Consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Date | 18 June 2025
Tomorrow (19 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1284th session for a consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. The Chairperson of the ACHPR is expected to deliver a briefing to the PSC on the work of the ACHPR as it relates to peace and security.
The consultative meeting is being convened in line with Article 19 of the PSC Protocol, which calls for close cooperation between the PSC and the ACHPR in advancing peace, security, and stability across Africa. Beyond the Protocol’s provision, the PSC, at its 866th session, agreed to institutionalise this engagement by holding annual joint consultative meetings with the ACHPR. This commitment to regular engagement is grounded in the broader legal mandates that define and reinforce the complementary roles of the PSC and ACHPR in promoting peace, security, and human rights on the continent. The two organs of the AU are both entrusted, under their respective legal frameworks, with advancing peace, security, and human rights across the continent. The PSC Protocol, under Article 3(f), outlines the Council’s responsibility to uphold human rights as an essential part of preventing conflict. Similarly, Article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights mandates the ACHPR to promote and protect the rights of individuals and communities. Additionally, Article 23 of the African Charter affirms that all people have a fundamental right to live in peace and security, both within their countries and globally. These provisions establish a shared legal and normative foundation for collaboration between the PSC and ACHPR in addressing peace and security challenges on the continent.
These consultative meetings have been held regularly since 2019; however, they were interrupted over the past three years. The most recent meeting took place in August 2021 during the Council’s 1019th session. The communiqué from that session underscored, among other key points, the vital importance of mainstreaming human rights throughout all phases of conflict prevention, management, resolution, stabilisation, and post-conflict reconstruction and development. In this context, it would be of interest to members of the PSC to explore how to operationalise this commitment, including through the engagement of specific mechanisms of the ACHPR, such as the Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situation in between the consultative sessions between the two sides.
During tomorrow’s session, the ACHPR is expected to brief the PSC on its recent efforts related to country-specific conflict situations. This may also include violations being reported to the ACHPR in relation to countries that are preparing for elections.
In terms of specific conflict situations, a key item the PSC is expected to be briefed on concerns the Joint Fact-Finding Mission to Sudan led by the ACHPR. In response to the PSC’s request during its 1213th session in May 2024 for an investigation into the human rights situation in El Fasher and other parts of Darfur, the ACHPR launched a hybrid Fact-Finding Mission to examine violations against civilians since the outbreak of the conflict. As explained during a press conference given by the ACHPR, the mission covers a wide range of issues, including civil and political rights (such as arbitrary detention and suppression of freedoms), economic and social rights (such as denial of access to food, healthcare, and education), environmental and property rights, and grave abuses like torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians. To support its investigation, the Commission invited written and oral testimonies from individuals and organisations, in which the submission window officially closed on 28 March 2025. Through this process, the ACHPR collected documentation on the kind of violations that took place in the course of the war.
In light of the ongoing crisis and the Commission’s initial findings, the ACHPR has taken further steps to strengthen its engagement through the extension of the mission’s mandate. The most recent ACHPR Resolution, ACHPR/Res.635 (LXXXIII) 2025, decided to extend the mandate of the Joint Fact-Finding Mission for an additional period of six (6) months, starting on 3 May 2025. The PSC is therefore expected to receive an update on the progress of the mission, including insights from virtual investigations, the extension of its mandate, and the ongoing challenges and opportunities for field deployment.
Regarding the ongoing deterioration of the human rights situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Commission is expected to update the PSC based on its Resolution ACHPR/Res.627 (LXXXII) 2025. This resolution highlights serious violations, including the destruction of camps for internally displaced persons, widespread sexual violence against women and girls, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, targeted assassinations, the burning of prisons, and the widespread collapse of social and economic infrastructure. It called on the DRC to end impunity by bringing perpetrators to justice and implored the AU and regional bodies to step up their efforts to bring an end to the long-protracted conflict.
The ACHPR is also anticipated to brief the PSC on the grave human rights situation in South Sudan, particularly in light of escalating violence and political instability in Upper Nile State and Nasir County. Drawing from its 11 March 2025 press statement, the ACHPR is likely to highlight concerns such as the arbitrary detention of political actors within the transitional government and the loss of civilian lives resulting from the ongoing unrest. It called for a) cease-fire and de-escalation; b) inclusive dialogue between the signatories of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan; c) ensuring the protection of civilians; and d) accelerated implementation of the transitional process.
Hence, building on these country-specific developments, the consultative meeting presents an opportunity for the PSC to receive rich perspectives on how to reinforce its approach to these individual conflict situations, drawing on these engagements of the ACHPR.
The ACHPR briefing may also cover thematic issues. These may include the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with a particular focus on vulnerable groups such as women, children, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and persons with disabilities. To this end, the Commission’s Resolution ACHPR/Res.513 (LXX), explicitly condemned attacks on IDP camps and urged States to uphold their civilian character and prosecute perpetrators. The Commission is also expected to spotlight the persistent and escalating use of sexual and gender-based violence as a tactic of war. This concern has been consistently addressed through its Focal Point on Conflict and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, such as Resolutions ACHPR/Res. 283 (2014) and ACHPR/Res. 365 (2017), and in its monitoring of conflict situations such as Boko Haram-affected areas and South Sudan. Another key thematic area likely to be addressed is the accountability gap for grave human rights violations and the urgent need to strengthen transitional justice mechanisms in line with the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. The ACHPR’s 2018 Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa provides a comprehensive African Charter–based framework for promoting truth, reparations, and legal redress, complementing the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. Furthermore, the Commission may raise emerging concerns related to the human rights implications of militarisation, the misuse of emergency powers, and the obstruction of humanitarian access, particularly in protracted and complex crises.
Lastly, in tomorrow’s consultations, it is expected that the two organs will revisit and follow up on key previous decisions. The communiqué adopted during the PSC’s 866th session set out concrete modalities aimed at strengthening and sustaining collaboration with the ACHPR. These include the establishment of a structured mechanism for regular information exchange—particularly through the incorporation of ACHPR’s relevant outputs into the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); periodic briefings to the PSC between annual joint sessions, focusing on the human rights dimensions of specific conflict situations or cross-cutting thematic issues; and consistent interaction between the PSC Chairperson and the ACHPR, either through the Commission’s Chairperson or its designated Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situations. These mechanisms are designed to ensure the systematic integration of human rights into the PSC’s peace and security work. However, such engagements have not been actively pursued in recent years. Tomorrow’s session, therefore, offers an opportunity to revive and operationalise these collaborative mechanisms.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its commitment to strengthening collaboration with the ACHPR and, in doing so, emphasise the establishment of a formal coordination mechanism between the PSC Chairperson and the ACHPR Chairperson or its designated Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situations to enable timely communication and decision-making on urgent human rights concerns in conflict-affected contexts. To enhance the integration of human rights in peace and security responses, the PSC may encourage the systematic mainstreaming of human rights across all phases of conflict prevention, management, resolution, and post-conflict recovery, including through the incorporation of ACHPR analyses and outputs into PSC deliberations. In this regard, the Council may underscore the importance of integrating ACHPR findings and resolutions into the Continental Early Warning System to strengthen early warning capabilities through the use of human rights indicators, particularly in high-risk countries and regions. Concerning the Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan, the PSC may endorse its continuation and adequate resourcing, and encourage facilitation of field deployment where security conditions permit. Furthermore, the PSC may stress the need to address the root causes and structural drivers of armed conflict on the Continent, urging Member States and relevant stakeholders to adopt inclusive, rights-based approaches to conflict resolution—emphasising dialogue, negotiation, mediation, and context-specific transitional justice mechanisms that promote accountability, reconciliation, and sustainable peace. In this respect, the Council may encourage Member States to establish or reinforce domestic transitional justice mechanisms in alignment with continental human rights and justice frameworks. The PSC may also highlight the importance of receiving regular briefings from the ACHPR through its special mechanisms such as the country rapporteurs, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, the Focal Point on Human Rights in Conflict Situations and the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Asylum Seekers. The communique may also reiterate the outcomes of the previous consultative meetings and call for the adoption of a program of action for the operationalisation of the concrete measures identified in the communiques of the 866th, the 953rd, and the 1019th sessions.
Update on the situation in South Sudan
Update on the situation in South Sudan
Date | 11 June 2025
Tomorrow (12 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1283rd session to receive an update on the situation in South Sudan.
Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Joram Mukama Biswaro, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Juba; Ismail Wais, IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan and representatives from the AU Panel of the Wise and AU Ad-Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) are also expected to deliver briefings. The representative of South Sudan, as a country of concern, is also expected to make a statement.
The session follows the Council’s 1265th and 1270th sessions on South Sudan, held on 18 and 31 March respectively, in response to the sharp deterioration in South Sudan’s political and security landscape since renewed violence erupted on 4 March. The 4 March attack on the South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) base in Nasir by the militia group known as the White Army that is reportedly loosely associated with First Vice President Riek Machar the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement- In Opposition (SPLM-IO), has triggered the most severe crisis facing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) since its adoption in 2018. The situation has since devolved into military confrontations, high-level arrests, deployment of Ugandan troops and increased violence. These developments have gravely undermined the transitional process.
Tensions had been mounting even before the 4 March incident, largely due to the breakdown of relations in the presidency and a series of unilateral actions. These included replacing opposition officials with loyalists and reshuffling positions within his own faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Since February 2025, more than 20 senior SPLM/A-IO political and military officials have been arrested, while many others have gone into hiding or fled the country, further deepening the rift between Kiir and Machar. Governors in at least three states loyal to Machar have also been replaced.
The unstable political situation spiralled further down when the government arrested Machar on 26 March in Juba—a move his party denounced as marking the collapse of the 2018 peace agreement, which ended a devastating five-year civil war that claimed nearly 400,000 lives. The move was widely condemned, including by the PSC’s 1270th session press statement, which called for Machar’s ‘immediate and unconditional release’ and urged the government to uphold his safety and health.
Apart from the constitutional crisis it has triggered for the Government of National Unity under the R-ARCSS, Machar’s detention also instigated a rapid unravelling of the SPLM-IO’s cohesion. Reports indicate that key party figures, including Deputy Chairperson Oyet Nathaniel, fled or went into hiding, while internal disputes escalated into factionalism. Internal rifts within the SPLM-IO erupted publicly in April 2025 when Deputy Chairman Oyet Nathaniel, who is also the first deputy speaker of parliament, suspended four senior members of the party, including Peacebuilding Minister Stephen Par Koul, for allegedly plotting to replace Machar. In response, a convening of a faction of SPLM-IO members in Juba on 9 April announced the establishment of a temporary leadership structure that will cease upon Machar’s release and named Koul as the interim chairperson of the party. Despite the PSC’s firm position calling for Machar’s immediate and unconditional release, Juba did not heed this call. Machar and other political and military leaders from the SPLM-IO remain in detention.
Further compounding the difficult political situation is the major changes in the leadership of the ruling SPLM that President Kiir chairs. In a move that is widely seen to be an orchestration of a succession plan, President Kiir took steps to elevate his former financial advisor, Benjamin Bol Mel, to very senior positions. First, he appointed Bol Mel to the position of vice president of the country. Most recently, on 21 May, after dismissing James Wani Igga, a long-serving liberation struggle stalwart, Kiir appointed Bol Mel to be the first vice chairman of the ruling SPLM, a position that is viewed to be a launching pad to the presidency.
The security situation has also deteriorated markedly. Across Upper Nile and other hotspots, clashes between the SSPDF and SPLM-IO forces have intensified, resulting in widespread civilian displacement and the destruction of critical infrastructure, including the 3 May aerial bombing of a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital. The AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, condemned the attack, which he described as ‘a flagrant breach of International Humanitarian Law’ and urged for an investigation. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan also warned the attacks ‘could amount to a war crime.’ The gravity of the situation in South Sudan is further underscored by recent UNHCR data indicating that over 165,000 have fled since the resurgence of violence in March, with over 100,000 people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries.
While Uganda’s military deployment in South Sudan is under a bilateral agreement for training and technical support and positions Uganda in shaping the political and security trajectory in South Sudan including as one of the guarantors of the R-ARCSS, there are concerns that Uganda’s presence tips the balance firmly in favor of President Kiir and away from SPLM-IO and may trigger militarised external interference on the side of SPLM-IO. The SPLM-IO also accuses Ugandan forces of participating in military operations, hence in a manner contrary to the R-ARCSS.
Given that the implementation of the R-ARCSS was already derailed, the current situation is feared to deal a mortal blow to the transitional process. In his briefing to the extraordinary summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan held on 12 March, the Executive Secretary of IGAD warned that ‘should tensions escalate, the risk of a return to widespread hostilities looms large, with repercussions that would echo resoundingly across the region.’ In his 16 April briefing to the UN Security Council, Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS described the conditions as ‘darkly reminiscent of the 2013 and 2016 conflicts, which took over 400,000 lives’ and warned of a trajectory that could shift from community-based violence to ‘a more complex picture involving signatory parties and foreign actors.’ He also flagged the intensifying use of hate speech and misinformation, which continue to fuel ethnic tension and violence.
In response to the growing crisis, regional and international actors have ramped up diplomatic efforts despite minimal breakthroughs. On 29 March, the AUC Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf and UNSG António Guterres discussed the evolving situation in South Sudan. They reaffirmed their support for the R-ARCSS as the best path to lasting peace in South Sudan and agreed to coordinate efforts between the AU, IGAD, and the UN.
The PSC’s 1265th and 1270th sessions had called for the AU Commission Chairperson to deploy a high-level delegation to engage the parties in South Sudan. Led by former Burundian President Domitien Ndayizeye, the AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, deployed the AU Panel of the Wise to Juba on 2 April. The delegation held meetings with various stakeholders, including President Kiir, but was reportedly denied access to Riek Machar. It is expected that tomorrow’s session will consider the Panel’s report of the visit.
The Panel’s visit was followed by a joint AU–IGAD high-level visit from 5–6 May, during which the AU Commission Chairperson and the IGAD Deputy Executive Secretary met with South Sudanese leaders to reaffirm support for the R-ARCSS and preserve its hard-won gains and reiterate support for the timely, credible, and transparent implementation of the transitional roadmap. Yet again, the Chairperson did not get access to Machar.
More recently, on 8 May, the Quartet – AUMISS, IGAD, UNMISS and RJMEC- issued a joint statement urging an immediate cessation of hostilities, the release of detainees, and the revitalisation of the R-ARCSS. The statement welcomed the recent joint visit by the AUC and IGAD to South Sudan and highlighted that the 2018 peace deal remains the only viable framework for resolving the crisis. The Quartet, also called the reinvigoration of the ‘visibly stalled peace implementation by addressing all grievances through an inclusive political dialogue’, with the release of the First Vice President and other SPLM/A-IO officials as the starting point.
From 3 – 4 June, IGAD convened a consultative meeting bringing together regional and international envoys, including representatives from the AU, UNMISS, and the C5, to address South Sudan’s peace process. The discussions aimed to identify viable solutions to de-escalate tensions and reinforce support for the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), emphasising the need for coordinated efforts to sustain stability and advance the country’s transitional roadmap. (A consolidated overview of key developments, policy positions and diplomatic engagements can be accessed via Amani Africa’s regularly updated Tracker of events and diplomatic efforts on the crisis in South Sudan)
Apart from following up on its proposed policy measures from previous sessions, tomorrow’s session is expected to help the PSC take stock of both the political and security developments on the one hand and the diplomatic efforts underway, including the steps taken by the AU. Building on the mission of the Panel of the Wise and the joint AU-IGAD visit, the statement of the Quartet may help structure PSC’s deliberations on additional steps to be taken to arrest the deteriorating situation and put the transitional process in South Sudan back on track. Undeniably, for any initiative of the PSC, the role of the region and most notably Uganda, with its presence on the ground and its role as Guarantor, is expected to be paramount.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may reiterate that the R-ARCSS remains the most viable and relevant Agreement for sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan. The PSC may call for immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities and restoration of strict adherence to the permanent ceasefire, with IGAD’s Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) reinforced to ensure compliance. Echoing the Quartet, the PSC may also call for the full and scaled-up return to and implementation of the R-ARCSS and the transitional process with the full and effective participation of the signatories of the R-ARCSS. To this end, the Council may reiterate its demand for the release of detained politicians, including First Vice President Riek Machar. The PSC may also call for the streamlining and coordination of diplomatic efforts. The PSC may request the AU Commission Chairperson to task a head of state of an AU member state to work with the guarantors of the R-ARCSS and the Committee of 5 to facilitate dialogue between the leaders of the main signatories of the 2018 agreement to restore mutual confidence and culminate in a joint public declaration affirming their commitment to peace.
The funding of the AU from member states is a ‘farce’, Mo Ibrahim
The funding of the AU from member states is a ‘farce’, Mo Ibrahim
Date | 10 June 2025
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
The issue of the poor state of self-financing of the African Union (AU) once again came into the spotlight. During the annual Mo Ibrahim Governance Weekend (IGW) event held from 1-3 June in Marrakech, the Kingdom of Morrocco, in a conversation with Mo Ibrahim, founder of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the former AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat in the plenary of the annual event told Ibrahim that the AU depended on external donors for about 70 per cent of its funding.
Ibrahim expressed his dismay about AU’s excessive dependence, stating that ‘70% of the 650 million annual budget of the AU is funded by foreigners is a farce.’ Faki agreed and added that ‘it is actually frustrating.’ Instructively, in an exclusive interview for Amani Africa’s podcast, The Pan Africanist, the new AU Commission Chairperson, Mohamoud Ali Youssouf, identified the issue of financing as a major priority area for his chairship of the AU Commission.
The deserved public criticism of the failure of African leaders to fund the AU comes as the AU’s landmark decision towards enhancing self-financing marks its ten-year anniversary this June. As part of her consequential tenure that set in motion the pioneer initiatives of AU’s Agenda 2063, including the AfCFTA, one of the issues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma championed was to address the perennial challenge of heavy dependency on external sources in the financing of the AU. It culminated in two key policy decisions.
AU member states’ Johannesburg and Kigali ambitions
The first was the June 2015 summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, where the AU Assembly adopted a decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.578 (XXV) on the Scale of Assessment and Alternative Sources of Financing of the AU. One of the major commitments that AU member states made under Assembly decision 578 was to fund 100 per cent of the operational budget, 75 per cent of the program budget and 25 per cent of the AU’s peace operations budget.
The second was the July 2016 Kigali summit that settled the question of the sourcing of the funds for realising the decision adopted in Johannesburg. Accordingly, the Kigali AU summit adopted Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) decision which committed to ‘institute and implement a 0.2 per cent levy on all eligible imported goods into the Continent to finance AU Operational, Program and Peace Support Operations Budget starting from the year 2017.’
AU’s non-implementation malady
Signifying the fast-expanding gulf between the ambitions of AU summit outcomes and the realities of acting on such outcomes, the Johannesburg and Kigali decisions have faced the same fate as other decisions of the AU – non-implementation. This malady of non-implementation that became prominent during Faki’s tenure promoted him to lament during his address of the opening of the February 2024 AU summit that ‘the frantic tendency to make decisions without real political will to implement them, has grown to such an extent that it has become devastating to our individual and collective credibility.’
As a result, little progress has been made in the ambition of the financial reforms introduced since Johannesburg to ensure financial autonomy and reduced dependency and secure timely, adequate, reliable and predictable payments by member states of their assessed contributions.
The story that the 2025 AU budget tells
The 2025 budget of the AU, adopted during the 45th ordinary session of the Executive Council held in Accra, Ghana in July 2024, was US$608,248,415. Of these, the regular budget was at US$555,319,415. The operational budget to which AU member states contributed 98 per cent, short of 2 per cent from the Johannesburg target, was only 167,045,485. By contrast, AU member states, along with African institutions and internal sources, covered only 22.5 % of the US$ 388,273,929 programme budget of the AU. While this represents a notable increase from the less than 6 per cent contribution of member states to the programme budget in 2015, it is a far cry from the Johannesburg target, which member states committed to realise by 2025. Considering the significance of the programme budget for advancing the major AU objectives, the failure to meet the Johannesburg target is emblematic of the growing gulf between the policy ambitions of the AU and its actual performance.
When it comes to member states’ contribution to peace operations, the lack of progress becomes even more glaring. The July 2024 Executive Council decision (EX.CL/Dec.1265(XLV) carrying the 2025 budget indicated that ‘peace support operations with a budget of US$52,929,131’ was ‘funded by International Partners.’
What emerges from the 2025 AU budget is that the AU has met the Johannesburg target only in relation to its operational budget. The portion of member states’ contribution to the overall AU budget renders the distance between the Johannesburg target and where the AU stands today stark. The overall budget of the AU for 2025, as captured in the July 2024 Executive Council decision, puts the balance of contributions between AU member states and partners at 32.9 per cent and 58.1 per cent, respectively.
Explaining the ‘farce’ that is the state of AU’s self-financing
A major factor behind this dismal state of the self-financing of the AU is the non-implementation of the Kigali AU summit decision. In 2018, the AU reported that only 16 of the AU member states were implementing the Kigali decision of collecting the 0.2 levy. Between that time and 2025, that number increased by only one.
Another major factor that impeded the growth of member states’ contribution to programme operations budgets was the 2019 decision of the AU capping member states’ contribution at $250 million. The result of this capping is that much of the member states’ contribution ends up funding the operational budget and leaving only small portion of as the remaining balance for the programme budget.
Additionally, despite the ambition of the AU’s financial reform to move away from reliance on a few member states, the AU did not succeed in achieving this ambition. As such, the continuing reliance on a few countries constrains the scope for expanding the contribution of member states for achieving ownership. The AU Commission Chairperson, Youssouf, told The Pan Africanist that the formula for mobilising the contributions of member states has created heavy reliance on a few countries. As he put it, ‘we need to think about a better sharing of the burden (of AU financing) …we have to look into the formula again.’
Further compounding the dismal state of the financing of the AU is the negative growth of member states’ contributions since the time of COVID-19. As the AU Commission Deputy Chairperson, Selma Haddadi, reminded members of the PRC in her address to the opening of the 50th ordinary session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of the AU on 9 June 2025, ‘the African Union’s approved budget has experienced a negative growth rate of 6 per cent, despite the establishment of new organs and the expansion of its mandates.’ She went on to note that ‘[a]lthough Member States’ contributions have been capped at US$250 million since 2019, actual assessed contributions have consistently fallen short of this ceiling.’ In fact, the statutory contribution of member states was capped at $200 million for 2025.
There is also the issue of delay or non-payment of assessed contributions on time and in full. Following the adoption of the three-tier sanctions regime in 2018 on payment of assessed contributions and the follow-up of the sanctions regime, the payment of member states has improved significantly. However, the fact that a significant number of member states, including major contributors, effect payment as late as the middle of the year represents a challenge. For the 2024 budget, the AU Ministerial Committee on Scale of Assessment reported that 13 member states did not pay into the 2024 regular budget, and a further five member states made only partial payment as of 31st December 2024.
The price AU is paying for the poor state of its funding
The dismal state of progress in meeting the Johannesburg targets entails dire consequences for the functioning of the continental body. As the Deputy Chairperson pointed out, apart from perpetuating heavy reliance on external funding and thereby differing the ambition of ownership, the funding challenge significantly constrained the AUC’s capacity to effectively implement the decisions of the Policy Organs and strategic priorities.’ Additionally, this funding constraint, Haddadi pointed out, ‘has significantly hindered the effective implementation of security and safety standards.’
AU Commission Deputy Chairperson invited member states to provide ‘guidance on the immediate way forward’ and engage in ‘reflection on this critical issue of the financial sustainability of our Union and its impact on our operations.’ In his exclusive interview with The Pan-Africanist Chairperson Youssouf, apart from proposing the revisiting of the burden sharing, he emphasised the need for other sources of financing such as the private sector and innovative finance sources.
Enter the new AU Commission leadership
Signifying the attention the new AU leadership attaches to this issue, during the opening session of the 50th Ordinary Session of the PRC, the financing woes afflicting the AU took prime place in the speech of the Deputy Chairperson (DCP) of the AU Commission. One third of the speech was dedicated to this issue.
The new AU Commission leadership is on target in prioritising the issue of the funding of the AU. ‘In (my) vision,’ the Chairperson told The Pan Africanist, ‘the mobilisation of resources is central.’ Echoeing Mo Ibrahim’s comments, Youssouf noted that ‘You can not envisage… the possibility …of ownership of the programmes while waiting the support of partners’.
It will be quite a success if this focused prioritisation of addressing the challenge of AU funding by the new AU Commission leadership leads to enabling member states to deliver on the long-delayed commitment of funding at least 75 per cent of the programme budget of the AU. While one hopes that Youssouf and Haddadi succeed in this quest, it remains to be seen how they will catalyse the required collective will of member states for overcoming the ‘farce’ that is the funding of the AU.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR)
Update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR)
Date | 9 June 2025
Tomorrow (10 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1282nd session to receive an update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and review the implementation of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR) in the Lake Chad Basin.
Following opening remarks by Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. Statements are also expected from Hycinth Banseka, Technical Director of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) on behalf of the Executive Secretary of the LCBC and Godwin Michael MUTKUT, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Commander.
Tomorrow’s session follows the PSC’s 1254th meeting on 13 January 2025, convened to consider the AUC Chairpersons report on the activities of the MNJTF against Boko Haram where the Council renewed the MNJTF’s mandate for an additional 12 months and requested the AU Commission and the LCBC Secretariat to regularly report to the Council on the activities of the Force. The session emphasised enhanced diplomatic engagement, particularly with Niger, to strengthen regional counter-terrorism efforts. It also brought attention to the need for strengthening coordination and effective participation of MNJTF contributing countries and in this respect, it tasked the Lake Chad Basin Commission to continue engaging Niger to ensure its full return and cooperation with the Force and to promote a comprehensive, multi-sectoral and inclusive approach and civil-military cooperation for creating conditions for return of displaced persons. Tomorrow’s session is expected to build on these priorities, with a particular focus on operational developments, prevailing security dynamics, and the status of the implementation of the RS-SRR, notably the review and updating of the strategy.
The Lake Chad Basin, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges, largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS). The MNJTF, comprising troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states and Benin, remains a critical regional coalition serving as the security instrument in countering the threats posed by these groups. The Force has reportedly facilitated the return of over 3,800 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 2,306 refugees in 2024 alone.
However, despite significant military successes by the MNJTF, the terror groups continue to pose a threat through asymmetric tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, abductions and attacks on civilian and military targets. In one such recent major attack, on 25 March, Boko Haram is reported to have killed at least 20 Cameroonian soldiers in an attack on a military base in the Nigerian border town of Wulgo.
One of the issues expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and places both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCCs national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have begun using surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to enemy intelligence.
As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ In this respect, the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’
Another issue is the follow up on PSC’s decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the coup of June 2023 was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025 Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. Apart from political dynamics, it appears that withdrawal of support for Niger might have played a role. The Communique of the Lake Chad Basin 5th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisaiton Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’
It is feared that Niger’s withdrawal will weaken the MNJTF and create a security vacuum that the terrorist groups operating in Lake Chad could take advantage of. The void from Niger’s withdrawal coupled with the influx of militants and weapons from the Sahel and ISIS networks in North Africa, poses threat to the gains made under the MNJTF. It is also worth recalling that the death of 40 Chadian soldiers in a terrorist attack on a military base in Chad’s border region with Nigeria last December prompted Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby to threaten possible withdrawal from the MNJTF as well. During tomorrow’s session, it would be of interest for PSC members to get clarity on the implications of Niger’s withdrawal for the MNJTF and how any adverse impact of the withdrawal can be mitigated.
The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilisation strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian, and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger on 27 February 2025 adopted the revised strategy. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and puts greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy.
The communiqué of the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum, among others, encouraged the PSC to endorse the adjusted RS-SRR. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy and consider the updated RS-SRR for endorsement. The PSC is also likely to reiterate its 1207th session call for the states to develop National Action Plans in line with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 2250 and 2419, and to operationalise these two UNSC Resolutions through the revised TAPs, in order to ensure that the implementation of the revised RS SRR effectively addresses the structural root causes of the conflict.
Sustained reintegration of returnees and fighters that deserted the terror groups requires stronger investment in infrastructure, education and livelihoods. In the report to the PSC in January 2025, the AU Commission Chairperson noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’ Environmental degradation, exacerbated by climate change, compounds these challenges and increases community vulnerability.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The Council is expected to endorse the revised RS–SRR and call on member states to align their national plans with the revised strategy. The PSC may underscore the need for enhancing close coordination and commitment of MNJTF member states and for continuing to engage in Niger on collaboration in addressing the collective threat posed by terrorist groups in the region. The PSC may also call for fortifying the capabilities of the MNJTF, including by equipping the mission with anti-drone technology or jamming systems to address the threat posed by the deployment of drones from terrorist groups. The Council may also wish to follow up on its 1207th decision to undertake a solidarity field mission to the Lake Chad Basin. The PSC may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF, particularly in terms of enhancing its anti-IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. The PSC may underscore the need for climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities. The PSC may emphasise the importance of enhancing collaboration between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities, particularly ECOWAS, to facilitate more coherent cross-border responses and address the transnational nature of the threats posed by Boko Haram and the ISWAP. The PSC may also task the AU Commission and the LCBC to undertake an assessment of the impact of the withdrawal of Niger from the MNJTF and develop strategy for mitigating adverse impacts.
PSC shaping a new maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea
PSC shaping a new maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 5 June 2025
Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa
On 23 April, the PSC held its 1275th session to discuss the imperatives of the Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The outcome of the meeting was adopted as a communiqué.
The session included a series of presentations and statements from key regional and continental stakeholders. However, despite the importance of receiving an update from the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department, the department was not represented and therefore did not provide a briefing on the implementation of previous decisions.
One of the key outcomes of the session was the PSC’s endorsement of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) for the Gulf of Guinea as a standing, ready-to-deploy force, capable of delivering rapid and coordinated maritime security responses across the region. In addition to endorsing the CMTF, the PSC also affirmed the CMTF’s vision of a united, secure, safe, and resilient region, free from transnational organised crime.
Beyond expressing its endorsement, in an effort to set up the institutional backbone of the Task Force, the PSC requested the AU Commission to facilitate the further development of the Task Force, welcomed the adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by additional member states, and encouraged others to consider joining the initiative. The Council also emphasised the need to advance the Task Force’s operational instruments and urged Member States of the Gulf of Guinea Commission to extend their political backing for its effective operationalisation. Furthermore, the PSC emphasised the need for the Military Staff Committee to visit the CMTF headquarters in Lagos to gather direct insights and advise the PSC on advancing its operationalisation. While this political commitment provides essential legitimacy and momentum, it must be accompanied by concrete resource mobilisation and inclusive engagement, ensuring that less-resourced littoral states are not left behind in the implementation process. Additionally, translating these institutional arrangements into a tangible maritime presence and effectiveness will require adequate funding, logistical support and coordination.
The outcome also reflects a growing momentum in developing institutional and operational frameworks for advancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, deserving of sustained support from the AU. Additionally, symbolic steps, like the proposed flag-off ceremony and Nigeria’s readiness to host the CMTF headquarters, highlight political will on both sides of the AU and Member States. Institutionally, the PSC retreated its call for the AU Commission to take concrete measures to ensure inclusive stakeholder engagement, including the formal inauguration of the Committee of African Heads of Navies and Coast Guards (CHANS), as outlined in the AIMS 2050 framework.
The emphasis on coordinated maritime deployments and readiness to establish permanent headquarters suggests growing interest and commitment. However, the reliance on individual states for leadership and hosting functions, in the absence of a clear burden-sharing framework, also raises concerns about long-term sustainability and inclusivity.
On capacity building, the Council recognised the importance of intelligence sharing, joint operations, and strategic partners to support the Gulf of Guinea Commission in planning and conducting the AMANI Africa III Command Post Maritime Exercise. It rightly emphasised the need for tailored support—logistical, financial, and technical—for coastal Member States, and encouraged international partnerships for sustainable capacity development.
Concerning coordination and interoperability, the Council’s call for harmonising efforts between the CMTF and the Yaoundé Architecture reflects an increasing awareness of the fragmentation across regional efforts. Again, operationalising such structures will require not just institutional mandates but clarity on the division of labour among AU organs, RECs/RMs, and regional mechanisms.
Importantly, the emphasis on addressing the root causes of maritime crime, such as poverty, weak governance, and limited economic alternatives, signals a welcome and necessary shift toward a more holistic and preventive approach to maritime security. This broader perspective acknowledges that sustainable security cannot be achieved solely through military and law enforcement responses, but must also tackle the socio-economic and structural drivers that make maritime crime attractive or viable in coastal territories. By focusing on development deficits, corruption, youth unemployment, and lack of livelihoods, the approach has the potential to generate long-term stability and resilience in coastal communities. But without concrete interventions to address these conditions, the reference to dealing with root causes will remain hollow.
The inclusion of environmental protection discussions and the call for strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) to safeguard marine ecosystems marks a significant and commendable departure from earlier sessions where such concerns were often overlooked. This shift reflects a recognition of the interlinkages between maritime security and environmental sustainability, particularly as climate change, pollution, and unsustainable exploitation of marine resources increasingly contribute to insecurity in coastal regions. However, there is a need for clarifying the practical implications of conducting SEAs and the institutional and policy framework for anchoring such an exercise and the follow-up to it. Without defined implementation mechanisms and integration into existing regional frameworks, such as the African Blue Economy Strategy and 2050 AIMs, the commitment risks becoming a token gesture.
Lastly, although the meeting primarily focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, the PSC demonstrated a broader continental outlook by urging Member States to actively support the operationalisation of the Maritime Coordination Centre. This move is aimed at enhancing the coordination and governance of maritime safety and security across all five regions of the continent, reflecting the Council’s growing recognition of the interconnected nature of Africa’s maritime security challenges. Furthermore, the PSC acknowledged the Indian Ocean Commission’s participation in Gulf of Guinea Commission meetings and called for a consultative engagement with the Commission, signalling an effort to bridge regional maritime security efforts.
In the absence of updates from the Department of PAPS on the implementation of its previous decisions, the PSC reiterated its September 2023 decision, adopted during its 1174th session. The Council renewed its request for the Commission to expedite the establishment and operationalisation of a Coordination Mechanism—or Maritime Security Unit—within the AU Commission.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments
Briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments
Date | 3 June 2025
Tomorrow (4 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1281st meeting for a briefing on the synergy between the Global Framework Ammunition (GFA) Management and the Regional Arms and Ammunition Control Instruments.
Following opening remarks by Ambassador Innocent Shiyo, Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Eric Kayiranga, Weapon and Ammunition Senior Advisor representing the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) in the Great Lakes Region, is also expected to make a presentation, followed by statements from representatives of the RECs/RMs. A representative of the UN is also expected to make a statement during the session.
This meeting is convened to explore the synergies and implementation of regional instruments on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) adopted by AU Member States, alongside the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA), in alignment with the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). It is worth recalling that the CADSP is a strategic framework adopted by Member States to promote a shared understanding of security needs, common defence and security threats and the necessity for collective action to address these challenges. It serves as a vital tool for AU Member States to coordinate their defence and security initiatives, advancing continental stability in alignment with Africa’s Agenda 2063 for sustainable development and peace. Furthermore, the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2030 emphasises the importance of addressing the illicit proliferation and circulation of arms, with a specific focus on controlling the flow of ammunition into conflict zones. The GFA, on the other hand, serves as a comprehensive political framework encompassing fifteen objectives and eighty-five measures designed to prevent the diversion, illicit trafficking, and misuse of conventional ammunition. It also seeks to mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions and promote the safe and secure management of ammunition across its entire lifecycle, from production to final disposal. The framework addresses a broad spectrum of ammunition, including both small-calibre and large conventional types. Of particular relevance to Africa, the GFA aligns with the continent’s pressing peace and security challenges, especially the widespread proliferation of SALW and their associated ammunition. This proliferation significantly contributes to the escalation of armed conflict, terrorism, and transnational organised crime across the region.
Regional arms and ammunition control instruments, on the other hand, are critical frameworks, agreements and protocols established by regional organisations to regulate the production, transfer, storage and use of conventional arms, including SALW and their ammunition. These instruments are designed to address the pressing challenges of illicit proliferation, trafficking and misuse, which often fuel armed conflict, violence and regional instability. Their primary objectives include preventing unauthorised manufacturing, trafficking and diversion of arms and ammunition, enhancing security by reducing armed violence, terrorism and conflict through improved stockpile management and promoting regional collaboration, information-sharing and joint action to tackle cross-border challenges. On the continent, several key instruments exemplify these efforts. The ECOWAS Convention on SALW, their Ammunition and other Related Materials, adopted in 2006, is a legally binding agreement that replaced a 1998 moratorium. It focuses on controlling SALW, ammunition and related materials through transfer controls, stockpile management and tracing, while encouraging Member States to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW, established in 2004, on the other hand, targets the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and bordering states. Coordinated by the RECSA, it mandates training, destruction of surplus firearms and cross-border cooperation to curb trafficking. The Central African Convention/Kinshasa Convention, adopted in 2010 by ECCAS, is legally binding and entered into force in 2017, covering SALW, ammunition and components for manufacture, repair and assembly, with a broader scope than other regional protocols.
At the continental level, there are no legally binding continent-wide instruments, but there are frameworks. The Bamako Declaration of 2000, a political Africa-wide instrument, establishes a common African position on illicit SALW proliferation, circulation and trafficking, strengthening regional and international cooperation. The AU is also guided by the AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW. The AU Commission also embarked on a process of coordination and alignment of the implementation of the GFA. A study titled ‘Synergies Between African Regional Instruments and Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management’ was conducted. This analysis explored the alignment between the four key African regional instruments highlighted above and the fifteen objectives of the GFA. Following a workshop held on 6 and 7 May 2025 in the AU Commission, gathering experts from RECs/RMs and RECSA, the zero-draft report of the study sets the stage for dialogue, reflection and a unified path forward.
Beyond mere assessment, the study illuminated gaps in the framework and proposed thoughtful areas for improvement, aiming to strengthen the execution of both regional instruments and the GFA itself. In terms of alignment and differences, it was noted that African regional instruments, with the exception of the Bamako Declaration, hold legal force, obligating their signatories, while the GFA operates on a voluntary basis, its guidelines backed only by political commitment, just like the Bamako Declaration. Additionally, the GFA addresses all types of conventional ammunition, from small-calibre rounds to artillery shells, whereas regional instruments limit their scope to ammunition for SALW. Consequently, the study’s comparison and analysis account for the binding legal responsibilities of State Parties to the regional instruments, but focus exclusively on SALW ammunition. At the same time, the GFA’s prioritisation of international cooperation and technical assistance, facilitated through mechanisms such as the United Nations SaferGuard Programme and the Ammunition Management Advisory Team (AMAT), presents valuable opportunities for supporting AU Member States and RECs in strengthening stockpile security.
Tomorrow’s session will therefore provide an opportunity for the PSC to engage in a focused discussion on the challenges associated with aligning and coordinating the GFA with existing regional arms control instruments, as emerged from the aforementioned study. In terms of challenges, one major concern is the limited financial and technical capacity of many Member States, which may be further strained by the introduction of new frameworks such as the GFA. Council may also consider the imperative of updating regional instruments to incorporate standards like the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs), enhance risk reduction, improve inventory and tracing systems and strengthen gender mainstreaming and stakeholder cooperation.
Although the establishment of such legal frameworks at sub-regional levels helps respond to challenges specific to those regions and is a positive step, it has resulted in parallel legal regimes and has made responses fragmented. Even in regions that have instruments, implementation is still lacking. The fragmented response has also left regions such as the Sahel without an established instrument. As such, the PSC may follow up on the outcome of its 1085th meeting. First, it called for the integration of arms control and Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) programmes into the broader framework of Africa’s peace, security, and sustainable development agenda. Second, the Council requested the elaboration of a continental strategy to combat the proliferation of illicit firearms, including emerging categories of weaponry.
The Council may use this session to brainstorm on practical and sustainable measures to effectively bolster arms control and promote peace across the continent, drawing on the GFA. It is recalled that the 860th PSC session previously highlighted the persistent lack of reliable data on national stockpiles as a critical challenge. In response, the GFA’s call for transparency and systematic information-sharing—such as through the UN Register of Conventional Arms—can serve to enhance regional monitoring and auditing practices. Moreover, the PSC may revisit the conclusions of its 776th session, which drew a direct connection between illicit arms flows and broader threats such as transnational organised crime and terrorism. In this light, the GFA’s holistic and lifecycle-based approach to ammunition management offers a valuable framework for advancing regional strategies that address these underlying security drivers, while simultaneously aligning with the objectives of Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, which seeks to significantly reduce illicit arms flows.
It is also worth noting that tomorrow’s meeting is also being convened just few weeks before the convening of the preparatory meeting of States on the ‘Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management’ which will be held from 23 to 27 June 2025 at the UN Headquarters, as communicated by the UNODA in January 2025. A meeting expected to ‘explore possible options for the development of the process to ‘prevent diversion, illicit trafficking and misuse of ammunition; mitigate and prevent unplanned explosions at munition sites; ensure the safety and security of conventional ammunition throughout its life-cycle from the point of manufacture; and contribute to lasting peace, security and sustainable development.’
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may express deep concern over the growing illicit flow of SALW in Africa. The PSC is also likely to reiterate the imperative of Member States and RECs/RMs to scale up efforts towards the full implementation of the regional SALW instruments. The PSC may underscore the operational role of RECs and the RECSA in supporting the implementation of regional arms control instruments and advancing alignment between these instruments and the GFA. The PSC may also call for the establishment of systematic stockpile audits, improved coordination among regional mechanisms and the development of specialised training programmes. The Council may, in particular, propose the establishment of regional training initiatives grounded in the regional instruments, the AU frameworks and the IATG and the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), in order to build capacity for effective weapons and ammunition management. The Council may call for leveraging the GFA’s provisions on export controls and risk assessments related to diversion to mitigate external illicit arms transfers, which remain a persistent threat to peace and security across the continent. PSC could urge the AU Commission, Member States, and RECs/RMs to engage in the preparatory meeting at the UN Headquarters in New York, scheduled for 23 to 27 June 2025, by sharing valuable experiences and best practices on the safe and secure through-life management of ammunition. The Council may also encourage Member States to use the key findings and recommendations from the study conducted by the Commission in close collaboration with the four regions as a reference in making their interventions during the preparatory meeting. The PSC may encourage Member States to integrate the objectives of the GFA into national and SALW strategies, in alignment with the AU Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns by 2030. The Council may request technical assistance from the UNODA, the AMAT, and the UNREC to support national authorities in implementing regional and continental instruments on marking, tracing, and stockpile management, based on the IATG and the ISACS. The PSC may request the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs, to develop a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework to track progress in GFA implementation, emphasising evidence-based interventions and sustained institutional coordination. The PSC may also reiterate its request from its 1085th session and call on the AU Commission to follow up and report to the Council.
