Africa and the African Union in Shaping the Future of Peacekeeping and the Berlin Ministerial
Africa and the African Union in Shaping the Future of Peacekeeping and the Berlin Ministerial
Date | 6 May 2025
INTRODUCTION
Peacekeeping faces unprecedented challenges, driven by rapidly evolving security threats, complex global geopolitics, and shifting priorities among Member States. While talk of the ‘end of peacekeeping’ may be overstated, the foundational consensus that has long supported peacekeeping missions has faded, if not collapsed. In response, the international community—including policymakers, scholars, and peacekeeping practitioners—is engaged in a deep reassessment of peacekeeping’s role, relevance, and the strategies required to adapt and make it fit for these changes and challenges.
This policy brief presents an analysis of the major themes and insights that emerged from a day-long conference that Amani Africa convened on 19 March 2025 based on the UN Commissioned Independent Study on the Future of Peacekeeping.
Briefing on AU Support to Member States on Security Sector Reform
Briefing on AU Support to Member States on Security Sector Reform
Date | 6 May 2025
Tomorrow (07 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1278th session to receive a briefing on the theme ‘AU Support to Member States (The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan) on Security Sector Reform (SSR): Lessons Learned and Perspectives on the Way Forward’.
The session will commence with opening statements by Harold Bundu Saffa, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the AU and PSC Chairperson for May, followed by introductory remarks from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Statements are expected from the representatives of The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, and South Sudan. Mali, currently suspended from AU activities, will not participate in the session. In addition, statements may be delivered by the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the United Nations Office to the AU (UNOAU), will also address the session. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) may brief the PSC on the study reviewing the SSR processes in the five countries, conducted in partnership with the AU Commission.
This is not the first time the PSC is addressing the issue of Security Sector Reform. The last dedicated discussion on the theme took place at the 874th session in September 2019, held in the context of the commemoration of Africa Amnesty Month. In that session, the PSC underscored that good governance of the security sector is a sine qua non for sustainable economic and political development and recognised SSR as a ‘delicate, sensitive, and politically complex process’ requiring careful handling. SSR is also featured regularly in PSC discussions on country-specific situations. For instance, at its 844th session in April 2019, the PSC considered a progress report on SSR in The Gambia. During its 1219th session in June 2024, while reviewing the report of its field mission to South Sudan, the PSC called on the Chairperson of the Commission to provide technical support to South Sudan on SSR, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and the collection of weapons currently in illegal possession.
Beyond the PSC, the AU Commission undertook several activities in 2023 to mark the 10th anniversary of the AU SSR Policy Framework, adopted by the AU Assembly at its 20th Ordinary Session. In November 2023, it convened a major conference under the theme ‘The African Union Security Sector Reform Policy Framework: A Decade of Implementation’. This served as a platform for reflecting on achievements, challenges, and lessons from a decade of AU support to Member States, while setting a course for the next phase. Also in November, the AU Commission convened the 5th meeting of the AU/Regional Economic Communities (RECs) SSR Steering Committee—established in 2019—which reviewed the implementation of the AU SSR Policy Framework and discussed follow-up on the Addis Ababa conference, agreeing to submit recommendations to the PSC for strategic guidance.
The AU Commission, in partnership with the ISS, has also conducted a study documenting lessons from AU engagement on SSR in The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan. Tomorrow’s session is expected to build on this study, offering a reflection on AU’s engagement over the past decade, identifying gaps, and informing recalibrated approaches to better support Member States.
Over the years, the engagement of the AU in SSR is anchored on various normative and institutional frameworks elaborated as part of its peace and security mandate. The 2013 AU SSR Policy Framework remains central, offering guidance to the AU, RECs, Member States, and partners on implementing SSR programmes. SSR is also a pillar of the AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy—revised in 2024—which outlines key objectives for conflict-affected states. Complementing this framework, the AU Commission has developed several Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) on aspects of SSR including training, needs assessments, legislative harmonisation, codes of conduct, good practices, monitoring and evaluation, and gender integration. In October 2024, the Commission also finalised draft OGNs on ‘Oversight and Accountability in SSR’ and ‘SSR and Mediation’, which were validated through a workshop.
At the institutional level, the AU’s DDR/SSR Division, under the Governance and Conflict Prevention Directorate, oversees SSR-related activities. The Commission also established mechanisms for regular dialogue and coordination, including the triannual SSR Africa Forum and the annual SSR Steering Committee, which bring together the AU, RECs, the UN, and other partners to coordinate support and share best practices.
The AU’s SSR work is integral to its broader peace and security agenda, including Aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063 and the ‘Silencing the Guns’ flagship initiative, which should be applied not only in post-conflict settings but also as a conflict prevention strategy. Its efforts focus on three core areas: providing direct technical support to Member States, generating knowledge tools and building capacity, and promoting coordination among actors. Support to Member States is provided upon request and typically covers design, implementation, and coordination of nationally led SSR processes.
Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to highlight country-specific engagements by the AU Commission in the five focus countries.
In The Gambia, AU support has demonstrated how modest interventions can yield significant results. Between 2018 and 2020, the AU Technical Support Team to The Gambia (AUTSTG)—a small group of SSR and rule of law experts—was embedded in national institutions. The team assisted in developing the National Security Policy, structuring the Office of the National Security Adviser, reorganising the Ministry of Defence and the Gambia Armed Forces, and enhancing civil-military cooperation. Though the AUTSTG’s mandate ended in 2020, AU support has continued. In November 2024, the Commission supported the review of the national SSR strategy and helped develop an M&E framework in line with the AU Operational Guidance Note.
In Mali, the AU provided support through its Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), deploying a DDR/SSR expert in 2018 to assist in implementing accelerated DDR and restructuring defence and security forces. In 2024, the AU supported efforts to enhance national capacity for SSR M&E, aligned with Mali’s National SSR Strategy (2020–2024).
AU support to Madagascar began in 2014 after a constitutional crisis. The AU led a joint SSR assessment with partners, identifying key priorities. Subsequently, the Commission deployed SSR experts to the AU Liaison Office in Madagascar to advise on the formulation, design and implementation of a nationally led SSR initiative. This engagement contributed to the adoption of a national SSR Policy in 2016. The Commission also supported the country’s SSR revitalisation processes in the re-establishment of a national SSR coordination mechanism.
In Lesotho, the AU worked in close collaboration with the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2016, the AU and SADC supported a national technical workshop on SSR that helped forge consensus on the importance of implementing SSR and establishing the necessary legal, institutional, and financial frameworks. The AU further deployed a consultant to support the reform process.
In South Sudan, following a request from the government and a PSC decision, the AU deployed a DDR/SSR consultant between November 2023 and February 2024 to support the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) in developing SSR guidelines, which were validated in July 2024. Ongoing technical needs, the Commission also deployed a senior DDR/SSR consultant with arms management expertise in November 2024.
In addition to highlighting technical support, tomorrow’s briefing is expected to reflect on key challenges and lessons. One of the major challenges in this regard is securing political will. SSR is not merely a technical exercise but is fundamentally political as it involves control over the state’s coercive instruments. As such, governments may be reluctant to embrace SSR, particularly when it challenges entrenched power structures. Even when SSR is launched—sometimes to meet donor expectations—it often lacks genuine political backing or adequate resources. South Sudan provides a case in point: despite AU support, the SSR process has stalled amid delays in force unification and deployment. Tensions between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, exacerbated by the 4 March 2025 incident, underline the risks of half-hearted commitment.
These experiences demonstrate the importance of advocacy and awareness-raising to encourage Member States to view SSR as essential to peace and democratisation. Trust is also vital. Without confidence in the support provided—both in terms of the AU’s impartiality and the expertise of its consultants—Member States may resist or delay cooperation. Ensuring national ownership and deploying highly qualified technical experts are critical for success.
Moreover, while SSR is a necessary condition for sustainable peace, it is not sufficient on its own. To achieve lasting outcomes, it must be embedded within broader processes of political reform and democratisation. In this context, it is particularly important to integrate and ensure the coordinated implementation of interrelated programmes such as DDR and transitional justice as part of a comprehensive political settlement.
The complex socio-political and security dynamics in political transitions and stabilisation processes present another challenge, often slowing SSR implementation. The lack of inclusive processes and the failure to design gender-sensitive SSR programmes are also critical gaps that need to be addressed
Another challenge is funding. AU support to the five countries has often involved short-term consultancy deployments due to budget constraints, even though long-term engagement is necessary. Increasing the allocation of resources from the AU Peace Fund could help address this gap. The recent operationalisation of the Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF), in line with the Assembly’s February 2023 decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.2(XXXVI)], is a promising development. It is to be recalled that the AU disbursed USD 1 million in late 2023 to support DDR efforts in Ethiopia. Given the involvement of multiple stakeholders in SSR, enhanced coordination also remains imperative to prevent duplication and ensure efficient use of limited resources.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the decades of support provided by the AU Commission to Member States in implementing SSR programmes. It may encourage Member States to fully utilise the technical support offered by the Commission, including the AU SSR Policy Framework and Operational Guidance Notes. At the same time, the communiqué may underscore the need to address key challenges impeding effective SSR implementation, particularly the lack of political commitment and funding gaps. In this context, the PSC may highlight the importance of sustained advocacy and awareness-raising to promote SSR as a cornerstone of lasting peace. The PSC may call for embedding SSR in robust security sector governance reform and political settlement. It may also emphasise the need for adequate and predictable funding to strengthen the Commission’s support. To this end, and alongside efforts to mobilise resources and coordinate with international partners, the PSC may explore the possibility of leveraging the AU Peace Fund to finance SSR support to Member States. It may further encourage Member States to integrate SSR-related expenditures into their national budgets. Finally, the PSC may stress the imperative of designing and implementing inclusive and gender-responsive SSR programmes in Member States.
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2025
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - March 2025
Date | March 2025
In March, under the chairship of Morocco, as the stand-in chair on behalf of The Gambia, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled programme of work consisting of six sessions, covering seven agenda items, an informal session and induction of members of the PSC.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for May 2025
Date | May 2025
In May, the Republic of Sierra Leone will take the chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Program of Work (PPoW) for the month envisages five substantive sessions, all scheduled at the ambassadorial level and a field mission to the Republic of Guinea. Among the five sessions, only one is country-specific session on the political situation in Gabon.
On 7 May, the PSC will hold its first session of the month to receive a briefing on the AU’s support to Member States—specifically The Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and South Sudan—in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR), focusing on lessons learned and the way forward. Notably, since its 844th session, which focused on SSR efforts in The Gambia, the PSC has not held a dedicated session to review and assess SSR support of the AU. In the case of The Gambia, following a request in 2017, the PSC mandated a needs assessment that led to key recommendations on state-building priorities, including SSR, the rule of law, transitional justice, and human rights. The PSC endorsed the assessment during its 694th session, resulting in the deployment of a ten-member AU Technical Support Team from 2018 to 2020 to assist national security institutions. Recognising ongoing challenges in coordinating SSR efforts, the AU Commission later deployed an SSR Consultant from October to December 2021 to provide targeted technical support. Building on these efforts, in November 2024, the AU further supported in enhancing The Gambia’s national SSR strategy, aligning it with the AU’s Operational Guidance Note on Monitoring and Evaluation. In Lesotho, the AU Commission provided similar support, focusing on capacity building through training and research to enhance strategic SSR competencies. These efforts also emphasised national ownership, self-assessment, and the development of reform action plans to guide prioritisation and resource mobilisation. In Mali, on 31 July 2024, through its mission MISAHEL, the AUC delivered technical and institutional support, particularly in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), helping to build national expertise aligned with the 2022–2024 National SSR Strategy. Complementary efforts in The Gambia also involved reviewing the national SSR process and establishing an M&E Framework to assess alignment with national security priorities and democratic principles. In South Sudan, following a request from the government and a PSC decision, the AU Commission deployed a DDR/SSR consultant from November 2023 to February 2024 to support the development of SSR guidelines under the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board (SDSRB) and the guidelines were validated in July 2024. Due to continued technical needs, particularly on SSR documentation, and in response to PSC calls for inclusive strategies to address intercommunal violence and arms management, the AU also deployed a senior DDR/SSR consultant with arms management expertise in November 2024. The session is also expected to feature briefings on best practices that can be applied in contexts where states face a high risk of relapse into conflict.
The next session, set for 12 May, will focus on addressing food insecurity and conflict in Africa. Although PSC has addressed food insecurity in the context of its annual sessions on humanitarian action in Africa, it was not until its 1083rd session, held on 9 May 2022, that the Council dedicated a meeting specifically to the link between food security and conflict. Later that year, the PSC also explored the issue in relation to climate change. In the Communiqué adopted by the 1083rd session, the impact of conflicts on food production and the role they play in the disruption of agricultural yields and value chains was emphasised. Of particular significance was the PSC’s condemnation of ‘any kind of conditionality for food access and the use of starvation as instruments of war and/or access to humanitarian assistance.’ Currently, this is particularly important in the war in Sudan, where access to food is used as an instrument of war and the fighting involves targeting of agricultural production. Building on its previous session, the PSC is expected to review how food insecurity and conflict intersect and the ways in which the intersection between the two manifests itself in current conflicts. In terms of countries affected by conflict, the World Bank’s March 2025 Food Security Update further highlights that nearly 25 million people in Sudan, 6.3 million in South Sudan, and 3.4 million in Somalia are facing acute food insecurity. Additionally, the session also presents the opportunity for the PSC to follow up on its previous decisions, including conducting a study with recommendations to improve food production, strengthening coordination across humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts, and receiving regular briefings from regional centres on climate change, agriculture, and food security.
The third session planned for the month is an open session on Organised Transnational Crime, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region planned for 14 May. During its 845th session held on 25 April 2019, the PSC had decided to hold an annual session on the theme of transnational organised crime and peace and security in Africa. The session comes against the backdrop of deepening security challenges in the region marked by the expanding nexus between transnational organised crime and terrorism. While the three Sahelian states: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso had pledged to jointly address terrorism through a new regional force under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) following their withdrawal from ECOWAS, there is concern that the disrupted flow of information, intelligence sharing and cross border cooperation could worsen the region’s response to security threats and cross-border organised crime. This lack of coordinated regional response, compounded also by the dissolution of the G5 Sahel, has increased the risk of further terrorist expansion in the central Sahel region, making the region the epicentre of global terrorism. A recent UNODC report on the impact of transnational organised crime on stability and development in the Sahel, highlights the dual role of organised crime in the Sahel noting that while it fuels violence by financing armed groups and exacerbating competition over illicit markets, it also serves as a critical livelihood source in areas with few economic alternatives, something the PSC would need to grapple with to develop effective responses. Stabilisation efforts in the Sahel have predominantly focused on terrorism and have largely underestimated the role transnational organised crime plays in driving the current situation in the Sahel. As such, the session will provide the PSC an opportunity to shape coherent continental responses that match the scale and complexity of the threat. The session would also serve the PSC to recalibrate its approach to the Sahel by coupling security cooperation with sustained diplomatic and political engagement. While strengthening coordination among AU member states’ police forces and enhancing collaboration with international partners remain essential, the AU must also ensure that suspension from its activities does not hinder its responsibility toward affected countries. The last time the PSC considered this theme was during its 1082nd session. The session would also present an opportunity for the PSC to follow up on its decisions from that session, including its request for AFRIPOL to work in close collaboration with CISSA and INTERPOL to urgently develop a comprehensive database of persons, groups and entities involved in Transnational Organised Crimes, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters, as well as regional databases on Transnational Organised Crimes in order to guide Member States and RECs/RMs in the formulation of necessary policy interventions.
On 16 May, the PSC is scheduled to convene its second annual joint consultative meeting with the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The consultative meeting is in alignment with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, which emphasises the importance of close collaboration and policy coordination with RECs/RMs. The meeting will be an opportunity to assess progress since the inaugural session held in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2024 and reinforce collaborative efforts against West Africa’s pressing security challenges. The inaugural consultative meeting between the Councils had urged for the immediate operationalisation and revitalisation of regional security frameworks such as the Nouakchott and Djibouti Process and synergised international and regional efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism.
On the same day, the PSC will commemorate the International Day of Living Together in Peace.
The final session of the month, scheduled for 19 May, will be dedicated to the political situation in Gabon. This will mark the PSC’s second engagement on Gabon since its 1241st session held in October 2024, which followed the Council’s field mission to Libreville, Gabon in September 2024. Following the presidential elections held in Gabon on 12 April and the emergence of the coup leader, General Brice Oligui Nguema, as the winner of the election, the PSC convened a session on 30 April 2025 to determine whether the conclusion of the elections would mark the restoration of constitutional order in Gabon, which would warrant the lifting of the suspension placed by the AU.
Aside from these substantive sessions, the last activity of the PSC for May 2025 is expected to be a field visit to the Republic of Guinea that will take place 30-31 May 2025. In the footnote, the program of work also envisages a possible engagement of the Council with the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The last time the PSC held an interaction with the AU Commission Chairperson was in September 2019.
Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic
Review of the Political Transition in the Gabonese Republic
Date | 29 April 2025
Tomorrow (30 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene for its 1277th meeting to review the Political transition program of the Gabonese Republic.
The meeting will begin with opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to be present at the meeting to make a presentation, followed by remarks by Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Representatives from ECCAS and the Gabonese Republic are also expected to make statements.
Tomorrow’s meeting is being convened as an additional agenda item to the programme, as the session was not on the initial programme of work for April, having been proposed for May. This session also comes exactly two weeks after Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president, won the presidential election, by about 90 per cent of the vote. Following the 2023 coup, the country progressed with a transition roadmap, in which Gabon’s Council of Ministers, following the adoption by Gabon’s parliament of a new electoral code, set out the rules and conditions for organising elections in the country, which declared the presidential elections to take place on 12 April 2025. In addition, the Gabonese voters approved a new constitution in November 2024. The proposed new constitution introduced changes, including the establishment of presidential term limits and the elimination of the prime minister’s position.
It is to be recalled that following the mission it undertook to Gabon on 12 to 14 September 2024, the PSC held a session for considering the Report of the mission, which sought to legitimise the coup stating that ‘[t]he [Gabonese] interlocutors mentioned that the coup d’état of 30 August 2024, which they described as a ‘Liberation Coup’, was a peaceful coup with no bloodshed.’ The PSC failed to communicate the AU rule on non-eligibility of those who participated in the military seizure of power under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Instead, the communique of its 1241st session that considered the report of the field mission requested ‘the AU Commission to engage the Transition Authority of Gabon to identify areas of support and provide the needed technical and financial support to Gabon…’ In addition to this, the Council also requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to use his good office to engage with the leader of the Transition Authority to mediate the differences with the former President to ensure a smooth and peaceful transition in the country.’
As a follow-up to the foregoing, the AU deployed an election observation mission to Gabon. Following the election, it also welcomed the outcome of the election and expressed a congratulatory message. Tomorrow’s session comes as the presidential victory of Nguema would mark the end of the political transition in the country. The purpose of the meeting is accordingly to determine that the conclusion of the election marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of the suspension of Gabon.
The fact that Gabon’s military-led transitional government agreed to a transitional timeline and respected the timeline is notable. This together with the conclusion of the election on and of itself does not indicate that Gabon is witnessing a new dawn of democracy. Even then, the fact remains that the PSC determined that a coup happened in Gabon and suspended Gabon from participation in the activities of the AU. The nature of the process followed for restoring constitutional order does not vitiate or render inapplicable Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Even if the PSC proceeds with deciding to lift the suspension of Gabon, as it seems to be prepared to do, in the light of the outcome of its field mission, it needs to address the question of the lack of compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This is critical not just from the perspective of PSC’s credibility in the face of its policy position of zero tolerance to unconstitutional changes of government, particularly coups. It is imperative for at least two strategic considerations. The first of this is the precedent that the election of someone who led a military seizure of power sets for those involved in military usurpation of power in the other five countries with respect to the applicability of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The second strategic consideration is the message that such leniency in the enforcement of Article 25(4) sends to all militaries on the continent. If those who seize power through military coup can be legitimised through election that the AU endorses, why should not militaries across the continent feel that the benefits of engaging in a coup outweighs its risks and costs?
It emerges from the foregoing that the question before the PSC during tomorrow’s session is not a simple question of whether the ‘successful’ conclusion of the elections in Gabon marks the restoration of constitutional order, warranting the lifting of Gabon’s suspension. The PSC also has to address the question of the implications of the election of Brice Oligui Nguema, who led the coup and served as interim president in the face of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. As outlined in a recent analysis, this necessitates that the PSC engages in thoughtful reflection by putting the case of Gabon in the broader context of all the countries under suspension and the applicable AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government.
The process followed thus far by the PSC and the AU in relation to the transitional process in Gabon suggests that the PSC is unlikely to consider as an option non-recognition of the outcomes of the elections that marked the end of the transitional period as representing restoration of constitutional order in Gabon. If the PSC consequently lifts the suspension of Gabon, what can and should the PSC do about the implications of this with respect to Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance? First, it should be recognised that there is a breach of Article 25(4). Second, the PSC needs to state clearly that it does not condone the breach. Third and relatedly, it needs to affirm the validity of the AU rule under Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Fourth, the PSC also requires to state that the breach of Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in some cases does not mean to set a precedent that overturns the application of the rule under Article 25(4) in other cases. Fifth and finally, the PSC needs to express its commitment to this provision and its application in future cases.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will lift the suspension of Gabon from participating in AU activities. It remains unclear if the PSC would take account of and pronounce itself on the lack of compliance in the Gabon election process with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. At the very least, it can indicate that it stands by Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and it does not consider any deviation from this article as negating the applicability of this provision, hence the prohibition of coups and the exclusion of coup makers from benefiting from their engagement in prohibited acts. It is worth noting that there will be a press conference by the PSC Chairperson, the AU Commission Chairperson, Gabon and the Commissioner for PAPS. It is expected that they will commend Gabon for concluding the transitional process within the agreed timeline and call on others to follow the example of Gabon in having a time-bound transitional process for restoring constitutional order.
Launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations (GAPO)
Launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations (GAPO)
Date | 28 April 2025
We are excited to announce the launch of the Global Alliance for Peace Operations – a collective endeavour of more than 50 leading think tanks, research institutes and civil society organizations working on UN and regional approaches to peace operations (https://www.peaceoperations.net).
Coordinated by the Global Governance Institute (GGI) in Brussels, the Berlin Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and Amani Africa Media and Research Services, the Alliance brings together the expertise and brain power of close to 100 peace operations experts from around the globe. For a full list of members, please see here.
At this crucial time for peace operations, the Alliance provides comprehensive and direct civil society input to the intergovernmental deliberations at the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial 2025 in Berlin. The UN Peacekeeping Ministerial takes place at a critical juncture for the future of peace operations and the wider multilateral crisis management system. It is a key moment to mobilize collective thinking for strengthening UN peace operations in the years to come. The Alliance was created in liaison with the German Federal Foreign Office and the German Federal Ministry of Defence.
The first round of activities produced eight collaborative policy papers and close to 20 short issue papers which form the basis for concrete policy recommendations on how to strengthen UN peace operations. The recommendations will be discussed at an online workshop on 29 April 2025. On 12 May 2025, immediately ahead of the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, the Alliance will host an in-person Symposium in Berlin and seven side events on a range of aspects essential to the future of peace operations.
The Global Alliance for Peace Operations webpage (www.peaceoperations.net) features information on all events, will publish the policy papers and issue papers, and already facilitates knowledge-sharing, including by gathering prior research and publications by Alliance members. Individuals or organizations working on peace operations that are interested in joining can get in touch with the Alliance at [email protected] .
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM
Date | 28 April 2025
Tomorrow (29 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1276th session for receiving updates on the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
The meeting will commence with the opening remark of Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025. Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) will deliver a briefing.
This is the second meeting of the PSC on AUSSOM during the month. As examined in detail in the edition of Insights on the PSC dedicated to that session, the last session was held on 10 April. During that session, the PSC received an update on the state of operation of AUSSOM with a focus on the status of its funding. With only less than 20% of the funding required for the period of January to June 2025 mobilised, the briefing session revealed that AUSSOM faces major funding shortfalls. While AUSSOM operates under conditions that militate against the moral and operational effectiveness of the mission with a much-reduced troop size of about 11,146, the security situation continues to deteriorate with Al Shabaab on the resurgence.
Tomorrow’s meeting comes following the extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Governments of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to AUSSOM held in Kampala, Uganda on 25 April. The summit was preceded by a preparatory senior officials and ministers meeting on 22-24 April, which concluded their respective meetings by adopting several recommendations for the summit’s consideration. Subsequently, the summit adopted a communiqué endorsing these recommendations, which are now expected to be submitted to the PSC and the UN Security Council.
The TCCs summit reviewed the security situation in Somalia and assessed the performance of the AUSSOM sector by sector to evaluate its operational effectiveness in combating Al-Shabaab. The TCCs stressed the need to increase troop strength by at least 8,000 additional personnel to address the prevailing security challenges. This proposal, endorsed by the summit, seeks ‘to address the prevailing security situation in Somalia so as not to roll back the hard-earned gains made so far and bridge manpower gaps by having more personnel than before the drawdown.’ Highlighting the gravity of the deterioration of the security situation, beyond the additional troop surge for AUSSOM, the summit also adopted the Minister’s conclusion that it is ‘urgent to consider deploying bilateral troops to augment’ AUSSOM. On its part, the Federal Government of Somalia is expected to ‘recruit community/local defence forces and mobile force in order to hold and consolidate the areas that were liberated.’ All of these are clear admissions that the drawdown of troops during the past years has not been replaced with Somali forces as planned, resulting in major gaps that Al Shabaab has been able to exploit to regain territories. In this context, the summit directed the Chiefs of Defence Forces, together with Somalia, to work out a comprehensive plan to deter, degrade and eliminate Al-Shabaab.
The summit also endorsed the proposal for enhancing air assets and capabilities, as well as strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), considering the fragmented deployment of AUSSOM TCCs and their limited ability to support Somali Security Forces in conducting mobile operations.
During the meeting, the Somali Federal Government provided an update on the preparedness of its security forces and the progress made in force generation and integration. It reported to the summit that over 20,000 troops had been trained over the past two years, with plans to train an additional 5,000 elite special forces in 2025. Since January 2023, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) have assumed control of 23 forward operating bases (FOBs) from the AU mission. Of these, only one position—Biyo Cade—was recaptured by Al-Shabaab, while the remaining 22 FOBs remain under SNAF control. At the same time, Somalia’s representative admitted that Somalia is ‘challenged with defeating terrorism and stabilising liberated areas’, while dismissing the portrayal of the country as being in political turmoil. Yet in apparent indication of the role of political cohesion in Somalia, the summit underscored the need for the Somalia Federal Government to strengthen its engagement with Federal Member States and traditional leaders to enhance efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab. It also emphasised the importance of bolstering civil-military coordination, prioritising humanitarian relief, and implementing quick-impact stabilisation projects in recovered areas to consolidate security gains and foster lasting community trust.
In apparent indication that there is a need for close alignment between the implementation of the mandate of AUSSOM and the political and institutional advancements in Somalia, the summit decided to establish TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism at the Heads of State and Government Level chaired by Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni supported by the AU Commission. This is envisaged to serve as an oversight, accountability, coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation of AUSSOM and the Somalia Security and Development Plan (SSDP).
The elephant in the room was the funding challenge facing the mission, particularly the outstanding reimbursements for military and police personnel since January—an issue the TCCs warned is significantly undermining morale and operational effectiveness. At the meeting, it was reported that the total urgent cash requirement to cover the financial costs for the period January to June 2025 is estimated at approximately US$96 million. Thus far, the AU has secured only US$16.7 million, while the mission requires roughly US$15 million per month to meet its obligations. Therefore, the TCCs reiterated that securing predictable and sustainable financing remains a strategic priority to maintain AUSSOM’s operational viability and to ensure continued support for Somali security forces in fully assuming security responsibilities. In this context and in the light of the proposal for the additional 8000 troops surge, they emphasised the urgent need for the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy.
AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf stated in his remarks that the Commission will spare no effort in mobilising financial resources. He emphasised, however, that saving the mission will require a collective effort from member states and international partners. Youssouf underscored that the security and stability of Somalia is vital not only for the Horn of Africa but also for global peace. The summit welcomed the role of traditional and non-traditional partners to support AUSSOM and the Somali federal government. Recently, China and Japan contributed US$ 1 million and US$ 3 million, respectively, in support of AUSSOM. The AU is urging other partners to follow their example. A donors’ conference was anticipated to take place this month in Doha, Qatar, but there is currently no indication that it will proceed as scheduled.
The TCCs also recommended the allocation of additional resources from the AU Peace Fund to help address the mission’s financial shortfalls. This was the case in 2023, when the AU was authorised to use the Peace Fund’s crisis reserve facility to address the funding shortfall faced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)—the predecessor of AUSSOM—particularly with regard to troop allowances. However, given that the largest commitment from the Fund has so far been to AUSSOM, this call for use of additional funds from the Fund may face major pushback from various PSC members who express concern that the Peace Fund risks being used as a funding mechanism for AUSSOM while it is meant to cover the peace and security efforts of the AU across the continent.
Most importantly, the TCCs are placing their hopes on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which outlines a framework for financing AU-led peace support operations, as a means to address the financial challenges facing AUSSOM. However, Chairperson Youssouf acknowledged reluctance in New York regarding its application. This hesitation stems from the position of the United States, which has communicated to both the UN and the AU that it ‘will not support the application of the UNSCR 2719 framework to AUSSOM when the matter comes before the Security Council on May 15.’ The representative of the US informed the summit in Kampala that the US does not believe that ‘Somalia is the best place to trigger the resolution’ and does not ‘support the implementation of a hybrid implementation model to finance AUSSOM.’ It seems that the AU Commission leadership might travel to Washington, D.C., to engage with the US administration and other relevant stakeholders on this matter. Donald Kaberuka, the High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Financing, is also reported to be in the US in search of resolution.
In the meantime, the UN has been working with the AU to conduct an independent strategic review of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) pursuant to Security Council resolution 2767 adopted on 27 December 2024. The review is meant to facilitate the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting from 1 July 2025. The two organisations appointed Maman Sidikou of Niger and Neil Cole of South Africa to co-lead the review process. They undertook consultations in Mogadishu, Addis Ababa and New York with the Somali government, TCCs and international partners. They submitted their report by the end of March, but the Secretary-General, following consultations with the AU, requested additional time to finalise the review process by 30 April, which the Security Council granted.
The outcome of the UNSOS review is expected to enable the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM starting 1 July, utilising existing resources made available through the rightsizing of UNSOS. Cost savings from this process are anticipated to cover up to 75 per cent of AUSSOM’s estimated US$ 190 million budget, with the remaining funds to be jointly mobilised by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources. However, the review reportedly yielded only US$ 61 million in savings—well below the amount needed to meet the 75 per cent threshold for funding through UN-assessed contributions. This shortfall appears to have prompted the request for an extension, allowing the UN and AU to continue exploring options for additional savings (they are looking at an additional US$ 40 million).
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may condemn and express concern over the threat to the gains made by AU troops and Somali forces posed by the intensification of attacks in recent months by Al Shabaab, with territorial gains particularly in the Middle and Lower Shebelle. It may, in this regard, underscore the need for reinforcing AUSSOM’s troop levels and capabilities. The PSC may, in this respect, welcome the outcomes of the Kampala summit of TCCs. With respect to the decision of the summit for the additional surge of 8000 troops, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop a plan on the surge and deployment of the additional troops including on whether they will be deployed under AUSSOM or bilateral basis. With respect to funding, the PSC may welcome the promising outcome of the UNSOS review within the framework of Resolution 2767 and the effort to enable the hybrid implementation through cost-saving from rightsizing of UNSOS. It may express deep concern about the huge financial shortfall facing AUSSOM, undermining the effective operation of the mission. It may remind the international community that AUSSOM, as a mission authorised by the UN Security Council, represents a global public good for maintaining international peace and security, which requires the assumption of full responsibility by the UN and the international community by ensuring predictable, sustainable and reliable funding for AUSSOM. In this respect, it may reiterate its previous decision, stressing the importance of ensuring predictable, sustainable and adequate funding for AUSSOM, including through a dedicated funding mechanism through UN-assessed contributions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) as the most suitable mechanism. PSC may commend the funding contributions that some members of the international community made and the continued commitment of others. It may, echoing the Kampala summit, request the AU Commission to develop a comprehensive Resource Mobilisation Strategy, including through pursuing the implementation of Resolution 2719.
