Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Date | 19 September 2022
Tomorrow (19 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1106th session to receive updates on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali.
The session starts with opening remarks from Amma Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of September 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL) and Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Ndjamena are expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to make statements as relevant country and regional mechanisms, in addition to the representative of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
It will be for the second time that Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one agenda item. The first was held on 14 April 2022 at its 1076th session where Council discussed the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. It is not clear why Council has not included Sudan in the agenda item this time. It has been now more than five months since the PSC considered the political transition in Sudan despite its decision, at its 1041st session, to receive monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to review the political developments in the four countries since its last meeting in April. It also presents Council the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of some of its key decisions taken at its 1076th session, including the establishment of a monitoring dashboard of the situations in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan; the organization of a Needs Assessment Mission to Guinea; the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea; and the establishment of a Transition Support Group in Burkina Faso (TSG-BF).
On Burkina Faso, a major development since the last session is the decision of Burkinabe authorities to set a shorter transition period than its initial 36 months timetable. Duration of the transition was a source of disagreement between Burkinabe authorities and ECOWAS as the latter found the 36 months proposal in early March unacceptable. As part of the effort to support the transition in Burkina Faso and resolve the disagreement over the duration of the transition, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS appointed former President of Niger Mahamadou ISSOUFOU as its mediator. Subsequent engagement between ECOWAS and Burkinabe authorities through the mediator bridged differences between the two sides. While the communique of the 61st ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority stated that the progress made led to lifting of economic and financial sanctions, there was no specified list of economic & financial sanctions imposed on Burkina Faso. What is lifted could only be the threat of immediate application of unspecified economic and financial sanctions to which reference was made in the March 2022 ECOWAS Authority meeting. Despite various policy measures including the reshuffling of the army command & the understanding reached on the duration of the transition, the security situation in the country did not show any improvement. If anything, the dire security situation has continued to deteriorate since the coup. According to ACLED data, more than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May 2022, showing a 115 percent year-on-year increase. The humanitarian situation also continues to worsen. According to the latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September, ‘violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’ in Burkina Faso, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crises in the world. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. The same source indicates that the ‘rate of severe food insecurity has nearly doubled compared to last year, with over 600,000 people in emergency hunger levels during this lean season’. The deteriorating security and humanitarian situation underscore the need for ending the political and constitutional crisis and implementing the necessary political and institutional reforms.
On Mali, like in the case of Burkina Faso, diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the transition authorities in Mali culminated in acceptable transition timeline of 24 months from 29 March 2022. With Malian transitional authorities submitting a new timetable of 24 months and taking other positive steps notably the promulgation of a new electoral law on 24 June and establishment of the single election management body, Agence Indépendante de Gestion des Elections (AIGE), the 61st ordinary session of ECOWAS authority decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions it imposed on 9 January while maintaining the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups.
The convening of the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) took place on 6 September in Togo pursuant to 1027th and 1076th sessions of the Council. Co-convened by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN under the auspices of the Togolese government, the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali presented an opportunity for Malian authorities to present steps being taken for implementing the transitional roadmap and mobilize support from regional and international actors for the reform process. The Transitional Authority of Mali, during the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, also requested the lifting of remaining sanctions. It remains to be seen how Council will respond to the call for lifting also of suspension, which under current circumstances could realistically happen only with agreement with ECOWAS. Mali’s request of the lifting of sanction also brings the gap in AU’s normative framework of sanctions into the spotlight as there is still unclarity on the issue of how and when sanctions are lifted.
On Guinea, the country has witnessed deteriorating political situation as tension erupted between the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) (an alliance of political parties, trade unions and civil society groups and a leading opposition group that spearheaded protests against former president Alpha Conde), and the military authority that took over-power unconstitutionally on 5 September 2021. The opposition group staged protests in late July and on 17 August over concerns of military authority’s ‘unilateral management’ of the transition towards a civilian rule. On 8 August, the transition authorities dissolved the FNDC, a further blow to the country’s transition towards democracy. Following the same pattern in Mali and Burkina Faso, the National Transition Council of Guinea set a 36-month transition to civilian rule on 11 May, which ECOWAS rejected. ECOWAS at its 61st ordinary session requested the transition authorities either to propose an acceptable transition timeline until 1 August 2022 or face economic and financial sanctions as well as targeted sanctions. The authorities did not comply with the provided deadline, and it is accordingly susceptible for ECOWAS sanctions. ECOWAS mediator, former Beninese President Boni Yayi, was reportedly in Conakry in August trying to convince the transition authorities to agree for a shorter duration of transition period, but no indication that such diplomatic engagements bore fruit so far.
On Chad, the situation in Chad is marked by two significant developments since Council’s last session in April. The first is the signing of peace agreement between Chad’s transition government and about 40 politico-military groups on 8 August in Doha, Qatar, after more than five months of peace talks. Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), main rebel group which was behind the April attack that cost the life of former President Idriss Déby Into, remains a holdout group, denting the success of the Doha peace talk. The second key development is the launch of the 21-day ‘Inclusive National Dialogue’ on 20 August following the signing of the Doha agreement. The dialogue gathered some 1,400 delegates from various stakeholders. After the launch, the dialogue ran into procedural challenges, its scheduled end has been pushed back by ten days, to 30 September. Apart from FACT, the dialogue was also boycotted by Wakit Tamma, a large coalition of opposition groups and civil society groups. Last week, Chadian forces fired tear gas on supporters of the leader of Transformers, one of the parties of the coalition that boycotted the dialogue, after he was summoned for questioning by authorities. The authorities have been cracking down on members of Transformers, with about 200 having been arrested and held for several days before their release for planning to stage a rally.
In apparent departure to its own norms and established practices, PSC did not sanctioned Chad for the military seizure of power in April 2021 but outlined list of conditions that Chad’s transition authorities should meet. During its 996th session held on 14 May 2021, Council requested the Transitional Military Council (TMC), among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. PSC’s 18-months deadline will lapse this October and it is unlikely that the deadline will be met. The question therefore remains: will the PSC proceed with sanction or extend the transition timeline? The PSC is seen as having dealt with the military seizure of power & the suspension of constitution leniently. For it to be seen to be applying AU norms fairly, at a minimum it needs to uphold its own decisions on Chad by reaffirming the timeline and conditions of the transition as set out in the communique of its 996th session.
The expected outcome is a communique. Council is expected to welcome the agreement reached between ECOWAS and Burkina Faso as well as Mali on the new timetable of the transition and the resultant lifting of the economic and financial sanctions on these countries by ECOWAS. It may also note the convening of the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, the promulgation of a new electoral law and the establishment of the single election management body in relation to Mali and the need for enhancing closer working relationship and support for the transitional process in Mali; and the signing of Doha peace agreement between Chadian Transitional Authorities and politico-military groups, the launch of the ‘inclusive national dialogue’ in relation to Chad as steps in the right direction towards the restoration of constitutional order and ensure lasting peace in these countries. While commending the signing of the peace agreement, it may call upon the holdout groups to join the peace process. It may also reiterate the demands it set in its 996th session and call on the transitional authorities to respect the freedom of assembly and protest of opposition groups and ensure full inclusion of all political and social forces in the national dialogue by addressing concerns of various stakeholders. On Guinea, Council may express its dissatisfaction over the Transitional authorities’ proposal of 36 months transition, and thus, it may urge the authorities to engage with ECOWAS in good faith with the view to reaching agreement on acceptable timetable for a rapid return to constitutional order and call for the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea for working with ECOWAS to get a transitional roadmap agreeable to all. It may also express concern over the deteriorating socio-political situation in Guinea due to the political disagreement with opposition groups over the transition. In this regard, Council may urge transition authorities to respect political rights as enshrined in the relevant instruments of the AU and hold inclusive national dialogue to resolve underlying issues. Council may also express its grave concern over the worsening security and humanitarian situation particularly in the context of Burkina Faso and Mali, which Council may call upon international partners to step up efforts to address these situations.
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Date | 19 September 2022
Tomorrow (19 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1106th session to receive updates on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali.
The session starts with opening remarks from Amma Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of September 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL) and Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Ndjamena are expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to make statements as relevant country and regional mechanisms, in addition to the representative of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
It will be for the second time that Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one agenda item. The first was held on 14 April 2022 at its 1076th session where Council discussed the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. It is not clear why Council has not included Sudan in the agenda item this time. It has been now more than five months since the PSC considered the political transition in Sudan despite its decision, at its 1041st session, to receive monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to review the political developments in the four countries since its last meeting in April. It also presents Council the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of some of its key decisions taken at its 1076th session, including the establishment of a monitoring dashboard of the situations in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan; the organization of a Needs Assessment Mission to Guinea; the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea; and the establishment of a Transition Support Group in Burkina Faso (TSG-BF).
On Burkina Faso, a major development since the last session is the decision of Burkinabe authorities to set a shorter transition period than its initial 36 months timetable. Duration of the transition was a source of disagreement between Burkinabe authorities and ECOWAS as the latter found the 36 months proposal in early March unacceptable. As part of the effort to support the transition in Burkina Faso and resolve the disagreement over the duration of the transition, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS appointed former President of Niger Mahamadou ISSOUFOU as its mediator. Subsequent engagement between ECOWAS and Burkinabe authorities through the mediator bridged differences between the two sides. While the communique of the 61st ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority stated that the progress made led to lifting of economic and financial sanctions, there was no specified list of economic & financial sanctions imposed on Burkina Faso. What is lifted could only be the threat of immediate application of unspecified economic and financial sanctions to which reference was made in the March 2022 ECOWAS Authority meeting. Despite various policy measures including the reshuffling of the army command & the understanding reached on the duration of the transition, the security situation in the country did not show any improvement. If anything, the dire security situation has continued to deteriorate since the coup. According to ACLED data, more than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May 2022, showing a 115 percent year-on-year increase. The humanitarian situation also continues to worsen. According to the latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September, ‘violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’ in Burkina Faso, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crises in the world. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. The same source indicates that the ‘rate of severe food insecurity has nearly doubled compared to last year, with over 600,000 people in emergency hunger levels during this lean season’. The deteriorating security and humanitarian situation underscore the need for ending the political and constitutional crisis and implementing the necessary political and institutional reforms.
On Mali, like in the case of Burkina Faso, diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the transition authorities in Mali culminated in acceptable transition timeline of 24 months from 29 March 2022. With Malian transitional authorities submitting a new timetable of 24 months and taking other positive steps notably the promulgation of a new electoral law on 24 June and establishment of the single election management body, Agence Indépendante de Gestion des Elections (AIGE), the 61st ordinary session of ECOWAS authority decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions it imposed on 9 January while maintaining the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups.
The convening of the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) took place on 6 September in Togo pursuant to 1027th and 1076th sessions of the Council. Co-convened by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN under the auspices of the Togolese government, the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali presented an opportunity for Malian authorities to present steps being taken for implementing the transitional roadmap and mobilize support from regional and international actors for the reform process. The Transitional Authority of Mali, during the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, also requested the lifting of remaining sanctions. It remains to be seen how Council will respond to the call for lifting also of suspension, which under current circumstances could realistically happen only with agreement with ECOWAS. Mali’s request of the lifting of sanction also brings the gap in AU’s normative framework of sanctions into the spotlight as there is still unclarity on the issue of how and when sanctions are lifted.
On Guinea, the country has witnessed deteriorating political situation as tension erupted between the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) (an alliance of political parties, trade unions and civil society groups and a leading opposition group that spearheaded protests against former president Alpha Conde), and the military authority that took over-power unconstitutionally on 5 September 2021. The opposition group staged protests in late July and on 17 August over concerns of military authority’s ‘unilateral management’ of the transition towards a civilian rule. On 8 August, the transition authorities dissolved the FNDC, a further blow to the country’s transition towards democracy. Following the same pattern in Mali and Burkina Faso, the National Transition Council of Guinea set a 36-month transition to civilian rule on 11 May, which ECOWAS rejected. ECOWAS at its 61st ordinary session requested the transition authorities either to propose an acceptable transition timeline until 1 August 2022 or face economic and financial sanctions as well as targeted sanctions. The authorities did not comply with the provided deadline, and it is accordingly susceptible for ECOWAS sanctions. ECOWAS mediator, former Beninese President Boni Yayi, was reportedly in Conakry in August trying to convince the transition authorities to agree for a shorter duration of transition period, but no indication that such diplomatic engagements bore fruit so far.
On Chad, the situation in Chad is marked by two significant developments since Council’s last session in April. The first is the signing of peace agreement between Chad’s transition government and about 40 politico-military groups on 8 August in Doha, Qatar, after more than five months of peace talks. Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), main rebel group which was behind the April attack that cost the life of former President Idriss Déby Into, remains a holdout group, denting the success of the Doha peace talk. The second key development is the launch of the 21-day ‘Inclusive National Dialogue’ on 20 August following the signing of the Doha agreement. The dialogue gathered some 1,400 delegates from various stakeholders. After the launch, the dialogue ran into procedural challenges, its scheduled end has been pushed back by ten days, to 30 September. Apart from FACT, the dialogue was also boycotted by Wakit Tamma, a large coalition of opposition groups and civil society groups. Last week, Chadian forces fired tear gas on supporters of the leader of Transformers, one of the parties of the coalition that boycotted the dialogue, after he was summoned for questioning by authorities. The authorities have been cracking down on members of Transformers, with about 200 having been arrested and held for several days before their release for planning to stage a rally.
In apparent departure to its own norms and established practices, PSC did not sanctioned Chad for the military seizure of power in April 2021 but outlined list of conditions that Chad’s transition authorities should meet. During its 996th session held on 14 May 2021, Council requested the Transitional Military Council (TMC), among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. PSC’s 18-months deadline will lapse this October and it is unlikely that the deadline will be met. The question therefore remains: will the PSC proceed with sanction or extend the transition timeline? The PSC is seen as having dealt with the military seizure of power & the suspension of constitution leniently. For it to be seen to be applying AU norms fairly, at a minimum it needs to uphold its own decisions on Chad by reaffirming the timeline and conditions of the transition as set out in the communique of its 996th session.
The expected outcome is a communique. Council is expected to welcome the agreement reached between ECOWAS and Burkina Faso as well as Mali on the new timetable of the transition and the resultant lifting of the economic and financial sanctions on these countries by ECOWAS. It may also note the convening of the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, the promulgation of a new electoral law and the establishment of the single election management body in relation to Mali and the need for enhancing closer working relationship and support for the transitional process in Mali; and the signing of Doha peace agreement between Chadian Transitional Authorities and politico-military groups, the launch of the ‘inclusive national dialogue’ in relation to Chad as steps in the right direction towards the restoration of constitutional order and ensure lasting peace in these countries. While commending the signing of the peace agreement, it may call upon the holdout groups to join the peace process. It may also reiterate the demands it set in its 996th session and call on the transitional authorities to respect the freedom of assembly and protest of opposition groups and ensure full inclusion of all political and social forces in the national dialogue by addressing concerns of various stakeholders. On Guinea, Council may express its dissatisfaction over the Transitional authorities’ proposal of 36 months transition, and thus, it may urge the authorities to engage with ECOWAS in good faith with the view to reaching agreement on acceptable timetable for a rapid return to constitutional order and call for the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea for working with ECOWAS to get a transitional roadmap agreeable to all. It may also express concern over the deteriorating socio-political situation in Guinea due to the political disagreement with opposition groups over the transition. In this regard, Council may urge transition authorities to respect political rights as enshrined in the relevant instruments of the AU and hold inclusive national dialogue to resolve underlying issues. Council may also express its grave concern over the worsening security and humanitarian situation particularly in the context of Burkina Faso and Mali, which Council may call upon international partners to step up efforts to address these situations.
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Date | 19 September 2022
Tomorrow (19 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1106th session to receive updates on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali.
The session starts with opening remarks from Amma Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of September 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL) and Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Ndjamena are expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to make statements as relevant country and regional mechanisms, in addition to the representative of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
It will be for the second time that Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one agenda item. The first was held on 14 April 2022 at its 1076th session where Council discussed the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. It is not clear why Council has not included Sudan in the agenda item this time. It has been now more than five months since the PSC considered the political transition in Sudan despite its decision, at its 1041st session, to receive monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to review the political developments in the four countries since its last meeting in April. It also presents Council the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of some of its key decisions taken at its 1076th session, including the establishment of a monitoring dashboard of the situations in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan; the organization of a Needs Assessment Mission to Guinea; the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea; and the establishment of a Transition Support Group in Burkina Faso (TSG-BF).
On Burkina Faso, a major development since the last session is the decision of Burkinabe authorities to set a shorter transition period than its initial 36 months timetable. Duration of the transition was a source of disagreement between Burkinabe authorities and ECOWAS as the latter found the 36 months proposal in early March unacceptable. As part of the effort to support the transition in Burkina Faso and resolve the disagreement over the duration of the transition, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS appointed former President of Niger Mahamadou ISSOUFOU as its mediator. Subsequent engagement between ECOWAS and Burkinabe authorities through the mediator bridged differences between the two sides. While the communique of the 61st ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority stated that the progress made led to lifting of economic and financial sanctions, there was no specified list of economic & financial sanctions imposed on Burkina Faso. What is lifted could only be the threat of immediate application of unspecified economic and financial sanctions to which reference was made in the March 2022 ECOWAS Authority meeting. Despite various policy measures including the reshuffling of the army command & the understanding reached on the duration of the transition, the security situation in the country did not show any improvement. If anything, the dire security situation has continued to deteriorate since the coup. According to ACLED data, more than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May 2022, showing a 115 percent year-on-year increase. The humanitarian situation also continues to worsen. According to the latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September, ‘violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’ in Burkina Faso, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crises in the world. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. The same source indicates that the ‘rate of severe food insecurity has nearly doubled compared to last year, with over 600,000 people in emergency hunger levels during this lean season’. The deteriorating security and humanitarian situation underscore the need for ending the political and constitutional crisis and implementing the necessary political and institutional reforms.
On Mali, like in the case of Burkina Faso, diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the transition authorities in Mali culminated in acceptable transition timeline of 24 months from 29 March 2022. With Malian transitional authorities submitting a new timetable of 24 months and taking other positive steps notably the promulgation of a new electoral law on 24 June and establishment of the single election management body, Agence Indépendante de Gestion des Elections (AIGE), the 61st ordinary session of ECOWAS authority decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions it imposed on 9 January while maintaining the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups.
The convening of the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) took place on 6 September in Togo pursuant to 1027th and 1076th sessions of the Council. Co-convened by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN under the auspices of the Togolese government, the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali presented an opportunity for Malian authorities to present steps being taken for implementing the transitional roadmap and mobilize support from regional and international actors for the reform process. The Transitional Authority of Mali, during the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, also requested the lifting of remaining sanctions. It remains to be seen how Council will respond to the call for lifting also of suspension, which under current circumstances could realistically happen only with agreement with ECOWAS. Mali’s request of the lifting of sanction also brings the gap in AU’s normative framework of sanctions into the spotlight as there is still unclarity on the issue of how and when sanctions are lifted.
On Guinea, the country has witnessed deteriorating political situation as tension erupted between the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) (an alliance of political parties, trade unions and civil society groups and a leading opposition group that spearheaded protests against former president Alpha Conde), and the military authority that took over-power unconstitutionally on 5 September 2021. The opposition group staged protests in late July and on 17 August over concerns of military authority’s ‘unilateral management’ of the transition towards a civilian rule. On 8 August, the transition authorities dissolved the FNDC, a further blow to the country’s transition towards democracy. Following the same pattern in Mali and Burkina Faso, the National Transition Council of Guinea set a 36-month transition to civilian rule on 11 May, which ECOWAS rejected. ECOWAS at its 61st ordinary session requested the transition authorities either to propose an acceptable transition timeline until 1 August 2022 or face economic and financial sanctions as well as targeted sanctions. The authorities did not comply with the provided deadline, and it is accordingly susceptible for ECOWAS sanctions. ECOWAS mediator, former Beninese President Boni Yayi, was reportedly in Conakry in August trying to convince the transition authorities to agree for a shorter duration of transition period, but no indication that such diplomatic engagements bore fruit so far.
On Chad, the situation in Chad is marked by two significant developments since Council’s last session in April. The first is the signing of peace agreement between Chad’s transition government and about 40 politico-military groups on 8 August in Doha, Qatar, after more than five months of peace talks. Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), main rebel group which was behind the April attack that cost the life of former President Idriss Déby Into, remains a holdout group, denting the success of the Doha peace talk. The second key development is the launch of the 21-day ‘Inclusive National Dialogue’ on 20 August following the signing of the Doha agreement. The dialogue gathered some 1,400 delegates from various stakeholders. After the launch, the dialogue ran into procedural challenges, its scheduled end has been pushed back by ten days, to 30 September. Apart from FACT, the dialogue was also boycotted by Wakit Tamma, a large coalition of opposition groups and civil society groups. Last week, Chadian forces fired tear gas on supporters of the leader of Transformers, one of the parties of the coalition that boycotted the dialogue, after he was summoned for questioning by authorities. The authorities have been cracking down on members of Transformers, with about 200 having been arrested and held for several days before their release for planning to stage a rally.
In apparent departure to its own norms and established practices, PSC did not sanctioned Chad for the military seizure of power in April 2021 but outlined list of conditions that Chad’s transition authorities should meet. During its 996th session held on 14 May 2021, Council requested the Transitional Military Council (TMC), among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. PSC’s 18-months deadline will lapse this October and it is unlikely that the deadline will be met. The question therefore remains: will the PSC proceed with sanction or extend the transition timeline? The PSC is seen as having dealt with the military seizure of power & the suspension of constitution leniently. For it to be seen to be applying AU norms fairly, at a minimum it needs to uphold its own decisions on Chad by reaffirming the timeline and conditions of the transition as set out in the communique of its 996th session.
The expected outcome is a communique. Council is expected to welcome the agreement reached between ECOWAS and Burkina Faso as well as Mali on the new timetable of the transition and the resultant lifting of the economic and financial sanctions on these countries by ECOWAS. It may also note the convening of the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, the promulgation of a new electoral law and the establishment of the single election management body in relation to Mali and the need for enhancing closer working relationship and support for the transitional process in Mali; and the signing of Doha peace agreement between Chadian Transitional Authorities and politico-military groups, the launch of the ‘inclusive national dialogue’ in relation to Chad as steps in the right direction towards the restoration of constitutional order and ensure lasting peace in these countries. While commending the signing of the peace agreement, it may call upon the holdout groups to join the peace process. It may also reiterate the demands it set in its 996th session and call on the transitional authorities to respect the freedom of assembly and protest of opposition groups and ensure full inclusion of all political and social forces in the national dialogue by addressing concerns of various stakeholders. On Guinea, Council may express its dissatisfaction over the Transitional authorities’ proposal of 36 months transition, and thus, it may urge the authorities to engage with ECOWAS in good faith with the view to reaching agreement on acceptable timetable for a rapid return to constitutional order and call for the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea for working with ECOWAS to get a transitional roadmap agreeable to all. It may also express concern over the deteriorating socio-political situation in Guinea due to the political disagreement with opposition groups over the transition. In this regard, Council may urge transition authorities to respect political rights as enshrined in the relevant instruments of the AU and hold inclusive national dialogue to resolve underlying issues. Council may also express its grave concern over the worsening security and humanitarian situation particularly in the context of Burkina Faso and Mali, which Council may call upon international partners to step up efforts to address these situations.
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Update on some countries in political transitions (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali)
Date | 19 September 2022
Tomorrow (19 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1106th session to receive updates on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali.
The session starts with opening remarks from Amma Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of September 2022, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL) and Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Ndjamena are expected to deliver statements. The representatives of Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to make statements as relevant country and regional mechanisms, in addition to the representative of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
It will be for the second time that Council considers the situation in countries undergoing political transitions due to unconstitutional changes of government as one agenda item. The first was held on 14 April 2022 at its 1076th session where Council discussed the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan. It is not clear why Council has not included Sudan in the agenda item this time. It has been now more than five months since the PSC considered the political transition in Sudan despite its decision, at its 1041st session, to receive monthly update on the evolution of the situation in Sudan.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to review the political developments in the four countries since its last meeting in April. It also presents Council the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of some of its key decisions taken at its 1076th session, including the establishment of a monitoring dashboard of the situations in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan; the organization of a Needs Assessment Mission to Guinea; the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea; and the establishment of a Transition Support Group in Burkina Faso (TSG-BF).
On Burkina Faso, a major development since the last session is the decision of Burkinabe authorities to set a shorter transition period than its initial 36 months timetable. Duration of the transition was a source of disagreement between Burkinabe authorities and ECOWAS as the latter found the 36 months proposal in early March unacceptable. As part of the effort to support the transition in Burkina Faso and resolve the disagreement over the duration of the transition, it is to be recalled that ECOWAS appointed former President of Niger Mahamadou ISSOUFOU as its mediator. Subsequent engagement between ECOWAS and Burkinabe authorities through the mediator bridged differences between the two sides. While the communique of the 61st ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority stated that the progress made led to lifting of economic and financial sanctions, there was no specified list of economic & financial sanctions imposed on Burkina Faso. What is lifted could only be the threat of immediate application of unspecified economic and financial sanctions to which reference was made in the March 2022 ECOWAS Authority meeting. Despite various policy measures including the reshuffling of the army command & the understanding reached on the duration of the transition, the security situation in the country did not show any improvement. If anything, the dire security situation has continued to deteriorate since the coup. According to ACLED data, more than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May 2022, showing a 115 percent year-on-year increase. The humanitarian situation also continues to worsen. According to the latest data provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) published on 5 September, ‘violent attacks has driven more people to flee between January and July 2022 than during the entire year of 2021’ in Burkina Faso, making the country one of the three fastest growing displacement crises in the world. Close to 2 million (nearly one in 10 persons) have been displaced in the country. The same source indicates that the ‘rate of severe food insecurity has nearly doubled compared to last year, with over 600,000 people in emergency hunger levels during this lean season’. The deteriorating security and humanitarian situation underscore the need for ending the political and constitutional crisis and implementing the necessary political and institutional reforms.
On Mali, like in the case of Burkina Faso, diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the transition authorities in Mali culminated in acceptable transition timeline of 24 months from 29 March 2022. With Malian transitional authorities submitting a new timetable of 24 months and taking other positive steps notably the promulgation of a new electoral law on 24 June and establishment of the single election management body, Agence Indépendante de Gestion des Elections (AIGE), the 61st ordinary session of ECOWAS authority decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions it imposed on 9 January while maintaining the suspension and targeted sanctions against individuals and groups.
The convening of the 3rd meeting of the Monitoring and Support Group for the Transition in Mali (GST-Mali) took place on 6 September in Togo pursuant to 1027th and 1076th sessions of the Council. Co-convened by the AU, ECOWAS, and UN under the auspices of the Togolese government, the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali presented an opportunity for Malian authorities to present steps being taken for implementing the transitional roadmap and mobilize support from regional and international actors for the reform process. The Transitional Authority of Mali, during the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, also requested the lifting of remaining sanctions. It remains to be seen how Council will respond to the call for lifting also of suspension, which under current circumstances could realistically happen only with agreement with ECOWAS. Mali’s request of the lifting of sanction also brings the gap in AU’s normative framework of sanctions into the spotlight as there is still unclarity on the issue of how and when sanctions are lifted.
On Guinea, the country has witnessed deteriorating political situation as tension erupted between the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) (an alliance of political parties, trade unions and civil society groups and a leading opposition group that spearheaded protests against former president Alpha Conde), and the military authority that took over-power unconstitutionally on 5 September 2021. The opposition group staged protests in late July and on 17 August over concerns of military authority’s ‘unilateral management’ of the transition towards a civilian rule. On 8 August, the transition authorities dissolved the FNDC, a further blow to the country’s transition towards democracy. Following the same pattern in Mali and Burkina Faso, the National Transition Council of Guinea set a 36-month transition to civilian rule on 11 May, which ECOWAS rejected. ECOWAS at its 61st ordinary session requested the transition authorities either to propose an acceptable transition timeline until 1 August 2022 or face economic and financial sanctions as well as targeted sanctions. The authorities did not comply with the provided deadline, and it is accordingly susceptible for ECOWAS sanctions. ECOWAS mediator, former Beninese President Boni Yayi, was reportedly in Conakry in August trying to convince the transition authorities to agree for a shorter duration of transition period, but no indication that such diplomatic engagements bore fruit so far.
On Chad, the situation in Chad is marked by two significant developments since Council’s last session in April. The first is the signing of peace agreement between Chad’s transition government and about 40 politico-military groups on 8 August in Doha, Qatar, after more than five months of peace talks. Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), main rebel group which was behind the April attack that cost the life of former President Idriss Déby Into, remains a holdout group, denting the success of the Doha peace talk. The second key development is the launch of the 21-day ‘Inclusive National Dialogue’ on 20 August following the signing of the Doha agreement. The dialogue gathered some 1,400 delegates from various stakeholders. After the launch, the dialogue ran into procedural challenges, its scheduled end has been pushed back by ten days, to 30 September. Apart from FACT, the dialogue was also boycotted by Wakit Tamma, a large coalition of opposition groups and civil society groups. Last week, Chadian forces fired tear gas on supporters of the leader of Transformers, one of the parties of the coalition that boycotted the dialogue, after he was summoned for questioning by authorities. The authorities have been cracking down on members of Transformers, with about 200 having been arrested and held for several days before their release for planning to stage a rally.
In apparent departure to its own norms and established practices, PSC did not sanctioned Chad for the military seizure of power in April 2021 but outlined list of conditions that Chad’s transition authorities should meet. During its 996th session held on 14 May 2021, Council requested the Transitional Military Council (TMC), among others, to complete the transition within 18 months from 20 April 2021, further stating that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It also urged the Chairman and members of the TMC not to run for the upcoming elections. PSC’s 18-months deadline will lapse this October and it is unlikely that the deadline will be met. The question therefore remains: will the PSC proceed with sanction or extend the transition timeline? The PSC is seen as having dealt with the military seizure of power & the suspension of constitution leniently. For it to be seen to be applying AU norms fairly, at a minimum it needs to uphold its own decisions on Chad by reaffirming the timeline and conditions of the transition as set out in the communique of its 996th session.
The expected outcome is a communique. Council is expected to welcome the agreement reached between ECOWAS and Burkina Faso as well as Mali on the new timetable of the transition and the resultant lifting of the economic and financial sanctions on these countries by ECOWAS. It may also note the convening of the 3rd meeting of the GST-Mali, the promulgation of a new electoral law and the establishment of the single election management body in relation to Mali and the need for enhancing closer working relationship and support for the transitional process in Mali; and the signing of Doha peace agreement between Chadian Transitional Authorities and politico-military groups, the launch of the ‘inclusive national dialogue’ in relation to Chad as steps in the right direction towards the restoration of constitutional order and ensure lasting peace in these countries. While commending the signing of the peace agreement, it may call upon the holdout groups to join the peace process. It may also reiterate the demands it set in its 996th session and call on the transitional authorities to respect the freedom of assembly and protest of opposition groups and ensure full inclusion of all political and social forces in the national dialogue by addressing concerns of various stakeholders. On Guinea, Council may express its dissatisfaction over the Transitional authorities’ proposal of 36 months transition, and thus, it may urge the authorities to engage with ECOWAS in good faith with the view to reaching agreement on acceptable timetable for a rapid return to constitutional order and call for the operationalization of the Monitoring Mechanism on the Transition in Guinea for working with ECOWAS to get a transitional roadmap agreeable to all. It may also express concern over the deteriorating socio-political situation in Guinea due to the political disagreement with opposition groups over the transition. In this regard, Council may urge transition authorities to respect political rights as enshrined in the relevant instruments of the AU and hold inclusive national dialogue to resolve underlying issues. Council may also express its grave concern over the worsening security and humanitarian situation particularly in the context of Burkina Faso and Mali, which Council may call upon international partners to step up efforts to address these situations.
Briefing on the AU Peace Fund
Briefing on the AU Peace Fund
Date | 16 September 2022
Tomorrow (16 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene a joint-meeting with the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Budget Matters along with the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund, to discuss the status of the AU Peace Fund operationalisation.
Apart from the remarks of the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, the opening segment of the session is envisaged to feature remarks of the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund and the Chairperson of the AU Committee of (F15). The substantive session is envisaged to involve update on the status of the Peace Fund. In this respect, the Deputy Chairperson of the AUC, who is a member of the Executive Management Committee of the Peace Fund, will brief the session on the rational for the establishment and operationalizing a high-performing Fund in line with international best practice. This is followed by an update by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) on ‘Evolving consensus on financing AU Peace Support Operations and priority utilization of the Fund’.
The last time Council convened a session to discuss the AU Peace Fund was in October 2021, at its 1036th meeting. At that session, Council deliberated on the utilisation of the Peace Fund on priority areas including support to peace processes in specific conflict and crisis affected member states including Libya, Mali, Somalia and Sudan. Tomorrow’s briefing presents the opportunity for Council to receive updates and reflect on the latest developments regarding operationalisation of the Peace Fund. The session is unique in bringing together all the major stakeholders, thereby presenting an opportunity for achieving consensus on the full operationalization of the Fund including the proposed piloting of the utilization of a specified amount of the Fund.
The major developments since the last session of the PSC include the finalization of the identification of the priority areas for use of funds from the interest accrued to the current contributions to Peace Fund. It is to be recalled that the PSC discussed and agreed on the utilization of the AU Peace Fund through pilot projects from the accrued interest during its 13th retreat on its working methods in the context of AU Institutional Reforms (ref. PSC/Retreat.13 dated 27-29 May 2021) held in Mombasa Kenya.
The AU Commission engaged the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund towards the pilot utilization of the Peace Fund in 2022 through costed and prioritized programmatic activities to address urgent peace and security challenges on the Continent. The representatives of the Executive Committee composed of the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and the Commissioner for PAPS, in consultation with the AU High Representative on Financing of the AU and the Peace Fund, have identified priorities for utilisation of the Fund. Within this framework, 21 priority areas were identified.
The Board of Trustees approved for consideration and adoption by the relevant AU policy organs the use of $ 8.4 million from the interest accrued to the Peace Fund to implement pilot projects. During the 4th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia, the Executive Council approved an additional $5 million for the Crisis Reserve Fund (CRF). The revolving $5 million for the CRF proposed for the pilot phase is expected to be used for activities that do not exceed one year.
Through CRF the AUC envisages to support startup costs of missions authorized by relevant AU policy organs, emergency situations that exceed the capacity of member states, activities that can be undertaken in a short period and activities that can rapidly bring change in the peace and security situation. The CRF fund allows the PSC and the AUC to respond to emerging crises for which provision could not have been made in the annual regular budget for peace and security.
During the consideration of the report on the CRF in Lusaka, one of the issues raised centered around the extent to which the relevant bodies were consulted and whether due process has been followed as stipulated in the Financial Rules and Regulations (FRR). The concept of implementing a pilot project under the three windows of the Peace Fund has been largely welcomed but the Executive Council could not consider the proposed project for approval. Hence this Joint Briefing session is meant to provide firm clarity on compliance with the FRR and ensure that the relevant AU bodies achieve common understanding. It also serves to pave the way for proposed $8.4 million for the pilot projects that is yet to be approved by the PRC for adoption by AU policy organs.
In addition to reaching agreement on priority areas, the legal, operational and governance mechanisms relevant for the full functioning of the Fund have also been established. This includes finalisation of the process of drawing programmes and costing priority areas for utilisation; establishment and operationalisation of the Board of Trustees and the Executive Management Committee; adoption of modalities for the recruitment of Independent Evaluation Panel and Fund Managers; and commencement of processes for the establishment of the Peace Fund Secretariat. The PAPS Department has also prepared the Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the budget proposal for the pilot utilization of the Peace Fund.
On 30 June 2022, the Board of Trustees held a meeting to review the progress obtained in operationalising the Peace Fund. Key progresses noted at the meeting include the appointment of two external, independent Fund Managers – Old Mutual Investment Group from South Africa and Sanlam Investments East Africa from Kenya. Further to that, the Financial Rules for the Peace Fund have also been adopted as part of the AU’s financial rules and regulations in February 2022.
With respect to the status of contributions of member states to the Peace Fund, as of mid-August 2022, the amount from member states assessed contributions stands at $279,069,008.43. Together with voluntary contributions, interest earned on investment of Peace Fund assets and the transfer of the Legacy Peace Fund to the revitalized Peace Fund, the total amount of the Peace Fund stood at $321,504,709.15 as of mid-August 2022. According to the AU report presented to the 41st Ordinary Session held in Lusaka last July, twenty-two (22) AU member states paid their 2022 Peace Fund assessments in full while five (5) member states had made partial payments as at 30 June 2022. Twenty-eight (28) member states had not made any payment to their 2022 Peace Fund assessments. Apart from collection of assessed contribution of member states, there is also the ongoing process for achieving consensus on the contribution of six member states from the North region and the collection or clearing of arrears by defaulting member states.
On the process for achieving the modalities for contribution to the Peace Fund by the six countries, the Executive Council through its Decision (EX.CL/Dec.1162(XL) of February 2022 directed the Commission to work closely with the F15 and the Office of Legal Counsel to analyze proposals made by the Countries of the Northern Region regarding the assessment of member states to the Peace Fund and the implications thereof and recommend solutions in accordance with the legal frameworks of the African Union. While consultations have accordingly been carried out, breakthrough has as yet to emerge finding a proposal that is satisfactory to all while complying with the legal requirements. In terms of collection or clearing of arrears, the report of the Joint-Sitting of the Ministerial Committee on Scale of Assessment and Contributions and the Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (F15) highlighted that Seychelles had fully implemented its payment plan and cleared all its arrears to the budget of the Union. Somalia and Burundi had not made payments in 2022 in line with their payment plan for clearing arrears. Also, Libya and Sudan have yet to conclude the consultations with the Commission to agree on their respective payment plans.
Such progress in the operationalization of the Peace Fund notwithstanding, also of significance for tomorrow’s session is the need for momentum for finalising the common African position on accessing UN assessed contributions for financing AU peace and security activities. It is to be recalled that after the stalling of the efforts of the African 3 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 2018 and 2019 to get adoption of a resolution on UN assessed contributions for AU led or authorized peace support operations, the matter was referred back to the AU to provide guidance through a common position. In this regard, a notable progress attained in 2021 has been the development of a ‘Zero Draft African Consensus on Accessing Sustainable and Predictable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities.’ At the 23rd and 24th PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) meetings, the Zero Draft was considered and the CoE gave inputs for further refinement of the draft. However, the updated draft is as yet to be presented and considered by the PSC before its submission to the AU Assembly for final approval. During tomorrow’s session, one of the issues on which Adeoye could provide update is where this process stands and the next steps for finalizing it and resuming the engagement with the UNSC on accessing assessed contributions.
At the time of going to production, while an outcome document is expected, the form that it will take was unknown. Council and the PRC Sub-Committee on Budget Matters are expected to welcome the commendable progress obtained in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund and the steps taken for the utilisation for pilot priority areas. The meeting is expected to endorse the $8.4 million and the additional $5 million of the CRF for adoption by the AU policy organs, so that the utilization of peace fund for the pilot priority projects would fully commence in 2023. The meeting may call on defaulting member states to pay their assessed contributions on time, including those member states expected to finalize the clearing of arrears. It may also urge concerned member states and the AU Commission to fortify efforts towards reaching consensus on contribution of the six countries from the North region to the Peace Fund. The meeting may welcome the progress made in developing the consensus position and encourage the speeding up of the remaining steps for resuming the engagement of the UNSC on accessing UN assessed contributions for AU led peace support operations.
Briefing on the AU Peace Fund
Briefing on the AU Peace Fund
Date | 16 September 2022
Tomorrow (16 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene a joint-meeting with the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Budget Matters along with the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund, to discuss the status of the AU Peace Fund operationalisation.
Apart from the remarks of the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, the opening segment of the session is envisaged to feature remarks of the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund and the Chairperson of the AU Committee of (F15). The substantive session is envisaged to involve update on the status of the Peace Fund. In this respect, the Deputy Chairperson of the AUC, who is a member of the Executive Management Committee of the Peace Fund, will brief the session on the rational for the establishment and operationalizing a high-performing Fund in line with international best practice. This is followed by an update by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) on ‘Evolving consensus on financing AU Peace Support Operations and priority utilization of the Fund’.
The last time Council convened a session to discuss the AU Peace Fund was in October 2021, at its 1036th meeting. At that session, Council deliberated on the utilisation of the Peace Fund on priority areas including support to peace processes in specific conflict and crisis affected member states including Libya, Mali, Somalia and Sudan. Tomorrow’s briefing presents the opportunity for Council to receive updates and reflect on the latest developments regarding operationalisation of the Peace Fund. The session is unique in bringing together all the major stakeholders, thereby presenting an opportunity for achieving consensus on the full operationalization of the Fund including the proposed piloting of the utilization of a specified amount of the Fund.
The major developments since the last session of the PSC include the finalization of the identification of the priority areas for use of funds from the interest accrued to the current contributions to Peace Fund. It is to be recalled that the PSC discussed and agreed on the utilization of the AU Peace Fund through pilot projects from the accrued interest during its 13th retreat on its working methods in the context of AU Institutional Reforms (ref. PSC/Retreat.13 dated 27-29 May 2021) held in Mombasa Kenya.
The AU Commission engaged the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund towards the pilot utilization of the Peace Fund in 2022 through costed and prioritized programmatic activities to address urgent peace and security challenges on the Continent. The representatives of the Executive Committee composed of the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and the Commissioner for PAPS, in consultation with the AU High Representative on Financing of the AU and the Peace Fund, have identified priorities for utilisation of the Fund. Within this framework, 21 priority areas were identified.
The Board of Trustees approved for consideration and adoption by the relevant AU policy organs the use of $ 8.4 million from the interest accrued to the Peace Fund to implement pilot projects. During the 4th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia, the Executive Council approved an additional $5 million for the Crisis Reserve Fund (CRF). The revolving $5 million for the CRF proposed for the pilot phase is expected to be used for activities that do not exceed one year.
Through CRF the AUC envisages to support startup costs of missions authorized by relevant AU policy organs, emergency situations that exceed the capacity of member states, activities that can be undertaken in a short period and activities that can rapidly bring change in the peace and security situation. The CRF fund allows the PSC and the AUC to respond to emerging crises for which provision could not have been made in the annual regular budget for peace and security.
During the consideration of the report on the CRF in Lusaka, one of the issues raised centered around the extent to which the relevant bodies were consulted and whether due process has been followed as stipulated in the Financial Rules and Regulations (FRR). The concept of implementing a pilot project under the three windows of the Peace Fund has been largely welcomed but the Executive Council could not consider the proposed project for approval. Hence this Joint Briefing session is meant to provide firm clarity on compliance with the FRR and ensure that the relevant AU bodies achieve common understanding. It also serves to pave the way for proposed $8.4 million for the pilot projects that is yet to be approved by the PRC for adoption by AU policy organs.
In addition to reaching agreement on priority areas, the legal, operational and governance mechanisms relevant for the full functioning of the Fund have also been established. This includes finalisation of the process of drawing programmes and costing priority areas for utilisation; establishment and operationalisation of the Board of Trustees and the Executive Management Committee; adoption of modalities for the recruitment of Independent Evaluation Panel and Fund Managers; and commencement of processes for the establishment of the Peace Fund Secretariat. The PAPS Department has also prepared the Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the budget proposal for the pilot utilization of the Peace Fund.
On 30 June 2022, the Board of Trustees held a meeting to review the progress obtained in operationalising the Peace Fund. Key progresses noted at the meeting include the appointment of two external, independent Fund Managers – Old Mutual Investment Group from South Africa and Sanlam Investments East Africa from Kenya. Further to that, the Financial Rules for the Peace Fund have also been adopted as part of the AU’s financial rules and regulations in February 2022.
With respect to the status of contributions of member states to the Peace Fund, as of mid-August 2022, the amount from member states assessed contributions stands at $279,069,008.43. Together with voluntary contributions, interest earned on investment of Peace Fund assets and the transfer of the Legacy Peace Fund to the revitalized Peace Fund, the total amount of the Peace Fund stood at $321,504,709.15 as of mid-August 2022. According to the AU report presented to the 41st Ordinary Session held in Lusaka last July, twenty-two (22) AU member states paid their 2022 Peace Fund assessments in full while five (5) member states had made partial payments as at 30 June 2022. Twenty-eight (28) member states had not made any payment to their 2022 Peace Fund assessments. Apart from collection of assessed contribution of member states, there is also the ongoing process for achieving consensus on the contribution of six member states from the North region and the collection or clearing of arrears by defaulting member states.
On the process for achieving the modalities for contribution to the Peace Fund by the six countries, the Executive Council through its Decision (EX.CL/Dec.1162(XL) of February 2022 directed the Commission to work closely with the F15 and the Office of Legal Counsel to analyze proposals made by the Countries of the Northern Region regarding the assessment of member states to the Peace Fund and the implications thereof and recommend solutions in accordance with the legal frameworks of the African Union. While consultations have accordingly been carried out, breakthrough has as yet to emerge finding a proposal that is satisfactory to all while complying with the legal requirements. In terms of collection or clearing of arrears, the report of the Joint-Sitting of the Ministerial Committee on Scale of Assessment and Contributions and the Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (F15) highlighted that Seychelles had fully implemented its payment plan and cleared all its arrears to the budget of the Union. Somalia and Burundi had not made payments in 2022 in line with their payment plan for clearing arrears. Also, Libya and Sudan have yet to conclude the consultations with the Commission to agree on their respective payment plans.
Such progress in the operationalization of the Peace Fund notwithstanding, also of significance for tomorrow’s session is the need for momentum for finalising the common African position on accessing UN assessed contributions for financing AU peace and security activities. It is to be recalled that after the stalling of the efforts of the African 3 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 2018 and 2019 to get adoption of a resolution on UN assessed contributions for AU led or authorized peace support operations, the matter was referred back to the AU to provide guidance through a common position. In this regard, a notable progress attained in 2021 has been the development of a ‘Zero Draft African Consensus on Accessing Sustainable and Predictable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities.’ At the 23rd and 24th PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) meetings, the Zero Draft was considered and the CoE gave inputs for further refinement of the draft. However, the updated draft is as yet to be presented and considered by the PSC before its submission to the AU Assembly for final approval. During tomorrow’s session, one of the issues on which Adeoye could provide update is where this process stands and the next steps for finalizing it and resuming the engagement with the UNSC on accessing assessed contributions.
At the time of going to production, while an outcome document is expected, the form that it will take was unknown. Council and the PRC Sub-Committee on Budget Matters are expected to welcome the commendable progress obtained in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund and the steps taken for the utilisation for pilot priority areas. The meeting is expected to endorse the $8.4 million and the additional $5 million of the CRF for adoption by the AU policy organs, so that the utilization of peace fund for the pilot priority projects would fully commence in 2023. The meeting may call on defaulting member states to pay their assessed contributions on time, including those member states expected to finalize the clearing of arrears. It may also urge concerned member states and the AU Commission to fortify efforts towards reaching consensus on contribution of the six countries from the North region to the Peace Fund. The meeting may welcome the progress made in developing the consensus position and encourage the speeding up of the remaining steps for resuming the engagement of the UNSC on accessing UN assessed contributions for AU led peace support operations.
Inaugural Annual PSC and CSO Consultative Meeting
Inaugural Annual PSC and CSO Consultative Meeting
Date | 14 September 2022
Tomorrow (14 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its inaugural annual consultative meeting with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to engage on the implementation of the Accra Declaration and Malabo Decisions.
Following the opening statement of Amma Twum-Amoah, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Ghana to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of September 2022, Bankole Adeoye Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a presentation. Following his intervention, representatives of the Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), Civil Society Organizations and the United Nations are expected to deliver their statements.
The inaugural session is expected to focus both on strengthening the working relations between PSC and CSOs and to fast-track the operationalization of the outcome documents of the Accra Forum and Malabo Extraordinary Summit that took place in March and May 2022 respectively.
The AU Constitutive Act stipulates that one of the objectives of the Union is ‘to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society’ and to promote the ‘participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union’. The Statutes of the AU ECOSOCC provides a broad description of civil society organizations comprising social, professional groups, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), community-Based Organizations (CBOs), as well as voluntary and cultural organizations. The important role of policy research and knowledge production by academic and research institutions has been recognized in the 2009 Tripoli Declaration.
Similarly, Article 20 of the PSC Protocol states that: ‘the Peace and Security Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-based and other civil society organizations, particularly women’s organizations, to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required, such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.’ Article 8 of the Protocol further stipulates for the PSC to hold ‘informal consultations with…civil society organizations for the discharge of its responsibilities’. This informal consultation envisaged in Article 8 of the PSC has as yet to be operationalized, CSOs are invited to and engage in the open sessions of the PSC at which they present statements on the agenda of the session.
There were various efforts in terms of operationalizing Article 20 of the PSC. The first retreat of the PSC, the Dakar Retreat called for the establishment of a mechanism to manage the engagement between the PSC and CSOs. Building on the 2007 conclusions of the Dakar Retreat, the PSC elaborated the modalities for engaging with such institutions in the Livingstone Formula and the Maseru Retreat Conclusions. The Livingstone Formula identified a number of areas in which CSOs can contribute towards the promotion of peace and security including in conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction as well as the provision of technical support, popularizing the decisions of the PSC.
While these initiatives are encouraging, the partnership has not been institutionalized. PSC engaged with and drew on the work of various institutions on an ad hoc basis. It is hence fundamental making the engagement with think tanks, civil society organizations and policy research organizations more systematic and it’s more beneficial for strengthening the Council’s role in discharging its mandate. This in particular can be achieved by enhancing PSC’s understanding of the role of these institutions and the contributions that they made and by engaging more regularly. Tomorrow’s session will be an important step in consolidating this understanding and implementing the provision identified in the Livingstone Formula which called for an annual meeting between the PSC and CSOs through the ECOSOCC. It is also important to critically reflect and assess the gaps in the implementation of the of the provisions of Council’s retreat conclusions and its norms.
The agenda and the complexity of issues that the PSC has to address have expanded exponentially. The number of meetings of the PSC has increased by almost five-fold since the PSC was inaugurated in 2004. This growing scope requires additional capacity and resources. More particularly the PSC may benefit from expertise and resources of policy and research institutions to cover the wide range of issues that require immediate and continuous attention. The policy analysis that can be provided by policy and research institutions brings a non-state perspective that adds depth to and enriches policy deliberations of the PSC. The Council can tap into the expertise, knowledge and technical resources of non-state actors particularly African policy research organizations, think tanks and civil society organizations. This would allow for the Council to explore and experiment with the range of policy options that it can choose from in its efforts for taking the most optimal policy action for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.
As indicated in the concept note the other central objective of tomorrow’s session is to chart a way to deepen the collaboration between the PSC and CSOs in implementing the Accra declaration and Malabo decisions. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 1061st session held in January 2022 decided to organize a reflection forum on unconstitutional changes of government after the spike in military coups in Africa. Consequently, the Accra forum was convened from 15 to 17 March. The PSC decided to submit the Accra Declaration to the Malabo Extraordinary Session of the AU Heads of State and Government, for consideration and adoption, which among other considered the developments related to unconstitutional changes of government.
The consultative meeting will present an opportunity for the PSC and CSOs to enhance their engagement in ‘promoting good governance, democracy, rule of law, constitutionalism and dealing with the emerging menace of unconstitutional changes of government.’ The aim is to enhance synergy on timely governance, peace and security issues which the PSC is seized with while strengthening the broader cooperation as enshrined in the various instruments of the PSC.
The outcome of the session remains unknown. Yet, it is expected that the PSC would recall the commitments enshrined in its Protocol, the Livingstone Formula and Maseru Conclusions. It may recognize the role of CSOs in providing independent analysis, technical support for the PSC in discharging its mandate and the importance of tapping into their expertise. Beyond CSOs participation in PSC sessions, the Council may call for a more enhanced engagement and proactive engagement in the context of field missions, mediation as well as peace support operations. The Council may identify concrete steps in advancing the role of CSOs in the decision and policy making process. The PSC may decide to institutionalize the annual consultation with CSOs to have a more systematic engagement. The Council may underline the critical role of CSOs in advancing inclusive governance, peace and security and in order to reverse the current trend of unconstitutional changes of government that threatens the gains made so far in the continent. PSC may call on CSOs to deepen their engagement with the Council to also further popularize its decision and work at national and local levels.