Launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations (GAPO)
Launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations (GAPO)
Date | 28 April 2025
We are excited to announce the launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations – a collective endeavour of more than 50 leading think tanks, research institutes and civil society organizations working on UN and regional approaches to peace operations (https://www.peaceoperations.net).
Coordinated by the Global Governance Institute (GGI) in Brussels, the Berlin Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and Amani Africa Media and Research Services, the Alliance brings together the expertise and brain power of close to 100 peace operations experts from around the globe. For a full list of members, please see here.
At this crucial time for peace operations, the Alliance provides comprehensive and direct civil society input to the intergovernmental deliberations at the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial 2025 in Berlin. The UN Peacekeeping Ministerial takes place at a critical juncture for the future of peace operations and the wider multilateral crisis management system. It is a key moment to mobilize collective thinking for strengthening UN peace operations in the years to come. The Alliance was created in liaison with the German Federal Foreign Office and the German Federal Ministry of Defence.
The first round of activities produced eight collaborative policy papers and close to 20 short issue papers which form the basis for concrete policy recommendations on how to strengthen UN peace operations. The recommendations will be discussed at an online workshop on 29 April 2025. On 12 May 2025, immediately ahead of the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, the Alliance will host an in-person Symposium in Berlin and seven side events on a range of aspects essential to the future of peace operations.
The Global Alliance for Peace Operations webpage (www.peaceoperations.net) features information on all events, will publish the policy papers and issue papers, and already facilitates knowledge-sharing, including by gathering prior research and publications by Alliance members. Individuals or organizations working on peace operations that are interested in joining can get in touch with the Alliance at [email protected] .
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM
Date | 28 April 2025
Tomorrow (29 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1276th session for receiving updates on the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
The meeting will commence with the opening remark of Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will deliver a briefing.
This is the second meeting of the PSC on AUSSOM during the month. As examined in detail in the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to that session, the last session was held on 10 April. During that session, the PSC received an update on the state of operation of AUSSOM with a focus on the status of its funding. With only less than 20% of the funding required for the period of January to June 2025 mobilised, the briefing session revealed that AUSSOM faces major funding shortfalls. While AUSSOM operates under conditions that militate against the moral and operational effectiveness of the mission with a much-reduced troop size of about 11,146, the security situation continues to deteriorate with Al Shabaab on the resurgence.
Tomorrow’s meeting comes following the extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AUSSOM held in Kampala, Uganda on 25 April. The summit was preceded by a preparatory senior officials and ministers meeting on 22-24 April, which concluded their respective meetings by adopting several recommendations for the summit’s consideration. Subsequently, the summit adopted a communiqué endorsing these recommendations, which are now expected to be submitted to the PSC and the UN Security Council.
The TCCs summit reviewed the security situation in Somalia and assessed the performance of the AUSSOM sector by sector to evaluate its operational effectiveness in combating Al-Shabaab. The TCCs stressed the need to increase troop strength by at least 8,000 additional personnel to address the prevailing security challenges. This proposal, endorsed by the summit, seeks ‘to address the prevailing security situation in Somalia so as not to roll back the hard-earned gains made so far and bridge manpower gaps by having more personnel than before the drawdown.’ Highlighting the gravity of the deterioration of the security situation, beyond the additional troop surge for AUSSOM, the summit also adopted the Minister’s conclusion that it is ‘urgent to consider deploying bilateral troops to augment’ AUSSOM. On its part, the Federal Government of Somalia is expected to ‘recruit community/local defence forces and mobile force in order to hold and consolidate the areas that were liberated.’ All of these are clear admissions that the drawdown of troops during the past years has not been replaced with Somali forces as planned, resulting in major gaps that Al Shabaab has been able to exploit to regain territories. In this context, the summit directed the Chiefs of Defence Forces, together with Somalia, to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al-Shabaab.
The summit also endorsed the proposal for enhancing air assets and capabilities, as well as strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), considering the fragmented deployment of AUSSOM TCCs and their limited ability to support Somali Security Forces in conducting mobile operations.
During the meeting, the Somali Federal Government provided an update on the preparedness of its security forces and the progress made in force generation and integration. It reported to the summit that over 20,000 troops had been trained over the past two years, with plans to train an additional 5,000 elite special forces in 2025. Since January 2023, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) have assumed control of 23 forward operating bases (FOBs) from the AU mission. Of these, only one position—Biyo Cade—was recaptured by Al-Shabaab, while the remaining 22 FOBs remain under SNAF control. At the same time, Somalia’s representative admitted that Somalia is ‘challenged with defeating terrorism and stabilising liberated areas’, while dismissing the portrayal of the country as being in political turmoil. Yet in apparent indication of the role of political cohesion in Somalia, the summit underscored the need for the Somalia Federal Government to strengthen its engagement with Federal Member States and traditional leaders to enhance efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab. It also emphasised the importance of bolstering civil-military coordination, prioritising humanitarian relief, and implementing quick-impact stabilisation projects in recovered areas to consolidate security gains and foster lasting community trust.
In apparent indication that there is a need for close alignment between the implementation of the mandate of AUSSOM and the political and institutional advancements in Somalia, the summit decided to establish TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism at the Heads of State and Government Level chaired by Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni supported by the AU Commission. This is envisaged to serve as an oversight, accountability, coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan (SSDP).
The elephant in the room was the funding challenge facing the mission, particularly the outstanding reimbursements for military and police personnel since January—an issue the TCCs warned is significantly undermining morale and operational effectiveness. At the meeting, it was reported that the total urgent cash requirement to cover the financial costs for the period January to June 2025 is estimated at approximately US$96 million. Thus far, the AU has secured only US$16.7 million, while the mission requires roughly US$15 million per month to meet its obligations. Therefore, the TCCs reiterated that securing predictable and sustainable financing remains a strategic priority to maintain AUSSOM’s operational viability and to ensure continued support for Somali security forces in fully assuming security responsibilities. In this context and in the light of the proposal for the additional 8000 troops surge, they emphasised the urgent need for the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy.
AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf stated in his remarks that the Commission will spare no effort in mobilising financial resources. He emphasised, however, that saving the mission will require a collective effort from member states and international partners. Youssouf underscored that the security and stability of Somalia is vital not only for the Horn of Africa but also for global peace. The summit welcomed the role of traditional and non-traditional partners to support AUSSOM and the Somali federal government. Recently, China and Japan contributed US$ 1 million and US$ 3 million, respectively, in support of AUSSOM. The AU is urging other partners to follow their example. A donors’ conference was anticipated to take place this month in Doha, Qatar, but there is currently no indication that it will proceed as scheduled.
The TCCs also recommended the allocation of additional resources from the AU Peace Fund to help address the mission’s financial shortfalls. This was the case in 2023, when the AU was authorised to use the Peace Fund’s crisis reserve facility to address the funding shortfall faced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)—the predecessor of AUSSOM—particularly with regard to troop allowances. However, given that the largest commitment from the Fund has so far been to AUSSOM, this call for use of additional funds from the Fund may face major pushback from various PSC members who express concern that the Peace Fund risks being used as a funding mechanism for AUSSOM while it is meant to cover the peace and security efforts of the AU across the continent.
Most importantly, the TCCs are placing their hopes on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which outlines a framework for financing AU-led peace support operations, as a means to address the financial challenges facing AUSSOM. However, Chairperson Youssouf acknowledged reluctance in New York regarding its application. This hesitation stems from the position of the United States, which has communicated to both the UN and the AU that it ‘will not support the application of the UNSCR 2719 framework to AUSSOM when the matter comes before the Security Council on May 15.’ The representative of the US informed the summit in Kampala that the US does not believe that ‘Somalia is the best place to trigger the resolution’ and does not ‘support the implementation of a hybrid implementation model to finance AUSSOM.’ It seems that the AU Commission leadership might travel to Washington, D.C., to engage with the US administration and other relevant stakeholders on this matter. Donald Kaberuka, the High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Financing, is also reported to be in the US in search of resolution.
In the meantime, the UN has been working with the AU to conduct an independent strategic review of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) pursuant to Security Council resolution 2767 adopted on 27 December 2024. The review is meant to facilitate the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025. The two organisations appointed Maman Sidikou of Niger and Neil Cole of South Africa to co-lead the review process. They undertook consultations in Mogadishu, Addis Ababa and New York with the Somali government, TCCs and international partners. They submitted their report by the end of March, but the Secretary-General, following consultations with the AU, requested additional time to finalise the review process by 30 April, which the Security Council granted.
The outcome of the UNSOS review is expected to enable the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting 1 July, utilising existing resources made available through the rightsizing of UNSOS. Cost savings from this process are anticipated to cover up to 75 per cent of AUSSOM’s estimated US$ 190 million budget, with the remaining funds to be jointly mobilised by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources. However, the review reportedly yielded only US$ 61 million in savings—well below the amount needed to meet the 75 per cent threshold for funding through UN-assessed contributions. This shortfall appears to have prompted the request for an extension, allowing the UN and AU to continue exploring options for additional savings (they are looking at an additional US$ 40 million).
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may condemn and express concern over the threat to the gains made by AU troops and Somali forces posed by the intensification of attacks in recent months by Al Shabaab, with territorial gains particularly in the Middle and Lower Shebelle. It may, in this regard, underscore the need for reinforcing AUSSOM’s troop levels and capabilities. The PSC may, in this respect, welcome the outcomes of the Kampala summit of TCCs. With respect to the decision of the summit for the additional surge of 8000 troops, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop a plan on the surge and deployment of the additional troops including on whether they will be deployed under AUSSOM or bilateral basis. With respect to funding, the PSC may welcome the promising outcome of the UNSOS review within the framework of Resolution 2767 and the effort to enable the hybrid implementation through cost-saving from rightsizing of UNSOS. It may express deep concern about the huge financial shortfall facing AUSSOM, undermining the effective operation of the mission. It may remind the international community that AUSSOM, as a mission authorised by the UN Security Council, represents a global public good for maintaining international peace and security, which requires the assumption of full responsibility by the UN and the international community by ensuring predictable, sustainable and reliable funding for AUSSOM. In this respect, it may reiterate its previous decision, stressing the importance of ensuring predictable, sustainable and adequate funding for AUSSOM, including through a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) as the most suitable mechanism. PSC may commend the funding contributions that some members of the international community made and the continued commitment of others. It may, echoing the Kampala summit, request the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy, including through pursuing the implementation of Resolution 2719.
The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 22 April 2025
Tomorrow (23 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will discuss the imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Following opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that presentations will be delivered by Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), Emmanuel Budu Addo, Director of Administration, Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) and the Representative of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to deliver statements.
The development of the Maritime Task Force by the PSC has evolved progressively. The first mention of the initiative was in the PSC’s 1012th session on 23 July 2021, where the Council called on the AU Commission, in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), to promote cooperation and establish a Maritime Task Force among African littoral states. Building on this, the PSC’s 1128th session on 19 December 2022 acknowledged efforts by the Chiefs of Naval Staff, who met in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, in May 2022, to advance the establishment of the Regional Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea. This marked a transition from political commitment to concrete regional action, with a call for broader support from Member States and stakeholders. By the 1174th session on 18 September 2023, further institutional advancements were made, particularly through a follow-up Technical Committee Meeting in Dakar in August 2022, where a technical expert committee was established to guide the Task Force’s development. The PSC urged continued support from Member States and stakeholders to sustain these efforts. Finally, the 1209th session on 18 April 2024 marked a significant milestone as the PSC welcomed the formal establishment of the CMTF in May 2022 and the adoption of its Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by ten Gulf of Guinea countries, solidifying the Task Force as a regional mechanism for collective rapid response to maritime security threats. This trajectory demonstrates a structured approach to addressing maritime security challenges, moving from initial policy discussions to concrete operationalisation. However, ensuring the sustainability of the Task Force and enhancing inter-agency coordination remain critical considerations for the future. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s discussion will mainly focus on those two aspects.
The imperative to sustain and institutionalise maritime security mechanisms in the Gulf of Guinea stems from its strategic significance as the largest contiguous maritime space in Africa. Unlike the relatively narrower maritime spaces of North Africa’s Mediterranean coast or East Africa’s corridor near the Middle East, the Gulf of Guinea opens into the vast Atlantic Ocean, linking Africa to North and South America. This strategic positioning makes it one of the most navigable and economically significant maritime regions on the continent. Its importance is further amplified by continent-wide initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which depend on secure and efficient maritime trade routes.
Regarding the scope of discussions during tomorrow’s session, it is important to note that while the agenda indicates the PSC will focus on the role of ‘the CMTF in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea’, the region’s security challenges extend well beyond piracy. The Gulf of Guinea faces a complex and evolving array of maritime threats, including hijackings and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Fishing vessels are often linked to broader illicit activities, worsening economic losses, depleting marine resources, and driving coastal communities into poverty—conditions that increase vulnerability to piracy and transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking, illicit trade, and arms smuggling. Adding to the instability is the growing threat of terrorism closer to coastal states. Moreover, as maritime domains become contested spaces for geopolitical rivalry and competing claims, the risk of undermining unified security efforts deepens.
In this context, tomorrow’s session presents a critical opportunity to reassess how the CMTF can be effectively leveraged not only to combat piracy but also as a broader platform to address the interlinked maritime and coastal security threats facing the Gulf of Guinea.
While the decline in incidents of piracy by 22% in 2024 from the 2023 levels, representing only 22% of all the incidents reported in 2020, highlights the contribution of regional collective action, experts caution that piracy networks remain active and capable of resurgence if current security efforts are not sustained. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus not only on maintaining the downward trend but also on ensuring the long-term institutionalisation of maritime security mechanisms and ensuring the implementation of the Lome Charter and the AU’s blue economy plans.
As outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) adopted in April 2023 by the Chiefs of Naval Staff and Coastguards of 10 countries in the GoG region, the CMTF is envisioned as a multinational, rapid-response force led by the AU and operating in coordination with regional bodies such as ECOWAS and ECCAS. Designed to provide real-time operational capacity, the CMTF aims to address a range of maritime threats, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, transnational organised crime, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and maritime terrorism. Recognising the vast and complex maritime landscape of the GoG, the CONOPS divides the area into three operational sectors to enhance coordination and responsiveness: Sector North, headquartered in Senegal; Sector Central, based in Lagos, Nigeria; and Sector South, located in Pointe-Noire, Congo. This tri-sector approach treats the GoG as a single operational theatre, enabling integrated and collaborative maritime security efforts across national boundaries. In line with this structure, President Bola Tinubu, during the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, called on the PSC to formally establish the CMTF and reaffirmed Nigeria’s readiness to host its headquarters in Lagos.
The establishment of the CMTF raises an important question: how does it align with the Yaoundé Architecture? According to the CMTF Coordinating Commander, Mohammad Saghir Shettima, the establishment of the CMTF aims to address a key limitation of the Yaoundé Architecture—its reliance on voluntary state responses, which often delays operational action due to resource and priority constraints. While the Yaoundé Architecture has proven to be effective in coordination and intelligence-sharing, the CMTF could enhance it by providing a standing, ready-to-deploy force capable of rapid, coordinated maritime responses. He also indicated that this bridges the gap between early warning and action, strengthening regional maritime security. However, despite its strategic relevance, progress toward the full establishment and operationalisation of the CMTF has been limited since its establishment in 2022. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus on outlining the financial and logistical commitments required from the side of the AU to ensure the effective deployment and functionality of the Task Force.
In addition to the foregoing, tomorrow’s session is also expected to follow up on other initiatives for coordination and enhanced collective action in the maritime domain, including those envisaged in the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS). This provided for a coordinated approach to maritime security, the establishment of a Naval Component within the African Standby Force (ASF), and the formation of a Committee of Heads of African Navies and Coastguards. The Council may also follow up on the first ASF maritime exercise. Noting the financial, logistical, and institutional challenges, the AU Commission is expected to provide updates on the planning of the upcoming maritime command post exercise, based on the concept note developed during the AU Continental Maritime Exercise Concept Development Workshop held in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2024. Members of the PSC will be particularly interested in receiving detailed information on budgetary requirements, logistical arrangements, and organisational planning. It is also anticipated that any developments regarding the establishment of the CHANs working group will be shared. More broadly, it would be of interest for PSC members to receive update on the establishment of a Group of Experts or a Task Force to provide technical support to Member States and other stakeholders in delivering on the AU 2050 AIM Strategy and the implementation of the Lomé Charter and the establishment of a coordination mechanism or Unit on Maritime Security within the AU Commission.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a communique. The PSC may reiterate the importance of strengthening collaboration with regional partners to improve intelligence sharing, coordinate joint patrols, and bolster counter-terrorism efforts for maritime security and regional stability in the Gulf of Guinea. Along those lines, the PSC may urge Gulf of Guinea Commission Member States to strengthen political backing for the effective launch of the CMTF to boost regional maritime security efforts. The PSC may in this respect take note with commendation the interest that Nigeria expressed for hosting the headquarters of the CMTF. It may also reiterate its request for the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of a dedicated Maritime Security Coordination Unit to provide institutional leadership, coordination, and oversight of the CMTF and broader continental maritime security initiatives. In this regard, the PSC may also request the Commission, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and Member States, to develop a costed implementation plan and resource mobilisation strategy for the CMTF. To enhance operational coherence, the PSC may recommend strengthened coordination between the CMTF and existing Yaoundé Architecture structures—particularly the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, and CRESMAO—supported by the development of standard operating procedures to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing and response. Furthermore, the PSC may reiterate the call for the immediate activation and formal institutionalisation of CHANs as a continental advisory and coordination mechanism, and request the AU Commission to report on its operationalisation. Lastly, the PSC may also retreat its previous decisions calling for the establishment of a Group of Experts or Task Force to provide technical assistance to Member States in implementing the AU’s maritime security agenda, including the 2050 AIMS, Lomé Charter, and CONOPS of the CMTF.
Update on the AU elections for membership in the PSC for the Northern Region and the two remaining AU Commission Portfolios
Update on the AU elections for membership in the PSC for the Northern Region and the two remaining AU Commission Portfolios
Date | 17 April 2025
INTRODUCTION
This policy brief provides an update on what transpired during the 24th Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council. During the 38th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly held last February, the issue that attracted the most attention was the elections of the AU Commission and the members of the PSC. As discussed in our various analyses on the elections, the AU Commission elections for two portfolios could not proceed. As such, a decision was taken for the election process to open promptly and for the Executive Council to hold an extraordinary session to hold the elections on 15 April 2025. As part of this extraordinary session, it was also decided that the Executive Council would hold an election for membership in the PSC for the seat of the North Africa region.
Africa Mourns the Loss of an Illustrious Son and Great Pan-Africanist
Africa Mourns the Loss of an Illustrious Son and Great Pan-Africanist
Date | 11 April 2025
Said Djinnit* and El-Ghassim Wane*
And so it is that, on 8 April 2025, Amara Essy left us, joining the long lineage of servants of the Pan-African ideal who are no longer of this world. He was 80 years old.
An accomplished diplomat and man of vision, he marked a historic turning point in the life of the continental body.
We truly came to appreciate Essy’s exceptional qualities after his July 2001 election in Lusaka as the last Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), assuming a year later the role of interim Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission. He succeeded Salim Ahmed Salim, who had steered the OAU’s evolution through the post-Cold War era and was assigned the delicate mission of ensuring the transition to the AU.
This task, he carried out with rigor, determination, and humility. In Durban, in July 2002, the texts governing the functioning of the main organs of the AU were adopted and the new Union officially launched during a grandiose ceremony.
Before taking over the leadership of the OAU General Secretariat, Essy had notably served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire and as his country’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where he held the presidency of the General Assembly, playing a leading role in defending African positions. His experience, network, strategic insight, and benevolent leadership made him uniquely qualified to ensure this successful transition between the two institutional incarnations of Pan-Africanism: the OAU and the AU.
Numerous other accomplishments can be credited to Essy’s leadership during his productive twenty-four-month tenure—from his election as head of the continental organisation’s executive to his departure following the July 2003 Maputo summit. Indeed, this transformative period saw the adoption of several landmark documents, including the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)—an initiative that articulated a bold vision of governance and development in Africa; the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council; the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption; and the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women. All these instruments remain highly relevant to this day.
While guiding the successful transition from OAU to AU and advancing these normative frameworks, Essy remained fully engaged with other pressing issues of the time. He was actively involved in finding solutions to the crises affecting various regions of the continent, particularly in Madagascar, the Central African Republic, and Burundi, skillfully wielding the tools of African diplomacy, even when facing the most assertive leaders.
Well-versed in the intricacies of the international system, Essy had an acute awareness of the asymmetrical distribution of power within it and the inequalities and injustices that characterized it. He was fond of quoting this West African proverb: ‘The hand that gives is above the one that receives,’ as he advocated for a financially autonomous and politically sovereign African Union. Throughout his tenure, he championed this vision with remarkable persistence.
Essy’s management style was one of quiet authority, delegating with confidence and mobilizing energies in a spirit of genuine collaboration.
But what struck people most about him was the man behind the diplomat. He was remarkably humble, generous, discreet, and loyal in friendship. Everywhere he went, he left a profound imprint and earned universal esteem and respect. Those who knew and worked with him cherish memories of his exceptional kindness and attentiveness, qualities that extended well beyond his professional obligations. To the very end, he maintained meaningful bonds with his former collaborators, offering comfort and recognition with the dignified silence of the truly great.
His mandate concluded in July 2003 with the election of former President Alpha Oumar Konaré, yet his role as a bridge-builder between the OAU and AU remains indelible in the continent’s history. In today’s uncertain times, his example continues to inspire: ethics, commitment, discretion, and effectiveness stand as the enduring pillars of his legacy.
Essy often invoked another African adage: ‘In the village, everyone knows who the best dancers are.’ With his passing, Africa has lost one of its most graceful performers on the multilateral stage.
Our grief is profound. Yet we find solace in the wisdom of Birago Diop, who reminds us that:
« Those who die are never gone,
They are in the shadow that grows brighter,
And in the shadow that grows darker …,
They are in the trembling trees,
They are in the whispering wood,
They are in the water that runs,
They are in the water that sleeps … ».
Indeed, Essy’s spirit lives on in the memories, actions, and pathways of countless individuals he inspired across Africa and throughout the world.
Farewell, Mr. Amara Essy! May your noble soul rest in eternal peace.
* Said Djinnit, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in West Africa and Former Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region. He served as Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the Organisation of African Unity and Commissioner for Peace and Security at the African Union during Amara Essy’s tenure.
* El-Ghassim Wane, Former Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Mali and Head of MINUSMA and Former Peace and Security Director at the African Union Commission. He served as Senior Political Officer/Acting Deputy Head of the OAU/AU Conflict Management Centre during Amara Essy’s tenure.
L’Afrique perd l’un de ses illustres fils et un grand panafricain
Said Djinnit* et El-Ghassim Wane*
Ainsi donc Amara Essy nous a quittés le 8 avril 2025, rejoignant la longue lignée des serviteurs de l’idéal panafricain qui ne sont plus de ce monde. Il avait 80 ans.
Diplomate accompli et homme de vision, il aura marqué un tournant historique de la vie de l’institution continentale.
Nous avons véritablement découvert Essy après son élection, en juillet 2001, à Lusaka, comme dernier Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine (OUA), devenant un an plus tard Président intérimaire de la Commission de l’Union africaine (UA). Il succédait alors à Salim Ahmed Salim, artisan de l’adaptation de l’OUA à la période d’après-Guerre froide, et s’était vu assigner la mission délicate d’assurer la transition vers l’UA.
Cette tâche, il la mena avec rigueur, détermination et humilité. À Durban, en juillet 2002, les textes régissant le fonctionnement des principales instances de l’UA furent adoptés et la nouvelle Union officiellement lancée lors d’une grandiose cérémonie.
Avant de prendre la direction du secrétariat général de l’OUA, Essy avait notamment exercé les fonctions de ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Côte d’Ivoire et de représentant permanent de son pays auprès des Nations unies, où il assuma la présidence de l’Assemblée générale, jouant un rôle de premier plan dans la défense des positions africaines. Son expérience, son réseau, sa lucidité stratégique et son leadership bienveillant ont fait de lui l’homme idéal pour assurer ce passage réussi entre les deux incarnations institutionnelles du panafricanisme que sont l’OUA et l’UA.
Bien d’autres résultats peuvent être mis à l’actif du leadership d’Essy, pendant les vingt-quatre mois de travail intense qui ont séparé son élection à la tête de l’exécutif de l’institution continentale de son départ après le sommet de Maputo en juillet 2003. Cette période a en effet vu l’adoption de textes majeurs, comme le Mémorandum d’entente de la Conférence sur la sécurité, la stabilité, le développement et la coopération en Afrique (CSSDCA) – une initiative fondée sur une vision audacieuse de la gouvernance et du développement en Afrique; le Protocole portant création du Conseil de paix et de sécurité; la Convention de l’UA sur la prévention et la lutte contre la corruption et le Protocole de Maputo sur les droits des femmes. Autant d’instruments qui restent, aujourd’hui encore, d’une brûlante actualité.
Tout en œuvrant à la réussite de la transition entre l’OUA et l’UA et à ces avancées normatives, Essy ne négligea point la gestion des autres dossiers prioritaires de l’époque. C’est ainsi qu’il s’impliqua activement dans la recherche de solutions aux crises qui affectaient diverses régions du continent, en particulier à Madagascar, en Centrafrique et au Burundi, maniant avec finesse les outils de la diplomatie africaine, y compris face aux dirigeants les plus affirmés.
Rompu aux arcanes du système international, Essy avait une conscience aiguë de la distribution asymétrique du pouvoir en son sein et des inégalités et injustices le caractérisant. Il aimait à répéter ce proverbe ouest-africain : « La main qui donne est au-dessus de celle qui reçoit », plaidant pour une Union africaine financièrement autonome et politiquement souveraine. C’était là l’un de ses combats constants.
Essy gérait les dossiers avec une autorité tranquille, déléguant en toute confiance et mobilisant les énergies dans un esprit de collaboration sincère.
Mais ce qui frappait le plus chez lui, c’était l’homme derrière le diplomate. Il était d’une rare humilité, généreux, discret, et fidèle en amitié. Partout où il est passé, il a laissé une empreinte profonde et a toujours joui de l’estime ainsi que du respect de tous. Nombreux sont ceux qui, l’ayant côtoyé et pratiqué, gardent le souvenir de sa sollicitude et de sa bonté, bien au-delà des exigences du devoir. Jusqu’à la fin, il aura maintenu un lien cordial avec ses anciens collaborateurs, leur offrant réconfort et reconnaissance, dans le silence digne des grands.
Son mandat prit fin en juillet 2003 avec l’élection de l’ancien président Alpha Oumar Konaré, mais son rôle de bâtisseur de ponts entre l’OUA et l’UA restera inoubliable. En ces temps d’incertitudes, son exemple demeure une source d’inspiration : éthique, engagement, discrétion et efficacité sont les piliers de son héritage.
Essy se plaisait à rappeler cet autre adage africain: « Dans le village, on connaît les meilleurs danseurs ». Avec sa disparition, l’Afrique vient de perdre l’un de ses plus fins danseurs sur la scène multilatérale.
Notre peine est immense. Mais, nous nous consolons avec la certitude, comme le rappelle Birago Diop, que:
« Ceux qui sont morts ne sont jamais partis,
Ils sont dans l’ombre qui s’éclaire,
Et dans l’ombre qui s’épaissit …,
Ils sont dans l’arbre qui frémit,
Ils sont dans le bois qui gémit,
Ils sont dans l’eau qui coule,
Ils sont dans l’eau qui dort … ».
Bref, Essy continuera à vivre dans la mémoire, les gestes et pas de ceux, nombreux, que son exemple a inspirés – tant en Afrique qu’en dehors du continent.
Adieu Monsieur Amara Essy ! Que ton âme repose éternellement en paix.
* Said Djinnit, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies en Afrique de l’Ouest et ancien Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies pour la région des Grands Lacs. Il a servi comme Secrétaire général adjoint aux Affaires politiques à l’Organisation de l’unité africaine et Commissaire à la Paix et à la Sécurité à l’Union africaine pendant le mandat d’Amara Essy.
* El-Ghassim Wane, ancien Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies au Mali et chef de la MINUSMA et ancien Directeur Paix et Sécurité à la Commission de l’Union africaine. Il a servi comme fonctionnaire politique principal/chef adjoint par intérim du Centre de gestion des conflits de l’OUA/UA pendant le mandat d’Amara Essy.
Update Briefing on The Status and Operations of The AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia
Update Briefing on The Status and Operations of The AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia
Date | 10 April 2025
Tomorrow (11 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene for its 1273rd meeting for an ‘Update on the Status of the Operations of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).’
The meeting will begin with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Thereafter the PSC will receive introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).
Tomorrow’s session came at short notice following a quick shift on the programme, as the session was initially scheduled to happen on 17 April. This session also comes as an Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of the Troop Contributing Countries to AUSSOM is being organised to take place on 23 to 25 April 2025 in Entebbe, Uganda. A summit which was initially planned to take place on 15 April 2025, but following a note verbale addressed to the AU Commission on 31 March from Uganda, it had to be rescheduled.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to discuss AUSSOM’s financial status for military, police, civilian and operational components for the period January to June 2025 as well as ATMIS’s outstanding liabilities for TCCs. AUSSOM faces a critical funding challenge for the period January to June 2025, with a total cash requirement of $90.4 million to support military, police, civilian and operational components. Military costs dominate at $78.5 million, driven by troop allowances and compensation, while police and civilian components add $8.1 million and $3.3 million, respectively, and operational costs total $0.4 million. Against this backdrop, committed funding stands at $16.7 million from China, the AU Peace Fund, Japan and Korea, covering just 18.5% of the need, leaving a $73.7 million shortfall. Additionally, the liquidation ATMIS incurs of $1.7 million in liabilities, of which $1 million remains unfunded, bringing the total urgent cash requirement to $92.1 million. An unspecified pledge from the United Kingdom offers hope, but immediate action is needed to bridge this gap and ensure operational continuity. Compounding the issue, outstanding liabilities from ATMIS owed to TCCs for 2022–2024 total $93.9 million, including Uganda ($34.5 million), Kenya ($15.7 million), Ethiopia ($17.2 million), Djibouti ($8.3 million) and Burundi ($18.1 million).
Since the beginning of 2025, this will be the first meeting on AUSSOM since the official transition of the AU mission from ATMIS to AUSSOM on 1 January 2025. During its last convening, the 1253rd meeting was held on 19 December 2024 on ‘Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and Post-ATMIS Security Arrangements.’ As observed in the Monthly Digest on the PSC for December, ‘funding uncertainties remain a significant barrier to the full operationalisation of AUSSOM.’ The PSC thus stressed ‘the importance of ensuring predictable, sustainable and adequate funding for the AUSSOM, including through a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023), as the most suitable mechanism for providing adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, in order to avoid the perennial financial challenges faced by previous Missions.’ Equally important was its appeal to the UN Security Council ‘to consider the financing option, on the hybrid application of the framework established under resolution 2719(2023), as the only practicable solution for AUSSOM, for the mission to fulfil its mandate and support the implementation of the Somalia Security Sector Development Plan (SSDP).’ When endorsing AUSSOM CONOPs and authorising the mission’s deployment under Resolution 2767, the UNSC went some distance towards positively responding to this request of the PSC. It thus requested the UN Secretary-General to implement “the hybrid implementation” of the framework established by Resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025, including access to United Nations assessed contributions not exceeding 75 percent of AUSSOM’s annual budget. But this is made contingent on report to be submitted to the UNSC by 1 May 2025 detailing ‘the progress made in preparations for the implementation of the framework established by Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM under the “hybrid implementation” and confirmation by the Council of ‘the request to the Secretary-General in this paragraph through a Security Council decision, taking into account the report requested in paragraph 43 to this resolution, by 15 May 2025.’
It is to be recalled that the US abstained from Resolution 2767. With the Trump administration’s firm stand on cutting down costs and withdrawing from UN entities, the door that Resolution 2767 opened for applying 2719 to AUSSOM under the hybrid implementation no longer seems open. Unless conditions change and the Trump administration shows willingness to support the application of 2719 to AUSSOM on the basis of Resolution 2767, AUSSOM would face an even bleaker financial future beyond June 2025. As such and ahead of the summit of AUSSOM troop contributing countries one of the issues expected to feature during tomorrow’s session is whether there is a plan b regarding the financing of AUSSOM outside of the application of 2719 and what the implications of the absence of any such viable alternative plan for the sustainability of the mission post June 2025.
Tomorrow’s session would provide an opportunity for the PSC to assess the preparations for putting in place the report requested under Resolution 2767. It is expected that the AU Commission will provide an update in this respect. The PSC may also receive update on its request to the Commission to ‘draw up a roadmap, in collaboration with the UN for resource mobilisation to fill the funding gap of 25% for AUSSOM as directed by resolution 2719, including the possibility of convening a pledging conference…’ and ‘to present the AUSSOM Budget to the PSC for consideration and onward transmission following due process through the PRC Sub-Committee on General Supervision and Coordination on Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters (GSCBFM) and F-15 Technical Experts in order to use part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment and the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to contribute to the financing of the AUSSOM in line with paragraph 11, of Communique [PSC/PR/COMM. 1236 (2024)] adopted at the 1236th PSC meeting held on 22 October 2024.’
What also makes this consideration of the financial uncertainties of AUSSOM pressing is the recent escalation of the threat that Al-Shabaab poses ’s persistent threat, with the group adapting through asymmetric warfare and maintaining control over parts of southern Somalia. The mission’s success and effectiveness hinge on the SSF’s ability to hold territory, which faced setbacks in recent months. Geopolitical rivalries and Somalia’s lack of political consensus continue to complicate AUSSOM’s operations. There has been skepticism as the mission has been criticised as inheriting ATMIS’s unresolved issues, including limited mobility and logistical constraints.
The expected outcome of the session is a summary record. The PSC is likely to express grave concern over the continued threat posed by Al Shabaab to peace and security in Somalia and the region and condemn all the attacks against Somali security forces and ATMIS forces. It is expected to encourage all Somali political stakeholders to prioritise the country’s national interests and immediately resume inclusive dialogue on all outstanding national issues through the framework of the National Consultative Council (NCC). The council may also reiterate its request for the AU Commission to continue extensive engagements with strategic partners and potential new donors to ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable funding and other forms of support for the AUSSOM. It may encourage the AU Commission working in consultation with Somalia and TCCs as well as interested stakeholders such as EU to work on a plan B in the highly likelihood of the UNSC declining to adopt a decision authorising the use of UN-assessed contributions under Resolution 2719. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission to present options regarding the various scenarios on the funding of AUSSOM in order to enable the PSC to make informed decisions.
