Engagement between the PSC and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance
Engagement between the PSC and the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance
Date | 11 August 2023
Tomorrow (11 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1166th Session that is dedicated to the PSC’s engagement with the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG).
The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU, Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe will be delivering the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. Additionally, a briefing is expected to be delivered by James Pitia Morgan, as the Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Sudan to the AU and the Chairperson of the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance. It is also anticipated that Remy Lumbu, Chairperson of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and Chairperson of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) Platform will also make a statement.
The upcoming session marks the second annual joint engagement between the PSC and the Sub-Committee. This session was institutionalized during the 1095th session, where the PSC made the decision to hold the meeting with the Sub-Committee every August. The engagement is not only supported by the PSC’s decision, but is also enshrined in the PSC Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC, which mandates the PSC to follow up on progress towards promoting democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. Correspondingly, beyond promoting AU shared values, the mandate of the Sub-Committee additionally involves: hearing briefings from AGA platform members; recommending policy initiatives, draft declarations, draft resolutions and decisions in the area of human rights, democracy and good governance; considering proposals/documents concerning the programs, policies, strategies of AU human rights, democracy and governance initiatives; and supporting efforts and initiatives aimed at the full operationalization of the AGA, its platform and its synergy with the APSA.
Similar to the previous engagement, the upcoming session aims to create synergy and coordination between the PSC and the Sub-Committee in respect of the role of the PSC on issues relating to governance, democracy and human rights. The session also seeks to identify joint programs as well as initiatives going forward.
However, the surge in coup d’états in the continent increases the relevance of tomorrow’s session. As a result of the successful coup attempt that took place from 26 – 28 July 2023, Niger has joined Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Sudan in the list of African countries that have experienced a coup since April 2020. While some of those countries are still struggling to transition from military to civilian rule, Sudan has experienced a full-blown conflict that resulted in the worsening of human suffering with human rights violations including the death and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese. The increasing frequency of coups throughout the Sahel region reflects the failure of continental frameworks aimed at maintaining democratic order in African countries.
As concern over the growing number of coups in Africa intensifies, PSC has convened three sessions in the past year to address the issue of unconstitutional changes of government, including the reflection forum held in March 2022 in Accra, Ghana. Subsequently, the AU’s Extraordinary Session of the Assembly adopted the Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government on May 28, 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. This declaration enshrines the consensus among member states that an urgent response is required from both the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The AU and the RECs/RMs are intensifying their efforts to restore democratic rule by supporting the on-going transitions and attempting to put a stop to the epidemic of coups on the continent.
However, none of these efforts have succeeded in preventing coups. Progress in facilitating the transition of countries under military rule towards restoration of constitutional order also remains slow. Tomorrow’s session thus presents an opportunity for discussing what more needs to be done collectively by the AGA and APSA institutions to reverse the spread of coups, including by revisiting the Accra Forum and the follow up of PSC’s decision from the 14 September 2022 inaugural meeting with CSOs for reconvening of the Accra forum.
As the PSC itself admitted in various occasions and reflected in the Accra Declaration, the lack of regard by Member States for the provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and other similar governance and human rights instruments is one of the sources of the decline in the state of democracy and human rights in Africa. Hence, as the organ mandated with promoting the AU’s shared values on human rights, governance, and democracy, tomorrow’s consultation presents an opportunity for critically reflecting on how HRDG Sub-Committee creates the space for the AGA Platform members to critically assess the weaknesses in their current approach to the execution of their mandate and design and deploy strategies and approaches that are more effective in arresting and countering the regression in democratic governance and respect for human rights that serves as fertile ground for military coups, economic dislocation and conflicts and other sources of insecurity in Africa. The PSC’s past engagement with the Sub-Committee had also urged Member States to expedite the universal signature and implementation of the ACDEG. However, despite popularization efforts, the ACDEG has no seen progress in terms of signatories since the previous engagement of the two organs. As such, in the upcoming session, the PSC is expected to be briefed on the work that the AGA Secretariat and the AGA Platform undertook towards enhancing ratification and implementation. The session may also include discussion on elections, as the monitoring of elections through periodic report is in the standing agenda of the PSC and promoting of ACDEG is one of the mandates of the Sub-Committee.
Furthermore, the ACDEG is at the core of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the AU Executive Council has also directed the Sub-Committee to continue engaging with AU organs and institutions with human rights and governance mandates in a view to enhance synergy between the AGA and African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In line with these and building on the PSC’s previous engagement with the Sub-Committee, the PSC may seek to receive updates on the progress made and the challenges to the institutionalization of the synergy. The upcoming session may also present an opportunity for the PSC to explore a critical aspect that was overlooked in the previous session. Particularly, exploring ways to facilitate the implementation of decisions made by the members of the AGA platform, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child as well as the AU Anti-Corruption Board. Additionally, the two organs may hold discussions on promoting the integration of AU democracy and human rights standards across the AU Executive Council and AU Assembly decisions through the PRC.
In terms of further follow up, in its previous engagement with the Sub-Committee the PSC has encouraged the Sub-Committee to engage CSOs through the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). As per the February 2023 report of the Sub-Committee that was submitted to the AU Executive Council, it was indicated that the Sub-Committee received a briefing from the ECOSOCC. In the report ECOSOCC also cited the promotion of the continental civil society sensitization campaign on the ratification and domestication of the ACDEG, participation in ECOSOCC Citizens’ Forum and supporting ECOSOCC programs on the integration of Women and Youth in democratic governance in Africa as proposed areas of collaboration. Against that backdrop, the PSC may request an update on activities that were undertaken by the Sub-Committee in the engagement of CSOs.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. The PSC may welcome the consultation with the HRDG Sub-Committee of the PRC, while underscoring the need for enhancing the effectiveness of the Sub-Committee and importantly the role of the AGA platform and its members. In light of the coup that took place in Niger, it may condemn the democratic regression in the continent and the blatant disregard by member states of the decisions of the AU bodies on human rights and governance and the recent spike in military coups on the continent. It may also request the Sub-Committee working with the AGA Secretariat and the AGA Platform members to look into the apparent support that African citizens are showing to military coups and develop strategies on how to build strong defence on the part of African people against unconstitutional changes of government in all its forms. The PSC may also request the Sub-Committee to facilitate coordination and dialogue between the AGA Platform members and member states concerned on enhancing the implementation of decisions of the African human rights and governance bodies as critical measures for fending against conditions that make coups possible. While welcoming the engagement between the Sub-Committee and ECOSOCC, the PSC may request that the coordination between the two focuses on measurable activities for enhancing public awareness and support for AU shared values including ACDEG through the use of media and public surveys working, for example, with organizations such as Afrobarometre. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the involvement of CSOs in governance matters and for the representation of Africa citizen in regional human rights bodies and in this respect the importance of expanding and consolidating platforms for their impactful engagement. In the light of the continuation of the occurrence of coups, the PSC may call for the convening of a follow up to the Accra Forum within the framework of decision for the holding of the forum on annual basis.
Amani Africa Dispatch Ep2 - The AU and ECOWAS have to make the best of very bad policy options
https://youtu.be/QbINr_d9bxQ
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of August 2023
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of August 2023
Date | August 2023
Burundi will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of August 2023. The PSC’s Provisional Program of Work includes eight substantive sessions. Three of these will focus on country specific situations. Three will address thematic issues, with the remaining two dealing with consultative meetings. All of the planned sessions are expected to be held virtually, unless in person meeting is specifically called for. The PSC is also expected to conduct a field mission to the Republic of Guinea from 14 to 16 August.
On 3 August, the PSC will convene its first substantive session to consider the report of its field mission to Burkina Faso. It is to be recalled that the PSC undertook the field mission from 24 to 28 July. The report is expected to present the assessment of the mission on the political, security, economic and humanitarian situation in Burkina Faso with recommendations on how the AU could enhance its support for the transitional process and contribute to the effort to contain the insecurity and accompanying humanitarian crisis in Burkina Faso.
On 11 August, the PSC will convene its second substantive session, which will be committed to the joint engagement between the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG). This will be the second such joint consultative session. The first was held during the 1095th session of the PSC on 1 August 2022. This upcoming consultative meeting will serve to review the implementation of the outcome of the previous session and exchange with the Sub-Committee on developments since the last session. In light of the coup in Niger and the launch of the African Peer Review Mechanism’s African Governance Report 2023 focusing on unconstitutional changes of government, this consultative meeting offers the PSC and the Sub-Committee to reflect on the recurrence of unconstitutional changes of government on the continent.
The third week of August will commence with the PSC’s Field Mission to Guinea, which is expected to take place from 14 to 16 August. It is to be recalled that on 4 December 2022, the transitional military government has agreed to a consolidated 24 months transition time table with elections scheduled for January 2025. The field mission presents the PSC the opportunity to engage with Guinea’s transition authorities on the various tracks of the transition. Apart from enabling the PSC to have first-hand engagement with various national stakeholders and communicate its policy position directly with the relevant authorities, the field mission highlights PSC’s willingness to show its presence on the ground.
On 17 August, the PSC is scheduled to convene its third substantive session which will assess unfolding development in Niger following the coup that took place on 26-28 July 2023. On 28 July, the PSC met to discuss the situation and demanded that the military shall ‘immediately and unconditionally return to their barracks and restore constitutional authority, within a maximum period of fifteen days’ from the date of the decision. The coming session is hence being convened in the context of the 15 days’ timeline stipulated by the PSC. Following its discussion on 31 July of the proposal to have another meeting on Niger following the ECOWAS summit, the PSC took the right conclusion for considering the outcome of the ECOWAS summit when it convenes the session its 28 July session envisaged after two weeks. This timeline would also give members of the PSC enough time to scrutinize the nature and implications of the outcome of the ECOWAS summit and the follow up action that ECOWAS may adopt upon the expiry of the one week timeline it gave to the junta in Niger.
On 18 August, the PSC will hold its fourth substantive session of the month, where it will be briefed on the situation in Sudan. This is the fifth time the PSC will be discussing the situation in Sudan since the beginning of the conflict on 15 April. At the 1156th session held on 27 May, it adopted the AU Road Map for the Resolution of the conflict in Sudan, which is meant to serve as a blueprint for the AU to work towards resolving the conflict. The PSC had requested the AU Chairperson to coordinate the implementation of this roadmap in cooperation with the warring parties, IGAD, LAS, UN and partners towards the restoration of peace and stability, as well as to promptly develop and execute the means of implementation of this roadmap. It is therefore envisaged that the PSC will be briefed on both the situation in Sudan and where the diplomatic efforts stand and how best these efforts could be strengthened.
For its fifth meeting taking place on 22 August, the PSC will receive a briefing on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) are expected to update the PSC on key emerging trends and issues of relevance to the peace and security landscape of the continent. At its 1073rd session held on 6 April 2022, the PSC requested the AU Commission to facilitate quarterly briefings to the PSC by the department of PAPS, Panel of the Wise, AFRIPOL, ACSRT and CISSA to ensure prompt conflict resolution. In line with this decision, the PSC, in its annual indicative program of activities for 2023 had scheduled to receive such briefings in February, June, October and December. However, the briefing session initially planned for June did not take place. The coming session hence provides the chance to follow-up on the implementation of PSC’s decisions adopted at the 1138th session held in February 2023, including its request for the AU Commission to better capacitate and resource the ACSRT, AFRIPOL and the AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Centre.
The third Annual Consultative Meeting between the PSC and Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) Policy Organs will take place from 24 to 26 August in Bujumbura, Burundi, constituting the sixth meeting of the month. The representatives of the Policy Organs of the RECs and RMs and members of the PSC are expected to reflect on the state of AU-RECs/RMs relationships and engagements. The second Annual Consultative Meeting between the PSC and RECs/RMs Policy Organs took place two years back in 2021, where substantive challenges in the harmonization of decision making between the PSC and RECs/RMs was discussed. In addition to sharing ideas on how to resolve such challenges, specific crises situations and themes of interest to these decision-making organs could be addressed at the coming consultative meeting.
The seventh session of the month is expected to be a briefing on the Development of the Common African Position on Cyber Security in Africa, expected to take place on 29 August. It is to be recalled that in its 1148th session held on 13 April 2023, the PSC had requested the preparation of a draft statement on the application of international law to cyberspace and a questioner to be filled by States on such application. The PSC had also requested the AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL) to urgently complete and submit the draft statement of a ‘Common African Position on the Application of International Law to Cyberspace’. It is expected that the PSC will be briefed on the developments of the draft statement and draft Common African position in this respect.
On the same day, the PSC is also expected to receive a presentation on a) the draft ToR of the Sanctions Committee; b) the draft ToR for the Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism – both to be established in line with the decision of the May 2022 Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government – and c) the draft Manual on the working methods/modalities for engagement between the PSC and the African three member of the UN Security Council (A3). It is to be recalled that the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) has been extensively engaged in the development of these documents including through the convening of a retreat in May 2023.
On 31 August, as its eighth and final session of the month, the PSC will receive updates for its annual session on the impact of climate change on peace and security. During its 1079th meeting convened on 21 April 2022, the PSC discussed climate change and peace and security, and requested the AUC to expedite the finalization of the report of the AUC Chairperson on the Study on the Nexus Between Climate Change and Peace and Security and to submit it to the PSC for consideration. Apart from presenting an opportunity to receive update on this and related previous decisions of the PSC, the session on 31 August will particularly focus on developing contribution to the Africa Climate Summit scheduled to take place in Nairobi, Kenya in early September on the climate and security nexus.
In addition to the substantive sessions and activities of the PSC, the programme of work encompasses the meetings of the CoE. The CoE is scheduled to convene on 8 and 21 August to deliberate on the agenda for the third Annual Consultative Meeting between the PSC and RECs/RMs Policy Organs. As envisaged in footnote of the programme, the PSC will also consider via email, the provisional programme of work for the month of September.
Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Australian Embassy in Ethiopia for the support in the production of this Insight on the Monthly Programme of Work of the AU Peace and Security Council
The coup in Niger: Lessons from a trouble in paradise
The coup in Niger: Lessons from a trouble in paradise
Date | 31 July 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Lea Mehari Redae
Associate Researcher, Amani Africa
After two earlier unsuccessful attempts, the latest usurpation of power by Niger’s army succeeded in ousting the country’s elected President, ending the last central Sahel country under civilian rule. Niger has been put on a pedestal. As a country where the incumbent respected presidential term limits and transferred power to a successor after the holding of elections in 2021, Niger was portrayed as an island of democracy in a sea of military coups and terrorism. During his visit to Niger US Secretary of State Anthoni Blinken praised Niger as ‘a model of resilience, a model of democracy, a model of cooperation.’
For a country with such standing, the coup that took place on 26-28 July ousting Niger’s elected President may come as a trouble in paradise. Certainly, it is a major blow to the country’s fragile democratization process. Even more troubling is the constitutional and political uncertainties the coup induces may compound the country’s fragilities. These uncertainties would detract from the effort to contain the terrorism menace unfolding in the country. There is also a huge risk that it exacerbates the geopolitical rivalry unfolding in the region by rendering the country to be a theatre of the power tussle that Niger’s neighbours became victims of.
Yet, the attempted coup in March 2021 made it apparent that Niger was not free of the threat of military seizure of power. France 24 reported quoting a Nigerien official that while the President was in Turkey ‘a second bid to oust Bazoum occurred last March.
Niger also shares some of the fragilities that characterise the central Sahelian countries, although it fared better than its immediate neighbours and avoided the crisis that befell Mali following the collapse of Libya in 2012.
Niger’s democratic credential shares some of the characteristics of Mali’s prior to 2012. Like Niger, Mali prior to 2012, was viewed as an example of democracy in the region. This view is best summed up by one analyst who asserted that ‘Mali has achieved a record of democratization that is among the best in Africa.’ As the events in 2012 revealed and many admitted, Mali’s democracy was not much more than electoral democracy.
Like Mali, Niger’s democracy is bereft of substantive depth that goes beyond elections. According to Afrobarometer’s 2020 survey, despite 53% support for democracy in Niger, 67% of Nigerians surveyed thought that the army ‘can intervene if leaders abuse power.’ Unless democracy is reduced to relatively free elections, it is difficult to imagine why citizens consider military intervention in politics as a first choice for holding leaders to account. A major factor that may account for such attitude is the absence or poor performance of the constitutional mechanisms in a democracy such as separation of powers and checks and balances, independent judiciary, free media and open civic space with autonomous civil society.
Apart from the public attitude to military intervention, the other context for the coup involves the widespread perception of President Bazoum administration’s deepening ties with France and the West in the face of the spreading anti-French sentiment in much of Francophone Africa. In other words, putting Niger on a pedestal might inadvertently have exposed Bazoum’s administration to be on a collision course with Nigeriens opposing to Niger becoming the new hub for France’s operation against terrorist groups in the Sahel as protests earlier in the year showed.
None of the foregoing however makes the coup right, although these could limit public opposition against the coup. Indeed, despite the excuse by the junta that the coup was staged due to ‘the continuing deterioration of the security situation and poor economic and social governance’, the coup mostly has to do with greed and personal interests of those who led it. The actual motivation for the coup is immediately tied to President Bazoum’s plan to replace the leader of the Presidential Guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, who took over as Niger’s leader.
The coup in Niger is the seventh successful coup to take place in Africa since 2020. Six countries stretching from the Atlantic coast in the West to the Red Sea coast in East Africa are being led by men in uniform.
The epidemic of coups, as UN Chief characterized it, is, among others, a result of the crisis of governance of the security sector. The coup in Niger manifests the lack of total break from the experiences of politicization of the armed forces and the militarization of politics associated reflected in the number of successful and attempted coups in the country. As the attempt by Tchiani to forestall his planned replacement shows, the coup also shows the poor level of professionalism and integrity of the military. All of these suggest that democracy in its electoral form will remain susceptible to the vagaries of the army as long as these issues of the crisis of security sector governance are not effectively resolved.
In response to the latest coup in Niger, apart from the unanimous condemnation from AU, UN & other international entities, the regional body ECOWAS adopted the most severe measures including closure of borders & airspace, suspension of economic & financial exchanges and threat of military intervention. These may not be enough to reverse the coup without support from Nigeriens. This highlights that it is utterly inadequate for regional and continental norms to be effective in discouraging coups and other unconstitutional seizure of power to be dependent largely on external mechanisms of protecting constitutional order. More often than not, these norms are not adequately backed by national level robust formal and informal processes and institutions of accountability and checks and balances. They are further undermined by governing elites tampering constitutions including presidential term limits.
The failure of the anti-coup norms of the AU to prevent coups is not thus merely a result of the lack of effective enforcement and consistent application of the norms on the part of the AU. It is also attributable to the lack of mobilizing and nurturing of anti-coup constituency on the part of the African public at the national level. This emphasizes that continental and international actors have to rethink the dominant approaches to democracy that are election centric and to international relations, including development and security cooperation, that are elite-driven. Not only that continental and international actors need to avoid downplaying the political and socio-economic grievances of local populations against national authorities. Their engagement and development and security cooperation should go beyond the security sector and national elites and extend to the human security, political freedom and development needs of local populations as well.
The upshot of the foregoing is that there is a need for rethinking both democracy promotion and counterterrorism security cooperation in Africa anchored on the primacy of the local. As Amani Africa’s research on terrorism asserted, such a paradigm shift necessitates policy interventions that focus ‘on the vulnerabilities and fragilities as well as political and socio-economic governance pathologies that create the conditions both for the emergence and … resilience of terrorist groups’ as well as coups. With such policy interventions that also entail ‘the same, if not more, level of infusion of technical assistance, financial resources and training of civilian expertise is directed to the governance, the economic and social issues facing local populations as the security-related sectors’, it is possible to mobilize a public that would become a bulwark against coups and other threats to constitutional order and security.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’