Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Date | 18 November 2025
Presented at the joint Amani Africa, PSC Chairperson for November 2025, Republic of Cameroon, and UNOAU policy dialogue on ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’ held on 18 November, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
By SALIMATTA TOURAY, Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the African Union and member of the Peace and Security Council
Excellency Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Ambassador of the Republic of Cameroon and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November,
Excellency Elizabeth Mary Spehar, Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support,
Representative of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and head of UN-OAU,
Excellency Ambassador Erastus Ekitala Lokzale, Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN,
Excellency Ambassador Ricklef Johannes Beutin, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission
Dr. Solomon A. Dersso, Founding Director, Amani Africa Excellencies, distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
Firstly, allow me to extend my warm congratulations to you, Chairperson for the month of November 2025, the Republic of Cameroon, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) and Amani Africa for convening this high-level policy forum on the ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’. The outcome of today’s forum will complement and guide the joint peacebuilding work undertaken by the AU PSC.
It is therefore my honour to address you today on the significant peacebuilding journey undertaken by The Gambia since 2017, under the auspices of the United Nations Peacebuilding Programme. Our nation has made notable strides, focusing on a transition to democratic governance and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, with invaluable international support.
In The Gambia, we are implementing peacebuilding through a transitional justice programme that happens to be the most holistic transitional justice programme globally, and perhaps in this regard, The Gambia is challenging us all to think differently- more broadly, innovatively and intentionally- about local, regional and international partnerships- for more robust coordination, resource mobilization and implementation of national reform programmes in post-conflict settings.
Main message: The Gambia’s transitional justice experience demonstrates complementarity between the UN, AU and even ECOWAS’ peacebuilding architectures, but also provides valuable lessons
learnt around coordination.
I will not delve into ECOWAS’s contributions to peace, security and peacebuilding in The Gambia, but it goes without saying that in the case of The Gambia, ECOWAS’s strict coercive diplomatic means directly led to peacefully resolving our political impasse in December 2016, and was able to do so whilst equally abiding by United Nations Charter and prohibition to use of force principle.
ECOWAS’s intervention has served as the bedrock upon which all other transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts being undertaken by the UN and AU are built.
Today, ECOWAS also continues to stabilize, and augment to capacity of the security sector through the ECOMIG forces, and in more recent times, the approval of ECOWAS Heads of States to establish a Special Tribunal for the prosecution of international crimes committed in The Gambia between July 1994 and January 2017, directly enables attainment of transitional justice peacebuilding.
The Gambian experience demonstrates that the legitimacy of regional and international organizations is not a zero-sum game. Rather than competing for legitimacy, the UN, AU and ECOWAS complement each other, leveraging respective strengths, convening powers and capacities to address shared security challenges.
The Gambia encourages synergy and cooperation between global organisations to create more robust and inclusive security framework capable of handling the complex security issues of the twenty-first century. I will now focus on how the AU and UN have worked collaboratively, and complementarily in The Gambia on transitional justice:
Firstly, on sustaining political support for, both the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU Commission have exercised their convening powers for The Gambia and have provided several strategic platforms to the Government of The Gambia to engage with Member States.
The PBC and the AUC frequently inviting the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Ambassadors at the UN and AU to engage in high-level discussions on our processes. These in several instances has equally invited our civil society organizations, led to further bilateral engagements with Member States, the exchange of experiences and knowledge and the successful mobilization of financial contributions.[1]
On the elaboration of national plans and strategies, the Gambia’s transitional justice model has been heavily influenced by both the Secretary General’s Guidance Note on Transitional Justice, as well as the AU’s Transitional Justice Policy, with technical assistance and advice having been consistently available to the Government through the UN and AU’s respective departments of political, peacebuilding/security affairs.
While international organisations like the UN and AU provide a forum for multilateral cooperation and diplomacy, the AU and ECOWAS have provided a more localized approach to transitional justice and security governance, adapted to the unique requirements and dynamics of our individual Gambian context. This complimentary nature has promoted a unified and inclusive framework that supports a broad range of perspectives and notions.[2]
When it comes to the operationalization of transitional justice mechanisms and processes, both the UN and AU have provided technical and financial support through a variety of facilities: The UN Peacebuilding Funds, which has demonstrated the ability to provide swift, immediate relief to the Government through catalytic funding only 4 months into the transition in May 2017- has Programmatic funding channeled through implementing agencies- UNDP, OHCHR, the International Center for Transitional Justice etc. Between 2017 and 2022, the PBF provided such support in the country through 16 projects and a total investment of USD 30,913,673.
The AU Technical Support to The Gambia was a pragmatic initiative launched in 2018, that seconded 10 of the continents top experts in rule of law, democracy, transitional justice and security sector reform to Government ministries and national institutions, providing strategic advice and mentorship over 1 to 2 years.
More recently, in 2024 and 2025, the AU-EU Initiative to Transitional Justice in Africa has equally deployed 2 experts upon the request of the Government of The Gambia for the newly established Reparations Commission, in policy development and strategic communications.
The Gambia looks forward to engaging with the AU Peace Funds in the near future, to push the transitional justice agenda to a logical conclusion of at least, the full operationalization of a reparations programme and prosecutions in The Gambia.
Excellencies our process has not been without challenges, and we have learnt hard lessons:
At such a nascent and highly unstable stage of our transition comes one of the most difficult technical demands of transitional justice- the design of a programme, sincerely informed by a unique national context and embraced by national and local ownership. A delicate balance must be struck between the goodwill of external advisors and experts, which may not always be in line with national or local priorities.
This was The Gambia’s experience, specifically in security sector reform, whereby weak national coordination and contradictory advice of various advisers from the UN, EU, ECOWAS and AU, led
to wastage and created confusion and rather than propel, stagnated the elaboration of national plans and strategies. Transitional justice programmes cannot be divorced from the national development agenda, and therefore, technical assistance facilities can prove to be more useful when designed to accompany mechanisms and processes with a focus on the post-conflict environment of reconstruction and development agenda.
In this regard, the role of international financial institutions and facilities, such as the EU and World Bank budget support programmes, should equally be understood as complementary to the peacebuilding efforts of international and regional organizations such as the AU and the UN, as the formulation of budget support indicators should mirror critical transitional justice objectives and milestones. Equally, the important role of CSOs in supporting transitional justice processes from design to implementation, cannot be overstated.
In light of the stated challenges and lessons learnt, we would like to offer the following recommendations around coordination.
In a climate of shifting global financial and political dynamics, whereby peace and security challenges are both increasing and evolving, further stretching limited resources, the onus remains on Governments to establish from the onset, robust frameworks for coordination with UN, AU and other international and regional actors, including IFIs and civil society, supported by monitoring and evaluation approaches to ensure accountability and responsiveness.
We have learnt in The Gambia that local and regional organizations exhibit a higher level of ownership and legitimacy since members participate more directly in decision-making and implementation methods. Beyond ownership, grassroots approaches to transitional justice develop a sense of accountability, hence increasing the overall legitimacy of transitional justice activities.
Thus, The Gambia is operating as an incubator for novel approaches to transitional justice and security governance, which has also been influenced by global standards of practice, but also now, contributing to that global discourse.
A missed opportunity and strong recommendation for other countries in pursuit of peacebuilding, is that robust coordination framework should be designed from the onset to play an important role in bridging the gap between global security standards and local realities. The UN and AU with their far reaching networks are uniquely designed to support government-led coordination efforts.
Excellencies,
In conclusion, now, more than ever, we call upon our partners in the international community, regional organizations, and all stakeholders to stand with The Gambia. In this regard, I would like to convey the Government of The Gambia’s thanks and appreciation to ASG Elizabeth Spehar and Ambassador Monono for their invaluable technical and financial support. Let us renew our commitment to peace, justice, and inclusive development. We urge you to continue your support—politically, technically, and financially—to ensure that the gains we have made are not only preserved but built upon.
Together, let us work to transform challenges into opportunities, foster unity, and secure a peaceful and prosperous future for all Gambians.
Thank you.
[1] We have received bilateral contributions from Ireland (approx. $400,000 channeled through UNDP for victims and survivors of SGBV), Switzerland (several grants to Gambian CSOs, at least $200,000 worth since 2017, prioritizing victim and women led organizations) just to name a few.
[2] If looking for examples of how The Gambian TJ model is so “Gambian” you can cite how we started the entire process of designing our TJ model by holding intensive, inclusive national dialogues, consultations and conferences (from May to December 2017, and we continue to employ a very consultation approach in the continued design of TJ- for example in the design of the Victims Reparations Act in 2023 and as we continue to design the Peace and Reconciliation Commission Bill). The outcome of these discussions have been listened to, translated into tangible laws, policies and strategies, and complemented by lessons learnt from other contexts such as Sierra Leone and South Africa. So, in the TRRC Act for example, the nationality of Commissioners being restricted to Gambians only, but reflecting all ethnic, gender, age and geographical differences of people- was as a direct result of the outcome of local consultations. The fact that the Commission was granted the powers to provide interim reparations too was a result of consultations with the victims, and lessons learnt from other places such as South Africa and Sierra Leone, whose reparations programmes stall to date.
Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Gambia’s transitional justice experience: Opportunities and lessons for a closer partnership between the AU and UN Peacebuilding Architecture
Date | 18 November 2025
Presented at the joint Amani Africa, PSC Chairperson for November 2025, Republic of Cameroon, and UNOAU policy dialogue on ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’ held on 18 November, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
By SALIMATTA TOURAY, Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the African Union and member of the Peace and Security Council
Excellency Ambassador Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Ambassador of the Republic of Cameroon and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November,
Excellency Elizabeth Mary Spehar, Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support,
Representative of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and head of UN-OAU,
Excellency Ambassador Erastus Ekitala Lokzale, Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN,
Excellency Ambassador Ricklef Johannes Beutin, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, and Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission
Dr. Solomon A. Dersso, Founding Director, Amani Africa Excellencies, distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
Firstly, allow me to extend my warm congratulations to you, Chairperson for the month of November 2025, the Republic of Cameroon, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) and Amani Africa for convening this high-level policy forum on the ‘State of Peacebuilding in Africa: opportunities for a closer relationship between the African Union and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture’. The outcome of today’s forum will complement and guide the joint peacebuilding work undertaken by the AU PSC.
It is therefore my honour to address you today on the significant peacebuilding journey undertaken by The Gambia since 2017, under the auspices of the United Nations Peacebuilding Programme. Our nation has made notable strides, focusing on a transition to democratic governance and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, with invaluable international support.
In The Gambia, we are implementing peacebuilding through a transitional justice programme that happens to be the most holistic transitional justice programme globally, and perhaps in this regard, The Gambia is challenging us all to think differently- more broadly, innovatively and intentionally- about local, regional and international partnerships- for more robust coordination, resource mobilization and implementation of national reform programmes in post-conflict settings.
Main message: The Gambia’s transitional justice experience demonstrates complementarity between the UN, AU and even ECOWAS’ peacebuilding architectures, but also provides valuable lessons
learnt around coordination.
I will not delve into ECOWAS’s contributions to peace, security and peacebuilding in The Gambia, but it goes without saying that in the case of The Gambia, ECOWAS’s strict coercive diplomatic means directly led to peacefully resolving our political impasse in December 2016, and was able to do so whilst equally abiding by United Nations Charter and prohibition to use of force principle.
ECOWAS’s intervention has served as the bedrock upon which all other transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts being undertaken by the UN and AU are built.
Today, ECOWAS also continues to stabilize, and augment to capacity of the security sector through the ECOMIG forces, and in more recent times, the approval of ECOWAS Heads of States to establish a Special Tribunal for the prosecution of international crimes committed in The Gambia between July 1994 and January 2017, directly enables attainment of transitional justice peacebuilding.
The Gambian experience demonstrates that the legitimacy of regional and international organizations is not a zero-sum game. Rather than competing for legitimacy, the UN, AU and ECOWAS complement each other, leveraging respective strengths, convening powers and capacities to address shared security challenges.
The Gambia encourages synergy and cooperation between global organisations to create more robust and inclusive security framework capable of handling the complex security issues of the twenty-first century. I will now focus on how the AU and UN have worked collaboratively, and complementarily in The Gambia on transitional justice:
Firstly, on sustaining political support for, both the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU Commission have exercised their convening powers for The Gambia and have provided several strategic platforms to the Government of The Gambia to engage with Member States.
The PBC and the AUC frequently inviting the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Ambassadors at the UN and AU to engage in high-level discussions on our processes. These in several instances has equally invited our civil society organizations, led to further bilateral engagements with Member States, the exchange of experiences and knowledge and the successful mobilization of financial contributions.[1]
On the elaboration of national plans and strategies, the Gambia’s transitional justice model has been heavily influenced by both the Secretary General’s Guidance Note on Transitional Justice, as well as the AU’s Transitional Justice Policy, with technical assistance and advice having been consistently available to the Government through the UN and AU’s respective departments of political, peacebuilding/security affairs.
While international organisations like the UN and AU provide a forum for multilateral cooperation and diplomacy, the AU and ECOWAS have provided a more localized approach to transitional justice and security governance, adapted to the unique requirements and dynamics of our individual Gambian context. This complimentary nature has promoted a unified and inclusive framework that supports a broad range of perspectives and notions.[2]
When it comes to the operationalization of transitional justice mechanisms and processes, both the UN and AU have provided technical and financial support through a variety of facilities: The UN Peacebuilding Funds, which has demonstrated the ability to provide swift, immediate relief to the Government through catalytic funding only 4 months into the transition in May 2017- has Programmatic funding channeled through implementing agencies- UNDP, OHCHR, the International Center for Transitional Justice etc. Between 2017 and 2022, the PBF provided such support in the country through 16 projects and a total investment of USD 30,913,673.
The AU Technical Support to The Gambia was a pragmatic initiative launched in 2018, that seconded 10 of the continents top experts in rule of law, democracy, transitional justice and security sector reform to Government ministries and national institutions, providing strategic advice and mentorship over 1 to 2 years.
More recently, in 2024 and 2025, the AU-EU Initiative to Transitional Justice in Africa has equally deployed 2 experts upon the request of the Government of The Gambia for the newly established Reparations Commission, in policy development and strategic communications.
The Gambia looks forward to engaging with the AU Peace Funds in the near future, to push the transitional justice agenda to a logical conclusion of at least, the full operationalization of a reparations programme and prosecutions in The Gambia.
Excellencies our process has not been without challenges, and we have learnt hard lessons:
At such a nascent and highly unstable stage of our transition comes one of the most difficult technical demands of transitional justice- the design of a programme, sincerely informed by a unique national context and embraced by national and local ownership. A delicate balance must be struck between the goodwill of external advisors and experts, which may not always be in line with national or local priorities.
This was The Gambia’s experience, specifically in security sector reform, whereby weak national coordination and contradictory advice of various advisers from the UN, EU, ECOWAS and AU, led
to wastage and created confusion and rather than propel, stagnated the elaboration of national plans and strategies. Transitional justice programmes cannot be divorced from the national development agenda, and therefore, technical assistance facilities can prove to be more useful when designed to accompany mechanisms and processes with a focus on the post-conflict environment of reconstruction and development agenda.
In this regard, the role of international financial institutions and facilities, such as the EU and World Bank budget support programmes, should equally be understood as complementary to the peacebuilding efforts of international and regional organizations such as the AU and the UN, as the formulation of budget support indicators should mirror critical transitional justice objectives and milestones. Equally, the important role of CSOs in supporting transitional justice processes from design to implementation, cannot be overstated.
In light of the stated challenges and lessons learnt, we would like to offer the following recommendations around coordination.
In a climate of shifting global financial and political dynamics, whereby peace and security challenges are both increasing and evolving, further stretching limited resources, the onus remains on Governments to establish from the onset, robust frameworks for coordination with UN, AU and other international and regional actors, including IFIs and civil society, supported by monitoring and evaluation approaches to ensure accountability and responsiveness.
We have learnt in The Gambia that local and regional organizations exhibit a higher level of ownership and legitimacy since members participate more directly in decision-making and implementation methods. Beyond ownership, grassroots approaches to transitional justice develop a sense of accountability, hence increasing the overall legitimacy of transitional justice activities.
Thus, The Gambia is operating as an incubator for novel approaches to transitional justice and security governance, which has also been influenced by global standards of practice, but also now, contributing to that global discourse.
A missed opportunity and strong recommendation for other countries in pursuit of peacebuilding, is that robust coordination framework should be designed from the onset to play an important role in bridging the gap between global security standards and local realities. The UN and AU with their far reaching networks are uniquely designed to support government-led coordination efforts.
Excellencies,
In conclusion, now, more than ever, we call upon our partners in the international community, regional organizations, and all stakeholders to stand with The Gambia. In this regard, I would like to convey the Government of The Gambia’s thanks and appreciation to ASG Elizabeth Spehar and Ambassador Monono for their invaluable technical and financial support. Let us renew our commitment to peace, justice, and inclusive development. We urge you to continue your support—politically, technically, and financially—to ensure that the gains we have made are not only preserved but built upon.
Together, let us work to transform challenges into opportunities, foster unity, and secure a peaceful and prosperous future for all Gambians.
Thank you.
[1] We have received bilateral contributions from Ireland (approx. $400,000 channeled through UNDP for victims and survivors of SGBV), Switzerland (several grants to Gambian CSOs, at least $200,000 worth since 2017, prioritizing victim and women led organizations) just to name a few.
[2] If looking for examples of how The Gambian TJ model is so “Gambian” you can cite how we started the entire process of designing our TJ model by holding intensive, inclusive national dialogues, consultations and conferences (from May to December 2017, and we continue to employ a very consultation approach in the continued design of TJ- for example in the design of the Victims Reparations Act in 2023 and as we continue to design the Peace and Reconciliation Commission Bill). The outcome of these discussions have been listened to, translated into tangible laws, policies and strategies, and complemented by lessons learnt from other contexts such as Sierra Leone and South Africa. So, in the TRRC Act for example, the nationality of Commissioners being restricted to Gambians only, but reflecting all ethnic, gender, age and geographical differences of people- was as a direct result of the outcome of local consultations. The fact that the Commission was granted the powers to provide interim reparations too was a result of consultations with the victims, and lessons learnt from other places such as South Africa and Sierra Leone, whose reparations programmes stall to date.
Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar
Briefing on the Situation in Madagascar
Date | 19 November 2025
Tomorrow (20 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1313th session to receive a briefing on the Situation in Madagascar.
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. The Special Envoy of the AU Commission Chairperson, Mohamed Idris Farah, and Dominitien Ndayizeye, former Burundian President and member of the Panel of the Wise, are expected to brief the Council. It is also expected that a representative of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) will make a statement.
The session comes as the Council seeks to assess follow-up on the implementation of its 15 October decision following the coup in Madagascar and the country’s suspension from AU activities. It is to be recalled that the PSC held two sessions just one day apart, before and after the coup (1305th and 1306th Sessions).
Following the seizure of power by the leader of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) and the dissolution of parts of the constitution and all institutions except the lower house of parliament, the PSC, at its 1306th session on 15 October, suspended Madagascar from Participation in AU activities. Declaring the military coup a clear violation of AU principles and governance frameworks, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the PSC demanded the restoration of constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government and the organization of elections as soon as possible, while urging all units of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and refrain from meddling in political affairs.
The political landscape in Madagascar has evolved since the PSC’s previous session. Colonel Michael Randrianirina was formally sworn in as President of the ‘Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar’ on 17 October and has since moved to consolidate his authority while projecting an image of reform-minded governance. In his public statements, Randrianirina has dismissed allegations that Rajoelina’s removal amounted to a coup, stressing that it occurred without violence, and rejected claims of judicial retaliation, asserting that ongoing investigations reflect justice rather than vengeance.
On 28 October, Randrianirina unveiled a new 29-member government featuring several prominent opponents of former President Rajoelina in key positions, including Christine Razanamahasoa as foreign minister, Fanirisoa Erinaivo as justice minister, and Hanitra Razafimanantsoa as state minister for ‘refoundation,’ alongside businessman Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as Prime Minister. Randrianirina announced priorities of fighting impunity, enforcing budget austerity, and stabilising the business climate, warning ministers that failure to show results within two months could lead to their replacement.
The military authorities have articulated what they describe as a comprehensive reform agenda. Randrianirina outlined a six-step plan purporting to respond to the collective will to break with past crises and build a just, stable, sustainable, and fully legitimate country. The steps include restoring trust between the state and its citizens, strengthening governance and transparency, intensifying the fight against corruption, guaranteeing the republican nature of the responsibilities of the armed forces, drafting the fundamental texts that will govern the new Republic, and organising a constitutional referendum followed by free and fair elections recognised by all. The proposed roadmap envisages nationwide consultations led by the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (FFKM) to establish a new governance system, followed by a referendum and presidential election within two years, alongside plans for a Youth Assembly and strengthened Malagasy language and history education.
The proposed two-year transitional timeline and the plan for a new constitution are further indicators of the unconstitutional seizure of power. It is worth recalling that the High Constitutional Court that ‘invited’ Randrianirina to seize power, thereby giving a semblance of legality to the military seizure of power, tasked him to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant. While he accepted the ‘invitation’ of this Court and defended the ‘constitutionality’ of his seizure of power on that basis, after seizing power, he ignored the court order on the timeline for holding elections. The decision for the two-year transition is not a result of a process of national consultation or dialogue.
The military’s self-determined two-year governance timeline directly contradicts the AU’s call for immediate handover to a civilian-led transitional authority. More significantly, the military’s appointments of key figures, including Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo without consultation, and its unilateral extension of the transition timeline have reportedly fostered growing disillusionment among the youth protesters whose demonstrations precipitated the political upheaval. What began as a convergence of interests between CAPSAT and the youth-led movement has given way to a troubling divergence between the protesters’ demands for genuine democratic renewal and the military’s consolidation of its own authority. This pattern is increasingly familiar in the many instances of such military seizure of power on the continent from Gabon to Guinea, where military forces initially embraced as allies by civilian protesters subsequently sideline protest movements after seizing power, failing to fulfil revolutionary aims and instead entrenching their control under the guise of stabilisation and reform.
Acting on the PSC’s decision of its 1305th session, the AU Commission Chairperson announced on 3 November that he appointed Mohamed Idriss Farah as Special Envoy for Madagascar. The Special Envoy commenced his first visit on 6 November. Along with the Farah’s mission to Madagascar and as a follow-up of the decisions of the 1305th and 1306th sessions of the PSC, the AU Commission dispatched a High-Level Delegation to Madagascar from 7 to 11 November, led by Ndayizeye. These visits had the primary objective of engaging in constructive dialogue with Malagasy authorities and national stakeholders to address the current political crisis. The delegation was received by the leader of the transition, Randrianirina, Prime Minister Rajaonarivelo, and the Foreign Minister, Razanamahasoa, in meetings described as taking place in ‘an excellent atmosphere’ that allowed both parties to share views on the current situation.
According to official AU communications, particular emphasis was placed during these exchanges on the need to maintain frank and constructive dialogue between the AU and Malagasy authorities to support their efforts to overcome the political situation, facilitate national reconciliation, and respond to the legitimate political and socio-economic aspirations of the Malagasy people. The Head of the AU delegation welcomed the openness of the authorities to dialogue and their expressed commitment to the African Union and the values of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, while reiterating the continental organisation’s commitment to supporting and accompanying the Malagasy people and authorities in their quest for peace, stability and justice. These positive characterisations of the engagement suggest that diplomatic channels remain open and suspension does not preclude but rather necessitates AU’s robust engagement.
Yet the critical question confronting tomorrow’s session is whether this diplomatic reception translates into a genuine willingness to meet the AU’s core demands for civilian-led transition and constitutional restoration. The AU delegation’s positive assessment of the authorities’ openness must be carefully weighed against the fact that the military leadership arrogated to itself the role of deciding the transitional process without any national consultative process. There is a tangible risk that the military authorities may seek to leverage diplomatic engagement to gain time and legitimacy while pursuing their predetermined course, rather than genuinely engaging with AU requirements. The articulation of reform commitments and the appointment of opposition figures to ministerial positions without the participation of political and civilian forces of the country is a clear entrenchment of the military’s control of the transitional process. It is worth recalling that the PSC in its decision demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections.’ Yet, the developments since mid-October, instead of representing meaningful steps toward the civilian-led transition it demanded, indicate a consolidation of military authority dressed in reform rhetoric.
It is expected that the SADC representative will update the PSC on SADC’s initiatives. It is to be recalled that SADC differed on the determination of whether what transpired in Madagascar was a military seizure of power, contrary to the constitutional processes established in Madagascar for seizure of power. The PSC in which five SADC member states including the Chairperson of the PSC for October were represented did not deem difference of determination necessary as there was no any uncertainty about the occurrence of a military seizure of power contrary to established constitutional processes In a communiqué issued after the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, held virtually on 16 October 2025, the Organ urged all political actors in Madagascar to engage in inclusive dialogue as the only path toward lasting peace and endorsed the deployment of a technical fact-finding mission to Madagascar by 22 October 2025. SADC sent a fact-finding mission led by the Panel of Elders, including former Malawian President Dr. Joyce Banda, ‘to engage all stakeholders, ease tensions, promote dialogue, and identify the root causes of the crisis.’ The extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held on 7 November resulted in acknowledgement of Madagascar’s relinquishment of its role as Chair of SADC due to its incapacity to discharge the responsibilities of the position following recent political developments, and South Africa became Interim Chair of SADC until August 2026. It did not, however, address the outcome of the visit of the SADC Panel of Elders. From the information available, there is no indication as yet that the report from the SADC visit has yet been received and validated by the SADC Organ Troika Summit.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may also recall its previous decisions of the 1306th sessions, urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed-upon transitional civilian authority and reaffirm its stand in that respect. The PSC may commend the AU Chairperson and the AU Commission Chairperson for assigning a dedicated mechanism that follows on the decisions of the 1305th and 1306th sessions and may in this respect welcome the visit by the Special Envoy to Madagascar immediately after his appointment along with the deployment of the high-level delegation. The Council may acknowledge the military authorities’ articulation of a reform agenda and their reported openness to dialogue and call on them to continue collaboration with the AU and SADC mechanisms within the framework of the communiqués its 1305th and 1306th sessions, including on the need for civilian-led rather than military-directed. It may in this respect call for inclusive national dialogue that centres the voices of civil society, youth movements, and political stakeholders and the development of a transitional roadmap on the basis of such inclusive national dialogue with the support of SADC and the AU. The PSC may emphasise the need for close coordination between the AU and SADC in providing comprehensive accompaniment to the transitional process in Madagascar on the basis of joint responsibility. The Council may stress that the reform process for restoration of constitutional order must address not only the political crisis but also the underlying socio-economic challenges and poor governance that sparked the protests. The PSC may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decisions of the Council and the initiatives of the AU and SADC toward addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth, and supporting the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.
Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area
Update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area
Date | 18 November 2025
Tomorrow (19 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1313rd session to receive an update on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Area.
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks. Statements are also expected from the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Godwin Michael Mutkut, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Commander.
Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the PSC’s 1282nd session of 10 June 2025, which was convened to provide an ‘Update on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and consideration of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR)’. At that meeting, Council requested the AU Commission to enhance its support to and collaboration with the LCBC in the implementation of the revised Five-Year RS-SRR.’ This followed the assessment that ‘despite the sustained efforts being deployed by the LCBC and MNJTF, Boko Haram remains an existential threat to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the wider region.’ That threat remains pronounced, as the MNJTF, whose mandate runs until January 2026, has yet to generate a decisive shift in the situation on the ground. Meanwhile, emerging developments that undermine the MNJTF, combined with persistent climate, security, and governance fragilities, are pushing the force toward a critical inflexion point. Tomorrow’s session may therefore revisit these priorities, with particular attention to the evolving security dynamics and the region’s dire humanitarian situation.
The Lake Chad Basin, encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, remains a region of complex security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges. In addition to the impact of climate change, these challenges are largely driven by the activities of Boko Haram and its factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).
One of the issues likely to feature prominently in tomorrow’s session is the intensifying pattern of insurgent attacks. According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, militant Islamist-related fatalities in the LCB region rose 7 per cent over the past year to 3,982, representing 18 per cent of the continental total, while civilian targeting increased by 32 per cent to 880, the highest since 2016. Nigeria recorded an 18 per cent rise in fatalities, with Borno state alone accounting for 74 per cent of regional deaths; Cameroon registered 467 deaths with a 45 per cent decline, whereas Chad more than doubled to 242. This escalation is accompanied by notable tactical advancements; ISWAP reportedly overran 15 Nigerian military bases, introduced night vision and deployed armed and surveillance drones. Since June, JAS has attacked positions at Baga, Goldavi near Talakatchi, and Kirawa, with night assaults aided by night vision and modified commercial drones, and with reports citing rocket-propelled grenades, armed drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Meanwhile, Insurgent infighting has also resurged. From 5 to 8 November 2025, JAS attacked ISWAP across Lake Chad islands and river routes for control of extortion revenues, arms and fuel smuggling corridors through Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
The other issue expected to feature during tomorrow’s session concerns the operational challenges facing MNJTF. Despite ongoing support from the AU and partners, the MNJTF continues to face capability gaps that undermine the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, such as a lack of appropriate counter-IED equipment. IEDs, particularly those placed along main supply routes, accounted for approximately 60% of MNJTF casualties in 2024. The unavailability of sophisticated IED detectors has delayed troop movements and placed both civilian convoys and military convoys at risk. The absence of a dedicated attack aircraft has also left the force reliant on TCC’s national air forces, delaying approvals and undermining the force’s ability to mount coordinated air-ground operations. Considering that terrorist forces have continued to use surveillance drones to monitor MNJTF movements and started using drone attacks, the Force’s lack of anti-drone technology or jamming systems reduces its operational advantage and leaves it vulnerable to both enemy intelligence and drone attacks. In this respect, the PSC may reiterate from its last session its call on the AU Commission and international partners to mobilise support required to address these deficits through availing assets, including modern drone detection and jamming equipment, combat and reconnaissance drones, combat boats, armoured vehicles, and demining equipment.’
As highlighted in respect to the PSC’s 1254th session, another major challenge for the MNJTF is the continued presence of terrorist groups on the islands of Lake Chad. As reported back then, the 4th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum identified as a major challenge the need ‘to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond.’ The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities. In this respect, the 5th Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum held late in January 2025 called for ensuring that ‘member states effectively occupy the Lake Chad islands as a means of strengthening transboundary security, with a focus on securing and controlling waterways.’
Another issue is the follow-up on its decision on ensuring the participation of Niger in the MNJTF. Although the initial interruption of Niger’s participation in MNJTF following the coup of June 2023 was restored owing to engagement from Nigeria, in March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from MNJTF. A major factor for Niger’s severance of ties with MNJTF appears to be the withdrawal of support for Niger. The Communique of the Lake Chad Basin 5th Governors Forum for the Regional Cooperation on Stabilisation, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development, thus ‘noted with concern the suspension of donor support for Niger’s National Window of the Regional Stabilisation Facility (RSF), which could negatively impact progress across the region.’ Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF has created a security void in its Area of Operations in Sector 4 (Diffa), complicating cross-border coordination and patrols along key stretches of the Lake Chad frontier. In this regard, the Council may wish to seek an update on efforts to restore the support to Niger and facilitate its return to MNJTF, recalling its 1282nd meeting at which it took note ‘with deep concern of the withdrawal of the Republic of Niger from TCCs and its impact on the operations of the MNJTF.’
The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the regional stabilization strategy. The RS-SRR, endorsed by the PSC during the 816th session held on 5 December 2018 and entered its second phase in 2024, complements the MNJTF’s military efforts by addressing the structural drivers of conflict through addressing broader governance, humanitarian, and development challenges. The strategy, implemented across eight targeted territories in the four LCBC states, has facilitated community reconstruction, market reactivation, and the reintegration of former combatants. Following the revision of the RS-SRR for 2025 – 2030 at the 5th steering committee meeting on 20 September 2024, with updated Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and a Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy to enhance its effectiveness, the 70th Ordinary Session of the LCBC Council of Ministers held in Niamey, Republic of Niger, on 27 February 2025, adopted the revised strategy. Subsequently, during its 1282nd session, the PSC endorsed and validated the revised RS-SRR as adopted by the 70th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the LCBC. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach. The LCBC Council of Ministers also directed the Executive Secretariat to revise the Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and develop a Regional Transitional Justice Policy. Tomorrow’s session will thus provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess progress on the implementation of the strategy..
The other issue that the PSC is expected to discuss during tomorrow’s session is the dire humanitarian conditions. Insecurity, attacks and violence continue to affect millions. Recurrent flooding is devastating the region, exacerbating existing humanitarian challenges and forcing counterterrorism assets to be diverted to relief operations. MNJTF canoes and army drones were deployed to support evacuations. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that in the first half of 2025, 487 security incidents were recorded, causing 415 deaths. By June 2025, IDPs still numbered 2.9 million, reflecting only a 6 per cent decrease. Around 330,000 refugees have been registered, marking a 23 per cent rise since January 2025. Nigeria remains the epicentre of the crisis, hosting 2.1 million IDPs due to persistent insecurity in the northeast, followed by Cameroon, where over 476,000 people have fled violence in the Far North. An estimated 220,000 children are severely malnourished, with more than 87 per cent of them in Nigeria. As of June 2025, violence and attacks had forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the LCB, 80 per cent of which are in Chad, the most severely affected country. As of September, humanitarian actors had received US$618 million, just 19 per cent of the total funding required. The Council may therefore call for an urgent and coordinated scale-up of humanitarian access and funding, prioritising the protection of civilians, support for severely malnourished children and the reopening and safeguarding of schools, while urging member states and partners to close the 2025 funding gap and align relief with longer-term resilience in the LCB as part of the stabilisation strategy.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The Council may express its continued concern over the continued serious threat that Boko Haram and its splinter groups continue to pose in the region. It may also reaffirm its continued support for the MNJTF and the need for predictable and sustainable resources for the MNJTF. Taking forward its call from its last session on the need for provision of additional modern technological capabilities, including drone and anti-drone and jamming technology, the PSC may call for the LCBC working together with the AU Commission to develop a realistic plan on the mobilisation of such support. It may also call for restoring the support given to Niger in its capacity as MNJTF TCC in order to facilitate its return to the MNJTF and remove the void created due to its withdrawal. The PSC may further highlight the need to deepen cooperation between the MNJTF and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in order to ensure more coherent cross-border responses commensurate with the transnational nature of the threat. It may also endorse the revised RS–SRR and call on member states to align their national plans with the revised strategy. In addition, considering that the Council held its last field mission to the region in July 2017, whose report was considered at the PSC’s 721st meeting in September 2017. To that end, the Council may seek to follow up on its 1207th decision to conduct a solidarity field mission to the LCB.
8th Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBC
8th Annual Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and the UNPBC
Date | 16 November 2025
Tomorrow (17 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC) are scheduled to hold their 8th Annual Consultative Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cameroon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for November 2025, and Ricklef Beutin, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN and Chairperson of the UNPBC. Following the welcoming remark of the co-chairpersons, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), are expected to make statements. It is the second time that the consultative meeting is being held since the decision of the PSC and the PBC during the 6th Informal Annual Consultative Meeting held in November 2023, to elevate the annual informal consultation into a formal consultative meeting.
Convened during the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Awareness Raising Week, taking place from 17 to 21 November, tomorrow’s session is expected to build on the 7th consultative session. It is to be recalled that, the Joint Statement adopted during the last joint consultations, the 7th Annual Consultative Meeting, emphasised the role of the PBC in convening stakeholders and garnering international support, as well as the role of the AU in implementing and advancing PCRD policy, noting that ‘strengthened cooperation between the AUC-PCRD in Cairo and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (PBSO/DPPA), is essential for implementing the AU-UN MoU on Peacebuilding.’ The Pact for the Future, adopted at the Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024, inculcates renewed political momentum by reaffirming commitment to advancing peacebuilding efforts. The session also comes in the context of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR), which offers a timely opportunity to both sharpen focus on operational effectiveness and measurable impact and to enhance close coordination between the AU and the UN in developing and implementing peacebuilding interventions in Africa.
Against the foregoing background, the first agenda item of the 8th annual consultative meeting is the ‘Review of Collaborative Peacebuilding Efforts and Priorities.’ It is envisaged that the PSC and PSC Chair will take the lead in making a statement on this agenda item. This segment is expected to highlight the collaborative peacebuilding efforts of the AU and the PBC, as well as key achievements in peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa. It will pay particular attention to conflict prevention, sustainable financing and integration of peacebuilding with development priorities, particularly amid the ongoing 2025 PBAR. The PBAR is especially significant when viewed alongside the latest guiding multilateral frameworks, including the newly revised AUPCRD policy, the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future, which collectively call for more coherent and effective global governance approaches to conflict management. During the High-Level Dialogue on ‘Cultivating Consensus Towards a Common African Position on the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review,’ the AU engaged in developing a set of recommendations for consideration in the development of the Common African Position (CAP) on the 2025 PBAR, ensuring Africa’s ownership and leadership in advancing the peacebuilding agenda. This was informed by regional consultations, including the ACCORD-DIRCO-UNPBSO forum of October 2024, in which discussions centred on establishing stronger links between the UN PBSO and regional and national mechanisms to enhance peacebuilding efforts.
The CAP developed and adopted by the PSC in 2020, as Africa’s contribution to the first Review of the UNPBA, identified twelve core peacebuilding priorities that continue to hold relevance today. These include managing transitions which assumed particular significance during the past few years; strengthening inclusive, resilient and responsive governance institutions; advancing transitional justice; preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism; and ensuring sustainable financing for peacebuilding, among others. However, national peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts are increasingly challenged by various, at times intersecting political transitions being pursued in a context mired by terrorism and violent extremism, rising debt distress and cost of living, institutional fragility, breakdown of state-society relations, contested legitimacy of governments, pandemics, rising geopolitical fragmentation and tension and the escalating impacts of climate change. As a result, support to African countries emerging from conflict or navigating complex transitions must be planned and developed to address these interconnected pressures within and as part of a political settlement rather than just as a technical process. It is therefore essential that the current review of the UNPBA reflects and integrates these priority concerns into its deliberations.
The second agenda item focuses on Youth – linkages between development and Peacebuilding. Under this agenda item, it is envisaged that the PSC and the African Union Youth Ambassador for Peace (AYAP) will make the presentation. It is expected that the PBC will also give an update on youth engagement in the Peacebuilding Architecture. In the previous Annual Joint Consultations between the two bodies, both bodies underscored ‘the importance of the Youth Peace and Security Agenda and to leverage the AU’s Youth Decade Plan of Action and the PBC’s Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding to promote the inclusion of youth in peacebuilding efforts, including by building their capacities, skills and livelihoods to actively contribute to sustaining peace and development.’ This focus on youth comes at a time when Generation Z (GenZ) protests have become recurrent, highlighting the growing disenchantment of the majority youthful population on the continent with the state of governance and economic opportunities. As highlighted in our analysis of the PSC’s 1310th session on YPS and migration held early in the month, increasing youth migration and the entanglement of migration with various threats to peace and security is another manifestation of the discontent with the pervasive development and governance deficits in various parts of the continent. These clearly indicate the need for systematic peacebuilding interventions that address the twin challenges of development and governance deficits stunting opportunities for youth.
The PBC’s presentation is expected to highlight its involvement in initiatives such as the Africa Regional Consultation for the Second Independent Progress Study on YPS, mandated by Action 20 of the Pact for the Future. This forum provided a platform to highlight new narratives and contributions that young people are making in peace processes. Moreso, the Peacebuilding Support Office, together with partners, commissioned the 2025 Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Thematic Review on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), which highlights best practices and lessons from 41 PBF-funded projects across 33 countries (2018 – 2022). The review outlines how these initiatives expanded opportunities for youth participation in decision-making by supporting youth councils, strengthening stakeholder dialogue and fostering youth networks and YPS linkages, which also contributed to the development of National Action Plans and other national strategies on YPS.
The third and last agenda item of the 8th consultative meeting is a discussion on ‘Peacebuilding Initiatives in South Sudan, Sahel countries and the Lake Chad Basin.’ The fragile political and security situation in those areas has compelled the AU to intensify its efforts to respond effectively. Since early 2025, the PSC has intensified its engagement on the situation in South Sudan in response to escalating political and security instability. Since clashes erupted in March between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and armed groups linked to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), a recent Amani Africa briefing to the UNSC on the situation in South Sudan highlighted that the fragile peace established under the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is in grave peril and the country is on the cusp of relapsing back to full-scale war. For pursuing meaningful peacebuilding, the briefing emphasized that the downward spiral to full-scale conflict should be arrested through robust and prompt preventive diplomacy; measures that restore commitment of the parties to the 2018 peace agreement such as dialogue should be urgently implemented; and support to the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), particularly in enhancing protection of civilians and advancing sub-national peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts should be sustained.
The situation in the Sahel countries epitomises the challenges to peacebuilding efforts in political transition taking place in a context of violent extremism and conflict involving terrorist groups and a geopolitical context of absence of trust and broken regional and international relationships. As highlighted in the edition of Insight on the PSC for the informal consultation with countries in transition held on 13 November, pursuing the transition process for restoration of constitutional order (and by extension peacebuilding activities) cannot be separated from and need to be part of a wider stabilization and state authority expansion strategy backed by a security mechanism they develop and deploy together with the Sahel countries to address the existential threat facing these countries.
Finally, in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), despite the sustained efforts being deployed by the LCB Commission and the MNJTF, Boko Haram remains an existential threat to peace and security in the area and the wider region. The gravity of this threat has not diminished, and the MNJTF has not been able to break this status quo. At the same time, the emergence of developments weakening the MNJTF and persisting vulnerabilities due to climate, security and governance fragilities are fast bringing the MNJTF to a turning point. Yet, given the important contribution of the stabilisation strategy for the region, the challenge is how to scale up peacebuilding interventions and expand the nature and focus of such interventions in the region.
The expected outcome is a joint statement. The two bodies are expected to encourage Member States to integrate peacebuilding and social cohesion into their National Development Strategies, emphasising strong national ownership and leadership, as well as the inclusive participation of all segments of society, particularly women and youth. The meeting is also likely to reiterate the urge for international partners, including in the UN System, as well as international and regional financial institutions, to align and coordinate their peacebuilding-related efforts in Africa, with nationally led peacebuilding, regionally and continentally supported efforts, with particular emphasis on addressing the twin challenges of development and governance deficits triggering youth protests and migration. The two bodies are also likely to stress the importance of effective partnership and cooperation, including with the regional and sub-regional organisations, to improve coordination and cooperation in peacebuilding, and increase synergies to ensure the coherence and complementarity of such efforts. The AUPSC and UNPBC are also expected to highlight the importance of political commitment on the part of national political actors and authorities and the need for pursuing peacebuilding as part of a political settlement that has solid support from various sectors of society and all political and social forces, including the youth and women.
Pan-Africanism and Its Contemporary Challenges: Reclaiming Africa’s Political Project
Pan-Africanism and Its Contemporary Challenges: Reclaiming Africa’s Political Project
Date | 13 November 2025
Abdul Mohammed*
Pan-Africanism, at its core, is not a cultural aspiration or sentimental slogan—it is a political project. It was born of struggle, forged in the furnace of slavery, colonialism, and racial domination, and matured through the anti-colonial liberation movements of the 20th century. Its essence is the sovereign determination of African peoples to shape their own destiny—to liberate themselves from all forms of external servitude, whether colonial, neocolonial, or neoliberal.
Pan-Africanism’s central purpose was never merely to unite for unity’s sake. It was a response to fragmentation—the deliberate fracturing of Africa by slavery and colonial borders. That fragmentation persists today, in new and more insidious forms: economic dependency, ideological subservience, the weaponization of identity, and the erosion of common purpose. The Pan-African project, therefore, remains unfinished.
The Political Essence of Pan-Africanism
Before African states were born, Pan-Africanism existed as a people’s movement, transcending boundaries and calling for a shared African identity anchored in solidarity, dignity, and self-determination. To renew that mission today, Africa must transcend the limits of the colonial nation-state and reconstruct Pan-Africanism as a continental and global political project of the African people.
The Founding Generation: Political Leadership in Command
Modern African history demonstrates that progress has only been made when politics was in command—when leadership was visionary, competent, and grounded in the ideals of Pan-African liberation.
The first generation of African leaders understood the task before them: to complete the decolonization of Africa and overcome the legacy of political and territorial fragmentation. Their project gave rise to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the Lagos Plan of Action—institutions that sought to translate Pan-African ideals into collective political and economic action.
These leaders—Nkrumah, Nyerere, Nasser, Haile Selassie, Senghor, and others—saw Pan-Africanism as both a philosophy of liberation and a strategy for integration. Their achievements liberated the continent from colonial rule, but the project reached its limits as post-independence politics became entangled in Cold War rivalries, coups d’état, and external domination.
The Generation that midwifed the transition from OAU to AU: Africa’s Renaissance and Reinvention
The dawn of the 21st century marked Africa’s rebirth—a period of renewal guided by a new generation of leaders who sought to restore Pan-Africanism as a credible political project. The transition from the OAU to the African Union (AU) symbolized a renaissance in African political thought and leadership.
Under initiatives such as NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Africa attempted to reclaim ownership of its governance and development. This was the golden period of the modern Pan-African project—a time of optimism, coherence, and political seriousness.
Important charters were established: the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). These instruments reflected a political reimagination of the African state as a capable, legitimate, and people-centered institution.
The Current Moment: Fragmentation, Transactionalism, and Bureaucratic Capture
The past decade has seen the degradation of leadership both at national and continental levels. A new era of transactional politics has displaced the Pan-African spirit. The continental project is now dominated by bureaucratic Pan-Africanists—functionaries without political vision or courage.
Africa’s position in global affairs has weakened despite symbolic gains such as membership in the G20 and expanded participation in BRICS. State capture and corruption have eroded leadership legitimacy. The Pan-African project has been depoliticized, reduced to administrative routine, while external powers continue to shape Africa’s strategic direction through economic leverage and military patronage. The collapse of multilateralism globally has compounded Africa’s vulnerability.
Reclaiming ‘African Solutions to African Problems’
One of the most telling indicators of Africa’s drift is the hollowing out of the once-powerful principle: African solutions to African problems. Originally conceived as part of the African Renaissance agenda, it meant the ownership of problem definition and solution design by Africans.
Today, this principle has been weaponized into inertia—a rhetorical shield for inaction. To restore its meaning, African leaders must return it to its political essence: a Pan-African commitment to self-determination, collective responsibility and accountability.
Mediation, Leadership, and the Crisis of Political Competence
Nowhere is Africa’s political decline more evident than in the domain of mediation and peace processes. From the Great Lakes to the Horn of Africa, external actors dominate African conflicts. Mediation—an inherently political act—has been reduced to transactional deal-making dominated by transactional external actors.
Yet mediation, more than peacekeeping, requires political competence, moral authority, and strategic clarity. Africa’s priority must be to reclaim the political nature of mediation—to train and empower mediators who are politically literate and Pan-African in outlook.
The Path Forward: Repoliticizing Pan-Africanism
Pan-Africanism today stands at a crossroads. Either it becomes irrelevant, buried under bureaucratic inertia, or it is repoliticized—revived as a people’s movement guided by serious, principled leadership dedicated to advancing freedom of Africans from want, fear and external domination.
The tasks before us are clear: reclaim the political identity of Pan-Africanism, nurture a new generation of competent leaders, rebuild the African state as a people-centered institution, and develop a continental strategy to navigate the emerging multipolar global order.
Pan-Africanism remains the only project that offers Africa the possibility of collective dignity and survival in an uncertain world. The time has come to return politics to command—to revive Pan-Africanism not as nostalgia, but as a living, disciplined political project rooted in the people.
* Abdul Mohammed, who served as senior official in both AU and UN mediation processes, is one of Africa’s leading mediation practitioners and experts.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
