Briefing on the AU led peace process for Ethiopia
Briefing on the AU led peace process for Ethiopia
Date | 21 October 2022
Tomorrow (21 October), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1115th session for a ‘Briefing on the AU led peace process for Ethiopia’. The meeting was not initially included in the monthly programme of work of the Council.
Following opening remarks by Mohammed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a statement. Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria and AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa is also expected to provide update to the PSC. The representatives of Ethiopia and the regional body the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are also expected to deliver statements as the concerned country and regional economic community, respectively.
It is to be recalled that the PSC held its last meeting on the situation in Ethiopia on 4 August 2022 at its 1097th session. Since that time, the situation in the conflict has dramatically changed for worse. Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to focus on two issues. The first relate to the current state of the hostilities that resumed on 24 August. The second area of focus of tomorrow’s session will be the preparations for the peace talks that the AU has been working to get off the ground.
Tomorrow’s session comes in the context of three important developments. The first relate to developments on the battle front where significant escalation of violence has been witnessed in recent weeks. Ethiopia’s federal government announced the capture of three strategic towns in Tigray (Shire in northwest, and Alamata and Korem in South of Tigray) after weeks of fighting in which Eritrean Defense Forces play major part in the hostilities between Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) supported by regional Amhara forces on one side and the Tigray forces on the other.
It is to be recalled that fighting resumed between federal government and Tigray region on 24 August after five months of lull in violence. The resumption of hostilities collapsed the truce that was in force following the 24 March 2022 declaration by the Federal Government declared an ‘indefinite humanitarian truce’ and its subsequent reciprocation by Tigray forces by expressing willingness to respect the truce and cessation of hostilities on condition that adequate and timely humanitarian assistance are provided. Between March and August, the diplomatic engagements by the AU High-Representative for the Horn of Africa, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, along with his US, EU and UN counterparts were hoped to make headways towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict that has taken a heavy human toll since its eruption in November 2020. However, tension began to mount again as diplomatic interventions by the various special envoys failed to build up on and translate the momentum witnessed between March and August into meaningful peace talks towards an agreed cessation of hostilities and comprehensive political settlement. Meanwhile, as diplomatic efforts failed to make headways, concerns have been expressed about the inadequacy and unsustainability of the ‘indefinite humanitarian truce’, including deepening differences over the flow of humanitarian assistance and the resumption of basic services to Tigray, which has been cut off from electricity, telecom, banking, and other basic utilities. Against the background of military buildup on all sides and the failure of regional and international actors to take these differences seriously and mobilize stronger efforts to iron them out, attacks and subsequent seizure of territories in the neighboring Amhara region by Tigray forces triggered the resumption of hostilities in various border areas of Tigray.
The second context in which tomorrow’s session is held is the proposed convening of UN Security Council’s meeting on 21 October on the ongoing hostilities in Tigray. This meeting, being convened on the request of the African 3 (A3) members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), brings the total number of Security Council’s meetings on this conflict situation to fifteen since the outbreak of the conflict in November 2020.
The proposed convening of the UNSC meeting comes in the context of growing anxiety about both the scale and gravity of the bloodshed the nature of hostilities are feared and reported to be precipitating and aggravating an already dire situation for civilians who have already endured enormous suffering since the start of the war. Regional and international actors as well as partners have intensified their call for the immediate cessation of hostilities as intensifying fighting continues deeper into Tigray, raising the alarm over worsening humanitarian crisis and the susceptibility of the context of the hostilities for atrocities. The AU, widely perceived as responding inadequately to this situation, was on the lead in calling for an end of the hostilities. In a statement issued on 15 October, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat expressed his ‘grave concern’ over the ‘reports of increased fighting in the Tigray Region’ and called for an ‘immediate, unconditional ceasefire and the resumption of humanitarian services’. In the same statement, the Chairperson also urged the two parties to ‘recommit to dialogue as per their agreement to direct talks to be convened in South Africa by a high-level team led by the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and supported by the international community’.
Mahamat was not alone in issuing such statement. On 17 October, United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, characterized the situation in Ethiopia as ‘spiraling out of control’ while calling the hostilities in Tigray to end immediately and for ‘immediate withdrawal of and disengagement of Eritrean armed forces from Ethiopia’. In his 18 October tweet, Guterres further stressed the need for urgent resumption of talks and expressed UN’s readiness to support the AU in that regard. The following day UN Human Rights Chief issued a statement saying that ‘Since 31 August we have received numerous reports of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian objects due to airstrikes and artillery strikes in Tigray – disruptions to communication make it particularly difficult to verify reports, but it is clear that the toll on civilians is utterly staggering.’ He further held that ‘Under international law, indiscriminate attacks or attacks deliberately targeting civilians or civilian objects amount to war crimes’, although statements from the Federal Government of Ethiopia expressed that efforts are made for avoiding the targeting of civilians. Others particularly the European Union and the United States issued statements with similar firmness, urging both sides to cease hostilities and recommit to the AU-led peace process.
The third context is AU’s new call for the convening of peace talks on 24 October in South Africa. It is to be recalled that on 1 October, the Chairperson of the AU Commission dispatched a letter inviting both parties to the conflict to attend an AU-convened peace talk slated for 8 October in South Africa within the framework of the AU-led peace process for Ethiopia, which was envisaged to deliberate on the ‘guiding principles, agenda issues, modalities, format, and timelines for the negotiated settlement’. Regarding the mediation team, in the statement he issued on 6 October, Mahamat stated that ‘the peace talks will be conducted through a high level panel of eminent Africans, established purposefully for the Ethiopian peace process. The panel is led by H.E Olusegun Obasanjo, AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and former President of Nigeria, along with H.E Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of Kenya, and H.E. Dr Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, former Deputy President of South Africa and Member of the AU Panel of the Wise. The Federal Government of Ethiopia announced the acceptance of the invitation on 5 October. On the same day, the Tigray side responded positively but sought two main clarifications: whether there would be additional actors to be invited to the negotiation and the envisaged role for the international community, and logistical details particularly the travel and security arrangements for its negotiating team. Just a day before the planned negotiation date, former President Kenyatta informed the Chairperson that he would not be able to attend the meeting due to a schedule clash. He also sought clarity from the AU Commission on the ‘structure and modalities of the talks, including but not limited to the rule of engagement for all the interlocutors invited’ and whether the issue of ‘immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities’ would be on the agenda of the meeting. The proposed meeting was eventually postponed, given the lack of clarity around the modalities of the peace talks and tight schedule.
Since then the AU Commission has held wide consultations and been working hard for putting in place the necessary preparations for the commencement of the delayed peace talks. This process, among others, clarified the role of regional and international stakeholders stating that the peace talks will be held with the support of such stakeholders. The statements that AUC Chair issued on 6 October and on 15 October affirmed that the talks will be ‘supported by the international community.’ It was against this background that the AU Commission sent another letter to the members of the mediation panel and the parties to the conflict inviting them for starting the peace talks on 24 October in South Africa. No official statement has been issued by both sides as of yet, but Redwan Hussien, national security advisor to the Prime Minster of Ethiopia, in his 20 October tweet, confirmed federal government’s participation. There was no response from the forces in Tigray on the new proposed date of the peace talks.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its deep concern about the resumption of hostilities and the toll the fighting is having on peoples in the effected territories. The PSC, reiterating that war cannot be a solution to the conflict, may welcome the 15 October statement of the AU Commission Chairperson and his strong call for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire and the resumption of humanitarian services’. The PSC may also call on all third parties to refrain from all acts that may further inflame the situation and may in this regard call on Eritrea to withdraw its troops. The PSC may also express the necessity for the parties to start peace talks and in this respect may welcome the preparations made by the AU Commission and the members of the mediation panel including the invitation sent for the parties for starting talks on 24 October in South Africa. The PSC may welcome the commitments that the parties have been expressing for engaging in AU-led peace talks and urge them to send their delegations for the peace talks. The Council, decrying the attacks that caught civilians and humanitarian actors, may also urge the parties to observe human rights and international humanitarian law rules at all times to ensure the protection of civilians and humanitarian actors. It may also reiterate its encouragement to the parties to the conflict ‘to place the supreme interests of Ethiopia and its people above all else and embrace inclusive political dialogue as the only viable approach towards finding a consensual solution to the current situation. The PSC may also reaffirm its ‘appreciation to all partners for their continued support and encourages them to scale up their support for the AU-led mediation process’ and commends South Africa for its willingness to host the peace talks and urge other member states to intensify their support to the efforts of the mediation panel.
Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus: Building Resilience and Adaptation for Food Security in African Island States Towards COP27
Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus: Building Resilience and Adaptation for Food Security in African Island States Towards COP27
Date | 18 October 2022
Tomorrow (18 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is scheduled to hold its 1114th session at the ministerial level under the theme ‘Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus: Building Resilience and Adaptation for Food Security in African Island States Towards COP27’.
Following the opening remark by the minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates of the Kingdom of Morocco and Chairperson of the PSC for October Nasser Bourita, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Josefa Sacko, the Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE) of the AU Commission is scheduled to make a presentation on the theme of the session. Omar Gad, Permanent Representative of Egypt and incoming chair of COP27 is also expected to deliver a statement. The representatives of the World Food Program (WFP), Climate Change Competence Center and Adaptation of African Agriculture are also expected to brief the PSC. Seychelles as Chair of the African Islands Climate Commission is scheduled to make a statement.
Climate change and security is one of PSC’s standing thematic agenda items that is increasingly receiving attention from highest level of decision makers. Since 2016, PSC has addressed the nexus between climate change and security in Africa from various perspectives through the different sessions dedicated to the theme. In 2021 alone three sessions were held on the theme including two at heads of state and government level. More specifically the unique vulnerability experienced by small island states has been the focus of the PSC’s 877th session. The meeting underscored the severity of climate change on island states and expressed its concern by noting how the effects of climate change are ‘threatening their survival and impacting on biodiversity, food security and the livelihoods of communities’ and further called for urgent action for the protection of livelihoods and biodiversity.
African island states and in most cases small island states are inherently vulnerable due to their size and remoteness from global interconnected economic system. These states are also highly vulnerable given their exposure to environmental challenges and limited resource base. Despite their negligible contribution to greenhouse gas emissions they have been disproportionately affected by the devastating effects of climate change. Availability of food and water resources remain critical challenges to these states. Food insecurity is a result of multiple factors. In the majority of these states the agricultural sector is characterized by subsistence production. Smallholder farmers constitute the majority producers in the sector. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report more than 80% of farmers hold less than 2 ha in Guinea-Bissau and 90% hold less than 1 ha in Cabo Verde. The sector also highly depends on rainfall and any decrease in precipitation due to climate change exposes communities to drought and the reduction of agricultural production. The use of fertilizers is also low in many of these states. In addition to the agriculture sector island states are also highly dependent on their oceanic and fishery resources for food security and livelihoods and for economic development.
Food insecurity has deteriorated at an alarming rate across Africa threatening human security. The AU, FAO and the UN Economic Commission for Africa have reported that the hunger situation on the continent witnessed the most deterioration during 2019 and 2020. According to the three entities, 281.6 million Africans are undernourished in 2020. More reports are indicating that these trends will likely worsen in subsequent years (read more in Amani Africa’s ‘Insights’ on Food Security and Conflict in Africa).
In addition to the structural and economic difficulties of island states which make them susceptible to effects of climate change, their condition is further exacerbated by extreme weather events such as cyclones and slow onset processes like sea level rise. This vulnerability is expected to worsen in the coming decades. As per United Nations’ World Meteorological Organization’s report in 2022, Africa’s island states and coastal states will carry a heavy brunt of rising sea level and it will cost them an estimated $50 billion in damages by 2050. Moreover, extreme weather events and island states remain highly susceptible to external shocks. The combined effects of climate change, COVID19 and the global crisis that followed the war in Ukraine had severe effects that further exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities. These multiple crises have had direct impact on the economies of these countries including due to the adverse effects on the tourism sector, agricultural sector, infrastructure and energy.
The cost of adaptation remains high and these states face difficulties in accessing climate financing. According to United Nations Environmental Protection (UNEP) data the annual adaptation cost for developing nations is estimated at USD 70 billion. The numbers are expected to rise to up to USD 140-300 billion in 2030 and USD 280-500 billion in 2050. Developed nations are far from meeting their commitments of USD100 billion per year, to finance climate change actions at national, regional and international levels.
Building resilience is fundamental for communities and countries to respond to shocks without leading to crisis or conflict. However, security and environmental crises continue to erode the resilience of communities. Drought, water shortage, food insecurity, and desertification that are caused or aggravated by climate change, are risk multipliers for conflict. Moreover, other external and global factors also contribute to this fragility. Hence, tomorrow’s session may reflect on policy responses that support island states in scaling up their efforts towards a more resilient and climate-smart agriculture that can respond to internal and external difficulties.
An important aspect to consider during tomorrow’s session is the relationship between climate change and security and how these interplay in the context of island states. Although there is an increasing recognition of the nexus between climate and security, it is an area that is yet to be properly studied and analyzed. The relationship is complex and as also highlighted in the concept note there is no direct causal link between climate change and security. Nonetheless, the compounded effects of declining security and environment are being witnessed in various parts of the continent. In recognition of the link between the two components, the 6th IPCC Report on Climate Change stressed the importance of building synergies between climate adaptation and peacebuilding to address climate-related fragility and conflict risks more comprehensively. Indeed, some of the island states in Africa in addition to climate change related challenges, are also experiencing insecurities and fragile political processes, as has been the case in Comoros. Climate change has the effect of accentuating these existing vulnerabilities and insecurities.
As highlighted in the concept note, one of the key developments that is expected to take place in tomorrow’s session is the presentation by the AUC of the ‘key messages’ on the nexus between climate change, peace and security within the context of the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture to facilitate the development of a Common African Position on climate change, peace and security nexus. This builds from previous PSC decisions and it is also a critical exercise to integrate peace and security matters within COP27 which have been absent in previous COPs.
From the perspective of the upcoming COP27 presidency, the representative from Egypt is expected to highlight the COP priorities and the various initiatives. The representative may also highlight the centrality of adaptation, losses and damages as priorities in the COP and for the continent. These priorities are particularly critical for island states. The absence of a loss and damage fund and the sensitivity around the issue, which was also witnessed in COP26 negotiations, continues to affect developing nations ability to access financing for recovery, reconstruction and to assist communities whose home and livelihood have been destroyed. The representative may also use the opportunity to remind participants and highlight the importance for Africa to clearly articulate its position and interest and ensure that African states advance a collective goal in addressing a global challenge that is disproportionately affecting the continent.
The expected outcome is a communique. Council may underscore the unique vulnerabilities of African island states to climate change and the consequences related to food insecurity. The Council may express its concern over the devastating effects of climate change induced natural disasters and the consequent loss and damage. The PSC may welcome the key messages presented by the AUC as an important step in forming a common position and informing the COP27 deliberations on climate and security matters. The PSC may commend Egypt for the work it has undertaken in preparation of COP27. The Council may call for the harmonization of policies and action at all levels between the AU, member states and Regional Economic Communities in early warning and early action. The PSC may also call for the need for investing in preparedness and capacity for effective response. Additionally, the PSC may call for a strengthened cooperation between the Africa Multi-hazard Early Warning System and Early Action (AMHEWAS) Situation Room and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Situation Room. The Council may reiterate its previous call for countries most responsible for climate change to honor their pledge and deliver on the USD100 billion for annual climate financing to developing nations. It may also highlight the imperative for countries with the most responsibility for greenhouse emissions to take the urgent measures for meeting the target set for limiting emissions. With respect to island states and countries whose economies are battered by the impacts of climate change, it may welcome the plan for including loss and damage in to the COP27 agenda and call for the establishment of a dedicated mechanism for supporting loss and damage.
Annual Informal Joint Seminar and Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council
Annual Informal Joint Seminar and Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council
Date | 13 October 2022
Members of the AUPSC will be travelling to New York this week to take part in the 16th joint annual consultative meeting between the Security Council and the AUPSC which will be held on 14 October 2022. The annual meeting rotates between Addis Ababa and New York, and this year New York will be hosting the meeting in-person. Because of the COVID situation, the meeting was held via video teleconference for the last two years.
7th Informal Seminar
The annual consultative meeting between the two Councils will be preceded by the seventh informal joint seminar which will be held on 13 October 2022. The joint seminar will allow the two Councils to reflect on how they can enhance cooperation in peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa. One of the items for discussion during the informal session is the perennial issue of working methods. The issue of the modalities for implementing their decision to undertake joint field missions, follow up on the conclusions of the consultative meeting and the status of the joint communique are among the various working methods issues. The informal seminar will also discuss on developing an African common agenda between the two Councils. Other issues of common interest expected to receive attention include strengthening AU and UN peace support operations and promotion of peacebuilding in Africa.
Ahead of the annual meeting, the Security Council is also expected to hold its annual debate on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations, focusing on the partnership with the African Union on 11 October 2022. The UN Secretary-General’s annual report on “Strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU)”, which was published on 25 August, will be the basis for discussion at the debate. In addition, the Gabon Security Council Presidency wants to highlight the 20th anniversary of the African Union during the meeting and facilitate a discussion on how to strengthen the partnership between the UN and the AU in support of ‘a constructive multilateral world’. Lately, there has been renewed momentum in the discussion on UN Security Council reform in New York. Therefore, Gabon intends to capitalize on this and foster discussion on this issue with a view to advancing Africa’s longstanding position as encapsulated in the Ezilwini consensus.
16th Annual Consultative Meeting
The consultative meeting will be held the following day on 14 October. After consultations through exchange of letters, the two Councils have agreed on the agenda items for their annual consultative meeting. Accordingly, they are expected to discuss the situations in West Africa and the Sahel and in the Great Lakes region, the application of sanctions in conflict situations in Africa and the strengthening of AU and UN peace support operations in Africa.
On West Africa and the Sahel, the growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism as well as unconstitutional changes of government will likely attract the attention of the two Councils. It is to be recalled that the United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) have jointly launched an Independent High-Level Panel on Security, Governance and Development in the Sahel in September to provide recommendations on how to effectively respond to the challenges facing the region. The High-Level Panel is chaired by the former President of Niger Mahamadou Issoufou and its report, due to come out early next year, will likely inform future discussions and how coordinated action by these organizations to address the multiple and complex challenges facing west Africa and the Sahel can be mobilized.
In terms of the situation in the Great Lakes region, the two Councils will have focused discussion on developments in DRC and the Central African Republic. The resurgence of the M23 Movement in eastern DRC and the subsequent tension between DRC and Rwanda has been a major preoccupation in recent months. The PSC held a session on the situation in August. The two Councils may discuss the ongoing regional initiatives through the Nairobi process under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the Luanda mediation initiative under the leadership of the Angolan President João Lourenço Angolan President João Lourenço, current Chair of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). In the context of the Nairobi process, the EAC Heads of State have been trying to address the security challenge in eastern DRC in two tracks through the facilitation of political dialogue between the DRC and armed groups and the deployment of a regional force to fight armed groups which refuse to engage in the dialogue process. The EAC regional force is expected to be deployed for an initial period of six months. Burundi has already deployed a battalion in eastern DRC as part of the regional force and Kenya is expected to follow in the near future. On 6 July, President Lourenço hosted Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Luanda for talks which culminated with the adoption of a roadmap outlining steps to be taken by the two countries and the region to address the security situation in eastern DRC.
In Central African Republic, the implementation of the 2019 political agreement and the Luanda roadmap adopted by the ICGLR remains critical. The republican dialogue promised by President Faustin Touadera following his reelection took place in March 2022 but it was boycotted by several opposition parties and civil society groups. One of the controversial issues during the republican dialogue was a proposal for revising the constitution which was rejected by opposition parties and civil society representatives. However, the government has been organizing public demonstrations in support of amending the constitution through a referendum. This led to the formation of a committee to draft a new constitution but opposition parties and civil society groups continue to oppose this move. Subsequently, the initiative was also challenged before the Constitutional Court, which rejected proposals seeking to extend term limits as unconstitutional. Local elections are expected to take place early next year for the first time in several decades but funding has been a major constraint. The security situation in the country also remains very fragile and reports about gross violations of human rights and conflict related sexual violence are a major concern. These issues are likely to elicit discussion at the annual consultative meeting.
Regarding the application of sanctions, the AUPSC and the African regional mechanisms have been calling on the Security Council to lift the sanctions imposed on some African countries. Examples in this respect include the Central African Republic and South Sudan. Accordingly, the three African members of the Security Council (Gabon, Ghana and Kenya) have been raising this issue. This has impacted recent negotiations on extending sanctions regimes resulting in the abstention of African members on votes renewing the sanctions on some African countries. For example, last May, Gabon and Kenya abstained the resolution renewing the arms embargo and travel and financial sanctions on targeted individuals. This is expected to be a controversial topic during the annual meeting. While some Council members support the African members on this issue, several others do not necessarily share the same view.
Recently, there has been renewed interest regarding the financing of AU led peace support operations in both Councils. It is to be recalled that African members of the Security Council had proposed a draft resolution in December 2018 to advance the issue but the US threatened to block it using its veto power. In 2019, South Africa tried to facilitate progress but the AUPSC called for suspension of this effort until it comes up with a common position on the matter. Since then, a draft common position paper has been in the works but there seems to be an urgent need to finalize it in light of the 31 August Security Council presidential statement. This is going to be critical as efforts continue to push for a concrete outcome following the upcoming report of the Secretary-General in April. Unlike 2018, there appears to be an interest on the part of the Biden administration to make progress on this issue.
Baring major disagreement, it is expected that the two Councils will adopt a joint communique building on last year’s annual consultative meeting that succeeded in issuing the joint communique promptly. The AUPSC Committee of Experts, who already travelled to New York in preparation for the annual meeting, are expected to hold consultations with their Security Council counterparts on 11 October 2022 to finalize the draft which covers the above-mentioned topics.
