Update on the Progress made towards Silencing the Guns in Africa
Update on the Progress made towards Silencing the Guns in Africa
Date | 17 December 2024
Tomorrow (18 December), the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1252nd session at the ambassadorial level to receive an update on the progress made towards Silencing the Guns in Africa and consider and adopt its provisional program of work for January 2025.
The session commences with the opening remarks of Abdi Mahamoud Eybe, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Djibouti to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of December. Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, is expected to deliver a briefing on the agenda item. This is expected to share the review of the implementation of the Master Roadmap and the progress made, if any, and the challenges facing the flagship project. Amani Africa has also been invited to make a presentation on the subject, drawing on its recent research report.
Silencing the Guns (STG) is AU’s flagship initiative, which was born out of the recognition, stated in the AU Constitutive Act, that sustainable development and economic prosperity are impossible to achieve in Africa without lasting peace. It was conceived during the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/ African Union (OAU/AU) in 2013 as part of the Solemn Declaration, where member states pledged to ‘rid the continent of wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, and violent conflicts’. Subsequently, the STG thus constitute one of the flagship projects of the AU’s Agenda 2063, which is anchored on the Agenda’s aspiration for a peaceful and secure Africa. Building on the undertaking of AU Member States under the 50th OAU/AU anniversary Solemn Declaration ‘to end all wars by 2020’, the AU envisioned achieving the objective of STG by 2020.
In order to translate the vision into practical steps, the Peace and Security Council developed the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns, which was adopted by the 29th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in January 2017. The Lusaka Master Roadmap (2016) provided a framework for addressing the root causes of conflict, focusing on five interlinked areas: political governance, economic development, societal cohesion, environmental sustainability and peace and security. The roadmap emphasises strengthening conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, advancing post-conflict reconstruction, addressing governance and economic drivers of conflict, fostering democracy and the rule of law and curbing the proliferation of illicit arms.
Despite progress made towards resolving some conflicts, as illustrated by the signing of a revitalised peace agreement in South Sudan in 2018, the ambition of silencing the guns by 2020 unsurprisingly failed to materialise. As a result, the 14th Extra-Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, held on December 6, 2020, in Johannesburg, South Africa, decided to extend the timeline by ten years to 2030. As part of enhancing implementation and in a bid to achieve the STGs initiative, the ‘Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism for the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030’ was adopted in June 2021 in line with the recommendation given during the 28th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of States.
Tomorrow’s session is being convened within the framework of the decision of the AU Assembly to review the implementation of the flagship project every two years following the extension. Thus, the session offers an opportunity to reflect on the continent’s current security landscape, assess the implementation of the initiative, and identify effective strategies to bridge the gap between the ambition to rid Africa of conflicts and the realities on the ground.
It would be of particular interest for PSC not only to be informed about the setbacks faced towards achieving the STG and the nature and gravity of the setbacks but also the factors that explain the setbacks and the measures that need to be taken to put the STG on a path of progress. Despite the extension of the timeline for STG to 2030, the peace and security situation on the continent did not get any better than it was in 2020. By AU’s own admission, some of the limited progresses achieved are a far cry from the lofty goals and objectives set out in the AU Master Roadmap for silencing the guns in Africa and the scale of peace and security challenges. Parts of the continent remain mired in conflict, and new challenges to peace and security have proliferated.
As extensively analysed in Amani Africa’s Special Research report, the gap between the much-needed flagship agenda of STG and the harsh realities on the ground has widened over the years, highlighting the significant challenges the AU faced in implementing the STG. First, there is an increase in the number of conflicts on the continent. Analysis of the work of the PSC established that the number of conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC increased by nearly threefold in the ten-year period from 2013 to 2023. This indicates both the spread of conflicts/crises and the rise in the number of such conflicts/crises within individual countries. Apart from the increase in the number of conflicts, Africa has also experienced, during the first ten years of the STG, an expansion in the geographic spread of conflicts. Additionally, the humanitarian consequences of the spike in the number and the expansion in the geographic spread of conflicts have also registered an alarming increase. For example, Amani Africa’s report established that the number of internally displaced persons increased by three times between 2013 and 2023.
This exponential increase in the number of crisis/conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC can be attributed to three factors. The first of these is the growth in conflicts involving terrorist groups. Apart from the emergence of Lake Chad Basin as a main threat of conflicts involving terrorism during the first part of the first ten years of the STGs, this increase in the number of conflicts on the agenda of the PSC involving terrorist groups is attributable to the expansion of such conflicts and their subsequent prominence in the Sahel and the eruption of such conflict in Southern Africa in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique.
The second factor for the rise in the number of crisis/conflict situations on the agenda of the PSC relates to the resurgence of military coups, particularly since 2020. Since August 2020, there have been nine successful military takeovers. With six countries suspended from the AU, the recent surge in coups has led to a swath of nations under military rule across the Sahel, stretching from the Atlantic coast in Guinea and Gabon through the central Sahel to the Red Sea coast in Sudan.
The third factor has to do with the eruption of new armed conflicts and those other crises involving political instability and incidents of violence that triggered the involvement of the PSC. Apart from the civil war in South Sudan that erupted in December 2013, other newly erupted conflicts involve the civil war in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (Nov 2020 on PSC agenda since October 2021), Eastern DRC (the re-emergence of the M23 rebellion and the ensuing fighting in Eastern DRC in April 2022, on PSC agenda since August 2022) and the recent one involving the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan since April 2023.
Amani Africa’s research report also established the increase in inter-communal conflicts and internationalised intra-state conflicts. The growing interference by foreign powers and other international actors, leading to increased internationalisation of conflicts in Africa, is not only shaping conflict dynamics and political behaviour of conflict parties but also undermining the agency of regional and continental policymakers in addressing conflicts and political crises, further straining continental conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms. The PSC has also noted the challenges posed by foreign interference in the internal affairs of member states by undermining the efforts to silence the guns as evidenced in the communiques of its 1182nd and 1237th sessions. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons also remains a major obstacle to silencing the guns.
Clearly, Africa is far from the AU’s ambition of silencing the guns. A lot remains to be done, and it has to be done differently. All indications are that the goal of silencing the guns cannot be achieved in a business-as-usual approach to the management of the affairs of the countries of the continent and, indeed, peace and security in Africa. Former AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa Ramtane Lamamra stressed ‘the need to review and adjust our conflict prevention and resolution tools in order to effectively and efficiently respond to the ever-changing nature of conflict, violence and criminality on the continent’. He also underscored the need to ‘reduce the gap between strategic political and military efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, on the one hand, and investment in economic and social development, on the other hand’.
As highlighted in the research report referenced above, the emergence of terrorism as the dominant peace and security crisis, with parts of the continent becoming the epicentre of terrorism not only in Africa but also globally, has at least three strategic implications for the AU and its conflict prevention, management and resolution tools. The first is the increasing demand for approaches that involve a mix of stabilisation, peace enforcement and peacebuilding capacities that leverage and are deployed along with livelihood supporting development interventions. The other is the growing need for the protection of civilians and equally growing demand for facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Third, it necessitates that the AU develops a framework on the use of negotiation, mediation and reconciliation tools for such unconventional conflict situations involving terrorism.
Many of the conflicts now dominating the continent’s security landscape did not emerge suddenly. They are the result of long-simmering tensions stemming from interconnected factors such as governance deficits, political marginalisation, environmental pressures, and socio-economic challenges. Yet, the PSC’s focus has remained predominantly on conflict management, with persistent gaps in early warning and early action hindering its ability to proactively address emerging threats. It is, therefore, necessary that political solutions are foregrounded as the primary means of silencing the guns and thus addressing the governance and institutional fragilities and weaknesses that create the conditions both for the emergence and expansion of the terrorist threat and other violent conflicts on the continent.
Considering the new global geo‐political dynamics, enhancing the role of the AU and regional mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa is not an option. This underscores the need for enhancing strategic coordination and cohesion among member states of the AU and a close working relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs. The PSC’s inaugural annual joint consultative meeting with the SADC organ on Politics Defence and Security and SADC member states on 30 August 2024 recalled the imperative of accelerating the implementation of STG and encouraged SADC member states to regularly report on the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap to silence the guns.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session remains unknown. The PSC may adopt a communiqué. If that happens, it is expected that the PSC will highlight the importance of identifying weakness in the implementation of the APSA and the need for enhancing the capacity of AU’s tools for preventive diplomacy and strengthening the Continental Early Warning System. The PSC may underscore the need for reinvigorating and updating the methods, approaches and means of pursuing silencing the guns. It may also call for a more regular review of the progress and challenges to silencing the guns in Africa. In view of the significant deterioration of the peace and security situation on the continent during the past decade, the PSC may request the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs/RMs, to submit a report to the AU Assembly outlining a new strategy that will enhance progress for silencing the guns in Africa.
Briefing on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action and Review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS)
Briefing on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action and Review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS)
Date | 16 December 2024
Tomorrow (17 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1250th session with two related agenda items. The first agenda item is on ‘Consideration of the AU/UN Policy Paper on Enhancing AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Early Action’. The other agenda item concerns the review of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS). This edition of Insights on the PSC accordingly presents an analysis of both of these agenda items.
The Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the AU and Chair of the PSC for the month of December, Abdi Mahamoud Eybe, will deliver opening remarks and set the scene for the session. This is followed by a briefing from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (CPAPS), Bankole Adeoye. It is expected that Adeoye will share elements from the policy paper and update the PSC on the CSVRA and CSVMS.
In terms of background to tomorrow’s session, it was at its 1208th session convened on 16 April 2024 that the PSC discussed ways to unblock obstacles and ensure effective early warning and response. During the session, the PSC not only expressed its commitment to fully implement Article 12 of the PSC Protocol on the establishment and operationalisation of AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) but also tasked the AU Commission (AUC) to take specific measures to enhance early warning and early response. The Commission is also required to report back to the PSC before the end of the year. One such measure highlighted in the communiqué is to ‘hasten the ongoing AUC institutional reforms to enhance the utility of the CEWS in PSC decision-making processes as one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).’
While the 1208th session is the most immediate background for tomorrow’s session, the task that the PSC entrusted during that session to the AU Commission for reporting back before the end of the year draws on prior engagements of the PSC on the subject. Revamping the AU early warning system was one of the focuses of the Mombasa retreat held in May 2021. The conclusions of the retreat emphasised the need for regular horizon scanning briefings and informal consultations as platforms for the AU Commission and the PSC to share particularly ‘sensitive’ early warning information. The 1000th session of the PSC underlined ‘the need to promote the early warning system in the spirit of identifying at early stages conflict and crises situations while underscoring the imperative to confer the required importance to conflict prevention efforts.’ At its 1073rd meeting in April 2022, the PSC took note of the critical importance of early warning to avert most of the peace and security threats faced in the continent, including the recurrence of unconstitutional change of government.
Yet, despite the critical place that conflict prevention occupies in the PSC Protocol and the various pronouncements of the PSC, challenges persist. One of the major limitations identified in the implementation of the PSC Protocol in the context of the 20th anniversary of the PSC is its conflict prevention mandate broadly and Article 12 of the Protocol that establishes CEWS specifically. On the political front, the major hurdle, as alluded to by the PSC in various of its sessions, including the 1208th session as well as the May 2024 High-Level Colloquium, is the ‘culture of denialism’ by Member States and RECs/RMs regarding credible early warning reports of looming crisis and conflict situations, while invoking sovereignty as a shield. This denial prevents timely action, including the deployment of preventive diplomacy and mediation. At times, Member States are backed by RECs/RMs, claiming the principle of subsidiarity, to block a looming situation/crisis from reaching the agenda of the PSC.
Technically, one of these identified in the 527th session of the PSC is the gap between early warning and early action. The call for the establishment of a ‘trigger mechanism and indicators’—a request first made during the Cairo Retreat held in October 2018—to facilitate the role of the PSC in assessing whether a given situation calls an early action by the PSC remains unheeded. The need for establishing a trigger mechanism was reiterated in the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC. This may be an area where the members of the Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NET4PEACE) working in concert with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and the AU Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) – formerly African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)).
Institutionally, CEWS suffered a major blow in the context of the institutional reform of the AU. Unlike the previous structure, which had a division dedicated to conflict prevention and early warning in the now-defunct Department of Peace and Security, the new PAPS structure does not have such a dedicated structure. Under the PAPS structure, early warning, for example, falls under the ‘Conflict Management’ directorate and is said to have been ‘mainstreamed’ into the regional desks. Similarly, the Situation Room, established as part of the CEWS under Article 12, is envisaged under the new structure to serve the PAPS department in its entirety rather than being part of the conflict prevention directorate. This restructuring not only fails to confirm with Article 12 of the PSC Protocol but also has downgraded CEWS, leading to operational difficulties, as CEWS is deprived of a fully dedicated structure for its regular and effective functioning. In light of the foregoing, the AU/UN Policy Paper on Enhancing the AU Continental Early Warning System and Early Action is expected to recommend the reestablishment of a dedicated CEWS division.
The brief that Adeoye is expected to share with PSC members responding to the 1208th session also comes in the wake of the Dar es Salaam Declaration’s commitment ‘to enhancing the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises and fully utilising all available preventive diplomacy tools.’ This policy preoccupation with revamping CEWS also comes against the backdrop of the renewed emphasis on conflict prevention globally, as elaborated in the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future.
Apart from reinvigorating diplomacy at international and regional levels for advancing prevention, both the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future call for the establishment of national prevention capacities and infrastructure for peace. Action 18 of the Pact of the Future commits member states of the UN to build and sustain peace through, most notably, building ‘national capacity to promote, develop and implement their nationally-owned prevention efforts and address the root causes of violence and conflict.’ It is worth recalling that the PSC was the first to identify the establishment of mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts at the national level as a key action for advancing peace as far back as 2013. The 360th session of the PSC held in March 2013 thus called on Member States ‘to put in place comprehensive national prevention mechanisms that would operate in conjunction with the relevant AU and RECs/RMs structures.’
The establishment of the CSVRA and CSVMS was in part initiated to facilitate the establishment of national infrastructure and mechanism for prevention. The second agenda of tomorrow’s session accordingly focuses on review of CSVRA and CSVMS.
Tomorrow’s session marks the third time in less than two years that the PSC has included the CSVRA and CSVMS on its agenda. Similar reviews were scheduled in March and May 2023 but did not take place as planned.
Developed by the now-defunct Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division (CPEWD) of the Peace and Security Department, these tools are integral to the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF). They aim to provide a coordinated, Commission-wide approach to structural conflict prevention. The CSVRA identifies structural vulnerabilities to conflict, while the CSVMS outlines medium- to long-term strategies to mitigate such vulnerabilities and build resilience.
However, the institutional restructuring that transformed the Peace and Security Department into the PAPS has undermined these efforts. The removal of a dedicated CEWS division has left the CSVRA and CSVMS without clear institutional support, raising questions about the tools’ future coordination and implementation. Recent policy discussions on reinstating a dedicated conflict prevention and early warning division offer hope for revitalising the CSVRA and CSVMS tools.
The CSVRA/CSVMS came within the framework of a continental early warning system and as a follow-up to PSC’s 360th session, held in March 2013, a session that stressed the need for a strategic focus on addressing the structural/root causes of conflicts. During its 463rd session that took place in October 2014, the PSC commended the Commission for its efforts to finalise the elaboration of the CSCPF as well as to develop a Structural Vulnerability Assessment tool and further requested the Commission to expedite the process. PSC’s 502nd session, convened in April 2015, adopted the CSVRA/CSVMS tools and requested the Commission, in collaboration with the RECs, to avail all the necessary assistance to Member States and popularise the tools while encouraging Member States to fully take advantage of these tools in their efforts towards the structural prevention of conflict.
The AU Assembly, during its 35th ordinary session, held in February 2022, encouraged Member States to ‘utilise the opportunities afforded by the Commission and RECs/RMs to address structural causes of violent conflict through the implementation of the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment/Country Structural Vulnerability and Mitigation Strategies (CSVRA/CSVMS) processes.’ In that summit, the Assembly went on requesting the Commission to establish a ‘Monitoring and Oversight Committee’ comprising the AU Commission, RECs/RMs, APRM and Member States to facilitate effective coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In tomorrow’s session, PSC may follow up on progress made towards the implementation of this decision.
The CSVRA/CSVMS are voluntary processes and, hence, should be implemented by Member States through a request simultaneously addressed to the AU Commission and the concerned REC. The request may come at the initiation of the AU. Following the request, a team of experts composed of an expert nominated by the Member States, the CEWS staff, representatives of relevant AUC departments, representatives from the concerned REC, as well as representatives from other stakeholders will be formed to work on the CSVRA report, which is envisaged to be finalised within three months. Once the report is finalised, the next phase will be for the concerned state, in coordination with the AUC and the relevant REC, to start working on the CSVMS.
Indeed, the status of implementation of the CSVRA/CSVMS leaves a lot to be desired, highlighting the need for revamping implementation of these tools. In that context, there are at least three points that the PSC may consider in tomorrow’s deliberation.
As voluntary processes, the success of the CSVRA and CSVMS hinges on stronger political buy-in of Member States. The fact that only three countries—Ghana (2017), Côte d’Ivoire (2019), and Zambia (2020)—have initiated structural vulnerability assessments highlights both limited buy-in and the lack of a dedicated structure in PAPS in effectively promoting the tools and their benefits. While it is encouraging that Seychelles, Madagascar, and Mauritius have shown interest, as well as more recent indications from Malawi and Kenya, these developments reflect only modest progress.
Enhancing political buy-in and wider subscription will require concerted efforts from the PSC and the Commission to demonstrate the practical advantages of these tools to Member States, including addressing concerns about the framing of the process as a ‘vulnerability assessment,’ which may deter some states. The AU may leverage the commitment to prevention in the Pact for the Future, which puts focus on promoting the bolstering of national conflict prevention mechanisms, for advancing buy-in and collaboration with UN and international partners for using CSVRA and CSVMS as critical platforms for rolling out the establishment and strengthening of national prevention capacities and infrastructure for peace.
Beyond advancing political buy-in on the part of member states, the other issue of clarifying the relationship between the CSVRA/CSVMS and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as the APRM also involves structural vulnerability analyses as part of its country reviews. The PSC should provide policy guidance to ensure these mechanisms complement one another and avoid overlaps, thereby enhancing their collective effectiveness. Similarly, there is also a need to establish and strengthen coherence and coordination in early warning analysis between the CEWS on the one hand and CISSA, AFRIPOL, and AUCTC on the other hand.
Additionally, strengthened coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RMs/RMs) is critical to advancing the implementation of the CSVRA and CSVMS. Recent efforts in this area appear promising, as demonstrated by the interest from Malawi and Kenya, which could be partly attributed to closer engagement between the AU and RECs/RMs on early warning systems. Building on this momentum, the AU should further leverage partnerships with RECs/RMs to expand the adoption of these tools among a broader range of member states.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may extend its support for the efforts of the CPAPS to reinvigorate the CEWS within the framework of the communique of the 1208th session of the PSC. It may reiterate the commitment under the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted on 25 May 2024 at the High-Level Colloquium in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the PSC, to enhancing the PSC’s conflict prevention mandate, including by responding swiftly to early warning signs of looming conflicts and crises. It may request full implementation of Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, which requires the reinstitution of the CEWS structure in the PAPS department as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. The PAC may also underscore the need for clarifying the relationship between the respective roles of various AU entities with relevant areas of work and the modalities for ensuring coherence with CEWS while affirming the centrality of CEWS for early warning and conflict prevention as established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol. It may also task the AU Commission to work with the NET4PEACE, CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL in the development of a trigger mechanism with clear criteria and indicators and the threshold for activating early action. The PSC may underline the critical importance of CSVRA/CSVMS tools to the structural prevention of conflict and consolidation of peace and stability in the continent. Considering the benefits that the CSVRA/CSVMS tools offer, particularly in identifying and addressing the structural vulnerabilities of member states that may evolve into violent conflicts, the PSC is expected to encourage member states to take full advantage of these tools. It may also request the Commission to provide all the required support to Member States. It may further request the Commission to develop a strategy to better popularise these tools and ensure greater buy-in of Member States so that more countries undertake the assessment. The PSC may underscore the importance of CSVRA/CSVMS as the vehicle for cooperation between the AU, the UN and other international actors for the implementation of Action 18 of the Pact for the Future. In the light of the fact that the institutional reform had left the Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework without a structure for its effective operationalisation, the PSC may call for a dedicated capacity within PAPS for taking responsibility for CEWS and in promoting and implementing CSVRA/CSVMS.
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