Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Date | 31 October 2022
Tomorrow (31 October), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1116th session to receive a briefing on the situation in the Sahel region as one of the two agenda items tabled for its consideration.
The session is expected to start with an opening remark by Mohammed Arrouchi, the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Mamane Sambo Sidikou, AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, as well as the representatives of the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) are also expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Guinea Bissau and Democratic Republic of Congo will make statements as the current chairs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), respectively. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) is also among the speakers.
The last time the PSC dedicated a stand-alone session on the situation in Sahel was during its 1087th session on 1 June 2022. However, it also considered the political transitions in the countries of the region, namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad at its 1106th sessions in September.
The past few years have shown the spike in the intensity and frequency of terrorist attacks and expansion in the geographic spread of terrorism in the region. The security outlook of the region is even more bleak in 2022 as a recent report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) confirms. ACLED’s 2022 mid-year update on Sahel notes that instability in Sahel is ‘persisting, expanding, and escalating’. Same update indicates that ‘2022 is on track to be the deadliest year for both Burkina Faso and Mali’ since the onset of the crisis more than a decade ago. Conflict intensity remains highest in Burkina Faso among Sahelian states in the first half of 2022, while Mali takes the lead in terms of the reported fatalities. Recent spike of fatalities in Mali puts the country back to its place as ‘the epicentre of the crisis after being surpassed by Burkina Faso in the count of conflict-related deaths in two of the last three years’. However, the situation in Niger seems to be improving in 2022 after registering 129% increase of fatalities in 2021. Worsening security situation is also fuelling political instability in the region as observed in Burkina Faso, which witnessed a coup within a coup this month. The coup came few days after an ambush on a supply convoy on its way to the town of Djibo, capital of the Soum province which remains under blockade for months, reportedly killed 27 soldiers and 10 civilians.
Trends of fatalities
(Source: Jeune Afrique and ACLED)
International security partnerships in the region are facing major setbacks at a time when strong cooperation and coordination is desperately needed. One month after its decision to leave the G5 Sahel Joint Force, on 14 June, Mali’s military authorities announced to end the commitment of Malian personnel serving in the western zone (Mali-Mauritania) and central zone (Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger) as of 30 June. Following this step, Mission’s headquarters were relocated from Bamako to N’djamena while terminating its operational and logistics support for the Malian battalions. The security situation in the three-border area worsened as cross-border cooperation decreased, resulting in the spike of civilian casualties. According to the 3 October 2022 UN Secretary-General report on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), ‘the death toll for just the first half of 2022 represented more than 90 per cent of the annual toll for 2021’. The last French military unit of Barkhane forces also left Mali on 15 August after a fallout between the two countries following the 24 May coup. Relations between Mali’s transitional authorities and MINUSMA have become increasingly strained, compromising MINUSMA’s ability to discharge its mandate.
Meanwhile, in September, the Independent High-Level Panel led by former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou was launched to undertake an Independent Strategic Assessment of the situation in Sahel. Its findings are expected to be presented to the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly in February 2023. Up on its conclusion, the assessment is hoped to offer a deeper understanding of the complex security-governance-development crisis in Sahel and provide guidance on how to effectively address the challenge at a structural level.
On the political front, the region is marked by setbacks in political transitions in Burkina Faso and Chad. In Burkina Faso, on 30 September, army Captain Ibrahim Traore deposed military leader President Paul-Henri Damiba who himself came to power on 24 January of this year overthrowing democratically elected President Roch Kabore. New coup leaders announced the dissolution of interim government and transitional national legislative, and suspension of the transitional charter. Both ECOWAS and AU issued statements condemning the military coup, also calling upon the military authorities to ensure strict compliance to the already agreed transition timetable of 24 months with electoral deadlines for the restoration of constitutional order by 1 July 2024. Two weeks after seizure of power, on 14 October, a national forum of 300 delegates from different groups opened to consider a transition charter and appoint a new interim president in line with a charter. Accordingly, Traore was appointed as transition president until elections are held in July 2024, who in turn named a civilian Prime Minister on 21 October. The forum also adopted part of the charter that prohibits transition president from standing in the upcoming elections. Against this backdrop, two main concerns of ECOWAS and AU on transition timeline and eligibility of interim president in upcoming elections seem to be addressed by the military authorities, which may help the latter to avoid further sanctions from the regional bodies.
In Mali, on 11 October, a Constitutional Commission handed over the preliminary draft of a new Constitution to the President of the transition, Colonel Assimi Goita, which is expected to be put to a referendum in March 2023. The draft of a new constitution could be seen as a right step towards laying out a new social contract that presents Mali a fresh opportunity to forge consensus around the nature, aspirations, and principles of the political state. The draft constitution also forms part of series of decisions by Mali’s transitional authorities in recent months, including the adoption of a new electoral law and the creation of the Independent Electoral Management Authority, and submission of acceptable transition timetable of 24 months. In light of these progress made, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS lifted the economic and financial sanctions in July although it maintains the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups. During the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) in September, Mali requested the lifting of the remaining sanctions imposed by AU and the regional bloc. The PSC in its last session of 19 September 2022 took note of Mali’s progress but this did not lead to the lifting of the sanction that Council imposed during its 1001st meeting of June 2021.
In Chad, the transition has backtracked following Chad’s Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue extended the transition period for additional 24 months and allowed members of the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) to run in upcoming elections. Accordingly, on 10 October, Chad’s military leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno was sworn in as President of a two-year transitional period, triggering deadly protests on 20 October that left around 50 people dead and hundreds injured. Both the proposed new timeline and participation of members of the TMC in the upcoming elections contradict the list of conditions of transition set out by the Council during its 996th session of May 2021. It is to be recalled that PSC went out of step with its own established norms and practices when it failed to sanction Chad for the April 2021 military takeover of power. Instead, Council, at its 996th session, requested the TMC, among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. These conditions, reiterated during Council’s 1106th meeting convened on 19 September 2022, have now been breached. Given that the PSC withheld the application of Article 7(1)(g) on suspension of a member state upon the occurrence of unconstitutional change of government such as by seizure of power by the military and suspension of constitutional processes as happened in Chad on the premise of these conditions, the breach of these conditions necessitate the revisiting of PSC’s decision on applying suspension pursuit to Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol.
On the humanitarian front, the condition has not showed any improvement since Council’s lasting meeting on the situation in Sahel in June. The rising insecurity, political volatility, climatic and demographic pressures coupled with elevated global prices for agricultural commodities are exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation in the region. According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, forced displacement is at ‘an unprecedented high, with over 4 million refugees and internally displace peoples’ across the Sahel in 2022. In Burkina Faso, ‘Violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crisis in the world, according to a latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. Food insecurity has reached ‘alarming levels’ in the region. WFP and FAO recent report highlights that during the June–August 2022 period, around 13 million people were projected to be acutely food insecure, at Crisis level or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in the region. This is a nearly 50 percent increase compared to 2021, and over 120 percent higher than the five‑year average. With terrorist activity expanding geographically, some sources claim that up to 40 per cent of Burkina Faso’s territory is outside state control. Several towns including Djibo are under the blockade of terrorist groups, cutting off population’s access to basic goods and services.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its grave concern over the expanding and escalating threat of terrorism in the Sahel, as well as its impact on the political stability and humanitarian situation of the region. While Council may stress the importance of coordinated military response against terrorist groups in the region, it may also emphasize the importance of a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that would address the multi-layered structural drivers of the scourge. In this respect, Council is likely to welcome the formal launch of the Independent High-Level Panel led by Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou and may look forward to its outcome before the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Given that Mali remains a key theatre for the fight against terrorism in the region and taking G5 Sahel joint Force’s critical role in this context, Council may urge countries of the G5 Sahel to engage in dialogue to iron out difference on the presidency of the institution and other underlying contentions. On Mali-Cote d’Ivoire tension over the 46 Ivorian soldiers, Council may echo the call made by ECOWAS summit for their unconditional release. On the political transitions in countries of the region, Council is likely to express its disappointment over transition rollback in Burkina Faso and Chad. In relation to Burkina Faso, Council may reiterate the call of the chairperson of the AU Commission for military authorities to ‘ensure strict compliance with electoral deadlines for the restoration of Constitutional order by 1 July 2024, at the latest’. On Chad, the PSC is well placed to revise its earlier decision of not applying suspension if conditions set out for transition were not fulfilled and use its Article 7(1)(g) responsibility for ensuring the credibility of its decision and the relevant norm on unconstitutional changes of government. In addition, Council may condemn the violence that occurred on 20 October against protesters and may further call for a credible investigation into the killings of the protesters.
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Date | 31 October 2022
Tomorrow (31 October), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1116th session to receive a briefing on the situation in the Sahel region as one of the two agenda items tabled for its consideration.
The session is expected to start with an opening remark by Mohammed Arrouchi, the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Mamane Sambo Sidikou, AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, as well as the representatives of the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) are also expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Guinea Bissau and Democratic Republic of Congo will make statements as the current chairs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), respectively. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) is also among the speakers.
The last time the PSC dedicated a stand-alone session on the situation in Sahel was during its 1087th session on 1 June 2022. However, it also considered the political transitions in the countries of the region, namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad at its 1106th sessions in September.
The past few years have shown the spike in the intensity and frequency of terrorist attacks and expansion in the geographic spread of terrorism in the region. The security outlook of the region is even more bleak in 2022 as a recent report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) confirms. ACLED’s 2022 mid-year update on Sahel notes that instability in Sahel is ‘persisting, expanding, and escalating’. Same update indicates that ‘2022 is on track to be the deadliest year for both Burkina Faso and Mali’ since the onset of the crisis more than a decade ago. Conflict intensity remains highest in Burkina Faso among Sahelian states in the first half of 2022, while Mali takes the lead in terms of the reported fatalities. Recent spike of fatalities in Mali puts the country back to its place as ‘the epicentre of the crisis after being surpassed by Burkina Faso in the count of conflict-related deaths in two of the last three years’. However, the situation in Niger seems to be improving in 2022 after registering 129% increase of fatalities in 2021. Worsening security situation is also fuelling political instability in the region as observed in Burkina Faso, which witnessed a coup within a coup this month. The coup came few days after an ambush on a supply convoy on its way to the town of Djibo, capital of the Soum province which remains under blockade for months, reportedly killed 27 soldiers and 10 civilians.
Trends of fatalities
(Source: Jeune Afrique and ACLED)
International security partnerships in the region are facing major setbacks at a time when strong cooperation and coordination is desperately needed. One month after its decision to leave the G5 Sahel Joint Force, on 14 June, Mali’s military authorities announced to end the commitment of Malian personnel serving in the western zone (Mali-Mauritania) and central zone (Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger) as of 30 June. Following this step, Mission’s headquarters were relocated from Bamako to N’djamena while terminating its operational and logistics support for the Malian battalions. The security situation in the three-border area worsened as cross-border cooperation decreased, resulting in the spike of civilian casualties. According to the 3 October 2022 UN Secretary-General report on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), ‘the death toll for just the first half of 2022 represented more than 90 per cent of the annual toll for 2021’. The last French military unit of Barkhane forces also left Mali on 15 August after a fallout between the two countries following the 24 May coup. Relations between Mali’s transitional authorities and MINUSMA have become increasingly strained, compromising MINUSMA’s ability to discharge its mandate.
Meanwhile, in September, the Independent High-Level Panel led by former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou was launched to undertake an Independent Strategic Assessment of the situation in Sahel. Its findings are expected to be presented to the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly in February 2023. Up on its conclusion, the assessment is hoped to offer a deeper understanding of the complex security-governance-development crisis in Sahel and provide guidance on how to effectively address the challenge at a structural level.
On the political front, the region is marked by setbacks in political transitions in Burkina Faso and Chad. In Burkina Faso, on 30 September, army Captain Ibrahim Traore deposed military leader President Paul-Henri Damiba who himself came to power on 24 January of this year overthrowing democratically elected President Roch Kabore. New coup leaders announced the dissolution of interim government and transitional national legislative, and suspension of the transitional charter. Both ECOWAS and AU issued statements condemning the military coup, also calling upon the military authorities to ensure strict compliance to the already agreed transition timetable of 24 months with electoral deadlines for the restoration of constitutional order by 1 July 2024. Two weeks after seizure of power, on 14 October, a national forum of 300 delegates from different groups opened to consider a transition charter and appoint a new interim president in line with a charter. Accordingly, Traore was appointed as transition president until elections are held in July 2024, who in turn named a civilian Prime Minister on 21 October. The forum also adopted part of the charter that prohibits transition president from standing in the upcoming elections. Against this backdrop, two main concerns of ECOWAS and AU on transition timeline and eligibility of interim president in upcoming elections seem to be addressed by the military authorities, which may help the latter to avoid further sanctions from the regional bodies.
In Mali, on 11 October, a Constitutional Commission handed over the preliminary draft of a new Constitution to the President of the transition, Colonel Assimi Goita, which is expected to be put to a referendum in March 2023. The draft of a new constitution could be seen as a right step towards laying out a new social contract that presents Mali a fresh opportunity to forge consensus around the nature, aspirations, and principles of the political state. The draft constitution also forms part of series of decisions by Mali’s transitional authorities in recent months, including the adoption of a new electoral law and the creation of the Independent Electoral Management Authority, and submission of acceptable transition timetable of 24 months. In light of these progress made, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS lifted the economic and financial sanctions in July although it maintains the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups. During the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) in September, Mali requested the lifting of the remaining sanctions imposed by AU and the regional bloc. The PSC in its last session of 19 September 2022 took note of Mali’s progress but this did not lead to the lifting of the sanction that Council imposed during its 1001st meeting of June 2021.
In Chad, the transition has backtracked following Chad’s Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue extended the transition period for additional 24 months and allowed members of the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) to run in upcoming elections. Accordingly, on 10 October, Chad’s military leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno was sworn in as President of a two-year transitional period, triggering deadly protests on 20 October that left around 50 people dead and hundreds injured. Both the proposed new timeline and participation of members of the TMC in the upcoming elections contradict the list of conditions of transition set out by the Council during its 996th session of May 2021. It is to be recalled that PSC went out of step with its own established norms and practices when it failed to sanction Chad for the April 2021 military takeover of power. Instead, Council, at its 996th session, requested the TMC, among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. These conditions, reiterated during Council’s 1106th meeting convened on 19 September 2022, have now been breached. Given that the PSC withheld the application of Article 7(1)(g) on suspension of a member state upon the occurrence of unconstitutional change of government such as by seizure of power by the military and suspension of constitutional processes as happened in Chad on the premise of these conditions, the breach of these conditions necessitate the revisiting of PSC’s decision on applying suspension pursuit to Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol.
On the humanitarian front, the condition has not showed any improvement since Council’s lasting meeting on the situation in Sahel in June. The rising insecurity, political volatility, climatic and demographic pressures coupled with elevated global prices for agricultural commodities are exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation in the region. According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, forced displacement is at ‘an unprecedented high, with over 4 million refugees and internally displace peoples’ across the Sahel in 2022. In Burkina Faso, ‘Violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crisis in the world, according to a latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. Food insecurity has reached ‘alarming levels’ in the region. WFP and FAO recent report highlights that during the June–August 2022 period, around 13 million people were projected to be acutely food insecure, at Crisis level or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in the region. This is a nearly 50 percent increase compared to 2021, and over 120 percent higher than the five‑year average. With terrorist activity expanding geographically, some sources claim that up to 40 per cent of Burkina Faso’s territory is outside state control. Several towns including Djibo are under the blockade of terrorist groups, cutting off population’s access to basic goods and services.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its grave concern over the expanding and escalating threat of terrorism in the Sahel, as well as its impact on the political stability and humanitarian situation of the region. While Council may stress the importance of coordinated military response against terrorist groups in the region, it may also emphasize the importance of a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that would address the multi-layered structural drivers of the scourge. In this respect, Council is likely to welcome the formal launch of the Independent High-Level Panel led by Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou and may look forward to its outcome before the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Given that Mali remains a key theatre for the fight against terrorism in the region and taking G5 Sahel joint Force’s critical role in this context, Council may urge countries of the G5 Sahel to engage in dialogue to iron out difference on the presidency of the institution and other underlying contentions. On Mali-Cote d’Ivoire tension over the 46 Ivorian soldiers, Council may echo the call made by ECOWAS summit for their unconditional release. On the political transitions in countries of the region, Council is likely to express its disappointment over transition rollback in Burkina Faso and Chad. In relation to Burkina Faso, Council may reiterate the call of the chairperson of the AU Commission for military authorities to ‘ensure strict compliance with electoral deadlines for the restoration of Constitutional order by 1 July 2024, at the latest’. On Chad, the PSC is well placed to revise its earlier decision of not applying suspension if conditions set out for transition were not fulfilled and use its Article 7(1)(g) responsibility for ensuring the credibility of its decision and the relevant norm on unconstitutional changes of government. In addition, Council may condemn the violence that occurred on 20 October against protesters and may further call for a credible investigation into the killings of the protesters.
Update on the situation in CAR and the operations of MOUACA
Update on the situation in CAR and the operations of MOUACA
Date | 31 October 2022
Tomorrow (31 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1116th session to receive updates on the situation in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) and operations of the AU Military Observer Mission in CAR (MOUACA).
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, H.E. Ambassador Mohammed Arrouchi, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) for CAR, Bertino Matias Matondo will also brief Council. Representative of CAR, as the concerned country, and representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as Chair of Economic Community of East African States (ECCAS) are also expected to make statements.
The last time Council met to assess the situation in CAR and operations of MOUACA was at its 1093rd session convened on 25 July 2022. Having deliberated on developments in relation to the political, security and humanitarian situations in the country including implementation of peace processes and status of operations of MOUACA, Council underscored key action points at the session, including for the AU Commission to report back to it before the end of October 2022, on issues relating to financial support and continuation of activities of MOUACA, based on consultations with relevant actors. Tomorrow’s session serves to follow up on this and other decisions of the 1093rd meeting.
CAR’s political climate largely remains tense and charged with contentions between the government, opposition political parties and armed groups intensifying. Despite the convening of a republican dialogue launched by President Touadera in March 2022 with the hopes of resolving some of the existing differences in CAR’s political processes and peace and reconciliation efforts, the dialogue seems to have created additional controversies while failing to outline concreate proposals that can advance prompt national reconciliation, consolidation of peace and economic recovery for CAR. The dialogue which involved 450 participants and ended with over 600 recommendations – majority of which are identical to those adopted at the 2015 Bangui Forum but apparently remain unimplemented – demonstrated the extent to which absence of adequate structures and serious commitment for implementation contributes to the continuation of CAR’s crisis.
In addition, the dialogue was conducted in the absence of key opponents and rebel armed groups. The Democratic Opposition Coalition (COD-2020), an alliance of political opposition groups which has been very vocal in contesting the conditions under which the controversial elections of December 2020 took place, was among the political groups that boycotted the dialogue. Despite various stakeholders’ position that involving armed groups in the dialogue would be essential, the government stood its ground that these groups excluded themselves from the national reconciliation process when they took up arms. As a result, armed actors including the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), were not part of the dialogue.
Aside from lack of inclusivity, there were also suspicions on the side of opposition groups that the republican dialogue would be used to advance the ruling party’s agenda of constitutional amendment with the purpose of securing another term in office for the incumbent President. Proving these suspicions correct, a proposal for constitutional amendment was made at the dialogue, although the proposal was reportedly withdrawn before the final adoption of the recommendations. Regardless, a constitutional referendum to bring amendments to CAR’s constitution was announced on 12 August 2022 by President Touadera, an initiative proposed by the National Assembly’s presidential majority. This was followed by rampant opposition group protests while the government also organised public demonstrations in support of amending the constitution.
Among other points, the proposed constitutional amendment included the removal of presidential term limits; modification of the composition of the Constitutional Court as to allow membership to Heads of State; and prohibition of dual citizenship for presidential candidates. On 23 September 2022, the CAR Constitutional Court blocked the constitutional referendum process through the adoption of a decision that nullifies a series of presidential decrees that aimed to establish a constitution drafting committee. On 25 October, President Touadera fired the Head of the Constitutional Court citing a 2017 Regulation to the effect of declaring the judge to be subject to “definitive preclusion” from office. The president’s move has been labelled by oppositions as a “constitutional coup” intended to extend his term in office. A critical point to reflect on for PSC members with regards to these developments is that further to impeding progress in CAR’s national reconciliation and peace consolidation processes, they also entail new challenges including a possible coup which will further complicate the existing situation.
Added to this political context, the deteriorating security situation continues to challenge implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (PAPR) in CAR. This has been apparent from the hundreds of violations of the agreement that continue to be recorded. The most recent available data recorded by the UN presents 431 violations of the PAPR as of 01 October 2022, a substantial increase from the 374 violations recorded by the UN in the period from February to June 2022. These violations include attacks against civilians, illegal military activities, restrictions of movements and obstruction of humanitarian and State activities and were perpetrated by both armed groups and defence forces of the State. In addition to these incidents, multiple signatories to the PAPR have also been found in violation of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) – 402 incidents of human rights abuses and IHL violations against 1,552 victims recoded by the UN in the period between 02 June and 01 October 2022. Ensuring implementation of PAPR commitments by armed groups cannot be achieved without sufficient and sustained engagement with these actors. The republican dialogue’s exclusion of armed groups has been a missed opportunity in this regard. On the other hand, the Luanda Roadmap launched by the ICGLR in September 2021 which aims among others, to ensure consultation of ICGLR Heads of States with leaders of armed groups to advance total renunciation of violence, remains to be an important framework for the realisation of commitments made in the PAPR.
The humanitarian situation in CAR also remains grave. In addition to displacement constantly fuelled by cycles of violence, CAR is also affected by occasional natural disasters that adds to the existing humanitarian toll. Out of its total population of 4.9 million people, 3.1 million are assessed by the UN as people that require humanitarian assistance. Food-insecurity is also a major challenge in CAR with 2.2 million people declared as food-insecure. As off the beginning of October 2022, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in CAR have reached a total of 484,335, a figure to which the floods of June 2022 highly contributed. In addition to displacing significant number of people, the floods which affected 176 towns and villages also destroyed more than 2,600 houses and 18,500 hectares of crops, exacerbating existing humanitarian needs.
The status of MOUACA’s operations forms another important part of tomorrow’s deliberations. In line with the 936th PSC Communiqué which authorises MOUACA, the mission’s mandate will be expiring at the end of this month following the three-month extension at the 1093rd session of the PSC. Whether the mission’s mandate will be renewed or not depends largely on the availability of funds for its continued operations, particularly the outcomes of AU Commission’s engagement with the EU, in line with the communiqué of Council’s 1093rd session. Having been operationalised based on funds derived from the European Peace facility (EPF), the mission’s deployment was suspended on 31 July 2022, at the end date of the EPF’s funding period. Possibility of extension of funds within the framework of EPF has seemed unlikely considering the level of operationalization of the mission which so far used €1,100,915 of the €9,551,897 that was granted. Indeed, discussions subsequent to the 1093rd session of the PSC did not change the funding issues of MOUACA.
On the AU’s side, the reasons tabled for MOUACA’s limitations in attaining its objectives and utilising its funds effectively are related to the security situation throughout CAR and the absence of sufficient and effective protection for MOUACA personnel by CAR security forces. Indeed, one of the points observed from the EU’s side in deciding to freeze MOUACA’s funds was also this very aspect of dangerous security situation in CAR which has made deployment of the observers outside of Bangui difficult, demonstrating the need for protection by UN forces or through expansion of MOUACA capacity to provide protection to its own personnel. It is to be recalled that in addition to monitoring and supporting the overall implementation of PAPR, MOUACA was mandated to assess progress of the activities of the Joint Special Security Units (USMS) and contribute towards efforts in the areas of protection of civilians (PoC) and protection of resources necessary for CAR’s economic recovery. In light of the realities on the ground, while MOUACA still has much to do in the areas of these mandates, unless alternative means for financing the mission are found, it may be necessary to consolidate or transfer the mandate of MOUACA into MISCA, AU’s political mission in CAR.
The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council may express concern over the latest political developments in the country including attempts made to manipulate constitutional term limit through amendment of the 2016 CAR Constitution and advice against any moves that will put at risk advances made in the country’s peace processes. It may condemn the continued violation of the PAPR by armed groups and urge concerned groups to abide by the commitments they have entered. Council may call on the international community to redouble humanitarian efforts in CAR in light of the grave circumstances. Regarding MOUACA, Council may either decide to renew the mission’s mandate or call for the transfer of its activities to the AU Mission in CAR (MISAC), depending on the recommendations of the AU Commission informed by consultations with the EU. It may also take note of the limited human and financial resource constraining effective functioning of the AU Liaison Office in Bangui and reiterate its repeated requests for the AU Commission to take all necessary measures to fully equip and capacitate the Office, in order to ensure that it effectively discharge its duties including ‘support for the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement, taking into account the role of the AU as Guarantor of this Agreement’ (1011th Communiqué) and to explore all options including modalities to utilise the AU Peace Fund (979th Communiqué).
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Briefing on the situation in the Sahel region
Date | 31 October 2022
Tomorrow (31 October), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1116th session to receive a briefing on the situation in the Sahel region as one of the two agenda items tabled for its consideration.
The session is expected to start with an opening remark by Mohammed Arrouchi, the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Mamane Sambo Sidikou, AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, as well as the representatives of the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) are also expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Guinea Bissau and Democratic Republic of Congo will make statements as the current chairs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), respectively. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) is also among the speakers.
The last time the PSC dedicated a stand-alone session on the situation in Sahel was during its 1087th session on 1 June 2022. However, it also considered the political transitions in the countries of the region, namely Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad at its 1106th sessions in September.
The past few years have shown the spike in the intensity and frequency of terrorist attacks and expansion in the geographic spread of terrorism in the region. The security outlook of the region is even more bleak in 2022 as a recent report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) confirms. ACLED’s 2022 mid-year update on Sahel notes that instability in Sahel is ‘persisting, expanding, and escalating’. Same update indicates that ‘2022 is on track to be the deadliest year for both Burkina Faso and Mali’ since the onset of the crisis more than a decade ago. Conflict intensity remains highest in Burkina Faso among Sahelian states in the first half of 2022, while Mali takes the lead in terms of the reported fatalities. Recent spike of fatalities in Mali puts the country back to its place as ‘the epicentre of the crisis after being surpassed by Burkina Faso in the count of conflict-related deaths in two of the last three years’. However, the situation in Niger seems to be improving in 2022 after registering 129% increase of fatalities in 2021. Worsening security situation is also fuelling political instability in the region as observed in Burkina Faso, which witnessed a coup within a coup this month. The coup came few days after an ambush on a supply convoy on its way to the town of Djibo, capital of the Soum province which remains under blockade for months, reportedly killed 27 soldiers and 10 civilians.
Trends of fatalities
(Source: Jeune Afrique and ACLED)
International security partnerships in the region are facing major setbacks at a time when strong cooperation and coordination is desperately needed. One month after its decision to leave the G5 Sahel Joint Force, on 14 June, Mali’s military authorities announced to end the commitment of Malian personnel serving in the western zone (Mali-Mauritania) and central zone (Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger) as of 30 June. Following this step, Mission’s headquarters were relocated from Bamako to N’djamena while terminating its operational and logistics support for the Malian battalions. The security situation in the three-border area worsened as cross-border cooperation decreased, resulting in the spike of civilian casualties. According to the 3 October 2022 UN Secretary-General report on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), ‘the death toll for just the first half of 2022 represented more than 90 per cent of the annual toll for 2021’. The last French military unit of Barkhane forces also left Mali on 15 August after a fallout between the two countries following the 24 May coup. Relations between Mali’s transitional authorities and MINUSMA have become increasingly strained, compromising MINUSMA’s ability to discharge its mandate.
Meanwhile, in September, the Independent High-Level Panel led by former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou was launched to undertake an Independent Strategic Assessment of the situation in Sahel. Its findings are expected to be presented to the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly in February 2023. Up on its conclusion, the assessment is hoped to offer a deeper understanding of the complex security-governance-development crisis in Sahel and provide guidance on how to effectively address the challenge at a structural level.
On the political front, the region is marked by setbacks in political transitions in Burkina Faso and Chad. In Burkina Faso, on 30 September, army Captain Ibrahim Traore deposed military leader President Paul-Henri Damiba who himself came to power on 24 January of this year overthrowing democratically elected President Roch Kabore. New coup leaders announced the dissolution of interim government and transitional national legislative, and suspension of the transitional charter. Both ECOWAS and AU issued statements condemning the military coup, also calling upon the military authorities to ensure strict compliance to the already agreed transition timetable of 24 months with electoral deadlines for the restoration of constitutional order by 1 July 2024. Two weeks after seizure of power, on 14 October, a national forum of 300 delegates from different groups opened to consider a transition charter and appoint a new interim president in line with a charter. Accordingly, Traore was appointed as transition president until elections are held in July 2024, who in turn named a civilian Prime Minister on 21 October. The forum also adopted part of the charter that prohibits transition president from standing in the upcoming elections. Against this backdrop, two main concerns of ECOWAS and AU on transition timeline and eligibility of interim president in upcoming elections seem to be addressed by the military authorities, which may help the latter to avoid further sanctions from the regional bodies.
In Mali, on 11 October, a Constitutional Commission handed over the preliminary draft of a new Constitution to the President of the transition, Colonel Assimi Goita, which is expected to be put to a referendum in March 2023. The draft of a new constitution could be seen as a right step towards laying out a new social contract that presents Mali a fresh opportunity to forge consensus around the nature, aspirations, and principles of the political state. The draft constitution also forms part of series of decisions by Mali’s transitional authorities in recent months, including the adoption of a new electoral law and the creation of the Independent Electoral Management Authority, and submission of acceptable transition timetable of 24 months. In light of these progress made, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS lifted the economic and financial sanctions in July although it maintains the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups. During the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) in September, Mali requested the lifting of the remaining sanctions imposed by AU and the regional bloc. The PSC in its last session of 19 September 2022 took note of Mali’s progress but this did not lead to the lifting of the sanction that Council imposed during its 1001st meeting of June 2021.
In Chad, the transition has backtracked following Chad’s Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue extended the transition period for additional 24 months and allowed members of the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) to run in upcoming elections. Accordingly, on 10 October, Chad’s military leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno was sworn in as President of a two-year transitional period, triggering deadly protests on 20 October that left around 50 people dead and hundreds injured. Both the proposed new timeline and participation of members of the TMC in the upcoming elections contradict the list of conditions of transition set out by the Council during its 996th session of May 2021. It is to be recalled that PSC went out of step with its own established norms and practices when it failed to sanction Chad for the April 2021 military takeover of power. Instead, Council, at its 996th session, requested the TMC, among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. These conditions, reiterated during Council’s 1106th meeting convened on 19 September 2022, have now been breached. Given that the PSC withheld the application of Article 7(1)(g) on suspension of a member state upon the occurrence of unconstitutional change of government such as by seizure of power by the military and suspension of constitutional processes as happened in Chad on the premise of these conditions, the breach of these conditions necessitate the revisiting of PSC’s decision on applying suspension pursuit to Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol.
On the humanitarian front, the condition has not showed any improvement since Council’s lasting meeting on the situation in Sahel in June. The rising insecurity, political volatility, climatic and demographic pressures coupled with elevated global prices for agricultural commodities are exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation in the region. According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, forced displacement is at ‘an unprecedented high, with over 4 million refugees and internally displace peoples’ across the Sahel in 2022. In Burkina Faso, ‘Violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crisis in the world, according to a latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. Food insecurity has reached ‘alarming levels’ in the region. WFP and FAO recent report highlights that during the June–August 2022 period, around 13 million people were projected to be acutely food insecure, at Crisis level or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in the region. This is a nearly 50 percent increase compared to 2021, and over 120 percent higher than the five‑year average. With terrorist activity expanding geographically, some sources claim that up to 40 per cent of Burkina Faso’s territory is outside state control. Several towns including Djibo are under the blockade of terrorist groups, cutting off population’s access to basic goods and services.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its grave concern over the expanding and escalating threat of terrorism in the Sahel, as well as its impact on the political stability and humanitarian situation of the region. While Council may stress the importance of coordinated military response against terrorist groups in the region, it may also emphasize the importance of a comprehensive counterterrorism approach that would address the multi-layered structural drivers of the scourge. In this respect, Council is likely to welcome the formal launch of the Independent High-Level Panel led by Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou and may look forward to its outcome before the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly. Given that Mali remains a key theatre for the fight against terrorism in the region and taking G5 Sahel joint Force’s critical role in this context, Council may urge countries of the G5 Sahel to engage in dialogue to iron out difference on the presidency of the institution and other underlying contentions. On Mali-Cote d’Ivoire tension over the 46 Ivorian soldiers, Council may echo the call made by ECOWAS summit for their unconditional release. On the political transitions in countries of the region, Council is likely to express its disappointment over transition rollback in Burkina Faso and Chad. In relation to Burkina Faso, Council may reiterate the call of the chairperson of the AU Commission for military authorities to ‘ensure strict compliance with electoral deadlines for the restoration of Constitutional order by 1 July 2024, at the latest’. On Chad, the PSC is well placed to revise its earlier decision of not applying suspension if conditions set out for transition were not fulfilled and use its Article 7(1)(g) responsibility for ensuring the credibility of its decision and the relevant norm on unconstitutional changes of government. In addition, Council may condemn the violence that occurred on 20 October against protesters and may further call for a credible investigation into the killings of the protesters.
Briefing on the AU led peace process for Ethiopia
Briefing on the AU led peace process for Ethiopia
Date | 21 October 2022
Tomorrow (21 October), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1115th session for a ‘Briefing on the AU led peace process for Ethiopia’. The meeting was not initially included in the monthly programme of work of the Council.
Following opening remarks by Mohammed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a statement. Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria and AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa is also expected to provide update to the PSC. The representatives of Ethiopia and the regional body the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are also expected to deliver statements as the concerned country and regional economic community, respectively.
It is to be recalled that the PSC held its last meeting on the situation in Ethiopia on 4 August 2022 at its 1097th session. Since that time, the situation in the conflict has dramatically changed for worse. Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to focus on two issues. The first relate to the current state of the hostilities that resumed on 24 August. The second area of focus of tomorrow’s session will be the preparations for the peace talks that the AU has been working to get off the ground.
Tomorrow’s session comes in the context of three important developments. The first relate to developments on the battle front where significant escalation of violence has been witnessed in recent weeks. Ethiopia’s federal government announced the capture of three strategic towns in Tigray (Shire in northwest, and Alamata and Korem in South of Tigray) after weeks of fighting in which Eritrean Defense Forces play major part in the hostilities between Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) supported by regional Amhara forces on one side and the Tigray forces on the other.
It is to be recalled that fighting resumed between federal government and Tigray region on 24 August after five months of lull in violence. The resumption of hostilities collapsed the truce that was in force following the 24 March 2022 declaration by the Federal Government declared an ‘indefinite humanitarian truce’ and its subsequent reciprocation by Tigray forces by expressing willingness to respect the truce and cessation of hostilities on condition that adequate and timely humanitarian assistance are provided. Between March and August, the diplomatic engagements by the AU High-Representative for the Horn of Africa, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, along with his US, EU and UN counterparts were hoped to make headways towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict that has taken a heavy human toll since its eruption in November 2020. However, tension began to mount again as diplomatic interventions by the various special envoys failed to build up on and translate the momentum witnessed between March and August into meaningful peace talks towards an agreed cessation of hostilities and comprehensive political settlement. Meanwhile, as diplomatic efforts failed to make headways, concerns have been expressed about the inadequacy and unsustainability of the ‘indefinite humanitarian truce’, including deepening differences over the flow of humanitarian assistance and the resumption of basic services to Tigray, which has been cut off from electricity, telecom, banking, and other basic utilities. Against the background of military buildup on all sides and the failure of regional and international actors to take these differences seriously and mobilize stronger efforts to iron them out, attacks and subsequent seizure of territories in the neighboring Amhara region by Tigray forces triggered the resumption of hostilities in various border areas of Tigray.
The second context in which tomorrow’s session is held is the proposed convening of UN Security Council’s meeting on 21 October on the ongoing hostilities in Tigray. This meeting, being convened on the request of the African 3 (A3) members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), brings the total number of Security Council’s meetings on this conflict situation to fifteen since the outbreak of the conflict in November 2020.
The proposed convening of the UNSC meeting comes in the context of growing anxiety about both the scale and gravity of the bloodshed the nature of hostilities are feared and reported to be precipitating and aggravating an already dire situation for civilians who have already endured enormous suffering since the start of the war. Regional and international actors as well as partners have intensified their call for the immediate cessation of hostilities as intensifying fighting continues deeper into Tigray, raising the alarm over worsening humanitarian crisis and the susceptibility of the context of the hostilities for atrocities. The AU, widely perceived as responding inadequately to this situation, was on the lead in calling for an end of the hostilities. In a statement issued on 15 October, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat expressed his ‘grave concern’ over the ‘reports of increased fighting in the Tigray Region’ and called for an ‘immediate, unconditional ceasefire and the resumption of humanitarian services’. In the same statement, the Chairperson also urged the two parties to ‘recommit to dialogue as per their agreement to direct talks to be convened in South Africa by a high-level team led by the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and supported by the international community’.
Mahamat was not alone in issuing such statement. On 17 October, United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, characterized the situation in Ethiopia as ‘spiraling out of control’ while calling the hostilities in Tigray to end immediately and for ‘immediate withdrawal of and disengagement of Eritrean armed forces from Ethiopia’. In his 18 October tweet, Guterres further stressed the need for urgent resumption of talks and expressed UN’s readiness to support the AU in that regard. The following day UN Human Rights Chief issued a statement saying that ‘Since 31 August we have received numerous reports of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian objects due to airstrikes and artillery strikes in Tigray – disruptions to communication make it particularly difficult to verify reports, but it is clear that the toll on civilians is utterly staggering.’ He further held that ‘Under international law, indiscriminate attacks or attacks deliberately targeting civilians or civilian objects amount to war crimes’, although statements from the Federal Government of Ethiopia expressed that efforts are made for avoiding the targeting of civilians. Others particularly the European Union and the United States issued statements with similar firmness, urging both sides to cease hostilities and recommit to the AU-led peace process.
The third context is AU’s new call for the convening of peace talks on 24 October in South Africa. It is to be recalled that on 1 October, the Chairperson of the AU Commission dispatched a letter inviting both parties to the conflict to attend an AU-convened peace talk slated for 8 October in South Africa within the framework of the AU-led peace process for Ethiopia, which was envisaged to deliberate on the ‘guiding principles, agenda issues, modalities, format, and timelines for the negotiated settlement’. Regarding the mediation team, in the statement he issued on 6 October, Mahamat stated that ‘the peace talks will be conducted through a high level panel of eminent Africans, established purposefully for the Ethiopian peace process. The panel is led by H.E Olusegun Obasanjo, AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and former President of Nigeria, along with H.E Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of Kenya, and H.E. Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, former Deputy President of South Africa and Member of the AU Panel of the Wise. The Federal Government of Ethiopia announced the acceptance of the invitation on 5 October. On the same day, the Tigray side responded positively but sought two main clarifications: whether there would be additional actors to be invited to the negotiation and the envisaged role for the international community, and logistical details particularly the travel and security arrangements for its negotiating team. Just a day before the planned negotiation date, former President Kenyatta informed the Chairperson that he would not be able to attend the meeting due to a schedule clash. He also sought clarity from the AU Commission on the ‘structure and modalities of the talks, including but not limited to the rule of engagement for all the interlocutors invited’ and whether the issue of ‘immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities’ would be on the agenda of the meeting. The proposed meeting was eventually postponed, given the lack of clarity around the modalities of the peace talks and tight schedule.
Since then the AU Commission has held wide consultations and been working hard for putting in place the necessary preparations for the commencement of the delayed peace talks. This process, among others, clarified the role of regional and international stakeholders stating that the peace talks will be held with the support of such stakeholders. The statements that AUC Chair issued on 6 October and on 15 October affirmed that the talks will be ‘supported by the international community.’ It was against this background that the AU Commission sent another letter to the members of the mediation panel and the parties to the conflict inviting them for starting the peace talks on 24 October in South Africa. No official statement has been issued by both sides as of yet, but Redwan Hussien, national security advisor to the Prime Minster of Ethiopia, in his 20 October tweet, confirmed federal government’s participation. There was no response from the forces in Tigray on the new proposed date of the peace talks.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its deep concern about the resumption of hostilities and the toll the fighting is having on peoples in the effected territories. The PSC, reiterating that war cannot be a solution to the conflict, may welcome the 15 October statement of the AU Commission Chairperson and his strong call for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire and the resumption of humanitarian services’. The PSC may also call on all third parties to refrain from all acts that may further inflame the situation and may in this regard call on Eritrea to withdraw its troops. The PSC may also express the necessity for the parties to start peace talks and in this respect may welcome the preparations made by the AU Commission and the members of the mediation panel including the invitation sent for the parties for starting talks on 24 October in South Africa. The PSC may welcome the commitments that the parties have been expressing for engaging in AU-led peace talks and urge them to send their delegations for the peace talks. The Council, decrying the attacks that caught civilians and humanitarian actors, may also urge the parties to observe human rights and international humanitarian law rules at all times to ensure the protection of civilians and humanitarian actors. It may also reiterate its encouragement to the parties to the conflict ‘to place the supreme interests of Ethiopia and its people above all else and embrace inclusive political dialogue as the only viable approach towards finding a consensual solution to the current situation. The PSC may also reaffirm its ‘appreciation to all partners for their continued support and encourages them to scale up their support for the AU-led mediation process’ and commends South Africa for its willingness to host the peace talks and urge other member states to intensify their support to the efforts of the mediation panel.