Discussion on AU Sanctions regime
Discussion on AU Sanctions regime
Date | 23 October 2023
Tomorrow (24 October 2023), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1181st session on the AU Sanctions regime, at the Ambassadorial level.
The Chairperson of the PSC, Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo to the AU will start the meeting with an opening statement, followed by remarks from Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS).
Following the waves of coups that swept across parts of the continent, there has been increasing policy discussion on the need for bolstering the response for containing the spread. Since 2020 alone, the AU has grappled with seven coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Chad, Niger and most recently, Gabon. Of the seven coups, two countries have faced dual coups (i.e., Mali and Burkina Faso). As the sanction measures adopted by the AU and regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) fail to change the behavior of coup makers or to deter the occurrence of new coups, one of the issues that received increased attention in continental and regional policy processes is how to reinforce the sanctions measure.
The instruments guiding the AU on imposing sanctions on Member States include the PSC Protocol, Lomé Declaration, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the Accra Declaration. While the AU ordinarily adopts suspension from participation in AU activities, the other sanctions are what the Lomé Declaration calls ‘limited and targeted sanctions’. The ‘limited and targeted sanctions’ listed in the Lomé Declaration travel bans, asset freezes, visa denials for the perpetrators of unconstitutional change of governments (UCG), restrictions of government-to-government contacts, and trade restrictions.
During the Reflection Forum on UCGs, convened in March 2022 in Accra, Ghana, one of the recommendations was to reactivate the PSC Sanctions Committee. This was echoed in the decision of the AU Extraordinary Summit held in May 2022. Subsequently, the PSC held a session on sanctions and enforcement capacities in the deterrence against UCGs and called for the full operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee and the development of the requisite technical capacities to ensure its effectiveness. During this 1100th session, the PSC also instructed the Committee of Experts (CoE) to develop the ToRs for the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. It is important to note that the sub-committee on sanctions was initially established in 2009 through the PSC’s 178th communique, but it has never been operational. During the CoE retreat in May, the CoE identified certain issues, such as the composition of the Sub-committee and the level of its chairship that require the guidance of the PSC with respect to the Sanctions Sub-Committee. During its 1170th session, the PSC received report from the CoE on the work accomplished during the CoE retreat for developing the sanctions regime and the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions.
It is expected that tomorrow’s session will also cover the discrepancy in the application of sanctions as one of the critical challenges faced by the AU in imposing sanctions and deterring UCG. In this respect, it is vital that this PSC session aims to look at the divergence in policy implementation between the PSC and the relevant regional mechanisms and foster an environment where there is coordination and collaboration among these entities yielding a more effective and consistent application of sanctions.
Unsurprisingly, tomorrow’s meeting would also give an update on PSC’s request to the AU Commission to establish a solid sanctions infrastructure using the available resources in the PAPS Department that will effectively support the work of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions, as well as a monitoring and evaluation group, to assess the implementation of the sanctions imposed against the Member States. This is in accordance with the decision in communique PSC/PR/COMM.1100 (2022) adopted at PSC’s 1100th session on 15 August 2022. Furthermore, it will be prudent for this meeting to consider the need for refining existing sanctions pronouncements into consistent frameworks that are aligned with the current evolution of the challenges they are meant to address. To put this into context, the PSC had requested the Commission, ‘in collaboration with the UN stakeholders and relevant African research institutions and think tanks, including the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) and UN Security Council Permanent Members, to explore and develop an effective collaborative mechanism to strengthen the AU sanctions regime and provide appropriate technical capacities to the PSC Committee of Experts and the Military Staff Committee’.
In addition to highlighting collaborative efforts towards the concretization of a sanctions infrastructure, the deliberation is also likely to give latest update on the operationalization of the PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions. Moreover, it is imperative for the PSC to engage on the need for the establishment of an independent expert body on AU Response to UCGs. This is crucial for the provision of objective and in-depth technical advisory and support on a regular basis to the PSC and its subsidiary or affiliated bodies, including the Sub-Committee on Sanctions; the Committee of Experts (CoE); and the Military Staff Committee (MSC).
The other and critical issue that would be of interest to the PSC in its consideration of sanctions is the need for ensuring that sanctions are targeted. There is also the related issue of crafting sanctions with the requisite carveouts for ensuring that they don’t lead to collective punishment of the population of the target country. As noted above, the Lomé Declaration took care in specifying the need for targeted sanction. It thus speaks only of ‘limited and targeted sanctions.’ Accordingly, when adopting sanctions that go beyond suspension, there is a need for ensuring that they provide for humanitarian carveouts for facilitating humanitarian access and essential socio-economic activities vital for the wellbeing of populations. It may also interest the PSC to discuss how once fully reactivated, the Sub-Committee on Sanctions can ensure the establishment of clear benchmarks on the criteria and process for easing and lifting sanctions.
The anticipated outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communique. It is expected that the PSC will highlight the status of the recently suspended countries, namely Niger and Gabon, and emphasize the need to meet the timeframe of the transitional term limit of six months following military coups. The PSC may also underscore the need for enhanced coordination and synergy between the decisions taken by the PSC and that of RECs/RMs on sanctions. The PSC may also call for full and effective implementation of the step by step and graduated approach to sanctions envisaged in the Lomé Declaration and ACDEG as well as the 2009 Ezuliweni framework on UCG. The PSC may also reiterate and refine its earlier call for the establishment of a multidisciplinary team of experts to operate as an independent expert body that works with the PSC Sub-Committee and provides independent technical analysis on the occurrence and nature of UCG, the appropriate response measures including proposals on diplomatic initiatives, and the mobilization of leverage and coordination for maximum and swift impact. The PSC may also affirm the primacy of diplomacy and political engagement for which suspension and sanction provides support for securing agreement on the pathway for restoration of constitutional order. It may further underscore the importance of ensuring that sanctions are ‘limited and targeted’ to constrain those they intended to affect and spare the population of the country concerned from their impacts. The PSC may encourage finalization of the work for the operationalization of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions and call for the full operationalization of the PSC Sanction Committee. Lastly, the PSC may also call for respect for constitutionalism and rule of law as well as term limits set in Constitutions. It may also reiterate its earlier calls for the AU Commission to undertake a study on the root causes of UCG and on ways for reinforcing measures against manipulation of term limits as specified in the Accra Declaration and the Malabo Summit outcome documents. It may also call for a follow-up to the Accra Declaration in having a follow up convening considering developments since March 2022.
Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon
Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon
Date | 22 October 2023
Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1180th session to receive updates on developments in Niger and Gabon following the recent unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) in the two countries.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements on Niger and Gabon respectively as the concerned Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
At its 1168th session held on 14 August, the PSC decided to suspend Niger from all activities of the AU, and its organs and institutions until effective restoration of constitutional order. At its 1172nd emergency session convened on 31 August, the PSC also adopted a similar decision with respect to Gabon.
Over the past several weeks, the situation in these two countries evolved quite differently. In Niger, the tension that ensued between the military junta and ECOWAS following ECOWAS decisions slapping raft of sanctions on Niger and threatening military intervention for reinstating the ousted government of President Mohammed Bazoum has persisted. Mali and Burkina Faso, two other West African countries being ruled by military leaders, pledged to come to Niger’s aid in the event of a military intervention by ECOWAS. Accordingly, the three countries signed what they called the Liptako-Gourma charter to forge a collective defense and mutual assistance pact. The charter was named after the border triangle between the three countries which has been the source of instability in the Sahel. The fate of G5 Sahel remains unclear in the face of this development. G5 Sahel has been “paralyzed” for quite some time following Mali’s decision to withdraw after it was blocked from assuming the rotating chairmanship of the group. The security situation appears to have worsened in all these three countries with a significant surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists recently.
At the moment, it appears that the possibility of an ECOWAS military intervention has lost steam in the face of division within West Africa but also lack of wider African support as illustrated by the decision of the PSC declining the request of ECOWAS for receiving endorsement for its decisions including for undertaking military intervention for reinstating the deposed President. ECOWAS maintained that it is keeping all options open for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In this regard, it sent delegations to Niamey on several occasions to engage in talks with military leaders who later proposed a three-year transition of power and appointed a civilian prime minister. Although there were media reports about proposed timelines by ECOWAS for the transition in Niger, the organization refuted these claims and insisted that the military leaders in Niamey should restore constitutional order immediately.
Algeria, which shares a long border with Niger, has offered its mediation to resolve the crisis in that country. It reportedly proposed a six-month transition period with the participation of all parties in Niger. This proposal envisages the establishment of a consensual civilian authority accepted by all sides of the Nigerian political class to lead the transition and pave the way for the restoration of constitutional order. The military leaders in Niamey reportedly accepted Algeria’s mediation but insisted that the timeline for the transition should be determined by Nigerians themselves. Although there were expectations for follow-up engagement in Niamey, Algeria reportedly suspended its initiative because of concerns over public pronouncements by the Nigerian military leaders which seems to have cast doubts about their willingness to accept the mediation.
The Nigerian military leaders had altercations with France, the former colonial power which maintains a military presence in Niger, making Niger a major hub for its counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region following the ejection of French troops from Mali. France came out strongly in support of the ECOWAS decision on Niger which led the military leaders in Niamey to demand that the country withdraw its forces from Niger. Although it initially resisted to heed the demand disputing the legitimacy of the military junta to make such decisions, France has already started withdrawal. The United States also maintains a military presence in Niger and has sent its acting deputy secretary of state Victoria Nuland to engage in talks with the military leaders in Niamey. The US had refrained from characterizing the situation as a coup d’état, but on 10 October the state department issued a statement concluding that a coup d’état took place in Niger. While this would lead to freezing of security and related assistance, the implication of this announcement on its military presence in Niger remains unclear. The country has already suspended its assistance to Niger but said that it will maintain life-saving humanitarian, food, and health assistance to the Nigerian people.
The UN General Assembly in New York saw high-level engagement on the Nigerian issue, including a meeting between several ECOWAS leaders and the US Secretary of State. There has also been tension between the UN and the Nigerian military leaders who wanted to take part in the General Assembly but were excluded from attending the meeting. In response to this development, they have ordered the UN resident coordinator in Niamey to leave the country within 72 hours.
In Gabon, the situation appears to have unfolded differently. While the military junta seems disposed to diplomatic engagements and expressed their commitment to restore constitutional order, they have not as yet indicated any timeline for the transition period. This lack of commitment for timeline is not totally surprising. Given that the opposition presidential candidate performed well in the elections but the military coup interrupted the electoral processes to play itself out to its logical conclusion, it may not be in the interest of the military junta to proceed to elections in a short period of time. There is indeed a risk that if elections were to be held in a short term, the leading opposition candidate may win the election and this may not settle well with those that would like to sustain the status quo.
The Gabonese military also released the deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba but his wife, under house arrest since the coup, has now been reportedly charged with money laundering, forgery, and falsification of records. The UN Special Representative for Central Africa Abou Abarry was allowed to meet with the military leaders and the deposed president. The new prime minister Raymond Ndong Sima attended a Security Council high-level meeting in New York on 20 September that discussed the situation in Ukraine.
Gabon happened to be the chair of ECCAS, the REC for the central Africa region, when the coup took place in Libreville. ECCAS suspended Gabon from all activities of the organization but stopped short of imposing sanctions on the country. The regional leaders also decided to temporarily move the ECCAS Headquarters from Libreville to Malabo until the restoration of constitutional order. The president of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was the Vice-Chair of ECCAS, assumed the rotating chairmanship of the organization, and the president of the Central African Republic Faustin Touadera was appointed as ECCAS facilitator to engage with the Gabonese military leaders to restore constitutional order in that country. Subsequently, Touadera traveled to Libreville in a bid to carry out his mandate.
General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, who is the leader of the Gabonese military government, has been on a regional tour, which took him to Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, and recently the Democratic Republic of Congo (he is also expected to travel to Cameroon). He is doing so to request countries of the region to allow Gabon back to the regional fold and seek their support for the lifting of the suspensions imposed by the PSC. Past week, he also undertook a mission to Rwanda and Burundi where he met with the presidents of the two countries as well.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may recall its previous decisions on Niger and Gabon urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed upon transitional civilian authority and reiterate its stand in that respect. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts and in that vein, urge military leaders in both countries to engage with initiatives led by the relevant regional organisations as well as the AU towards charting a proper transitional process for the restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may decide that a dedicated mechanism is established that follows on the decisions of the 1168th session and meets the requirements of the Lomé Declaration which requires that the AU Commission Chairperson deploy robust diplomatic efforts involving the establishment of engagement with the perpetrators and enlisting of the contribution African leaders and personalities. With respect to Gabon, the PSC may reinforce the decision it adopted during its 1172nd session by calling for transfer of power by the military junta to a transitional civilian authority representative of the various political and social forces in the country and requiring that the transitional authorities specify the timeline for restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the deployment of a high-level mission to Gabon specified under paragraph 8 of the communique of the 1172nd session which is along the lines of what is required in the Lomé Declaration.
Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon
Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon
Date | 22 October 2023
Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1180th session to receive updates on developments in Niger and Gabon following the recent unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) in the two countries.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements on Niger and Gabon respectively as the concerned Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
At its 1168th session held on 14 August, the PSC decided to suspend Niger from all activities of the AU, and its organs and institutions until effective restoration of constitutional order. At its 1172nd emergency session convened on 31 August, the PSC also adopted a similar decision with respect to Gabon.
Over the past several weeks, the situation in these two countries evolved quite differently. In Niger, the tension that ensued between the military junta and ECOWAS following ECOWAS decisions slapping raft of sanctions on Niger and threatening military intervention for reinstating the ousted government of President Mohammed Bazoum has persisted. Mali and Burkina Faso, two other West African countries being ruled by military leaders, pledged to come to Niger’s aid in the event of a military intervention by ECOWAS. Accordingly, the three countries signed what they called the Liptako-Gourma charter to forge a collective defense and mutual assistance pact. The charter was named after the border triangle between the three countries which has been the source of instability in the Sahel. The fate of G5 Sahel remains unclear in the face of this development. G5 Sahel has been “paralyzed” for quite some time following Mali’s decision to withdraw after it was blocked from assuming the rotating chairmanship of the group. The security situation appears to have worsened in all these three countries with a significant surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists recently.
At the moment, it appears that the possibility of an ECOWAS military intervention has lost steam in the face of division within West Africa but also lack of wider African support as illustrated by the decision of the PSC declining the request of ECOWAS for receiving endorsement for its decisions including for undertaking military intervention for reinstating the deposed President. ECOWAS maintained that it is keeping all options open for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In this regard, it sent delegations to Niamey on several occasions to engage in talks with military leaders who later proposed a three-year transition of power and appointed a civilian prime minister. Although there were media reports about proposed timelines by ECOWAS for the transition in Niger, the organization refuted these claims and insisted that the military leaders in Niamey should restore constitutional order immediately.
Algeria, which shares a long border with Niger, has offered its mediation to resolve the crisis in that country. It reportedly proposed a six-month transition period with the participation of all parties in Niger. This proposal envisages the establishment of a consensual civilian authority accepted by all sides of the Nigerian political class to lead the transition and pave the way for the restoration of constitutional order. The military leaders in Niamey reportedly accepted Algeria’s mediation but insisted that the timeline for the transition should be determined by Nigerians themselves. Although there were expectations for follow-up engagement in Niamey, Algeria reportedly suspended its initiative because of concerns over public pronouncements by the Nigerian military leaders which seems to have cast doubts about their willingness to accept the mediation.
The Nigerian military leaders had altercations with France, the former colonial power which maintains a military presence in Niger, making Niger a major hub for its counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region following the ejection of French troops from Mali. France came out strongly in support of the ECOWAS decision on Niger which led the military leaders in Niamey to demand that the country withdraw its forces from Niger. Although it initially resisted to heed the demand disputing the legitimacy of the military junta to make such decisions, France has already started withdrawal. The United States also maintains a military presence in Niger and has sent its acting deputy secretary of state Victoria Nuland to engage in talks with the military leaders in Niamey. The US had refrained from characterizing the situation as a coup d’état, but on 10 October the state department issued a statement concluding that a coup d’état took place in Niger. While this would lead to freezing of security and related assistance, the implication of this announcement on its military presence in Niger remains unclear. The country has already suspended its assistance to Niger but said that it will maintain life-saving humanitarian, food, and health assistance to the Nigerian people.
The UN General Assembly in New York saw high-level engagement on the Nigerian issue, including a meeting between several ECOWAS leaders and the US Secretary of State. There has also been tension between the UN and the Nigerian military leaders who wanted to take part in the General Assembly but were excluded from attending the meeting. In response to this development, they have ordered the UN resident coordinator in Niamey to leave the country within 72 hours.
In Gabon, the situation appears to have unfolded differently. While the military junta seems disposed to diplomatic engagements and expressed their commitment to restore constitutional order, they have not as yet indicated any timeline for the transition period. This lack of commitment for timeline is not totally surprising. Given that the opposition presidential candidate performed well in the elections but the military coup interrupted the electoral processes to play itself out to its logical conclusion, it may not be in the interest of the military junta to proceed to elections in a short period of time. There is indeed a risk that if elections were to be held in a short term, the leading opposition candidate may win the election and this may not settle well with those that would like to sustain the status quo.
The Gabonese military also released the deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba but his wife, under house arrest since the coup, has now been reportedly charged with money laundering, forgery, and falsification of records. The UN Special Representative for Central Africa Abou Abarry was allowed to meet with the military leaders and the deposed president. The new prime minister Raymond Ndong Sima attended a Security Council high-level meeting in New York on 20 September that discussed the situation in Ukraine.
Gabon happened to be the chair of ECCAS, the REC for the central Africa region, when the coup took place in Libreville. ECCAS suspended Gabon from all activities of the organization but stopped short of imposing sanctions on the country. The regional leaders also decided to temporarily move the ECCAS Headquarters from Libreville to Malabo until the restoration of constitutional order. The president of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was the Vice-Chair of ECCAS, assumed the rotating chairmanship of the organization, and the president of the Central African Republic Faustin Touadera was appointed as ECCAS facilitator to engage with the Gabonese military leaders to restore constitutional order in that country. Subsequently, Touadera traveled to Libreville in a bid to carry out his mandate.
General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, who is the leader of the Gabonese military government, has been on a regional tour, which took him to Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, and recently the Democratic Republic of Congo (he is also expected to travel to Cameroon). He is doing so to request countries of the region to allow Gabon back to the regional fold and seek their support for the lifting of the suspensions imposed by the PSC. Past week, he also undertook a mission to Rwanda and Burundi where he met with the presidents of the two countries as well.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may recall its previous decisions on Niger and Gabon urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed upon transitional civilian authority and reiterate its stand in that respect. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts and in that vein, urge military leaders in both countries to engage with initiatives led by the relevant regional organisations as well as the AU towards charting a proper transitional process for the restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may decide that a dedicated mechanism is established that follows on the decisions of the 1168th session and meets the requirements of the Lomé Declaration which requires that the AU Commission Chairperson deploy robust diplomatic efforts involving the establishment of engagement with the perpetrators and enlisting of the contribution African leaders and personalities. With respect to Gabon, the PSC may reinforce the decision it adopted during its 1172nd session by calling for transfer of power by the military junta to a transitional civilian authority representative of the various political and social forces in the country and requiring that the transitional authorities specify the timeline for restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the deployment of a high-level mission to Gabon specified under paragraph 8 of the communique of the 1172nd session which is along the lines of what is required in the Lomé Declaration.
MAPPING THE ROLES OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES OF THE AFRICAN UNION
Amani Africa
20 October 2023
INTRODUCTION
In 2022, Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa) published a special research report providing an overview on the decision-making institutions of the African Union (AU). The special research report identified and typified AU decision-making actors and their respective roles and it outlined the decision-making processes of the AU. The report identified the need for Amani Africa to undertake further in-depth studies examining the attributes and roles of each of the AU’s key actors and how they fit into the AU’s decision-making processes. Such further studies would also explore the nuance between statutory functions and the actual practices of relevant actors.
This special research report builds on the above body of work by exploring how decision-making undertaken by one organ, the African Union Commission (AUC), influences the realisation of the goals and strategies of the AU. The report maps the roles of the AUC in the decision-making processes of the Union, drawing both from the AUC’s statutes as well as from practice.
The Situation in Sudan
The Situation in Sudan
Date | 19 October 2023
Tomorrow (20 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1179th session to consider the situation in Sudan.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October 2023, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Mohamed el Hacen Lebatt, Principal Strategic Adviser to the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Special Envoy to Sudan and Mohamed Belaiche, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) in Sudan are also expected to deliver statements. In addition, a representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is also expected to make remarks on the situation in the country under consideration.
The meeting is being convened as an additional agenda item in October’s provisional programme of work for the activities of the PSC. The last time the PSC convened a meeting to consider the situation in Sudan was during its 1156th session held at the Heads of State and Government level on 27 May 2023, whereby a Communiqué was adopted as an outcome document. In the Communiqué, the Heads of State and Government adopted the African Union Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan, towards silencing the guns in Sudan, and called on Sudanese stakeholders and the international community to support the implementation of the Roadmap.
On 31 May 2023, the 3rd Meeting of the Expanded Mechanism for the Resolution of the Sudan Conflict was convened. The meeting, which was chaired by Professor Mohamed El-Hacen Lebatt, Spokesperson for the AU Process for Sudan, presented to the members of the Expanded Mechanism the outcomes of the 1156th PSC Meeting as well as the next steps towards an inclusive, Sudanese-owned process, that would end the fighting and put Sudan on the path to a democratic, civilian-led government. In addition, the Expanded Mechanism welcomed the Jeddah Process, facilitated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, which resulted in the Declaration of Commitments and the Short-term Ceasefire and Humanitarian Assistance Arrangement.
In alignment with the Expanded Mechanism’s commitment to convene the Core Group, the AU held its inaugural meeting with the Core Group of the Expanded Mechanism on 2 June 2023 to fine-tune the modalities of the implementation of the roadmap and settle on concrete steps for a ceasefire. The final outcomes of this convening have yet to be released.
Tomorrow’s meeting will provide an opportunity for the PSC to deliberate on the progress made towards the implementation of the adopted Roadmap during the 1156th meeting. This includes the following six elements outlined in the Roadmap:
- Establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure all efforts by the regional and global actors are harmonized and impactful;
- Immediate, permanent, inclusive and comprehensive cessation of hostilities;
- Effective humanitarian response;
- Protection of civilians and civil infrastructure;
- Strategic role of neighboring states and the region; and
- Resumption of a credible and inclusive political transition process, that takes into account the contributory role of all Sudanese political and social actors, as well as the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, towards a democratic civilian-led government.
As the conflict in the country between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) passed its sixth month, tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to give an insight into the recent joint AU-IGAD delegation meeting with Sudanese political and civilian groups. The delegation met with the democratic Bloc, allied groups in Cairo, and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) to initiate a political process to end the ongoing conflict and establish new constitutional arrangements to reinstate civilian governance.
The 14th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government was also held on Monday, 12 June 2023, in Djibouti, the Republic of Djibouti, where it adopted the IGAD Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of Sudan. The action points from the Roadmap included:
- Include the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as the fourth member of the IGAD High-Level Delegation for the Peace Process in the Republic of Sudan; and for H.E. William Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya, to Chair the Quartet Countries of the Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan and for the Quartet to work in close coordination with the African Union Commission;
- Within ten days, the Quartet to arrange a face-to-face meeting between H.E. Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the Chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of the Republic of Sudan, and Gen. Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo in one of the regional capitals;
- Within two weeks secure a commitment from the leadership of SAF and RSF to establish a humanitarian corridor;
- Within three weeks initiate an inclusive political process towards a political settlement of the conflict in the Republic of Sudan.
Since its initial convening, IGAD has hosted consecutive meetings in alignment with its roadmap. On 10 July 2023, IGAD Heads of State and Government held a meeting at the level of Quartet to address the implementation of the roadmap. The session explored substantial options including a request to the East African Standby Force to convene a meeting on the options of deployment for the protection of civilians. The meeting also recognized the supplementary role neighboring states have taken with the initiative to convene on 13 July 2023 in Egypt to address peace and stability in the Republic of Sudan in alignment with the IGAD Roadmap. Finally, a significant decision was made to ensure measures are taken for the facilitation of immediate humanitarian assistance. However, the decision to ensure humanitarian access was not revisited during the second IGAD Quartet Group meeting that recently took place on 6 September 2023. The second IGAD Quartet Group meeting instead emphasized the need for an all-inclusive consultation of civilian actors that will yield a more structured approach to peace dialogue and as such mandated IGAD and the AU to expedite the consultation process.
Despite the existence of such various mechanisms and initiatives, currently there is no meaningful processes for addressing the situation. The ceasefire process has stalled. Thus, after nearly a dozen mediated or declared ceasefire initiatives, the very process for ceasefire has been suspended. Neither the IGAD process nor that of the AU has also led to any meaningful wider peace or political process. There are two issues arising from this state of affair. The first is the existence of multiple initiatives and absence of a common platform around which all actors rally. The second concerns the fact that there is no dedicated mechanism that works on a full-time basis on the war on Sudan, for example, along the lines proposed by President Museveni when he Chair the PSC last May on Sudan – establishment of a high-level facilitator or panel of facilitators.
These various processes failed to do anything more than meeting and adopting statements or communiqués. None managed to mitigate or in any way make a dent on the war. The result of the inadequacies of these various and poorly coordinated processes is that the war is allowed to continue to rage on, with no end in sight. Neither the AU nor IGAD are able to put in place or initiate a mechanism to also address and ameliorate the worsening humanitarian crisis.
The war has claimed the lives of nearly 10,000 people. Over 5.8 million have been internally displaced. 1.2 million people have fled to neighboring countries as refugees. Apart from this, humanitarian actors are able to reach to and deliver humanitarian assistance to only 3 percent of the more than 18 million people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. The war also continues to involve not only indiscriminate attacks on civilians but also cause enormous destruction on civilian infrastructure. The country continues to fragment and Sudan is risking if not already experiencing state collapse. Apart from the suffering this creates to Sudanese, it creates vacuum, which if not urgently addressed, may be exploited by war economy entrepreneurs including terrorist groups.
One of the focus of tomorrow’s session could be receiving feedback on where the various processes stand and whether there is now an opening for a meaningful peace process based on the engagement with the various civilian groupings. Additionally, it would be of particular interest for members of the PSC to get a dedicated mechanism that monitors, documents and reports on the humanitarian situation and facilitates civilian protection and compliance by warring parties with international humanitarian law.
The anticipated outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communique. It is expected that Council will call on members of the international community, including the immediate neighbors of Sudan, to continue to demonstrate solidarity by assisting Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers, among others, by facilitating expeditious and dignified processes, conditions of entry, transit and reception of refugees from Sudan in line with the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1969 Kampala Convention. It may also underscore the growing humanitarian toll resulting from the conflict in Sudan, urge conflicting parties to observe the fundamental rules and principles of international humanitarian law and human rights law underpinning the protection of civilians and appeal to the international community to redouble efforts geared towards ensuring effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected communities. In this respect, the PSC may specifically call on the parties to end indiscriminate attacks against civilians. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of consolidating efforts and creating better coherence between the various initiatives put underway to manage the crisis in Sudan. It may also call for the establishment of a joint high-level panel on Sudan by the AU, IGAD and the UN.