Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for December 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for December 2025
Date | December 2025
In December, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages four substantive sessions covering five agenda items. Three of the sessions will focus on country- and region-specific situations, while the remaining sessions will address thematic issues. In addition to the sessions, the PSC will also hold the annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, held at the ministerial level, and an informal consultation with countries in political transition and the peace and security issues affecting them. All the sessions are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. No open session is anticipated in the PPoW.
The PSC will begin the month with the ‘12th Annual High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in enhancing cooperation between the AUPSC and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in Addressing Peace and Security issues on the Continent,’ to be held on 1 and 2 December. Convened within the framework of Article 17(3) of the PSC Protocol, this year’s edition of the high-level seminar, also known as the Oran Process, will take place in Algiers, Algeria.
The programme for this year’s high-level seminar envisages: ‘i. Global Landscape of Peace and Security in Africa: Current Dynamics, ii. AU and UN Concerted Action on Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,’ and a closed session to focus on: ‘i. Taking Stock of A3+ Activities: Lessons learned and way forward, [and] ii. AUPSC and A3+: A Stronger Voice for UNSC Reform.’ It is also expected that this 12th High-Level Seminar will unveil the ‘Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination Between the AUPSC and the African Members of the UNSC,’ adopted during the PSC’s 1289th meeting held in July 2025.
On 8 December, the PSC will convene its first substantive session to consider the Situation in Somalia and the operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). It is expected to focus on the full operationalisation of the mission and the existential financing challenges facing it. Not only is AUSSOM facing significant shortfalls, but it is also expected to lose some $130 million from the UN logistics support package, further aggravating the dire funding woes of the mission. The session will build on its previous session held at the ministerial level in July 2025, in which the Council decided ‘to increase the ceiling level of the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) by an additional 10 million USD to make it 20 million USD for 2025 to support the deployment of AUSSOM.’ In September 2025, at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM jointly organised by the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU Commission, the UN and the United Kingdom (UK) saw pledges being made by both traditional and non-traditional donors for the mission. The UK pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each pledged to commit USD 1 million. Japan and South Korea also came on board to make some contribution to AUSSOM’s funding.
On 9 December, the PSC will convene for a briefing on the ‘Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook.’ The session will feature contributions from key AU institutions, including the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), and the AU Counterterrorism Centre (AUCTC). Despite the reference to ‘continental early warning, conspicuously absent from providing analysis on early warning is the AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). CEWS, a statutory structure established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, was at the heart of the provision of such briefing to the PSC through horizon scanning until its demise, contrary to Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, in the context of the institutional reform that saw the merger of the Political Affairs and Peace and Security Departments in 2021. Since then, the PSC took decisions to rectify the situation, but this is yet to take effect. This session will also build up – and get an update – on Council’s 1298th meeting held on August 2025, in which it tasked the AU Commission, together with AUCTC, AFRIPOL, CISSA and APRM, to establish and institutionalise, by December 2025, a dynamic and continuously updated risk mapping tool to allow the PSC to strengthen its ability to engage in early warning for early action, by providing a consolidated picture of threats, vulnerabilities and potential triggers, including colour-coded risk levels linked to a pre-authorised menu of diplomatic, security and stabilisation tools’ as well as ‘an annual review of acted/missed alerts with lessons-learned.’
On the same day, the PSC is scheduled to consider the Draft Conclusions of the 12th High-Level Seminar.
On 11 December, the Council will have an informal consultation with countries in political transition. This meeting was initially planned for November 2025 but was eventually postponed, in part due to lack of confirmation of participation from representatives of the three central Sahel countries. This will, however, be the fourth such informal consultation since the PSC introduced this format into its working methods. This practice was introduced following the PSC’s 14th Retreat on its Working Methods in November 2022, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol, to allow direct engagement with representatives of Member States suspended from AU activities due to unconstitutional changes of government. The upcoming session will assess the progress made and challenges encountered in these ongoing transition processes. It will also explore how the PSC can enhance its support for the political normalisation of the affected Member States. No formal outcome is expected for this session.
The following week, on 15 December, the PSC will convene to consider the Commission’s report on the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) mandate. Such a session was earlier planned by the Council in November 2025, but a decision was taken to postpone it, as Amani Africa learned, in order to address the situation together with the renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF, hence its rescheduling for this month. It is expected to provide update on implementation of previous PSC decisions including from its last 1282nd meeting on the MNJTF held in June 2025 which endorsed and validated ‘the revised Five-Year Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Resilience and Recovery of the Boko Haram Affected areas in the Lake Chad Basin’ and requested the AU Commission ‘to enhance its support to and collaboration with the LCBC in the implementation of the revised Five-Year RS-SRR… and continue supporting the MNJTF in its operations to consolidate and sustain the gains made thus far against the Boko Haram terrorist group.’ This session is also expected to evaluate the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the MNJTF’s efforts in countering Boko Haram and the two main splinter groups, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), who continue to pose significant threats to regional peace and security.
The final substantive meeting of the PSC for the month concerns the situation in Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are now advancing aggressively into Kordofan, with major cities such as Babnusa and El-Obeid squarely in their sights. Having defeated the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in El Fasher last month – an assault that triggered widespread atrocities, including the reported killing of at least 1,500 civilians and the displacement of tens of thousands – the RSF currently holds the battlefield momentum in Sudan’s escalating war. In October 2025, following the fall of El Fasher, the PSC held an emergency session on the situation in Sudan, particularly on the atrocities that ensued following the city’s fall. From the communiqué it adopted after the session, the PSC tasked the AU Commission ‘to regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, in order to put in place preventive measures and reduce the risk of recurrence; develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation; [and] develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.’ Council went further and directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee, under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda, to urgently facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary RSF, including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan. Another assignment included tasking the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. This, however, did not happen.
The meeting will also be held just weeks following Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, rejection of a ceasefire agreement proposed by the Quad. He also criticised the UAE’s involvement in the Quad, accusing it of supporting the RSF, a claim widely shared by others. For its part, the RSF recently announced an apparently unilateral 3-month humanitarian truce. The Quad mediation efforts, which have included a push from US President Donald Trump, may be one of the factors for the recent escalation in fighting as part of the push for strengthening bargaining power in the negotiations.
As per usual practice, provision is made in the footnote for the convening of Committee of Experts meetings to consider the draft report on the State of Peace and Security in Africa and the Activities of the PSC covering January to December 2025 on a date to be determined.
Emergency Session on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau
Emergency Session on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau
Date | 28 November 2025
Today (28 November) in the afternoon, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to meet to discuss the situation in Guinea-Bissau. This emergency session has been called following the military seizure of power by the ‘High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order’ group, following a fiercely contested presidential and legislative elections held in the country on 23 November 2025.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, followed by a briefing by Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is also expected to make a statement, followed by a representative of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, as the country concerned, and a representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in its capacity as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The session is being held following the announcement of a group of military officers, on Wednesday, 26 November 2025, that they have taken ‘total control’ of the country, just one day after the two leading candidates, in a closely contested presidential election – incumbent Umaro Sissoco Embalo and main challenger Fernando Dias, declared victory before the release of official results. Ahead of the announcement of seizure of power by the army, the incumbent president told various news outlets on 26 November that he was arrested at his office at the presidential palace, although no force was used against him. Appearing on national television, the self-styled ‘High Military Command for the Restoration of National Security and Public Order’ read a statement suspending the electoral process ‘until further notice’ despite stating that they acted to stop attempts to ‘manipulate electoral results’, without specifying the source of such attempted manipulation. They further stated that the following day, Thursday, 27 November 2025, Major-General Horta Nta Na Man, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, was sworn in as transitional president for a one-year term after the military formally deposed President Umaro Sissoco Embaló.
During the swearing-in ceremony on Thursday afternoon, transitional president Major-General Horta Nta Na Man appointed Major-General Tomás Djassi as the new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The coup unfolded just one day before the National Elections Commission was scheduled to release provisional results from the presidential runoff between incumbent Umaro Sissoco Embaló and his main challenger, 47-year-old political newcomer Fernando Dias. Hours before the military’s televised announcement on Wednesday, heavy gunfire echoed through Bissau for nearly an hour near the electoral commission headquarters and the presidential palace. Shortly afterwards, President Embaló contacted French media to confirm that he had been ousted from power. In a statement dated Thursday and released before Senegal confirmed it had granted him asylum, the military declared that Embaló and several senior officials were ‘under the control’ of the High Military Command.
This development came against the background of acute political instability and constitutional crisis in which the president has been at the centre. It is to be recalled that Embaló was sworn in on 27 February 2020 under a cloud of uncertainty about his electoral victory. His victory was confirmed by the Supreme Court only in September 2020. The tension that accompanied the contested ascent of Embaló to power had as one of its features a confrontation between him and the Assembly, which is dominated by the opposition party PAIGC. There were three instances in which he reported that he faced an attempted coup: in February 2022, December 2023 and last month. Embaló moved to dissolve the parliament in May 2022, months after the purported attempted coup of February 2022. At the time, Embaló justified his decision to dissolve the parliament by making reference to ‘persistent and unresolvable differences’ with the parliament. This triggered fierce opposition, with many questioning the constitutionality of the decision. Not long after another purported coup in early December 2023, which is attributed to a clash between a unit in the army and the presidential guard, Embalo once again blamed parliament and issued a decree dissolving the national assembly in another constitutionally questionable move. Since then, the country has been without one of the key arms of government, the legislature and Embalo was ruling through decree.
Embalo also postponed elections originally scheduled for 2024. When the five-year period since his ascent to power came in February 2025, the opposition insisted that his term expired on 27 February and his stay in power beyond that point was illegitimate. However, the Supreme Court ruled that it extends until 4 September, the date it validated his victory in 2020. ECOWAS’ efforts to mediate failed with a joint ECOWAS-UNOWAS diplomatic mission, deployed from 21 to 28 February, forced to leave on 1 March after Embaló threatened its expulsion, rejecting regional interference. When, finally, the national elections were set for November after repeated postponement and a month before the November elections, the historically prominent PAIGC party was excluded from contesting both the presidential and legislative elections, the first in such exclusion of the former ruling party in the country’s history. PAIGC blamed what it called Embalo of heavy-handed tactics that led to its exclusion from the vote on a technicality.
The last time the PSC held a session on the situation in Guinea-Bissau was in December 2022. Despite the fact that the PSC was scheduled to hold another session in December 2023, following the so-called attempted coup and Embal’s dissolution of parliament, the session was postponed. As a result, the dire constitutional crisis that characterised the political landscape of the country for over two years since the PSC’s last session did not receive the attention of the PSC. Today’s convening of the PSC emergency session, prompted by the announcement of military seizure of power, is emblematic of the deeply flawed policy approach that has become characteristic of both the AU and regional bodies like ECOWAS: react to the symptom (coup) while remaining silent to the governance crisis underlying the symptom. At least for ECOWAS, it is to be recalled that it sent a mission along with the UN Office to West Africa and the Sahel to achieve a consensual roadmap for elections, but the mission was aborted after Embaló threatened the mission. In a statement it issued at the time, ECOWAS said that it had ‘prepared a draft agreement on a roadmap for elections in 2025 and had started presenting it to the stakeholders (including the President) for their consent’. It further stated that the mission ‘departed Bissau in the early morning of 1st March, following threats by the president.’ Yet, ECOWAS did nothing when its efforts were thwarted.
The Chairperson of the AU Commission issued a Press release on 26 November 2025, stressing ‘the imperative of respecting the ongoing electoral process and upholding constitutional order, in line with the mandate of the National Electoral Commission (CNE), the sole institution legally empowered to proclaim official election results in the country.’ He further called for ‘the immediate and unconditional release of President Embaló and all de- detained officials, and urged all parties to exercise the utmost restraint in order to prevent any further deterioration of the situation.’ The AU Election Observation Mission to the November 2025 General Elections in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau Preliminary Statement pointed out, among other things, that ‘the dissolution of the National People’s Assembly before the end of its term, which was due to end in 2027, deprived the country of parliamentary representation and legislation, leading to early legislative elections in November 2025, held concurrently with the presidential election.’ The Heads of the AU Election Observation Mission, ECOWAS Election Observation Mission, and the West African Elders Forum on the Post-Election Situation in Guinea-Bissau also issued a Joint Statement in which they expressed concern about the arrests of top officials, including those who are in charge of the electoral process. In this regard, they urged the armed forces to immediately release the detained officials to allow the country’s electoral process to proceed to its conclusion.
The ECOWAS convened an extraordinary summit on 27 November. The communiqué that the summit adopted condemned the ‘coup d’etat perpetrated on 26 November’ and rejected ‘any arrangements that perpetuate an illegal abortion of the democratic process and the subversion of the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.’ While deciding to suspend Guinea Bissau, ECOWAS demanded that the coup makers ‘respect the will of the people and allow the National Electoral Commission to proceed without delay with the declaration of the results of the elections of 23 November 2025.’ Cognisant of the imperative for swift and high-level engagement, it also mandated ‘the Chair of the (ECOWAS) Authority to lead a high-level Mediation Mission to Guinea Bissau to engage the leaders of the coup’.
There are four issues that the PSC needs to address when it convenes at 15:00hrs EAT in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for the in-person session. The first of these is how to ensure that the results of the elections of 23 November are not tampered with. Any possibility of reversing the military coup depends on it. The second is to convince the coup makers to heed the call of the AU Commission Chairperson and the ECOWAS Authority to allow the finalisation of the electoral process by allowing, without delay, the declaration of the results by the electoral body. The third is to plan for the terms on the basis of which the coup makers may reverse their course of action, including the kind of guarantees to be availed to them in exchange for allowing the elections to proceed. The fourth is how to effectively and decisively address the institutional crisis related to the constitutional design of power relations in Guinea-Bissau that has kept the country in perpetual political, constitutional and security instability.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to condemn the seizure of power by the military on 26 November 2025 and reject the interruption of the electoral process, which violates AU principles and normative instruments, particularly the African Charter on Governance, Elections and Democracy and the 2000 Lomé Declaration. In this regard, the PSC, in line with relevant AU instruments, particularly Article 7 (g) of the PSC Protocol, and Article 25 (1) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, is expected to suspend Guinea-Bissau from participating in all activities of the Union, its organs and institutions, until constitutional order is restored in the country. The PSC may urge that the coup makers refrain from engaging or allowing anyone to engage in tampering with the electoral process and the results of the elections. It may also endorse the decision of ECOWAS and reiterate the AU Commission Chairperson’s statement calling for respect for the ongoing electoral process and allow the announcement of the results of the elections. To facilitate that such an outcome is secured, the PSC may task the Chairperson of the AU Commission to coordinate with ECOWAS for the AU Chairperson, along with the Commission Chairperson, joining the high-level mission to be led by the Chairperson of the ECOWAS Authority, President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone, with the participation of Faure Gnassingbe, President of Togo, Jose Maria Pereira Neves, President of Cabo Verde, and Bassirou Diomaye Faye, President of Senegal, accompanied by the President of the ECOWAS Commission. Given the political trajectory that led to the coup, PSC’s action may also seek to address the persistent institutional crisis and governance fragility and to this end may task the AU Commission Chairperson to urgently appoint a special envoy on Guinea-Bissau to work closely with the Panel of the Wise, and to strengthen the mandate of the AU Liaison Office in the country, with the view to facilitate necessary constitutional and security sector governance reforms in Guinea Bissau in coordination with ECOWAS.
Briefing on the situation in eastern DRC
Briefing on the situation in eastern DRC
Date | 27 November 2025
Tomorrow (28 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to meet to receive a briefing on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Council last discussed this issue in February during its summit-level meeting. Since then, there have been several developments, both regarding the security situation on the ground and ongoing mediation efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the longstanding crisis in eastern DRC.
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks from Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, followed by an introductory statement of Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Representatives of DRC and Rwanda, as countries concerned, are also expected to make a statement in the open segment of the session. It is also expected that the representatives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Eastern Africa Community (EAC), as concerned RECs/RMs and the UN, are also expected to make statements.
Since January, the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group has expanded its control over territory in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, capturing strategic cities including Goma and Bukavu, and the respective provincial capitals. Not only did the M23 expand its territorial control, but it also went on to institutionalise its control through the establishment of its own administrative structures in the territories under its control. This has created concerns over the threat of territorial fragmentation of the DRC.
In the PSC’s summit meeting on 14 February 2025, it ‘unequivocally condemned the activities of M23 and its supporters, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and other armed groups’ and called for ‘the immediate withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, armed and terrorist groups operating in the DRC.’ On 21 February, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2773 on the situation in eastern DRC, which, among other elements, demanded the immediate cessation of further M23 military advances, calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, and expressed the Council’s readiness to consider additional measures against those contributing to the continuation of the conflict in eastern DRC.
The security situation in eastern DRC has continued to deteriorate, with further fears that the M23 will expand its territorial control into Uvira. Tension between DRC and Rwanda also continues, with both countries persisting in trading accusations. In his 23 September address during the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, President Tshisekedi accused Rwanda of deliberately obstructing peace efforts and continuing its support for the M23, and he called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. Speaking at the General Assembly on 25 September, Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, accused the DRC of renewed militarisation and ongoing collaboration with ‘genocidal and sanctioned armed groups,’ including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) —an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda—and Wazalendo militias.
As peace efforts from continental initiatives face setbacks, efforts have been underway to reorganise continental efforts. In March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC Summit met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process. The operationalisation of this process remains slow.
Despite the setbacks faced in the Luanda process and attempts to reorganise continental efforts, new peace efforts emerged, albeit outside of the AU and African regional bodies. Following the collapse of the meeting of the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda in December 2024, on 18 March, the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, facilitated a meeting in Doha between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. According to a joint statement issued afterwards, the two leaders ‘reaffirmed the commitment of all parties to an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.’
On 25 April, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, hosted DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and La Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, and Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Olivier Nduhungirehe, in Washington, D.C. During the meeting, he facilitated the signing of a Declaration of Principles aimed at supporting a ‘pathway to peace, stability, and integrated economic development in the eastern DRC region and the resumption of normal bilateral relations.’
Negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda under US auspices ultimately led to the signing of a peace agreement on 27 June in Washington, D.C. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened four meetings so far.
The US has been working through the mechanisms established under the 27 June agreement to ease tensions and help the DRC and Rwanda translate their commitments into concrete action. Most recently, the fourth meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism was held in Washington, D.C., on 20 November. This mechanism is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the harmonised plan to neutralise the FDLR and to facilitate the disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the DRC and Rwanda reaffirmed their commitment to what is referred to as the Operations Order (OPORD), developed as the implementation plan for advancing the CONOPS.
On 7 November, the Joint Oversight Committee—established under the peace agreement to resolve any disputes arising during implementation—met in Washington, D.C. According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, the parties committed to refraining from any hostile actions or rhetoric that could undermine the full implementation of the 27 June peace agreement. They also initialled the text of a Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF), which outlines key areas for fostering economic cooperation and development between the two countries. During the meeting, Qatar provided an update on the ongoing negotiations in Doha, including progress on prisoner exchanges and the first meeting of the Doha ceasefire monitoring mechanism, established in October to oversee implementation of the ceasefire between the Congolese government and M23.
Meanwhile, following a first direct encounter between representatives of the Congolese government and the M23 in Doha under Qatar’s facilitation, the two sides issued a joint declaration on 23 April reaffirming their ‘commitment to an immediate cessation of hostilities, a categorical rejection of any hate speech, intimidation, and call on local communities to uphold these commitments.’
Since then, negotiations have continued in pursuit of a comprehensive peace agreement. Several contentious issues have emerged. For example, the M23 insisted on implementing confidence-building measures—such as the release of prisoners of war—as a precondition for further progress, while the Congolese government maintained that such measures could only be considered once an agreement is signed, including on the restoration of state authority. Other sensitive matters, including the restoration of state authority and broader governance arrangements, have reportedly elicited strong reactions from both sides.
Nonetheless, Qatar has continued its facilitation efforts, and both the Congolese government and the M23 remain actively engaged in the process. Ultimately, the two parties agreed on a prisoner exchange mechanism, under which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will oversee the identification, verification, and safe release of detainees held by both sides.
On 19 July, the Congolese government and M23 signed a Declaration of Principles in Doha, including a commitment to a ceasefire. Subsequent Qatari-led negotiations paved the way for the signing of the Doha Framework for Peace on 15 November. Under this framework, the parties affirmed their commitment to addressing the root causes of the conflict through structured dialogue, confidence-building measures, and a phased approach to de-escalation and stabilisation. The Doha Framework for Peace is intended to serve as the foundation for a comprehensive peace process, with a series of protocols, annexes, and technical arrangements to be negotiated in due course. These are expected to address specific issues, including the consolidation and verification of the ceasefire, modalities for troop disengagement, humanitarian access, reintegration, and support for national dialogue. Media reports have indicated a planned summit this month between DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington, D.C. The signing of the Doha Framework could provide the necessary momentum for this summit.
The situation was a subject of deliberation in the consultative meetings, both between the PSC and the UNSC and the PSC and the European Political and Security Committee (EUPSC). In the joint communiqué of the PSC and the EUPSC, which, unlike the PSC-UNSC joint communiqué, contained substantive elements that reflect the current policy thinking on the state of the situation in Eastern DRC. First in relation to the M23, the PSC-EUPSC joint communiqué, reaffirming ‘the imperative obligation to fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC’ as essential to resolving the country’s conflict, expressed grave concern over M23’s military operations and territorial expansion, and called for the ‘dismantlement of the so-called ‘parallel administration’ by the rebel Movement of M23.’ Second, the joint communiqué called ‘for foreign armed forces not invited by the DRC to unconditionally withdraw in line with UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025).’ While the EUPSC-AUPSC avoided naming who ‘uninvited foreign forces’ refers to, the reference to UNSC Resolution 2773 leaves very little doubt about who it refers to.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express concern over the continuation of the conflict in Eastern DRC and the tension between the DRC and Rwanda. It may reiterate the imperative for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC and its call for unconditional cessation of hostilities. The PSC may also welcome the various peace processes, including the signing of agreements in Washington, D.C., and Doha and call on the parties to the peace processes to abide by the commitments they have made. It may also underscore the need for coordination of the peace processes led by the US and Qatar with the efforts of the AU mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators for the DRC. It may also welcome the decisions of the joint EAC-SADC Summit and the merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. In this respect, the PSC may also call for the activation of the joint secretariat under the AU for enhancing the role of the continent in peace efforts in Eastern DRC.
Will the AU-EU summit move from performative dialogue to meaningful listening for joint action?
Will the AU-EU summit move from performative dialogue to meaningful listening for joint action?
Date | 24 November 2025
The 7th AU-EU summit kicked off earlier today under the theme ‘Promoting Peace and Prosperity through Effective Multilateralism.’ As the nearly 80 leaders of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) convene in Angola’s capital, Luanda, on 24-25 November 2025, a major question in the minds of many is whether this summit will mark a departure from the previous summit.
The last time the two sides met at a summit level was in February 2022. It is to be recalled that the summit was held under the theme ‘Two unions, one vision’. As it was clear for many close observers at the time, coming against the background of major policy dissonance over the COVID-19 pandemic, including over access to the vaccine, the idea of the AU and EU having ‘one vision’ was seen as nothing more than an illusion. What unfolded soon after that summit in February 2022, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, made it clear that the idea of ‘one vision’ was anything but grounded in reality.
The reality is that there are areas of shared interest between the AU and the EU. This has been in full display in the robust partnership and cooperation of the AU and the EU on peace and security. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the operationalisation of the peace and security architecture of the AU without the critical role played by this partnership. Understandably, the peace and security partnership, for which the EU established the African Peace Facility, was premised on the recognition that the AU’s enhanced role in peace and security is a useful contribution to the global public good of the maintenance of international peace and security, which the EU has an interest in promoting.
Parallel to such a major area of convergence, the other equally important reality is that there are many policy areas in respect of which the interests of the two sides diverge, at times fundamentally. The policy dissonance regarding COVID-19 brought this into sharp relief. While the AU Assembly advocated for a TRIPs waiver regarding COVID-19 vaccines underscoring the need for a just international system, the EU was not supportive of the demand for TRIPs waiver. Although not the same situation, in the context of the war in Ukraine and unsurprisingly, the lack of shared policy position between the EU and the AU on the response to the war became a deal breaker in three consecutive annual consultative meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council. As a result, the annual consultative meetings held during 2022, 2023 and 2024 ended without adopting a joint communiqué.
Given that it is being held in a much more fraught global context and regional dynamics that further strain multilateral cooperation, the AU-EU summit in Luanda needs to be informed by the lessons from these experiences. For example, AU’s support for multilateralism is increasingly accompanied by the demand by AU member states (which is getting louder and was evident during the G20 summit in Johannesburg) for both a) reform, among others, of the global tax regime and the international financial institutions and b) delivery on commitments made in relation to the sustainable development goals and measures for addressing the threat of climate change.
This requires both sides treating the relationship with the seriousness it deserves. Despite being courted by many, the reality is the AU needs the EU. A case in point is the EU’s critical support for the AU’s mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). If mobilised towards priorities set by Africa and jointly designed and implemented, investments from the EU under the Global Gateway would be catalytic to advance some of the flagship projects of Agenda 2063 of the AU. The EU, on its part, needs Africa’s endowment with critical minerals, the demography that will be a major source of labour for the global economy and its growing market. It also needs, like others, AU member states in multilateral negotiations. Despite the power asymmetry and the different institutional arrangement for developing positions still working in its favour, the EU would do well not to perpetuate the business-as-usual model of engaging the AU, hence being comfortable with setting the agenda and dominating the process of shaping the outcomes of the AU-EU partnership meetings.
There is a lot of dialogue between the AU and the EU. As the cases referenced above show, the dialogue does not always translate into listening and mutual understanding. As the EU would do well not to perpetuate the business-as-usual-model of engaging the AU, for member states of the AU, there can be no exercise of agency without being able to set and negotiate the agenda of the AU-EU partnership meetings. Similarly, the rhetoric and ambition of speaking with one voice should be supported by a negotiated common position premised on Agenda 2063.
These were barely on display during the AU-EU ministerial on the part of the AU member states. By contrast, the AU adopted a different posture in the preparations for the summit. Instead of taking the easy road of copying and pasting from the AU-EU ministerial outcome document, the AU initiated a draft with new elements that reflect the interests and policy positions of Africa on the various agenda items agreed between the two sides.
In the negotiation on the outcome document for the AU-EU summit in Luanda, initially, there was no real discussion both on what informed the elements of the draft that the AU initiated and on why the EU side responded by deleting and replacing with its proposed formulations. This was far from an ideal way of engaging in negotiations. It became clear to both sides that there was a lot of value in engaging in direct negotiations held on 11 and 12 November. A critical factor in creating such an atmosphere was the role of the chair on the side of the AU. It has become apparent that there is a need for a more flexible engagement grounded in principle.
In an era in which the competition for Africa’s attention and partnership is fierce, for the EU-AU partnership to be meaningful, it also needs to shift the approach to the development and delivery of partnership projects from being supply-heavy to being demand-driven. A case in point in this respect is the very important EU infrastructure program of Global Gateway. As perceptively observed, the projects ‘were perceived—rightly or wrongly—to have been defined by Brussels, rather than together.’ Additionally, follow through and clear accounting for commitments made under the AU-EU summit will be one of the key issues that will advance enhanced trust and closer coordination between the AU and the EU.
Is Africa charting its own destiny?
Is Africa charting its own destiny?
Date | 21 November 2025
By Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga
Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the
African Union and Head of UNOAU
Delivered during the High-Level Seminar on Charting Africa’s Agency in Uncertainty and Transforming Global Order, Sheraton Hotel, Lalibela Conference Room, Addis Ababa, 21 November 2025
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Many thanks Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and Ambassador Stian Christensen, Permanent Representative of Norway to the African Union, for your kind invitation to UNOAU to join you today in this timely High-Level Public Seminar under the theme ‘Charting Africa’s Agency in Uncertainty and Transforming Global Order’.
Looking at today’s theme, ‘Is Africa charting its own destiny?’ is the first question that comes to mind. My answer is yes. But if not, which are the forces at work, both internal and external, that are obstructing the continent’s agency. In other words, what would it take for Africa to be the sole or the main agent of its own future?
And if non-African agents are still at work in influencing or even dictating the continent’s trajectory, what forces, means or kind of power are they applying to determine Africa’s fate?
If, as it may be the case, such forces are jostling for global power, is Africa equipped to take advantage of their conflicting interests or would the continent continue to be just a battle ground, the grass trampled by fighting pachyderms?
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
I will not attempt to answer these and other questions as we are truly gifted to have such an eminent panel of scholars doubled with unquestionable panafrican credentials.
Suffice for me to stress that for a continent that was ‘absent’ at the creation of this passing world order, Africa cannot afford to leave it to others to redraw the emerging new distribution of power and roles.
I said ‘absent’, because those representing the continent, including our host country, were lacking the critical mass to influence for Africa’s own benefit the policies and normative frames that have been serving for over 80 years as the basis for the global political, economic, financial, military, and technological trajectory of world affairs.
Yet, as we all agree that the world is indeed in flux and more fragmented, mainly because what I have come to call the ‘San Francisco Consensus’ no longer serves its intended purpose in the eyes of dominant powers, we should guard from believing that the fundamentals of the new ‘power equilibrium’ that is in the making will be drastically different from the prevailing ones.
The emerging new world is likely to be a measure of the capacity of major blocs, states, and other entities, including major corporations, to ascertain their agency in the evolving global power redistribution. The question before us today may therefore be ‘will Africa be ready or what would it take for the continent to influence and count in the emerging global order’?
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I dared raising these questions because I know Africa is not coming to this conversation void of any options.
The news of the ‘end’ of global justice and the ‘end’ of sustainable development is a forewarning of emerging global challenges. But have the universalism, the democratic and the development ideals of the AU, the AU Constitutive Act, and the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance been defeated?
Are AU injunctions against unconstitutional changes of government, or AU imperatives for good democratic governance suddenly passé? Or are African aspirations for unity, promising a global role for African agency?
Have we sacrificed the values of continental unity on the altar of global power-privilege? Or do enlightened collective ideals, or universal rights of recognition and redistribution enshrined in the UN Charter still have a seat at the global table?
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Today, thanks to its forward leaning and ambitious normative frameworks, currently under review, the AU is unquestionably a bastion of multilateralism and a home to universalist and democratic ambitions. APSA and AGA present a vision not only for a just African order, but also a just world order. However, Africa alone and/or Africa divided, cannot achieve its ambitions. The fact that implementation remains a daunting challenge should not be a reason for despair but rather a reminder of the imperative to forge ahead with greater impetus.
The UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, the UN-AU Strategic Partnership for the Implementation of UN Agenda 2030 and AU Agenda 2063, and the UN-AU Human Rights Framework exemplify democratic and development values and present a model for a networked multilateralist system called for by Secretary-General Guterres and Chairperson Youssouf.
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Whether as a matter of ‘polarization’, ‘particularism’, or ‘pluralism’, global competition is heightening not lowering, as evinced by this year’s convention of the G7 in Canada, or the International Conference on Financing for Development in Spain, to mention just a few intergovernmental processes.
Likewise, global competition is currently on display in Belém and will certainly be palpable during the upcoming G20 meeting in South Africa, where the African Union will take its seat for the first time (22-23 November).
The question we need to address in these circumstances is: Will Africa position itself to negotiate collective interests amidst this prolific and plural competition, or will African countries get picked off one by one?
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
With a proliferation of external actors in increasingly protracted African conflicts and a proliferation of external actors in their resolution, there is admittedly ground for concern.
However, the agenda for sustainable development, including AU Agenda 2063, with a focus on international economic and financial reforms, the agenda for global social justice and a just green transition, and the agenda for multilateral cooperation, where small and big states share decision-making powers, remain alive in AU and UN relations. Indeed, with the support of the AU, the UN member States endorsed such a vision in the ‘Pact for the Future’ (September 2024).
These values were reaffirmed recently at the UN HQ during the 9th Annual Conference of the UN Secretary-General and the AU Commission Chairperson.
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
We are certainly witnessing the move towards a ‘multi-polar world’, and consequently need a more robust multi-lateral framework to address emerging challenges. The Pact for the Future offers a path to strengthen multilateral approaches to peace and security, and represents a key step toward more effective, inclusive and networked multilateralism.
In this context of networked multilateralism, the AU and UN partnership is by no means the only venue for African agency, alongside the G20, the AU can look to other global blocs, including ASEAN, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of American States.
And, if united around key strategic interests as outlined in Agenda 2063 and related Moonshots, the AU can enter into mutually beneficial partnerships with other major players such as the US, China, the Russian Federation or the EU, but also mid-level powers using capital to leverage power in the world today.
Excellencies, Distinguished Colleagues,
Power and prestige continue to play an oversized role in international relations. Africa’s power resides in African unity, its vibrant people, particularly its dynamic youth and, of course, its immense endowments in strategic minerals. African prestige relies on Africa’s ability to discriminate its interests from those of its partners and competitors.
For Africa, by virtue of the many tragedies that marked its history over the past several centuries, unity and regional integration should not be treated as optional rather an existential and strategic imperative.
And, as history has shown since immemorial times, nations that have invested in their human capital and mastered science and technology have often been better equipped to create wealth and amass capital, which in turn have enabled them to establish strong institutions underpinned by respect for the rule of law and human rights.
To succeed, Africa’s renaissance, as enshrined in Agenda 2063, will be no exception.
While the Secretary-General stresses the need for a global order that works for everyone, Africa can seize this moment to truly own African values, and to assert African interests.
The time has come for Africa to decide, and Africa can count on the UN to always stand by its side.
I thank you for your kind attention.
Reimagining Africa’s Role in the emerging multipolar world order that resembles ‘English Premier League’
Reimagining Africa’s Role in the emerging multipolar world order that resembles ‘English Premier League’
Date | 21 November 2025
Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
In an era where the global order resembles less a hierarchical pyramid and more a shifting but rugged playing field, Africa finds itself at a decisive juncture. The growing competition by old and new as well as middle powers for Africa’s support in international affairs and access to its resources continues to shape Africa’s rising visibility in global affairs. This visibility is reflected, among others, in African Union’s admission into the Group of 20 (G20) as a permanent member and the increase in the number of African states in the BRICS. Yet visibility is not the same as influence and influence same as outcome. The central question confronting Africa today is how Africa position itself in a shifting geopolitical landscape to break its historic standing as a marginal player and become an active actor and shaper of the process of the redefinition of the rules and structure of the game for the emerging multipolar world order.
This question lay at the heart of a two-day conference co-convened by Chatham House, Amani Africa, and UNDP, which brought together policymakers, scholars, and practitioners from across the continent to reflect on Africa’s role in a rapidly evolving world order. The discussions were rich in insight, examining how Africa’s agency can be strengthened through coherence, strategic partnerships, and leadership anchored in the values of Pan-Africanism.
A metaphor shared by Gedion Timotheos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, in his keynote address in the opening session served as a useful analytical frame that shaped much of the discussion during the conference. Drawing from the world’s most-watched sport, he likened today’s global order to the ‘English Premier League’, unpredictable, competitive, and full of surprise victories. No longer a two-team league of superpowers (as during the Cold War) or a one-club show (the post Cold War unipolar moment), the world is increasingly multipolar, with many players vying for influence. The implication for Africa is clear: it must decide whether to maintain its marginal place or to step confidently onto the field as a united, disciplined, and strategically minded team.
Kicking off the substantive segment of the conference, the panel on Power, Partnerships, and the Global Order, explored the contours of this changing landscape. Participants emphasized that Africa must move from being an arena of competition to a player of consequence. The continent’s demographic vitality, resource wealth, demonstrated self-awareness and historical moral vision position it to be a strategic actor, not merely a passive recipient of global shifts. But agency requires more than awareness, it demands deliberate strategy and coordinated action rooted in principle. The modern reinterpretation of non-alignment and Africa’s role as a moderating and balancing power articulated in the Joint Namibia-Amani Africa High-level Panel of Experts on Africa and the Reform of the Multilateral System emerged as a central idea. The reinterpretation of non-alignment rather than signaling just neutrality or indecision or not taking sides, it represents strategic independence whereby Africa partners with all actors based on its interests.
Pan-Africanism, participants reminded, remains the philosophical compass guiding this endeavor. It is not merely a historical sentiment but a living principle, one that ties Africa’s global engagement to solidarity, justice, and collective progress. In a fragmented world where power often speaks louder than principle, in addition to harnessing its resources for advancing its agency, Africa’s moral voice, anchored in Pan-African ideals, constitutes its most valuable currency.
A second theme that echoed throughout the discussions was the need for coherence between Africa’s national and continental institutions. The discussions underscored a long-standing paradox: while Africa is institutionally rich, it often struggles to harness that abundance into collective strength. Participants observed that Africa’s effectiveness abroad begins with alignment at home. As Hannah Tetteh, Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of UN Mission in Libya, put it, the first and critical level of alignment is between continental frameworks and policies on the one hand and national level politics and policies. The other level is the one between the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The challenge here is not the absence of frameworks, but the need for clarity in their division of labour, stronger accountability mechanisms, and above all, political will in delivering jointly, collaboratively and complementarily.
As several speakers put it, Africa’s problem is not a deficit of policy frameworks and institutions, but a deficit of implementation. The continent must transform existing commitments into concrete outcomes, bridging the gap between policy ambition and practice.
Not surprisingly, the other issue that received particular attention was financial autonomy. The conference’s exchanges laid bare a structural paradox: despite its vast resources, Africa’s financial dependency often constrains its political independence. Without self-sustaining financial mechanisms, even the most well-crafted strategies remain vulnerable to external pressures. ‘Africa’s political liberation must now be matched by financial emancipation,’ one speaker noted. This perspective reflects a growing consensus that Africa’s agency begins to systematically weigh in global affairs and materially advance its interests when Africa takes leadership in financing its priorities, leveraging, among others, its vast natural resources endowment, through increasing beneficiation and better terms of trade and pushing for a more just global tax regime.
If financial independence defines the foundation of agency, sustainable development and climate diplomacy represent its forward-looking frontier. Discussions during the session on ‘African Priorities in Sustainable Development, Climate Diplomacy, and Biodiversity’ highlighted Africa’s growing leadership in shaping global environmental governance. Through the two Africa Climate Summits and related initiatives, the continent is articulating a development model that integrates climate action with economic transformation, a ‘climate-conscious growth’ paradigm that links decarbonization with industrialization on the basis of the principle of just transition.
Without being oblivious to the fact that climate change is driven by greenhouse gas emissions for which advanced economies largely bear the responsibility and the attendant burden of responsibility for addressing it, participants also pointed to the crucial role of local and sub-national actors whose initiatives in renewable energy, waste management, and urban sustainability are driving meaningful change from the ground up. Their experiences illustrate how climate governance is most effective when it is both localized and inclusive.
At the global level, the discussions called for a unified African voice in negotiations on critical minerals, carbon markets, and climate finance. As a recent Amani Africa policy brief compellingly argued, a unified negotiation position on critical minerals can be achieved through the establishment of a continental natural resource governance authority. Additionally, Mechanisms such as the African Group of Negotiators and the African Green Mineral Strategy were identified as essential instruments for ensuring that Africa engages with global markets on fair and transparent terms. Equity, community benefit, and transparency in carbon trading were seen as non-negotiable principles if Africa’s green transformation is to be both just and sustainable.
Turning attention to the economic engines that must drive Africa’s transformation, it was indicated that despite mounting challenges, from debt distress to declining aid inflows, Africa’s economic fundamentals remain promising. However, as participants observed, the path forward requires diversification, industrialization, and inclusive growth that empowers youth and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) not merely as beneficiaries but as architects of innovation and resilience.
The conversation also linked peace, governance, and prosperity as inseparable dimensions of Africa’s progress. Economic growth cannot flourish in contexts of instability or exclusion. Sustainable peace and inclusive development are mutually reinforcing, the twin pillars of a resilient Africa. Building on this understanding, the reflection on African-led peace and security initiatives shifted the focus from abstract aspirations to the practical question of how Africa can exercise genuine ownership over its security and governance agenda.
On peace and security, the conversation underscored a necessary shift from reactive peacekeeping to proactive prevention and peacemaking, where conflict is addressed through governance reform, inclusive dialogue, and creative diplomacy rather than militarized responses. Financing emerged as a critical fault line, emphasizing the need for enhanced financial contribution from Africa while recognizing that international peace and security on the African is not a matter to be left to be financed by Africa but is a collective global responsibility that directly implicates the UN which bears primary responsibility for international peace and security, including in Africa. Interestingly, the debate also highlighted that more than resources, what matters most for advancing Africa’s leadership in peace and security is the provision of technical and strategic analytical leadership by the AU and its ability to mobilise a unified position and voice by its member states. It is on these bases that the session called for a recalibration of Africa’s peace and security architecture, anchored in human security, knowledge production, and political courage, to ensure that African leadership defines the continent’s peace agenda to contain the worrying trend of reacting to external designs.
This two-day dialogue (which reaffirmed the importance of African perspectives through collaboration between research organisations in shaping not only Africa’s future but the global order itself) was not an end in itself but a catalyst, a moment to connect ideas with strategy, reflection with resolve. As Amani Africa’s policy brief for the conference showed, the emerging multipolar world presents both opportunities and risks. Yet, this emerging order also offers space for Africa to assert its agency. But this demands coordination and foresight based on, as the policy brief outlined, deliberate and well-thought-out strategy and foreign policy to avoid fragmentation and marginalization.
Across the sessions, a powerful consensus emerged: the era of aspiration and norm development has passed; this is the time of implementation and action. As the Chief of Staff of the AU Commission, Souef Moahmmed El-Amine underscored in his opening address, this is the moment to convert Africa’s visibility into influence and its influence into outcomes that improve lives.
This transition from symbolism to substance depends on Africa’s ability to act in consistent unity grounded in solidarity. When its nations, regions, and institutions work in harmony, Africa’s collective voice resonates more strongly in global forums. But disunity frustrates agency. To borrow again from football metaphor of Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the question is not whether Africa can play the game. Africa can. It even has shown flashes of brilliance as documented in the policy brief Amani Africa released to accompany this conference. The question is rather whether it can play as a team and consistently. The continent has talented players, from Tunis to Cape Town, Lagos to Nairobi, Addis to Dakar. But as any football fan knows, talent without teamwork wins no championship.
The match of global politics is already underway; the referee will not wait for Africa to warm up. The task now is to train together, strategize together, and play for the same side. That requires coherence in policy, consistency in diplomacy, and commitment to collective action.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts
Open Session on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts
Date | 20 November 2025
Tomorrow (21 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1314th session, which will be an open session on children affected by armed conflicts (CAAC).
Following the opening remarks from the Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. It is expected that Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and Co-Chair of the African Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC), will deliver a statement. Robert Doya Nanima, Member of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and Special Rapporteur on CAAC, is also expected to address the Council. Statements are also expected from representatives of the respective Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children International.
In August 2025, the PSC convened its 1296th session, focusing on ‘Education in Conflict Situations,’ in which, among other decisions, it emphasised the need to ‘strengthen the protection of children in conflict situations and promote children’s rights in AU peace, security and development programmes.’ Council went further and tasked the AU Commission to ‘develop a comprehensive and dynamic matrix listing all AU legal frameworks, strategies and initiatives aimed at promoting inclusive education for all, particularly ensuring continuity of education in times of conflict in Africa and to develop an action plan on activities to be undertaken in this area from 2025 onwards.’
This meeting is being held just a day after the ‘World Children’s Day’ – also known as the Universal Children’s Day – which is observed annually every 20th of November. It was on 20 November 1959 that the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Exactly thirty years later, on 20 November 1989, the Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, often called the UNCRC. This year also marks the 35th anniversary of the adoption of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), which was adopted on 11 July 1990.
The session takes place as conflicts on the continent worsen and the humanitarian crises resulting from them deepen. Mirroring the depiction of the grim state of peace and security captured in the research report titled Africa in a new era of insecurity and instability, noting how civilians are bearing the brunt of the rising number and spread of conflicts on the continent, the UN reported that violence against children in armed conflict reached ‘unprecedented levels’ in 2024. In Africa, such incidents of violence were recorded both in situations on the agenda of the PSC and those that are not, namely, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Lake Chad basin, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Of these, the countries with the highest number of reported violence are the DRC with 4043, Somalia with 2568, and Nigeria with 2436 and those that experienced what the UN report called ‘sharpest percentage increases’ are Mozambique with a 525% increase and Ethiopia with a 235% increase.
With violence-driven displacement tripling from 11 million people in 2015 to 34 million in 2024 and with more than one in every five children globally now affected by war, the futures of an entire generation hang in the balance. The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner also highlighted that ‘some 473 million children were affected by armed conflict globally in 2024, approximately one in six children, according to estimates by Save the Children.’ In Africa, it was reported that 218 million African children (32.6% of the continent’s entire child population) were living within 50 kilometres of armed violence, which is ‘an all-time high both in absolute numbers and global share.’
In the Central African Republic (CAR), UNICEF reported that from January to June 2025, the humanitarian situation in CAR showed some relative improvement, yet the overall context remains highly fragile. Civilians, including children, continue to face serious threats to their lives and well-being due to persistent insecurity, natural disasters (especially recurrent flooding) and new waves of displacement triggered primarily by armed violence. Although the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) decreased from the previous year to 446,722, displacement surged again during the first half of 2025. The main drivers were renewed fighting between armed groups in the south-east, the sporadic violence in the north-west and widespread flooding.
The UN report noted that attacks on civilian objects, including schools and hospitals, dramatically increased the vulnerability of children. In Nigeria, recently, gunmen attacked the Government Girls Science Secondary School in Maga, Kebbi State (Northwest Nigeria), killing the school’s Vice-Principal and abducting at least 25 students. This incident is part of a disturbing pattern of attacks on educational institutions in northern Nigeria, where hundreds of children (especially girls) have been kidnapped in recent years, seriously undermining the safety of children in schools and denying many their right to education.
In the Sahel, it has also been reported that ‘about four million people are now displaced across Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and neighbouring countries (around two-thirds more than five years ago) reflecting insecurity, limited access to services and livelihoods and the effects of climate change.’ Women and children account for 80% of all forcibly displaced people. The widespread insecurity across the region continues to endanger civilians, children in particular, exposing them to physical violence, forced recruitment into armed groups, severe restrictions on movement and arbitrary detention.
It is to be recalled that the war in Sudan has created the world’s largest child displacement. This pattern has continued with the escalation of violence in recent months. The latest, November 2025 UNICEF Humanitarian Flash Update in Sudan, with a specific focus on the North Darfur (Al Fasher) and Kordofan Crisis, highlighted that in North Darfur State, escalating violence since 26 October has displaced over 81,000 people from Al Fasher town, severely restricting humanitarian access and preventing the delivery of life-saving aid. Displaced families urgently require shelter, food, water and medical care, while protection risks, especially for women and children, are rising amid reports of widespread killings, sexual violence and looting of health facilities. In the Kordofan States, on the other hand, nearly 37,000 people have been displaced from various localities in North and South Kordofan due to recent conflict and shifting frontlines, with many seeking refuge in White Nile, Kassala and other states where host communities are absorbing large numbers of families, placing severe strain on already limited local resources and services.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The Council is likely to express deep concern over the rise in armed conflicts in parts of the Continent and over the heightening, devastating impact conflicts are having on children in particular. In this regard, the Council is expected to urge all actors in conflict situations on the continent to fully respect international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) and to uphold children’s rights. Council may emphasise the importance of strengthening advocacy efforts to ensure the safety and security of children in conflict zones, such as by integrating AP-CAAC in PSC field missions. The PSC may also request the systematic monitoring, documentation, and annual reporting on the state of protection of children in armed conflict in Africa, as a critical vehicle for adopting relevant measures informed by such comprehensive data and analysis. It may also request that the protection of children be specifically highlighted in briefings and reports on specific conflict situations, to facilitate the adoption of tailored measures to enhance child protection. The PSC may also encourage those Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, and to take concrete steps toward the full and effective implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, as well as other relevant international instruments. It may further appeal to all relevant stakeholders, including regional and international partners, to strengthen their support and assistance for children affected by conflicts in Africa.
