Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of November 2021
Amani Africa
Date | November 2021
In November, Egypt will be the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC’s provisional programme of work for the month envisages four sessions dedicated to thematic issues, one country specific session and a joint consultative meeting with the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC). As a conclusion to Council’s activities of the month, a press conference by the PSC Chairperson is scheduled to take place on 30 November.
The first activity the PSC will be undertaking during the month is the meeting between the PSC Chair and the African three elected members of UN Security Council (UNSC) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (A3+1), scheduled to take place on 1 November. It is to be recalled that at its 983rd session on the unified role of the A3, Council made some concrete decisions aimed at improving the role played by the A3 in advancing common African positions on African peace and security issues which are on the agenda of the UNSC. One of the key decisions emerging from that session was to have monthly consultations between the PSC Troika and the A3, in order to ensure provision of timely updates and guidance to the A3 on African peace and security issues ahead of UNSC meetings. At the 13th PSC Retreat which took place in May 2021 in Mombasa, it was further reiterated that the incoming Chair of the PSC shall convene monthly meetings with the Coordinator of the A3 and that these meetings shall be reinforced with quarterly meetings at the level of the PSC Troika and the A3 as whole. The upcoming meeting therefore takes place within the framework of these decisions and could also contribute to preparations being made for the upcoming joint consultative meeting of the PSC and UNSC.
The PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) will be convening on November 2 to prepare for the planned filed mission to Somalia as well as for engagement with UNSC experts at the upcoming annual joint consultative meeting between the PSC and UNSC.
On 5 November, Council will convene its first substantive session, which will focus on the protection of medical personnel and facilities in armed conflicts. The session is likely initiated in response to the growing trend of attacks against medical personnel and facilities observed in conflict affected areas globally, most of these being concentrated in west and central Africa. Reports signify that in the period from 2016 to 2021, over 1000 reported cases of attacks against health workers and medical facilities have been recorded in west and central Africa. Particularly, in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria, a concerning surge in such attacks has resulted in suspension of medical activities, constraining peoples’ access to healthcare, an issue compounded further by outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The PSC is scheduled to undertake a field mission to Somalia from 9 to 10 November.
On 12 November the PSC is set to consider three agenda items. In the morning session the PSC will receive a briefing on AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). This will be the second session on the theme to take place within this year, in line with PSC’s 2021 indicative annual programme of activities, which envisages convening twice to review PCRD efforts in the continent. It is to be recalled that the first meeting on the theme took place at Council’s 1017th meeting convened in August, with a focus on AU support to member States in political transition and in post-conflict situations. At the upcoming session, Council may follow up on some of its key decisions made at the 1017th session, mainly on the reactivation of the PSC Sub-Committee on PCRD and its request for the Chairperson of the AU Commission to submit a comprehensive report on implementation of PCRD activities in Africa.
In the afternoon of 12 November, Council will convene its joint consultative meeting with the UNPBC. It is to be recalled that the two bodies had their last annual consultative meeting in October 2020, where country specific, regional and thematic peace and security issues of common concern were discussed. The upcoming meeting provides the stage for further reflection on these issues and to exchange ideas on how the AUPSC and UNPBC can further consolidate collaborations on peacebuilding in Africa, particularly taking account of the need to give effect to the contents of the Common African Position on the 2020 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture adopted at Council’s 948th session.
The consideration and adoption of the draft programme of work for the month of December is also expected to take place on 12 November, through email exchanges.
The next PSC session is scheduled for 15 November, although the date is yet to be confirmed. The session is planned to take place at the ministerial level and will be committed to the theme of countering radicalism and extremist ideologies in Africa. In October 2021, Council already convened a ministerial level session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa. This trend demonstrates that the PSC is giving much needed attention to the interconnected concern of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, which are intensifying, in some parts of the continent.
On 17 November, Council will be convening to receive a briefing on the situation in Libya. In May 2021, Council convened a ministerial session on Libya (997th meeting) where the AU Commission was requested to provide regular progress reports on the implementation of AU decisions aimed at supporting the Libyan transitional process. The upcoming briefing could therefore highlight, among others, the status of preparations for the planned general elections, particularly regarding finalization of all necessary constitutional frameworks, and more generally, the challenges and progresses in the implementation of the October 2020 Ceasefire Agreement.
The final substantive session of the month will be convened on 26 November, addressing climate change and peace and security in Africa. The session is a timely one provided that the current year has seen increasing impacts of and corresponding concerns over climate change. It is also to be recalled that one of the agenda items of Council’s 984th session convened at the summit level was dedicated to climate change and its effects on peace and security in Africa. At that session, decisions were adopted including establishing an AU special fund on climate change. In addition, the AU Commission was requested to submit a report elaborating the nexus between climate change and peace and security in Africa and also to provide updates regarding the appointment of AU Special Envoy for climate change and security. The upcoming session presents the opportunity to also follow up on these decisions.
As envisaged in the footnotes of Council’s indicative programme of work for the month, meetings may be scheduled as needed, to assess situations in Chad, Guinea, Mali, Somalia and Sudan, countries currently facing pressing peace and security challenges. The footnotes also indicate that the 12th Annual Retreat of AU High Representatives is expected to take place from 1 to 3 November and engagement of PSC CoE with UNSC Experts as well as preparations for the PSC-UNSC annual joint consultative meeting is to continue in New York, from 22 to 24 November.
Disaster Management in Africa: Challenges and Perspectives for Human Security
Amani Africa
Date | 29 October, 2021
Tomorrow (29 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1043rd session on ‘Disaster Management in Africa: challenges and perspectives for human security’ at the level of Heads of State and Government. This session takes place under the chairship of Mozambique, which also hosted a virtual meeting of the Committee of Ministers Responsible for Disaster Risk management from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 26th May 2021 with the aim to review progress on regional Disaster Risk Management programmes and ensure effective coordination at the regional level.
The session is expected to have two segments, an open and a closed session. In the open session invited guests will deliver their statements. Following the opening Statement by Felipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, is expected to make remarks. Further remarks are expected from the President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, in his capacity as the AU Champion for Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, as well as President of Gabon, Ali Bongo Ondimba, in his capacity as the Leader of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSOC). AU Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, Amira EL Fadil, and AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment, Josefa Leonel Correia Sacko, are scheduled to deliver presentations.
This session comes on the heels of the International Day for Disaster Risk Reduction, which is observed on 13 October to raise awareness about disaster risk reduction. This year’s commemoration took place under the theme of ‘international cooperation for developing countries to reduce their disaster risk and disaster losses’, the sixth target of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The session also takes place ahead of the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow, which is scheduled for 31 October-12 November 2021. As Africa bears the brunt of climate change but has contributed least to climate emissions, the summit may also present an opportunity to remind commitments around climate finance and adaptation.
This high level engagement on disaster management becomes all too important as Africa continues to face evermore frequent disasters and increasing vulnerability with a devastating repercussion on the lives and livelihoods of its people. According to World Risk Report 2021, Africa has the second highest disaster risk next to Oceania while it is the continent with the highest overall societal vulnerability—12 of the 15 most vulnerable countries in the world are located in Africa. The risk has been evident from multiple disasters that hit the continent in recent years including the volcano eruption on Mount Nyiragongo in the city of Goma in DRC, locust swarms and flooding in Horn of Africa, cyclones and storms that led to heavy rains and flooding in Southern Africa countries such as the Comoros, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 90 percent of the major disasters in Africa have been climate related.
Over the years, the AU has put in place policy and institutional frameworks to effectively respond to the increasing disasters confronting the continent. The African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ARSDRR), which was adopted by the Assembly (Assembly/AU/Dec.38) during its third ordinary session held in July 2004, guides the continent’s disaster risk reduction efforts. The AUC has further developed the Programme of action (PoA) for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. To address the humanitarian consequences of disasters, the Union also adopted, among others, the Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa and the Common African Position (CAP) on Humanitarian Effectiveness that shaped Africa’s new humanitarian architecture.
On the institutional aspect, the African Risk Capacity (ARC)—a specialized agency of the AU established in 2012—comes at the center of Africa’s ‘disaster risk architecture’. The ARC aims to help African governments improve their capacities to better plan, prepare, and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters by combining the concepts of early warning, disaster risk management, and risk finance. The Special Emergency Assistance Fund (SEAF) is also established to support African countries affected by drought and/or famine although it needs to be replenished. The African Humanitarian Agency (AUHA) is also expected to facilitate coordination in humanitarian response. The African Standby Force (ASF) is another mechanism that has the mandate to respond to natural disasters.
While there are notable progress in terms of laying down the necessary structures to address disaster risks in the continent, many challenges remain. One of the significant challenges in this respect is, as captured by Lesley Ndlovu (CEO African Risk Capacity Limited) in her recent remarks on the international day for disaster risk reduction, that ‘disaster response is extremely slow and inefficient and, by the time governments and NGOs have raised enough money to respond meaningfully, the problem has become much worse, and more funding is needed’. In most cases, not only the response is ‘slow and inefficient’ but also it is largely reactive focusing on relief and immediate rehabilitation while ignoring preventive disaster reduction measures.
Hence inadequate early warning system and the gap in translating early warning to early action remain critical hurdles. As captured in the notes prepared for this session, ‘in most countries, early warning systems are sectoral in nature and hardly coordinated’. A positive development in this respect is a recent conference convened this month by the AU Commission to validate a Multi-Hazard Early Warning/Early Action (MHEWS/EA) Framework. The development of the Framework is a step forward in building the resilience of African countries as it ensures a functional early warning system. It is also to be recalled that the Council, at its 864th session held in August 2019, suggested the ‘establishment of command centers which operate on a 24 hour basis to closely monitor and timeously issue early warning alerts on impending natural disasters’, something that the Council find it worth following up in terms of strengthening the early warning system.
Inadequate funding has heavily affected disaster management. Not only there is a huge gap between the needs of people at risk to disasters and the available funding but also most of African countries and the continental mechanisms lack sustainable and predictable funding as they rely largely on external sources. Though there is an Assembly Decision to increase AU Humanitarian Fund from 2% to 4% of member states’ assessed contributions, meant to ensure predictable and sustainable resources for the AU to enable fulfil its humanitarian responsibilities, its practicality and buy-in from member states remain questionable. As indicated in the notes prepared for tomorrow’s PSC session, there is a growing trend of establishing uncoordinated disaster specific funds, and hence there is a need to embrace ‘multi-hazard funding mechanisms’.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. Among others, while commending the existing AU structures that are established to address disaster risks, the PSC may emphasize on the need to operationalize and strengthen the capacity of these structures, and in this respect, there much to be desired from member states in supporting the mechanisms. In addition, the Council may also stress the importance of enhancing coordination among the plethora of AU mechanisms for disaster management to ensure complementarity as well as avoid duplication of efforts. The PSC may underscore the importance of shifting the focus from treating the effects of disasters (reactive measures) towards a proactive approach that is more economical and efficient. On the funding challenge, the Council may stress not only on the need to rely on Africa’s own resources in the spirit of pan-Africanism but also highlight the imperative of diversifying sources of finance, as well ensuring predictable and sustainable funding for the AU to effectively discharge the expected role in addressing disaster risks. In this regard, the Council is likely to explore options to raise funds from non-traditional donors from non-traditional donors including African civil society, private sector and the diaspora, in addition to traditional sources of funding. The Council may further reiterate its support for the upcoming African Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference in Malabo, which is expected to serve as impetus to operationalize the African Humanitarian Agency and mobilize required financial resources to address the ever growing humanitarian needs of the continent. In relation to building effective early warning system and bridging the gaps between early warning and early action, the Council may also urge for the finalization of the Multi-Hazard Early Warning/Early Action (MHEWS/EA) Framework and the development of Continental MHEWS/EA Situation Room, which are pivotal in providing operational guidance on Multi-Agency and Multi-Sectoral coordination and communications at member states, regional and continental level. Finally, the Council may reiterate its 864th session which underscored the need for the ‘Regional Standby Forces to reinforce their engagement in responding to natural disasters’.
Emergency Session on the Situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 26 October, 2021
Tomorrow (26 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an emergency session on the situation in Sudan.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. Sudan as the country concerned may also make a statement. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as the relevant regional organization may also deliver statement.
On 25 October 2021, Sudan’s military successfully staged a coup by arresting Prime Minister Hamdok and other civilian officials. A few hours later, head of the Sovereign Council and army chief, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the dissolution of the transitional government, declared state of emergency and announced that the military will oversee Sudan’s transition until the conduct of elections and formation of a democratically elected government.
This is a very troubling development that not only violates the AU norm banning unconstitutional change of government, involving the dissolution of government by the military but also the AU facilitated constitutional declaration of August 2019 that established the transitional power-sharing government with civilian and military components. If the transitional process is not brought back on track with full respect of the Constitutional Declaration through restoration of the transitional government with its civilian leadership under Prime Minister Abdela Hamdok, this coup and the decision by the military to be in charge of the transition will completely reverse the gains achieved thus far and jeopardize the hope for a successful democratic transition in Sudan.
There have been warning signs that this military coup has been in the making. The relationship between the civilian leadership and the military has from the very beginning been fragile, although this does not make today’s events inevitable. Disagreement and tension have been expanding for more than a year. The two sides disagreed over foreign policy, the issue cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) relating to the prosecution of alleged crimes perpetrated in Darfur, including the handing over of former president Omar Al Bashir to ICC, and importantly the reform of the security sector in Sudan.
Despite the efforts of the transitional government to secure debt relief and obtain foreign investment to revive it, Sudan’s economy has been on a downward spiral since 2019, with recent inflation rates reaching a shocking level of 400% per year. This has added to the complexity of the situation creating citizen discontent and complaint over the rising cost of living. During the previous months, Sudan experienced a crisis involving the blocking in Eastern Sudan of the path to port Sudan, causing serious shortage of supplies in the country and thereby endangering processes for easing the dire economic situation in the country. While the public protests spurred by the economic difficulty have undermined the transitional civilian authorities, the public has also remained opposed to the military, expressing their unwillingness to have a military rule in the country and endangering the gains made towards establishing a civilian government.
In September, there was an announcement of the foiling of an attempted coup by some security personnel associated with the previous administration of Bashir. This brought the growing tension between the civilian leadership and the military to a low point with the two sides trading accusations. While the military accused the civilians of alienating the military and failing to effectively govern the country, the civilians accused the military of trying to create conditions for countering the revolution and grabbing power by force.
Though the ‘remnants of al-Bashir’s regime’ were scapegoated for the aborted coup, it clearly signalled not only the rocky transition towards a democratic rule but also revealed the deep divides and the simmering tension within civil-military coalition. Immediately after the attempted coup, it was reported that military component of the Sovereign Council suspended all meetings with its civilian counterpart while removing the security details of the Committee for Dismantling the June 30 1989 Regime, Removal of Empowerment and Corruption, and Recovering Public Funds—a committee established by the interim transitional government with the aim to claw back assets from the ousted government of al-Bashir.
As reflected in the Constitutional Declaration, the power-sharing arrangement between the two was for military to chair the Sovereignty Council for 21 months before a civilian takes over for the remaining 18 months of the transitional period leading to elections. Many have been casting their doubt on whether the military will honour the terms of the power-share deal given its history and reluctance for accommodating reform that limits its role in the politics of the country. Indeed, the coup happened only weeks away from the time for transferring the leadership of the Sovereign Council to the civilian leadership.
The absence of a mechanism for resolving disputes between the military and the civilian leadership in a context of mutual distrust and with the slow pace of the establishment of the transitional assembly, there has been increasing tendency for mobilizing rival public protests. Against the background of the deteriorating relationship since the attempted coup in September and in the context of the deterioration of the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military and in the face of the impending handover of the leadership of the Sovereign Council by the military to the civilian leadership headed by Prime Minister Hamdok, a pro-military sit-in was staged in front of the presidential palace. This pro-military protest not only put the blame on the civilian leadership for the contestations and ‘ineffective governance’ of the country but also called for, among others, the overthrow of the civilian leaders. It was reported that Sudanese and observers of Sudan feared that this was the pretext for a hostile takeover of power.
In a show of public support for the civilian leadership and their rejection of the military’s manoeuvre to frustrate the reform process, protests countering the pro-military demonstration took place not only in Khartoum but also other parts of the country. This mobilized various sectors of society from different walks of life.
International organizations and states responded to the situation unfolding in Sudan. The Chairperson of AU Commission, for instance, issued statement calling for the ‘immediate resumption of consultations between civilians and military within the framework of the Political Declaration and the Constitutional Decree’, in addition to urging authorities for the release of political leaders. The Executive Secretary of IGAD ‘strongly’ condemned ‘any attempt to undermine the transitional government’ while urging all parties to ‘exercise utmost restraint’. The Secretary-General of the Arab League issued statement as well expressing concerns over the military take-over and called for all parties to ‘full abide’ by the constitutional declaration signed in August 2019. The UN Secretary-General also called for the immediate release of Prime Minister Hamdok and other officials. Governments like the US and France also condemned the act.
Most significant is the mobilization of civilian protesters in Sudan. Unsurprisingly, protestors took over Khartoum and its twin city Omdurman in apparent opposition to the military coup. This has made it clear that there is widespread opposition against military rule. It also signifies that many civilians are determined to put their lives on the line for reversing the military takeover of power. In this context, there is heightened risk for confrontation by the military that will put the lives, safety and bodily security of civilians in grave peril. It is to be recalled that the PSC sanctioned Sudan on 5 June 2019 following the 3 June violent crackdown by the military against civilians that claimed the lives of many civilians and on account of lack of progress towards the establishment of a civilian-led Transitional Authority as prescribed by the Council in its previous sessions.
From a security perspective, the military coup not only brings the military on a deadly collusion course against the civilians who have been mobilized for defending the revolution throwing the country into deep instability but also threatens the Juba sponsored peace process that led to the integration of various armed groups from Darfur and the two areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile into the transitional process. All indications are that unless the situation is reversed and the transitional process is put back on track, fragile security conditions in Darfur and other parts of Sudan may deteriorate further.
Tomorrow’s session will be followed very closely not only by the wider African public and the international community but also by Sudanese themselves, including the civilian leaders of the transition. Members of the PSC may consider recent experiences involving military seizure of power. These have been witnessed among others in Chad, Mali and Guinea. Considering the gravity of the situation in Sudan including its adverse impact not only on the transitional process but also on the stability and peace and security of the country and the region, there seems to be very little legally viable and politically legitimate option other than following the approach taken to the military seizure of power in Guinea. Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry made this clear in a statement that expressed strong condemnation of today’s military coup d’état in Sudan and called for immediate restoration of the transitional government.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC may express grave concern about the military takeover of power in Sudan and its very adverse implications for the transitional process and the peace and security of Sudan and the region. It may condemn the dissolution of the government and the arrest of the civilian leadership of the transitional government contrary to the Constitutional Declaration of August 2019. The PSC may also welcome the statement of the AU Commission Chairperson and the call of others including IGAD rejecting the attempt to derail the transitional process. It may also reiterate its zero tolerance for military coup and its rejection of the announcement by the military to be in charge of the transitional process contrary to applicable AU norms on democracy and constitutional rule. It may in this context consider the situation in Sudan as unconstitutional change of government in line with Lomé Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance. In line with its established practice and invoking Article 7(1) (g) of the PSC Protocol, the Council may suspend Sudan from all AU activities until restoration of the transitional process involving the civilian leadership. The Council may further demand the immediate and unconditional release of Prime Minister Hamdok and other civilian leaders and their return to their positions. Following its best practice and to facilitate implementation of these decisions and restore stability in Sudan, the PSC may request the Chairperson of the Commission to send a special envoy who helps the parties in the process of restoring the transitional process on the basis of the Constitutional Declaration and facilitate agreement between the civilian leadership under Prime Minister Hamdok and the military on ways of implementing the transition process within the framework of the Constitutional Declaration and on the basis of mutual respect and establishment of an agreed upon dispute resolution mechanism.