6th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC
6th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC
Date | 02 May 2023
Tomorrow (02 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 6th informal joint retreat, which will be followed by the 14th annual joint consultative meeting to be convened on 03 May. This year’s joint retreat is expected take place in Brussels, Belgium.
The practice of convening an informal joint retreat ahead of the annual consultative meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC was institutionalised starting from 2015. Since then, the two counterparts have regularly held these retreats which are meant to facilitate constructive dialogue by presenting the platform for consultative engagement based on identified thematic issue(s). The coming informal joint retreat is expected to feature two agenda items. The first one will be global peace and security concerns, with a focus on issues surrounding multilateralism. The second agenda item will focus on the financing of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), including through access to UN assessed contributions.
As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, the world today faces complex challenges that necessitate joint action and multilateral solutions. Arms proliferation, transnational organised crimes, spread of terrorism, climate change, global economic shocks and cybersecurity are some of the security threats that have clear transboundary effect and cannot be effectively addressed in the absence of a well organised global approach. Despite this, we witness growing scepticism about multilateralism with nationalist sentiments and individualistic tendencies increasing globally. While this trend started a while ago, it became particularly acute during the COVID-19 pandemic during which some parts of the world such as Africa were left to fend for themselves despite the mantra ‘we are all in this together’. The rise of protectionism and the failure of advanced countries to show solidarity by sharing essential medical supplies including therapeutics and vaccines and vaccines technology blew a major blow to people’s faith in multilateralism. The situation was further aggravated by the lack of collective action that fairly responds to the socio-economic fallouts that the pandemic triggered. As if these were not enough, the war in Ukraine and the responses it triggered added a more dangerous dimension with economic shock waves and deepening bug power confrontation threatening to plug the world into further division and even a nuclear catastrophe. All of these and the various other conflicts in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa highlight not only the failure of the prevailing multilateral system to deliver on some of its most basic roles and the need for its urgent transformative reform. Questions such as how to make the multilateral system more inclusive and representative (for example through the reform of the archaic and increasingly failing UN Security Council), how to ensure consistent and effective collective enforcement of international norms and how to achieve the call of Secretary General for a new Bretton Woods moment and the enhancement of the role of regional organizations are some of the issues that are of pressing concern for this first agenda item of the 6th informal joint retreat.
One of the key issues in this regard that may receive some attention at tomorrow’s informal joint retreat is the use of sanctions and coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. While the use of Chapter VII to impose sanctions has to an extent been an effective tool for maintaining international peace and security, both sanctions under Chapter VII and more so unilateral sanctions have also lately come under criticism for having counterproductive impact on nations’ ability to effectively defend themselves and pursue their development agendas. For the AU, as elaborated in the outcome of the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly [Assembly/AU/Res. 1(XXXV)], unilateral coercive measures and sanctions have proven not only to have ‘disproportionate and indiscriminate human cost’, but also impede on the right to development particularly by constraining trade and investment relations and negatively impacting post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. Additionally, given the major reversals being experienced in the state of peace and security both in Africa and globally, it may interest for tomorrow’s informal consultation that the AUPSC and the EUPSC explore ways of enhancing effective conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic and other means within the framework of Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter (on ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ and ‘Regional Arrangements’, respectively) as critical measure for restoring the effectiveness of the multilateral system to meet the promise of the UN Charter to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.
Aside from these issues, it is also possible that EUPSC members will make remarks regarding the war in Ukraine, within the framework of the agenda item on global peace and security concerns. It is to be recalled that the EU proposed to discuss the Ukraine war as one of the agenda items of the previous joint retreat. However, on the side of the AU, the topic was considered to be beyond the mandate of the PSC for discussion at the joint retreat. Eventually, the lack of agreement on the inclusion of a reference became a deal breaker as the annual consultative meeting ended without the adoption of a joint communique. Discomfort on the part of AU member states on the matter still persists and it would be interesting to see if the convening of the meeting in Brussels will lead to the inclusion of a language on the war in Ukraine.
The other agenda tabled for the AUPSC-EUPSC informal retreat is the perennial issue of financing of AU PSOs, which is not actually totally separate from the first agenda. AU PSOs serve and contribute to the global public good of maintaining international peace and security. It is this recognition of the role of AU PSOs that led to the establishment by the EU of its most celebrated financial instrument – the Africa Peace Facility. This facility more than any other served as the fuel critical to both the establishment and effective take off of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the launch of over a dozen peace support operations that tremendously contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security, albeit at heavy loss of the lives of PSO personnel which only African troop contributors are willing to bear. The lack of effective, predictable and sustainable funding has severely undermined the use of AU PSOs. The resultant vacuum that this situation has left has led to not only the proliferation of poorly functioning, military heavy, ad hoc and politically expedient self-defence based operations but also the increasing resort of countries seeking robust security cooperation to private military companies. These are developments that not only take place with little regard to multilateral frameworks but also in the case of the Wagner Group in a manner that undermines various tenets of multilateralism.
The discussion on the agenda is coming on the heels of the adoption of the African Consensus Paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for the AU peace and security activities by the AU Assembly at its 36th ordinary session held in February of this year. On 28 April, the UN Secretary-General also released the much-anticipated report on progress made towards the fulfilment of commitments set out in UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2320(2016) and 2378(2017), which were adopted to advance the issue of sustainable and predictable funding for AU PSOs using UN assessed contributions.
Members of the EUPSC are likely to be interested to get clarity on what AU’s 25 percent commitment to the PSOs means as envisaged in the Consensus Paper. It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly agreed to cover 25 percent of its PSOs budget in January 2015 as part of the effort to take charge of its own budget. According to the Concept Note, it appears that the commitment is not to cover 25 percent of the total budget of PSOs but to dedicate the same percent of AU’s annual budget to cover the ‘preparation stage’ of AU PSOs while expenses required for the ‘employment and post-employment stages’ of the PSOs are expected to be covered by the UN through its assessed contribution.
The Consensus Paper further explains activities that fall within the category of ‘preparation stage’ stating that the 25 percent of the Union’s annual budget will cover costs related to strategic planning, mission specific pre-deployment training, mission-specific technical assessments and fact-finding missions, recruitment and selection process of mission personnel, pre-deployment verification of personnel and equipment, negotiations and signing processes for the MoU between the AU and Police/Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCC), negotiations and signing processes for AU-Host Country Status of Forces/Mission Agreements, negotiations and signing processes for Letters of Assists between the AU and Countries Contributing capabilities for AU-Led PSOs.’
In terms of the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund, the PSC members may also highlight the commitment the AU Assembly displayed at its 36th ordinary session in February of this year, where it decided to the immediate use of the Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility to support the deployment and operations of East African Community regional force in eastern DRC, as well as to contribute towards filling the financial gap in ATMIS.
The informal retreat is also an opportunity to assess the status of the implementation of the tripartite AU-EU-UN project on AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF). Launched in November 2022, the project aims to enhance AU’s capacity to ensure that its PSOs are continuously planned and conducted in compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Given that the compliance issue was one of the sticking points during the negotiation to adopt UNSC resolution on financing AU PSOs in 2018 and 2019, the work undertaken under this project is expected to strengthen AU’s position in the negotiation expected to resume this year. The informal meeting serves as an occasion to build and renew the consensus for access to UN assessed contributions for AU PSOs authorized by the UNSC.
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of May 2023
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of May 2023
Date | May 2023
Uganda will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in May. The provisional programme of work for the month envisages five thematic and two country specific sessions as well as the 6th Annual Informal Retreat and 14th Annual Consultative Meeting of the AU PSC and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC). In addition to substantive sessions, a field mission to Sudan and Abyei is also envisaged in the program of work, to be conducted if conditions improve and allow such visit.
On 02 May and 03 May consecutively, the PSC will have its 6th annual informal retreat and 14th annual consultative meeting, respectively, with the EUPSC. In accordance with the annual rotation of the venue of the consultative meeting between Addis Abeba and Brussels, this year’s annual retreat and consultative meeting will be taking place in Brussels, Belgium. As is the norm, the informal retreat is expected to serve as a platform for the two counterparts to discuss thematic issues relevant to the EU-AU partnership and the full realisation of the MoU between the two for advancing joint strategies in addressing conflicts and crises through an integrated approach. The state of multilateralism is expected to take centre stage. This year’s consultative meeting is set to focus on situations in three regions in Africa: the Great Lakes, the Horn and Sahel. The ongoing conflict in the DRC, the fight against the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia and complex political transitions as well as the fight against terrorism in countries in the Sahel region are expected to feature as the main agenda items.
On 10 May, the PSC will consider and adopt the provisional programme of work for the month of June 2023.
The next substantive meeting of the PSC is set to take place on 11 May. The session is expected to present a briefing by the Panel of the Wise on its mission to Chad, conducted in line with the request of the PSC’s Press Statement of its 1121st session held on 11 November 2022. Delayed by over a month from the required timeline, the coming briefing is expected to highlight the Panel’s findings with respect to the outcomes of Chad’s national dialogue, particularly the two contested issues of in/eligibility of the members of the Military Council to run for elections and the duration of the transition.
The following day, on 12 May, the PSC will have its third session of the month which will be a virtual ministerial meeting committed to a discussion on financing of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Taking place two weeks after the anticipated release of the UN Secretary General’s April 2023 Report on progress attained by UN and AU towards realising commitments made in Resolution 2320(2016) on UN’s cooperation with regional organisations and Resolution 2378(2017) on peacekeeping reform, PSC’s ministerial session provides members the opportunity to reflect on the findings of the report and how to build on and take forward the AU’s consensus paper on financing peace and security activities in Africa, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly [Assembly/AU/Dec.842(XXXVI)].
On 16 May, the PSC will convene its fourth session taking the form of a briefing on the activities of the African First Ladies Peace Mission (AFLPM). The AFLPM is an initiative that emerged as an outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women, which served as an opportunity for African wives of Heads of States to come together as ambassadors of peace. As little is known about what the AFLPM has in concrete terms contributed to any peace process thus far, the session serves as an opportunity for discussing the state of operationalization of the mechanism and the ways for harnessing its potentials including most notably around lending much needed additional leverage for advancing the Children Affected by Conflict and Women, Peace and Security agenda.
The fifth session of the month is scheduled for 17 May. This will be an open session committed to the PSC’s annual meeting on humanitarian action in Africa. It was in line with its 469th meeting that the PSC decided to dedicate an annual meeting to assess humanitarian situations in the continent. Within this framework, the coming session is expected to have a focused discussion on the growing concern over food insecurity and the resultant humanitarian crisis in Africa and reflect on opportunities to boost Africa’s food production, in order to address the continent’s food crisis in a more sustainable manner.
From 18 to 22 May, the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) will be conducting a retreat to discuss around three major issues: first, finalisation of the ToR of the Sanctions Committee to be established in line with the May 2022 Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG); second, finalisation of ToR for the Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism, also to be established in line with the decision of the May 2022 Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and UCG; and finally third, codification of working methods/modalities for engagement between the PSC and the African three member of the UN Security Council (A3).
The sixth session is set to take place on 23 May and will be committed to a briefing on the outcomes of the Heads of State meeting of Troop Contribution Countries (TCCs) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The Heads of State Summit took place on 27 April, in Kampala, Uganda, as part of a four-day meeting of ATMIS TCCs which mainly aimed to evaluate the achievements made in the implementation of ATMIS’s mandate and to review the ATMIS drawdown plan in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 2670(2022) and 2628(2022) as well as the Communiqué of PSC’s 1068th session (PSC/PR/COMM.1068(2022)). Among other key points, the briefing could provide updates regarding concreate plans around facilitating drawdown of troops for phase one, which was postponed from December 2022 to June 2023, as well as the coming additional three phases of drawdown.
From 24 to 26 May, a field mission to Sudan and Abyei is envisaged in the provisional program of work. With the latest worrying developments unfolding in Sudan, the conduct of the field mission highly depends on whether the security situation on the ground will allow the PSC to travel to the area.
On 29 May, the PSC will convene its seventh session which will be committed to a review of the AU Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA). In March 2023, it is to be recalled that the PSC was scheduled to consider the status report on the implementation of the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF), including the CSVRA and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS). This session could not take place in March as per the plan and was postponed to coming months. In that context, the coming meeting sets the stage to reflect on structural issues and challenges which trigger conflicts and instability in the continent and to provide some highlights on how best to identify member states’ vulnerabilities to conflict at an early stage in order to enable timely intervention and response.
On 30 May, the PSC Military Staff Committee (MSC) will conduct a meeting to consider the current support models for the AU PSOs. The meeting aims to reflect on lessons learnt and the way forward for AU PSOs in this respect.
The last PSC session envisaged in the programme of work for May is consideration of the report of the PSC Field Mission to Sudan and Abyei.
The programme of work also envisages in footnote, a press release to be issued by the Chair of the PSC on 16 May, in commemoration of the International Day of Living Together in Peace. It is to be recalled that at its 891st meeting held in November 2019, the PSC decided to dedicate an annual open session to this theme. Although a few sessions have been committed by the PSC to commemorate the International Day of Living Together in Peace in the years that followed, this hasn’t been done regularly.
Solomon Dersso talked to Al Jazeera on the situation in Sudan and what more needs to be done in the diplomatic front
Solomon Dersso talked to Al Jazeera on the situation in Sudan and what more needs to be done in the diplomatic front
Apr 28, 2023
One year of ATMIS Operations: Progress, Challenges and Funding
One year of ATMIS Operations: Progress, Challenges and Funding
Date | 28 April 2023
Tomorrow (28 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1151st session to take stock of the progress, challenges, and funding as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) marks the first anniversary of its operation on 1 April, replacing the 15 years long African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
The session is expected to start with opening remarks by Abdelhamid Elgharbi, Permanent Representative of Tunisia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, followed by introductory remarks of Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representatives of Somalia and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are expected to deliver statements. The representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are also among the speakers.
This session is coming against the background of increasing diplomatic efforts to address challenges facing ATMIS, most notably the dire funding shortfall facing the Mission. Delegates from ATMIS TCCs have started a four-day meeting on 24 April to evaluate the performance of the mission and deliberate on how to undertake a smooth withdrawal of the 2000 troops from Somalia as per the revised timeline of 30 June.
ATMIS, mandated through the PSC communique 1068 (2022) and the UN Security Council Resolutions 2628 and 2670 (2022) for a fixed period ending by 31 December 2024, is expected to undertake transfer of security responsibilities to SSF in four phases as envisaged in its Concept of Operations (CONOPs) and the STP. In each phase, different benchmarks and timelines are outlined that ATMIS and the FGS need to meet, including ATMIS troop drawdowns and force generation of the SSF (for more details on the four phases in the implementation of ATMIS mandate, see our March 2022 monthly digest).
But the last one year proved the difficulty of delivering on the agreed benchmarks and timelines as evidenced from the need necessitated by security conditions for delaying the first troop drawdowns for additional six months. 2000 ATMIS troops were set to withdraw at the end of Phase I on 31 December 2022. The FGS however requested the revision of the operational timeline for the drawdown considering the security situation on the ground. Accordingly, the PSC, at its 1121st session held on 11 November 2022, supported the request to extend Phase I of ATMIS for the drawdown of 2000 troops until 30 June 2023 while reaffirming to maintain the exit date of 31 December 2024. Accordingly, the UN Security Council Resolution 2670(2022) ‘exceptionally’ extended the authorization of the mission until 30 June.
While the drawdown created the space to undertake outstanding tasks during Phase I, it also brought about critical challenges as highlighted by the SRCC Souef during his remarks to the PSC and UNSC in March of this year. The first challenge is the unclarity over how to carry out the drawdown given that UNSC requested, under its Resolution 2670(2022), for the mission to implement a ‘strategic sector-by-sector’ approach to the drawdown of the 2000 troops while ATMIS CONOPs envisaged the ‘pro rata formula’ for the drawdown. The second challenge is that no funding modality has been agreed so far to fund the six months drawdown delay, further compounding the ATMIS funding shortfall.
Over the last one year, ATMIS has made notable progress in the execution of its mandate, carrying out joint kinetic operations with the SSF against Al Shabaab as well as providing critical support to the ‘SSF-led and owned offensive’ that has been launched since August 2022. Such offensives, which benefited greatly from the support provided by local communities, registered significant security gains inflicting defeats on Al Shabaab, particularly in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states, degrading Al Shabaab’s operational capability and recovering several towns and villages from the group. The successful security operations led by local militias and the FGS also paved the way for the handover of Forward Operating Basis (FOBs) as part of the security transition in line with the CONOPs and the STP. The first of such handover took place in January when ATMIS transferred Maslah FOB, which had been under its control since 2012, to the federal government. It also played critical role in securing the May 2022 Presidential election and the subsequent peaceful transfer of power in June 2022.
Encouraging, albeit slow, steps have been taken by the FGS to increase the pace of force generation that remains a critical factor for the realization of the STP and orderly exit of ATMIS at the end of 2024. In that context, the return of 3,500 Eritrean-trained Somali troops to Somalia, and the ongoing trainings of the SSF in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Uganda are expected to enhance momentum in speeding up force generation that is critical towards the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to the SSF pursuant to the PSC communique 1068 (2022) and the UNSC Resolutions 2628 (2022).
The second drawdown of further 3000 troops should be completed by 30 September 2023. This means that ATMIS is expected to withdraw 5000 of its 18,586 troops from Somalia in the next five-month period. Despite the fact that ATMIS faced some of the most fatal attacks since the deployment of AU’s mission to Somalia and the security gains are not completely secure from facing reversals, it is anticipated that some of the gains made may avoid the need for a request for extending this second drawdown. This is more so the case on account also of the support and coordination that Somalia initiated with its neighbouring countries.
Above all, the funding shortfall has been one of the biggest challenges of ATMIS, risking reversal of the hard-won security gains in Somalia. The mission went operational without securing the required funding. Since then, the mission witnessed widening funding shortfall as highlighted above. On account of the seriousness of the problem, financing ATMIS has been one of the recurrent themes that featured throughout PSC’s sessions that are dedicated to address Somalia/ATMIS.
Despite the direct funding by the EU, which remains the major ATMIS financial contributor, the mission’s funding shortfall for the year 2022 was around €25.8 million, but the shortfall has considerably increased this year. In March, Bankole reportedly appealed to bilateral and international partners to help fill $ 89 million funding gap, further warning that if ATMIS does not have the funds to operate effectively in the coming months before the scheduled handover in December 2024, ‘it may mean that al-Shabaab will eventually take over the responsibilities of a state in Somalia.’ Even more concerning is the substantial reduction of EU’s contribution in support of ATMIS military component from Euro 140 million for 2022 to 85 million for 2023.
With the aim to address the budget shortfall, PSC sought different options in various of its sessions including an appeal to the UN Security Council to hold a special session on financing ATMIS and the SSF (1075th session); a call on EU and other partners to establish a financial support package (1075th session); and a request on AU Commission and UN, along with IGAD and partners, to jointly organize international pledging conference by March 2023 (1121st session). The PSC also stressed, in all its communiques adopted at the sessions on ATMIS, the need for accessing UN assessed contributions for sustainable and predictable funding necessary for the effective execution of the mandate of the mission.
As highlighted by Amani Africa’s ‘Ideas Indaba’ on the first anniversary of ATMIS, the AU Commission along with FGS most recently undertook a roadshow in an effort to mobilize funds to make up for the funding shortfall. This involved travels to and holding of convening with partners in New York and Washington DC for soliciting funding for ATMIS. while no major breakthrough has emerged, India contributed $ 2 million following the roadshow in New York.
On its part, the AU is set to use its Peace Fund in line with the decision of the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in February that approved the ‘immediate use of the AU Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF)’ to fill the financial gap in ATMIS. While this is a welcome decision, for the immediate needs of ATMIS it would only avail from $ 5 million Crisis Reserve Fund that was approved and can be disbursed in the short term.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC is expected to welcome progress made in the execution of ATMIS mandate over the last one year despite the challenges that the mission continues to face. It may particularly commend ATMIS and the FGS for the successful offensives launched against Al Shabaab and may further request them to keep up the momentum in the fight against the terrorist group. It may also emphasize the imperative of stabilization efforts to restore state authority and basic services in those areas that are liberated from the terrorist group. PSC is likely to commend the FGS for its effort to increase the pace of force generation as evidenced from the return of Eritrea-trained Somali troops to Somalia and the ongoing training in several other countries. In that regard, the PSC may highlight the issue of force generation in the required number and quality as a critical factor to ensure a timely and orderly transition of security responsibilities from ATMIS to the SSF. As the timelines for the first and second ATMIS troop drawdowns are fast approaching, the PSC may request the ATMIS leadership and the FGS to make timely preparations and work on all pending tasks to avoid any further delays to the agreed timelines for troop drawdowns. On financing ATMIS, the PSC is expected to express once again its deep concern over the mission’s funding shortfall that continues to widen and may draw attention to the risk of reversal of the hard-won security gains in Somalia without addressing this challenge. In that light, while acknowledging the significant support provided by the EU and other partners, the PSC may reiterate its appeal to bilateral and international partners to contribute their part in filling the existing financial gap. It may also reiterate its longstanding position over the possibility of using UN assessed contribution to finance ATMIS and ensure sustainable, predictable and adequate funding throughout the duration of the mission.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2023
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2023
Date | March 2023
In March, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Tanzania. Four sessions were convened in March and two of these were committed to country specific situations whereas the other two addressed thematic issues on the agenda of the PSC. The initial program of work of the PSC also envisaged sessions on three other substantive issues but these were postponed.
Informal consultation with countries in political transition
Informal consultation with countries in political transition
Date | 26 April 2023
Tomorrow (26 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an informal consultation with representatives of member states undergoing political transitions (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Sudan). The consultation mainly aims to serve as an opportunity for direct engagement between the PSC and representatives of member states suspended from the activities of the AU in relation to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG).
The meeting is being convened on the basis of Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol and Rule 16 of the PSC Rules of Procedure which envisage informal consultations of the PSC ‘with parties concerned by or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration’. As Amani Africa’s Handbook on the AUPSC discusses, although a format yet to be properly operationalised, PSC’s informal consultation – along with closed and open sessions – forms one of the three types of meetings stipulated under the provisions of Article 8, sub-articles 9 to 11 of the PSC Protocol. Despite the presence of the mechanism, tomorrow’s consultation forms the first time for the PSC to explore this meeting format as a way to overcome the limitation from the other two forms of PSC meetings to engage with member states suspended from the activities of the AU.
The immediate background that precipitated the activation of this format of PSC’s meeting from its long dormancy is traced back to the challenges for effective PSC engagement in countries facing complex transitions induced by military seizure of power. At the 14th Retreat on the Working Methods of the PSC held in November 2022, one of the issues which formed part of the discussions was PSC’s interface with AU member states that are suspend from the activities of the union. Highlighting the relevant provision of the PSC Protocol to enable informal consultations with such member states – Article 8(11) – the conclusions of the 14th Retreat underscored how the PSC may utilise such consultations to engage with AU member states suspended for UCG, to gather first-hand information on the situation on the ground and to work towards finding durable solution.
Additionally, during the AU summit in February, the ministers of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali were present for holding side meetings, although they were not allowed entry into the formal meetings of the summit. One of the issues that they highlighted in their engagement and presence during the summit without access to and presence in the sessions of the Executive Council and AU Assembly sessions was the unfairness of their exclusion while the AU did not suspend a neighbouring country, Chad, where similar military seizure of power took place, and allowed its full participation despite continuing military transitional rule.
It was also in this context that the concrete idea for the convening of the informal consultation was conceived. This emerged during one of the engagements of these ministers. This engagement involved a meeting with the minister of foreign affairs of Tunisia. After the meeting, Tunisia’s foreign minister agreed to explore the convening of an informal consultation that gives the opportunity for the PSC to have direct engagement and hear first-hand from the parties. According to the information Amani Africa received in the consultation on the program of work for April under the Tunisia’s chairship, the informal consultation may see the participation of the three countries at the level of ministers. At the time the program was developed and adopted, in addition to the three West African countries suspended for UCG, Sudan was also anticipated to participate. It is to be seen if Sudan will participate in the light of its recent descent to the ongoing deadly fighting.
The suspension of member states from AU’s activities at the occurrence of UCG is not an end by itself, but rather a means to the desired end result of ensuring the restoration of constitutional order in the concerned member state. The 2000 Lomé Declaration on UCG is in fact clear on the importance of sustained engagement of the AU with the perpetrators of a coup in order to exert the necessary pressure to ascertain a speedy return to constitutional order. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) also clarifies under Article 25(3) that notwithstanding the suspension of a given member state, the AU ‘shall maintain diplomatic contacts and take any initiatives to restore democracy’ in that member state. In light of these guiding norms therefore, it is important to conceptualise suspension as a tool to register displeasure over the breach of agreed community rules and as a lever to use diplomatic efforts in member states affected by UCG for the initiation and implementation of roadmap for relevant reforms that facilitate both the return to constitutional order and its sustainability by preventing recurrence of UCG through addressing the conditions for its occurrence.
Upon suspension from the AU, representatives of member states are not invited to address the PSC as concerned country when the PSC convenes a meeting on their country situation. At the very best, those countries have to present their case by proxy either through members of the PSC or if their view is canvased as part of the report, briefing or statement that the AU Commission presents to the PSC. As a result, with the exception of the only time the PSC has been able to conduct a field visit to one of these member states (the PSC’s evaluation mission to Mali conducted in July 2021 following the coup of May 2021), its direct interface with authorities in charge of the transition processes has been lacking. After the October 2021 military power grab experienced in Sudan, the PSC had also planned to conduct a similar evaluation mission to engage Sudanese actors but the visit could not be carried out as intended. There have also been no PSC missions to the other two member states suspended for UCG, Burkina Faso and Guinea. This is seen by PSC members as having the effect of limiting both PSC’s understanding of perspectives of the de facto authorities and the full scope of the issues and dynamics at play as well as its diplomatic leverage over the authorities. Tomorrow’s informal consultation is accordingly designed to address these perceived challenges around the direct engagement between the PSC and the de facto authorities of countries suspended on account of UCG.
Another critical area the informal consultation could contribute to is in responding to concerns that have been raised from various stakeholders, regarding inconsistencies observed in the way the AU has responded to UCG that occurred in the course of 2021 and 2022. After the consecutive coups that took place in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan in 2021 (Burkina Faso’s coming in 2022), only Chad has remained immune from suspension in line with Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol. Despite Chad’s specific circumstances which led to the PSC’s decision to refrain from imposing immediate suspension, not only has this decision brought up questions around the consistent application of the AU principles and norms banning UCG, it has also raised concern over the perceived differential treatment accorded to Chad – whose representatives had direct access to the PSC during its sessions on the situation in Chad while the other countries were restricted from the same privilege, having been suspended. Although it may not respond to the complex issues that arise from these experiences, the envisaged informal consultation could in part address some of the concerns that have been raised in this regard.
While appreciating the advantages of an informal consultation of the PSC with member states suspended from the AU, it is also important to maintain the established practice through which the PSC keeps track of the status of developments in countries in political transitions. Although it has not had direct exchanges with suspended member states, the PSC constantly maintains engagement on the developments in these countries through the AU Commission and its Chairperson, though the PSC has not been receiving updates as regularly as the period as stipulated in PSC decisions. Indeed, even with PSC’s direct engagement the best way to facilitate effective political transition for restoring constitutional order is through deploying diplomatic initiative (through a special envoy or high-representative or transition support mechanism and through the provision of technical support to transition authorities in required specific transitional tasks) as envisaged the Lomé Declaration and Article 25(3) of ACDEG. The role of the PSC would largely be to mandate the establishment or launching of such diplomatic initiative, the accompanying and monitoring of such initiative, and the review of its decision on suspension based on assessment of progress made.
No formal outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s informal consultation. The consultation is expected to emphasise the importance of AU norms on democracy, good governance and constitutionalism, not only to avert the occurrence of coups, but also to ensure sustained peace, security and stability in Africa. It may commend member states currently undergoing political transitions for their ongoing efforts to restore constitutional order in their respective territories and urge them to continue abiding by the agreed terms in their transition charters and to fully handover authority to democratically elected civilian governments by the envisaged timelines. Highlighting the importance of occasional informal consultations to enable direct interaction between the PSC and member states suspended from the AU, it may stress the need for maintaining the established method of engagement through the auspices of the AU Commission, particularly the Chairperson.
