Consideration of the Report of AUC Chairperson on the activities of MNJTF and mandate renewal of the Force
Consideration of the Report of AUC Chairperson on the activities of MNJTF and mandate renewal of the Force
Date | 12 January 2025
Tomorrow (13 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), in its first session of the year, will consider the report of the AU Commission Chairperson on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and renew the force’s mandate.
Following opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2025, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement introducing the Chairperson’s report. As usual, the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Mamman Nuhu, is also expected to brief the PSC.
It was during its 1197th session held on 30 January 2024 that the PSC last renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for another period of twelve months, which is set to expire on 1 February 2025. The PSC also requested the AU Commission and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to renew the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) between AU, LCBC and MNJTF Troop Contributing Countries, which will guide the provision of AU additional support to the MNJTF, for a year. Tomorrow’s session could focus on the state of operation of the MNJTF, the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and the implementation of the regional stabilisation strategy.
There have been some notable developments during the year in the operation of the MNJTF. Although it took the MNJTF two years since the conduct of Operation Lake Sanity in 2022, the Force managed to undertake Operation Lake Sanity II during April-July 2024, following its postponement from 2023. This focused on focused on the degradation of the capacity of terrorists within the fringes of the Lake Chad Islands while enhancing local support to isolate them and induce more surrender. It is reported that the operation and related activities led to the ‘neutralisation’ of 344 members of terrorist groups and the capturing of various weapons, including one RPG bomb, 2 Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) tubes and 4 Anti-Aircraft guns. Despite these successes, it was noted in the report of the 4th LCB Governors Forum that ‘the urgent need remains to clear remnants of Boko Haram fighters from their bases on the Tumbuns (islands on the fringes of the Lake Chad) from which they continue to launch attacks on the surrounding areas and beyond. The Tumbuns serve as their logistics hub, secure havens, and staging grounds. Their occupation of these islands also facilitates their generation of funds through illegal fishing and farming activities.’ To this end, it emphasised ‘[o]ne key area of need is enhancing its (MNJTF’s) amphibious and naval capabilities in and around Lake Chad.’
The MNJTF has also continued to implement non-kinetic activities in support of the regional stabilisation strategy, including civil-military coordination (that seeks to foster trust, community dialogue and close coordination with local communities and facilitate humanitarian activities), quick impact projects and counter-messaging radio and other communication programmes. The Chairperson’s report also recorded that by ‘November 2024, the MNJTF had facilitated the return of over 3,800 IDPs to Kukawa and other communities within the MNJTF Area of Operation and about 2,306 refugees to Banki town in Nigeria.’
During 2024, the MNJTF also faced operational challenges not just from lack of resources but also from divergence of national interests and variations in military strategies among participating countries, as well as geopolitical challenges. In October 2024, 40 Chadian soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack targeting a military base near Chad’s border with Nigeria. Boko Haram was allegedly responsible for the attack, prompting the Chadian security forces to launch a military operation, reportedly killing at least 61 terrorist elements. Following this incident, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby threatened to withdraw from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), accusing the force of failing to address the security threats posed by terrorist groups. Additionally, the MNJTF was forced to operate for much of 2024 without the participation of Niger, which suspended its participation following the souring of relations owing to the sanctions imposed on Niger by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As such, the Force operated its 13,799 troops in 3 MNJTF Sectors of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria.
However, a major positive development took place during the third quarter of 2024 with respect to Niger’s participation in MNJTF. The December 2024 report of the UN Secretary-General on West Africa noted that on ‘28 August, the defence chiefs of Niger and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding in Niamey to boost cooperation against terrorism in the Lake Chad basin, with the Niger resuming its participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force.’
The security situation in the region indicates that the LCB region continues to maintain the significant degrees of stabilisation achieved in the affected areas, with military operations contributing to eroding the capabilities of terrorist groups operating in the areas of operation of the MNJTF and successfully restoring state presence in several borders and other areas in the region. Yet, the major terrorist groups operating in the region, namely Boko Haram and its splinter group Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), continue to pose a significant threat.
One major development that persisted during the reporting period is the worrying increase in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Thus, despite the overall decline in the threat level of the region, there has been a spike in the use of IEDs, particularly in the Far North Province of Cameroon and corresponding areas on the Nigerian side of the border, targeting the MNJTF and national armed forces as well as civilians. According to the Chairperson’s report, ‘a total of 70 IED incidents were recorded compared to 50 similar incidents during the same period in 2023, with 37 soldiers and 13 civilians killed during these attacks against 34 soldiers and 57 civilians killed during similar attacks in 2023.’ Further threats to the security situation arise from suicide attacks, kidnappings and other militant and criminal activities, including predatory attacks by terrorist groups on civilian communities. In June and July 2024, suicide attacks were reported in Borno State, Nigeria, attributed to Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province, resulting in several fatalities. Additionally, in September 2024, suspected Boko Haram members targeted communities in Yobe State.
The threats from the two major terrorist groups in the region, combined with the impact of climate change, have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the region. The report of the 4th Governance Forum of the LCB noted that during the 13 years of insurgency and conflicts, ‘Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to attack and unleash violence on communities, producing around 2.9 million internally displaced (IDPs), including 2 million in Nigeria alone.’ According to the latest UN figures from September, there are approximately 21,650 refugees, more than 220,600 internally displaced persons, and around 16,885 returnees in Chad. In Cameroon, the numbers are about 120,600 refugees and 453,660 internally displaced persons. The humanitarian situation is also affected by inadequate humanitarian and rehabilitation support, which undermines returnees. In this respect, the Chairperson’s report noted that ‘[w]hile the number of resettled populations have continued to rise, most of these communities received little or no form of humanitarian assistance, and there is a need for urgent actions to enhance the livelihoods of these resettled communities.’ Climate change further aggravates the difficult humanitarian situation in the region, as recent flooding events affecting all of LCB countries highlighted. The UN reported that as of ‘2 December, over 4.9 million people have been affected by floods, with 1.94 million in Chad, 1.52 million in Niger, 612,700 in Nigeria and over 448,000 in Cameroon.
The other issue expected to receive attention during tomorrow’s session is the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. One of the major developments in this respect during the reporting period is the updating of the Strategy. On 20 September 2024, the 5th meeting of the Steering Committee for the implementation of this regional strategy took place virtually. The meeting approved the adjusted Regional Strategy and Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration Policy for 2025-2030, which is expected to be endorsed by the LCBC Council of Ministers. The revised strategy seeks to shift focus from stabilisation efforts to sustained stability and put greater emphasis on socio-economic development on the basis of the security, humanitarian and development nexus approach.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend the MNJTF for the progress it registered in degrading the capabilities of the terrorist groups operating in its areas of operation in the LCB region and the resultant progress in the stabilisation of the affected regions. It may also welcome the productive conclusion of Operation Lake Sanity II undertaken by MNJTF. The PSC may commend the MNJTF participating countries and encourage them to sustain and enhance the close coordination between them. In this respect, the PSC may welcome the MOU signed between Nigeria and Niger and the resumption of Niger’s participation in the MNJTF. It may call on AU and LCBC to mobilise additional support to the MNJTF particularly in terms of enhancing its anti IED and amphibious and naval capabilities. It may request the renewal of the MoU between the AU and the LCBC for another year. In light of the threat that terrorist groups in the LCB region pose and the need for sustaining gains made, the PSC is expected to renew the mandate of the MNJTF for a further period of 12 months. The PSC may also commend the LCBC for its role in the stabilisation of the region through the implementation of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy and the progress made towards the revision and adjustment of the Strategy. The PSC may express concern about the humanitarian situation in the region, including the impact of climate change and the recent flooding. It may underscore the need for a climate change sensitive programming and provision of rehabilitation support for affected regions and communities.
The African Union Peace and Security Council Handbook - 2024
Amani Africa
2024
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The African Union Peace and Security Council Handbook is an initiative of Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa) that provides authoritative information and analysis on the PSC and its work. As with the previous three editions of the Handbook, this edition of the Handbook benefited from Amani Africa’s engagement with the key actors in the work of the PSC. I wish to acknowledge members of the PSC, in particular the monthly chairpersons of the PSC, the PSC Secretariat, and members of the Committee of experts for their support towards the preparation of this edition of the Handbook.
I wish to extend special thanks to H.E. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) for the Foreword, underscoring the importance of research and analysis in supporting the implementation of the PSC protocol.
Allow me to also recognize with appreciation the usual support of the staff of the PSC Secretariat, particularly Neema Nicholaus Chusi, the Head of the PSC Secretariat.
This edition of the Handbook is a product of Amani Africa’s engagements with the wider staff of the PAPS Department to whom we also extend our gratitude.
We wish to thank the Government of Switzerland that provided partner support for the project on the updating and publication of this new edition of the Handbook.
Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso, on behalf of Amani Africa team
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for January 2025
Date | January 2025
The Republic of Côte d’Ivoire will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January 2025 through Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU. The Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages seven substantive sessions covering eight agenda items. Seven of the eight agenda items are on thematic issues while one is dedicated to a country situation. All the sessions are scheduled to take place at the ambassadorial level. No open session is stipulated in the PPoW.
The first session of the month, scheduled for 13 January, will consider the AU Commission’s report on the activities and mandate renewal of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which is set to expire on 1 February 2025. The session is also expected to evaluate the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and the MNJTF’s efforts in countering Boko Haram and the two main splinter groups Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) who continue to pose significant threats to regional peace and security. Despite the MNJTF’s operational success in neutralising several Boko Haram elements and disrupting the group’s supply lines, critical developments such as Niger’s suspension of its MNJTF membership and Chad’s potential withdrawal pose significant challenges that could greatly weaken the coalition’s efforts.
On 20 January, the PSC will convene its second session on strengthening cooperation and collaboration between the PSC and RECs/RMs in the management of conflict and new security threats on the continent. In 2024, the PSC commendably convened two of its Inaugural Annual Joint Consultative Meetings with the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS in April in Abuja, Nigeria and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security in August in Gaborone, Botswana. These meetings aimed to enhance the coordination and collaboration between the PSC and RECs/RMs in line with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and various PSC instruments, including the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding. This session is expected to discuss trends and developments in the relationship between the two levels and areas for collaboration and coordination in matters of peace and security with all regional blocs to enhance synergies in regional peace and security efforts.
The third session is expected to be held on 22 January and will be committed to receiving updates on the situation in Somalia and the deployment of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM). The session will come shortly after the AUUSOM’s mandate is launched and will seek to assess the deployment of the mission in line with the CONOPS that the PSC adopted during its 1225th session on 1 August and the Roadmap that was endorsed at the 8th UN – AU High-Level Conference on 21 October 2024. Despite the clear timelines and processes outlined in various PSC communiques, the implementation of the final phase of ATMIS and, importantly, the finalisation of the preparation of the design and components of AUSSOM were not finalised as planned. ATMIS becomes AUSSOM on 1st January before the process of ATMIS liquidation has been finalised. Resolution 2767 of the UN Security Council endorsing the decision of the PSC on the deployment of AUSSOM thus stipulated that the realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM has to be completed by 30 June 2025. Additionally, the composition of AUSSOM, which, according to Somalia’s representative to the UN, was decided bilaterally rather than as envisaged in the PSC communiqué of the 1253rd meeting of the PSC, remains a source of contestation.
On 24 January, the Council will convene the PSC’s bi-annual consideration of the half-year report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa. Following the 1224th session held on 25 July 2024, when the PSC considered the Chairperson’s report on elections conducted in the continent during the first half of 2024, the forthcoming session is expected to consider the report on elections conducted during the second half of the year July – December 2024. In addition, the report is also expected to provide information on upcoming elections taking place in 2025, with a focus on those expected to be held during the first half of the year. Some of the elections from the second half of 2024 that could be expected to feature in the report and thus generate some discussion in the PSC are Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda, Mauritius, Namibia, Mozambique, Tunisia and Guinea Bissau. Special attention may be given to Mozambique due to the post-electoral violence that erupted in Maputo and other cities following Mozambique’s general elections. Reports of election irregularities, including ballot stuffing and intimidation and the killing of PODEMOS members, led to protests that were met with deadly force by security forces. Tensions and instability are escalating following the confirmation of the results by the Constitutional Council.
On 28 January, the PSC will convene a session with two agenda items: Consideration of the report of the activities of the Peace and Security Council and the state of Peace and Security in Africa and consideration of the report on the Implementing of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects. The first agenda item, in line with Article 7 (q) of the PSC protocol and established practice, will consider the report detailing the Council’s activities in 2024 and an assessment of Africa’s peace and security landscape and submit to the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly scheduled to take place in February.
On 30 January the PSC will convene to receive an Update on the operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF). While the ASF is a key element of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as outlined in Article 2 (2) of the PSC protocol, its operationalisation has faced challenges. Though steps have been taken towards the operationalisation of the ASF, its full operationalisation remains a question of political will. On 12 May 2023, the 15th Specialised Technical Committee of Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) adopted the MoU between the AU Commission and the RECs/RMs. The adoption of the MoU was a significant step towards clarifying the respective roles and responsibilities of the AU and the RECs/RMs in the planning, deployment, employment, and post-deployment stages of the ASF. Following this, during its 1159th session held on 22 June 2023, the PSC requested the AU Commission to expedite the implementation of decisions of the 15th meeting of the STCDSS, particularly the strategic review of the ASF. The AU Commission kicked off the process of strategic review of the ASF with a technical consultative meeting held in Algiers, Algeria, on 2-4 December 2024. It is expected that the PSC will receive updates on recent developments and the next steps towards the full operationalisation of the ASF.
The last activity of the Council will be a session on 31 January where the council will commemorate Africa Day of Peace and Reconciliation for the third time to discuss the state of peace and security on the continent, share experiences on national reconciliation and lessons learnt in how the AU can best advance peace and reconciliation. The African Day of Peace and Reconciliation is celebrated annually on January 31. It was designated at the 16th Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The first commemoration took place on 31 January 2023, and the second on the same date in 2024. During the same summit, Angola’s President, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, was appointed as the AU Champion for Peace and Reconciliation in Africa.
The PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) is also scheduled to meet during the month, from 15 – 17 January, to consider the ‘Report on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa’ and on 21 and 23 January to consider the ‘Report the Implementing of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects’ before both of these are tabled to the PSC on 28 January as elaborated above.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - November 2024
Date | November 2024
In November 2024, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) undertook its activities under the chairship of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the first time since the council’s formation 20 years ago. The initial Provisional Program of Work (PPoW) envisaged seven substantive sessions in addition to the annual joint consultative meeting with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) and its 16th retreat on the review of its working methods. The PPoW underwent two revisions that resulted in a postponement of planned sessions.
Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa
Amani Africa Briefing to the 1252nd session of the Peace and Security Council on Silencing the Guns in Africa
Date | 18 December 2024
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Chairperson of the African Union Peace and Security Council, Ambassador Abdi Mohamoud Eyeb,
Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye,
Excellencies, distinguished members of the Peace and Security Council
A very good morning to you all.
It is an honor for me to address you today representing my organization Amani Africa Media and Research Services, an organization that is dedicated to the advancement of peace and security through supporting the noble mandate of this august house. our Union’s standing peace and security decision-making body.
Chairperson, Ambassador Adeoye, your excellencies members of the PSC,
I would like to commend you for dedicating today’s session for reviewing the state of implementation of African Union’s (AU) flagship project of silencing the guns.
It cannot be disputed that silencing the guns is the most pressing policy agenda of the AU that demands the utmost attention and urgent collective action of the entire African Union system under the leadership of this Council.
What informs the issues that are highlighted and the policy proposals presented in my address today are this urgency and supreme importance of achieving registering irreversible progress for silencing the guns in Africa. In drawing attention to these issues and outlining the proposals, I will be drawing on our recent major research report titled Memo to the new AU Commission leadership from the roaring guns on AU’s first decade of silencing the guns.
Before moving further, it is important to underscore the importance of the critical role of the AU and this Council for achieving progress towards silencing the guns. Without the AU and this Council, it is not difficult to imagine how dire the peace and security situation on the continent would have been and how untenable it would have been to even conceive of silencing the guns.
As we have pointed out in our study, the state of the peace and security situation on out continent ‘makes the AU and its standing decision-making organ, the PSC, more critical than ever. With rising global geopolitical tensions and a weakened multilateral system, the effective functioning of the AU and its PSC is now a strategic imperative for Africa.’
The first key message of this major research report, a product of more than a year of research and analysis on the first ten-year of silencing the guns, is that silencing the guns is more deeply pressing today than a decade ago when it was adopted.
Despite the efforts of the AU and various AU stakeholders and the progress registered in some cases, our report established that conflicts and crises have shown exponential increase during the decade since the launch of Silencing the Guns in Africa. Our analysis of the number of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC during the decade since 2013 highlighted the increase in conflict and crisis situations in Africa by nearly threefold. This is further substantiated by our analysis of global conflict datasets, which adduce data showing the alarming spike in conflict events on the continent, with the compound annual growth rate of conflicts in Africa at a staggering 9.6%. While the level of increase is not the same, our study established that the increase is across conflict types, including state-based conflicts, one-sided conflicts, non-state conflicts and internationalised conflicts.
Not only has the number of conflicts alarmingly increased, but their geographic spread and humanitarian and socio-economic impacts have also exploded. Many more territories on the continent are affected by conflicts and crises today than when silencing the guns was launched. The number of people that bear the brunt of wars and crises on the continent has increased by many folds during the past ten years and reached a level larger than the highest number of people affected by conflict during the past six decades in absolute terms. Beyond and above the large number of lives these conflicts have claimed and displacements they have precipitated, Africa has lost enormous resources and treasures to the devastating impacts of these conflicts.
As our report put it, these conditions turned the first ten years of silencing the guns into the years of the roaring guns. The increase in the number of conflicts, their geographic spread and the severity of their impacts are making a mockery of AU’s agenda of STGs. There is no clear sign of this state of affairs changing as the AU embarked on the second phase of the STGs. The various sources of data and the accompanying analysis suggest that the approach to STGs pursued during the first ten-year period had largely failed. In his address to the opening session of the 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 17 February 2024, the AU Commission Chairperson candidly painted the grim state of the situation when asking, ‘How should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries, without doing anything? How can we accept just watching African countries destroyed, entire Regions engulfed by tremours and Tsunamis, without doing anything significant?’
Our conclusion, excellencies from this bleak picture is not that silencing the guns is doomed. Nor is that we should give up on the agenda of silencing the guns.
Our conclusion is that the nature and scale of conflicts in some of the regions affected by these conflicts is such that they pose existential threat to the affected peoples and countries. This is particularly true today in the countries of the Sahel affected by conflicts involving terrorist groups and in Sudan.
Our conclusion is that the increase in the number of conflicts and the scale and consequences of the conflicts and crises has reached emergency levels. We are not being hyperbolic in making this assertion. It is how those affected experience these conditions.
Our conclusion is that the business-as-usual approach to peace and security adopted thus far in pursuing the goal of silencing the guns is not working.
Our conclusion is that STGs has to entail a more effective mobilisation of collective action for ending violent conflicts and preventing the eruption of new ones in order to register irreversible progress towards silencing the guns by 2030.
Our conclusion is that targeted policy action must be deployed in two ways: one for resolving ongoing violent conflicts and another for preventing the risks of eruption of new conflicts or relapse back to conflicts.
Excellencies,
Against this background, we outline below some of the recommendations distilled from our report:
- There is a need for a strategic review of the situation on the continent and the issues impeding the effective role of the AU and the APSA in pursuing the agenda of STGs. Such a strategic review should be one of the priorities of the AU for 2025, and it is our submission that such a review should be accompanied by a special summit of the AU under the new leadership of the AU Commission.
- The PSC needs to designate the most serious conflict situations as reaching emergency levels and constituting existential threats to the affected peoples and states. This is particularly true with respect to conflicts in the Sahel and Sudan. This necessitates the establishment of an emergency situation room dedicated to these situations with a high-level task force with the responsibility for mobilising response measures that involve a mix of stabilisation, peace enforcement and peacebuilding capacities that leverage and are deployed along with livelihood supporting and economic opportunity enhancing development interventions as well as negotiation, mediation and reconciliation.
- The PSC needs to call for the development of a conflict management and resolution strategy tailored to each conflict situation backed by the requisite technical, diplomatic and financial resources. The strategy needs not only to ensure the design and use of conflict resolution tools tailored to the specificities of each conflict situation informed by such strategy but also to provide guidance on the means and methods of ensuring the effectiveness of the use of such tools.
- There is a need to pay increasing attention to inter-communal conflicts that constitute the majority of non-state conflicts in Africa. This necessitates enhancing the development and use of peace and security tools tailored to addressing such non-state conflicts. Of interest in this respect is the need for enhancing the mapping of intercommunal conflicts and their trends through the Continental Early Warning system. It also necessitates the enhanced use of interventions that target the impacts of climate change, enhance peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms between diverse communities and deliver livelihood-enhancing and other adaptation and resilience-enhancing support.
- There is clearly a need for a much forceful and proactive approach to conflict prevention if new conflicts are to be presented from erupting. This entails that the AU and RECs/RMs as well as international organizations such as the UN and partners are able to effectively map situations that face risks of violent conflict and initiate timely policy intervention to prevent such risks from materializing.
- There is also a need to reinvigorate the use of AU-led peace support operations on the basis of the ASF. Since the deployment of the last major AU-led peace support operations in CAR and Mali, a vacuum has emerged, leading to the proliferation of ad hoc missions which are not fully anchored on the APSA and have the unintended consequence of undermining the use of AU-led peace support operations. Accordingly, AU needs to assert its leadership role in deploying peace support operations as it did some years back and leverage Resolution 2719, which affirms AU’s leadership role in peace support operations.
- We also propose foregrounding political solutions and diplomacy as the primary means of silencing the guns and thus addressing the governance and institutional fragilities and weaknesses that create the conditions both for the expansion of the terrorist threat on the continent and the eruption of violent conflicts. The PSC and the AU need to reinvigorate the primacy of diplomacy and, to this end, call for the development and implementation of a strategy that clearly establishes the range of AU diplomatic instruments and, bolsters their effectiveness and enhances their use as primary means of advancing peace and security and pursuing silencing the guns.
- The PSC may call for the development of guidelines on negotiation and dialogue for peace in conflict situations involving terrorist groups. Currently, the use of such peace and security tools (negotiation and dialogue) is frowned upon due to the exclusion of such tools in the context of the global war against terrorism. There is now a recognition that an approach that excludes negotiation and dialogue does not yield success. As such, the guidelines that the AU develops, using its well-established norm development role, help in providing guidance on how to pursue negotiation and dialogue with terrorist groups with regard to the delicate issue of de-radicalization, accountability for and reconciliation with affected members of communities.
- The PSC and the AU broadly ill afford to continue the current path of sustaining the bare minimum of their functions and increasingly contested credibility. The PSC and the AU need to reinvigorate the assumption of their leadership role in not only outlining well-grounded political solutions for the resolution of conflicts but also in mobilising the level of consensus and support from member states and other key stakeholders necessary for advancing the implementation of such political solutions supported by relevant peace and security instruments of the APSA.
Ministerial meeting on consideration of the situation in Somalia and the Post-ATMIS security arrangements
Ministerial meeting on consideration of the situation in Somalia and the Post-ATMIS security arrangements
Date | 18 December 2024
Tomorrow (19 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 1253rd session at a ministerial level on the situation in Somalia and the Post-ATMIS Security Arrangements.
The session is set to commence with the opening remark of Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti and chairperson of the Peace and Security Council for December. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security Department, is expected to make a statement and provide updates on the requests from the 1225th session of the PSC. The PSC may also receive an update from Mohamed El-Amine Souef, the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, and Donald Kaberuka, High-Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for the Peace Fund.
Since the last PSC meeting in October, there have been several major developments in terms of the political and security situation in Somalia, the tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as the discussion around the deployment of AUSSOM, the successor mission to ATMIS whose mandate expires by the end of December. The Commission has circulated a briefing note to AUPSC members which covers these developments.
Despite the progress Somalia has been registering, the political situation in Somalia has worsened recently with rising tensions between the Federal Government and the Jubaland State following the organisation of regional elections by the latter, which saw the re-election of President Ahmed ‘Madobe’ for a third term. This followed the regional parliament’s July decision to amend the constitution and remove the term limit. In November, the Somali parliament approved the necessary bills in this regard. However, the federal government’s efforts are opposed by two federal member states, namely Puntland and Jubaland. Since January 2023, Puntland declared its intention to act independently until the finalisation of a new Somali constitution. Jubaland also severed ties with Mogadishu following mounting tensions with the federal government. The situation subsequently led to an armed confrontation between the federal government forces and the Jubaland regional forces in Ras Kamboni, the southernmost tip of Somalia in lower Juba bordering Kenya.
In terms of the post-ATMIS security arrangements, there are two major issues that require urgent resolution to make progress in wrapping up the exit of ATMIS and rolling out the commencement of AUSSOM. The first of these concerns the funding of AUSSOM. It is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 1225th session, requested the AU Commission to hold extensive consultations with the UN, EU and all strategic partners and report back on the financing of AUSSOM. At the same time, the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 2748 adopted on 15 August, requested the UN and the AU to develop a mission design and financing options for AUSSOM and submit their recommendations by November 15. The AUPSC, through its 1238th communiqué, expressed its preference for a dedicated funding mechanism for AUSSOM through UN-assessed contributions within the framework of resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations, as the best option to secure sustainable funding for the mission to avoid the perennial challenges faced by AMISOM/ATMIS.
The joint UN-AU report, submitted to the UNSC on November 26, after some delay from the original 15 November deadline to allow for the finalisation of consultations, recommended a hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 to support AUSSOM. This would entail a reconfigured and rightsized UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which will continue to be financed through UN-assessed contributions, providing logistical support to AUSSOM. Additionally, it proposed that 75 per cent of the AUSSOM troop reimbursements would be covered by UN-assessed contributions.
There is broad agreement within the Security Council on the deployment of the AUSSOM to sustain the gains in Somalia and avoid a security vacuum. Nevertheless, there are divergent views regarding how the mission should be financed, with the US arguing that it is premature to apply resolution 2719 in the case of Somalia. In this regard, it has circulated a non-paper outlining its position on the matter, proposing a two-year bridging mechanism to allow more time to put in place the necessary conditions for the implementation of the resolution. The US has also indicated that it will consider all options, including vetoing any resolution that might prematurely trigger resolution 2719 on Somalia.
Following the submission of the UN-AU joint report, the UK, the penholder on Somalia, developed a draft text and started consulting behind the scenes. However, the initial draft text, which was considered a pre-zero draft, seemed to treat the timelines outlined in the joint AU-UN Roadmap on Resolution 2719 as preconditions rather than milestones that guide the implementation of Resolution 2719. The AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat wrote a letter to the three African members of the Security Council (A3 plus – Algeria, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, as well as Guyana) explaining the AU’s position on the matter. The EU members in the Security Council also appear to be very much supportive of the AU position given the fact that the EU has been a major financial partner for AMISOM/ATMIS for the past 17 years and wants other partners to share the burden.
The UK subsequently circulated a revised text to Council members as a zero draft, which endorses the AUPSC decision to replace ATMIS with AUSSOM and authorises the new mission for 12 months. It also requests the Secretary-General to implement, within existing resources made available by the rightsizing of UNSOS, the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM from 1 July 2025, including access to United Nations assessed contributions in line with the recommended financing option in the Joint Report. This is meant to coincide with phase 2 of the mission as envisaged in its Concept of Operations adopted by the AUPSC in August.
The UK convened the first round of negotiations on 12 December, and not surprisingly, there was major disagreement with the financing options. It did not apparently receive the support of both EU members and the US. It appears that there are also ongoing discussions behind the scenes, including at the highest levels, with the US insisting on its red lines. In this context, the UK has apparently proposed the following options for the consideration of Council members.
- Option ‘a’ in the Joint Report: continuation of the status quo financing model.
- Option ‘b’ in the Joint Report: funding through the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) under a ‘two-budget’ model (i.e. applying 2719 to AUSSOM alone).
- Option ‘c’ in the Joint Report: funding exclusively through voluntary contributions via a trust fund.
- Funding through the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) under a ‘one-budget’ model (i.e. applying 2719 to both AUSSOM and UNSOS).
- Establishment of a new funding mechanism whereby the payment of a proportion of troop stipends is included as an additional category of support provided by UNSOS.
- A subvention from the UN to the AU to pay for additional costs involved in AUSSOM.
The UK circulated a revised version of the text on 16 December, putting the relevant operative paragraphs on the financing issue in brackets for further discussion. Although the resolution’s adoption was initially scheduled for 18 December, negotiations are expected to drag on until the end of the month. Tomorrow’s ministerial session provides a particular opportunity for members to receive all relevant updates in this regard and provide the necessary guidance to the A3 plus in the Security Council to advance the common African position more forceful in the ongoing Security Council negotiations to secure a clear and unambiguous commitment on the financing of AUSSOM based on the recommendations of the joint UN-AU report.
The second issue for tomorrow’s session relates to the liquidation of ATMIS, the composition and structure of the AUSSOM, and the requisite enablers it requires. A meeting of ATMIS troop-contributing countries was convened by Somalia (instead of the AU) in Mogadishu in early December, which brought together representatives of all TCCs except Ethiopia. This meeting focused on reviewing the state of the exit of ATMIS and the requirements for transition to AUSSOM. It is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 1225th session, tasked the AU Commission to undertake consultations with TCCs, host country and other stakeholders ‘on the implications of Phase 3 drawdown of ATMIS in order to avoid any security vacuum during the transition to the AUSSOM.’
In terms of finalising preparations for AUSSOM, the PSC through its 1238th session directed ‘Chairperson of the African Union Commission to liaise with the Federal Government of Somalia, as the host country, on the composition of the Mission.’ Since then, the Commission invited expressions of interest from all AU Member States. It has received responses from the current TCCs of ATMIS including Ethiopia and from Egypt as new contributing country. Consultations are to be held with the host country on the basis of the expression of interest the Commission received.
Considering that one of the major issues for finalising an agreement on the composition of AUSSOM is the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somalia, during the October session, the PSC requested ‘the Chairperson of the African Union Commission working in close cooperation with the relevant Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), and other stakeholders, to use all available preventive diplomacy tools to urgently find an amicable/peaceful solution to the differences between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.’ Earlier this month, a major positive development arose in mediating between the two countries through the facilitation of Türkiye.
Following the earlier two rounds of negotiations held at the level of Foreign Ministers, the Turkish-mediated talks between Somalia and Ethiopia recently took place in Ankara at the level of Heads of State and Government, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan facilitating the talks. The outcome was the 11 December Ankara Declaration, in which the two leaders, among other things, agreed to ‘closely work together to finalise mutually advantageous commercial arrangements and sustainable access to and from the sea under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia.’ Following the Declaration, technical discussions are expected to begin between the two countries, facilitated by Türkiye, before the end of February 2025. AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, as well as other bilateral and multilateral partners, have welcomed the breakthrough achieved during the Ankara talks. The expectation is that this will now help resolve the issue regarding the fate of Ethiopian troops in Somalia.
Tomorrow’s session comes less than two weeks before the end of the timeline for the termination of ATMIS and the start of AUSSOM. As the foregoing analysis highlights, despite the progress made thus far, there remain outstanding steps for the proper exit of ATMIS and its replacement with AUSSOM. Indications are that the need to avoid the emergence of a security vacuum and ensure a proper transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM would necessitate the adoption of a transitional timeline during which the outstanding steps for full operationalisation of AUSSOM would be concluded. The PSC has, in this respect, two options. The first option is a technical rollover for ATMIS beyond the 31 December deadline. The second option is to declare the commencement of AUSSOM starting 1 January 2025 while continuing the necessary work for finalising the operational transition of ATMIS to AUSSOM on the ground.
Both of these options, while not being ideal, have the advantage of avoiding vacuum and allowing further time to finalise the remaining tasks. Additionally, both of them have implications for funding options. In this respect, the PSC may during tomorrow’s session consider a range of options. One of the options is to affirm the funding option of the joint UN-AU report, thereby calling for the use of Resolution 2719. The second option is to use the existing funding arrangement along with the mobilisation of further funds from AU and partners to cover the costs for the transition period. The third option involves the combination of the second option and to requesting the UNSC to make a decision, as part of the resolution it is currently considering, committing to the application of 2719 at the end of the interim period during which the necessary preparations for the operationalisation of 2719 for AUSSOM will be finalised.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC may underscore the importance of preserving the peace and security gains achieved through AMISOM and ATMIS and reiterate the commitment of the AU to support the fight against Al Shabaab. The PSC may express concern about recent security incidents between the Federal Government and Jubaland and urge that they address their differences peacefully to avoid the risk of the situation leading to security setbacks. The PSC may also welcome the Ankara Declaration that Ethiopia and Somalia adopted and urge them to build on the declaration for normalising their relations. The PSC may also note the efforts of the AU Commission in undertaking consultations and urge that these consultations are finalised for reporting to the PSC on the structure of AUSSOM. In the light of the limited time left for finalising the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM and the need for finalising outstanding tasks and steps in this respect, the PSC may decide to adjust the timelines under the AUSSOM CONOPs as adopted during its 1225th session and call for a technical rollover of a maximum of six months. The PSC may also reaffirm its earlier decision from its 1238th session on the use of Resolution 2719 as the main option for funding AUSSOM to ensure predictable and sustaining funding, thereby avoiding the financial crisis that afflicted ATMIS, undermining its effectiveness. While reaffirming its decision for the use of funds from the AU as outlined in the communiqué of its 1238th session and its determination to mobilise additional funds from others, including partners, on the basis of the consultations being undertaken through Kaberuka, it may adopt the use of the current funding sources during the transitional period along with the convening of pledging conference to fill the funding shortfalls and request the UNSC firmly to clearly commit to the use of Resolution 2719 as the major source of funding of AUSSOM within the framework of the joint UN-AU report at the end of the interim period during which the necessary preparations for the operationalisation of 2719 for AUSSOM will be finalised.
