Deradicalisation as Leverage for the Fight Against Violent Extremism in Africa
Deradicalisation as Leverage for the Fight Against Violent Extremism in Africa
Date | 18 March 2025
Tomorrow (19 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1266th session to discuss the theme of ‘Deradicalisation as a Leverage for the Fight against Violent Extremism in Africa.’
The Permanent Representative of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March, Mohammed Arrouchi, will deliver the opening remarks, followed by a presentation from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is also expected to deliver a statement.
This is not the first time that the PSC has dedicated a session on deradicalisation as a strategy to fight terrorism and violent extremism. On 7 October 2022, during its chairship of the PSC, Morocco convened a ministerial-level session on the same theme, ‘Development and Deradicalisation as Levers to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism.’ The communiqué adopted at that session identified radicalisation and underdevelopment as key factors fostering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Emphasising comprehensive, multidimensional, and human rights-sensitive approaches, the PSC highlighted the need to address all structural root causes, drivers, and facilitators of radicalisation and violent extremism.
A major outcome of that session was the endorsement of reconciliation, dialogue, and negotiation as critical tools in countering terrorism. Relatedly, it underscored ‘the critical role of the media, religious institutions, educational and cultural institutions in countering terrorist narratives, deradicalisation, and in promoting inter-faith dialogue, tolerance and peaceful coexistence.’ These echo findings from our Special Research Report on the growing threat of terrorism in Africa, which highlights that ‘the recognition of the essentially political, governance, and development nature of the conflict dynamics in which insurgent groups identified as terrorists operate necessitates that negotiation and dialogue with members of such groups forms part of the political strategy for settling the conflict involving these groups.’ Furthermore, the PSC requested the AU Commission to develop a compendium of African national reconciliation best practices for the Council’s consideration. It also called for the inclusion of strategies to counter radicalisation and extremist ideologies in the envisaged review of the African Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity to follow up on progress in implementing these and other related decisions adopted by the PSC at various times to combat terrorism and violent extremism in the continent.
This session takes place against the backdrop of a persistent and escalating threat of terrorism and violent extremism. The Sahel region remains the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for 51 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024, according to the newly released Global Terrorism Index 2025, an annual report by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The region has also witnessed a nearly tenfold increase in terrorism-related deaths since 2019. Six of the ten most affected countries are in Africa—Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and Cameroon. Despite a decline in both attacks and fatalities, Burkina Faso remains the most impacted country, accounting for one-fifth of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide. Meanwhile, Niger recorded the highest increase in terrorism-related deaths globally, rising by 94 per cent—highlighting the fragility of progress in countering terrorism.
Tomorrow’s discussion is important in spotlighting political, social, cultural and socio-economic approaches to counterterrorism, particularly given the dominance of hard security as the prevailing policy thinking and response. As outlined in our aforementioned special research report, an analysis of AU policy decisions—from the AU Assembly to the PSC—reveals particular emphasis on hard security measures in combating terrorism.
Building on the 1111th session of the PSC and the increasing recognition in the AU Counter Terrorism Centre for a more comprehensive approach, tomorrow’s session can take forward the shift to a multidimensional strategy that prioritises the political governance, social, cultural and socio-economic, development dimensions. Given its focus on deradicalisation, the session is also expected to draw attention to public policy measures that facilitate social cohesion, reconciliation and inclusion, opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration, and religious teachings and practices that advance tolerance and moderation.
In terms of best practices, it is expected that the session may put the spotlight on Morocco’s success in deradicalisation programs. Morocco has been classified among the countries with ‘zero risk’ of terrorism worldwide, ranking first in North Africa according to the GTI 2025. The report, which assesses the impact of terrorist attacks across 163 countries, places Morocco 100th—marking significant progress from its 76th position in 2022 among countries affected by terrorism. This shift moves Morocco into the category of countries with ‘no impact’ from terrorism, making it one of the safest in the world, registering scores of zero, meaning the country had been free of terrorist activity for at least the past five years. This track record is not due to a lack of threats. In fact, Morocco remains a target for terrorist groups due to its location at the crossroads of Africa, Europe, and the Arab world. However, its success in containing the threat is largely attributed to its multidimensional counterterrorism strategy.
The 2003 Casablanca attacks marked a turning point in Morocco’s counterterrorism approach, prompting a comprehensive strategy—often described as a ‘tri-dimensional counterterrorism strategy’—that integrates security measures, socio-economic development, and religious oversight. Law 03.03, enacted shortly after the attacks, established a stronger legal framework, while from a security perspective, enhanced border security and intelligence capabilities have reportedly helped dismantle over 200 terrorist cells and arrest more than 3,500 individuals on terrorism-related charges over the past two decades, potentially preventing over 300 planned attacks.
A key pillar of Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy is its deradicalisation programs, notably the Moussalaha (Reconciliation) initiative, which has rehabilitated hundreds of detainees. As part of efforts to counter extremist narratives, Morocco’s Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has developed an educational curriculum for nearly 50,000 imams and female Islamic guides (mourchidates). As summarised in a contribution to the GTI 2022, key lessons from Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts include its deep understanding of the threat, the interconnectedness of its counterterrorism methods, the combined application of soft and hard measures, the facilitation of information-sharing practices, and the promotion of international cooperation as the sine qua non of counterterrorism.
As this experience attests and our research report established, while security measures remain essential in addressing immediate terrorist threats, they alone cannot fundamentally alter the continent’s terrorism landscape without addressing the underlying socio-economic and political conditions that fuel extremism. As highlighted in our special research report, governance deficiencies, community grievances, and structural vulnerabilities create fertile ground for terrorist groups to emerge and thrive. Given the limitations of a security-heavy approach, it remains imperative for the PSC to prioritise investments in socioeconomic development, governance reforms, and humanitarian interventions alongside security responses. Despite being in a neighbourhood that witnessed a major expansion of the terrorist threat, another country that largely shielded itself from the impacts of terrorism is Mauritania. As with Morocco, this is not attributable to the reliance on the security approach but also to the use of instruments that advance the prevention of violent extremism and deradicalisation.
Encouragingly, in recent years, PSC discussions have increasingly recognised the need to address the structural root causes of terrorism. For instance, the Declaration of the April 2024 High-Level African Counter-Terrorism Meeting in Abuja, endorsed by the PSC during its 1219th session, emphasised the importance of complementing military action with political solutions. It called for policies to counter economic, religious, and cultural discrimination, promote inter-community dialogue, and strengthen social cohesion. The Declaration also underscored the need to invest in education, integrate counterterrorism efforts with SDG 16 and Agenda 2063, and adopt community-led approaches. Additionally, it highlighted the importance of countering terrorist propaganda that exploits inter-religious tensions and the clash of civilisation narratives.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the importance of adopting a comprehensive and multidimensional counterterrorism strategy that integrates both hard and soft approaches, including security measures, legal frameworks, socio-economic development, and programs for countering radicalisation and deradicalisation. It may also emphasise the need for national reconciliation, social cohesion, and inter-community dialogue to address the structural challenges that fuel terrorism and violent extremism while highlighting the importance of facilitating platforms for lesson learning and experience sharing. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its call from the 1111th session for the AU Commission to develop a compendium of best practices on national reconciliation in Africa. Recognising the role of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism Programme Office in Rabat in supporting Member States’ capacity-building efforts, the PSC may encourage Member States to effectively leverage its resources and enhance coordination with Nigeria’s recently upgraded Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre. Furthermore, the PSC may use this opportunity to follow up on the implementation of its previous decisions, such as the full operationalisation of the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter-Terrorism and the PSC’s Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism.
Informal consultation with countries in political transition
Informal consultation with countries in political transition
Date | 17 March 2025
Tomorrow (18 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an informal consultations with Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan at the ambassadorial level.
Informal consultation with countries undergoing political transitions was incorporated into the PSC’s repertoire of working methods following its decision during the 14th Retreat on Working Methods, held in November 2022. The conclusions of the retreat introduced these consultations as a mechanism to facilitate direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from participation in the AU due to unconstitutional changes of government, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Since then, two such consultations have been held in April and December 2023.
The last time the PSC held informal consultations with countries in political transition was in December 2023. Since then, the PSC convened its 1212th session on 20 May 2024 as a formal meeting to receive updated briefings on the political transitions in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. The PSC also conducted a field mission to Gabon in September 2024. Tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity for the PSC and countries in political transition to exchange views on the latest developments and provides a platform for candid discussions on concerning trends affecting the restoration of constitutional order in these countries.
During tomorrow’s informal consultation it is expected that some of the representatives of the affected countries will raise concerns on how suspension from the AU continues to affect effective engagement of the AU. It is worth recalling that one of the reasons for the use of the informal consultation is to provide a platform for engagement between the PSC and the affected countries. As a manifestation of the fact that suspension does not sever AU’s responsibilities towards affected countries, the PSC undertook missions to some of these countries. In September 2024, the PSC undertook a mission to Gabon. The following month, the PSC spent a day in Port Sudan on a field visit as well.
Yet, it remains unclear how these engagements have changed the dynamics of AU’s role in relation to these countries. For example, in the case of Sudan, it appears that the expectation from Port Sudan was for the lifting of Sudan’s suspension. Indeed, this issue was put on the agenda of the PSC during its session on 9 October. After debating the matter, a divided PSC adopted a principled position of upholding the suspension. This is not surprising, considering that there is no political process in Sudan to warrant the lifting of the country’s suspension from AU activities.
This outcome affirms that the effort to improve AU’s engagement in these countries cannot be reduced to the narrow issue of the lifting of suspension. Principally, the expectation, also from earlier experiences, is that the AU deploys and maintains robust diplomatic engagement focusing as relevant on two areas. First, this involves instituting a dedicated mechanism to work with the national actors on the transitional process on a sustained basis. When the AU suspends a state from its activities, its responsibility for sustained engagement becomes higher than usual. Second, the AU is rightly expected to initiate and deploy all the relevant policy measures to address the peace and security challenges facing these countries. For a long time, the focus on the unconstitutional change of government has overshadowed the imperative for the AU to elevate its policy action to address the security threats facing, most notably, the Sahelian countries in transition. This has led to charges of AU being absent in having an active role with respect to the existential threat facing these countries. A case in point is the fact that the AU has not for a long time filled the position of the head of its mission in Mali and Sahel (MISAHL), which has been vacant since the departure of Mamane Sidikou in mid-2023.
Indeed, with respect to the countries in the Sahel, the PSC itself, at its 1212th session, rightly expressed concern about ‘the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region due to the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups, and the attendant dire humanitarian situation.’ Despite this concern and the fact that the persistence of conflicts involving terrorist groups is at the core of the security and institutional crises facing Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, the PSC, once again, failed to consider concrete steps for helping to address, this principal challenge. Putting a spotlight on this lack of meaningful action, the AU Commission Chairperson, in his address to the AU Assembly on 17 February 2024, posed the following rhetorical questions: ‘How should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries without doing anything? How can we accept just watching African countries destroyed, and entire regions engulfed by tremors and tsunamis, without doing anything significant?’
In terms of instituting a dedicated mechanism to work with national authorities for facilitating transitional processes, it can be discerned from the outcome of the 1212th session of the PSC that the AU neither deployed effective mechanisms nor ensured the effective functioning of existing ones. As a result, the PSC reiterated its request for the AU Commission ‘to appoint a High-Level Facilitator at the level of sitting or former Head of State to engage with the Transitional Authorities.’ Additionally, taking note of ‘the leadership vacuum within the African Union Mission for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL)’ at a time when the AU needs active engagement in these countries, the PSC requested ‘the Chairperson of the AU Commission to ensure the nomination of a High Representative, which remains a crucial interface in ensuring collective oversight between the Commission, Council, and the Countries in transition.’ The AU Commission Chairperson failed to act on this demand and his term came to an end, leaving MISAHEL without a leader.
One notable and positive development that emerged since the 1212th PSC meeting is the decision of the AU to use the Crisis Reserve Facility of the Peace Fund to provide symbolic funding for supporting the efforts of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali in the fight against terrorist groups with allocation of $ 1 million to Burkina Faso and $ 500,000 each to Niger and Mali.
In terms of enhancing AU’s role in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, the AU may build on this recent support and adopt a Sahel stabilisation strategy supported by the activation of the decision to deploy 3000 troops to the Sahel made by the AU Assembly at its 33rd Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)] in February 2020. It is a good time to have such a strategy and deployment considering the decision of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali as the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) to deploy a new regional 5000 strong force to fight against terrorism.
It is expected that some of the representatives of the countries concerned may put a spotlight on the lack of consistency of the AU in applying the rules on unconstitutional changes of government. This may become a key area of contestation, particularly as it relates to the eligibility of the coup makers for elections that may be held for restoring constitutional order. Despite the fact that the PSC affirmed the AU rule that the members of the Transitional Military Council in Chad are ineligible for election, the Chairman of the Council, Mahamat Idriss Déby, oversaw an orchestrated national dialogue and constitutional referendum that enabled him to run for elections, ultimately being declared the winner of the 6 May 2024 presidential election. The PSC’s failure to enforce its principles and decisions against the eligibility of military authorities in elections has put the AU in the difficult position of not being able to uphold this principle with respect to military leaders in other countries in transition, as highlighted by the 16 September 2024 edition of Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba.
Another issue likely to receive attention in tomorrow’s engagement is the duration of the transition period. In Burkina Faso, the transitional timeline initially agreed to come to an end by 2 July 2024 has been extended by an additional five years. Similarly, Mali’s agreed timeline with ECOWAS for a February 2024 transition has been postponed indefinitely. In Niger, no clear transition timeline has been announced, though the junta proposed a three-year period. Guinea, which had committed to organising elections by the end of 2024 under a 24-month transition agreement with ECOWAS, also failed to meet this deadline. In Sudan, the prospect of a return to civilian rule has become a distant luxury as the ongoing conflict plunges the country into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, Gabon’s transitional government has set 12 April 2025 as the date for the presidential election to end military rule, which has been in place since August 2023. Earlier this month, military leader General Brice Oligui Nguema announced his intention to run for President in the upcoming election. The variations in the specific political, institutional and security context of these countries also underscore that a generalised approach to AU’s role in respect to these countries would be inadequate and unfit and require a policy approach tailored to the specificities of each.
Tomorrow’s informal consultation is also expected to touch on the issue of the severing of ties by three central Sahel countries with ECOWAS, dealing a major blow to AU’s ideal of regional integration. On 15 December, during its 66th ordinary session, ECOWAS approved the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (who formed their own Alliance of Sahel States (AES abbreviated in French) from the regional bloc, effective 29 January 2025. However, it also decided to institute a six-month transitional period (29 January–29 July 2025) for these countries, leaving the door open for them to reverse their decision. In a step that signals the determination of the countries to exit ECOWAS, the three states unveiled a new common passport of the Confederation of Sahel States, which is expected to come into circulation the same day the exit from ECOWAS takes effect. That the separation of AES states from ECOWAS took effect is an indictment on the AU’s role of advancing regional integration, underscoring its inability, if not failure, to play the role of mediating between the two.
No outcome document is expected from tomorrow’s informal engagement.
Consideration of the situation in South Sudan
Consideration of the situation in South Sudan
Date | 17 March 2025
Tomorrow (18 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1265th session to discuss the situation in South Sudan.
The Permanent Representative of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March, Mohammed Arrouchi, will deliver the opening remarks, followed by an introductory report from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson to South Sudan is also expected to brief the Council. As per the applicable practice and established procedure, a representative of South Sudan is expected to make a statement as a country concerned. A representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan may also deliver statements.
Tomorrow’s session came amidst heightened tensions between longtime rivals President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, following the 4 March incident when the White Army, Nuer militia linked with Riek Machar, overran a South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) base in Nasir, Upper Nile State—a strategic town on the South Sudan-Ethiopia border. The violence was triggered reportedly due to disagreements over the replacement of the existing SSPDF in Nasir stationed for close to eight years with a combined force of SSPDF, Agwelek, and Abushok militias.
Tensions had been building since January and February, not only in Upper Nile State but also in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. On 27 February, it appears that Machar requested a face-to-face meeting with President Kiir to address deteriorating security situations in these regions. Machar cited attacks by SSPDF forces on areas controlled by SPLM-IO in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal and accused SSPDF and allied militias of violating the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement by deploying forces to Nasir, including the Agwelek and Abushok militias. This deployment was seen as a violation of the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, which envisages the deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces.
In response to escalating tensions, on 27 February, the African Union Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) expressed deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Upper Nile State, as well as clashes in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal involving signatory parties to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The statement warned that failure to address these incidents could undermine the Permanent Ceasefire, urging all parties to utilise established mechanisms under the R-ARCSS to de-escalate tensions and restore calm.
This call went unheeded, and tensions escalated into violence in Nasir on 4 March, followed by the arrest of several senior SPLM/A-IO military and government officials, including a deputy military chief and two ministers allied with Machar in the capital, Juba. The situation worsened on 7 March when an attack on a UNMISS operation to evacuate stranded SSPDF personnel resulted in tragic casualties, including the late General Majur Dak, several soldiers, and a UN crew member.
Despite President Kiir’s assurance on 7 March that South Sudan would not revert to war, tensions remain high in Juba and elsewhere, prompting widespread concerns about the potential collapse of the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement, which ended a five-year civil war claiming nearly 400,000 lives. In his briefing to IGAD’s 43rd extraordinary summit, Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu warned that ‘the Nasir clashes are the latest episode in a series of incidents and cyclic violence pushing South Sudan ever closer to the brink of war.’ Indicating the gravity of the situation, reports suggest that Uganda has deployed special forces to Juba despite denials by South Sudan’s government.
Against these developments, regional and international organisations reacted. On 8 March 2025, the Chairperson of the AU Commission issued a statement expressing deep concern over the escalating tensions and clashes, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and reaffirming the AU’s longstanding appeal for South Sudanese parties to fully implement the revitalised peace agreement. IGAD also convened its 43rd extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan, held on 12 March 2025. In the communiqué adopted at the summit, IGAD urged the parties to immediately de-escalate tensions, demanded the release of detained officials, instructed the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (CTSAMVM) to investigate the Nasir clashes and the attack on the UN helicopter to establish facts and ensure accountability, and called for the reactivation of various security mechanisms impacted by the arrests. The regional bloc further agreed to form an IGAD Ministerial-level sub-committee on South Sudan to engage and monitor the restoration of calm and the implementation of the revitalised peace agreement. The Sub-committee was tasked with travelling to Juba immediately to assess modalities for initiating inclusive dialogue.
The renewed tensions are unsurprising given the lack of meaningful progress in implementing key provisions of the revitalised peace agreement, including drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections, and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). In September 2024, the parties to the peace agreement extended the transitional period by another two years, pushing the long-awaited first elections to December 2026 without a clear plan for implementing the new transitional roadmap within the agreed timeline.
Delays in deploying the NUF, a critical component of the agreement under chapter two essential for the country’s peace and stability, have become a major obstacle to its full implementation. Reports indicate that since the graduation of 53,000 unified forces in phase one, only seven per cent of the required 83,000 have been deployed, while the long-overdue training for phase two has yet to commence due to a lack of funding. The government’s failure to allocate the necessary resources for training has been a key factor in these delays. Moving forward, prioritising phase two training and ensuring the full deployment of the unified forces at their required strength of 83,000 remains critical to enhancing security, addressing rising subnational violence, and preventing incidents like the clashes on 4 March.
As the IGAD Executive Secretary noted in his briefing to the extraordinary summit, mechanisms established to oversee security arrangements, such as the Joint Defence Board (JDB), have fallen into disuse, while mutual confidence within the Presidency, as established by the agreement, has been gravely undermined. The JDB, composed of chiefs of staff, directors general of the national security service, police, and other organised forces, is mandated to exercise command and control over all forces under the revitalised peace agreement. However, its failure to convene regular meetings and prevent escalating tensions has further weakened security arrangements. Ensuring the full functionality of the JDB is now more urgent than ever.
The spillover of Sudan’s conflict may be another factor behind the renewed tensions in South Sudan. According to a recent report on the fighting in South Sudan, one major impact is South Sudan’s economic crisis, triggered by damage to its main oil export pipeline near Khartoum amid fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This disruption has cost South Sudan two-thirds of its revenue and fueled widespread discontent. As Sudan’s conflict drags on, South Sudan appears to be struggling to maintain neutrality between the two warring parties, SAF and RSF. Reports indicate that economic pressures have drawn President Kiir closer to the RSF and its alleged backer, the UAE, a shift further intensified by the RSF’s alliance with the SPLM-North, a Sudanese rebel group aligned with Juba. What makes the suspicion about Port Sudan’s possible hand is the interest of the SAF in using its allies in South Sudan to squeeze RSF out of the areas on the border with South Sudan.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to welcome the convening of IGAD’s 43rd Extraordinary Summit and endorse its outcomes, particularly the decision to establish an IGAD Ministerial-level sub-committee on South Sudan. It may call on the AU Commission to coordinate with this committee to facilitate dialogue and ensure the full implementation of the revitalised peace agreement to prevent further violence and the risk of renewed conflict. Expressing deep concern over the recent violence in Nasir County, Upper Nile State, the PSC may stress the need for de-escalation and urge parties to uphold the peace agreement. In line with IGAD’s summit conclusions, it may call for the immediate release of detained officials as a critical de-escalation measure. The PSC may also condemn the attack on the UN aircraft and the death of UN personnel, which could constitute a war crime. In this regard, it may support IGAD’s decision to conduct an investigation, through CTSAMVM, into the Nasir clashes and support the UN’s initiatives to investigate the UN helicopter attack to ensure accountability. The PSC may further urge the parties to expedite the implementation of key provisions of the revitalised agreement, including drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections, and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). It may also call for strengthening oversight mechanisms such as the Joint Defence Board. The PSC may call on the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) to dispatch to South Sudan a high-level mission as a critical step to de-escalate the situation and prevent both the relapse of South Sudan into conflict and the risk of merger of the conflict in Sudan into South Sudan. Finally, it may request the AU Commission to put in place an emergency task force dedicated to the situation in South Sudan, both for monitoring and crafting interventions for preventive diplomacy.
Briefing by the Panel of the Wise, FemWise, and WiseYouth on Their Activities in Africa
Briefing by the Panel of the Wise, FemWise, and WiseYouth on Their Activities in Africa
Date | 10 March 2025
Tomorrow (11 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1264th session to receive a briefing from the Panel of the Wise and its subsidiary bodies – FemWise-Africa and WiseYouth – on their activities and contributions to continental peace and security. The Council is also scheduled to consider and adopt its program of work for April 2025.
Following opening remarks by Mohammed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Stand-in Chairperson of the PSC for March 2025, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make an introductory statement. Effie Owuor, Chairperson of the Panel of the Wise and Femwise-Africa, is expected to deliver the briefing.
The last session of the PSC with the Panel was during its 1204th session on 13 March 2024. Apart from considering the report of the Panel on its activities, the session also deliberated on the institutional and operational arrangements of the Panel as well as its working methods. Apart from the key decision tasking the conduct of strategic reviews of the Panel’s activities to assess effectiveness, the PSC tasked the AU Commission to facilitate the provision of the Panel’s mission reports to the Council, ensure the Panel accesses early warning information and analyses for proactive preventive diplomacy efforts and support and facilitate for joint deployments of the Panel of the Wise with similar regional bodies in situations requiring urgent attention. Tomorrow’s session, therefore, can serve as an opportunity to follow up on these decisions.
In terms of the institutional interface of the Panel with other bodies, despite the PSC’s 665th session decision to institutionalise quarterly briefings by the Panel of the Wise ‘in order to enhance the conflict prevention capacity, early warning and timely decision-making processes of the Council’, the engagements remain sporadic, with the last briefing occurring a year ago during the PSC’s 1204th session. Prior to that, the Panel met with the PSC in May 2023 during the PSC’s 1152nd session, which was convened to consider the Report of the Panel on its mission to the Republic of Chad. The gaps between these sessions show that the quarterly briefings by the Panel are yet to be fully institutionalised, as per the decision of the communiquéof the 665th decision, which necessitates a more realistic timeline for the interaction between the PSC and the Panel. Such rationalisation of the Panel’s engagement with the PSC seems a necessity if the Panel is to focus on the delivery of its core mandate and enhance its engagement with similar bodies as specified in the communiquéof the 1204th session of the PSC.
Arising from the 1204th session of the PSC is also how realistic the PSC’s expectations for the Panel to play a role in countries in transition, support mediation processes and implementation of peace agreements. While these are areas relevant to the Panel’s work, as captured in an Ideas Indaba analysis, the PSC’s push for the Panel to deepen its engagements in these contexts raises concern of increasing the breadth of the Panel’s mandate, thereby spreading it thin and eventually limiting its effectiveness in its core mandate of preventive diplomacy. The Panel’s primary mandate, under Article 11 of the PSC Protocol, is to support the efforts of the Council and the AU Commission Chairperson in conflict prevention. The instruments for the Panel’s action provided for in the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel range from establishing channels of communication, shuttle diplomacy, and fact-finding missions to assisting and advising mediation teams on how to resolve disputes. Particular attention is therefore needed for prioritising the core mandate of the Panel in preventive diplomacy rather than expanding the areas of engagement of the Panel before it has delivered effectively on this core mandate.
Tomorrow’s session follows the appointment of the members of the 6th Panel of the Wise during the 38th AU Summit in February 2025, with Domitien Ndayizeye (Central Africa), Effie Owuor (East Africa), and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (Southern Africa) being re-appointed. However, the appointment of representatives for North and West Africa remains pending, with the Assembly tasking the incoming AU Commission Chairperson to consult with West and North Africa regions to select one candidate each and delegating its authority to appoint representatives from West and North Africa regions to the 47th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council.
In terms of the activities of the Panel, the PSC is expected to be updated on the work of the 5th Panel of the Wise during the past year. Of particular interest to the PSC is the Panel’s engagement in South Sudan. The Panel’s High-Level Reflection Roundtable in July 2024 and subsequent shuttle diplomacy engagements played an important role in engaging key stakeholders to advance the peace process in South Sudan. The Panel’s field mission to Juba in November 2024 assessed the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and identified key challenges, including slow progress on constitutional reforms, inadequate resources for electoral preparations for the elections that had been scheduled for December 2024 but have since been postponed to 2026, and the need for greater inclusivity, particularly of women, youth and marginalised communities in governance processes. The Panel had also been complementing the work of the C5 and the Tumaini initiative to ensure a unified and coherent approach to peacebuilding in South Sudan. Yet, South Sudan is facing the most serious risk of relapse back to conflict.
The 27th Statutory Meeting of the 5th Panel of the Wise focused on strategies to support Member States in transitions. In line with the direction by the PSC for the Panel to continue engaging with countries in transition, the Panel held informal consultations with representatives of suspended member states in April 2024 to assess humanitarian concerns, security challenges and governance reforms. Despite them being informal, and a stretch of the Panel’s mandates, there is no indication that anything came out of these engagements.
Another area of the Panel’s work that tomorrow’s session is expected to be briefed on concerns the Panel’s participation in election observation and governance initiatives. The Panel is expected to brief the PSC on its engagement in member states in efforts to mitigate electoral tensions and engage key stakeholders to address concerns over potential irregularities, particularly in Comoros (January 2024), Senegal (February 2024) and Ghana (October and December 2024). A notable case of post-electoral violence in which the Panel was not effectively deployed is Mozambique. One key decision in this regard from the 1204th session tomorrow’s session may wish to follow up on is the request for the AUC to facilitate a rapid deployment mechanism for the Panel’s swift intervention in the emerging crises.
Despite its critical mandate, the Panel continues to face constraints that hinder its operational effectiveness in conflict prevention. The PSC, in its 1204th session, had reiterated calls for the AU Commission to provide adequate political, human, and financial resources to the Panel, enabling it to carry out its mandate with greater efficiency. The 38th AU Assembly also reiterated this by requesting the Chairperson of the AUC to prioritise the allocation of sufficient resources to the Panel of the Wise in the annual budget.
In addition to resources, the revitalisation of the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise) remains a strategic priority to enhance cooperation with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in conflict prevention. In this regard, the inaugural joint retreat between the Panel of the Wise and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Committee of Elders in November 2024 marked a significant milestone for coordination between continental and regional bodies to enhance mediation, dialogue and conflict prevention efforts in line with the PSC 1204th decision to enhance the Panel’s role in revitalising cooperation with similar mechanisms at RECs/RMs. During the retreat, the two bodies agreed to establish a coherent framework to coordinate interventions and share experiences aimed at the resolution of border and territorial disputes, directing their respective secretariats to formulate a joint strategy for addressing conflicts in the region. This falls in line with the PSC 1212th session request for the AU Commission to facilitate a joint deployment of the Panel of the Wise. Recognising the need for deeper collaboration, tomorrow’s session may encourage the Panel to reflect on the lessons from the engagement with its ECCAS counterpart on how to work with such counterparts in other regions for advancing conflict prevention and pursuing preventive diplomacy.
The fifth Panel had also seen increased coordination with its subsidiaries. A key development that may be of interest for tomorrow’s session is the full operationalisation of the WiseYouth Network, which was established as a subsidiary mechanism of the Panel of the Wise to engage youth in preventive diplomacy, mediation and dialogue across the continent. The first cohort of the WiseYouth Network with 20 members who will serve a three-year mandate, underwent training in preventive diplomacy and mediation and were co-deployed with the Panel in South Sudan and carried out some preventive diplomacy engagements, including dialogues with youth on pertinent peace and security issues. WiseYouth also participated in AU electoral missions.
The other subsidiary body of the Panel, FemWise, also pursued various efforts in member states aimed to strengthen mediation efforts, advocating for the need to strengthen the role of women mediators and their contributions to more inclusive peace processes. The network also commenced preparations for the induction of its second cohort of members in 2025, ensuring continuity in its efforts to mainstream gender perspectives in AU-led mediation processes. In collaboration with the Gender, Peace, and Security Program and the Office of the Special Envoy on WPS, FemWise welcomed the PSC’s directive to develop a policy framework ensuring gender equity and equality in all AU-led mediation and peace processes. Alongside these efforts, the Network continued to deploy women mediators and peacebuilders to AU Election Observation and Preventive Diplomacy missions and promoted peace dialogue platforms for women in conflict-affected countries, particularly through its support for the Sudanese Women Dialogue and its contributions to the South Sudan peace process. Apart from the four national chapters, FemWise also saw the launch of the Southern Africa Regional Women Mediators Network by SADC, complementing the regional networks of ECOWAS and ECCAS.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may underscore the need for prioritising and placing particular focus on the work plan and activities of the Panel on the core mandate of the Panel in preventive diplomacy. The PSC is expected to commend the Panel’s engagement in South Sudan and, in this respect, request the Panel to maintain active preventive diplomacy engagement in South Sudan within the framework of paragraph 7 of the communiqué of the 1204th session. The Council may also welcome the inaugural joint retreat between the Panel and the ECCAS Committee of Elders and encourage the institutionalisation of the coordination mechanism with all similar regional bodies. The PSC is also expected to welcome the progress made in the operationalisation of WiseYouth. The PSC may encourage member states and RECs/RMs to accelerate the establishment of national and regional chapters with adequate resources, ensuring a stronger role for women in conflict prevention.
Climate Change: Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa
Climate Change: Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa
5 March 2025
Tomorrow (6 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1263rd session to discuss ‘Climate Change: Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa.’
Following opening remarks by Mohammed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of Morocco to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for March, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. In addition, the AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment may also deliver a statement. A representative of the UN may also make a statement.
The PSC last convened a session dedicated to climate change, peace, and security during its 1240th session on 30 October 2024 to discuss the Common African Position on Climate, Peace and Security (CAP-CPS). The consultation was intended to create a shared understanding among PSC members of the intricate nexus between climate change, peace, and security in Africa while gathering feedback to refine the Common African Position. Emphasising the importance of the CAP-CPS as a guiding framework, the session highlighted the necessity for effective collaboration among the AU, regional stakeholders, national governments, and international partners. In tomorrow’s session, the PSC may follow up on progress toward finalising the CAP-CPS for timely adoption, particularly in light of upcoming international events such as the 2025 G20 Summit in South Africa and the UN Climate Conference (COP30) scheduled for 10-21 November 2025 in Belém, Brazil.
Climate change continues to pose a significant threat to regional peace, security and development. The impacts of climate change, such as forced migration, food insecurity and economic disruptions, have the potential to exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce new vulnerabilities. Floods, cyclones, droughts and other climate-related shocks continue to severely affect the African continent. The effects of climate change continue to threaten regional peace, security and development. With rising temperatures, changing precipitation patterns and more extreme weather events, human health, food and water security, and socio-economic development continue to be threatened. Ironically, Africa contributes just 4% of global carbon emissions despite being the continent that suffers the most from climate change. The International Rescue Committee indicated that seven of the ten countries most at risk from climate-related disasters are situated in Africa; sixteen countries are caught in the intersection of climate vulnerability and armed conflict, representing a staggering 44% of people impacted by natural disasters and 79% of those in humanitarian need. One in four of those countries are in West Africa: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria.
In 2024, the Sahel region experienced devastating floods, which resulted in significant loss of life and destruction of cropland. Nearly 400 people died in Niger, and more than 1.5 million others were affected by floods triggered by last year’s torrential rains. A further 405 were injured, and more than 200,000 households – amounting to 1,526,653 people. Still, in the same year, it was reported that the Southern Africa region experienced its worst drought in over 100 years. The 2023/24 rainy season triggered widespread drought conditions across the region, driven by the El Niño climate phenomenon of 2023–2024, which was officially declared by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in July 2023, marking the first major El Niño event since 2018–2019. This declaration followed observations of sustained warming in the equatorial Pacific Ocean and shifts in atmospheric circulation patterns. Concurrently, elevated temperatures exacerbated water stress, compounding challenges for regional food security.
Another important issue worth considering in tomorrow’s deliberation is climate financing. As major European donors scale back assistance and climate financing, African governments face increased pressure to invest in disaster response capacities and identify alternative funding sources. President Donald Trump’s 2025 budget proposal, on the other hand, to reduce the U.S. humanitarian aid by 42% threatens to cripple Africa’s capacity to recover from climate-driven catastrophes, including the intensified droughts, cyclones and flash floods that have displaced over 15 million people across the continent since 2023. This policy shift seeks to slash foreign aid budgets by over 90%, specifically targeting the elimination of multiyear contracts and grants that do not align with the ‘America First’ agenda. This would result in a USD 54 billion reduction in overseas development and aid programs, disproportionately impacting African nations already reeling from intensified droughts and floods linked to climate change.
It should also be recalled that one of the key outcomes of COP29, held in Baku, Azerbaijan, from 11 to 22 November 2024, was the decision to triple climate finance for developing countries, raising the annual target from USD 100 billion to USD 300 billion by 2035. Nevertheless, many African nations considered this target insufficient, as they had been pushing for a more ambitious target of USD 1.3 trillion annually. Through the adoption of the ‘New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG),’ it was decided, among other things, that ‘the new collective quantified goal on climate finance will support the implementation of developing country Parties’, inter alia, nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and adaptation communications, including those submitted as adaptation components of nationally determined contributions; contribute to increasing and accelerating ambition; and reflect the evolving needs and priorities of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States.’ To this end, the urgency to enhance resilience against climate-related disasters has never been more critical. African nations must now prioritise building robust infrastructure and systems to manage and mitigate the impacts of these events. Additionally, seeking innovative funding avenues, such as public-private partnerships, regional cooperation and international collaborations, will be essential to ensure preparedness and sustainable development in the face of climate challenges.
This PSC session, therefore, aims to highlight the imperative for collaborations and coordination among security, humanitarian, development and climate actors to develop effective responsive and preventative strategies which will bolster and fortify community resilience in the face of escalating climate impacts. It is expected that the session will not only provide a shared understanding among PSC Members of the complex nexus between climate change, peace and security in Africa but also a platform for the identification of opportunities to address climate-related security risks in Africa. The PSC may also take this opportunity to reiterate its recurrent request to the Chairperson of the Commission to appoint an AU Special Envoy for climate change and security.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may underline the imperative of enhanced cooperation and collaboration in advancing the Climate, peace and security nexus between and among the AU institutions, Member States, RECs/REMs and other like-minded stakeholders. In this regard, it may highlight the importance of Member States, RECs/RMs and AU partners to actively pursue integrated approaches to boost climate change resilience and to pay particular attention to prevention and further strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus, as well as to improve communication on climate change phenomena such as drought, cyclones and floods with a view to effectively ensuring disaster preparedness and risk reduction at local, national, regional and continental levels. It is also expected that the Council will underscore the importance of the AU Commission to mainstream climate change in all its activities, particularly in early warning and prevention of climate change-related violent conflicts. Additionally, the PSC may highlight the need for the AU Commission and Member States to share experiences and best practices in addressing the adverse effects of climate change and instituting holistic national planning for development that addresses climate adaptation. It may also request the Commission to expedite the finalisation of the Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace, and Security and submit it for consideration and adoption.
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for March 2025
Provisional Programme of Work of the Peace and Security Council for March 2025
Date | March 2025
In March, the Kingdom of Morocco will chair the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), taking over the role from Equatorial Guinea. According to the rules on rotation of the monthly chairperson of the PSC in alphabetical order – Article 8 (6) of PSC Protocol and Rule 23 of the PSC Rules of Procedure – The Gambia was set to be the chairperson for March 2025. However, due to the conclusion of the duty of the ambassador, the typical alphabetical rotation could not be applied this month. While initially Sierra Leone was engaged to step in as the stand-in-Chairperson and a program of work for March was adopted on that basis, this changed just before the start of the month and Morocco became the stand-in-chairperson for March.
The provisional program of work for the month, prepared following Morocco’s assumption of the role of step-in-Chairperson, envisages a total of six substantive sessions. All the sessions, except one planned to take place at ministerial level, are scheduled to be held at ambassadorial level. Of the six sessions, except the informal consultation on countries in transition, all others are on thematic issues. As March is a transition month before the newly elected members of the PSC assume their seats in the PSC on 1 April, the provisional program, as per PSC practice, stipulates a plan for the induction of new members elected for three-year term during the 38th AU Summit.
The first meeting of the PSC introduced by the Chairperson of the month will be on ‘Climate Change: Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa,’ scheduled to take place on 6 March. It is to be recalled that this theme was on the agenda of the PSC when Morocco chaired the PSC in October 2022. Apart from the 22 October session, this month’s session is expected to build on the discussions from the last session of Council on ‘Consultations on the Common African Position vis-à-vis climate change, peace and security’ held on 30 October 2024, as its 1240th session. From the meeting, the PSC emphasised the need to ‘ensure that climate change responses are conflict-sensitive and security sensitive and that they mainstream peacebuilding efforts, as well as the need for holistic approaches that address the interlinkages between climate change and human mobility in conflict-affected settings, with a view to informing the design and implementation of policies and interventions that tackle climate-induced displacements in Africa.’
On 11 March, the PSC will receive a briefing on the activities of the AU Panel of the Wise and its subsidiary bodies, FemWise and WiseYouth. It is worth noting that the 6th members of the Panel of the Wise were elected during the 38th AU summit in February 2025. Accordingly, the summit re-elected Domitien Ndayizeye of Burundi, Effie Owuor of Kenya, and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka of South Africa. For the membership to the Panel from North and West Africa, the AU Assembly directed ‘the incoming Chairperson of the Commission to consult with the Western and North African regions to select one (1) candidate per each region based on consensus for these vacant positions and submit to the 47th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council’ and to this end it delegated to ‘the 47th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council the authority to appoint representatives from the Western and North African regions to complete the composition of the 6th Panel of the Wise.’
It is anticipated that the Panel of the Wise will provide an update to the PSC on its activities, including on files in respect of which the PSC tasked the Panel to engage in peace efforts. While FemWise, established in 2017, has traditionally been addressed by the PSC within the context of its Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, this session will be an opportunity for the PSC to engage with FemWise and WiseYouth within the broader framework of its collaboration with the Panel of the Wise.
On the same day, 11 March, the PSC is scheduled to consider and adopt the program of work for the month of April.
The next session taking place on 13 March will be dedicated to ‘Deradicalisation as leverage in the fight against violent extremism in Africa.’ PSC 1111th meeting held in October 2022 underlined the need for ‘expedited implementation of all decisions adopted by Council and the Assembly of the Union, particularly Decision [Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec. (XVI)] adopted by the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly held on 28 May 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.’ In addition, this session is expected to build upon the call during this 1111th session on the need for reviewing all AU counter-terrorism frameworks and instruments. In this context, the AU Commission was requested by Council to include countering radicalisation and extremist ideologies in the envisaged review of the African Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism.
On 18 March, the PSC will have the ‘Informal Consultation with Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan.’ It should be recalled that informal consultations with countries undergoing political transitions were incorporated into the PSC’s aptitude for working methods following its decision during the 14th Retreat on working methods, held from 17 to 19 November 2022. The conclusions of the retreat introduced these consultations as a mechanism to facilitate direct engagement with representatives of countries suspended from participation in the AU due to unconstitutional changes of government, in line with Article 8(11) of the PSC Protocol. Since then, two such consultations have been held – in April and December 2023. This engagement was, however, supposed to happen in December 2024 but did not. It was re-introduced on the PPoW in January, but similarly did not happen.
As of the beginning of 2025, the latest political developments in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan reflect countries marked by ongoing instability and military-led transitions. As pointed out in an edition of Insights on the PSC on this subject, one of the reasons for the use of informal consultation is to provide a platform for engagement between the PSC and the affected countries. Since the introduction of this format, the engagement between the PSC and these countries has shown improvements. However, it remains unclear how these engagements have changed the dynamics of the AU’s role in relation to these countries.
The last session of the month will be held on 20 March at the Ministerial level. The session will be committed to ‘Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its impact on Peace, Security and Governance in Africa.’ We can recall that during the 44th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council held on 14 and 15 February 2024, in an effort to explore the role of AI in promoting peace, security and development nexus in Africa, the Council through Decision [EX.CL/Dec.1233-1264(XLIV)], endorsed the ‘Conceptual Framework of the Continental Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy’ and requested the AU Commission to ‘Expedite the development of the Continental Cybersecurity strategy and the Continental Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategy with their implementation roadmaps.’ This was followed by a ‘Multistakeholder Consultative Sessions on the Development of a Continental Strategy on Artificial Intelligence (AI)’ from 19 to 24 April 2024’ to support and guide the development of a continental approach and strategy on AI that responds to Africa’s context, address its needs and position the continent as an active player at global level. Consequently, AUDA-NEPAD published a White Paper on ‘Regulation and Responsible Adoption of AI in Africa Towards Achievement of AU Agenda 2063’ alongside the AUDA-NEPAD AI Roadmap for Africa. The 1214th PSC session held in June 2024 further requested the AU Commission, ‘in particular the Political Affairs Peace and Security Department, in coordination with the Department of Infrastructure and Energy, to establish a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on Artificial Intelligence, peace, security and good governance in Africa; and to propose options for Continental Artificial Intelligence governance, including its military application and to report to Council every six months.’ It is expected that this upcoming PSC session will serve to receive an update on whether there is progress in this respect.
Aside from these substantive sessions, the induction of the new members of the PSC, elected at the 46th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council and endorsed by the 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, is expected to be the last activity of the PSC for the month of March 2025. The induction program of the Committee of Experts and the newly elected PSC members is scheduled to be held from 22 to 28 March in Arusha, Tanzania. The program of work also envisages (on the footnote) a possible briefing by PSC Chairs for January, February and March 2025 on the activities of the PSC during their respective chaired months, as well as a dinner reception on 31 March by the Chairperson of the month.
