Briefing on status of implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)
Briefing on status of implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)
Date | 22 June 2023
Tomorrow (22 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1159th session at a ministerial level to receive briefing on the status of implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and other relevant instruments on defence and security on the continent with Special focus on: Update on the Operationalisation of the Africa Standby Force (ASF).
Frederick Shava, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Zimbabwe and chair of the PSC for the month of June, is expected to preside over the session. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief PSC members on the progress made and pending issues in the full operationalization of the ASF, while the various Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are expected to provide update on their respective efforts to attain full operational capability of their Regional Standby Brigades.
The last time PSC met to follow up on the operationalization of the ASF was during its 1069th session held on 10 March 2022. In that session, which adopted a Summary Record as its outcome, the PSC discussed capacity gaps that continue to constrain the deployment and employment of the ASF. During its 1124th session, convened on 1 December 2022, PSC also considered the outcome of the inaugural lessons learned forum on AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the ASF, which was held in November of last year in Abuja, Nigeria. The 1124th session tasked the Military Staff Committee of the PSC to review and submit for its adoption. The conclusions of the inaugural forum was accordingly submitted to and adopted at PSC’s 1129th session. Apart from adopting the conclusions, a key decision taken in that meeting was the direction given by the PSC for the AU Commission to ‘utilize the ASF framework in the mandating, implementation, management, and oversight of all AU PSOs’.
This decision is against the context that the RECs/RMs are deploying regional forces outside of, and even without making references to, the ASF framework except for SADC, which has so far made three deployments (in Lesotho (SAPMIL), Mozambique (SAMIM), and most recently in Eastern DRC) purportedly within the ASF framework. This obviously raises the question of coordination and harmonization of decision-making and mandating process between the AU and RECs/RMs. Beyond coordination, even SADC’s claim of these deployments as ASF deployments could not be considered as ASF deployments to the extent that their deployments were made without the authorization of the PSC. When they were referred to the PSC, it was post-facto. The ASF, as the peacekeeping and intervention outfit of the AU, is established under the PSC Protocol and is envisaged under the Protocol to be deployed in pursuit of a decision of the PSC for the promotion of peace and security. The purported use of ASF outside this framework envisaged in the PSC framework or the resort to ad hoc coalitions constitute an aberration that endangers the fragmentation and erosion of AU’s peace and security order. Such fragmentation creates vacuum that encourages the use of all manners of external security arrangements on the continent that are not necessarily for a multilateral-based peace and security interest of the continent as envisaged in the PSC Protocol.
The purported use of ASF outside this framework envisaged in the PSC framework or the resort to ad hoc coalitions constitute an aberration that endangers the fragmentation and erosion of AU’s peace and security order. Such fragmentation creates vacuum that encourages the use of all manners of external security arrangements on the continent that are not necessarily for a multilateral-based peace and security interest of the continent as envisaged in the PSC Protocol.
Infographic 1: PSC sessions on the ASF and key outcomes
Moreover, as highlighted during the inaugural lessons learned forum, there is also a need for ‘reconceptualization and alignment of the ASF with the current PSO practices and realities’ on account of two main grounds. The first is that the ASF was envisaged to be a continental force coordinated and utilized by the AU. Yet, contrary to the PSC Protocol’s conception of the ASF, the prevalent practice is that it has been regionally facilitated and the forces raised by the regions are claimed to be ‘owned’ by the RECs/RMs. The second is the current security dynamics of the continent taking trans-regional character going beyond one REC/RM and requiring speedy and robust deployment necessitates the ASF is both well resourced and equipped and equally flexibility in the deployment of ASF capabilities without the need for such deployment being tied to a particular region but within the multilateral and continental framework of the AU.
One of the milestones achieved since 1069th session is the adoption of the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and RECs/RMs on the ASF during the Ministerial meeting of the 15th Specialized Technical Committee of Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) that took place on 12 May in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The MoU clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the AU and RECs/RMs in the preparation, employment, deployment, and post-employment of the ASF. Considering that the issue of the operationalization of the ASF as envisaged in the PSC Protocol is in significant part a political issues, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to explore whether the attempt made in the MoU to clarify the modalities of use of the ASF and respective roles of RECs/RMs would be enough to effect the much discussed full operationalization of the ASF in practice.
Considering that the issue of the operationalization of the ASF as envisaged in the PSC Protocol is in significant part a political issues, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to explore whether the attempt made in the MoU to clarify the modalities of use of the ASF and respective roles of RECs/RMs would be enough to effect the much discussed full operationalization of the ASF in practice.
An important aspect of tomorrow’s briefing will be the reception of update from the RECs/RMs on capability generation. AU has been complaining over the ‘hesitancy and reluctance’ by the RECs/RMs to confirm capabilities pledged and how they are to be made available as this would be critical to assess readiness for rapid deployment. At its 1069th session, the Commission informed the PSC that it was only the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) Secretariat that had provided a verification report pursuant to the request of the AU Commission in July 2021 for RECs/RMs to verify their pledged capabilities using the 2019 ASF Pledged Capabilities Verification Guidelines. PSC members are likely to be interested to hear which of the regional brigades other than the EASF were able to submit the verification report and what specific challenges are hindering the rest from submitting the reports. Of interest to the PSC in this regard is the recent request during the 15th STCDSS meeting to declare that the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) is operationally ready for deployment as part of the ASF. Based on this request, the Commission is expected to undertake a verification for the declaration of NARC’s readiness for deployment.
PSC members are likely to be interested to hear which of the regional brigades other than the EASF were able to submit the verification report and what specific challenges are hindering the rest from submitting the reports.
Infographic 2: Declarations on the ASF’s full operationalization
PSC may also receive update on the status of the utilization of the AU Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Doula, Cameroon. The CLB has been put to use for storing and managing equipment for PSOs including some donated to SAMIM and to the Multinational Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram (MNJTF). Despite its important utility, the CLB faces challenges, including shortage of funding for the recruitment of substantive staff because of which the CLB has been functioning through officers seconded by AU Member States. On a positive note, the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in February of this year, approved structures with an estimated cost of USD$ 4,717,606.45 for 2024. The recruitment for the approved structured is however conditioned on the availability of fund. In addition to the funding, lack of capacity in the continent to airlift equipment donated from the CLB in Doula to their intended place of use has been the other challenge. This was apparent from AU and SADC’s struggle to airlift the donated equipment to Mozambique for the use of SAMIM.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. PSC is expected to welcome the Ministerial meeting of the 15th STCDSS and its outcomes, including the adoption of then MoU between the AU and RECs/RMs on the ASF and express its expectations of the contribution of this in advancing the operationalization of the ASF and addressing some of the challenges arising between AU and RECs/RMs in relation to decision-making and mandate processes for the deployment of ASF. On capability generation, PSC may note the request made during the 15th STCDSS meeting to declare operational readiness of NARC for deployment, and it may request the AU Commission to conduct a verification in that regard. Furthermore, PSC may urge RECs/RMs that have not yet done so, to submit reports verifying their pledged capabilities and ensure that their deployments are conducted within the ASF framework. It may also commend RECs/RMs that have attained their full operational capability (FOC) and encourage those RECs/RMs that are yet to achieve FOC, to scale up the capabilities of their Regional Standby Brigades and work towards operationalizing their respective Regional Logistic Depots. On the reconceptualization of the ASF, PSC may echo the 15th STCDSS meeting and request the AU Commission to conduct a strategic review of the ASF and report to the 16th meeting of the STCDSS for consideration. The PSC may in this regard underscore the imperative of adapting the ASF concept to the prevailing realities of conflict dynamics that are not tied to one region and hence could not be addressed under one Regional Standby Force but through the use of the ASF under the AU as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. Taking its earlier decision of the 1129th session calling for all AU PSOs to be deployed under the ASF to the next level, the PSC may assert the need for all deployments under the ASF to be authorized by the PSC in accordance with the PSC Protocol. On the Continental Logistics Base, while welcoming the structures approved by the 36th ordinary session of the Assembly, PSC may appeal to Member States to support the efforts for the mobilization of the required budget of USD$ 4,717,606.45 for the approved structures.
AFRICA AND PEACE AND SECURITY DIPLOMACY IN A TIME OF THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE
AFRICA AND PEACE AND SECURITY DIPLOMACY IN A TIME OF THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE
Date | 16 June 2023
INTRODUCTION
One of the policy briefs arising from the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s 2021 report ‘Our Common Agenda’ that is expected to be released in the near future is the New Agenda for Peace. The framing of the New Agenda for Peace echoes the 1992 report of the then Secretary-General of the UN Boutros Boutros Ghali titled An agenda for Peace, a report that sought to articulate the Secretary-General’s view of how the UN should pursue preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world. Understandably, An Agenda for Peace was premised on the new context of the then emerging character the world order was taking in the aftermath of the demise of the Cold War.
Why the idea of the establishment of a civilian transitional authority in Sudan should be taken seriously and how it can be realized
Why the idea of the establishment of a civilian transitional authority in Sudan should be taken seriously and how it can be realized
Date | 15 June 2023
Solomon A. Dersso with contribution from Zekarias Beshah
Almost three months into the fighting, there is no sign of the war in Sudan slowing down let alone ending. Each of the warring parties in Sudan, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is locked in a logic for imposing its will by the barrel of the gun. The resultant entrenchment of the fighting is exacting enormous suffering on the Sudanese public and destruction on the state infrastructure.
Despite various diplomatic efforts involving regional and international actors and the announcement of about a dozen ceasefire initiatives or agreements, there is little to show for it. If anything, the approach of the peace and security and humanitarian diplomacy is aggravating the situation. It has bestowed legitimacy on the two warring parties. The singular focus of the efforts for ceasefire or humanitarian truce as well as peace mediation, as illustrated by the 12 June 2023 IGAD summit decision, is on the two parties, thereby inadvertently incentivizing the reinforcement of their respective positions.
Instead of any change of course, both the logic of the warring parties to achieve their objective through fighting and the glorification by the diplomatic processes of the two belligerents have set Sudan on a path for a protracted conflict with all the more catastrophic risks it carries with it. There is as a result a present danger of the collapse of the Sudanese state.
Sudanese civic actors are the only ones that provide the Sudanese state and the international community the viable window for averting this present danger of state collapse and the accompanying apocalyptic consequences that are frightening to contemplate. These civic actors comprise diverse groups, including the neighborhood/resistance committee, professional associations, trade unions, political parties and local community formations. Distinguishing themselves from other civic actors in other countries, Sudanese civilian actors have displayed incredible level of organizational ingenuity, agility and resilience.
It was the peaceful protest and other civic actions that they mobilized that set the stage for the overthrow of the three decades dictatorial rule of Omar El Bashir in April 2019. While drawing on rich civic traditions, the non-violent movement waged by these actors, or what is referred to as the ‘December Revolution’, drew the participation of people from various walk of life, with women and youth taking active role in organization and leadership.
When the military sought to abort the revolution by declaring military rule for three years after seizing power by ousting Bashir in April 2019, it was the Sudanese civic actors that fought this illegal seizure of power and imposition of military rule. Despite violent crackdown by the SAF and the RSF, Sudanese civic actors did not opt for armed insurrection as was the case in Libya. They displayed firm commitment for peaceful resistance. As Susan Stigant pointed out, ‘any tensions among Sudanese civilians should not belie their near-unwavering unity on a foundational principle: A commitment to democratic politics and debate, however messy. That commitment stands in stark contrast with the persistent behavior of senior officials in the SAF and RSF, who use force indiscriminately to settle their differences.’
All these provided the basis for the African Union (AU), together with the then Chairperson of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), supported by the US and gulf countries, to facilitate mediation for the establishment of a transitional process.
The power-sharing agreement this process produced with alteration of leadership of the Sovereign Council (the highest authority of the transitional power-sharing government) during an agreed 39-month period and legitimizing the military’s seizure of government power and active role in politics was the original sin that the international community committed. Seen as a pragmatic necessity, this arrangement ended up incentivizing the appetite of the SAF and the RSF to entrench their grip on power. Thus, just before transferring the role of heading the Sovereign Council to the civilian leadership of the power-sharing government as per the terms of the August 2019 Constitutional Declaration, the SAF and the RSF staged a coup and arrested Prime Minister Abdela Hamdok and his cabinet on 25 October 2021.
Once again it fell on the Sudanese civic actors to mobilize against the illegal usurpation of power by going to street with their legendary peaceful protests, forcing the military to engage in a shaky political process that aimed at resolving the standoff between protesters and the military. They even went as far as articulating a constitutional document. This time around, AU, IGAD and UN joined hands under a Trilateral Mechanism to facilitate the political process, but with the same strategy that is anchored on people with the guns. As in 2019, the political process resulted in the signing of a ‘Political Framework Agreement (PFA)’ on 5 December 2022 between the military and section of the civilian actors organized under Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). The US and other members of the Quad (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and UK) were behind this agreement.
The PFA, lauded by its sponsors as the first step towards the restoration of a civilian-led government but greeted with opposition from the resistance committees, instead of putting Sudan on a footing for democratic dispensation, set the SAF and the RSF, the incompatibility of whose interests has grown increasingly deep, on a collision course. While seemingly engaging the trilateral process, they were preparing for a final showdown to settle their power contest. The Trilateral Mechanism was busy in convening workshops and consultations to facilitate the appointment of a new prime minister when the two generals, Al Burhan of SAF and RSF commander Dagalo, started fighting in Khartoum on 15 April.
This time around as well, Sudanese civic actors, the unsung heroes, rose to the occasion, once again demonstrating their organizational ability to serve the public good even in the midst of fierce fighting between the SAF and the RSF through humanitarian action and local peace activism and peace making. They mobilized themselves to identify safe passages for enabling civilians caught in the cross fire to escape from harm’s way into safer areas, thereby serving not only Sudanese civilians but also foreigners including members of the diplomatic community. They organized humanitarian assistance involving the provision of food and medical help for civilians cut off from access to basic necessities due to the heavy fighting. Leaders of local communities in parts of Sudan signed local peace agreements to avoid being drawn into the fighting. Similarly, various civic actors rejected the war and campaigned for keeping Sudanese people from taking side in the war that they never chose.
Despite all of these, the international peace and humanitarian diplomatic processes showed little imagination and flexibility for anchoring their engagement on Sudanese civic actors and the enormous organizational resources they avail for humanitarian action, peacemaking and monitoring and reporting on the ceasefire commitments of the two fighting parties. Instead, these processes continue to show incredible level of impotence which was further compounded by proliferation of roadmaps and peace forums that continue to glorify the people with guns who are burning Sudan to the ground.
In the light of the extraordinary and present danger of state collapse arising from the continuation of the war and the lack of breakthrough from the use of the same failed diplomatic approach, there is an urgent need for changing course. This necessitates shifting the locus of peacemaking from the greed driven SAF-RSF duo to the Sudanese civic actors, who hold the key for averting the dangers associated with the continuation of this greed driven war.
The most viable avenue for seizing the opportunity that Sudanese civic actors present for saving the Sudanese state from collapse and the apocalyptic dangers that such collapse is sure to precipitate is the establishment of a civilian transitional government. It is true that this is a radical approach that is neither clean nor easy. But the extraordinary nature of the situation in Sudan demands nothing short of such radical approach. Under the circumstances, there is neither a clean nor an easy approach better than this for arresting Sudan’s descent into collapse.
While this proposal builds on arguments that analysts such as Alex de Waal made, we make a case for a two-staged process towards it. With these two phased processes, it is possible to inject a measure of pragmatism to this proposal.
The first phase involves the establishment of a civilian care taker government. This is a government whose only raison d’etre is the salvation of the Sudanese state by creating the space for a Sudanese led peace process that brings to the center of diplomatic efforts the agency of Sudanese civic actors. The mandate of this care taker government is envisaged to be further limited both in time and its non-participation in the subsequent transitional process. As a body with such limited emergency and technocratic power for saving the Sudanese state, there is a need for its urgent establishment whose narrow focus can mitigate, if not dissolve, fragmentation and contestation which was used against effective engagement with Sudanese civic actors.
Within the framework of the foregoing, this care taker government will have two principal roles. First is to mobilize Sudanese people in their various formations and the international community towards securing ceasefire. For it to succeed, it has to receive not only diplomatic recognition but also importantly substantial institutional support for it to be in charge of such state institutions as the bureaucracy and the Central Bank.
The establishment of such care taker government by Sudanese civic actors and the diplomatic recognition of such government by the international community brings multiple benefits for the search for ending the conflict. First, by creating an entity as main locus of diplomatic efforts and separate from either of the two fighting parties, it ends the glorification of the people with gun who are unleashing the destruction of the country. Clearly, such a care taker government does not dispense with the necessity of engaging the warring parties but disrupts the incentive structure. Second, it thus has the potential to break the logic of total victory and total defeat by which the action of the warring parties is currently dictated. Third, this would incentivize the warring parties, perhaps most notably the SAF, to opt for committing to ceasefire as a means of limiting their loss in any future dispensation. Fourth, by the sheer fact of its presence, it is also possible that the warring parties would be put into a position pursuing their interests by choosing to accept the role of the care taker government.
The second role of the care taker government, which will not be part of the future transitional government, is the creation of the conditions for the holding of a national popular convention. This is a convention that will bring together various political and social forces of Sudan for the elaboration of a transitional roadmap and the establishment the transitional government for the implementation of the roadmap involving various reforms that will usher in a democratic dispensation in Sudan.
Whether or not this could work and how it could be made to work depends first and foremost on the Sudanese civic actors. With them showing leadership by seizing the initiative themselves and doing so without much delay, they present an opportune challenge for international diplomacy to save itself from its repeatedly failed approach.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Briefing update on situation in the Horn of Africa
Briefing update on situation in the Horn of Africa
Date | 15 June 2023
Tomorrow (15 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1158th session to receive briefing update on the situation in the Horn of Africa. The briefing is expected to focus on the conflict in Sudan and its regional implication, and the implementation of the Pretoria Comprehensive Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Ethiopia.
The session commences with opening statement from Sophia Nyamudeza, Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of June, while Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make remarks. Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s former President and AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa will brief members of the PSC. The representatives of Ethiopia, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat, the United Nations (UN), and the European Union are also expected to deliver statements during the session.
On Sudan
The last time PSC met on the situation in Sudan was at its 1156th session on 27 May, which was held at the level of Heads of State and Government. In that session, the PSC adopted the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan that identifies six priority areas for AU engagement towards silencing the guns in Sudan.
Coming on the heels of 14th ordinary session of IGAD Heads of State and Government, held on 12 June in Djibouti, PSC members are likely to be interested to be briefed on the major outcomes of the summit and how it reframes diplomatic efforts for peace in Sudan. It has emerged from the summit that IGAD adopted a new roadmap for peace in Sudan whose action plans include to expand the IGAD High-Level delegation for Peace in Sudan, which was formed at the 40th extraordinary IGAD summit, held on 16 April, to give space for Ethiopia and establish a quartet with Kenya assigned with the role of chairing the quartet. Kenya’s President William Ruto, who is the chair of the quartet, also announced the plan to convene a face-to-face meeting between the quartet and the leaders of the belligerents within ten days.
This plan involves an exercise in claiming and asserting leadership role by IGAD in the search for resolution the new conflict in Sudan. In doing so, this plan, while not opposed to the US-Saudi or the AU initiatives, seeks to establish another platform and peace process. This peace processes, if not rationalised with other existing or emerging processes under US-Saudi or the AU, will be the third peace process. It would thus have the effect of not only multiplication of processes but also if successful can displace the AU’s Roadmap and the envisaged roles of the Expanded Mechanism as well as its Core Group.
It is to be recalled that the 20 April High-Level meeting convened under the auspices of the Chairperson of the AU Commission established the Expanded Mechanism to serve as the main platform to coordinate and consolidate international responses towards the conflict. As the Mechanism is so expanded in its nature, a ‘Core Group’ with smaller number of actors was established pursuant to the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan for effective action. If conflict and competition between the two processes is to be avoided, there is a need for the PSC to revise the AU Roadmap.
In terms of the regional implications, the lack of progress in the diplomatic efforts for containing the war makes it increasingly worrisome to neighbouring countries. On 15 June, Sudan marks the second month of the conflict, leaving 25 million people – about half of the population of the country – in need of humanitarian assistance. (See below the infographic on the humanitarian consequences of the conflict).
Infographic 1: Humanitarian crisis of the conflict in Sudan and attacks on civilian infrastructures
Source: IOM, UNICEF, WHO, and UNHCR
Despite plethora of diplomatic initiatives to end the conflict, the conflict has continued unabated, causing enormous suffering to civilians and damage to the state infrastructure. Thus far, nearly a dozen ceasefire declarations and agreements have been announced. Some of these ceasefires brought brief respite, allowing evacuation of diplomats and foreign nationals and limited flow of aid, but almost all of the ceasefire initiatives have failed to take hold, including the most recent ceasefire brokered by Saudi Arabia and the US on 9 June.
Infographic 2: Timeline of AU engagement and ceasefire initiatives
Source: Amani Africa’s tracker of diplomatic efforts on Sudan conflict
The impact of the ongoing conflict in Sudan will not be limited to the country, but also has the potential of convulsing the wider region given the geographic location of the country that borders seven countries, most of which are in fragile context. It is within this light that the agenda of tomorrow’s session is framed although the ripple effects of the conflict will be strongly felt even beyond the Horn of Africa, particularly in those countries which borders Sudan to the west, namely Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad.
The ripple effect of the conflict could manifest at least in three ways. The first is in terms of the refugee crisis that the conflict triggered, placing strain on the neighboring countries’ overstretched resources that are grappling with their own humanitarian crisis. IOM, UNHCR and government sources provide that around 476,811 people have fled to neighboring countries as of 4 June, some of them are in fact people displaced by internal crisis in their own countries. The influx of refugees to the neighboring states may fuel ethnic tensions in some context. The disruption of cross border trade because of the conflict is also resulting in food price increases in some countries such as South Sudan, Chad, and CAR.
Infographic 3: Number of people fleeing to neighboring countries
Source: IOM, Sudan Response Situation Update, 6 June 2023
Second, the conflict in Sudan not only risks a spillover into surrounding countries but also could morph into a regional conflict with the high possibility of dragging in its neighbors into the conflict. For the time being, most of the neighboring states seem to have adopted a neutral posture and even some of them offering mediation between the warring parties, but this could change as the conflict becomes protracted and spread closer to their borders. The controversy between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan over al-Fashaga (a contested territory controlled by Sudan during the Tigray conflict) are some of the dynamics raising the fear of regional spillover. For South Sudan, the conflict has direct economic consequences, which is dependent on Sudan for its oil export – the main source of revenue for the country.
Sudan is also a country where Islamist movements are very active. As a country that in the past hosted the late Al Qaida leader Osama bin Laden and sharing a border with Sahel, a state collapse in Sudan will create a vacuum that would be most attractive to terrorist groups both from the Sahel and Horn of Africa and outside of Africa as well.
As the expansion of the conflict towards Darfur looms large, the immediate spillover risk could be for countries west of Sudan, particularly Chad and CAR. West Darfur’s El Geneina, which is very close to the border with Chad, have already experienced the most deadly violence in recent days, raising the spectre of genocidal violence particularly targeting non-Arab communities. The cross-border ethnic dynamics between Sudan and Chad and the history of cross-border raids during the Darfur conflict decades ago; the presence of fluid non-state actors in CAR, Chad, and Libya; the involvement of various Sudanese armed groups in the conflict in Libya; as well as the reported presence of the Wagner group in CAR and its alleged support to the RSF are likely to increase the chance of the regionalization of the conflict.
Third, Sudan’s conflict risks proliferation of and easy access to illicit arms and weapons in the neighboring countries, more so in the context of porous borders. Sudan ranks second among its regional neighbor with over three million estimated firearms. According to sources, 2.7 million small arms and light weapons were estimated to circulate outside of state-controlled stockpiles. The ongoing conflict would create fertile condition for the smuggling of firearms to neighboring countries with the possibility of unleashing Libya-like situation where the flood of arms from that country significantly changed the security landscape of the continent for the worse by plunging the Sahel into hotbed of terrorism. Beyond countries in the region, protracted conflict in Sudan is also likely to ignite proxy war involving regional and international powers.
On Ethiopia
The signing of the Pretoria Comprehensive Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) constituted a turning point in bringing to a halt the deadliest war that was raging in northern Ethiopia. Developments since the signing of this agreement on 2 November 2022 indicate that active hostilities involving the signatory parties have come to an end. Follow up steps for the implementation of some of the key elements relating to cessation of hostilities such as the convening of the senior military commanders (which was held on 7 November hosted in Nairobi, Kenya) was held and the process of the handover of heavy weaponry and the deployment of Ethiopian Federal forces to Tigray have largely been undertaken.
As envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement, the AU working with the parties elaborated the terms of reference of the monitoring, verification and compliance mechanism. Subsequently, the Monitoring Verification and Compliance Mechanism (MVCM) comprising the Team of African Experts (Led by Maj. Gen. Stephen Radina from Kenya, the AU-MVCM includes Colonel Rufai Umar Mairiga of Nigeria and Colonel Teffo Sekole of South Africa) and Liaison Officers of the Parties was deployed to Mekele and launched on 29 December 2022. In the second joint Committee meeting of the MVCM convened by the AU on 24 May, the Committee underscored ‘the need to accelerate the demobilization and reintegration of the Tigray armed combatants’, and ‘to enhance the safety and protection of civilians by facilitating the steady return of internally displaced persons and refugees to the affected areas’ in line with the CoHA and the subsequent Nairobi Declaration of the Senior Commanders of 7 November 2023. In the light of the continued need for the work of the MVCM, the AU extended the mandate of the mechanism for further six months period until the end of December 2023.
The implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and restoring relations between Tigray and Federal authorities continues to show remarkable progress. One of the major developments towards the stabilization of the Tigray region and laying the foundation for restoring normalcy was the establishment of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (IRA) on 17 March 2023. Federal Parliament removed the designation of the TPLF as terrorist organization on 22 March 2023 and federal authorities dropped criminal charges against TPLF leaders.
While the pace and sustained implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and notably the commitment of the parties to the peace agreement have stunned many both within and outside Ethiopia, not surprisingly, implementation has not been without impediments. Despite the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from many parts of Tigray in accordance with Pretoria Agreement, there have been various reports of not just their continued presence in some parts of Tigray but involvement in the perpetuation of violence. Tigray IRA President, Getachew Reda, on 20 May accused Eritrean forces of blocking AU monitors from carrying out their monitoring activities in certain parts of Tigray. There is also the issue of the continued occupation by Amhara forces of the contested Western Tigray. On 23 May, thousands of people have staged protest in Tigray to demand the return of people displaced by the war there and the withdrawal of outside forces in accordance with the Pretoria Agreement.
The agreement outlines other guarantees, including the protection of civilians’ from violations; the resumption of public services in the region; the unobstructed flow of humanitarian supplies to Tigray; and a provision affirming that the two parties will facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to the region. While there are positive developments in this respect including the resumption of services that were disconnected during the two years war cutting Tigray off from access to basic needs and the rest of the world, progress in the provision of the requisite support to war affected people and in the rehabilitation of their lives and livelihoods to facilitate return of IDPs remains slow and unsatisfactory to the expectations and demands of the conditions facing war affected people.
Another setback to the implementation of Pretoria Agreement and in the normalisation of relations between Tigray and Federal authorities is the decision on 13 May 2023 of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) rejecting the TPLF’s request to restore its legal registration as a political Party, which was cancelled in January 2021 in the context of the designation of TPLF as terrorist organization after the outbreak of war. The TPLF and Tigray’s IRA denounced the decision, characterising it as being contrary to the Pretoria Agreement and developments since then.
Despite these various challenges and setbacks, the parties to the Pretoria Agreement continue to display commitment to follow through the implementation and build on the progress made so far. In this respect, one important positive recent development was the visit by the President of the Tigray IRA to the Amhara region on 11 June which, according to the President, was ‘as part of the efforts to address challenges to peace.’ One area that requires the most urgent attention for sustaining momentum in restoring normalcy in conflict affected areas including Tigray is the pace of implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction programs which are key for delivering peace dividends to conflict affected populations. Also not any less important is ensuring that humanitarian assistance that is disrupted due to the reported widespread diversion of aid is restored and those in desperate need of support receive the much needed aid while those responsible for diversion are held accountable.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. In relation to Sudan, PSC is expected to take note of IGAD’s 14th ordinary session of Heads of State and Government, held on 12 June in Djibouti. PSC may welcome the decision of the summit to expand IGAD Troika on Sudan and establish the quartet to lead the mediation effort in Sudan. In light of the decision of the summit, PSC may take a decision to adjust AU’s role with a focus on supporting the IGAD initiative, and to this end, it may request the AU Commission to designate an AU envoy that is fully dedicated to the Sudan file and provides the leadership for AU’s engagement in supporting the peace process. PSC may also task the AU Commission to reorganize the Expanded Mechanism to become the platform that facilitates coordination and information exchange among the countries neighbouring Sudan and for mobilizing support from the wider membership of the AU. It may also request the Commission to update the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan with a focus on active engagement of the neighbouring countries while securing their neutrality vis-à-vis the two fighting sides. In relation to the regional implication of the conflict, PSC is expected to express its concern over the spillover risks of the conflict in Sudan to the neighboring states and the wider region. Cognizant of this, the PSC may stress the need for devising strategies on how to contain the multifaceted implications of the conflict in Sudan to the neighboring countries, the Horn of Africa region and beyond. In this regard, the PSC may follow-up on the initiative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission to dispatch emissaries to neighbouring states and the Horn of Africa region to commend the countries of the region for their restraint thus far and to encourage them to refrain from taking sides in the current conflict. The PSC may also commend neighbouring countries who allowed access to Sudanese who are fleeing the fighting and seeking refuge in the neighbouring countries. It may also request the AUC to facilitate support from within the continent and beyond for helping the neighbouring countries in their efforts to welcome and host Sudanese refugees. The PSC may call for the fighting parties to extend full cooperation for the IGAD peace plan and may task the AUC to also focus on supporting the efforts of civilian actors in Sudan to play active role in the Sudan peace processes. On the Ethiopia peace process, the PSC may welcome the significant progress made in the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and the firm commitment that the parties have continued to display for sustaining progress despite challenges they are facing. It may commend the parties for the restoration of essential services, flow of humanitarian aid, TPLF’s turnover of heavy weapons and the establishment of the Tigray IRA. The PSC may also commend the high-level panel under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo. The PSC may call on the AU to continue its support for the implementation of CoHA and encourage the parties to remain committed to sustaining the progress they have made so far. The PSC may encourage the parties to handle the issue of reinstatement of the political party status of TPLF by dialogue and in accordance with the spirit of the CoHA. It may call for further efforts of the parties particularly in meeting the expectations of those affected by the war through speedy mobilization and implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction projects and in addressing challenges faced including with respect to demobilization and reintegration of forces and the presence of forces other than Ethiopian Federal forces. The PSC may welcome the work of the MVCM and endorse the recent extension of the mandate of the mechanism.