Open session on the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month
Open session on the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month
Date | 3 September 2025
Tomorrow (4 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an open session on the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month.
The session will commence with opening remarks from Miguel Bembe, Permanent Representative of Angola to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for September, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), Member States, and partners, including the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), may also address the session.
Since 2017, the PSC has held annual sessions to mark Amnesty Month, following the decision of the 29th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in July 2017. That decision declared September of each year, until 2020, as ‘Africa Amnesty Month’ for the surrender and collection of illegally owned weapons/arms. The 14th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly on Silencing the Guns, held in December 2020, extended the initiative until 2030, aligning it with the duration of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa.
Amnesty Month was launched by the Assembly to provide an opportunity for non-state actors illegally possessing weapons/arms to voluntarily and confidentially surrender them to designated government authorities. According to the decision, individuals who surrender weapons during the Amnesty Month shall not face disclosure, humiliation, arrest, or prosecution.
The decision also urges all Member States, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), as well as civil society organisations, to widely publicise Amnesty Month through all media platforms, to observe it each September, and to mobilise citizens to actively support the effort to silence the guns.
During the past few years, the PSC introduced the practice of commemorating the Africa Amnesty Month outside Addis Ababa in Member States. This was done in Lomé, Togo, in 2022, Maputo, Mozambique, in 2023, and Bangui, Central African Republic, in 2024. Although a similar initiative was planned this year under the Amnesty Month framework with a mission to Uganda, it is now expected to take place next month.
While the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month is largely symbolic, it serves the purpose of mobilising attention to the threat posed by the circulation and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) outside of the control of legitimate state authority. The proliferation of SALWs is identified as a major driver of conflicts and insecurity in the AU Roadmap on Practical Steps for STG. It also serves as an occasion for reviewing the implementation of the STG and the challenges that remain, more so given that 2025 marks the halfway point for achieving STG in 2030.
Across Africa, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) continues to threaten peace and security. A 2019 study conducted by the AU Commission and the Small Arms Survey estimated that the continent hosts around 40 million small arms and light weapons. Of these, about 5.8 million are officially registered, while over 16 million remain unregistered.
These weapons are among the primary drivers of violence, frequently used by illegal armed groups and terrorists to initiate and sustain conflicts. According to the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on counterterrorism submitted to the PSC’s 1182nd session, SALW remain the weapon of choice for terrorist groups, accounting for more than 70% of attacks and over 75% of recorded deaths in 2023. The 2019 mapping study on illicit small arms flows in Africa highlights two main sources of illicit weapons on the continent: the diversion of licit arms to unauthorised users, and weapons already illicitly circulating within Africa. The large-scale diversion of national stockpiles amid the crises in Libya, Mali, and CAR has not only intensified conflicts in those countries and beyond but also provided significant material supply for terrorist groups.
Illicit inflows of firearms further aggravate the situation. The study notes a ‘robust trend’ of Middle Eastern states being involved in illicit arms transfers to Africa. Most critically, cross-border trafficking remains the main source of illicit weapons on the continent, worsened by the porous nature of African borders.
To address the challenges posed by small arms and light weapons, the AU Commission and its partners have launched various initiatives under the framework of the Africa Amnesty Month. One such initiative is the joint project between the AU Commission and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to support Member States in implementing the Africa Amnesty Month. According to UNODA, 13 African countries benefited from this project between 2020 and 2022. These included Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Kenya in 2020; Madagascar, Niger, and Uganda in 2021; and Liberia, Tanzania, and Togo in 2022. As a result, more than 22,000 weapons were reportedly collected and destroyed in these countries. In 2023, Mozambique received support to organise that year’s edition of the AAM, while the Central African Republic, Djibouti, and Rwanda benefited from similar support to commemorate the 2024 edition.
In addition to SALW, Africa is now facing the challenge of the proliferation of new weapons technologies such as drones. These developments are shaping and transforming conflicts. The outlook of the spread of the supply and circulation of SALW and new weapons such as drones is made concerning by the worrying conflict landscape on the continent: the fragmentation and proliferation of armed groups, with the rise of non-state actors—particularly terrorist groups—as central players in Africa’s insecurity, the growing number and geographic spread of conflicts, the intensifying rivalry among both traditional and emerging foreign powers and their deepening meddling in conflicts in different parts of the continent.
These dynamics highlight that the challenges of the spread and use of SALW and other new weapon technologies are not only worsening but also becoming more complex. In this context, Africa Amnesty Month cannot contribute to the STG agenda if pursued in the business-as-usual fashion as it has been done since its adoption in 2017. For it to be effective and meaningful, it also has to serve as an occasion for facilitating concrete action in curbing the flow and use of such weapons in specific conflict situations. This can be achieved practically through an independent report on the sources and channels of supply of arms and weapons to conflict parties, such as that requested by the communiqué of the 1218th session of the PSC on Sudan.
In addition to the AAM initiative and the production of an independent report identifying the sources and channels of supply of SALW and other new weapons, it must be underscored that addressing small arms and light weapons requires tackling the root causes that fuel their demand. Governance deficits, socio-economic challenges, environmental and climate change, and state failure to provide basic services have all intensified the demand for weapons, necessitating a more holistic and nuanced response.
Although the PSC’s 832nd session emphasised the primary responsibility of Member States in combating illicit arms circulation and preventing weapons from falling into the wrong hands, limited state capacity and porous borders have hampered effective control. Member States are therefore expected to strengthen stockpile management, record keeping, and tracing mechanisms to reduce diversion to non-state actors. The AU Commission, in turn, should work to secure more political commitment from Member States to make Amnesty Month more meaningful through measures identified above, into national frameworks. However, limited reporting by Member States poses a challenge. In this regard, the PSC’s 1105th session in September 2022 directed the Commission to develop a standardised reporting and monitoring template and to conduct five-yearly surveys on illicit weapon collection to generate reliable data on progress. As noted earlier, in relation to situations of conflict, this member state’s reporting has to be supplemented by technical and independent documentation and reporting.
Continental frameworks also require reinforcement. While no legally binding continent-wide instruments exist, political frameworks are in place. The Bamako Declaration of 2000 establishes a common African position on illicit SALW proliferation, circulation and trafficking, strengthening regional and international cooperation. The AU is also guided by the AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW. The Common African Position on the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review the Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (adopted at PSC’s 1210th session), and the AU Fellowship Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation launched in July are also recent additional initiatives. While encouraging, these frameworks remain largely political commitments rather than legally binding obligations. It is therefore important to pursue the PSC’s call at its 1105th session for the Commission to explore the development of legally binding instruments on small arms and light weapons management.
The expected outcome is a press statement. The PSC may express concern over the threats posed by SALW and the increasing threat posed by the use of new weapons such as drones in various conflict settings, undermining the effort towards achieving the STG. It may commend recent initiatives of the Commission, including the launch of the AU Fellowship Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, while also following up on earlier requests such as the development of a legally binding instrument on the management of small arms and light weapons. The Council is likely to urge Member States to report on activities undertaken during the Africa Amnesty Month and may reiterate its call for the Commission to establish a standardised reporting and monitoring template. The PSC may also request the implementation of its decision in the communique of its 1218th session, tasking PSC Sub-Committee on Sanctions and CISSA to produce a report on external actors supporting the warring factions and the preparation of an independent report on annual basis on the sources and channels used for supplying SALW and other weapons to conflict parties in Africa as part of the Amnesty month. It may also request that the focus of the Amnesty Month go beyond SALW and cover the supply and use of new weapons such as drones. It may further encourage Member States to strengthen their legal frameworks for effective control and regulation of civilian firearm possession. The PSC may also underscore the importance of addressing the root causes driving the demand for small arms and weapons.
Opening Remarks Delivered by Korir Singoi
OPENING REMARKS BY H.E EXCELLENCY DR. MUSALIA MUDAVADI, E.G.H, PRIME CABINET SECRETARY AND CABINET SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AND DIASPORA AFFAIRS DURING THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING ON THE REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN UNION’S GOVERNANCE PEACE AND SECURITY FRAMEWORKS HELD AT GLEE HOTEL, NAIROBI
Delivered by Dr Korir Sing'oei
Date | 1ST SEPTEMBER, 2025
Your Excellencies, Members of the High-Level Panel,
Your Excellency Amb. Adeoye, Bankole, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security,
Your Excellencies, Ambassadors,
Distinguished Experts.
Ladies and Gentlemen.
- On behalf of His Excellency President William Ruto, the Government, and the people of the Republic of Kenya, I welcome you all to Nairobi. Karibuni sana. I thank all of you for graciously turning up to participate in this High-Level Meeting on the Review of the African Union’s Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks.
- At the outset, allow me to convey President William Ruto’s goodwill and best wishes for the successful outcomes of this High-Level Meeting. As the AU Champion for Institutional Reforms, President Ruto fully supports this process and looks forward to receiving the report and recommendations arising from the Review of the African Union’s Governance, Peace, and Security frameworks. Allow me also to commend the Chair of the AU Commission, H.E Youssef Mohammed for the choice of such distinguished members of the Panel whose collective experience will undoubtedly lend immense value to the strengthening of the AU peace mechanisms. Equally, I salute AU Peace and Security Commissioner, H.E. Adeoye Bankole, for providing the needed technical support to this process.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
- The fundamental objective of this meeting is to review the existing continental peace and security framework and assess whether it is fit for purpose.
- African leaders have long recognized that accelerating the continent’s political and socio-economic integration must go hand in hand with the promotion of peace, security, and stability. It is for this reason that we established the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System, the Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise to constitute an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address persistent challenges of armed conflicts in Africa. Indeed, the scourge of conflicts, primarily intra-state and, at times, inter-state, remains the leading cause of Africa’s socio-economic stagnation and the greatest source of suffering for its people.
- The AU Peace Architecture is thus entrusted with core responsibilities including, anticipating and preventing disputes, undertaking peacemaking and peacebuilding, authorizing peace support operations, and harmonizing efforts at both regional and continental levels to effectively combat terrorism. The AU Peace frameworks were never designed to be standalone stallions for peace but were intended to act in cooperative fashion while also taking advantage of the capacities of regional economic blocks and non-state actors to secure peace. It was envisioned that the interactions between these decisional nodes happening at different levels and scales would yield a polycentric peace profile that would respond effectively, alone and as a collective, to the multiplicity and complexity of conflicts.
- Unfortunately, the frameworks we established have failed to evolve fully to deliver their full potential. As a result, we are struggling to keep pace with the growing multiplicity and complexity of today’s conflict and security challenges. Our efforts, regrettably, remain fragmented, uncoordinated, competitive and underfunded. It is for this reason that the review of the African Peace and Security Architecture has been placed at the front and centre of the reform agenda.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
- The security scenario is made murkier by a global arena that is marked by intense geopolitical tensions and major power competition. Multilateralism is under unprecedented strain aggravated by intensified geo-strategic competition, deepening inequality, state fragility and an increasingly complex set of threats and challenges.
- Within this context, Africa is navigating a series of complex and interlinked challenges. Several states are facing a crisis of legitimacy amid a difficult post-pandemic recovery, the debt crisis, fiscal pressures, climate change, increasing inequality.
- We are witnessing increasing political instrumentalization and manipulation of Africa’s youth, the majority of whom face unemployment. Many of these youths, with access to digital technologies, are increasingly being mobilized in ways that undermine existing democratic systems. Moreover, the rapid spread of populist ‘sovereignty’ narratives, as evident in the Sahel, coupled with calls from some quarters for military takeovers, risks gaining wider traction across other parts of the continent.
- West Africa has experienced both civilian and military challenges to constitutional order, compounded by deep-seated and rapidly expanding terrorism and insecurity. The region is also witnessing a fundamental rupture in regional cooperation and a strain on long-standing ECOWAS integration arrangements.
- The Horn of Africa too has entered a challenging period with the war in The Sudan, protracted conflict in South Sudan, and a complex security transition in Somalia. Sharp geo-strategic competition, both around the Red Sea and within the wider global arena, is increasingly shaping dynamics in the region. In the Great Lakes, the complex war economy in eastern DRC remains at the heart of the long-standing crisis, compounded by rising inter-state tensions and intensifying geo-strategic rivalries.
- To compound the situation of Africa’s security landscape, the continent has, in recent years, regrettably become the global epicentre of terrorism. Terrorist activity has expanded dramatically from the Sahel to the coastal states, while persisting in the DRC, Mozambique, the Lake Chad Basin, and Somalia. Weakening political systems and the emergence of governance vacuums have created fertile ground for terrorists and criminal networks to expand their influence, often including exploiting longstanding grievances.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
- This is a defining moment for our continent. It is evident that the existing frameworks in their current configuration are not adequate and effective to address today’s complex dynamics and challenges. This underscores the urgent need to reform and strengthen Africa’s peace and security architecture.
- The AU’s presence in regional hotspots remains weak, less coordinated and under-resourced. The AU’s network of Special Envoys and High Representatives is under-utilized and is probably in need of a reset in certain cases. Strengthening the performance and effectiveness of AU peace support operations is a strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to collective peace and security. The fight against terrorism on our continent remains fragmented, reactive, not effectively coordinated and inadequately resourced. Developing a comprehensive Plan of Action for countering terrorism in Africa as envisioned in the 2022 Malabo Declaration, cannot wait any longer.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
- Despite the foregoing challenges, the last two decades have provided veritable lessons which we must harness in the search for a more robust peace and security arrangement. I am confident that this meeting and this esteemed panel has what it takes to reimagine a more effective framework.
- In the past, we have witnessed assessments and reviews of previous AU reform initiatives that revealed a rich catalogue of recommendations and proposals. Yet, many of these have remained unimplemented due to limited stakeholder buy-in, weak monitoring and evaluation, and, most critically, the lack of a structured implementation process within the Union. I believe that the review of the AU’s Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks that we are undertaking now will not be allowed to fall victim of these shortcomings.
Excellencies, Distinguished Experts, Ladies and Gentlemen,
- Once again let me welcome you to Kenya and wish you fruitful deliberations. It is now my honour and pleasure to declare the High-Level Meeting on the Review of the African Union’s Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks officially open.
Thank you.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - July 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - July 2025
Date | July 2025
In July, under the chairship of the Republic of Uganda, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) convened seven substantive sessions. Held at ambassadorial, ministerial and Heads of State and Government levels, three of the sessions were on country-specific situations focusing on the situations in Somalia, Libya and Sudan. The council also held its inaugural annual joint consultative meeting with the Pan African Parliament (PAP) on 17 – 18 July.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of September 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of September 2025
Date | September 2025
In September, the Republic of Angola will assume the role of Chair of the Peace and Security Council for the month. The month’s Provisional Programme of Work (PPoW) includes six substantive PSC sessions. Two of the six substantive sessions will focus on regional/country-specific situations, while the remaining will address thematic issues and a briefing on the activities of the Council conducted from June to August 2025. Four of the sessions will be held at the ambassadorial level, while the remaining two will take place at the ministerial level and at the level of Heads of State and Government. In addition, Council is expected to commemorate the International Day for Peace as well as take part in several bilateral and multilateral engagements for the month, most notably the 80th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), where there will be a High-level General Debate from 23 – 26 September.
The first session of the month is scheduled for 3 September, where the Council is expected to brief the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on its activities conducted in June, July and August. This briefing is expected to be done by the permanent representatives of Tanzania, Uganda and Algeria, in their capacity as chairs of the respective months.
On the same week, on 4 September, the second session of the PSC will be convened in an open format to commemorate the African Amnesty Month. It is worth recalling that the foundation of the commemoration of the Africa Amnesty Month is to encourage AU Member States to promote the voluntary surrender of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in line with national laws and international agreements. This initiative aims to raise awareness and foster adherence among communities, urging civilians to surrender illegally owned weapons to designated authorities without fear of arrest or prosecution. This session will build up from the previous year’s commemoration, held in the Central African Republic, under the framework of ‘Advancing the Goal of Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030.’
On 17 September, the PSC will host an open ambassadorial-level session on the ‘Nexus between Climate Change, Peace, and Security in Africa.’ This session comes a few days after the Africa Climate Summit 2 (ACS2), held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the theme ‘Accelerating Global Climate Solutions: Financing for Africa’s resilient and Green Development,’ as a platform for Africa to articulate its priorities and commitments – championing home-grown solutions that are driving adaptation and systems-level shifts on the road to COP30. The upcoming session will also build up on its previous substantive session on the theme, the 1263rd meeting of March 2025, in which, from the communiqué, Council was bold on the need to mobilize adequate and sustainable financing to close the adaptation financing gap, finance loss and damage, to ensure a just transition, reach the most vulnerable contexts, strengthen African financing facilities, and upscale climate-security actions in the continent. It is expected that there will be an update on the finalisation of the Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace and Security – following due process and taking into consideration the contributions from all AU Member States, the African Group of Negotiators and RECs/RMs, or subsequent incorporation in the national and regional policies and frameworks.
The next session thereafter will be a session on the ‘Update on the situation in the Central African Republic’, which will be held on 19 September. The country is slated for local and presidential elections in December 2025. This election follows a 2023 constitutional referendum that extended presidential terms to seven years and removed term limits, potentially allowing President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to run again. The election is seen as a critical channel for CAR’s recovery from conflict, though concerns about transparency persist. UNOCHA reported that the humanitarian needs in the country remain high, despite the recent improvement in the security situation. About 38 per cent of the country’s population is extremely vulnerable to the point that humanitarian assistance alone will not be enough for their well-being. Clashes between parties to the conflict and attacks on civilians and infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals, persist. The war in Sudan and tensions in southern Chad have led to the arrival of refugees, asylum seekers and returnees to an already fragile area that has very limited humanitarian assistance. Child soldier menace is another issue of concern. One of Amani Africa’s analyses highlighted that the exploitation of children in armed conflicts remains alarmingly widespread across Africa, with CAR emerging as one of the epicentres of recruitment.
On 21 September, the PSC will commemorate the International Day of Peace. It is worth recalling that the Pan-African Biennale, a joint initiative of the AU, UNESCO and the Government of Angola, was first convened in September 2019 in Luanda, with an agreement to hold the forum biennially. Its inaugural edition underscored the importance of strategic partnerships in scaling up initiatives for sustainable peace in Africa, the value of sharing best practices in conflict prevention and resolution and the need to celebrate Africa’s cultural diversity while highlighting the resilience of its people in the face of conflict. Under the Chairship of Angola, this year’s commemoration will be held under the theme ‘Act Now for a Peaceful World.’
Following that, on 24 September, the PSC will convene a summit-level meeting. Angola, being both the Chairperson of the AU and also the Chairperson of the PSC for September 2025, Council will convene a session in New York, on the margins of the 80th UN General Assembly under the theme ‘Re-energising Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.’ The upcoming PSC session will bring together Heads of State and Government leaders and high-level representatives to evaluate the AU’s conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, reflecting on vital lessons and best practices to strengthen the PSC’s mandate. The session is expected to address key issues, including how to ensure the efficiency and legitimacy of African Solutions to African Problems and how to foster effective synergies between the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA) to enhance the PSC’s conflict resolution capabilities, particularly in its relationships with the RECs/RMs, the UNSC, the EU Political and Security Committee, and the League of Arab States PSC. It is also expected that discussions will focus on the role of neighbouring countries in supporting Member States caught in cycles of violent conflict, strategies to ensure the full implementation of AU-facilitated peace agreements, the successful completion of political transitions within set timelines and measures to promote Member States’ compliance with decisions made by the PSC and the AU Assembly.
The last substantial meeting of the PSC will be held on 30 September, at the ministerial level, focusing on the situation in the Sahel region. The Sahel region is grappling with a worsening crisis as of August 2025, marked by escalating violence, political turmoil, humanitarian distress and environmental challenges. Insurgent groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province have intensified attacks. The upcoming session will provide an opportunity to receive the latest updates on the security, political and humanitarian developments in the region.
In addition to the substantive sessions and activities of the PSC, the programme of work for the month also encompasses the meetings of the PSC subsidiary bodies. The Committee of Experts (CoE) is expected to meet on 10 September for consideration of the PSC communiqué for the PSC Heads of State and Government level meeting which is scheduled for 24 September. In addition, the CoE will have a preparatory meeting of the 19th Annual Joint Consultation between the PSC and UNSC on 15 September, while the Military Staff Committee (MSC) will also convene on 29 September for an engagement on the ‘proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons: Surge in Terrorism.’
Briefing by the African Members to the UN Security Council
Briefing by the African Members to the UN Security Council
Date | 28 August 2025
Tomorrow (29 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1299th session to receive a briefing from the African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3).
The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, followed by a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representatives of the A3 members—Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—are then expected to brief the PSC on their activities.
This engagement is in line with the first conclusion of the High-Level Seminar (HLS) on peace and security in Africa, held in December 2013 in Algiers, where participants agreed that the A3 would brief the PSC quarterly on African issues on the agenda of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3, adopted during the PSC’s 1289th session on 24 July 2025, also stipulates that A3 coordinators shall provide regular briefings and quarterly reports to the PSC. This mechanism is designed to ensure accountability of the A3 to the AU and amplify Africa’s common voice within the UNSC. Although this commitment was made more than a decade ago, the quarterly briefings have not been carried out as regularly as envisaged. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to help revive this practice and give it greater institutional weight.
The A3 are expected to brief the PSC on activities undertaken within the UNSC over the past quarter. In particular, they will highlight efforts of the A3+ (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) in coordinating joint statements, engaging in collective negotiations, and increasingly assuming roles as penholder or co-penholder on African files. These activities are aimed at ensuring that Africa’s perspectives are integrated into UNSC decision-making and outcomes. One example likely to be cited is the joint statement delivered by the A3+ on 22 August during the UNSC’s meeting on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In that statement, the A3+ called for impartial investigations into atrocities committed by armed groups, demanded accountability for perpetrators, underscored the leading role of the AU and sub-regional mechanisms under Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé, and urged the establishment of a credible verification mechanism to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement.
The A3 are also expected to reflect on their role in negotiating UNSC outcome documents. Recent examples include negotiations on a draft resolution and statement concerning the situation in the DRC, as well as renewal of the sanctions regime in July and August. Earlier this month, the A3+ worked alongside the United Kingdom—penholder on the Sudan file—to draft a press statement following the RSF-led Tasis alliance’s declaration of a parallel governing authority. These instances underscore the growing contribution of the A3+ in shaping UNSC outcomes on African files.
Another positive development likely to be highlighted is the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3. Adopted on 24 July 2025, this milestone consolidated practices and commitments developed over years of PSC sessions and HLS conclusions. The request for a manual was first raised at the 8th HLS in December 2021, when participants urged the AU Commission to prepare guidelines for A3 engagement and PSC–A3 cooperation, drawing on previous experiences. The draft was subsequently refined through successive HLS discussions before its final adoption last month.
While the adoption of the manual is a step forward, the main challenge lies in ensuring its implementation. As highlighted in our special research report ‘Making Africa’s Voice Matter in the UN Security Council: Bridging the Gap between Ambition and Reality in the Role of the African Three Members of the UNSC’, A3–PSC coordination over the past decade has often been irregular and ad hoc. The manual provides an opportunity to shift from fragmented practice to more consistent engagement, but this will only be achieved if agreed commitments are translated into action.
For example, modalities such as inviting the A3 to participate in PSC meetings on agenda items also under discussion at the UNSC, holding quarterly video teleconferences (VTCs) between the PSC Troika (outgoing, current, and incoming chairpersons) and the A3, and aligning the PSC’s monthly programme of work with the UNSC on African files have not been implemented regularly. Moreover, the PSC’s annual report to the AU Assembly has not systematically reflected A3 activities, instead annexing HLS conclusions without substantive assessment. The manual seeks to address this by requiring the A3 Secretariat, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in New York, to submit an annual report to the PSC Secretariat by the end of October each year. This year presents an opportunity to begin incorporating A3 activities into the PSC’s annual report, a task that will be considerably easier if quarterly engagements between the PSC and the A3 are regularised.
The A3 briefing may also highlight efforts to institutionalise and strengthen strategic engagements between the African and Caribbean members of the UNSC, with the aim of amplifying the voice of both regions in advancing their interests at the Council. In this context, the briefing may spotlight the annual A3 Plus retreat, held in Georgetown, Guyana, in February 2025, which provided an important platform for strengthening modalities of internal coordination.
Another activity likely to be highlighted in the briefing is the Arria-formula meeting convened by Sierra Leone on ‘The Global Race for Critical Minerals: Addressing Resource-Driven Insecurity in Africa,’ with Guyana and the incoming UNSC non-permanent members (the DRC and Liberia) as co-sponsors in July. This was an important engagement, providing a forum to deliberate on the ongoing global race for critical minerals in Africa and its implications for the continent’s peace and security.
The A3 are further expected to update the PSC on preparations for two major upcoming engagements: the Oran Process, scheduled for later this year, and the annual PSC–UNSC joint consultative meeting, expected in October in Addis Ababa. The Oran Process will include, for the first time, participation of the DRC and Liberia, both of which were elected in June to serve as non-permanent members of the UNSC for two-year terms starting in January 2026. Early involvement of these incoming members will help build continuity and strengthen institutional memory within the A3.
No outcome document, in the form of a communiqué or press statement, is expected from tomorrow’s briefing. However, the PSC may commend the A3 for their efforts in enhancing internal cohesion and promoting Africa’s common voice within the UNSC. It may also welcome the adoption of the Manual on the Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the PSC and the A3 at its 1289th session and emphasise the importance of translating agreed modalities and commitments into practice, including the regularisation of quarterly briefings to the PSC by the A3. As highlighted in the manual, the PSC may further request the A3 to submit its report by October so that it can be included in the PSC’s annual report to be presented at the upcoming AU Summit.
Briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa
Briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa
Date | 26 August 2025
Tomorrow (27 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene for its 1298th session to get a briefing on the early warning system and its role in mapping risks and threats across Africa.
The session commences with an opening statement of the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025, Mohamed Khaled. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, will make an introductory remark. The session is expected to get presentations from Marie-Antoinette Rose QUATRE, Chief Executive Officer of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); Lallal Idris Lakhdar, Acting Director, African Union Counter Terrorism Centre; Jalel Chelba, Acting Director, African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation; and Maxwell Yaw Kumah, Principal Researcher and Analyst of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA). A representative from the African Regional Standby Forces is also expected to make a statement.
The session will build on previous discussions on the theme, with the recent engagement being the 1247th session held on 27 November 2024, where CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL briefed the PSC on the Continental Early Warning and Security Outlook. From the communiqué of the session, the Council encouraged these institutions ‘to continue to provide technical assistance and to increase the dissemination of early warning reports and operational intelligence to Member States and the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), with a view to enabling them to more effectively respond to emerging threats.’ In addition, Council tasked the AUCTC, CISSA, AFRIPOL, other specialised AU agencies and Member States ‘to work together towards the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force focusing on preventing the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and emerging technologies by terrorist groups for radicalisation, recruitment, training and funding.’
According to INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report, a growing share of reported crimes in Africa is cyber-related. The report goes further and highlights that, despite the rising caseloads, most African states surveyed still lack essential IT infrastructure to combat cybercrime. Just 30 per cent of countries reported having an incident reporting system, 29 per cent a digital evidence repository and 19 per cent a cyberthreat intelligence database. Additionally, while cybercrime routinely crosses national borders, 86 per cent of African countries surveyed said their international cooperation capacity needs improvement due to slow, formal processes, a lack of operational networks and limited access to platforms and foreign-hosted data. Against this backdrop, this upcoming PSC meeting will present an opportunity to advance the discussions from the 1247th meeting and brainstorm a concrete plan for the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Task Force.
Relatedly, of concern for tomorrow’s session will be the issue of violent extremism on the continent. It has been reported that, in the past year, nearly half of the fatalities (10,685) occurred in the Sahel, while Somalia accounted for about one-third of Africa’s total fatalities (7,289). Together with the Lake Chad Basin, these three regions comprised 99% of the continent’s militant Islamist-linked deaths. According to one recent report, ‘all five African theatres (including Mozambique and North Africa) remain highly dynamic with militant insurgents mounting offensive operations in each, especially in the Sahel and Somalia.’ There was a 14-per cent rise in battle-related deaths across the continent (15,678).’ Militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia expand their hold on territory.
Organised Transnational Crime is also another element of discussion to be addressed. In May 2025, the Council held its 1279th meeting to discuss this theme, with a focus on the Sahel region. From the communiqué of the meeting, Council expressed concern ‘over the growing operational sophistication of transnational criminal networks exploiting structural vulnerabilities across the Sahel, including governance deficits, legitimate or popular grievances, porous borders and limited state presence.’ Yet, organised transnational crime does not take the same form across various regions of the continent. Thus, Council tasked the AU Commission to coordinate with AFRIPOL, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other critical stakeholders ‘in developing tailored responses to the specific geographical and logistical profiles of each criminal corridor, including joint mobile units and specialised port and desert surveillance capacities…’ From Amani Africa’s Insight of the session, the PSC was in the spotlight as it faces ‘the challenge of how to push away from fragmented, security-heavy responses to more holistic, coordinated strategies that address the structural drivers of transnational organised crimes and terrorism’.
It would also be of interest for PSC members to follow up on PSC’s earlier decisions on the need for anchoring the sessions on early warning on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). It is worth recalling that during its 1251st session held on 17 December 2024, the PSC underscored the need for greater visibility and prominence of CEWS within the proposed restructuring of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department. Previously, the 1208th session of the PSC underscored the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts.’
Following the merger of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peace and Security, the structure that housed CEWS disappeared despite it being a statutory structure. Since then, instead of CEWS, established under Article 12 of the PSC Protocol, this session on early warning has been organised around the work of CISSA, AUCTC and AFRIPOL. This tends to limit the scope of analysis of threats to the domain of intelligence and law enforcement-based threats, hence making it hard security-focused. The implication of this is that it does not fully account for risks of conflict, political, social, economic and environmental issues. A case in point is the lack of attention given to intercommunal conflicts. In recent years, these conflicts have represented the majority of non-state conflicts in Africa.
During tomorrow’s session, the role of the APRM in early warning is also expected to feature. As the entity that identifies risks through its governance assessment of participating states, APRM stands to make a notable contribution in drawing attention to the governance-related risks of conflict. It is to be recalled that the 4th Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and APRM on 7 to 8 April 2025 highlighted the importance of leveraging APRM’s governance-focused peer review reports to enhance early warning strategies. This builds on prior pronouncements, which emphasised closer coordination between APRM and PSC to address structural vulnerabilities and governance deficits that fuel conflicts.
From the perspective of institutional coordination on early warning and continental security outlook, an issue that deserves attention during tomorrow’s session concerns the role of the early warning mechanisms of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). In May 2025, during the 2nd Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS MSC), the two bodies reaffirmed in their joint communique ‘the commitment to continue enhancing cooperation between the AU PSC and the ECOWAS MSC on Peace, Security and Governance issues, including by developing stronger and more structured cooperation on conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. In this respect, they ‘underlined the need to enhance Early Warning and joint analysis capabilities, and to further strengthen the synergy between the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), including joint scenario planning, data exchange and rapid deployment of early response teams to contain potentially explosive situations.’
Discussions may also address challenges such as climate change vis-à-vis peace and security, as it is a critical factor in Africa’s complex crises, intensifying conflicts, driving forced migrations and worsening socio-economic challenges. Identified as a ‘threat multiplier,’ it amplifies existing vulnerabilities and poses new risks to human security and regional stability. The concept note of PSC’s 1263rd session of March 2025 highlighted that ‘climate change also weakens state governance, making it harder to maintain security and public welfare. This creates opportunities for terrorist and criminal groups, who exploit climate-related frustrations to recruit and expand their influence, further threatening regional stability. Thus, climate change is not just an environmental threat – it undermines social cohesion and governance, necessitating an integrated approach that combines climate adaptation and resilience, sustainable development and peacebuilding.’
Acute competition for natural resources is a key issue slated for discussion at tomorrow’s PSC session, recognised as a significant threat to peace and security across Africa. The growing demand for limited resources like water, arable land, and minerals intensifies tensions within and between communities and states, particularly in regions such as the Sahel, Great Lakes, and Horn of Africa. This competition drives intercommunal clashes, banditry, and interstate disputes, with conflicts over water and fertile land escalating pastoralist-farmer tensions, and contests for valuable minerals fueling armed groups and transnational crime networks. The PSC is expected to explore integrating resource governance into early warning systems, prioritising sustainable management and equitable access to reduce conflict risks. This will likely involve using geospatial tools to track resource-related tensions and collaborating with RECs/RMs to craft tailored, region-specific strategies for preventing resource-driven conflicts.
Beyond these pressing challenges, the PSC is expected to address a set of emerging threats that further compound Africa’s security landscape. Among these are escalating inter-state tensions, intensifying geopolitical rivalries, and the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government. Youth restiveness, driven by widespread political exclusion and deep-seated structural unemployment, is identified as a particularly significant risk. The Council will also consider the effects of prolonged humanitarian crises, characterised by forced displacement and the weaponisation of sexual and gender-based violence, alongside the cascading impact of post-COVID-19 economic shocks and the growing burden of unsustainable external debt, all of which continue to erode state resilience.
The PSC is also expected to look into how tools like digital maps, satellite images, smart computer analysis, and future risk monitoring can help them better understand security situations and prepare for possible threats before they happen.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to emphasise the need for enhanced collaboration, including information sharing, between and among Member States, as well as with international partners, including technology firms, in order to more effectively counter the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorist and violent extremist groups. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the establishment of a joint cybersecurity taskforce and, importantly, call on AFRIPOL to develop an action plan on expanding the institutional and infrastructural preparedness of AU member states to deal with the increasing cybersecurity threats and enhance transnational cooperation for addressing the cross-regional nature of these threats. Considering the increase in intercommunal conflicts, the PSC may request the CEWS to undertake the mapping of intercommunal conflicts and their trends in close coordination with the concerned RECs/RMs. The PSC may reiterate its decision from its 1208th session on the imperative of ‘a robust and fully functional CEWS to effectively pre-empt and mitigate conflicts’. In this regard, it may call for the need for anchoring the CEWS in a structure dedicated to CEWS.
Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Second Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Date | 24 August 2025
Tomorrow (25 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its second annual joint consultative meeting with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
Following opening remarks from Mohamed Khaled, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for August 2025 and Stella Chiripo Ndau, Chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver remarks.
This year’s meeting, scheduled to take place virtually, builds on the commitment made during the inaugural consultative meeting held on 30 August 2024 in Gaborone, Botswana, where both parties agreed to institutionalise annual consultations alternating between Addis Ababa and Gaborone. Rooted in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and RECs/RMs, the meeting reflects ongoing efforts to strengthen coordination and collaboration in advancing peace, security and stability in the Southern Africa region.
At last year’s inaugural meeting, the PSC and SADC Organ reflected on lessons learned from SADC’s engagements through the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). The agenda covered terrorism and violent extremism in Southern Africa, the situation in eastern DRC, resource mobilisation for regional peace operations, and peacemaking efforts under the AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative. The meeting also underscored the historic significance of institutionalising a structured PSC–SADC platform as a vital step toward enhancing regional responses to peace and security threats.
One of the agenda items in tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to be the situation in Eastern DRC and SADC’s engagement. SAMIDRC, launched to stabilise eastern DRC, officially began a phased withdrawal on 29 April 2025 and concluded its military mandate earlier than anticipated, raising concerns about the sustainability of SADC’s military interventions. The forced withdrawal, announced on 13 March 2025 following military setbacks, further highlighted the need for reassessing the processes, including the coordination required with the AU, in the deployment of such a mission and the need for aligning of the legal basis in initiating and deploying such missions at the SADC level with that of the AU both for ensuring coherence and avoiding the kind of setbacks that SAMIDRC experienced.
Both the PSC and the SADC Organ have previously raised alarm over inadequate, unpredictable, and unsustainable funding for peace operations. This issue became a major challenge for SADC’s missions in both Mozambique and DRC, despite the fact that SADC tried to self-finance a significant portion of the funding for the missions. The issue of funding is another major area where the experience of both SAMIM and SAMIDRC highlight the necessity for rethinking SADC’s approach and find ways of aligning its processes with that of the AU as a critical step to establish the ground work for enabling future missions to benefit from UN assessed contributions within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2719.
The recent development in the DRC Peace Process is also expected to be of central concern in tomorrow’s agenda. Despite the withdrawal of SAMIDRC, SADC continues to provide ongoing support for political and diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict in the region. Following the direction by the Joint EAC-SADC summit of 8 February 2025 for the merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes, former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Uhuru Kenyatta, Sahle-Work Zewde, Mokgweetsi Masisi and Catherine Samba-Panza as facilitators.
In a further step to rationalize and create a single structure, a meeting of the co-chairs of the Joint EAC–SADC summit and the Panel of Facilitators held on 1 August 2025 in Nairobi adopted a framework for the merger of the Nairobi and Luanda processes and agreed to integrate AU, EAC, and SADC mediation structures under a joint secretariat led by the AU Commission in Addis Ababa to overcome fragmentation and enhance coherence in mediation efforts. Two of the outcomes are of particular interest for tomorrow’s meeting.
The first of this is the decision that entrusted the lead role to the AU Commission in respect to the joint secretariat of the merged peace process, thereby assigning an enhanced coordination role of the AU on this file. The consultations are expected to explore strategies on how to take this forward in practical terms.
Second and most notably, the outcome document called for ‘all other ongoing initiatives and stakeholders to align with the Africa-led process’, hence purporting to assert primacy.
This is where the merged framework also intersects with other external initiatives. The US-mediated Washington Peace Accord of 27 June 2025 sought to de-escalate tensions between the DRC and Rwanda, while Qatar facilitated dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23, culminating in a 23 April 2025 Declaration of Principles. Although Doha’s attempt to broker a peace agreement in August is yet to materialise, Qatar’s continued involvement underscores the growing role of external actors in African peace processes, a dynamic with both opportunities and risks to African-led conflict prevention and resolution practices.
At the political level, the 45th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government on 17 August 2025 reaffirmed commitment to peace and stability in the DRC and welcomed the AU – EAC -SADC joint mediation efforts. The summit also called for complementarity and harmonisation between Africa-led processes and other initiatives, underscoring the importance of maintaining continental leadership while leveraging external support.
Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is also expected to deliberate and make actionable decisions towards responding to the need for sustainable funding for peace operations, building on commitments from last year’s consultative meeting to jointly explore innovative means of joint internal resource mobilisation for peace operations, including special levies, private sector partnerships and continental financial entities.
The expected outcome of the second annual joint consultative meeting is a joint communique. The meeting is expected to reiterate the primacy of the role of the PSC as provided for in Article 16 of the Protocol establishing the PSC and the role of the SADC organ as provided for in the relevant SADC instruments. The two organs are expected to also reaffirm their commitment to regular, structured cooperation and interoperable early warning systems that respond to identified gaps in coordination due to structural differences. They may also call on the AU Commission and SADC Secretariat on identifying ways and means of enhancing policy coherence of SADC with the AU based on the lessons from SAMIDRC and the need for creating the foundation for operationalising UNSC Resolution 2719 for future deployments. On the DRC, the meeting is anticipated to welcome the outcome of the meeting of EAC–SADC Co-Chairs and call on the AU Commission to work with SADC and EAC secretariats to speed up the process of the joint secretariat and joint mediation framework. It is also expected that while welcoming some of the progress registered with the signing of agreements in Washington and the Declaration of Principles in Doha, the two bodies may echo the call of the joint SADC-EAC co-chairs meeting on the need for closer coordination and alignment with African initiatives.
