The Imperative of a Unified AU Health Architecture: A New Era of Collaboration
The Imperative of a Unified AU Health Architecture: A New Era of Collaboration
Date | 24 July 2025
Ibraheem Bukunle Sanusi 1
A pivotal meeting recently took place at the Africa CDC headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Her Excellency Ambassador Amma Twum-Amoah, the new African Union (AU) Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, held fruitful discussions with Africa CDC Director General H.E. Dr. Jean Kaseya. Their deliberations, focused on pressing health and humanitarian issues confronting the continent, culminated in a significant agreement: the establishment of a joint coordination team. This team, comprising experts from the AU Commission and Africa CDC, along with representatives from the Africa Medicines Agency (AMA), AUDA-NEPAD, Africa Humanitarian Agency (AfHA), and AfCFTA, is mandated to ensure policy coherence, enhance productivity and efficiency, and forge common positions in implementing health policies across Africa.
This initiative is a welcome and crucial step. It signals a deeper commitment to coordination and collaboration among Africa’s continental health, development, and integration institutions. This article argues that this agreement should be a powerful impetus to explore and ultimately establish a comprehensive African Health Architecture.
A Global Turning Point in Health Governance
We stand at an inflexion point in global health governance. The global health landscape is shifting amid ideological realignments and financial strains occasioned by geopolitical rifts. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for health in Africa has plummeted by 70% from 2021 to 2025, as donor countries redirect funds toward domestic priorities and even military spending in the wake of geopolitical crises. After a peak during COVID-19, global aid fell 7.1% in 2024, the first drop in years, with the U.S. slashing USAID programs by over 50% and others like the UK and Netherlands following suit. The decline “stems largely from shifting global economic conditions, evolving political priorities, and rising geopolitical tensions”. In short, the era of abundant donor support is waning.
As noted in the article Global Health and the “Second Independence of Africa”, global power dynamics around health are changing. During the COVID-19 pandemic, wealthy nations competed aggressively for vaccines and supplies, eroding faith in multilateral mechanisms. Health has emerged as a battleground in today’s geopolitical struggle, reminiscent of past contests for influence in Africa. As powerful countries pursue their own interests, Africa’s health needs too often take a backseat, leading to fragmented responses and a troubling lack of international cooperation during crises. The inequitable vaccine access in the pandemic and the exclusion of Africa CDC from the initial governance of the World Bank’s Pandemic Fund are stark reminders of Africa’s marginalisation. All of these points point to a simple truth: now is a critical moment for Africa to step forward with a cohesive vision and assert its health priorities on the global stage. African leadership and domestic commitment to health have never been more needed. As one expert noted, ultimate responsibility for Africa’s health security rests with African governments investing in health and citizens holding them accountable. The African Union (AU) must seize this moment to unite its institutions, voices and resources for health.
Pressure on Africa’s Health Systems and the Cost of Fragmentation
The changing global health governance dynamics have put Africa’s health systems under immense pressure. As clearly articulated in the “Africa’s Health Financing in a New Era” concept note, the financing crisis alone is staggering, with ODA collapsing, vital programs for pandemic preparedness, maternal health, and disease control at risk. This comes as Africa faces a surge in public health threats: outbreaks on the continent jumped 41% from 2022 to 2024, including Ebola, cholera, Marburg and more, all colliding with climate disasters and conflicts. Yet more than 20 years after pledging to spend 15% of budgets on health (the Abuja Declaration), only 3 African countries meet that target, while most languish below even 10%. The result is chronically fragile health systems now strained to the breaking point.
Current global health governance has often failed to alleviate these strains and, in some cases, exacerbated them. Donor-driven initiatives have saved lives but have also fostered dependency and duplication. When donors abruptly cut funds, decades of health gains can unravel. For example, SpeakUp Africa argued that neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), which afflict over 580 million Africans, saw major progress through partnerships, yet sudden bilateral funding cuts recently exposed the fragility of those gains. African countries were left scrambling for emergency funds to fill the gap, an alarming situation that underlines the risk of relying solely on external charity. As one advocate put it, African nations must not remain in “a position of vulnerability” dependent on donors’ whims. In the realm of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), the story is similar. Chronic conditions like heart disease, diabetes and cancer now account for 37% of all deaths in sub-Saharan Africa (up from 24% in 2000), a “hidden epidemic” that threatens to overwhelm health services. Yet global health financing has historically prioritised infectious diseases, meaning efforts to combat NCDs remain fragmented and under-resourced. Without a unified strategy, African institutions struggle to address cross-cutting issues like NCD prevention, mental health, and lifestyle diseases that don’t fit neatly under any single donor-funded program.
Compounding these challenges is the fragmentation among AU’s own health institutions. The African Union has no shortage of organs and agencies devoted to health or have health as part of their mandates: the AUC Department of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development (AUC-HHS) sets policies; the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) leads on epidemics and broader health topics; the new African Medicines Agency (AMA) will regulate drugs and vaccines; AUDA-NEPAD drives developmental projects and agenda; the AU’s IBAR and PANVAC focus on animal health and vaccines (crucial for zoonoses and food security); and more. Each plays a vital role, but too often they operate in silos or with overlapping mandates. Coordination is ad hoc at best, and critical issues risk falling through the cracks. For instance, Africa CDC has launched initiatives for local vaccine production (like the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing, now called Platform for Harmonised African Health Manufacturing – PHAHM) while the AMA is tasked with harmonising regulatory standards. Yet without structured collaboration, these efforts may stall. Likewise, “One Health” threats, diseases that leap from animals to humans, cannot be tackled by the Africa CDC or AU-IBAR alone. Recognising this, the AU in 2022 had established an Interagency One Health Coordination Group bringing together Africa CDC, AU-IBAR, the AUC, and others to jointly address zoonotic disease control. This was a positive step, but it underscores the point: when institutions are fragmented, Africa’s response to health challenges is fragmented. In areas from boosting pharmaceutical manufacturing to combating NCDs and NTDs, Africa’s myriad health actors need to move in unison, or risk working at cross purposes.
An AU Health Architecture: A Vision for Coordination and Cooperation
Central to addressing fragmentation is to foster cooperation. There is a need for continental health institutions and related organs with key health-related mandates to work more coherently under an African Union Health Architecture. This would not be a new brick-and-mortar institution, but rather a platform and framework that ties together all AU health-related bodies under a common vision for health security and development. In essence, it would serve as a continental coordination mechanism, similar to the successful African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the security realm or the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in the governance realm. The AGA, for example, functions as a dialogue and coordination framework among various AU-recognised institutions working on governance. We can do the same for health: create a structured forum for the AUC-HHS, Africa CDC, AMA, AUDA-NEPAD, IBAR, PANVAC, and others to share information, align strategies, and speak with one voice.
What would an AU Health Architecture actually do? First, it would institutionalise regular information sharing among these bodies. An architecture’s platform (perhaps an “AU Health Platform”) could convene quarterly coordination meetings, similar to the Senior Officials Meeting under APSA, joint task forces on specific issues, and a unified data hub. Imagine the Africa CDC and AMA jointly monitoring the rollout of a new vaccine with surveillance data feeding directly into regulatory decisions, and AUDA-NEPAD and AfCFTA representatives planning how to scale up manufacturing and distribution. Such synergy is only possible with a formal mechanism for cross-agency communication.
Second, a health architecture would enable joint advocacy and policymaking. Too often, Africa’s health priorities are fragmented when presented on the global stage. A unified AU Health Architecture can coordinate a continental voice in global health forums. Instead of Africa CDC, health ministers, and other agencies each making separate appeals, the AU can assert a single, loud position on issues like pandemic preparedness, financing, or intellectual property for medicines. We saw the power of unity during the TRIPS waiver negotiations at the WTO, with African states that spoke together on vaccine patent waivers having far greater influence. An AU Health Architecture can make this the norm, preparing common African positions for the World Health Assembly, G20 health discussions, and beyond. As African leaders have emphasised in the New Public Health Order (NPHO) initiative, Africa must secure “equitable and fair representation” in global health decision-making. Speaking as one through a coordinated platform is the best way to ensure Africa’s voice is heard and its interests defended. This is also a key pillar of the AU reforms agenda.
Third, an AU Health Architecture will directly address fragmentation on health priorities. It can set overarching continental targets, for example, reducing NCD mortality or eliminating specific NTDs and align the efforts of various organs behind those goals. This means less duplication and more coherence: one AU health agenda that leverages the strengths of each institution. The AU already has high-level strategies (the Africa Health Strategy 2016–2030, the Catalytic Framework to end AIDS, TB and Malaria, etc.), but implementation often falters without coordination. The architecture could establish thematic working groups (on NCDs, NTDs, maternal health, etc.), drawing experts from all relevant agencies. This platform would also help bridge human and animal health agencies in a One Health approach, ensuring that human health, veterinary services, and environmental experts jointly tackle issues like antimicrobial resistance or zoonotic outbreaks. Already, there is a proof of concept: with the AU’s One Health interagency group (co-hosted by Africa CDC and IBAR), which recently launched the One Health strategy for zoonotic diseases. An AU Health Architecture would take such collaboration continent-wide, so that whether it’s Ebola or Ebola in animals (like swine fever), the response is synchronised across sectors.
Finally, the architecture will serve as a platform for coordinating health product manufacturing with regulatory and trade considerations. Africa is making bold moves to produce its own vaccines, medicines, and diagnostics, a crucial step toward health security and self-reliance. But success requires aligning multiple pieces: manufacturers need a favourable trade environment and swift regulatory approvals, and countries need assurances of quality and market access. The African Medicines Agency and the AfCFTA cannot work in isolation; they must work hand-in-hand. Under the AfCFTA agreement, fragmented regulatory systems will be harmonised, and intra-African trade in pharmaceuticals is set to grow. The member states are already leading in this regard with the recently established MoU on Regulatory Reliance Mechanism, agreed to by the eight Maturity Level 3 (ML3) regulatory agencies in Africa. At the continental level, a health architecture would operationalise this by linking AMA’s regulatory harmonisation with the AfCFTA Secretariat’s trade facilitation, guided by input from Africa CDC on public health needs. In practical terms, this could mean creating an African Medicines & Vaccines Forum under the architecture, where AMA, Africa CDC, AUDA-NEPAD (which also has pharmaceutical manufacturing under its mandate), and AfCFTA representatives jointly plan how to boost local production and remove trade barriers. The benefits would be immense: with 61% of Africa’s pharmaceutical needs currently imported and only 3% of medicines traded within Africa, a coordinated approach can change that equation. During a high-level AU side event at the UN, leaders from Africa CDC, AUDA-NEPAD, and AfCFTA together underscored the need to invest in research, strengthen regulatory bodies, and enhance local production for health security. The AU Health Architecture provides the home for turning those commitments into action, aligning investments, regulations, and industrial strategy so that African-produced health products can travel seamlessly across African borders.
Amplifying Africa’s Voice and Sustaining Political Commitment
A consolidated AU Health Architecture would not only streamline internal coordination, but it would amplify Africa’s external voice and help sustain high-level political commitment to health. One of the great lessons of recent years is that Africa can no longer afford to be a passive recipient in global health. Our continent must set its own agenda. With a unified health architecture, the AU can articulate a bold, cohesive vision for health and back it up with collective weight. Consider Agenda 2063, the continent’s development blueprint. Its first aspiration envisions “a high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens,” including “healthy and well-nourished citizens”. Health is central to Africa’s long-term prosperity. By creating a central health coordination platform, the AU would demonstrate to citizens and the world that it is serious about achieving those goals. A health architecture can regularly track progress toward health targets in Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals, holding leaders accountable if commitments waver.
Importantly, an AU Health Architecture would help keep health security at the top of the political agenda even when there isn’t a scary epidemic making headlines. It can do so by instituting accountability mechanisms, for instance, annual “State of Africa’s Health” reports delivered to the AU Assembly, or a scorecard on each country’s fulfilment of pledges (like domestic health financing or immunisation coverage). Just as the AU’s Peace and Security Council meets routinely to address conflicts, a standing health coordination platform would ensure that health doesn’t slip into neglect between crises. This sustained focus is critical to, for example, finally realising the Abuja promise of 15% budget allocation to health. Peer pressure is a powerful tool: if finance and health ministers know that their performance will be reviewed in a continental forum, they have greater incentive to prioritise health in national budgets. An architecture could also facilitate joint resource mobilisation, presenting a united front to development partners for funding strategic priorities, rather than fragmenting donor engagement across many small initiatives. Development partners have long urged “country ownership”; through a health architecture, African nations collectively can take ownership, setting priorities and asking partners to align behind Africa’s plan and priorities, not the other way around.
Crucially, the architecture would bolster Africa’s position in global health governance. When negotiating the new Pandemic Accord or reforming the International Health Regulations, an organised African bloc can shape the outcome, for instance, pressing for equitable benefit-sharing of vaccines and data. African nations want and deserve a seat at the table in shaping global health initiatives. By coordinating continentally, Africa can approach these negotiations not as 55 separate voices but as one powerful voice representing 1.3 billion people. We have already seen the beginnings of this: the Lusaka Agenda (adopted in December 2023 by African and global health stakeholders) called out imbalances in global health and stressed alignment with national plans. An AU Health Architecture would embody that principle of alignment and give Africa the platform to assert its rights in global forums, whether it’s advocating for pandemic financing mechanisms that include African institutions, or championing issues often neglected globally (like NTDs or climate-health links).
Finally, the benefits extend to Africa’s broader integration projects like the AfCFTA and the free movement of people agenda. As the continent breaks down borders for trade and travel, public health cooperation must tighten. With freer movement of persons and goods, these initiatives will certainly impact public health across the continent, as Africa CDC itself noted. A health architecture can work closely with those implementing the Free Movement Protocol to harmonise health regulations, for example, standardising vaccination certificates or collaborating on cross-border disease surveillance so that viruses do not hitchhike along with increased human mobility. It can also inform the AfCFTA on health-related trade measures (ensuring, say, that essential medicines and health equipment enjoy low tariffs and smooth customs procedures across Africa). In doing so, the architecture would help unlock the synergies between economic integration and health security, a link that requires increasing emphasis. Healthy populations are more mobile and economically productive; conversely, integrated markets can support stronger health systems (through pooled procurement, larger markets for local manufacturers, and so on). By embedding health in Africa’s grand integration schemes, the AU Health Architecture would contribute to the vision of Agenda 2063’s “Africa We Want” – an Africa of free movement, one voice, and self-reliant, robust health systems supporting our development.
Learning from the African Governance Architecture: Feasibility and Accountability
Skeptics might ask: will creating an AU Health Architecture add another layer of complexity to an already crowded AU institutional landscape? It’s a valid concern, Africa’s health ecosystem is vast, and coordination is never easy. However, the solution to complexity is not to shy away from it, but to manage it through smart design. Here, the AU can draw inspiration from its own experience. In 2011, faced with numerous bodies dealing with democracy and human rights, the AU established the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as a coordination mechanism for dialogue among stakeholders. This platform did not replace or duplicate the mandates of those bodies; instead, it provided a structured forum for them to collaborate, align their activities, and monitor progress on shared goals. The AGA (and its associated African Governance Platform) clarified roles and created a one-stop framework for governance issues. Crucially, it also introduced accountability mechanisms, for example, an annual, now biennial, high-level dialogue and routine reviews of how AU members uphold governance commitments. The result has been greater coherence in AU actions on governance and human rights, even if challenges remain.
The proposed AU Health Architecture can emulate this model. Defined roles and responsibilities would be a cornerstone: each organ’s comparative advantage should be codified (e.g., Africa CDC as lead on health emergencies and surveillance, AMA as lead on regulatory harmonisation, HHS Department on policy development and health diplomacy, AUDA-NEPAD on program implementation and resource mobilisation, IBAR on animal health, etc.), so that they complement rather than compete with each other. A coordination platform, perhaps the “AU Health Platform”, would meet regularly (as an example, heads of these agencies could convene once or twice a year on the margins of the AU Summits, with working-level coordination more frequently) to ensure everyone is steering toward common objectives. This platform could also include regional representation (from the RECs or Regional Health Organisations) to connect the continental strategy with regional and national implementation. By formalising these interactions, the architecture would move us from the current patchwork of informal cooperation to a predictable, structured collaboration.
Accountability must be the other pillar. Here, lessons from both AGA and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) are instructive. APSA, through the Peace and Security Council and its early warning system, set up clear procedures for conflict prevention and response. A health architecture could strengthen the existing Specialised Technical Committee on Health in this regard. The STC would track countries’ compliance with agreed health commitments (for instance, reporting on how many have met the Abuja 15% target or how preparedness scores are improving). It could also provide a mechanism to rapidly escalate health concerns, such as an emerging pandemic threat, to the highest political level, ensuring AU heads of state take swift, coordinated action. Far from adding bureaucracy, such structures streamline decision-making by cutting through institutional silos. They make the sum greater than the parts.
It’s also worth noting that creating an AU Health Architecture does not necessarily mean setting up a large new institution with heavy costs. Much can be achieved with political will, a clear mandate from the AU Assembly, and a small coordinating secretariat (potentially housed within the AUC or Africa CDC). In fact, the AU Assembly could simply repurpose an existing mechanism, for example, expanding the mandate of the Specialised Technical Committee on Health to function as the political oversight of the Health Architecture, supported by a technical secretariat that coordinates across agencies. The key is to embed the architecture in the AU’s structures so it has teeth: decision-making authority, reporting lines, and the blessing of heads of state. Once that is in place, the various health agencies will naturally orient their work to align with the collective framework. Yes, there will be growing pains such as turf wars and resource questions, but these can be managed by clearly demonstrating that everyone stands to gain. Each institution will be more effective in its mandate when supported by others: Africa CDC gains a broader reach through community networks; AMA gains political backing to enforce standards; AUDA-NEPAD gains technical input for its projects; member states get one coherent guidance instead of multiple voices.
From personal experience, the African Governance Architecture took time to mature, but it showed that complex challenges demand coordinated solutions. Health is no different. By learning from AGA’s experience, setting a unifying vision, creating dialogue platforms, and instituting peer accountability, the AU Health Architecture can be both feasible and transformational. As the saying goes, if you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together. Africa cannot afford isolated, short-term fixes for its health challenges. We need to go far and fast together.
Seizing the Moment for Africa’s Health Security
In conclusion, there is no better time to establish an African Union Health Architecture. We are at a pivotal juncture with traditional pillars of global health support wavering, even as the continent faces rising health demands from all sides. Yet within this challenge lies an opportunity to reimagine Africa’s health governance on its own terms. By strengthening coordination and cooperation among our health institutions, we strengthen Africa’s ability to withstand shocks, whether from pandemics or funding cuts. By speaking with one voice, we ensure African priorities like local manufacturing, NCDs, NTDs, and One Health are no longer neglected on the world stage. By aligning health with our broader agendas of economic integration and self-reliance, we move closer to the Africa envisaged in Agenda 2063: prosperous, united, and taking charge of its destiny.
Yes, building an AU Health Architecture will require leadership, political will, diligence, and perhaps a shift in mindset among our leaders and institutions. But the alternative is to continue muddling through fragmentation and that is a recipe for stagnation and vulnerability. Our continent has experienced enough of that already. The COVID-19 crisis has already sparked the vision of a New Public Health Order for Africa, emphasising better coordination, increased domestic financing, and expanded manufacturing. The proposed Health Architecture is the vehicle to drive that vision forward. It would hard-wire collaboration into the AU system and help sustain the momentum for health development long after the headlines fade.
African countries often say, “African solutions to African problems.” This is our chance to apply that credo to health. Let us not wait for the next pandemic or the next donor conference to get our act together. The AU, in partnership with development partners and global health actors, should move now to design and implement a unifying health architecture. It is an investment in our collective security and well-being that will pay dividends for generations. With unity of purpose and structure, Africa can turn this global inflexion point into a launch pad from a continent often spoken about in global health, to a continent that speaks for itself and leads. The health of 1.3 billion Africans, and indeed global health security, will be the better for it.
1 Ibraheem Sanusi is the Sector Coordinator for Health and Social Development at the GIZ Office to the African Union, where he leads the implementation of strategic programmes aimed at strengthening the institutional and technical capacities of continental health bodies, including the Africa CDC, the African Pharmaceutical Technology Foundation, and the African Medicines Agency. He coordinates GIZ’s support to the African Union’s health agenda across areas such as pandemic preparedness, One Health, pharmaceutical regulation, and digital health governance.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya
AUPSC Summit on the situation in Libya
Date | 23 July 2025
Tomorrow (24 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1291 session on the situation in Libya, at the level of Heads of State and Government.1
Tomorrow’s summit-level session marks the first time since the PSC’s 294th session in September 2011 that Libya will be discussed at the level of Heads of State and Government. It will be the 27th session of the PSC since the PSC was seized of the situation in Libya in February 2011.
The session is expected to start with an opening remark by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for July 2025. It is also expected that Mahamoudi Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, will make an introductory statement setting the context for the session. As a country concerned, the representative of Libya is expected to make a statement. As per the usual practice of the PSC, Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative of the Secretary-general of the UN for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is expected to deliver a statement. A representative of Congo may also make a statement as Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya.
Coming only in two months from the last session, tomorrow’s session follows the 23 May PSC convening that was prompted by clashes between rival militias in Tripoli on 12 May. Apart from calling for unconditional ceasefire, the PSC underscored ‘the imperative of maintaining order and demilitarising the non-state forces in the capital and efforts to restore civilian order.’
As a follow-up to this immediate past session, the PSC is expected to hear during tomorrow’s session the fragile truce of 14 May that calmed down the situation in Tripoli, about the mechanisms established to monitor its implementation, and broader security and military arrangements aimed at easing tensions among rival factions in Tripoli.
It is of interest for members of the PSC to take stock of the persistence of insecurity and political instability in Libya. It is to be recalled that after Libya’s descent into civil war and anarchy following the 2011 military campaign that toppled the government of Muammar Gaddafi, the civil war came to an end with the signing of the ceasefire agreement of October 2020 and the establishment of the Libyan Dialogue Forum in November 2020. Despite the fact that this was supposed to lead to a transitional process set to culminate in the convening of elections at the end of 2021, the persistence of political and security divisions impeded agreement on the process and modalities for the holding of elections, leading to indefinite postponement of the elections.
Beyond the indefinite postponement of the elections that left Libya in a transitional limbo, the 2020 peace process that ended the civil war has not been able to overcome the political and security fragmentation that has become the characteristic feature of the political and institutional landscape of Libya. At the level of government entities, Libya operates on the basis of two rival governments. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli, while the Government of National Stability (GNS), aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Khalifa Haftar, operates from eastern Libya. Each command has some influence in the political and economic spheres and is supported by rival local and external backers. This has direct bearing on the economy reflected, among others, in the significant deterioration of the purchasing power of the Libyan dinar and the lack of agreement on a unified budget.
The other factor that carries particular significance for security and stability is the absence of a unified and professional security sector and the prevalence of various armed groups with various levels of links with the rival governments. These armed groups that emerged and proliferated following the descent of Libya into civil war in 2011 exercise control over various territories and have ties with various parts of Libya.
Tensions between these armed groups over territorial control and competition of political actors for influence over state institutions and access to state resources have on various occasions led to the eruption of violence between these armed groups. One of the major conflict databases, ACLED, reported that it recorded ‘64 instances of battles, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups.’ The most recent of these violent episodes that shook Tripoli took place in May 2025. While the leaders of GNU described the violent clashes as law enforcement operations against criminals, aimed at enforcing judicial orders issued by the Libyan Attorney General with the goal of upholding the rule of law, it is viewed as a manifestation of patterns of inter-elite competition. Thus, in her briefing to the UN Security Council on 24 June, Tetteh observed that ‘narratives have emerged, that risks pitting cities and neighbourhoods within western Libya against one another, threatening social cohesion and potentially fomenting further escalation.’ She further warned that the ‘continued inflow of weapons into Tripoli has led to the proliferation of heavy arms and weapons depots in densely populated civilian areas, posing serious risks to civilian lives. There is also growing concern that further instability will draw in eastern security actors and undermine the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement.’
Further compounding the political and institutional division and the fragmentation of the security landscape with the persistence of rival armed groups exerting influence on and loosely affiliated to government institutions are competing external interests. External actors have further destabilised the situation by supporting opposing sides, effectively turning Libya into a proxy battleground and complicating international mediation efforts.
Considering the fact that the rivalry between armed groups feeds into and reinforces the political and institutional division in Libya and that stability in Tripoli is held by transactional arrangements and financial cooption by the GNU rather than formal arrangements and institutional reform, it will be of interest for the PSC to interrogate whether and how a political roadmap that will lead to elections can be agreed to by the major actors under the prevailing conditions and without pursuing effective security sector reform.
The other issue that is of interest to PSC members is the state of the peace process and recent developments concerning the peace process and reconciliation in Libya. The UN remains the main actor in the Libyan peace process. Its recent efforts, under the leadership of Tetteh, focused on achieving consensus on the process and modalities for holding the long-delayed elections in Libya by promoting dialogue between the country’s rival factions. Following Tetteh’s appointment, in February, UNSMIL established an Advisory Committee to propose technically sound and politically viable solutions, building on frameworks like the Libyan Political Agreement, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) Roadmap and the 6+6 Committee’s electoral laws. By 20 May 2025, after more than 20 meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi, the committee delivered a comprehensive report to UNSMIL, outlining four options to address critical disputes, including the linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections, candidate eligibility criteria, voting rights and the electoral appeals mechanism. These options were: (1) holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously; (2) conducting parliamentary elections first, followed by the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution; (3) adopting a permanent constitution prior to holding elections; and (4) establishing a political dialogue committee—based on the Libyan Political Agreement—to finalise electoral laws, determine the structure of the executive authority, and adopt a permanent constitution.
Following the submission of the committee’s report, UNSMIL has been conducting a series of nationwide consultations aimed at facilitating an inclusive dialogue among Libyans on the committee’s proposed options and on how best to overcome the country’s prolonged political gridlock. These consultations have revealed widespread frustration among Libyans over the current security, political, and economic conditions. Many have reportedly lost trust in existing institutions and expressed a strong desire to see the transitional period come to an end. UNSMIL intends to use the views and perspectives gathered from a broad cross-section of Libyan society to develop a consensus-based roadmap toward national elections and the reunification of state institutions. At Thursday’s meeting, the PSC may receive updates on these developments and express support to the UN’s efforts in this regard.
Another notable recent development that is of interest to PSC members was the meeting of the Berlin Process International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL), held on 20 June for the first time in four years. The IFCL was established to coordinate international efforts in support of the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led political process. The June meeting brought together representatives from 19 countries and three regional organisations, including the African Union. According to the meeting’s summary, participants reviewed the work of the advisory committee, wherein countries such as Türkiye requested the dropping of one of the four options proposed by the committee, highlighting an instance of external actors determining the scope of choices for Libyans. Indicating renewed effort for coordinated action, participants agreed to hold regular meetings to strengthen coordination in support of the UN-led process.
While the UN continues to lead mediation efforts in Libya, the AU has also played a supportive role in advancing the United Nations-led political process. The AU is a member of the Libya Quartet—alongside the United Nations, the European Union, and the League of Arab States—which was established to ensure a coordinated approach to resolving the Libyan crisis. Notably, the AU High-Level Committee on Libya, chaired by President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, led on the national reconciliation efforts. In February, the Committee facilitated the signing of a Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation by Libyan stakeholders in Addis Ababa. However, some Libyan political actors voiced reservations about the Charter, and several prominent leaders were notably absent from the signing ceremony. Despite the fact that the head of the Presidential Council was in Addis Ababa, he did not sign the Charter. The Government of National Unity also did not send a representative to sign the reconciliation accord.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may urge the various Libyan stakeholders to summon the leadership and the compromise required to end the prevailing political stalemate and instability in the country. It may also express support to the efforts of the Chairperson of the AU High-Level Committee on Libya and reiterate its call on those Libyan actors who did not sign the Charter signed on the sidelines of the AU summit to sign and join the Charter. The PSC may also welcome the truce that was agreed in Tripoli and reiterate its call for unconditional ceasefire. The PSC may call for renewed effort for the adoption of a roadmap on implementation of security sector reform, focusing on the integration of the various security groups into a unified and professional national security institution and the disarmament and reintegration into society of others. With respect to the political process, it may express its support to the latest initiative of the UN for achieving a consensus among the various Libyan political and security actors on a roadmap for unification of national institutions and conducting the long-delayed elections. The PSC may call on external actors to end interference in the affairs of Libya and cease their support of rivalry among contending Libyan actors. It may also reiterate its plan for undertaking a field mission to Libya and the decision for moving the AU office to Tripoli.
1 This is the third year in a raw that Uganda convenes a session on specific conflict situation at the level of Heads of State and Government during its chair-ship of the PSC, signifying the interest on the work of the PSC at the highest levels in Uganda.
Rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts
Rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts
Date | 21 July 2025
Tomorrow (22 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1289th session focusing on the rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed conflicts.
Following opening remarks from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Rebecca Amuge Otengo, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Presentations and statements are also expected from Nts’iuoa Sekete, Permanent Representative of Lesotho to the AU and Vice Co-Chair of Africa Platform on Children Affected by Armed Conflicts (AP-CAAC). Nonceba Losi, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the AU will also share insights from her experience. Robert Doya Nanima, Member of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and Special Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict. More presentations and statements are expected to be delivered from Grace Acan, Social Worker and Survivor Rights Activist and and Victor Ochen, Founder, African Youth Initiative Network (AYINET) as well as representatives from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) office to the AU and ECA, Save the Children International. The Permanent Mission of Norway to the AU will also make intervention, as Partner Member of AP-CAAC.
While tomorrow’s session is fully dedicated to rehabilitation and reintegration of children affected by armed conflict, this is not the first session of the PSC to address the subject. At its 661st session, the PSC ‘underlined the need for governments to institutionalise the protection of children within their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes, as well as to include rehabilitation and opportunities for education to former child soldiers… and make full use of DDR and SSR, especially paying attention to rehabilitation of child soldiers, re-skilling and integrate them into the community.’ Additionally, apart from urging member states to share their experiences in rehabilitating ex-child soldiers and integrating them into the societies, the PSC emphasised ‘the need to include negotiation on the release of all children to child protection actors/officers in the mediation efforts undertaken to end conflict.’
The immediate past session of the PSC dedicated to the use of child soldiers held on 20 February 2025 during its 1262nd session emphasised the need for ‘implementing child-focused reintegration strategies in post-conflict settings’ and ‘to prioritise the provision of essential services such as education, healthcare, psychosocial support, and social care, while designing tailored reintegration programmes to restore the dignity and rights of children recruited and exploited in armed conflicts.’ It is worth recalling that Member States issued a similar stance in the Banjul Conclusions of 2023, in which they stated, ‘children’s interests should meaningfully be considered in DDR to facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration into communities and effectively address the phenomenon of re-recruitment of children in situations of conflict, particularly in protracted conflicts.’
Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to build on these previous sessions. In doing so, it would first offer an opportunity to assess whether and how the measures identified in these sessions on the subject of rehabilitation and reintegration have been implemented. Second, the session also helps to bring together into a single coherent text the steps identified in the outcome of the previous sessions on rehabilitation and reintegration of children affected by armed conflicts.
A critical point of departure for tomorrow’s session is to have clear data and analysis both on the state of engagement of children in armed conflicts and on whether and how the issues of rehabilitation and reintegration of children are addressed in peace agreements and in post-conflict and reconstruction processes. While there is no data specific to the situation of conflicts in Africa, according to the UNSG 2024 Children and Armed Conflict Annual Report, ‘22,495 children [were] affected by recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual violence and abduction.’ It recorded a 17 per cent increase in the number of child victims of multiple grave violations (3,137) involving the convergence of abduction, recruitment and use, and sexual violence, representing an alarming escalation in brutality.’ Indicating the persistence of the recruitment of child soldiers, the report pointed out that 7,402 children were recruited and used. Of the five countries with the highest numbers of children recruited and used, three were in Africa (the DRC, Nigeria and Somalia).
In terms of how rehabilitation and reintegration are addressed in peace processes, there are emerging practices in some settings despite persisting challenges. For example, according to the UN report, of the four countries in which 16,482 children formerly associated with armed forces or groups were provided with protection or reintegration support, two of them, namely DRC and South Sudan, are from Africa. In the countries affected by Boko Haram and its splinter groups in the Lake Chad Basin, the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of children is integrated into the regional stabilisation initiatives including DDR processes at the national levels. It emerges from this limited available data that there is a need for monitoring and documentation, including the systematic collection of information. The development and implementation of tailored measures for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in each of the conflict settings has to be informed by the nature and scale of the problem of children associated with armed forces or armed groups.
Also of significance for tomorrow’s session is the review of lessons learned on rehabilitation and reintegration of children from the experience of countries that implemented or are implementing DDR and SSR processes in post-conflict settings such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and South Sudan or those pursuing stabilisation measures such as countries affected by the conflict involving Boko Haram. The experience of Liberia, for example, shows not only that child protection has to be thought of from the outset of the design of DDR processes, but also that dedicated attention has to be paid to the needs of the girl child who is associated with an armed force or armed group. Other useful insights include the necessity of community participation and the use of relevant rituals in the rehabilitation and reintegration of children.
Tomorrow’s session also affords an opportunity to discuss the challenges to an effective and rights-based approach to the rehabilitation and reintegration of children. Reintegration is at times hindered by community stigma, especially for girls who face rejection due to sexual violence or pregnancies resulting from their exploitation. Without well-resourced programs that also cater for their needs, families and communities, often dealing with their own conflict-related trauma, may struggle to support returning children. Structural barriers also limit this endeavour. For instance, the widespread poverty and lack of access to education drive child recruitment, as children join armed groups for survival or to support their families. In addition, political instability and ongoing conflicts disrupt rehabilitation efforts and increase the risk of re-recruitment. Funding shortfalls are also another challenge. Humanitarian operations, including child protection programmes, face severe underfunding. In 2024, only 50% of UNICEF’s thematic humanitarian funding went to four emergencies (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Syria, Ukraine), leaving operations in high-need areas like the DRC, Burkina Faso, Mali and Somalia critically underfunded. This trend is expected to continue in 2025, impacting reintegration efforts. Its 2024 Annual Report noted that resources for child protection programmes continue to shrink amidst rising needs. A 20% projected budget reduction for 2026 suggests that 2025 funding for reintegration programmes remains constrained, particularly in conflict-affected regions.
Despite the policy advances made and the regularisation of the issue of child protection on the agenda of the PSC, systematic integration of the issue across the peace and security policy spectrum from early warning to PCRD remains a work in progress. For example, despite its mediation role during the negotiation of the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022, the AU did not include the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of children associated with the armed forces or groups in the mediation process.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Council is expected to encourage Member States to adopt national policy and action plans as well as legislative measures that prevent the participation of children in armed groups. It may also reiterate its call for mainstreaming child protection into the early warning system both to facilitate measures for mitigating the risk of recruitment of children and to integrate child protection measures into mediation and peace-making processes for ensuring that peace initiatives and PCRD interventions ensure rehabilitation and reintegration of children based on the best interest of the child including through prioritising education and access to schools and skill development opportunities. The PSC may call on states to integrate child protection and reintegration into national DDR and peacebuilding strategies, with adequate resourcing for long-term, holistic support to affected children and communities that also counters the stigmatisation of children affected by armed conflicts. The PSC may call on the AU Commission to ensure that reports or briefings on specific conflict situations or peace processes include a dedicated section on child protection and how to advance rehabilitation and reintegration of affected children. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission and the ACERWC to identify and assemble lessons learned and best practices on rehabilitation and reintegration of children as an authoritative reference for guiding national actors, the RECs/RMs and the AU in designing and implementing rehabilitation and reintegration processes. The PSC may also call for giving particular attention to and ensuring dedicated support measures for girls in the design and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programs, having regard to the vulnerability and special needs of girls. The PSC may also emphasise the need for leveraging the cultural resources of the community that affected children belong to and ensuring community engagement in the design and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programs. It may also underscore the need for allocating adequate resources for rehabilitation and reintegration programs.
African Youth Perspectives on the New Agenda for Peace
African Youth Perspectives on the New Agenda for Peace (NA4P)
Date | 16 July 2025
INTRODUCTION
This report is the outcome of the project of the African Union Commission’s (AUC) Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), in partnership with the Embassy of Switzerland in Addis Ababa and Amani Africa Media and Research Services (Amani Africa), initiated to foster structured dialogue with African youth on the nexus between YPS and the New Agenda for Peace. Accordingly, regional dialogues were held between 31 July and 7 August 2024 across Central, East, North, South and West Africa. These dialogues provided a platform for young people to share their perspectives on the future of peace and security in Africa and globally. The regional consultations were followed by a three-day continental consultation to synthesise all the regional perspectives and proffer practical recommendations. This report captures the voice of African youth representatives that seeks to contribute to the broader conversations around the implementation of the New Agenda for Peace, highlighting how youth voices are and should be made central to the global peace and security discourse.
Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Annual Consultative Meeting between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
Date | 16 July 2025
On July 17 & 18, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a two-day session dedicated to the annual joint consultative meeting with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) in Midrand, South Africa.
The consultative meeting is expected to be co-chaired by the President of the PAP and the Chairperson of the PSC. This will be the fourth meeting being held within the framework of Article 18 of the PSC Protocol.
The session will commence with opening remarks to be delivered by Rebecca A. Otengo, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for July, and Chief Fortune Charumbira, the President of the PAP. It is expected that this will be followed by an address by Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.
Although it is not being held on time as previously decided, the consultative meeting is being held in accordance with the outcome of the last consultative meeting of the two bodies held in June 2023, contained in the 1160th Communiqué of the PSC. Most particularly, the two bodies committed to to institutionalise and regularise the annual consultative meeting, between the PSC and PAP, on peace and security in Africa to be hosted alternatively in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and in Midrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and, in this respect, decide[d] that the next annual consultative meeting will be held in June 2024, in Midrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. Since the meeting was not held in 2024 as per the terms of the communiqué of the 1160th session, tomorrow’s meeting is accordingly being held in Midrand, Johannesburg, hosted by the PAP.
The holding of the session is preceded by a preparatory meeting. Apart from the usual preparatory work of the PSC Committee of Experts, recently, on the sidelines of the AU Mid-Year Coordination Meeting (MYCM) in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the two bodies held a high-level preparatory meeting to set the stage for their Joint Consultative Meeting.
Tomorrow’s session is being held in accordance with the legal instruments that set out the mandate of the two bodies. First and most importantly, Article 18 of the PSC Protocol stipulates that the PSC establishes a close working relationship with the PAP, recognising the complementarity of their respective roles in the promotion of peace, security, stability, human rights and democratic governance in Africa. Second, this consultative session also draws on the core objectives of the PAP, which, as stated in the 2001 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the PAP, cover the promotion of peace, security, stability, human rights and democratic governance. Additionally, the PAP is invested with the role of receiving reports from the PSC. Article 18 (2) and (3) of the PSC Protocol require the PSC to submit reports to the PAP through the AU Commission Chairperson whenever requested.
The consultative meeting is expected to have two dimensions. The first dimension is expected to involve exchange between the two bodies on the state of peace and security, as well as democratic governance in Africa. This exchange is expected to draw on the address by Adeoye. Within this framework, it will not be surprising for the deliberation to focus, among others, on the various conflict situations and the peace and security issues on the agenda of the PSC. These may include conflict hotspots, including the Sahel, the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan), Eastern DRC and thematic issues such as countries in transition, unconstitutional changes of government, terrorism and the AU’s engagement in advancing the reform of the multilateral system. As the first vice-president of PAP indicated during the preparatory meeting, the meeting is also expected to engage on the need to include women and youth in continental fora focusing on peace, security and governance.’ In this context, the issue of children affected by armed conflict (CAAC) is expected to receive particular attention, drawing on the focus given to it in the program of work of the PSC for the month and the role of the PSC Chairperson as Co-Chairperson of the Africa Platform on CAAC.
The second dimension of the meeting is expected to address working methods and modalities in operaitonalising Article 18 of the PSC Protocol. The development of the working methods in the relationship between the two concerns the follow-up to commitments made in previous meetings. It is worth recalling in this context that the PSC in the communiquéof its 1160th meeting on the previous consultative meeting underscored ‘the need for the two organs to continue to explore piratical means and way of further enhancing their collaboration and cooperation in the promotion of peace and security as well as African common positions on peace and security matters, particularly, in the international fora.’ It is expected that the PAP would put forward specific proposals on modalities for a close working relationship, as it did during the consultative meeting preceding the last one held during the 344th session of the PSC. Underscoring ‘the importance of building durable working methods,’ at the time of the preparatory meeting held in Malabo, the President of PAP proposed the following modalities: ‘formation of specialised parliamentary committees to support peace and security hotspots; enhanced use of parliamentary diplomacy in conflict resolution and management; institutional and operational synergies backed by time-bound action plans; and consideration of technical and financial capacity-building for PAP’s engagement in peace efforts.’
Tomorrow’s meeting will be held under the theme, ‘Enhancing Institutional Synergy and Collaboration for Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa.’ As such, in addition to the foregoing modalities, it is expected that the exchange will also focus on establishing mechanisms to enhance the PAP’s advocacy role in implementing AU peace and security initiatives.
In the communiqué of its 1160th session on the last consultative meeting, the PSC also requested ‘the PAP to regularly engage with it on its initiatives on the promotion of peace and security and democracy and good governance.’ There is no data to indicate that the PAP took on this invitation and engaged the PSC. Indeed, the report of PAP to the AU policy organs on its activities for 2024, other than the use of vague language of PAP engaging in fostering ‘collaboration on governance and security with AU and peace institutions,’ does not contain that the PAP engaged the PSC. The only notable engagement on peace and security contained in the PAP report is a reference to a resolution on peace and security in Africa and a recommendation on peace and security in Africa.
It clearly emerges from the foregoing that, notwithstanding, the solid legal foundation and the potential for a close working relationship, both the legal provisions and the potential remain unrealised. This is in no small part due to the governance and institutional challenges that have afflicted the PAP over the years. Apart from tarnishing the image and public standing of the continental body, PAP’s governance problems and the resulting institutional instability, including the controversy over the appointment of the clerk of PAP and the procedure followed in suspending the appointment, have had a direct bearing on the conduct of the activities of the institution. There is also the issue of the lack of ratification of the 2014 Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the AU Relating to the Pan-African Parliament (the 2014 PAP Protocol), which designates the PAP as the legislative body of the AU. The status of signature and ratification did not change from the analysis we produced on the last consultative meeting in June 2023, which put States that signed at 22 and those who deposited the instrument of ratification at 14. While the PSC in the communiqué of its 1160th session on the last consultative meeting held encouraged member states to ratify the protocol in order to enable it to enter into force, the recurring governance issues at PAP do not give confidence to member states on the wisdom of speeding up the entry into force of the protocol.
As such and in the face of the serious peace and security challenges on the continent that require the best performance of all AU institutions, it would be of interest to PSC members to ensure that the consultative meeting does not end up being an exercise in ticking boxes and that PAP organises and conducts itself for delivering on its role in advancing peace, security and stability and democratic governance in Africa. This necessitates not only the articulation of practical modalities for harnessing the mandate of the PAP but also the provision of mutual accountability in delivering on their common mandate.
Similarly, the proper functioning of the PAP would also facilitate the presentation on an annual basis by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the state of peace and security within the framework of Article 18 (2) & (3) of the PSC Protocol. Since this is a mutual responsibility, the PSC in its 1160th communiqué encouraged the AU Commission to enhance its engagement and continue to work closely with the PAP towards the implementation of these provisions.
The expected outcome is a joint conclusion identifying key areas for collaboration, to be adopted by the PSC as a Communiqué at a later session. It is expected that the PSC and PAP would resort to a unanimous roadmap for structured engagement between the two. In this regard, the two bodies would chart down thematic areas of engagement, including, but not limited to, youth in peacebuilding, climate security, women in peace processes, among others, in order to foster collaboration. It is also expected that the PSC would commend the AU Commission for the renewed efforts to enhance its engagements with PAP and stress the need for the AU Commission to continue to work closely with the Parliament. The outcome is also expected to reiterate the decision of the previous consultative session on institutionalising and regularising the annual consultative meeting and commits to holding the next meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It is also expected to highlight and welcome the need for ensuring proper functioning of the PAP as a necessary condition for ensuring that the PAP effectively executes its mandate towards contributing to peace and security and democratic governance in Africa, working in collaboration with the PSC. Given the capacity issues clearly stated by the PAP President, the joint conclusions may also highlight the imperative of strengthened capacity of PAP both in terms of the role of its Committees on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution and the use of parliamentary diplomacy by the PAP to advance conflict prevention, management and resolution.
