted the AUCIL, in collaboration with the AU Commission, to conduct consultations with relevant stakeholders on the application of international law to cyberspace. Subsequently, at the 1148th session, the PSC called upon the AUCIL to promptly finalize and submit a draft statement of the Common African Position on the Application of International Law to Cyberspace.
In response to the AU Commission’s request during the 1120th session for technical support in Member States’ development of their national positions and a Common African Position, in 2023, the AUCIL has organized three ‘capacity building’ and consultation sessions. These sessions sought to provide Member States with the essential knowledge and skills to actively contribute to the formulation of the CAP. Additionally, the sessions also provided an opportunity for consultations with Member States and African Experts, regarding the draft Statement. Experts representing AU Member States in the UN General Assembly First Committee, which is responsible for multilateral processes and the Sixth Committee, which is responsible for legal affairs, were also involved in these consultations.
Following the establishment of the Working Group of Experts as per the decision of the 1171st Session, the Group met in Tunisia from 29 November – 1 December 2023 and virtually on 9 January 2024. During these meetings, the draft CAP was presented and considered by the working group of experts.
Along with the increasing strategic significance of cyberspace in all areas of life and the growing use of cyber for orchestrating attacks and criminal acts, governance of cyberspace has become a pressing global issue. In this regard, the UN General Assembly took action in 2020 by adopting resolution 75/240, establishing a five-year open-ended working group dedicated to the security aspects of information and communications technologies (ICTs) from 2021 to 2025. This working group has actively encouraged the submission of national positions regarding the application of international law to ICTs. Consequently, several states have submitted their position papers on this matter and discussion forums have been convened.
This issue of safety of the cyberspace is of particular significance for Africa given the level of vulnerability of the continent. A recent manifestation of Africa’s vulnerability is the major cyber-attack that inflicted damage to the AU infrastructure in April last year. As one recent study established ‘the widespread use of technology, combined with insufficient cybersecurity measures, inadequate legislation in the field of information security, and a low level of public awareness concerning information security, creates favourable conditions for cybercriminals.’ Yet, perhaps more than the issue of immediate concerns of cybersecurity, for countries in Africa vulnerabilities that arise from the monopolization of digital platforms by some big corporations carry bigger challenges to their political and cultural as well as socio-economic identity and wellbeing.
“Yet, perhaps more than the issue of immediate concerns of cybersecurity, for countries in Africa vulnerabilities that arise from the monopolization of digital platforms by some big corporations carry bigger challenges to their political and cultural as well as socio-economic identity and wellbeing. “
It is in this context that the question of the role and application of international law in governing cyberspace acquires particular significance. In this regard, the development of the AU common position on the application of international law can also help articulate formulations that resonate with the particular vulnerabilities and needs of Africa as far as international law’s application to and role in governance of the cyberspace is concerned.
Apart from these immediate issues of security, other broader and more strategic issues pertaining to the cyber domain that are of paramount importance include non-intervention, use of force, due diligence, state responsibility, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. These issues are particularly of increasing strategic importance for Africa considering the dominance of the sector by big businesses domiciling mostly in old and new global powers. Reports from the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace, mandated by the General Assembly, have reached a consensus in acknowledging the applicability of the entire UN Charter, particularly regarding sovereignty, dispute resolution through peaceful means and non-intervention.
The ongoing debate as to whether traditional principles of sovereignty apply to the borderless nature of the digital realm has raised interesting questions regarding the suitability of well-established notions such as territorial control and state authority in the context of cyberspace. Advocates for maintaining sovereignty in the digital domain emphasize the importance of state responsibility for cyber activities within their borders while opposing viewpoints argue that cyberspace challenges conventional sovereignty concepts by surpassing physical boundaries and involving non-state actors. In this regard, the draft CAP will indicate the clear stance of African states on the applicability of the principle of sovereignty to cyberspace and the protection of persons and objects in the territory of a state against the infliction of cyber threats.
On the other hand, the principle of non-intervention, which is considered a natural extension of the sovereign equality of all states, is a fundamental principle of general international law that is also enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act. This principle encompasses the non-interference in matters within a state’s independent decision-making and the use of coercion. In this regard, the draft CAP may clarify the positions of AU member states regarding whether the prohibition of intervention primarily applies between states and does not directly extend to non-state actors, or if it also applies to non-state actors. It cannot be denied that the underlying precepts of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention linked to the fundamental principle of self-determination of all peoples remain relevant and provide the basis for ensuring that the dominance of certain businesses in controlling digital platforms is not instrumentalized, particularly in the context of rising geopolitical tensions, for manipulation and exercising undue influence on African countries, underscoring the importance of these principles vis-à-vis actions of non-state actors as well. Indeed, the international law rule that imposes an obligation on states to ensure that non-state actors operating within their jurisdiction don’t use their territories for engaging in threatening actions against other states can be instructive in this respect. When it comes to coercion, most states hold the position that determining what qualifies as coercion in the cyber context is complex and requires a case-by-case evaluation. Therefore, the draft CAP will likely indicate its stance on the determination of acts of coercion in cyberspace as well.
“It cannot be denied that the underlying precepts of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention linked to the fundamental principle of self-determination of all peoples remain relevant and provide the basis for ensuring that the dominance of certain businesses in controlling digital platforms is not instrumentalized, particularly in the context of rising geopolitical tensions, for manipulation and exercising undue influence on African countries, underscoring the importance of these principles vis-à-vis actions of non-state actors as well. “
The draft CAP is also anticipated to incorporate another component, which is the customary international law principle stated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Article 4(f) of the AU Constitutive Act, prohibiting the use or threat of force. This principle is applied with two exceptions: self-defence in the event of an armed attack and the use of force authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, the determination that is expected to be covered under the draft CAP is whether cyber operations fall under the prohibition of the use of force or not. Furthermore, the draft CAP may provide a position on the interpretation of the right to self-defence as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, as it has been a subject of greater disagreement among member states.
Additionally, the draft CAP is expected to cover the topic of a state’s obligation of due diligence to ensure that its territory is not used to harm other states. Due diligence is a standard of conduct that requires states to take reasonable measures to prevent their territory from being used for activities that could have significant adverse consequences for other states. The draft CAP may provide a position on how the obligation of due diligence of a state should be determined when it comes to the wrongful use of ICTs located within its territory. It may also indicate its stance on determining a state’s knowledge of a wrongful act occurring within its territory.
The draft CAP is expected to comprehensively address the application of general norms of State responsibility to wrongful acts in the cyber context, taking into account the technical challenges in attributing responsibility for cyber operations compared to kinetic operations. It is crucial for the draft CAP to clarify whether rules for attribution under the law of State responsibility also apply in cyberspace, including the attribution of the acts of non-state actors’ conduct to a state. Additionally, the draft CAP may also include the position of states on concerns related to the lack of legal requirements for a state to disclose evidence regarding attribution. Furthermore, the draft CAP will provide guidance on the application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to cyberspace.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is expected to reiterate the pressing need for a Common African Position on the application of international law in cyberspace. Additionally, the PSC is expected to acknowledge the efforts of the AUCIL in updating AU Member States’ representatives and the working group of experts on the latest development of the draft Common African Position in the application of international law to cyberspace. The PSC may endorse the draft Common African Position and recommend presenting it to relevant AU bodies, such as the Specialized Technical Committee (STC) on Justice and Legal Affairs, for wider input. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of Africa’s active engagement in the formulation of international legal principles. In this regard, the Council may also encourage member states to increase their engagement in multilateral debates; which will enhance Africa’s representation as well as the continent’s impact on the development of global standards and frameworks for cyberspace and protection of Africa’s interests.
Consideration of Mid-year report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Consideration of Mid-year report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Date | 23 January 2024
Tomorrow (24 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1194th session to consider the mid-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa, covering the period from July to December 2023 and providing an outlook for 2024.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma A. Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to present the half year report. Statements are also expected from the representatives of Member States that organized elections in the second half of 2023, namely Zimbabwe, Eswatini, Liberia, Madagascar, Egypt, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The Chairperson’s mid-year report on elections in Africa is in line with the PSC’s decision at its 424th session of March 2014 to receive regular briefings on national elections in Africa. The last time the Chairperson presented the half year report was during PSC’s 1165th session held on 31 July 2023, capturing the outcomes of elections organized between January and June 2023. As a continuation of this update, tomorrow’s briefing report will cover elections conducted between July and December 2023 while providing a snapshot of elections held in or planned for the first half of 2024. The report is also expected to shed light on electoral and political governance trends observed during the period under review. In addition, PSC may follow up on the initiatives on the Annual Report on Elections in Africa and the Documentary on AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM), both scheduled for publication and dissemination in the third quarter of 2023.
In the latter part of 2023, seven Member States—Zimbabwe, Gabon, Eswatini, Liberia, Madagascar, Egypt, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—conducted presidential and/or parliamentary elections. AU deployed election observers to all these countries, except Gabon, to assess the electoral process. During the review period, incumbents emerged victorious in all presidential elections with the exception of Liberia, which witnessed a peaceful transfer of power. The re-election of President Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe, President Andry Rajoelina of Madagascar, and President Félix Tshisekedi of DRC also marks their final term in office as stipulated by their respective constitutions.
Despite the generally calm atmosphere in which the elections were conducted, the outcomes in the majority of cases turned out to be highly contentious, indicating a worrisome trend regarding the credibility of the electoral process in the continent. In some cases, such as in Madagascar and the Comoros, elections were marred by boycotts and low turnout.
On 23 August 2023, Zimbabwe held Harmonized elections, covering both presidential and national assembly. The incumbent President, Emmerson Mnangagwa of the ruling ZANU-PF party, was declared winner with 52.6% of the vote against 44% for his main contender, Nelson Chamisa of Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC), according to official results announced by the Electoral Commission. Chamisa rejected the result, alleging irregularities. A preliminary statement by AU-COMESA Election Observation Mission (EOM) concluded that the elections were conducted, in a ‘generally peaceful and transparent manner despite logistical challenges’. The SADC Electoral Observation Mission (SEOM), however, expressed reservations, stating that ‘Some aspects of the Harmonized Elections fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2021)’.
The 26 August general elections in Gabon took a dramatic turn when the military seized power just hours after Gabon’s election commission announced incumbent Ali Bongo’s victory for a third term as a President in a disputed elections, with a reported 64.27% of the vote. Held without the presence of international observers, including from AU, the elections and its outcome were deeply contested. As a form of a palace or a family coup, the military in using the election outcome to intervene confined itself to removing Bongo. In avoiding the option of facilitating proper auditing of the election and make course correction paving the way for democratic change, the junta ensured continuity of the old regime minus Bongo. According to the tentative timetable of the two-year transition period the junta unveiled, elections are anticipated to take place in August 2025, while a new constitution will be put to a referendum in December 2024.
Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Eswatini held ‘peaceful’ parliamentary election on 29 September 2023. This election took place against the backdrop of the violent pro-democracy protests that had shaken the country in 2021/2022 and the brutal murder of prominent human rights activist and lawyer Thulani Maseko. It is to be recalled that SADC issued statement calling for independent investigation into Maseko’s killing.
In November, voters in Liberia and Madagascar went to the polls to elect their leaders. Liberia witnessed yet another successful election after the incumbent President George Weah conceded defeat to opposition leader Joseph Boakai and hence paving the way for another democratic and peaceful transfer of power. Boakai emerged triumphant over Weah in a closely contested two-round race that saw a record voter turnout, securing 50.64% of the vote against Weah’s 49.36%.
In Madagascar’s Presidential election, the incumbent President Andry Rajoelina was declared winner with 59% of the vote in an election marked by opposition boycott and low turnout. Ten out of the 13 Presidential candidates reportedly boycotted the election due to concerns over the credibility of the election and controversy regarding the validity of Rajoelina’s candidacy due to questions surrounding his nationality.
The other high stake election during the review period was the 20 December general elections in DRC. The incumbent President Félix Tshisekedi has been declared winner in a landslide victory – a result rejected by the opposition and challenged by local independent observers but upheld by the constitutional court. Domestic and international missions highlighted significant logistical challenges, which compelled the electoral commission to extend the voting for an additional day. Despite the various logistical challenges and the irregularities surrounding the elections, regional bodies and the AU issued their congratulatory message to President Tshisekedi.
Earlier on 10-12 December, Egypt also conducted a presidential election in which the incumbent President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi emerged victorious, with an overwhelming 89.6% of the vote, as announced by the National Elections Authority in an election lacked serious competition and held in an environment in which the incumbent’s victory was almost a foregone conclusion. The preliminary statement of the joint AU-COMESA election observation mission recommended to Egypt to ‘encourage all political parties to actively participate in the electoral process and ensure adequate representation at polling stations to enhance transparency and credibility.’
In 2024, Africa is set to experience a jam-packed election calendar, with over 20 Presidential and/or parliamentary elections anticipated to unfold. The electoral processes in the Comoros and Senegal are likely to grab the attention of Members of the PSC. The first election of the year took place in the Comoros, featuring both presidential and gubernatorial contests on 14 January. The electoral commission announced the re-election of the incumbent President Azali Assoumani, who is also current chairperson of the AU, securing 62.97% of the vote. Despite this announcement, the opposition has vehemently rejected the election results, alleging fraud and calling for the annulment of the outcome. Authorities reported a shocking low voter turnout of 16%, a figure contested by the opposition, who view the significant disparity in reported turnout between the presidential and regional governor contests, conducted simultaneously, as indicative of electoral irregularities. This development has led to heightened tensions and violent protests in the capital Moroni and elsewhere, prompting the government to impose curfew on 18 January.
Senegal’s presidential election, slated for 25 February, is highly anticipated as it unfolds against the backdrop of the tumultuous final years of President Macky Sall’s tenure, characterized by deadly protests over the conviction of prominent opposition leader, Ousmane Sonko, and speculation that President Sall might seek a third term or is bent on playing king maker. In July, Sall ruled out seeking re-election. Yet, the political saga surrounding Sonko and most notably the extraordinary decision of dissolving Sonko’s political party have casted long shadow over the fairness of the electoral context.
Between May and August, South Africa is poised to hold general elections, anticipated to be the most fiercely contested in the nation’s democratic history. The Presidential election in Mauritania, scheduled for 22 June, is also interesting to watch, with President Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ghazouani vying for re-election in his final term amid a resounding victory for his EI Insaf ruling party in the parliamentary election of May 2023. Togo is also expected to organize its legislative elections within the first half of the year.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. PSC is expected to adopt the report of the chairperson of the commission on Elections in Africa for the period of July-December 2023 and the outlook for first half of 2024. It is also expected to congratulate those Member States that organized elections during the review period, with a particular mention of Liberia for both the relatively credible elections and the concession of defeat by the incumbent that paved the way for peaceful transfer of power. However, it may also express its concerns over persistent challenges faced by African elections, notably election boycotts, low voter turnouts, and controversies arising from the outcomes of elections, which are detrimental to peace, security, and governance of the continent. In this context, the PSC may take the opportunity to address the escalating tension in the Comoros subsequent to the announcement of election results, as well as election disputes in DRC. As majority of Member States currently undergoing political transitions are poised to undertake elections this year, as per the agreed timelines, PSC may consider operationalizing effective mechanisms to enhance its engagement with these countries and monitor progress towards the organization of the elections, collaborating closely with relevant regional mechanisms. In relation to constitutional manipulation, PSC may also reiterate the importance of the AU finalizing and adopting the guidelines on the amendment of constitutions in Africa, which would serve as a framework to ensure that constitutional amendment processes adhere to formal rules and procedures, ensuring that such amendments reflect national consensus.
Situation between Ethiopia and Somalia
Situation between Ethiopia and Somalia
Date | 17 January 2024
Today (17 January) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is set to convene a session on the situation between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma A. Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief the PSC. Representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia are also expected to make statements.
This session was not on the program of work of the PSC. The convening of this session came in the context of the tensions escalating between the two countries after the announcement of an MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a territory that declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but received no recognition from any member of the international community.
It was on 1 January 2024 that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi signed the MoU. According to reports, this deal will grant Addis Ababa twelve miles of sea access along the Somaliland coast for the next five decades, where it plans to construct a naval base. Ethiopia currently relies on Djibouti as a major trade partner, as 95 percent of Ethiopia’s imports and exports pass through Djibouti. Addis Ababa has indicated its strong desire for ways to diversify its access to the sea.
Somalia deemed Ethiopia’s latest MoU with Somaliland as a threat to its territorial integrity. In response, Somalia recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia. Amid the nationalist fury that this development triggered, Somalia officials pronounced their determination to go to war in defence of the territorial integrity of their country. Somalia has also sent requests to the AU and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) to convene meetings on the issue.
Rather than the deal on access to the sea for Ethiopia along the Somaliland coast on its own, the main centre of contention that sparked the tension seems to be the report that in exchange for access to the port of Berbera, Ethiopia would look to recognize Somaliland as an independent country at some point in the future. If indeed this were to happen, Ethiopia would end up being the first country to recognize Somaliland as an independent state.
Apart from bringing the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia to near breaking point, the situation is also fuelling regional tensions. Somalia’s President announced that his country is willing to enlist the support of anyone willing to help the country secure its territorial integrity.
The regional body, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for an Extraordinary Summit to be hosted by Uganda on this situation on 18 January. It is to be recalled that IGAD Executive Secretary issued a statement on 3 January expressing deep concern about these developments between the two countries and calling on the IGAD leaders to be seized with the matter. On 16 January, it is reported that Ethiopia sent a letter to the Chairperson of IGAD, Djibouti, indicating its inability to attend the summit due to short notice and prior commitments.
Regionally, Djibouti, which is also the Chairperson of IGAD, issued a statement calling for respect for territorial integrity of all member states of IGAD. The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat also issued a statement on 3 January calling for calm and mutual respect to de-escalate the simmering tension. Additionally, Mahamat’s statement stressed ‘the imperative to respect unity, territorial integrity and full sovereignty of all African Union member states including the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.’
Further from the region, the European Union (EU) stated ‘the importance of respecting the unity, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia pursuant of its constitution, the Charters of the African Union and the United Nations.’ The Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Arab League also expressed similar views, stating the need ‘to abide by the rules and principles of good neighbourly relations’ and to ‘respect the sovereignty of [neighbouring] countries and not to interfere in their internal affairs’.
As Somalia pushes for the convening of UNSC session, there is pressure on the PSC to provide guidance for the African 3+1 members of the UNSC and set the tone for a possible UNSC meeting. Today’s meeting is accordingly meant to enable the PSC to play its part within the framework of its mandate in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa as set out in the Protocol establishing it.
Apart from the concern about the escalating situation getting out of hand and leading to armed confrontations, members of the PSC are also concerned about the risks of this situation undermining the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), to which Ethiopia is a major troop-contributing country. It is also widely recognized that the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia contributes to putting a check on the terrorist group Al Shabaab. At the same time, the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the nationalist fury it unleashed can easily be instrumentalised by Al Shabaab for its recruitment efforts. Al Shabaab also issued a statement rejecting the MoU and threatening attack against Ethiopia.
Although the exact form of the outcome remains unknown as we go to press, if previous practice of the PSC is any guide, the expected outcome of the session would be a communiqué. The PSC may express its grave concern about the escalating tension between the two countries and emphasize the need for maximum restraint on the part of the two countries to ensure that the situation does not descend into confrontation. The PSC is also expected to welcome the statement issued by the AU Commission Chairperson on 3 January and in that respect urge respect for the principle of territorial integrity of member states which is one of the principles enshrined both in the Constitutive Act establishing the AU and the PSC Protocol. The PSC may also call for a high-level diplomatic effort to avert further escalation and find avenues for peaceful resolution of the situation.
Situation between Ethiopia and Somalia
Situation between Ethiopia and Somalia
Date | 17 January 2024
Today (17 January) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is set to convene a session on the situation between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma A. Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief the PSC. Representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia are also expected to make statements.
This session was not on the program of work of the PSC. The convening of this session came in the context of the tensions escalating between the two countries after the announcement of an MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a territory that declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but received no recognition from any member of the international community.
It was on 1 January 2024 that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi signed the MoU. According to reports, this deal will grant Addis Ababa twelve miles of sea access along the Somaliland coast for the next five decades, where it plans to construct a naval base. Ethiopia currently relies on Djibouti as a major trade partner, as 95 percent of Ethiopia’s imports and exports pass through Djibouti. Addis Ababa has indicated its strong desire for ways to diversify its access to the sea.
Somalia deemed Ethiopia’s latest MoU with Somaliland as a threat to its territorial integrity. In response, Somalia recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia. Amid the nationalist fury that this development triggered, Somalia officials pronounced their determination to go to war in defence of the territorial integrity of their country. Somalia has also sent requests to the AU and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) to convene meetings on the issue.
Rather than the deal on access to the sea for Ethiopia along the Somaliland coast on its own, the main centre of contention that sparked the tension seems to be the report that in exchange for access to the port of Berbera, Ethiopia would look to recognize Somaliland as an independent country at some point in the future. If indeed this were to happen, Ethiopia would end up being the first country to recognize Somaliland as an independent state.
Apart from bringing the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia to near breaking point, the situation is also fuelling regional tensions. Somalia’s President announced that his country is willing to enlist the support of anyone willing to help the country secure its territorial integrity.
The regional body, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called for an Extraordinary Summit to be hosted by Uganda on this situation on 18 January. It is to be recalled that IGAD Executive Secretary issued a statement on 3 January expressing deep concern about these developments between the two countries and calling on the IGAD leaders to be seized with the matter. On 16 January, it is reported that Ethiopia sent a letter to the Chairperson of IGAD, Djibouti, indicating its inability to attend the summit due to short notice and prior commitments.
Regionally, Djibouti, which is also the Chairperson of IGAD, issued a statement calling for respect for territorial integrity of all member states of IGAD. The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat also issued a statement on 3 January calling for calm and mutual respect to de-escalate the simmering tension. Additionally, Mahamat’s statement stressed ‘the imperative to respect unity, territorial integrity and full sovereignty of all African Union member states including the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.’
Further from the region, the European Union (EU) stated ‘the importance of respecting the unity, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia pursuant of its constitution, the Charters of the African Union and the United Nations.’ The Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Arab League also expressed similar views, stating the need ‘to abide by the rules and principles of good neighbourly relations’ and to ‘respect the sovereignty of [neighbouring] countries and not to interfere in their internal affairs’.
As Somalia pushes for the convening of UNSC session, there is pressure on the PSC to provide guidance for the African 3+1 members of the UNSC and set the tone for a possible UNSC meeting. Today’s meeting is accordingly meant to enable the PSC to play its part within the framework of its mandate in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa as set out in the Protocol establishing it.
Apart from the concern about the escalating situation getting out of hand and leading to armed confrontations, members of the PSC are also concerned about the risks of this situation undermining the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), to which Ethiopia is a major troop-contributing country. It is also widely recognized that the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia contributes to putting a check on the terrorist group Al Shabaab. At the same time, the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland and the nationalist fury it unleashed can easily be instrumentalised by Al Shabaab for its recruitment efforts. Al Shabaab also issued a statement rejecting the MoU and threatening attack against Ethiopia.
Although the exact form of the outcome remains unknown as we go to press, if previous practice of the PSC is any guide, the expected outcome of the session would be a communiqué. The PSC may express its grave concern about the escalating tension between the two countries and emphasize the need for maximum restraint on the part of the two countries to ensure that the situation does not descend into confrontation. The PSC is also expected to welcome the statement issued by the AU Commission Chairperson on 3 January and in that respect urge respect for the principle of territorial integrity of member states which is one of the principles enshrined both in the Constitutive Act establishing the AU and the PSC Protocol. The PSC may also call for a high-level diplomatic effort to avert further escalation and find avenues for peaceful resolution of the situation.
