Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - April 2023
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - April 2023
Date | April 2023
Tunisia assumed the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in April. Six meetings were held during the month. One of these was an emergency session not envisaged within the programme of work and one session scheduled for the month was postponed. The initial programme of work for the month also envisaged convening of PSC’s 15th Retreat on its Working Methods but the activity was removed from the revised programme of work.
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Briefing on the situation in Sudan
Date | 27 May 2023
Tomorrow (27 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1156th session at the level of Heads of State and Government to consider the situation in Sudan.
Uganda’s President and chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, will preside over the session. President of the Union of the Comoros and Chairperson of the AU, Azali Assoumani, is expected to make remarks while the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, will brief the PSC. Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Workneh Gebeyehu; Executive Secretary of the League of Arab States, Ahmen Aboul Gheit; Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), António Guterres; as well as the representative of Egypt are also expected to deliver statements.
The PSC is convening on Sudan for the second time in less than two weeks, constituting the third session of the PSC since the outbreak of the conflict on 15 April 2023. The last time the PSC met on Sudan was on 16 May, at its 1154th session, with a press statement released as the product of the session. In the press statement, the PSC, apart from condemning the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), warned that ‘all perpetrators of criminal actions will be held accountable.’ This warning came against the backdrop of the widespread looting and destruction of civilian infrastructure, as well as diplomatic missions in violation of international law.
As the fighting continued, new dynamics are emerging in the conflict while exacerbating the existing ones. On 22 May, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Volker Perthes, in his briefing to the UN Security Council, raised alarm over the ‘growing ethnicization’ of the ongoing fighting and its risk of ‘engulfing the country in a prolonged conflict, with implication for the region.’ This was particularly manifested in West Darfur’s El Geneina where the fighting between SAF and RSF morphed into ethnic violence on 24 April while ethnic mobilization is simmering in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region.
As the belligerents opted for urban warfare with sheer disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights, the humanitarian consequence of the conflict in Sudan has become devastating. Sources indicate that more than 850 civilians have been killed and over 5,000 injured since the fighting began. The number of displaced people due to the conflict has now topped the 1 million mark, fleeing to safer locations inside and outside the country. Despite the pressing need for humanitarian aid, the revised Humanitarian Response Plan launched by OCHA was able to secure 12.4% of the required $2.6 billion funds to reach 18 million people in need.
Looting has become rampant in Khartoum and elsewhere and key civilian infrastructures have been targeted, severely restricting the accessibility of essential goods and services to those who are caught in the crossfire. During the 22 May briefing to the UN Security Council, SRSG Perthes highlighted the collapse of the health sector with more than two-thirds of hospitals being closed. International organizations such as the UN, humanitarian actors and diplomatic missions are not spared from the attacks and the widespread looting.
As documented by Amani Africa, ten declarations for ceasefire have been announced with many of which represent the parties’ expression of readiness to observe the declared ceasefire. However, almost all of the ceasefires did not hold. The latest of these is the Short-Term Ceasefire and Humanitarian Arrangements signed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 20 May. Envisaged to become effective on 22 May, this latest ceasefire seeks to facilitate the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance and the restoration of essential services. Unlike the previous ones, the ceasefire agreement is the first with a monitoring mechanism comprising the representatives of Saudi Arabia and the US, albeit it lacks effectiveness in the absence of presence on the ground or the involvement of Sudanese on the ground. It is hoped to provide a brief respite for the civilians from the enormous suffering, but the fighting has not meaningfully stopped as in the previous ceasefires.
Tomorrow’s session will present PSC members with the opportunity to take stock of the ongoing diplomatic efforts and discuss the next steps to end the conflict. Given that the session is convened at the highest (summit) level, the PSC is expected to take strategic decisions based on the De-Escalation Plan, which is expected to guide tomorrow’s discussion on Sudan. It is to be recalled that the 20 April Ministerial Special Session on Sudan requested the development of an urgent plan for de-escalation. In his briefing to the UN Security Council on 22 May, Bankole outlined the six pillars of the Plan that need to be addressed for a sustainable resolution of the conflict in Sudan. These pillars are:
- Co-ordinated international action to avoid a proliferation and duplication of mediation initiatives;
- Immediate, comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire;
- Urgent humanitarian action to relive the suffering of the Sudanese people;
- Protection of civilians, state infrastructure and ensuring accountability;
- Firm support to neighboring countries of the region impacted by the crisis; and
- Resumption of inclusive and fully representative political process towards a democratic, civilian-led government.
Indeed, one of the concerns emerging out of the ongoing diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict is the proliferation of actors and mediation initiatives. Despite that the key actors who participated during the 20 Ministerial Special Session agreed to ‘coordinate, collaborate, and harmonize their respective initiatives to resolve the conflict’, the initiatives are not only uncoordinated but also at times competing.
The 16 April emergency session of the PSC as well as the Ministerial Special Session envisaged the Chairperson of the AU Commission to take the leadership in coordinating international responses to the crisis within the framework of the Trilateral Mechanism (AU-IGAD-UN). On the other hand, IGAD’s 16 April extraordinary summit formed a high-level delegation led by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir Mayardit. The 7 May emergency ministerial level meeting of the League of Arab States (LAS) established a contact group on Sudan composed of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the LAS Secretary-General to find a peaceful settlement for the conflict. It was in addition to these diplomatic initiatives that Saudi Arabia and the US created a separate mediation track that culminated in the signing of two important agreements: the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan and the 20 May Short-Term Ceasefire and Humanitarian Arrangements.
Regional actors such as the AU and IGAD may appreciate the outcomes of the Jeddah mediation process, but are likely to remain unhappy with a process that has sidelined them. The need for the involvement of regional actors has been a major issue emphasized by the different speakers during the 22 May UN Security Council briefing. For instance, IGAD’s Executive Secretary stressed the importance of involving Sudan’s neighbors, while the African Members in the UN Security Council (A3) reaffirmed ‘the central role of the AU, IGAD and the Trilateral Mechanism in stabilizing Sudan’.
The other key concern is that ongoing diplomatic efforts have failed to include one of the key stakeholders in Sudan’s peace process – the civilians. This is a major omission considering that civilian actors in their various formations continue to play, as they did during and since the 2019 Sudan revolution, a vital role towards the achievement of democratic transition. Since the outbreak of the war, civilians continue to display their organizational ingenuity in identifying safe corridors for civilians to escape the sights of fighting to safer areas, in organizing humanitarian help of various kinds including medical assistance in their neighborhoods and in signing local peace agreements. In light of the nature of the conflict, it is a missed opportunity that international diplomatic efforts are not leveraging these various local initiatives for enhancing the space for civilian protection, ceasefire monitoring, local level peace building and humanitarian protection. Tomorrow’s session is an opportunity for the PSC to call on the representation of civilians in all diplomatic efforts.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will endorse the De-escalation Plan developed by the AU Commission pursuant to the 20 April Ministerial Special Session. PSC may welcome the signing of a Seven-day Agreement on a Short-Term Ceasefire and Humanitarian Arrangements in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 20 May, while expressing its deep concern over the reported violations of the Agreement by both sides. It may remind the parties of their obligations under international law and urge them to fully uphold their commitments under the Agreement. As the duration of the ceasefire agreement expires early next week, the PSC may urge the parties to extend the agreement for additional periods so that it paves the way for talks towards a more comprehensive ceasefire agreement. The PSC may commend various civilian actors in Sudan for their efforts in lessening the impact of the war on civilians through local humanitarian action, peace agreements and identification of safe corridors. It may emphasize the need for international diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to leverage and support these local civilian initiatives and ensure that civilians are represented in negotiations. Against the widespread looting and violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights by the parties, the PSC may call for the documentation and reporting of the various acts of violations as the key measure for ensuring the protection of civilians. While noting Saudi Arabia/US facilitated talks in Jeddah, the PSC may stress not only the imperative of a coordinated and consolidated diplomatic effort to resolve the conflict but also the centrality of the region (AU, IGAD, the Trilateral Mechanism, and the neighboring countries) in this process. In this respect, the PSC may call for the establishment of an international contact group on Sudan co-chaired by the AU and the UN and represented by all regional and international actors including the sponsors of the recent ceasefire.
Open Session on Humanitarian Action in Africa
Open Session on Humanitarian Action in Africa
Date | 18 May 2023
Tomorrow (18 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene its 1155th meeting which will be committed to its annual open session on humanitarian action in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Representative of the AU Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Development may deliver a statement. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are also expected to participate in the session.
Being convened within the framework of the decision of PSC’s 469th press statement to dedicate an annual session to humanitarian action in Africa, tomorrow’s meeting is expected to offer updates on the humanitarian situation in the continent, with a specific focus on the issue of food insecurity and prospects to enhance Africa’s self-reliance in food production. Having regard to the growing prevalence of the issue, it is to be recalled that the PSC committed its 1083rd session to ‘food security and conflict in Africa’. In the Communiqué of that session, the impact of conflicts on food production and the role they play in the disruption of agricultural yields and value chains was emphasised. The coming session serves to highlight the continuing increase in food insecurity in the continent and opportunities for Africa to enhance agricultural production to promote food security.
Driven by multiple man-made and natural causes, the current food security crisis experienced across the various regions and countries in Africa has reached unprecedented levels over the past couple of years. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and its socio-economic impact, the war in Ukraine and resulting disruption to food and energy supply chains as well as cropping seasons characterised by poor rains and even drought in some regions, compounded by ongoing conflicts and unstable security settings, have resulted in acute food insecurity in many parts of the continent. According to the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), a total of 20.2 percent of the African population was facing hunger in 2021 alone. Last year, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war and the geostrategic confrontation it triggered, African countries that depend on Russia and Ukraine for at least half percentage of their cereal import experienced over 70 percent raise in cereal prices. Not only has this put a major strain on the availability of and access to basic food items, it has also elevated hunger levels as the portion of population that cannot cope with the rise in food prices increased.
Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the food and energy crisis that the Russian invasion and the ensuing geopolitical confrontation triggered have underscored the imperative for Africa to severe its dependence on global supply chains for its food. The corollary to this imperative is the need for Africa to harness its enormous agricultural potential for achieving food security. Additionally, AU member states need to use this crisis for leveraging the African Common Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) for enhancing intra-Africa trade in agricultural products by prioritizing and fast tracking the processes for trading in agricultural products.
The East and Horn of Africa constitutes one of the regions, not only in Africa but also globally, most affected by food insecurity. As of December 2022, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated 37 million people in the region to be faced with acute food insecurity. Aside from being faced with the worst droughts experienced in decades, the region is home to some of the worst conflict situations in the continent. The devastating combined effect of insecurity, drought and other impacts of climate change such as floods have led to the displacement of over 13 million people in the east and horn region, as of June last year. South Sudan, which faces severe challenges in agricultural production due to the highest level of flooding the country has gone through in over 60 years, has 8.3 million people who face critical level of food insecurity as well as famine reported in multiple areas of the country. In Ethiopia, where over 22 million people are reportedly facing severe food shortages, over 8 million people are affected by prolonged drought experienced in the country’s south and south-east parts while the conflict in Tigray and affected neighbouring regions has left 83 percent of the population food insecure. In Somalia, 6.5 million people are reportedly facing acute food insecurity due to multiyear drought that the country continues to suffer from. Despite earlier predictions of improved cereal production in Sudan due to projected favourable weather conditions, the situation in the country is not looking good either, due to the difficult economic conditions and the political instability, which are now compounded by the outbreak of the raging war.
West Africa and the Sahel are faring no better than the east and horn region. Estimates indicate that over 18 million people in the Sahel region experience severe food insecurity. Nigeria hosts 13 million people living under grave level of acute food insecurity. A significant amount of these are located in Boko Haram affected regions. Erratic rainy season, insecurity and rise in food price with reduced supply of food items leaves 1.2 million people in Mali requiring urgent food assistance. Substantial portion of these people are populations displaced due to terrorism related conflict and intercommunal violence. Burkina Faso which now hosts the highest number of IDPs in the Sahel region – 1.9 million Burkinabe citizens displaced internally – is projected to have 3.5 million people facing acute food insecurity in the coming agricultural season of 2023.
In CAR, reduced access to basic materials required for agricultural production has been a principal factor behind the increase in the price of local foodstuff while the cost of imported goods has gone even higher due to rise in fuel and transportation prices. In the coming months of 2023, estimates point that about 3 million people are likely to be in crisis and emergency phases of food insecurity, particularly in violence affected and displaced community hosting regions. One of the world’s largest hunger crisis currently, DRC is home to 26.4 million food insecure people, a number topping the total for some of the entire sub-regions of the continent. As the current conflict in the eastern part of the country fuels the growing displacement rate, factors related to climatic shocks and poor agricultural yields drive the increasing degree of food insecurity.
Although to a much lesser extent, countries in the north and southern Africa regions have also felt the impacts of the cost-of-living crisis resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war. In countries like Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia inflation rates have gone up considerable percentages leading to increase in food prices while people’s purchasing power decreases. In the southern Africa region, in addition to the spike in cost-of-living, Malawi and Zimbabwe are susceptible to raising degrees of food crisis due to likelihood of droughts and cyclones while violent conflict is the main driver of food insecurity in Mozambique.
Although all of these data project a grim image, it also offers the opportunity to re-examine Africa’s approach in responding to food insecurity, in order to identify gaps and find solutions. In this respect, one important aspect the PSC may reflect on is the significance of responding to Africa’s food security crisis in a comprehensive manner that takes account of humanitarian, developmental and peace and security factors into consideration. While partnerships for humanitarian aid are pertinent and in fact indispensable to respond to immediate needs of affected populations, it is essential to ensure sustainability of humanitarian assistance, specifically by linking such efforts with development programmes that aim to boost food production at the national level. This opens up the potential for local communities to be assisted in a manner that would not only enable their eventual self-reliance, but also their contribution to nation-wide food production.
Further to tailoring humanitarian assistance towards building durable and sustainable food production along with addressing urgent needs, it is also critical for African member states to make all the necessary efforts to ‘build sustainable and resilient agri-food system to ensure food sovereignty’ as articulated in the Declaration of the 15th Extraordinary AU Humanitarian Summit [Ext/Assembly/AU/Decl.(XV)]. In most of the highly affected African countries, absence of agricultural modernisation and weak institutional capacity to provide research supported farming practices are among the factors which facilitate food insecurity. This requires that AU member states invest more on the agricultural sector.
Having regard to the role conflict and political instability play in inflaming food insecurity, the imperative for practical steps for silencing the guns cannot be overemphasized. For this, the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), UN and others together with CSOs need to work on preventing new conflicts from erupting and in mobilizing all their efforts for resolving existing conflicts.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. Expressing grave concern over the increasing rate of food insecurity faced in multiple parts of the continent, the PSC may recall the ‘African Common Position to accelerate the implementation of the Decade of Action to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030’, which articulates Africa’s collective resolve to strengthen the resilience of its food systems with the aim to meet the goals of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It may urge member states, in close collaboration with the AU Commission, to strengthen efforts towards realising the Common African Position as well as the outcomes of the 15th Extraordinary AU Humanitarian Summit relating to ‘food security and nutrition in humanitarian situations in Africa’. Noting AU’s theme for the year 2023 ‘Acceleration of African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Implementation’, the PSC may underscore the importance of AfCFTA for boosting intra-African trade in agricultural products and creating affordable food supply chains that can offer alternatives to increasing price of imports from outside of Africa. In this regard, the PSC may call on the AfCFTA Secretariat and states parties to the AfCFTA to prioritize and fast-track the adoption and operationalisation of the necessary institutional and legal arrangements for intra-African trade in agricultural products. PSC may encourage member states to invest more on services and raw materials relevant for advancing agricultural production and the sourcing of agricultural products used for humanitarian assistance from within the continent. The PSC may reiterate the request of its 1083rd session for the AU Commission to ‘undertake a study and propose to Member States recommendation on the strategies to boost food production in Africa’. It may further restate the need to ‘strengthen the linkage between humanitarian assistance, development and peacebuilding, with a view to enhance greater cooperation and coordination between actors in humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding’ to leverage the role of each for enhancing food security.
Update on the situation in Sudan
Update on the situation in Sudan
Date | 16 May 2023
Today (16 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1154th session to receive update on the situation in Sudan as one of the two agenda items tabled for consideration.
Opening remarks are expected by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and PSC Chairperson for the month of May while Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief members of the PSC.
Today’s session will be the second time that the PSC has met to discuss the situation in Sudan since the outbreak of fighting on 15 April between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. On 16 April, the PSC convened emergency session, which condemned the armed confrontation and called for an immediate ceasefire by the two parties. While the communique tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, to undertake peacemaking initiatives, it also requested the Chairperson to continue engagement, within the framework of the Trilateral Mechanism (AU-IGAD-UN), with the UN Secretary-General and IGAD Executive Secretary towards a consolidated response by the international community.
It was in that context that Faki convened on 20 April an urgent special ministerial meeting with bilateral, regional, and international actors, including UN Secretary-General, IGAD Executive Secretary, neighboring countries, Gulf countries, and some members of UN Security Council. The ministerial meeting asked the Trilateral Mechanism – under the leadership of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and in coordination with the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Troika and bilateral actors – to ‘immediately engage the leadership of SAF and the RSF’ for de-escalation and securing permanent ceasefire arrangements. In his briefing, Bankole is expected to update members of the PSC on the evolving situation in Sudan and the various diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.
Fighting has continued between the SAF and RSF mainly in the capital Khartoum as the conflict marked one month since its eruption on 15 April. The ongoing conflict not only raises the specter of full-blown civil war in the country but also its implication could go far and wide with the possibility of spilling into neighboring countries that are grappling with their own crisis.
Civilians are bearing the devastating brunt of the conflict as densely populated urban areas are turned into battlefield. Although accurate figures are hard to come by, Sudan’s Ministry of Health data indicates that the conflict killed at least 676 people and injured 5,576 between 15 April and 11 May. According to OCHA’s 14 May update, more than 936,000 people have been newly displaced by the conflict, with around 736,200 people displaced internally and about 200,000 people crossing into neighboring countries. The exodus from Sudan into the neighboring countries prompted the Chairperson of the AU Commission to issue a statement on 27 April, appealing to these countries and the international community to ‘speedily extend humanitarian support to civilians fleeing the conflict’ and ‘facilitate the transit and safety of civilians crossing their borders without impediment’. Millions are still stranded in Khartoum and elsewhere in the country, facing severe shortages of basic necessities such as water and electricity. The World Food Programme (WFP) warned that ‘the crisis in Sudan is likely to plunge millions more into hunger in the coming days and repercussions will be felt across the region’. WFP further expects that some 19 million people are bound to face acute food insecurity in the next three to six months if the fighting continues.
The other aspect of Bankole’s briefing is expected to be on the various diplomatic efforts that seek to broker cessation of hostilities and where such initiatives currently stand. There have been many attempts to secure humanitarian ceasefire, including the initiatives of AU Commission’s ministerial session and IGAD’s lead mediator, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir Mayardit. The warring parties have reportedly failed to observe the ceasefire in almost each case despite expressing their intention to abide by the commitment for temporary pause in fighting. (For details on the various initiatives for cessation of hostilities, see Amani Africa’s recently launched tracker of diplomatic efforts on Sudan conflict).
The pre-negotiation talks between the representatives of SAF and RSF, which was facilitated by Saudi Arabia and US, culminated in the singing of the ‘Declaration of Commitment to Protect Civilians of Sudan’ on 11 May, in which the parties affirmed their commitment to ensure protection of civilians, respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law, facilitate the rapid and unimpeded humanitarian relief, and that these commitments are fully disseminated within their ranks. The Trilateral Mechanism, in a statement issued on 11 May, welcomed the signing of the Declaration as an ‘important first step toward alleviating human suffering and protecting the lives and dignity of civilians in Sudan’, further urging the two parties to translate the commitments to meaningful action on the ground. However, it has not changed neither the course of the conflict nor the behavior of the actors.
Perhaps, one of the issues worth discussing in the session is how best the AU could maintain the leadership role in finding peaceful solutions to the conflict as the PSC envisages in its last meeting on Sudan. Experiences so far suggest not only the presence of plethora of diplomatic initiatives by various actors but also lack of coordination among these initiatives. Despite the already existing mechanism to coordinate efforts among AU, IGAD, and UN (the Trilateral Mechanism), these regional and international actors do not appear to fully utilize the Mechanism. This was evident for instance when IGAD’s 16 April extraordinary summit formed a high-level delegation under the leadership of President Salva Kiir while the PSC tasked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to lead peacemaking initiatives. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and US initiated a ‘pre-negotiation talks’ in Jeddah at a time when IGAD’s lead mediator has been requesting the warring parties to send their representatives to an ‘agreed venue’ to start the peace talks. Indeed, South Africa, in a statement issued on 8 May to welcome the start of Saudi Arabia/US facilitated talks, stressed the imperative of the ‘centrality of the African Union and IGAD in the pre-negotiation and subsequent talks.’ The uncoordinated and parallel diplomatic efforts could create the risk of forum shopping, not to mention the possibility of compromising actors’ leverage over the warrying parties.
The other important issue is the importance of not losing sight on the disrupted political negotiations towards the formation of a civilian government. While the conflict has shifted the focus towards bringing the warring parties to a negotiating table, there is a high need not only to engage the civilian actors in Sudan but also the talks to secure ceasefire should be conceived within the broader picture of establishing a civilian government in Sudan.
Today’s session is also likely to deliberate on how the AU could maintain its leadership role in Sudan’s peace talks. In that regard, Amani Africa’s recent opinion piece ‘Ideas Indaba’ on Sudan conflict suggested various measures, including for the AU, along with other relevant actors (notably IGAD and UN), to extensively engage various Sudanese stakeholders such as civilian actors; initiate humanitarian diplomacy; put in place interdisciplinary emergency taskforce on Sudan that tracks the fighting as well as violations; hold regular press conference and briefings on developments in Sudan; engage neighboring and other countries not only to refrain from being drawn into the conflict but also contribute to end the fighting.
The expected outcome of today’s session is a communique. Echoing the statement of the Trilateral Mechanism, the PSC may welcome the signing of the Declaration of Commitment to Protect Civilians of Sudan as a step in the right direction to alleviate the human suffering in the country. Despite the signing of the Declaration, the PSC is expected to express its concern over the ongoing conflict and in that regard, it may urge the two parties to use the singing of the Declaration as a steppingstone into a comprehensive ceasefire talks. In light of the unfolding humanitarian crisis, the PSC may reiterate the call of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for neighboring countries to facilitate the transit and safety of civilians crossing their borders and the international community to step up the delivery of humanitarian assistance. PSC may stress the importance of coordinating diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Sudan, and in that connection, it may request the Chairperson of the AU Commission to replicate the experience of his convening of a special ministerial meeting on the situation in Sudan. Given the gravity of the crisis and its potential implication on the peace and stability of the broader region and the continent, the PSC may highlight the need for more frequent engagement on the situation in Sudan.