The African Union Peace and Security Council Handbook - 2021
Amani Africa
2021
INTRODUCTION
The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the organ of the AU that is tasked with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. The norms underlying the mandate of the PSC and the methods and instruments for executing its mandate are enunciated in the Protocol to the AU Constitutive Act Establishing the PSC, which was adopted in Durban, South Africa in 2002.
The peace and security landscape of the continent and the nature of the mandate of the PSC demands that the PSC is organized and operates at a high level of effectiveness. Indeed, how the PSC functions and delivers on its mandate impacts not only the effectiveness of the continental response to the peace and security challenges, but also on global multilateral engagements. Various factors, including political will of member states, mobilization of consensus, and capacity, critically shape the level of effectiveness of the PSC.
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Continental Efforts in Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 22 October, 2021
Tomorrow (22 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1040th session at a ministerial level to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on continental efforts in prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa.
The session is expected to have two segments, an open and a closed session. In the open session invited guests will deliver their statements. Following the opening statement by Verónica Nataniel Macamo Dlhovo Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mozambique and PSC Chair for October, the Chairperson of the AUC Moussa Faki Mahamat is expected to deliver remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is scheduled to deliver a presentation. Ramtane Lamamra Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Algeria and Champion in Combating Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa is also expected to deliver remarks. The Chairpersons of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as the representatives of the European Union and the United Nations are expected to present their statements. During the closed segment Bankole Adeoye will present the report of the Chairperson of the AUC on continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa. The Secretary General of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) is also scheduled to present its statement.
The report of the chairperson is in line with the Assembly decision (/AU/Dec.311 (XV)) during its 15th Ordinary Session, held in July 2010, which requested the Commission to submit regular reports on the status of the fight and cooperation against terrorism in Africa. During its 249th meeting held in November 2010, it is to be recalled that the Council also requested the AU Commission to submit reports and briefings on the state of terrorism in Africa and the efforts made at continental and international level to address the scourge. Since then the Chairperson of the Commission has been reporting to the Council regularly, on the challenges related to terrorism in Africa and on continental efforts being undertaken towards combating the problem. The Council thus far held three of its sessions on the theme at the level of Heads of State and Government (455th, 571st, and 749th meetings). This makes the thematic issue the most addressed at a summit level.
On the state of terrorism and trends, the report underscores persistence of Africa’s vulnerability to the threats of terrorism and violent extremisms despite the progress achieved by member states in preventing and combating the scourge. Citing African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) data, the report provides that, from 1 January to 30 June 2021, the continent witnessed a total of 950 terrorist attacks resulting in 3,883 deaths—showing a 10 percent increase in the number of attacks as compared to the same period in 2020. Civilians continued to bear the brunt of terrorist attacks. On a positive note, the report indicates that counter terrorism operations neutralized 1,943 terrorists. Recently, major successes have been also registered in neutralizing top ranks of terrorist groups operating in Africa though its implication in reducing their lethality remains to be seen.
In terms of geographic distribution of terrorist attacks, the report highlights that Central Africa registered the highest number of attacks with 595 attacks resulting in 1,758 deaths (constituting 45 percent of the total death registered in the continent) while North Africa recorded the least both in number of attacks and deaths (11 attacks and 32 deaths). West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa come second, third and fourth, respectively. Mai-Mai groups, Allied Democratic Front (ADF), Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Al-Sunnah Wa Jummah (ASWJ) were the most active terrorist groups during the reporting period. Among these, ADF that operates in eastern DRC is the deadliest while Boko Haram remains the most lethal terrorist group in Africa.
The report attributes the spread of terrorism in Africa to several factors. First is the surge in the influx of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from outside the continent. Despite the military defeat of ISIL and its affiliates in Iraq and Syria, its spillover effect has continued to reverberate across Africa and elsewhere. On one hand, the return and relocation of FTFs pose a huge security risk by enhancing the operational capability of local terrorist groups and affiliates, particularly in the area of using and manufacturing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). On the other hand, the threat posed by ISIL and Al-Qaida has morphed into a ‘less visible network of autonomous individuals and cells’, which makes efforts of combating terrorism more challenging. Growing trend has been also witnessed among terrorist groups operating in Africa in terms of pledging allegiance to ISIS and Al-Qaida though there is little evidence suggesting strong link between them. It is against this context that the PSC, during its last session on FTFs (957th meeting), requested the AU Commission, African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and ACRST to ‘develop a comprehensive “guideline framework for countering FTFs”, as well as to expedite the development of a “database” of persons, entities or organizations involved in or supporting, in any form, the activities of terrorist organizations…’.
The second factor is the intricate linkage between terrorism and trans-national organized crime where not only illicit economies have become major source of financing for terrorists but also its profitability has become financial motivation for them to continue with their activities. Hence, as noted by the report of the Chairperson, depriving terrorist and violent extremist groups of their sources of funding should be a central element of any counter terrorism strategy. Terrorist groups also derive their funding from kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR), which showed a dramatic rise in 2021 as compared to the same period last year. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the rise of mercenarism—phenomenon particularly aggravated by the instability in Libya and Sahel—are also mentioned as factors contributing to the spread of terrorism in the continent. It is also worth noting that terrorists have taken advantage of the porous nature of African borders and ungoverned spaces in some of African countries due to weak national institutional capacities in this regard.
On the continental efforts to address the scourge, AU has made strides in building strategic partnership with UN and other stakeholders including through the launch of Coordination Committee between the AU Commission and UN Office of Counter-Terrorism on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. The AU has also continued its support to RECs/RMs and member states to strengthening their capacity in countering terrorism through the available mechanisms notably ACSRT, AFRIPOL, and CISSA. The ACSRT, for instance, have been providing assistance in the areas of developing/reviewing their respective counterterrorism strategies and plan of actions, building technical capacities, as well as sharing information and analysis. AFRIPOL, on its part, is also working to assist member states in their efforts to prevent and combat terrorism and transnational organized crimes through training and technical expertise. The establishment of the African Police Communication System (AFSECOM), which is intended to facilitate easy and security communication and sharing of information and data among police agencies of member states is a positive step towards the operationalization of AFRIPOL. The establishment and functioning of the 55 AFRIPOL National Liaison Offices (NLOs) within member states is another notable development having an impact on the functioning of AFRIPOL as well as its linkage with police agencies of member states. Financial, human and infrastructural issues however remain huge challenges in effectively discharging their mandates.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. Among others, the Council is expected to express its concern over the surge in influx of FTFs into Africa and its implication on the peace and security of the continent, and in this regard, the Council may reiterate its warning to ‘name and shame’ all those involved in sponsoring FTFs. In addition, the Council may recall its 1035th session that emphasized the need to expedite the implementation of the establishment of an African list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including FTFs. Towards strengthening continental mechanisms to counter terrorism, the Council may follow up on its previous decisions as well as the decision of the 14th extraordinary session of the Assembly on Silencing the Guns including the development of a comprehensive strategy for countering terrorism in Africa; the urgent need to operationalize AU Special Fund on the prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa; the establishment of special unit on counter-terrorism within the ASF; and the reactivation of the Council’s sub-committee on counter-terrorism. The PSC may also stress the need to strengthen the capacity of the specialized agencies including CISSA, ACSRT and AFRIPOL to fulfill their mandates effectively and to enhance their horizontal cooperation to create more synergy. The Council may reiterate its previous decision on the need to address the root causes including poverty and marginalization, which provide breeding ground to terrorism. Drawing on the recommendation of the report of the Chairperson, the Council may also highlight the need to mainstream counterterrorism and prevention/countering of violent extremism in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Assessment of implementation of the PSC work plans 2020-2021: achievements, challenges and way forward
Amani Africa
Date | 19 October, 2021
Tomorrow (19 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1039th session to assess the implementation of its work plans for 2020 to 2021. The assessment is aimed at reflecting on Council’s achievements, its challenges and ways forward in undertaking its works. In addition, Council may also consider the report of the technical early response mission to Comoros at tomorrow’s session.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement.
The indicative annual programme of activities for the years 2020 and 2021 would both suggest that while Council has been able to conduct significant number of its planned activities for these years, there is still substantial backlog of undertakings that were not completed within Council’s anticipated timeline or at the predetermined frequency. Tomorrow’s session presents Council the opportunity to reflect on the underlying reasons for the presence of a gap between its plan of activities and their implementation, and to discuss approaches for resolving the challenges faced in that regard.
In terms of sessions that were planned to take place during 2020, most of the country specific ones were successfully convened within the year despite extraordinary circumstances due to the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic and resulting changes to Council’s working methods. On the other hand, there was considerable gap in the convening of thematic sessions that were included in the annual plan of 2020. While some of these thematic sessions were not convened altogether, some did not take place at the planned frequency. For instance, the annual indicative plan included a session dedicated to climate change, which did not take place throughout the year. Similarly, Council planned to have a consultative meeting with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and another one with the Pan-African Parliament, both of which were not convened. A briefing by the Panel of the Wise, to take place twice within the year and every six months was another one of Council’s plans for 2020, which was not implemented.
Regarding the frequency of planned sessions, one example is Council’s plan to receive briefings on elections in Africa every three months, making the projected briefings on the topic four. However, only one briefing session was convened during the year on elections in Africa. Another example is Council’s plan to review post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) efforts in the Continent, twice within the year, although only one session was dedicated to the theme. Similarly, while Council was planned to receive once every three months, a briefing from the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA) on terrorism and violent extremism in the continent, two sessions were committed to the theme itself and neither one was a briefing by CISSA. Other thematic topics such as ‘women, peace and security’, ‘children affected by armed conflicts’ and ‘plight of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)’ which form part of Council’s standing agenda items were on the other hand successfully convened at the planned regularity.
In addition to the sessions planned for 2020, Council was also unable to carry out some of its regular activities, principally the induction of new PSC members and carrying out field missions. While four field visits were planned to take place to conflict affected AU member States within the year, only one field mission – to South Sudan – was conducted. It is also to be recalled that Council did not develop programme of work or assign official chairs for the months of August and December 2020.
Council’s annual indicative plan for 2021 has been largely similar to that of 2020’s with a few changes such as the plan to convene two sessions on children affected by armed conflicts (only one session was dedicated for that theme in 2020). So far into the year, Council has been able to convene multiple sessions, which were included in its yearly indicative programme, as well as some, which were introduced in its monthly programmes due to developing changes in the continent’s peace and security landscape. It has also been clear that the current year has shown progress in terms of achieving implementation of Council’s planned activities, as compared to 2020. For example, Council has been able to consider AU Commission Chairperson’s reports on elections in Africa twice already and has also convened a session on the impacts of Covid-19 on elections on the continent. This comes closer to meeting its projected plan of convening a session on that theme once every three months. Moreover, Council has also been able to convene its 13th retreat during the year in addition to conducting field visits to three countries (Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Sudan) as well as a fact-finding mission to Chad and its evaluation mission to Mali. Predictably, Council’s ability to adopt to its new working mechanisms developed in response to Covid-19 pandemic has contributed to its ability to better implement its planned annual activities in 2021. In addition, Council’s 2020 programme was more or less seized with sessions on the novel Covid-19 pandemic and its impacts on peace and security in Africa, making it difficult to maintain the original plan of activities.
While the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic has seriously impeded the implementation of Council’s programmes according to plan, there were also other contributing institutional issues which continue to impose challenges to the successful implementation of the Council’s work plans. Among these and perhaps a primary one is the shortage of human, financial and material capacity. Activities such as field missions and visits to conflict affected AU member States as well as the day-to-day activities of the PSC Secretariat and the regular meetings of Council members require considerable resources. Overcoming these challenges will require commitment from member states to make adequate contributions to enable the Council carryout all of its activities.
Another challenge which was also observed in PSC’s 2020 Activities Report – submitted to the AU Assembly’s 33rd Ordinary Session of February 20201 – is the lack of eligible, accredited ambassadors of PSC member States. Despite the requirement under Rule 18 of the PSC Rules of Procedure for each member state of the PSC to be represented at Council meetings by accredited representatives, this hasn’t always been the case. As the 2020 Activities Report indicates, of the fifteen PSC member States, five had no representatives. The appointment of ambassadors at the AU Headquarter to take part in Council’s activities including undertaking the rotational task of chairing the Council and drafting monthly programmes is not only a requirement but also essential for the smooth functioning of the PSC.
The current year has also shown that despite progress obtained in Council’s efforts to address conflict situations on the continent, there have also been cases of regress and outbreak of new conflicts. In relation to that, certain crises and conflict situations did not feature in the Council’s agenda.
On the other hand, the changing landscape of peace and security, mainly the clear resurgence of coups in Africa during 2021 has also meant that Council had to accommodate emerging situations in its work plan. These challenges notwithstanding, Council has been able to manage most of its planned activities for the current year so far. However, the experience has been an opportunity to reflect on the timeliness of early warning and early action. This will assist not only in identifying and averting possibilities of crisis and conflicts, it will also contribute to the PSC’s ability to prepare on how it may respond to such situations more quickly and effectively.
The new structure of the AU Commission particularly the merger of the Peace and Security Department and the Department of Political Affairs, leading to the formation of the new PAPS Department presents a new policy environment. It is therefore important to reflect on such changes and their implication on the mandate and work of the PSC. With the current increased engagement between AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), it is also important to reflect on policy coordination towards more effective response and management to conflicts.
The outcome of tomorrow’s session is unknown at the time of drafting this insight. Council may reflect on the challenges including the ones identified above and discuss the practical steps to address such challenges. It may call on AU member states and partners to consolidate their support and collaboration with the PSC. Council may particularly emphasise the importance of strict application of Article 5(h) of the PSC Protocol in the selection of PSC member States in order to ensure that elected members are fully capable of shouldering the responsibilities entailed by membership to the Council. It may call on member states and the AU to support its work. It may also underscore the importance of policy harmonization and coordination of efforts between the PSC and the various AU mechanisms and policy organs, which contribute, to the maintenance of peace and security including the RECs/RMs. Council may also recall and recommit to the agreements listed under section III of the Conclusions of its 13th Retreat (Mombasa Retreat) relating to challenges on compliance to PSC instruments and the ways forward in addressing these.
Briefing on the situation in Somalia and the status of consultations in the Independent Assessment Report on AMISOM post-2021
Amani Africa
Date | 07 October, 2021
Tomorrow (07 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected convene its 1037th session to consider the situation in Somalia and the status of consultations in the Independent Assessment Report on the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) post-2021.
The session is expected to have two segments. In the first segment which will be open to invited guests, opening remarks will be delivered by the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, to be followed with a statement from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The representative of the Federal Republic of Somalia, as the country concerned, and representative of the Republic of Sudan, Chair of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will follow with their statements. In the second segment of the session in which only PSC members and the AU Commission will participate, Francisco Madeira, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Somalia will make a presentation.
It is to be recalled that the PSC considered the report on Independent Assessment Team on the AU’s engagement in and with Somalia post-2021 during its 1015th session, which was held on 30 July this year. The Independent Assessment Team recommended the establishment of an AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilisation Support to Somalia as the most appropriate option for the future of AMISOM post-2021 while proposing an AU Multidimensional Stabilisation Support to Somalia (reconfigured AMISOM) as the second preferred option. No outcome document has been issued for the meeting.
The AU Commission subsequently sent a delegation led by Fiona Lortan to engage with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in August, to discuss among others, the new AMISOM mission post-2021. The two days meeting between the AU Commission and FGS resulted in a breakthrough agreement that culminated in a joint statement outlining the major issues they agreed on. Most notably, the two sides agreed to jointly consider the ‘AU Transition Mission’ as the post-2021 Somalia mission. Moreover, the AU Commission and FGS, together with UN and international partners, agreed to develop a joint ‘workable’, ‘realizable’, and ‘game-changing’ CONOPS, which forms the basis for the future ‘AU Transition Mission’, within the timeline for submission of no later than 31 October 2021. The PSC convened another session on 31 August to receive briefing about the meeting between the AU Commission and FGS from 18 to 19 August, but with no outcome document.
As a follow up to the August meeting, a joint steering committee meeting was held between the AU Commission and FGS from 21 to 23 September in Mogadishu, to develop the joint CONOPS for the ‘AU Transition Mission’. The meeting was convened specifically to work on the details of the CONOPS including the end state, objectives and tasks of the new transition mission; its composition and structure; sector alignment; command and control; joint operations and coordination with Somali National Army (SNA); force generation; and logistic requirements of the mission. It was agreed to review the zero draft of the CONOPS by 28 September and complete for the consideration by the PSC and subsequently submit to the UN Security Council by 31 October 2021. In tomorrow’s session therefore, the PSC is expected to receive update on the progress made towards the development of the joint CONOPS, which remains critical in shaping the envisaged transition mission in Somalia post-2021.
In addition, the Council may also hear about the activities of AMISOM particularly in the areas of joint military operations with SNA, the support provided in the implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP), as well as electoral assistances. One major development likely to be highlighted in this respect is the recent (22 September) launch of a Joint Operations Coordination Centre (JOCC) in Mogadishu, marking the establishment of such centres across all sectors of AMISOM. The August, AUC-FGS agreement emphasized the importance of joint operation between AMISOM and SNA and develop strong tactical cooperation and coordination to effectively degrade Al-Shabaab. In this context, the establishment of the centres is a step forward in bridging the existing gap in the areas of joint planning and coordination for military operations against Al-Shabaab. The financial, operational and technical support being provided to the elections in Somalia based on the PSC decision at its 994th session, are also likely to be highlighted.
It is also important to note that tomorrow’s session comes at the backdrop of deepening political tensions between Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble and President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo. There is concern that the ongoing disagreement within the government may affect the electoral process and the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab. The elections have already been delayed even before the disagreement between the two principals. Upper house elections, which were scheduled to take place from 25 to 28 July started after some delays. Lower house elections, which were supposed to start on 10 September, have been postponed. As the lower house delegates are the ones who will subsequently elect the president in an indirect voting model, the postponement will also affect the timeline for the presidential election, which was initially scheduled to take place on 10 October. There is so far no indication of when it will happen. Hence, there is growing call for the parties to resolve their differences through dialogue. They are being urged to work towards the successful organization of peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible elections and focus on the fight against Al-Shabaab.
On 2 October, International partners, including AMISOM and IGAD issued a statement expressing concern that the core issues of disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister have not yet been resolved in spite of the ongoing mediation efforts over the last couple of weeks. They indicated that the prevailing political uncertainty might have the risk of further delaying the elections and the ongoing dispute over the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS) and NISA, which will undermine the fight against Al-Shabaab. Therefore, they urged the two principals to resolve their differences and redirect their efforts towards implementing the 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021 agreements on the holding of elections and agree on the appointment of the leadership of key security institutions, which will be critical for the holding of peaceful elections.
It is against this backdrop that the future of AMISOM post-2021 is being discussed. The mandate of AMISOM is due to expire in December 2021. The UN has already done its own independent assessment and recommended a reconfiguration of the mission. The AU Independent Assessment Team’s recommendation for establishment of an AU-UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission was rejected by the Somali government, which necessitated further consultations between the AU and the Somali government to resolve differences and chart a way forward.
From what appears, the discussion is not over yet and December is fast approaching. Obviously, there is a need for the host country, AU, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) to agree on a common way forward on the future of AMISOM. This may require some time and there appears to be a request for an extension. The fact that elections are going to be delayed also makes it all the more logical. The Secretary-General, upon the request of the AU, is said to have made the request to the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, this is being met with opposition by some of the permanent members. What this all means is that the mandate renewal process over the coming months will not be a smooth sailing.
The outcome of tomorrow’s session is not clear at the time of finalizing this ‘insight’. However, the PSC may take note of the progress made towards the development of joint CONOPS for the ‘Africa Union Transition Mission’ and commend the efforts of AU Commission, FGS, and international partners in this regard. Council is also likely to welcome the positive steps taken by AMISOM and the SNA towards enhancing joint planning and coordination of military operations against Al-Shabaab including through the establishment of JOCC. Cognizant of the need to transfer security responsibilities progressively to the FGS, Council may underscore the importance of AMISOM’s continued support to strengthen the capacity of Somali national security forces. In relation to the election, the Council is likely to reiterate its request for AMISOM, during its 994th meeting, to ‘continue providing technical support to the political and governance processes of Somalia at federal and regional levels, including technical assistance to the planning and conduct of the elections once an agreement has been reached’. On the political situation, Council is expected to express its deep concern over the feud between Prime Minister Roble and President Farmajo, and in this connection, it may echo the call of the latest joint statement by international partners to resolve their differences through dialogue, prioritize the implementation of the 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021 electoral agreements, and ensure the ‘key security institutions (MoIS and NISA) are headed by able and legitimate leaders given the electoral season of the country. PSC may also request the AU Commission to use all available tools at its disposal with the view to supporting Somalia conduct peaceful and credible election, as well as preventing electoral violence.
PSC meeting on the AU Peace Fund and the financing of AU led peace support operations
Amani Africa
Date | 05 October, 2021
Tomorrow (5 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1036th session to consider the strategic priorities for the utilisation of the AU Peace Fund and the consensus paper on financing of AU led peace support operations using UN assessed contributions.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. The Chairperson of the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) for the month of August 2021, Jean Djounkeng, is expected to present the outcome of the meetings of the CoE on both the strategic priorities for utilising the AU Peace Fund and the consensus paper on using UN assessed contributions to finance AU led peace support operations. The AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Dr Donald Kaberuka may also address the PSC.
The AU Peace Fund was established to finance the organization’s peace and security activities, including in mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity and peace support operations. In 2016, the AU Assembly at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, decided to revitalize the Peace Fund. Accordingly in its decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted member states agreed to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m. Since 2017, fifty-four (54) AU Member States have contributed to the AU Peace Fund and a total of $217m has been collected. The $400 million amount that member states agreed to mobilize for the Peace Fund would cover the three windows covering various streams of activities a) preventive diplomacy, mediation activities (Window 1 of the Peace Fund), b) building of critical APSA capabilities (Window 2) and c) peace support operations (Window 3) as well as a crisis reserve facility (with an amount of no less than 50 million USD) for funding rapid response to emergency crisis.
As part of the effort for the full operationalize of the Fund, the AU has been working to put in place the necessary oversight and administrative structures. The Chairperson of the Commission appointed five African members of the Board of Trustees representing the five regions of the continent. Representatives of the UN and the EU also seat at the Board representing international partners. The AU has also been in the process of recruiting management and staff who will serve in the secretariat. The AU policy organs have decided that ‘the AU Peace Fund should not be utilised until all the governance and management structures are fully established.’
With specific reference to the utilization of the Fund, a High-Level Retreat on the operationalisation of the peace fund was also held with the participation of the AU PSC, the Bureau of the Permanent Representatives Committee, the Board of Trustees and Executive Management Committee of the AU Peace Fund, the Chair of the Sub-committee on General Supervision Budget and Administrative, the AU High Representative for Financing the Union and the Peace Fund, the Chairperson of the Committee of Fifteen Finance Ministers (F15) and the Chair of the Sub-Committee on Audit Matters. It is to be recalled that the PSC held the high-level retreat on 11 January 2020. The retreat agreed to implement, among others, the development of the Peace Fund Workflow processes and Strategic Priorities to be funded from the Peace Fund.
Subsequently, the AU PSC during its retreat in Mombasa in May 2021 considered the presentation of the AU Commission on the strategic priorities for the AU Peace Fund. As a follow up of the discussions in the Mombasa retreat and for presenting the specific proposals on priorities of the three windows of the AU Peace Fund, the Committee of Experts held its 23rd and 24th meetings on 9 and 23rd August 2021 respectively. The two meetings of the CoE focused on both the identification of the priorities for the three windows and the zero draft African Consensus on Accessing Sustainable and Predictable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities. It is the outcome of these meetings that the Chairperson of the CoE for August is expected to present to the PSC.
With respect to the utilization of the Peace Fund, the CoE have agreed that it is only the interest accrued to the Peace Fund endowment that will be made available for supporting priorities in the three windows of the Fund. With respect to Window 1, the priority activities which have been identified for inclusion at the end of the meeting of CoE include peace mediation efforts in ongoing crisis namely the political impasse in Somalia, situation in Cabo Delgado, Sudan and South Sudan, the transitions in CAR, Chad, Libya, and Mali and deployment of special envoys. Instead of the proposed inclusion in Window 1 of the dialogue in Ethiopia and the GERD negotiations, the CoE proposed the inclusion of the reactivation of the Role of the AU Special Envoy for Western Sahara and his/her deployment pursuant to PSC Communique [PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CMLXXXIV)] adopted by the PSC’s summit level 984th session. For Window 2, the priorities identified include strengthening the capacity of the AU Liaison Offices, particularly in Early Warning, Mediation, and Preventive Diplomacy, training of mediation and dialogue experts and development of a roaster of mediation experts, strengthening of RECs/RMs capacities on AU Human Rights and IHL compliance standards, and operationalization of the PCRD Centre.
For Window 3, the proposed priority activities include deployment of Gender Experts and Child Protection Officers in AU Peace Support Operations; Supporting pre-deployment assessment missions and regular monitoring and evaluation of existing missions; Supporting strategic lift of troops, equipment and weapons to conflict/crisis zones; Fully operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF); and Strategic planning for Human Resources and Military Observers.
In spite of the progress made in revitalizing the AU Peace Fund, from the very beginning of the process as set out in the June 2015 decision of the AU Assembly, 75 % of peace and security activities will be supported through international financing its peace operations on the continent. This year, the African members of the Security Council have been trying to advance the issue in the context of the discussions and negotiations on the mandate renewal of AMISOM. However, their proposal was not incorporated into resolution 2568 (2021) that renewed the mandate of the mission. They have also been trying to advance discussions on the Secretary-General’s proposal for a UN support Office to the G-5 Sahel joint force but it was opposed by UK and the US which do not support using UN assessed contributions for such forces and instead favor bilateral arrangements to provide support.
This notwithstanding, efforts are underway to revive the broader discussion on the financing of AU-led peace support operations through UN assessed contribution. In July, the AU PAPS Commissioner, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye briefed the Council on the work that is being done by the Commission to elaborate a common African position on the matter. The AU PSC Committee of Experts have been working on the draft zero consensus paper and it is expected to be considered by the PSC during its meeting on Tuesday. In his latest annual report to the Security Council on strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the UN Office to the African Union, the Secretary-General supported the efforts ‘to reinvigorate discussions between the two Councils on financing African Union peace support operations through United Nations assessed contributions’. He also noted that ‘the issue of a common African position on the funding of peace support operations is being considered by the African Union Peace and Security Council and the outcome of those discussions is awaited’.
The development of a common African position on the financing issue is indeed a step in the right direction. It is expected to facilitate a clear decision by the AU policy organs, which will then pave the way for the African members of the UNSC to resuscitate the discussion on the issue with a view to eventually securing a concrete commitment from the Security Council.
At the time of finalizing this ‘Insight’, the expected outcome of tomorrow’s session was unknown. PSC may commend the AU Commission and the CoE and with some amendments endorse the priority areas identified for the three windows of the Peace Fund. PSC may also welcome the “Zero Draft African Consensus on Accessing Sustainable and Predictable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities” and draw attention to the areas that will need further concretising. The PSC may also give guidance on the process for holding consultations with relevant stakeholders before finalizing the draft consensus position, including constructively engage with the UN Secretariat to reach agreement on the proposals identified in the draft.
Updates on the Situation in Guinea
Amani Africa
Date | 05 October, 2021
Tomorrow (5 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to hold its 1036th session. The third agenda item of the session will be an update on the situation in Guinea. PSC is expected to consider the developments in Guinea, since its previous session held on 10 September, which saw the country’s suspension from AU activities until restoration of constitutional order.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. The High Representative on Mali/Sahel Maman Sambo Sidikou is also expected to make a presentation. The Chair of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Ghana, and the representative of ECOWAS secretariat are also going to deliver their statements.
At its 1030th session convened following the military coup in Guinea, which took place on 5 September, the PSC totally rejected the act as an unconstitutional change of government and imposed immediate suspension against Guinea until restoration of normal constitutional order in the country. In the Communiqué, the Council also specified particular demands and conditions to be urgently met by Guinea’s military. Among these was the immediate and unconditional return of the military to the barracks, while refraining from further interference in the country’s political processes and allowing return to constitutional order through a civilian-led government. It is also to be recalled that the Council decided to undertake an assessment mission to Guinea, so as to identify areas for AU support to Guinea, through engagement with relevant stakeholders. Tomorrow’s session may also provide updates on the process of dispatching this mission.
On 27 September, the military unveiled a transitional charter, which it claims is aimed at steering the country back to civilian rule. While the document sets out major tasks such as the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of “free, fair and democratic elections”, it still raises concerns not only with respect to its drafting process, but also with regards to some of its contents.
The drafting of the charter by the military in itself poses an issue and raises the question as to whether the military has the legitimacy and whether it is best placed to take charge of the drafting process. In addition, as announced by the military, the transition is to be led jointly among the National Rallying Committee for Development (CNRD) (a committee set up and headed by Col. Mamady Doumbaya, the main architect of the 5 September coup), the president of the transition (a position assigned to Col. Doumbaya, who will also be serving as the head of State and chief of armed forces), a government headed by a civilian Prime Minister, and a legislative body called the National Transition Council (CNT). As the PSC emphasised at its 996th session relating to Chad’s military seizure of power, the roles and functions of a transitional government should be separately defined from those of the military. In the case of Guinea, not only has the military taken full charge of mapping the transition process, it has also assigned key political positions in the transition to military figures, including the removal of regional administrators and their replacement by individuals from the military. Moreover, members of the deposed government of former President Alpha Conde were completely side-lined from taking part in the transition process. While some oppositions of the former government welcomed this claiming that previous regime lawmakers promoted and assisted in the former President’s stay in office for a third term, it is also important to consider that a transition process which is not inclusive of all political actors may not have the desired long-term results.
As far as the contents of the transitional charter are concerned, the decisions to hold elections and to draft a new constitution can be considered as moves made in the right direction, mainly provided that the amendment of Guinea’s 2010 constitution to extend the presidential term limit and the highly contested elections of October 2020 which allowed President Conde to remain in office for a third term have triggered the current crisis in the country. Particularly, the transitional charter’s indication that none of the figures or institutions taking charge of the transition will be allowed to participate in either national or local elections to be conducted at the end of the transitional period is a positive development. However, there has been no clear indication as to when the election will be taking place.
While the ECOWAS at its Extraordinary Session of 16 September set six months as the time limit for the conduct of elections, Guinea’s military doesn’t seem to strictly follow that deadline, indicating in the transitional charter that the duration of the transition is yet to be determined. Hence, there is a possibility that the new transitional authorities may push ECOWAS to reconsider the deadline it has set for holding the elections. In light of the support Guinea’s military seems to have obtained from political opposition groups in the country, and also recalling ECOWAS’s conceding to extend Mali’s transitional period from one year to 18 months after the August 2020 coup, the balance seems to be tilted in favour of Guinea’s new transitional authorities in any negotiations that may take place regarding the period of transition.
Both the PSC and ECOWAS have also been clear in their demand for the immediate and unconditional release of former President Alpha Conde and other arrested officials. Despite these calls from the two institutions, Guinea’s military is yet to release the former President. According to reports, the military has remained adamant on the issue even after Col. Doumbouya’s meeting with ECOWAS representatives on 17 September, where the regional block’s demands for the release of Conde and his associates was reiterated. According to Guinea’s military leaders, the former President who has been rumoured to have the intention of leaving the country, shall remain in Guinea while being treated humanely.
While the continued refusal to release the former President as well as the military’s seeming intention to have the transitional period extended beyond ECOWAS’s timeline of six months could possibly serve as grounds for the regional economic community to proceed with economic sanctions, this seems to be improbable. Not only have the people of Guinea already expressed concerns over how any economic sanctions would directly impact the population, ECOWAS delegation’s statement that “ECOWAS and Guinea will find a way to walk together” following its meeting with Col. Doumbouya and his associates on 17 September would seem to imply that further sanctions are unlikely. Although a valid case could be made against the imposition of economic sanctions, simply accepting the terms set by the military very much endangers the future of democracy in the continent. Hence, it is important to note that both the PSC and ECOWAS have options other than economic sanctions, such as the imposition of targeted sanctions, including denial of visas, travel restrictions and freezing of assets of specific perpetrators of the coup, options properly put to use by ECOWAS at its Extraordinary session of 16 September.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. Council may take note of the steps taken, particularly the decision to ensure that none of the transitional figures, including those from the military, will be allowed to run for elections at the end of the transitional period. Council may also emphasise the importance of ensuring that the process of drafting a new constitution is all-inclusive and transparent. It may reiterate its call for the release of former President Conde and strictly condemn the arrest of officials of the ousted government without adherence to due process of law. It may once again reiterate its call for the military to hand the transitional process over to a civilian-led authority and to establish clear timeline for the transitional period and for holding elections.