The Situation in Sudan
The Situation in Sudan
Date | 19 October 2023
Tomorrow (20 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1179th session to consider the situation in Sudan.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for October 2023, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Mohamed el Hacen Lebatt, Principal Strategic Adviser to the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Special Envoy to Sudan and Mohamed Belaiche, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) in Sudan are also expected to deliver statements. In addition, a representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is also expected to make remarks on the situation in the country under consideration.
The meeting is being convened as an additional agenda item in October’s provisional programme of work for the activities of the PSC. The last time the PSC convened a meeting to consider the situation in Sudan was during its 1156th session held at the Heads of State and Government level on 27 May 2023, whereby a Communiqué was adopted as an outcome document. In the Communiqué, the Heads of State and Government adopted the African Union Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan, towards silencing the guns in Sudan, and called on Sudanese stakeholders and the international community to support the implementation of the Roadmap.
On 31 May 2023, the 3rd Meeting of the Expanded Mechanism for the Resolution of the Sudan Conflict was convened. The meeting, which was chaired by Professor Mohamed El-Hacen Lebatt, Spokesperson for the AU Process for Sudan, presented to the members of the Expanded Mechanism the outcomes of the 1156th PSC Meeting as well as the next steps towards an inclusive, Sudanese-owned process, that would end the fighting and put Sudan on the path to a democratic, civilian-led government. In addition, the Expanded Mechanism welcomed the Jeddah Process, facilitated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, which resulted in the Declaration of Commitments and the Short-term Ceasefire and Humanitarian Assistance Arrangement.
In alignment with the Expanded Mechanism’s commitment to convene the Core Group, the AU held its inaugural meeting with the Core Group of the Expanded Mechanism on 2 June 2023 to fine-tune the modalities of the implementation of the roadmap and settle on concrete steps for a ceasefire. The final outcomes of this convening have yet to be released.
Tomorrow’s meeting will provide an opportunity for the PSC to deliberate on the progress made towards the implementation of the adopted Roadmap during the 1156th meeting. This includes the following six elements outlined in the Roadmap:
- Establishment of a coordination mechanism to ensure all efforts by the regional and global actors are harmonized and impactful;
- Immediate, permanent, inclusive and comprehensive cessation of hostilities;
- Effective humanitarian response;
- Protection of civilians and civil infrastructure;
- Strategic role of neighboring states and the region; and
- Resumption of a credible and inclusive political transition process, that takes into account the contributory role of all Sudanese political and social actors, as well as the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, towards a democratic civilian-led government.
As the conflict in the country between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) passed its sixth month, tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to give an insight into the recent joint AU-IGAD delegation meeting with Sudanese political and civilian groups. The delegation met with the democratic Bloc, allied groups in Cairo, and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) to initiate a political process to end the ongoing conflict and establish new constitutional arrangements to reinstate civilian governance.
The 14th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government was also held on Monday, 12 June 2023, in Djibouti, the Republic of Djibouti, where it adopted the IGAD Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of Sudan. The action points from the Roadmap included:
- Include the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as the fourth member of the IGAD High-Level Delegation for the Peace Process in the Republic of Sudan; and for H.E. William Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya, to Chair the Quartet Countries of the Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan and for the Quartet to work in close coordination with the African Union Commission;
- Within ten days, the Quartet to arrange a face-to-face meeting between H.E. Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the Chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of the Republic of Sudan, and Gen. Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo in one of the regional capitals;
- Within two weeks secure a commitment from the leadership of SAF and RSF to establish a humanitarian corridor;
- Within three weeks initiate an inclusive political process towards a political settlement of the conflict in the Republic of Sudan.
Since its initial convening, IGAD has hosted consecutive meetings in alignment with its roadmap. On 10 July 2023, IGAD Heads of State and Government held a meeting at the level of Quartet to address the implementation of the roadmap. The session explored substantial options including a request to the East African Standby Force to convene a meeting on the options of deployment for the protection of civilians. The meeting also recognized the supplementary role neighboring states have taken with the initiative to convene on 13 July 2023 in Egypt to address peace and stability in the Republic of Sudan in alignment with the IGAD Roadmap. Finally, a significant decision was made to ensure measures are taken for the facilitation of immediate humanitarian assistance. However, the decision to ensure humanitarian access was not revisited during the second IGAD Quartet Group meeting that recently took place on 6 September 2023. The second IGAD Quartet Group meeting instead emphasized the need for an all-inclusive consultation of civilian actors that will yield a more structured approach to peace dialogue and as such mandated IGAD and the AU to expedite the consultation process.
Despite the existence of such various mechanisms and initiatives, currently there is no meaningful processes for addressing the situation. The ceasefire process has stalled. Thus, after nearly a dozen mediated or declared ceasefire initiatives, the very process for ceasefire has been suspended. Neither the IGAD process nor that of the AU has also led to any meaningful wider peace or political process. There are two issues arising from this state of affair. The first is the existence of multiple initiatives and absence of a common platform around which all actors rally. The second concerns the fact that there is no dedicated mechanism that works on a full-time basis on the war on Sudan, for example, along the lines proposed by President Museveni when he Chair the PSC last May on Sudan – establishment of a high-level facilitator or panel of facilitators.
These various processes failed to do anything more than meeting and adopting statements or communiqués. None managed to mitigate or in any way make a dent on the war. The result of the inadequacies of these various and poorly coordinated processes is that the war is allowed to continue to rage on, with no end in sight. Neither the AU nor IGAD are able to put in place or initiate a mechanism to also address and ameliorate the worsening humanitarian crisis.
The war has claimed the lives of nearly 10,000 people. Over 5.8 million have been internally displaced. 1.2 million people have fled to neighboring countries as refugees. Apart from this, humanitarian actors are able to reach to and deliver humanitarian assistance to only 3 percent of the more than 18 million people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. The war also continues to involve not only indiscriminate attacks on civilians but also cause enormous destruction on civilian infrastructure. The country continues to fragment and Sudan is risking if not already experiencing state collapse. Apart from the suffering this creates to Sudanese, it creates vacuum, which if not urgently addressed, may be exploited by war economy entrepreneurs including terrorist groups.
One of the focus of tomorrow’s session could be receiving feedback on where the various processes stand and whether there is now an opening for a meaningful peace process based on the engagement with the various civilian groupings. Additionally, it would be of particular interest for members of the PSC to get a dedicated mechanism that monitors, documents and reports on the humanitarian situation and facilitates civilian protection and compliance by warring parties with international humanitarian law.
The anticipated outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communique. It is expected that Council will call on members of the international community, including the immediate neighbors of Sudan, to continue to demonstrate solidarity by assisting Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers, among others, by facilitating expeditious and dignified processes, conditions of entry, transit and reception of refugees from Sudan in line with the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1969 Kampala Convention. It may also underscore the growing humanitarian toll resulting from the conflict in Sudan, urge conflicting parties to observe the fundamental rules and principles of international humanitarian law and human rights law underpinning the protection of civilians and appeal to the international community to redouble efforts geared towards ensuring effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected communities. In this respect, the PSC may specifically call on the parties to end indiscriminate attacks against civilians. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of consolidating efforts and creating better coherence between the various initiatives put underway to manage the crisis in Sudan. It may also call for the establishment of a joint high-level panel on Sudan by the AU, IGAD and the UN.
Amani Africa's UN Security Council briefing points out the need to rectify the inadequate state of AU-UN partnership
Amani Africa's UN Security Council briefing points out the need to rectify the inadequate state of AU-UN partnership
Date | 12 October 2023
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
Thank you, Mr. President,
I would like to thank Brazil’s Presidency for the invitation extended to me to deliver this briefing on behalf of my organization Amani Africa Media and Research Services.
I would like to recognize with appreciation the previous briefers my dear brother SRSG Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Head of UN Office to the AU and H.E. Ambassador Fatima K. Mohammed, Permanent Representative of the AU permanent Observer Mission to the UN.
Amani Africa, a pan-African policy research, training and consulting think tank that works on multilateral policy processes of concern and interest for Africa, is the leading source of information and analysis on matters of the African Union (AU) in general and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in particular, including AU’s strategic partnership with United Nations (UN).1
It is accordingly a particular honour for me to draw on our work for my briefing today.
Mr President,
At this historic moment,2 deepening the partnership between the UN and the AU is not a matter of choice nor is it just something nice to do. We believe that this is rather a pre-requisite for delivering on the peace and security and development objectives of the UN Charter.
There is a pressing and growing need both for more crisis management and for enhanced effectiveness of crisis management more today than earlier times. No single actor can meet these pressing demands alone. The continued relevance of the UN and the AU in the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa depends on them pulling their comparative advantages together and systematically coordinating their actions across files and portfolios.
The UN Secretary-General’s ‘Our Common Agenda’ affirms that regional organizations ‘fill a critical gap in our global peace and security architecture’. His report on UN-AU partnership highlights that there is no other organization that better reflects these attributes than the AU.
Yet, the state of UN-AU partnership is far from adequate for the AU to effectively fill in this critical gap. As we pointed out in one of our recent work, one manifestation of this inadequacy is the lack of a systematic and institutionalized global arrangement for harnessing the full potential and role of the AU as part of the global collective security system anchored on the UN Charter.
Thus, despite the progress registered in UN-AU partnership, the mobilization of responses largely reflects ‘ad hoc and a case-by-case basis’ approach. They are unable to collaboratively institute ‘peace support operations that not only have stabilization and peace enforcement mandates and capabilities but also are willing and able to act on their peace enforcement mandates,’3 that the security conditions warrant.
Critical to elevating the AU-UN partnership in this context is to establish a systematic and institutionalized arrangement, affirming the peace and security tools of the AU as part of the toolkit of the global collective security system under the UN Charter. This echoes the Secretary-General’s proposal for this Council to break new ground through ‘a new generation of African Union-led, United Nations- supported peace operations on the African continent that blend the respective strength of both organizations in a manner that prioritizes political solutions and maximizes the impact of both uniformed and civilian capabilities.’ A corollary to and an essential part of this institutionalized arrangement is the shift that this Council also has to make, as the SG put it, from considering the use of UN assessed contributions for AU -led PSOs ‘as exceptional circumstances’ to one that must be ‘considered in a more systematic manner’.
Mr President,
Today, elevating UN-AU partnership to a higher level is also a strategic imperative for the effective functioning of multilateralism.
The deepening polarization in the world, particularly among major powers, is among the key factors for the increasing fracturing of the multilateral system. The AU, whose member state make up 28 % of the UN has unique reservoir of potential for playing a moderation role in the face of such polarization. Tapping into this moderating role of the AU (and Africa’s positionality as the future of multilateralism) through the UN-AU partnership is key not just for arresting the fracturing of the multilateral system but also for making it fit for purpose. Our recent work thus emphasizes the need to bring ‘regional multilateral organizations like the AU to the center of the global peace and security diplomacy in a systematic way rather than on an ad hoc basis.’
Finally, Mr President, the AU-UN partnership needs to enhance their focus on the socio-economic and development dimensions of the maintenance of international peace and security. It is now widely accepted that the SDGs and peace and security are deeply intertwined. Achieving the SDGs for member states of the AU is also directly tied to the reform of the multilateral financial system. Africa pays a 500% premium on borrowing from the market and a reform could save Africa as much as $56 billion, expanding access for much needed resources to meet the SDGs.
On addressing immediate concerns, we wish to draw the attention of this Council to the urgent need to put in place a mechanism for addressing the growing and catastrophic humanitarian crisis occasioned by the raging war in Sudan. The UN’s humanitarian chief sounded the alarm with the extraordinary warning that ‘war and hunger could destroy Sudan.’ The situation continues to deteriorate with devastating consequences to civilians. We welcome the call that the UNSC and PSC made in the communique of their 17th annual consultative meeting. Yet, pending the emergence of an effective ceasefire and broader peace process, the UN and the AU need to put in place a mechanism dedicated to ameliorating the humanitarian emergency and the plight of civilians along the lines that we outlined in our briefing to the Peace and Security Council on 29 September 2023.
Mr President, your excellencies members of the UN Security Council, I would like to express our appreciation for inviting us to brief you. Indeed, my briefing to you a testament to your willingness to leverage the perspectives of research organizations including those from the continent whose work is dedicated to the issues under your consideration, which I commend wholeheartedly.
I thank you for your kind attention!
1 Together with the Republic of Namibia, we are leading a high-level process on ‘Africa and the reform of the multilateral system’, see https://amaniafrica-et.org/events/africa-and-the-transformation-of-the-multilateral-system-side-event-at-unga-78/?occurrence=2023-09-26 and https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Press-Release-Namibia-and-Amani-Africa.pdf
2 Characterised by multipolarity and low level of trust among global powers, increasingly complex and deadlier conflicts and the growing to prominence of new and emerging threats to peace and security – See Amani Africa, Africa and Peace and Security Diplomacy in a time of the New Agenda for Peace, Policy Brief (June 2023) available on https://amaniafrica-et.org/africa-and-peace-and-security-diplomacy-in-a-time-of-the-new-agenda-for-peace/
3 Amani Africa, ‘Seizing the New Momentum for UNSC Resolution on UN funding of AU Peace Operations’ (May 2023), available on: https://bit.ly/433Xsp6
